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Allies

From The Delian League To The Athenian Empire Thomas Garton Ash
Introduction When Athens began to emerge as a Greek city state in around the ninth century, it was a poor city, built on and surrounded by undesirable land, which could support only a few poor crops and olive trees. As it grew it was forced to import much of it's food, and while it was near the centre of the Greek world, it was far from being a vital trading juncture like, for example, Corinth. It's army was, by the standards of cities such as Sparta, pathetic. Yet somehow it became the most prominent of the Greek city states, the one remembered where it's contemporaries such as Sparta are forgotten. It was the world's first democracy (and, in some ways, the only true democracy the world has ever seen), producing art and fine architecture in unprecedented amounts. It became a centre of thinking and literature, producing philosophers and playwrights like Socrates and Aristophanes. But importantly of all, it was the city that controlled an empire spanning the Aegean sea. During the course of this project I will attempt to explain how small Athens managed to acquire this formidable empire, and why she became Greece's most prominent city state, rather than cities which seemed to have more going for them like Sparta or Corinth.

An Athenian coin showing a trireme, the type of ship Athens used to build a formidable empire The Persian Invasions and Birth of the Delian League While we tend to think of Greece as by far the most important nation of the ancient world, it was in fact a haphazard collection of autonomous city states, which, even with all their combined might, were no match for mighty empires like that of Persia. So, when King Darius I invaded, the Greeks must have been more than a little alarmed. Infuriated by the Athenian-backed revolt in Ionia, Darius demanded tokens of submission from the Greek states. While most of the smaller cities gave in, Athens and Sparta refused to do so, killing Darius' heralds as a gesture of defiance. Athens' actions showed a great deal of pluckiness, given it's relative military weakness, and enraged Darius. He put together a mighty expeditionary force and set sail in 490 B.C. The Spartan army proceeded to the plain of Marathon near Athens. The Spartans could not help as news of the Athenians' plight reached them on a religious holiday. However, the Athenians managed to win a convincing victory, faced with an army three times there size. When Darius' son, Xerxes, amassed one of the greatest armies of antiquity to exact revenge for his father's humiliation, fewer than 400 Greek vessels defeated the 1,200 strong Persian fleet thanks to the clever command of the Athenian statesman Themistocles. This caused Xerxes to flee to Asia, followed in 479 B.C. by his army.

By this time Athens had won the friendship of many Greek states, both because of their defeat of the Persians and because of the unpopularity of the Spartan regent, Pausanias, who, according to Thucydides [1], had "begun to reveal the true arrogance of his nature... (and) appeared to be trying to set himself up as dictator." Thucydides tells us that because of these reasons, the city states "had gone over to the side of the Athenians", which proceeded to take over leadership of the Delian League, a confederacy of cities determined to protect themselves from Persian attack and "compensate themselves for their losses by ravaging the territory of the king of Persia." Sparta was happy to cede leadership of the league as (according to Thucydides) "they were afraid any other commanders they sent abroad would be corrupted, as Pausanias had been, and they were glad to be relieved of the burden of fighting the Persians.... Besides, at the time they still thought of the Athenians as friendly allies." Also, Sparta wished to keep it's army at home to deal with helot revolts and prevent soldiers from becoming corrupted as Pausanias did. Initially the Delian League was a fairly loose coalition of states, each one independent and sharing a common interest with the others. Members of the league were numerous: Thucydides [2] tells us that they included "Chios, Lesbos, Plataea ... most of Acarnania ... Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace and the islands between the Peloponnese and Crete towards the East, and all the Cyclades except for Melos and There" as well as Aegina and most of the Euboean cities. Together, these states constituted a formidable force capable of achieving it's objectives.

A map showing the Athenian empire and the extent of discontent (Courtesy 'The Ancient Source', an excellent source of - er - ancient stuff) While Athens was the leader of the league, all the member states had an equal vote in the ruling council. Initially the league's action were only for the wellbeing of it's members. Under the command of the Athenian Cimon the Persian fortress of Eion on the Thracian coast was captured in 476 B.C. After this, Persian power in the North

began to diminish. In 473 B.C Cimon crushed a group of Dolopian pirates who had been terrorising the central Aegean from the island of Scyros. An allied colony was established in their place. In 468 B.C. the Persian fleet was annihilated on the river Eurymedon in southern Turkey, again by Cimon, while at some point in the 460s, Cimon liberated the Southern Aegean and Caria from Persian control. Meanwhile, Sparta was in trouble. Two of the states in the Peloponnesian League, a far looser collection of states then the Delian league led by her, became democratic, while Argos revolted against her leadership. After a devastating earthquake and helot revolt, the stricken Spartans appealed to Athens or help. This was only given with reluctance after Cimon begged the Athenians "not to allow Greece to go lame, or their own city to be deprived of its yoke-fellow." However, Sparta grew alarmed by growing Athenian imperialism and asked that the Athenian presence in their city be withdrawn. From a league to an empire While freeing the southern Aegean from Persian control, Cimon succeeded in convincing more states to join the league. According to Diodorus [3], having persuaded "the cities of the sea coast [and] the cities of Lycia" to revolt, he "took them over in the same way." This, along with further evidence, suggests that these cities were forced to join whether or not they wanted to. Plutarch tells us "Phaselis ... refused to admit {Cimon's] fleet or to fight against the King, and so he devastated their land." In 480 B.C. the Athenians attempted to force impoverished Andros to pay a sum to the league: "the Greeks ... surrounded Andros with a view to capturing it. Andros was the first island to reject Themistokles' requests for money." (Herodotus VIII.111) Further evidence of expansionistic Athenian policy can be seen in the case of Carystus, the one city in Euboea which declined membership of the Delian League. After refusing to join a second time in 472 B.C., they were paid a visit by the league's fleet and promptly conquered. In both these cases the Athenian's actions were at least partially justifiable. The Athenians had secured Greek control of the Aegean and Carian. At the time of the Carystian incident the Persians still controlled these regions, and thus Carystus could become a stepping stone to mainland Greece and encourage other Euboean cities to leave the league. A less justifiable incident was the way the Athenians dealt with Naxos' attempted secession from the league. The Naxians had seen the Persian threat in the North decline as a result of the league's actions, and saw no reason to continue contributing money to the league. The Athenians and the other allies, however, did not see it that way. The Naxians resources were needed in the South and the Naxians had, after all, sworn to remain in the league forever, as symbolised by the sinking of lumps of metal in the sea: a permanent, irreversible action. Athens also had reasons of it's own, which I loom at in my conclusion. Naxos was subjugated and the allies decided to take Naxos' fleet and change it's naval contributions to tribute. A garrison was left behind: Naxos effectively became an imperial subject. Erythrai, which rebelled in the 450's B.C. was the subject of a harsh and authoratitive decree.

