HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND PRE-EXISTENCE

BY

JOHN M'TAGGART

ELLIS M*TAGGART

LiTT.D. (Cambridge), LL.D. (St. Andrews) FBLLOW AND LBCTURER OF TRINITY COLLKGB IN CAMBRIDGE FBLI.OW OF THE BRITISH ACADEMY

SECOND IMPRESSION

LONDON

EDWARD ARNOLD
1916
.

[All rights reserved\

'

/.

BY THE SAME AUTHOR.

STUDIES IN THE HEGELIAN
DIALECTIC.
8.

STUDIES IN HEGELIAN COSMOLOGY. 8s.

A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S
LOGIC.
8s.

SOME DOGMAS OF RELIGION,

los. 6d. net.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND

PRE-EXISTENCE

PREFACE
The two
as

parts of this
III.

work

originally appeared
of

Chapters

and IV.

larger

work

entitled
in

Some Dogmas of
less

Religion, published

1906, the rest of which deals with quesof

tions

immediate

practical

concern.

They

are

now

issued separately in the hope

of interest to a larger circle

that they

may be

of readers than

would be

attracted to the study

of the other parts of the original work.

They have been

of a

reprinted with the alteration

few phrases only.

J.

E.

MT.

Trinity College,

Cambridge,
yuly, 1915.

CONTENTS
PART
I

Human Immortality

PART

II

Human Pre-existence

71

vu

HUMAN IMMORTALITY AND

PRE-EXISTENCE
PART
I

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
I

DO not propose
I

to offer here

any arguments

in support of the positive assertion that

men

are immortal.
exist,

and

that,

beheve that such arguments in spite of the difficulty and

obscurity of the subject, they are of sufficient

strength to justify a belief in our immortality.

expound these arguments would require an elaborate and lengthy treatise of techto

But

nical

metaphysics,

for

they

could

only be
idealist
reality.^

proved by a demonstration of some theory of the fundamental nature of

My
*

present design

is

merely to consider some

Cp. Postscript at the end of the present volume.

10

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

arguments against immortality which have been based on certain facts of ordinary observation,

and on
shall

certain results of physical science.

to

endeavour

show

that those

arguments
in

are invalid,

and

that the

presumption against

immortality, which they have

produced

many
It

people, should be discarded.

is

better to speak of the immortality of

the

self,

or of men, than of the immortality of

the soul.
views.

phrase suggests untenable For, in speaking of the identity of a

latter

The

man during different periods of we do not usually say that he is

but the same
self,

his bodily

life,

the same soul,

or the

same man.

And

to

use a different word

when we

are discussing

the prolongation of that identity after death,

up the idea of an identity less perfect than that which lasts through a bodily life. The form in which the question is put thus
calls

implies that the answer

is is

to

negative
after

be

in

some degree
himself
if

that a

man
is

not as
it,

much

death as he

before

even

something

escapes from complete destruction.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
Moreover,
say that a
it

ii

is

customary, unfortunately, to
is
*

man

has a soul, not that he

is
?'

one.

Now

if

our question

put in the form

Has

man an immortal
would be absurd.
anything
it

soul

an affirmative answer
far as
it

So

would mean

would mean

that the

man

himself

was the body, or something which died with the body at any rate was not immortal and

that something, not himself,

which he owned
death to con-

during

life,

was

set free at his

its

tinue existing on

own

account.

For these

reasons

it

seems better not

to speak of the soul,

and

to put our question in the

?'

form

Arc men

immortal

What

reasons are there for supposing that

is

our existence

only temporary

see around

me
I

bodies which behave so like

my

own, that

conclude that they are related to other con-

scious selves in the

is

related to

same way that my body But from time to time myself.

these bodies are observed to cease to behave

in this

way, and to become motionless, unless

outside.

moved from

Shortly after this the

12

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
dissolves into
its

body

constituent parts.

Its

form and identity

destroyed.

as a

body

are completely

The experience

of the past leads

me

to the conclusion that the

in

same thing

will

happen

the future to every

human body

now

existing, including

my

own.

How
effect of

does this
?

affect

the question of
if

my

existence

It

is

clear that

am

mere

my bodya
when
if

form of

its

activity

shall cease

the body ceases.

I

And

it

is

also clear that,

could not exist without this

the

particular body, then the destruction of

body

will

be a sign that

have ceased
is

to exist.

But, besides death, there

acteristic of nature

another charto

which tends

make us

doubt our immortality. Of all the things around us, from a pebble to a solar system,
science
of
tells

us that they are transitory.