By now the Persian threat had more or less dissolved and so the league had achieved it's purpose. However the Athenians chose to enforce the league's oath and force all members to remain in it. One member to revolt was Thasos, a rich and navally powerful island which controlled parts of nearby Thrace. The Athenians clearly had their eyes set on natural resources in Thrace, and when they started to dispute the Thasian possession of a gold mine, the Thasians grew worried, and threatened to withdraw from the league. Because of this the league overcame the Thasian fleet in 465 B.C. capturing 33 ships and laid seige to Thasos. The Spartans were sufficiently concerned with Athenian expansionism (and while the Delian League acted as one unit, it was clear that the Athenians were behind the action) to sign a secret pact with the Thasians under which they would invade Attica. As it happened Sparta could not do this due to internal strife, but the pact shows how transparent the Athenian imperialism was. At the same time as besieging Thasos the Athenians established an allied colony in Thrace, where they were clearly anxious to establish a foothold. In 462 B.C. Thasos had to capitulate, and lost her fleet, gold mint and city walls. Like Naxos, it was forced to pay tribute rather than making contributions to the navy. The disputed gold mine and some other valuable settlements in Thrace were annexed by the Athenians (it is notable that the Athenians took these over without even a pretence to them being under control of all the league.) Athens embarked on an aggressive new foreign policy, aimed against Sparta, Athens' major rival in Greece. Athens allied with Argos, Sparta's traditional antagonist in the Peloponnese, and proceeded to attack Corinth, Sparta's most important ally. Vast operations were launched on both land and sea, and the result was that by 457 B.C. Athens had control of the whole of central Greece (although this control had collapsed by the time of the Thirty Year Truce's signing in 445 B.C.) Athens' eagerness to build an empire, and the amazing, often rash, vigour which was caused by it's democracy, are shown in the sending of a vast fleet of 200 triremes to aid an Egyptian revolt from the Persian empire. Athenian cleruchies (colonies) were set up at strategic points throughout Greece, the Mediterranean and even in the Black sea where they maintained a good relationship with Cimmerians as Athens grew more and more dependent on the import of grain from this tribe. Amphipolis was built at a strategic junction on the northern Aegean coast road; Thourioi was founded as an Athenian stronghold in Magna Graecia; and a fleet was sent to the Back Sea simply as a demonstration of Athenian power and to keep the vital trade routes open. An Athenian empire was now well and truly established. The Resultant Empire

The Athenian Empire at its height (450 B.C.) Athens had by now obtained a mighty empire: the first example of imperialism in history. Of the more than 200 members (membership of the league had increased because Athens' friendship was an important asset for many Greek cities.) A few allies remained largely autonomous. According to Aristotle: "After the Athenians had gained their empire, they treated their allies rather dictatorially, except for Chios, Lesbos and Samos. These they regarded as guardians of the empire, allowing them to keep their own constitution and rule over any subjects they happened to have." (Consitution of Athens XXIV) However, the majority had ceased to contribute ships and instead gave Athens tribute. The change can be seen in the transmutation of the word phoros' meaning. Originally it meant 'contribution', but as the Delian League changed into the Athenian Empire, it came to mean 'tribute.' In around 448 B.C. Athens issued a controversial decree ordering the use of their coins werights ans measures among their allies: "If anyone in the cities strikes silver coins and does not use the currency, weights and measures of the Athenians, but foreign currency, weights and measures ... exact penal retribution" (Klearkhos Decree) As well as using this money to build ships, Athens embarked on an ambitious building program under Perikles. The Acropolis was rebuilt, with magnificent buildings such as the Parthenon (shown below) and Erechtheum contributing to the beautification of the city. Some warned that by doing this, the Athenians gave up any

pretence of working for the good of the League. The allies were indeed furious at the way their money was spent, but Perikles replied that so long as Athens protected her allies from the Persians it was not their concern how their money was spent.

The Parthenon (Courtesy Department of Archaeology, Boston University) After the incidents at Carystus, Naxos and Thasos, a new type of member emerged: a subject state. These states would at the very least be dominated by an Athenian garrison, and served as Athenian puppets in the league's assembly. When these votes were counted with those of the small states which were intimidated by Athens, the assembly became useless: whatever Athens wanted would always be done. It fell into disuse an was abolished between 440 and 432. After this, Athens ruled over the league by decree. Earlier, in 454 B.C., the treasury of the league had been moved from the small, neutral island of Delos to Athens. So great was Athenian control of the League that allied troops were used in conflicts where only Athens' interests were involved. Athens maintained it's leadership by a number of means. It possessed a magnificent navy, as the League's ships became part of the Athenian navy. This consisted of 300 triremes, and was by far the largest in the Greek world. At least 60 triremes were kept in the Aegean at any one time. The trireme was the predominant warship of the time, a narrow vessel built for speed. Each one required 180 oarsmen in three tiers, and fought by ramming enemy ships or boarding them with marines. As Pericles said to the Athenians: "The whole world is divided into two parts, the sea and the land... Of the whole of one part you are in control" (Thucydides II.62) Thucydides also tells us of the extent of the Atenians' power over their discontented but impotent allies: "The subject states of Athens were especially eager to revolt, even though it was beyond their capability." (Thucydides VIII.2) "They learned nothing from the fate of those of their neighbours who had already revolted and been subdued." (Thucydides III.39) "The Athenian fleet grew strong with the money which the allies had themselves contributed, whilst whenever they revolted they were ill-prepared and inexperienced." (Thucydides I.99)

Athens maintained a tight grip on all their allies, never letting a hint of dissent go unpunished. For example, the Chalkians had no swear not to "follow anyone who revolts, and if any person causes a revolt, [to] denounce him to the Athenians." Often, constitutions that were models of Athens' were imposed on allies, and serious cases were placed under the jurisdiction of Athens. Law courts often prosecuted antiAthenian elements. Control became so absolute that eventually no ally could sentence someone to death without first obtaining Athenian permission. We are told that: "...the Athenians sail out and bring false charges against the respectable elements among [their allies] and hate them, because they realize that the ruler is alkways hated by the subject" (Old Oligarch I.14) It is worth noting that many Athenians viewed this as an altruistic arrangement, and could not understand the anger at lost independence it caused. As Athenian delegates to Sparta complained: "In law suits with our allies arising out of contracts, we have put ourselves at a disadvantage, and when we arrange to have such cases tried by imperial courts at Athens, people accuse us of being over-fond of going to law." (Thucydides I.77) Colonies established on confiscate land were useful in the control of troublesome allies: "Pericles sent out one thousand settlers to the Khersonese, five hundred to Naxos, 250 to Andros, one thousand to Thrace to make their homes with the Bisaltai ... and, by setting up garrisons among the allies, to implant a fear of rebellion." (Plutarch, Pericles XI) Athens opportunistically exploited religion and idealism. Land was claimed because it had belonging to Athena, the patron of Athens, or, in the case of Scyros, because Theseus' bones were claimed to have been found there. Athens encouraged the belief that she was the mother of all Ionian cities, and propagated the myth that the Athenian Demeter had granted corn to mankind. While Athens usually supported democrats against oligarchs, she would occasionally support oligarchs when the situation demanded it. In short, she was willing to do practically anything to maintain here empire, and went to extreme lengths. The Delian League had been intended to keep Greece from becoming part of the Persian empire. Instead, it was the means by which Athens established an empire in Greece. Conclusion When she assumed leadership of the Delian League, Athens' intentions were for the most part honourable. In the first few years of her hegemony she accomplished extraordinary feats, forcing the Persians from Greece. However, she also experienced a huge influx of money from the league's members to pay for it's naval forces. The Athenians grew used to a higher standard of living, due to the money and food now flowing into the city. The prestige and power of their city was advantageous to them all. Athens was reliant on imported corn to support her growing population: the money now flowing into her coffers enabled her to do just that. Income from tributes and pillaging from the empire came to more than a thousand talents a year, while

confiscated land and colonies provided livelihoods for many Athenians. The money from the empire was used support the navy, construct magnificent public buildings, and support the city's poor. Jobs were created by the empire as well: almost everyone served in the navy at one point or another. Everyone in the city benefited, so it is not surprising that democratic Athens elected to keep the money flowing in when the league succeeded in eliminating the Persian threat. While justifying their actions to the Peloponnesians, Athenian representatives said: "We have done nothing surprising, nothing contrary to human nature, if we accepted leadership when it was offered and are now unwilling to give it up." (Thucydides I.76) "So far as the favour of the gods is concerned, we think we have as much right to that as you ... it is a general and necessary law of natur to govern eherever one can ... we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in precisely the same way." (Thucydides V.105) It is also worth noting that while the tributes became more oppressive after the Peace of Callias, they were never seen as being far too high. In fact the only dramatic rise in their level took place in 425 B.C., and this was both because of the political tension that year and to correct for recent inflation. Athens' preference for monetary rather than naval contributions was also at least partially justified by the fact that it was beyond the capabilities of many of the states in the Delian League to build triremes and train crews in the complicated art of manoeuvring a triple-banked rowing boat in battle. Athens had plenty of men eager to earn money as oarsmen, and also the impressive shipyards and skilled craftsmen required to build triremes. Indeed, many in the league were happy to let Athens take care of building ships. However, by doing this they were signing away their independence. The fleet which was meant to be the league's became Athens', and with it she could overcome any ally who complained about the tribute they had to pay. It could be argued that her rashness, her self-confidence and the "busy-bodyness" of which the Spartans complained were partly due to her democratic status. While oligarchs might not have taken such risks, ironically the assembly thought only of their own interests and were were willing to take great risks. They knew their empire for what it was, but were naturally loath to give up the prosperity, wealth, prestige and security that came with it. As Perikles said to them: "Your empire is now a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it; it is certainly dangerous to let it go." (Thucydides II.63) Bibliography Athens Ascendant, George Dent Wilcoxon (Iowa State Press/1979) Encarta, Microsoft History of the Peloponessian War, Thucydides (Primary source) A History of Greece, Bury & Meiggs (MacMillan, 1975) The Athenian Empire, Meiggs (OUP, 1972)