Each

them

arose out of something else, each of

them

will
is

pass

What

man

something else. that he should be exempt from

away

into

this universal

law

Thus we have

three questions to consider

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
(i) Is

13

my
to

an activity of my body ? (2) Is present body an essential condition of the

my

self

existence of

my

self

(3) Is there
self

any reason

suppose that

my

does not share the

I

transitory character

which

recognize in
?

all

the material objects around

me

With regard
it

to the first of these questions,

is

certain, to

begin with, that

my body

in-

fluences

my

self

much and
mental

continuously.

large part of
sations.
in

my

life is

made up
in

of sen-

Sensations are continually produced

connection with

changes

the

sense-

organs of

my

body, and, so far as

we know,

they are never produced in any other way.

And

the course of

my

thoughts and emotions

can be profoundly affected by the state of

body.
If

my
If

my body

gets

no food

for

twenty-

four hours, they will be affected one way.

I

introduce whisky or opium into

If

it,

they will
is

be affected another way.

fatigued, the ordinary
life

my body current of my
in

very

mental

will

be entirely suspended

profound

14
sleep,

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
or completely broken

by dreams.

If

any of these processes is carried far enough, my body dies, and I cease to have any relation to it for the future, which is certainly an important
or not.
It
is

event for me, whether

survive

it

equally certain that the

mind

acts

on

the body.

according

My limbs, on many occasions, move And the normal beto my will.

as the

haviour of the body can be altered by the

mind, as

much

normal behaviour

of the

mind can be
fear, or anger,

altered

by the body.

Grief, or
illness,

can produce bodily

and

even death.
each of these groups of events the effects of body on mind and of mind on body could be explained on the hypothesis that
self

Now

the

realities,

and the body were two separate neither of which was the mere

product of the other, though each affected the other, and caused changes in it. And it

might be thought that

this

would be the most

natural conclusion to adopt, since the action

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
appears to be reciprocal
as

15

mind acting on body

much
There

as
is

body

acts

on mind.

however, a very strong tendency to adopt the view that the self is a
always,

mere

any rate to hold that the only escape from this view lies in accepting some form of revealed religion

activity of the

body

or

at

which denies
is,

it.

The cause

of this

tendency

incomplete nature of the explanation which would be furnished by

the recognition of the self and
its

in the first plate, the

body

as

independent realities/ All ultimate explanation endeavours to reduce the universe to a

unity.
Spirit
ties,
It is

The

self is spirit,

the body

is

matter.

and matter, taken

as independent reali-

are very heterogeneous to one another.

evident that a theory which makes either

matter to be the sole reality in the universe, introduces a greater degree of unity
spirit or

By independent I do not here mean isolated, or unconnected realities, but such as stand on an equal footing, so that though each is connected with the other, neither
^

is

subordinate to the other.

i6

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

than a theory which makes them to be equally

real.

Monism
or idealism,
of inquirers

then,
is

whether

it

be materialism

more

attractive to the majority

is.

than dualism

We

must now

consider the various

causes which tend to

make

a materialistic

monism more
is

plausible

than an idealistic monism, and which impel

us to the conclusion that matter
reality,

the only

while

human
it

spirit

is

nothing more

than one of the

matter

activities
is

which characterize
special

when
body.

in
is

the

form

of

human
sent

(It

immaterial for our pre-

purpose whether the adherents of this view suppose matter to exist as a substance,
to

which these

activities belong, or

whether

they say that the activities are the matter.

The

difference

is

insignificant,
is

although the

second alternative

sometimes put forward The as a great improvement on the first.

essential point is that the spiritual
is

in either

case reduced to a temporary form of an activity

whose fundamental nature

is

non-spiritual.)

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
One
of

17

these

causes

is

the fact, so con-

tinually pressed

upon the
I

notice of every man,

that the nature of matter

dependent of his will. and there are narrow

to

almost entirely incannot create matter,

is

limits
I

to

the

extent

which

can alter

it.

cannot make into

bread the stone which

ever passionately
I

see and touch.

desire that
it

Howshould

may

be bread, however serious the consequences

to

myself and others of

it

its

remaining a stone,

a stone

remains.

By

a transition

which

is

natural though illegitimate

that whatever
is

we tend

to believe

so independent of our will

must be independent of us altogether. To some extent, indeed, the will can

matter.

affect

But the amount

of

its

effects is

com-

paratively insignificant.

All the exertions of

human
the

beings can only affect the surface of

slightly.

and that very other hand, matter seems

earth,
in its influence

On

the

far

on

spirit.

more powerful The diminution of

planet
is

the

temperature
trivial

of

single

an

absurdly

episode in astronomy.

But,

i8
if

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
the planet were our earth,
to the only conditions
it

would put an
as far

end

under which,

as our observation goes,

to exist.

it is

possible for spirit

Since

spirit,

then, appears so

much

weaker

than
is
it

matter

separately,
is

when they are taken strange that, when an attempt

it

made

to

reduce the one to the other,

is

spirit that is called

on

to give

way

In matter, too,
persistence

we can

observe a unity and a

to spirit but
Spirit

which may belong

it.

does
only

not obviously belong to

we

know in

the form of separate individuals, set in

the midst of matter, which

forms the only

means by which they

with one another.
as far as
for

are able to

communicate
has ever,

No human

spirit

we know, been open

to observation

much more

than a hundred years, and the

lower animals only slightly exceed this limit. Matter forms one vast system, which history
informs us has existed for thousands of years,

while science extends the period to millions.

And,

again, the

amount

of

knowledge which
is

science gives us about matter

far greater

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
than the amount which
it

19

gives us about spirit.

On

the one side

is

the whole vast extent of

the physical sciences.

On

the other side

we
of
it

have only psychology

psychology.

and
much

not the whole of

For the psycho-physical side

with matter as

that science deals as

does with

spirit.

All this increases the apparent importance

of matter,

and seems

to render

it

more

pro-

bable that matter, rather than

reality.

spirit, is

the sole

would be the way in which matter behaves under certain circumSpirit,

then,

stances. said that

And
the

in

support of this
of

it

may be
science
itself

activity

matter

does take

different

forms.

The same

energy,

informs us, which sometimes shows

heat,

as
or,

shows

itself at

other times as motion,

again, as electricity.
it is

And

this

same energy,
is

asserted

by the

materialist,

transformed
it

under other circumstances

in

human body

into

when
thought,

is

found

will,

and

emotion.

Certainly, he admits, thought, will,

like heat, motion,

and emotion are not very

20

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
electricity.

and

But then

heat, motion,

and
And,

electricity are not very like

if

one another.
this

they can

all

be reduced to

common

unity,

why should

not the forms of conscious?

ness share the same fate

These conclusions depend, it will be seen, on the proposition that matter can exist independently of
it

spirit.

For

if

this

were not

so,

would obviously be absurd

the temporary

to explain

away
it

the separate reality of spirit by making

of

one

forms which the activity

of matter takes.

show us

that

Deeper inquiry will, I think, there is no reason to believe that

exist.
If

matter does

this

is

the case
self as

we
the

cannot be entitled to consider the

activity of its body.

Of what nature
which,
of
it
?

is

the matter supposed to be

is

asserted, can exist independently

It
is

spirit

not

conceived as having

all

the qualities which, in ordinary language,

ascribe to matter.
it

we
But

We

say of an orange that

is

soft,

yellow, sweet,

and odorous.

these qualities are not held to belong to the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
orange

21

when

it

is

not

being observed.

In

strictness they are not held to

be quaHties of

the orange at

all,

but effects excited in the

by qualities of the orange. The orange is no more yellow when no one sees it than it is desired when no one knows of its
observer
existence.

But the object is conceived as having other qualities which really do belong to it, and give
it

that nature

which
if

it

has independently of
it.

observation,
size, its

and
its

no one observes
its

Its

shape,

position in space,

motion,
It

and
is

its

impenetrability are of this nature.

these qualities, or others of the

same

nature,

which have the power, under certain circumstances, of exciting in the observer the sensa-

tions of softness, yellowness,

and the
held
often

like.

The

qualities

which
matter

are are

really

to

belong to the

called its
its

primary

qualities.

The

others are called

secondary qualities, though, on this theory,

is

it

scarcely correct to call

all.

them

qualities of the

object at

22

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
Matter, then,
is

held to be extended, to have

position,

and

to

be capable of motion indeIt

is

impeneno two pieces of matter can occupy the same position in space. But it has no colour, it is neither hard nor soft, it
trable that
is,

pendently of observation.

also

has no

taste,
is

no smell, and no sound.

conceived in physical be said also to be the ordiit

This

matter as
It

is

science.

may

nary conception, for although

we speak

of an

orange as yellow, yet the idea that it is not yellow in the dark is generally known and
generally accepted.

What
belief
it is

reason can be given for a befief in the

?

existence of matter

conceive that such a

can only be defended on the ground that

a legitimate inference from our sensations.