The Athenians And Their Empire, McGregor (University of British Columbia Press, 1987) These Were the Greeks, Amos & Lang (Stanley Thornes, 1979) Several websites Endnotes 1. Thucydides I.95 2. Thucydides II.9

3. Diodorus XI.60Periclean Athens


War Against Persia As we have seen, after the defeat of the Persian invasion, the Delian League was formed to continue the war, and this league gradually changed from an alliance headed by Athens into an Athenian empire. Internal Athenian politics eventually brought about a change in the foreign policy of the league/empire. There were two opposing views. 1. War with Persia The policy of pursuing vigorously the war against the Persians was championed by Cimon. He belonged to one of the old families of the Plain, that is, he was a Eupatrid. This meant that he was from one of the aristocratic families. Accordingly, he was inclined to be well disposed toward conservative Sparta (the natural champion of oligarchy and opponent of democracy) and to oppose radical democracy. His policy therefore was peace at home with Sparta, war abroad with Persia. 2. War with the Oligarchies Others did not agree. They wished to increase the powers of the democracy. Given Sparta's political preferences, it was natural for the democrats to be hostile to Sparta. The Spartans had also established a form of hegemony over the other states of the Peloponnesus. In general, because of Spartans military superiority, the other poleis (polises) went along with the wishes of Sparta, and by 550 they had joined a loose organization called the Peloponnesian League, which largely followed the Spartan lead. If Athens pursued a course of increasing the democratic character of its government, it was natural for it to oppose the Spartans and their league. Furthermore, while most of the Athenian allies were Ionians, most of the members of the Peloponnesian league were Dorian. Thus, the Greek world was beginning to polarize into two camps. While the democrats did not immediately give up the war with Persia, eventually they chose to make peace with the Persians and pursue war with the Greek oligarchies in general and their Spartan patrons in particular. The Democratic Leaders While Cimon favored the old alliance with the Spartans, his democratic opponents felt the opposite. They were Ephialtes and Pericles. Ephialtes was a self-made man. Pericles' mother was the niece of Cleisthenes, the founder of the democracy. These were the leaders who would demand a change in policy and an enlargement of the powers of the democracy.

The major hardening of the Athenian position came in the 460s. In 465 Thasos revolted against the Athenians. Cimon went to subdue it. This took two years. On his return he was indicted for dereliction of duty by Pericles. This failed, but the mere fact that such a charge could be made showed that he was vulnerable. Revolt of the Helots and Triumph Of The Democrats The Thasians had asked for Spartan aid. They would have helped, but in 464 major revolt of the helots in Messenia broke out. The Spartans besieged the rebels on Mt. Ithome and asked for help, even from the Athenians. In 462 Cimon took Athenian troops there, but the Spartans insulted the Athenians, sent them packing (apparently they were worried about any democratic influence the Athenians might have on either the helots or the Spartan allies). This insult seriously undermined Cimon's position in Athens. (This weaking of their own ally illustrates the Spartan tendency to be shortsighted.) In 461 Cimon was ostracized (exiled) as pro-Spartan, and the democrats took control of the city. Their first act was to strip the Areopagus of its powers apart from murder trials. Since the council was made up of ex-archons (members of first two census classes) it was oligarchically inclined. Ephialtes was the instigator of this move, and he was murdered in that year under mysterious circumstances. Now Pericles was the undisputed democratic leader, and he was "strategos" (general) constantly until 429. (The ten generals continued to be elected even after the position of archon was chosen by lot, and the generals came to be the most important magistrates.) Under his guidance the democracy would reach the height of its powers. Pericles then instituted further reforms, which established the radical democracy. Radical Democracy Under Pericles a further series of reforms was enacted to increase the democratic element of Athens' goverment. In its final, radical form, the democracy had a number of traits that distinguished it from oligarchy. 1. Removal of most power from the Areopagus 2. Introduction of pay for office holding. Pay was also provided for members of the council of 500 and for jury duty. In antiquity, there was normally no pay for office holding, which naturally prevented those who had to work full-time from serving and thus in practice restricted eligibility to the wealthy. Now anyone could sit on the jury panels in Athens. 3. Introduction of absolute use of lot (no preliminary elections) for all archons and for council of 500. The importance of the older magistracies quickly declined. 4. Restriction of citizenship to lawful progeny of marriage of two citizens. Since citizenship now had economic benefits (pay for sitting on juries), the expansion of citizenship had to be restricted. 5. Hearing of all cases but murder before the large juries. The arguments used in the courts were political, not legal. There was no judge to decide on legality validity of the arguments made. The two sides spoke directly to the jurors, who made up their own minds. Athenian jury panels were often huge (as many as 500). The jurors acted as the representatives of the People, and their