I

This view has been contested, but

that the objection to
it

believe

rests

on a misunder-

standing.
truth, that

It

has been said, and with perfect

belief in the existence of matter

my

does not arise as an inference from

tions.
I

my

sensaof

do not

first

become aware

my

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
sensations and then
infer

23

the existence of
I

an orange.
the

On

the contrary,

am aware
If
I

of

existence of the

orange

first.

am

studying psychology or
validity of

am
I

doubtful of the

my

knowledge,
of
sight,

may then consider

and so on,

the

sensations

touch,

connected with

But

in

knowledge of the object. most cases I never do consider the

all.

my

sensations at

And

there are

young

chil-

dren

who

are quite aware of the existence of a

material world, but

who have

never realized

that they have sensations.

These

facts are sufficient to refute the view,

which has

sometimes

been held, that our

belief in a material

world arises as an inference

from our sensations.

relevant
to

But they are quite

ir-

the

question

now
be

before

us

whether our

belief in a material
if it

world must
all,

not be justified^

is

to

justified at

as

an inference from our sensations.

And when
hapit

such

facts are used, as not infrequently

pens, as bearing on this question,

involves a

very serious confusion.

24

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
The
belief in a material
It is

world requires

justi-

fication.

natural, in the sense that every-

one

who

has not reflected on the subject holds

the belief as a matter of course, together with

many
it is
it.

of those

who have
It is

reflected

on

it.

But

not inevitable.

possible to disbelieve

Many
is,

philosophers
at

have done

so.

And
self-

there

any

rate,
its

nothing obviously

on the subject
theories

contradictory in

denial.

Berkeley's theory

to take only

one out

of

many

which deny the existence

false,
is

of matter

whether true or
contradictory.

not obviously

self-

Since disbelief in the existence of matter

is

neither impossible

nor contradictory, the

question becomes inevitable

fication of

what
And

is
it

the justi-

the

belief

becomes
cases our

more

pressing,

because

in

many

judgements as to the existence of matter are admitted to be wrong. In the first place, the quite unreflective consciousness has no more
doubt that the world
than
it

of

matter

is

coloured
is

has that the world of matter

ex-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
tended.

25
reflective

But

either this or the

more

judgements of science and the modern world must be wrong here, since they disagree.
Again,
if

a man,

who

sees a cloak hanging

by moonhght, believes that he sees the body of a dead friend, it is obvious

matter before him.
to

up before him
that

he

has completely mistaken the character of the

And

if

our judgements as
is

what the external object

are so often

wrong,

we have

little

justification for

assuming

without inquiry that our judgement that there is an external object is ever right.

There

is

a stronger case than this.

For

in

dreams we do not only make wrong judgements as to the nature of matter, but as to
the existence of matter.
If

a believer in the

existence of matter dreams that he sees a roc's

egg, he

no more doubts, during

his

dream,

that the roc's egg exists as independent matter,

than he doubts, during waking

life,

that

his
yet,

table exists as independent matter.

And

on waking, he will admit that in his dream he was neither observing a roc's egg nor any

26

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
Not only was
'

other really existing matter which he mistook

for a roc's egg.
'

his dream-belief

this is a roc's
*

egg

mistaken, but his dream-

belief

this is

independently existing matter,'

was
it

also mistaken.

And

if

this

is

mistaken,

is

mere credulity
existence
is

to trust his belief in the

table's

without examination.

For

that belief

no stronger and no more evident than the other had been previously.

On

what can we base a

justification of the
?

belief in the

independent existence of matter

available

Nothing

is

except the sensations.

certain.

They
unless

are

there,

and they are

We
less

never believe that

we

are

observing matter

we experience

sensations

more or

analogous to the qualities

in the matter.

we
all.

believe to exist

We

may

not be conscious of

the sensations as such at

Indeed, as was

we never are conscious of them. But whenever we look for them, on such occasions, we find them. And the sensations are certain. I may be
said above, in the majority of cases

wrong

in

believing that

matter exists inde-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
pendently of me.

27
that
I

But the suggestion

am wrong
absurd.

beHeving I have a sensation is The behef is not sufficiently separin

able from the sensation for the possibility of

error.

that

may, of course, be wrong had a sensation in the past,

I

in believing

for

memory

may

deceive me.

And
I

may
it,

be wrong in the

general terms which

apply to a sensation,

when
it

attempt to classify

and

to describe

knowledge that I am having the sensation which I am having is one of those ultimate certainties which it is
to others.

But

my

impossible either to prove or to deny.

And we

find that although the sensations

are generally ignored, as sensations,

when

the

correctness of the judgement about the matter

is

not doubted, yet, as soon as

myself, or

other people, entertain a doubt of the correctness of the judgement, the situation
If it is
is

changed.

suggested that

what

believe to be an
is

experience of matter of a certain sort

a

really

dream or a
which

delusion,
I

I fall

back on the sensa-

tions

have experienced, and consider

28

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
for

whether they can be accounted

of the matter in question.

on any

other hypothesis than that of the existence

If

they cannot,

consider that

was

right in

my

judgement
a doubt

that the matter did exist.

And we must
arises,

act in the

same way

if

not merely of the correctness of our

this or that matter exists, but

judgements that
of

the

correctness

of

all

matter of any sort

is

exists.
is

judgements that The fact which it

that

impossible to deny

we have

the

sensations.

Are we

entitled to conclude

from

world really exists, and that the natural judgement that it does exist
this that the material

which

is

not,

however, as

we have

inevitable or universal
It is

judgement

seen, an

is

correct
are

evident that the

sensations

not

themselves the matter in question.

tion
is

sensa-

not matter, and

self to

it

cannot exist apart

It

from the

whom

it

belongs.

can have

no independent existence.
since they begin to exist,
1

But the sensations, must have causes.^

This step might not be accepted by any one who denied the universal vaHdity of caiisaHty. A thinker,

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
Now
sible
it

29

cannot be said to be obviously imposall

that
lie

the

causes of

my

sensations
It
is

should

within

my own
lie
I

nature.

cer-

tain that they

do not

within that part of

my own
I

nature of which

am

conscious, for

am

not conscious of producing

my

sensa-

tions.

But

it

might be

said, as

Leibniz has

said, that

all

my

sensations arise out of the

depths of
that
it

my own

unconscious nature, and

when
as

a self has once

come

into existence

is

its

independent of outside influences in sensations as a clock, when once wound

is

up,

in striking.

But there are

do not wish

difficulties

in the

way

of this

view into which we have

I

no time to

enter,

and

to lay
I

any

weight on the possibility of its prepared to admit what seems

truth.
to
all

am

more probable view tions have causes which

the

that

me by far my sensain

are not myself nor

anything in myself.

Such causes must

each

however, who denied the universal validity of causality could not, as far as I can see, have the least justification
for a belief in the existence of matter.

30

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
I

case be merely part-causes.

am

unquestion-

ably one of the causes of my own sensations, for, if I did not exist, my sensations also would

not exist.

may thus be admitted that my make it, at any rate, highly probable
It

sensations
that

some

reality exists,

which

is

not myself or anything

within myself, but exists independently of me.

But we have not got to matter. A reality which exists independently of me need not
be matter
spirit.
it

it

might, for example, be another

call

We

do not

anything matter unless

possesses the

primary qualities of matter

qualities

given above.

These

correspond to

certain sensations, or elements in sensations,

and the presence

of the sensation in

me

is

held to prove the existence of the corresponding quality in the material object.

But

is

this

legitimate

The independent
to

be the part-cause of the sensations, but that does not prove that
reality has

been admitted

Causes do not necessarily resemble their effects. Happiness in A does

it

is

like

them.

HUMAN
to the

IMiVlORTALITY
it

31

not resemble the misery which

envious B.

may cause An angry man does not

resemble a slammed door.

ray of sunshine

does not resemble a faded water-colour.

And, on
of
all

this very theory, the external causes

mental events do not resemble those

events.
I

When
I

see a sphere of red-hot iron

have sensations of form, sensations of colour,

(if

and

am

near enough) a feeling of pain.

Now
and

the ordinary theory of matter makes the

matter the cause of the sensations of colour

of the feeling of pain, as

much

as of the

sensations of form.

Yet

it

denies that the

is

matter

is

red or painful.

Here, therefore,

an external cause of mental events which does

not resemble them.
to fall
It is

therefore impossible

back on the principle, that the external cause of mental events alw^ays resembles them.
other principle have

And what

we
?^

to justify

us in ascribing the primary qualities to the

external causes of the sensations
^

must be noticed that the resemblance which the theory attributes to the sensations and their external
It

32

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
The
distinction

between the primary and

secondary quahties renders the theory of the existence of matter less tenable than it would
otherwise be.
inconsistency,
asserting that

In the

first

place, there

is

the

which we have

just noticed, of

we can argue from some

others.
If

of

our

sensations to a resemblance in their causes,

our perception of the secondary qualities varies from time to time, and from individual to individual, so also does

and not from

our perception of the primary

qualities.