decisions were final. Injustice often prevailed, since the juries were inclined to convict those they disliked, and to acquit those who were popular. Old men with nothing better to do tended to sit on the jury panels, looking upon the pay as a sort of pensions, and thus were rather inclined to protect the democracy that provided these payments and to view unfavorably anyone they considered a threat to this system. The People (demos) were thus supreme. Their decisions taken in the assembly were binding as law, and as represented by the jurors they decided all legal matters. The day-to-day administration was seen to by the council of 500, which was directly responsible to the assembly. The generals were empowered to oversee military operations, but the assembly could and often did directly interfere with the plans and campaigns of the generals. Though there was still the opportunity for an individual to gain prominence through his influence with the People, fundamentally the Athenian state was a collective body that expressed its will through the assembly. Two aspects of timocratic government remained ("timocracy" means "rule by distinction"). 1. Liturgies Ancient states had rudimentary administrative institutions, and usually farmed out complicated operations. The Athenian democracy continued the use of liturgies to see to the execution of complicated operations. A liturgy was an activity for which a rich man assumed responsibility. In particular, a man would pay for a chorus in one of the annual dramatic festivals or for the upkeep of a warship for a year. In legal cases, defendants would cite their liturgies as grounds for acquittal or leniency. 2. Election of generals The troops were raised from the ten tribes, and originally each tribe elected its own general. Under the radical the democracy such elections continued, though the whole citizen body now elected all ten. While it was felt that the regular magistracies could be elected by lot, talent (as determined by election) was still necessary for the crucial position of general. The People did, however, intervene in the regular operations of the generals. Pericles was repeatedly elected general (30 times in total), and in that office dominated the democracy until his death in 429. Nature Of Democratic Government The word "democracy" means "rule by the People." For the Greeks this was quite literal. There were no representative institions like the legislatures of modern democratic governments (which are accordingly distinguished from direct, participatory democracy with the designation "republic"). In Athens the People in their assembly had full and direct control over all policies of the state, and through the jury panels had direct control of the justice system. All magistrates were directly accountable to the People, and had judgment passed on their activities when they left office. Unsuccessful generals could (and at times were) tried for incompetence. The democratic system was directly correlated with the Athenian reliance on naval power. While hoplite service was restricted to those who could afford the equipment, all citizens, even the poorest, could row in the oar-powered warships. Thus, it was

natural that because of its reliance on naval power Athens should have a democratic tendency. In most ancient states, there was no pay for public office, which necessarily restricted it to the wealthy. The provision of pay for sitting on the council and on the juries allowed all members of the community to participate in government. This was offensive to most wealthy Greeks, who thought the poor were "riff raff." The domination of the Athenian state by the poorer members of the community, who naturally outnumbered the wealthy, explains why the Eupatrid families were hostile to democracy (they would naturally control an oligarchic system), and it should not be thought that democracy was uniformily popular even in Athens. Nonetheless in the late fifth century the democracy was able to maintain itself against domestic opponents. Long Walls At the start of the radical democracy, the Piraeus (Athens' port) was joined to Athens by a massive series of walls called the Long Walls (461-56 B.C.). These walls were several miles long, and ensured Athens' access to the sea. In effect, inland Athens was made a port. Since the fairly rudimentary Greek city states found siege warfare difficult, and the Spartans in particular were not much good at it, the walls were virtually impregnable. In times of war, the Athenians could abandon the countryside and continue to feed themselves, so long as they maintained control of the sea. Aggression of the Radical Democracy From 459 on, the new democracy waged a very broad series of campaigns to seize territory at home and abroad. At first things seemed to be going great: the Athenians made an alliance with Megara (which guards the invasion route from the Peloponnesus to Attica), conquered Boeotia to their north and seized Aegina, the large island off Attica. But the Athenians soon overextended themselves. In 459 they had come to aid of an Egyptian revolt against the Persians. After initial successes, they ran into trouble and in 454, the whole expedition was defeated (this provided the excuse for moving the Delian League treasury from Delos to Athens). At this point, military operations petered out. In 451, Cimon was recalled. He still represented the older policy of co-operation with Sparta, and worked out a five-year truce with Sparta. The democrats arranged to have him sent off on campaign against Persian-controlled Cyprus to get him out of the way. He died in 450/49, and the way was ready for a truce with the Persians (449). The Athenians kept their possessions, called off the attack on Cyprus. Now after 30 years of war the democracy had permanently ended its entanglement with the Persians, and could move against the oligarchic Greek states. Though there was a truce with Sparta, the war continued in Boeotia and elsewhere, and went badly for the Athenians. Subject cities became restless. In 446, as the truce with Sparta was expiring, the two parties made a new truce for 30 years. The Athenians lost all their mainland territories outside of Attica, including Megara. The treaty did recognize Athens' control of her allies. Pericles then decided to use some of the contributions made by the allies to the league fund for the purpose of rebuilding Athenian temples destroyed by the Persians. This measure was opposed by some at Athens, but the People agreed. This use of the common funds for a purely

Athenian purpose was a sure sign that the Delian League was now an Athenian empire. The Athenians also began to introduce Athenian settlers into the territory of subordinate polises. This would naturally help ensure Athenian control of the allies but such an act was very offensive to Greek sensibilities. Art Of Classical Athens Pericles used the funds from the empire to launch a building project on the Acropolis to make good the damage done by the Persians. Greek sculpture and architecture began back in the eighth century, and Periclean Athens sees the culmination of the naturalistic devlopments in sculpture and the perfection of architectural style, espcially in the perfect proportions of the Parthenon, the temple of Athena the virgin (parthenos) goddess. The sculpture tends to be naturalistic in that it portrays humans as they actually look, but concentrates on "perfect," idealized forms rather than on the personal characteristic of specific individuals: it portrays the perfection of the human form rather than the form of a given person. Such art tends to avoid the expression of emotion. The aesthetics of Periclean Athens had a huge impact on Roman art and on the art of the Renaissance. Important Points

Athenian democracy means the direct participation of all citizens in the government Cimon supported timocratic government, peace and co-operation with Sparta, and war with Persia The democracy favored war with the oligarchies and peace with Persia. In 459-54 the Athenians fought a large number of wars, overextending themselves. In 449 they made peace with Persia Ephialtes and Pericles in 461 had Cimon ostracized and soon established the "radical" democracy Pericles dominated Athens till his death in 429 Under Pericles the Athenians used a portion of the contributions to the league/empire for a building project in Athens The art of Periclean Athens portrays the ideal of the perfect human form, and at this time the perfection of the proportions of temple building is realized in the Parthenon.