If

our perception of the primary qualities exhibits a certain uniformity from time to time, and

from individual

to individual, so also does

our

perception of the secondary qualities.

And,

in the

second place, matter, while ex-

causes is very limited. The causes are not sensations, nor are their qualities sensations. All that can be said
is

to define, certain prethat, in some way not too easy dicates of the causes resemble the content of some of the sensations which are the effects of those causes.

But it is not necessary for my argument to follow out the ambiguities and difficulties which follow from this elaborate combination of similarity and difference between sensations and matter.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

33

tended and impenetrable, is destitute both of colour and of hardness, since these are secondary qualities.
sion

Now

the sensations of exten-

and impenetrability only come to us by When they come by sight sight and touch.
they are invariably conjoined with sensations
of colour,

when

they

come by touch they

are

invariably conjoined with sensations of hardness.

We

cannot even imagine to ourselves

sensation

which

gives

extension without

giving either colour or hardness.

Thus

the theory which

makes the external

material

causes of our sensations

reaches a

climax of inconsistency. Its one defence was the principle that the causes of the sensations

must resemble the sensations they cause. But now it turns out that that which the causes
are to resemble
sensations, a
is

mere abstraction from our

naked extension, which is so far from being a sensation which we experience, that we cannot even imagine what such a
sensation
Is
it

would be

like.

possible to avoid this inconsistency

3

by

34

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

dropping the distinction between primary and secondary qualities ? Shall we say that matter
has not only shape,
impenetrability,
smell,
size, position,

motion, and
hardness,

but
?

also

colour,

and

taste

This view certainly avoids

some

of the objections to the

It

theory.

more ordinary does not make an arbitrary and

gratuitous difference in the treatment of two

sets of qualities.

And

it

gives matter a nature

not

utterly

unlike

our experience, and not

utterly unimaginable

by us. But on the other hand the theory would no

treats matter as
it

longer have the support of physical science.

For that science

devoid of the

secondary qualities, and

that

endeavours to show

the primary qualities of matter, under

certain circumstances, excite in us the sensations of the secondary qualities.

Of course the independent existence and

ultimate nature
of

matter

is

question for

metaphysics and not for science.

fore a metaphysical
ses^ses the

And

there-

theory that matter pos-

secondary qualities as well as the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
primary cannot
science,

35
fact

be

upset
its
it

working from
view,
finds

by the own more

that

superficial

point

of

convenient to treat

matter as possessing only the primary qualities.

If

science keeps to

its

own

sphere,

it

cannot
If

clash with

any metaphysical theory.

at-

tempts are made to treat its results as if they were metaphysical truths, they have no claim
to validity in this sphere,

and a metaphysical
for being

theory
ible

is

none the worse

incompat-

with these misapplications.

that matter exists
plausibility

But the theory

very largely for

depended
illegiti-

its

on the

mate support which it obtained by taking and if it science as if it were metaphysics loses this support, as it must in the suggested
;

new
but

form,

it

loses, indeed,

no

real

strength,
it.

much

of

what caused people

to believe

As has been already

and

said, the fact that physical

spirit,

science treats matter as independent of

that physical science forms a vast system,

its

coherent, accepted, and, from

point, irrefutable, has

own

stand-

done much

to strengthen

36

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
belief

the
real,

that
that,
if

matter,

at

least,

must

be

and

one

of

the two must be

explained away by the other, it is spirit which must go, and matter which must stay. The
inference
is

quite illegitimate, since nothing in

physical science touches, or

can touch, the

existence
is

buestion
matter.

of

the
it

independent

of
fre-

But

is

an inference which

quently made.

And when

the theory of the

independent existence of matter defines the

nature of that matter in a manner completely
different

from
it

the

definitions

of

physical
to

science,

will

no longer be able

gain

apparent support in this way. Nor does the amended theory, while less
inconsistent than the original form, altogether

avoid inconsistency.
iron
is

The red-hot sphere

of

now admitted

not only to be a sphere,

independent of any observer, but to be red, independent of any observer.

still

But the pain

remains.

It is

not asserted that the iron

it

is

painful, although
is

causes

me

pain.

Now

the pain

a result produced in the observer

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
which
and
is

37

quite as real as the sensations of form

colour,

and quite
It is

as

independent of the

observer's will.

likewise just as uniform.