Delos

The Delean League

The years following the Persian wars were dominated by the growth of
Athenian power. The foundation had been laid by Themistocles who early on perceived the importance of a strong navy. The withdrawal of the Spartans from the continuing war against the Persians further played

into the hands of the Athenians who now assumed the role of protagonist of Hellenic freedom.

The Delean League

To establish closer ties with the Ionians and the islands the Athenians
established the League on the island of Delos, the ancient centre of Ioanian worship, in 478-77 B.C. and it was henceforth called the Confederacy of Delos. The object of the Delian League was to protect the outlying rescued areas from renewed Persian attacks. But although it was formed as a maritime organization with an anti-Persian orientation, the alliance very soon became an instrument for realizing Athenian ambitions in Hellas proper. Still, dealing with the intiatial purposes for the formation of the League they also wished as Zimmern tells us:

to push the war into the enemy's country, to revenge and indemnify themselves by plundering for the losses they had sustained and to complete the liberation of their enslaved brothers. They were ready and eager to be led to the attack. (Zimmern, 1947, p. 186).

The alliance then represented a duality in character, since it was


established not only for freedom but also for defence. Furthermore, apart from the primary objectives other factors, probably of a more practical nature, contributed to the creation of the Delian League. According to Plutarch, it was under pressure particularly from Chians, Samians and Lesbians that Aristides on behalf of the Athenians took over the leadership of the allies (Meiggs, 1979, p. 42).

Fear could be a possible excuse for the pressure of the allies to


institutionalize the Delian League. Fear and the threat of a probable reconquest by the Barbarians who still, not only had not lost their military power but also had not abandoned totally their imperialistic plans towards the West. The Greek, free, adventurous spirit was afraid of becoming subjugated to Persian rule. Their love of freedom made them realize from the very beginning that without a common League they would very soon become a part of a Persian Satrapy. But fear, according to Meiggs, could have motivated the Athenians to accept the responsibilities not only of establishing the League but also of becoming the leader of the alliance. The Athenians had very soon understood *that they would be the ultimate target of the Persians in the event of a new attack. One could say that since Themistocles had made Athens a seapower the Persians would be challenged by the superiority of the

Athenians at sea. The Athenians, however, in order to protect their city fortified Athens in 478 B.C., and in order to protect their sea power estabished the Delian League.

For some historians it was also pride and generosity after the glorious
victories over the Persians that led the Athenians to institutionalize the unification of the Ionian world. (Meiggs 1979:43, Fleiss 1966: 5)]. Meiggs in "The Athenian Empire" adds another factor that played a decisive role in the establishment of the League. This is the role of the Individuals. It is very probable, as Plutarch tells us, that these people didn't work for their own personal success. There is no clear indication that they were motivated by their own interest; instead, they acted according to the needs of Athens. The glory of their state was placed above all else. Aristides was probably one of those Athenians who was motivated by patriotism. Aristides was the personality of the time, the man who had organized the Delian League. However, Aristides' real motives became debatable concerning as did the pretexts that he used for the establishment of the alliance. For some, he was a shrewd man who had perceived the idea of uniting the Athenians and the Ionians in order to benefit the Athenians economically, and politically. For others, such as his contemporary Athenian Callaeschrus, he was nothing but a cunning person. A fox by name and fox by nature. C Meiggs 1979:40).

One could say that these characterizations are probably cynical since
Aristides is well known in Greek historical tradition as (a) (Meiggs 1979:44) a man of justice who was generous to friends and enemies. Furthermore, Aristides was an Athenian who loved his state and as a consequence he would do the best for Athens. Taking also into account, that the rise of Athens had been perhaps delayed not only because of internal political strife but also because of the lack of resources, Aristides clearly expressed the Athenian motives. I would dare say then that Athenenian policies were not motivated by altruism or dreams of heroic grandeur alone, but also by considerations of a pragmatic nature. At this point, I would like to refer to an additional reason that could probably justify the foreign policy of Athens concerning the confederacy of Delos. It was perhaps ARCHE the Greek political domination over the others that motivated the Athenians. Could it be true that the Athenians needed an overglorified position of ruling, an over all in order to justify their own freedom? It is possible, then, that the Delian League was the means to express their political domination and their role of protector.

Concluding the reasons that led to the establishment of the League, it would be valuable to stress the attitude of Sparta towards the fears of the majority of the Greek world and their need for such an alliance. 1. : Harmony, Power Politics, Athenian domination

According to Barry, it was Sparta's inability and unwillingness,


exhibited in her failure to follow up the battle of Mycale (479 B.C.) that forced upon Athens the leadership of a large segment of the Greek world (Burry 1963:328).

Perhaps it was the naval supremacy of Athens that deterred the Spartans
from joining the alliance or the fact that Sparta's political system and military orientation did not allow for a flexible foreign policy. As a consequence, Sparta remained outside the Delian alliance, but Athenian supremacy over the League of the Ionians did challenge Sparta to take up the search for her own spheres of influence.

By the spring of 478 or 477 the Confederacy of Delos was ready.


Aristides the assessor first drew up a list of members who numbered about 140 and were entitled to be ranked as a charter-members.