The
see
it

iron

will

not

give

me
if

the

sensations
(I shall

except under certain conditions.

to

not

be red,

for

example,

am

blind, or

have

my

eyes shut.)

And, under certain conit

ditions, quite as definite,

will inevitably give

me

the feeling of pain.

effect

Yet nothing resemis

bling the mental

attributed to the

cause in this case.

Why

should a difference
?

be made between this case and the others

And, even
tions, the

we amended
if

limit ourselves to sensa-

theory does not escape

inconsistency.

For,

even

if

the

qualities are predicated of matter,

it

secondary remains
like the

impossible to assert that matter

sensations

is

which

it

causes.

These sensations
to

change for
I

me from moment

moment.

If

look at a thing under one set of conditions,

as to light

and shade, I get one sensation of colour from it if I change the conditions next minute I get quite a different sensation.
;

38

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
if

And

two men

look at

it

simultaneously

under the
shade they
different

different

conditions of light and

will have, simultaneously, the

two

sensations

of
it is

colour which

had

successively.
that

Now
if

impossible to suppose

the

object

has
it

at

once two different

colours.

And

has only one, then that

at least,

colour must

differ,

from one

of the

two

sensations

experienced

by

the
differ

two
from

observers, since these

sensations

one another.

The same

is

the

case

with

the

other

secondary qualities. And it is also the case with the primary qualities. Two men who look at a cube from different positions simultaneously have two quite different sensations
of
its

shape

not merely numerically

an
object

different,

but sensations which do

another.

not resemble one

Yet

cannot

have two

shapes

at

once, and each of these

men

would,

under normal circumstances, agree about the

shape
of

the

object,

although they started

sensations.
It
is

from non-resembling

clear.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
therefore, that

39

shape attributed to the object cannot resemble the sensations of shape which it causes, since they do not resemble
the

one another.

Now

if

it is

attributed

once admitted that the qualities to the external object do not

qualities
of

resemble the
causes,

the

sensations

it

we have no
it

reason to attribute those

qualities to
for

at all.

The only

reason

we had

supposing the causes of our sensations to

have these qualities was the supposed resemblance of the qualities to the sensations.

But

now

it

becomes
to

clear

that

the

qualities

attributed

the

causes,

although partially

resembling the sensations, do not resemble them completely. It follows that a cause of
a sensation

may

lack
it

some

of

the

qualities

of the sensation

causes.

And

in that case

there seems no reason for denying the possibility of its

being quite different, and having

none
It

of the qualities in question.

may be

replied,

no doubt, that

it

is

never-

theless possible that the causes of the sensa-

40
tions

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
do possess
qualities partially resembling

the sensations.

The causes

exist,
it

and must
these

have some
qualities

qualities.

And

may be
so they

which they have, and would be

far too

may

be entitled to the name of matter.

a possibility

But such

vague to give

any support

to the theory that matter exists.

is

They may

possess these qualities, for there

no reason why a cause should not resemble its But there is no effect in certain respects.
reason to believe that they do possess them,
or that their
slightest

possession

of

them

is

in

the
boils
is

degree probable. A man a lobster red may have a red face

there
action

who

nothing to

prevent

it.

But

his

in

causing the redness of the lobster gives us no

reason to suppose that his face
^

is

red.^
of

The statement

that the

bare
still

possibility

the

remains open must be taken as referring only to the arguments in this I believe that further consideration should chapter. convince us, for reasons somewhat analogous to those of Hegel and Lotze, that all substance must possess certain
external causes being material

which are essential to the nature of spirit, and incompatible with the nature of matter. If this
characteristics

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
The
result
is

41

that

matter

is

in

the same
Its
it

position as the

existence

is

Gorgons or the Harpies. a bare possibiUty to which

nothing to make

would be

foolish to attach the least importis

it

ance, since there preferable to

wild.
If

at all

any other hypothesis, however

we
of

ask, then,

of

what

reality the

vast

mass

knowledge holds true which science

and everyday life give us about matter, we must reply that it holds true of various sensations

which occur

to various

men, and

of the

laws according to which these sensations are

connected, so that from the presence of certain sensations in

me
I

can infer

that,

under

certain conditions,

shall or shall not experi-

ence certain other sensations, and can also

infer that,

under certain conditions, other

be objected that

men

will or will not experience certain sensations.

It

will

this is

not what

view

book

is right a question beyond the purpose of this to investigate the existence of matter Mrould be

positively disproved.

42

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
experience and science profess to
say that this bottle contains
this vinegar,

common
do.