The Delian League included the Ionian and Aelian cities of Asia; the islands adjacent to coast from Lesbos to Rhodes; 35 cities from the Hellespont; 35 from Thrace, most of the Cyclades; Euboea except the city of Carystus; and 24 from the region of Caria. (Mc gregor 1987:101).

The allies had to confirm their loyalty to the League by a common oath.
The members swore to have the same friends and enemies: I will not desert the plethos, (common

people) of Athens nor the allies of the Athenians (Meiggs 1979:45).

The permanence of the alliance was symbolized by the dropping of iron


weights into the sea: The alliance was to last until the weights rose up again. Delos was chosen to be the centre of the League because of its religious associations and its practical advantages. The Delian temple of Apollo formed a convenient bank and the first contributions were paid there. Delos was situated in the centre of the Aegean (1), it had a good harbour and like Delphi it had always been too wealthy to have independent political ambitions (2). (Meiggs 1979:43).

The capture of Sestos under the leadership of Gimon, in 476 BC, was the
first achievement of the League. This successful expedition though, made

the Athenians and the allies realize that campaigning cost money and since the Delian Confederacy was an alliance of sea-states they should find a basis for the economic structure of the League. The basis of the contract was that each state should furnish ships (chirems) to the common fleet. However, the problem that arose was that certain members were small and poor; many could not equip more than one or two ships and many could do no more than contribute a part of the expense of furnishing a single galley (Burry 1963: 328).

1. Around Delos there were member-States of the Alliance 2. To have the treasures in a safe place.

The big islands which had a naval tradition to maintain would certainly
contribute in ships while the smaller states should pay yearly a sum of money to a common treasury. How was this amount fixed? For Berry it's very probable that a calculation was made that those States which undertook to pay in money ought to have been able to contribute between them 100 ships and that the annual contribution of 460 talents was taken as the equivalent of the contribution.

Burry and Plutarch agrees that Aristides was asked to examine the
land and revenues of the cities in order to estimate their capacity and hence carefully determine the contribution of each State (Burry
1963:328), (Meiggs 1979:53).

According to Thucydides, the Athenians had determined a fixed amount


of 460 talents which all the cities were obliged to pay. Meiggs accepts the source of Thucydides upon the fixed contribution as more reliable while Plutarch is characterized by him as a late and probably unreliable source. (Meiggs 1979:58).

Thus from the very beginning the Confederacy consisted of two kinds of
members: those who paid an equivalent in money, a "phoros" as it was called, and those who furnished ships. (The first class was larger). One could say, though, that this differentiation created a problem since the majority of the allies, even those who were able to contribute ships, preferred the system of money payments, which did not oblige their men to leave home.

The tribute was received by ten Athenian officers who bore the title of Hellenotamiae or "Treasurers of the Greeks" (Fine 1983:363). The economic character of the Delean League followed this type of arrangment till 525 BC when Aristidis was replaced as the financier of the Alliance by Cleon. Furthermore, the council of the confederates met at Delos, where the

treasury was located, and each member had an equal vote, in order that the stronger members would have no formal advantage in the council. (Fine 1983:364). According to Thucydides the allies were at first autonomous but at the same time were not in a suspicious mood. This reaction of the allies could probably explain the acceptance of Athenian "hegemony" from the early period of the formation of the League. Athens, hence, could influence the smaller states and the number of these votes overcame the weight of any opposition which the larger states could offer.

As leader of the Confederacy, Athens had the executive entirely in her


hands and it was of the greatest significance that the treasurers were not selected by the whole body of Confederates but by the Athenian citizens. The Delian League then having settled the political and economic structure started taking actions under the leadership of Athens. In 476, Eion was captured from the Persians by Cimon. From that time on Cimon initiated a number of expeditions in the Aegean. Scyros, Carystus and Naxos which had been notorious pirate bases now became Athenian settlements (Cleruchies). Simon also as leader of the Delian Alliance sailed to the Eurymedon in Asia Minor in 467 where he won decisive victories at sea and on land. The Eurymedon marked the culmination of Athenian leadership against Persia, it eliminated any serious threat to the Aegean and opened the way for a profitable offensive in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The actions of the League were escalated by the Athenian expedition to


Egypt in 459 B.C. with 200 or 300 ships. Unfortunately, this expediton proved to be disastrous for the alliance in terms of lost soldiers and ships (Burn 1962: 127). With the passing of time many expeditions were undertaken by the Delian League. Some were quite successful in terms of political and economic gains while others proved to be disastrous. However, the Alliance seemed to be bothered by a probably crucial difficulty. Since the primary purpose of the League was, as Thucydides tells us, to ravage the King's territory in vengeance for the damage he had inflicted (Meiggs 1979:44); how could the defensive character of the alliance be justified?

According to Fleiss, the determined pursuit of the Persians had two


effects: on the one hand it raised Athenian prestige throughout the Ionian world and brought more cities into the alliance, while, on the other hand, it encouraged defections from the League. (Fleiss 1966:5). The Delian Alliance then becomes transformed from a defensive military organisation, as for example, the Hellenic League was (481 BC), to a commercial Alliance.

Athens stood not only for freedom from the Barbarians (the Persians)
but also for freedom of intercourse and freedom of trade.

Athens, despite the fact that it established what Thycydides called "A hegemony over autonomous allies who participated in common synods" (Kagan 1969:40) had probably based her "hegemony", her power politics, upon mutual dependence. This is a quite possible since both were interdependent for reasons of survival. Athens needed the resources of the allies and the allies were dependent upon the Athenians because they provided them with a secure life. Athens as a sea power would "police" the Aegean with her triremes and, taking advantage of the allies, played the role of the protector and consequently "imposed" her "power politics", her political and judicial dominion. Although some of the allies, such as Naxos, Melos and Mytelene, protested against this association, viewing their obligations of membership as excessively burdensome, the administration of justice was preferable. Taking into consideration these advantages the allies continued to participate in the League despite their occasional conflicts with Athens. In the years following 460 BC the Athenians were extremely active. Most events that took place during that era show that the Athenians abandoned the policy advocated by Gimon and began hostilities with various allies of Sparta and soon with Sparta itself. In fact, the fighting in Greece from 459 until 445 (the date of the Thirty Years' Peace between Athens and Sparta), with an intervening five years' truce, can be called the First Peloponnesian War to contrast it with the Great Peloponnesian War which broke out in 431. Thucydides implies that Athens began hostilities by naval attacks on allies of Sparta such as Corinth and Aegina which by the spring of 457 was forced to surrender and come into the Athenian League as a tribute-paying member. What is noteworthy about these struggles is that it was the first recorded time that Athenian allies --presumably members of the Delian League-- took up arms against a Greek in a quarrel which existed solely between that State and Athens. However, the conflicts were multiplied since the Corinthians and their allies, wishing to aid Aegina, invaded Megara in the belief that the Athenians, with large forces occupied in Aegina and Egypt, would have to raise the siege of Aegina in order to bring support to their recent ally, Megara. The above events could convince us that the promising character of the Delian Confederacy had been changed. The common oath had been replaced by struggles revolts and civil wars under Athenian hegemony. . In 454 BC the treasury of the League was transferred from Delos to Athens (1).

According to Davies the catastrophe of the Egyptian expedition in 454 BC, and the revolts of the allies motivated the Athenians to transfer the treasury to Athens.

Whether fear was the true reason or merely a pretext we are not able to
know. It seems very probable, though, that the Athenians in a very short timemanaged to turn the event to their own advantage.

From that year (454) they began to collect one sixteenth of the tribute
paid by the allies as the first obligation to Athena Polias, Patron of Athens and now Patron of the reorganized League.

A careful record was made each year of the aparche paid to Athena, the
amount was audited by the Iogistae for the Helenotamial and the annual lists were inscribed on a large stone pillar displayed on the Acropolis. After the removal of the treasury from Delos to Athens the character of the Delian League changeds without pretext. Inititated as a defensive alliance, it turned into a merely maritime Confederacy and changed the Athenian Empire. The money collected would soon provide temples on the Acropolis, support the Athenian fleet, provide work for the citizens of Athens and accumulate a reserve fund. In 453 Pericles initiated an expedition to the Corinthian Gulf. In the same year the area of Achaea was brought under Athenian power and in 450, Cimon sailed to Cyprus where he won a crushing victory.

By 450, the Delian League appeared to have been trasnsformed from a


collection of autonomous Aegean States, united in a defensive purpose, under the hegemony of Athens with its central treasury at Delos into an organization of Athenian colonies, still nominally autonomous, but whose centre and treasury was now in Athens.

It appears that Athens had just become conscious of her new power
and as a consequence, unfolded a vitality that would not let her remain inactive in the face of the opportunities presented. But whatever the tendencies of Athens were, which are probably attributable to emotional and pragmatic causes, it is clear that the allies were considered to be of crucial impotance. What justified the tolerance of the allies towards Athenian power politics and the pressure on behalf of the Athenians for controlling the Aegean and the Ionians is perhaps their interdependence for survival. The allies needed Athenian protection and Athens needed their resources and their ports.

However noting the emotional reasons, perhaps the most striking


expression of the compulsive basis of Athenian hegemonic policy is the statement of the Athenian envoy Euphemus at Camarina in Sicily, during the great Sicilian campaign: We are rulers in order not to be subjects (Fleiss 1966: 108).

Concluding I would say that, the Delian League -- which was established
and developed during the years between the Persian Wars and the Peloponnesian War could be characterized as a promising alliance with a defensive character that was steadily converted into a collection of allies under the ARCHE of Athens. It seems that all powers benefitted from this alliance since all powers were probably seeking ways to justify their tendencies. (1) Although several sources (for example Plutarch, Perikles, Aristides) refer to this significant event, it is according to Fine, epigraphic evidence which provides the date. A series of very important inscriptions known as the tribute-quota lists, many fragments of which have been found especially on the Athenian Acropolis, furnish valuable information on various aspects, particularly the financial, of the Delian League. (back)

Delian League (477) First Attic Maritime Alliance


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Attica & Ionia

against Persia Themistocles Ostracized (470) enter Cimon, son of Miltiades


Eurymedon (465): victory over Persia

Spartan hostility to Athens grows Cimon Ostracized (461) Spartan supporter Sparta & Persia Athens ends alliance with Sparta (461)

Athens allies with Argos (461) long walls at Athens built (460-457) Athens settles helots in Naupactus Athens allies with Megara (460)

Corinth and Aegina ally with Sparta (460) Thebes allies with Sparta (457)
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Tanagra (Sparta) Oenophyta (Athens)

Athens allies with Boeotia, Locris, Phocis Aegina joins Delian League (456)
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Fleet Surrendered Commercial Competition

Treasury of Delian League moved to Athens (454) Cimon negotiates two-front truce (451)

Cimon dies (449) Peace of Callias (448) Greek polises non-interference Delian League Transformed (448) into an Athenian Empire
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Athenian coins, weights & measures

tributes to Athens Peace Conference (447) convoked by Pericles


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to secure peace

Sparta resists Thirty Years Peace (445)

between Athens and Sparta


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Spartan hegemony in Peloponnese

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