When we
about

champagne, and
ing

our

sensations.

we are And

not talkphysical

science deals with such things as planets, acids,

and nerves, none

It
is

of

which are
it

sensations.

quite true that

is

usual to express

the conclusions of

common
of

experience and of

science

in

terms which

assume the

inde-

pendent
in the
exist

existence

matter.

Most people

past

have

believed that matter does

;

independently

our language has been

moulded by
and shorter

this belief,

and now

it

is

easier

to express

our conclusions in this

way. Besides this, most people at present do hold the metaphysical opinion that matter exists independently, and tend to express
themselves accordingly.

But the conclusions remain

just as true,

if

we

take the view that matter does not exist.

Something has been changed, no doubt, but what has been changed is no part either of

common

experience or science, but a theory

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
of metaphysics

43
of either.

which forms no part

And

so

we

sacrifice neither the experience of

everyday

life

nor the results of science by

denying the existence of matter.

sacrifice

We

only

a theory of metaphysics which

justified.

we
is

have already seen cannot be

I

say,

in

ordinary language, that this

this
is

champagne and
that there
is

vinegar.

Supposing

neither

champagne nor vinegar

as matter existing independently of observation,

but that

it

remains true that a certain

is

group of sensations of sight and smell

trustworthy indication
certain
taste

that

can

secure a
actions,

by performing certain

and that another group of sensations of sight and smell is a trustworthy indication that I
can secure a different
similar
actions.
taste

by performing

Does

not this leave a per-

fectly definite

experience of
detail of that

and coherent meaning to the everyday life, which fits every

experience as well as the more
it

common

theory does, and only differs from

of

on a question

metaphysics

44
It is

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
the same with science.

Every obser-

vation

made by
is

science,

every uniformity

which

established, every statement as to the

past or the future

which

it

asserted,

would

still

have

its

meaning.

The

observations would

inform us of what had been experienced, the uniformities would tell us the connexions of
various experiences, the statements as to the
past
will

and future would

tell

us what has been or

if

be experienced, or would be so
conditions

the

necessary

were

present.

What

more does science

it

tell us,
?

or what

more could

desire to tell us

If

the language in which

scientific results are generally

expressed does

seem

to tell us

more, and to imply the indeof

pendent
science

existence

matter,

that

is

not

but

metaphysics

the

unconscious

and

uncritical

guage

and

its

metaphysics of ordinary lanrejection does not involve the

rejection or the distrust of a single result of

science.

Science

requires,

no doubt, that

experi-

ence should exhibit certain uniformities, so

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
as

45

that a certain experience can safely be taken

an indication of what other experiences will

it

follow

under certain conditions.

But

this

proves nothing as to the independent exist-

ence of matter.
sensations,

If
I

the external causes of

myself, have
a

my

and

constant

nature, the

sensations

which are

their joint

result will exhibit uniformities.

And

a non-

material cause can have a constant nature just

as easily as a material cause could have.

Science also requires that experience should have a community of nature between different

be possible for us to infer from any experience what the experience of another person would be under conpersons, so that
it

shall

ditions

more or

less

similar.

This,

again,

can be explained as easily without matter as with it. If my nature and that of other
persons were not more or less the same, our

experience would
the nature of
its

not

be similar, whatever

external cause.

But
then

if
it

our
is

natures

resemble

one

another,

obvious that the action on us of the same

46

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
would produce
it

external cause

results

which

resembled one another.

The

denial of matter,

must

also

does not lead us towards solipsism

say, to the denial

that

be noticed,
is

to

by each individual

of all

reahty except himself.

The arguments which

must have causes

prove that

my

sensations

which are not myself, nor in myself, but are some other reality, lose none of their force
if

we

decide that these causes are not of a

nature.

material

And

against solipsism
is

the

the other arguments

consideration of which

apart from our present object

are

just as

strong on the hypothesis that matter does not

exist.

might be supposed that the theory I have been advocating was a form of agnosticism.
It

Agnosticism holds that we can know nothing but phenomena. Beneath these phenomena
lies

a
this

reality

on which they are based, but

agnosticism declares,
If

of

reality,

we can

know

nothing.

we

only

know

of the ex-

ternal causes of our

sensations that they do

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
cause the sensations, have

47

we

not in effect

taken up the agnostic theory that the reality

on which phenomena depend is unknowable ? But this is not the case. Agnosticism says that we can know nothing whatever of the
reaUty behind the phenomena.
this,
it

And,
it

in saying

contradicts
reality

itself.

For

asserts that
it

such a
certain

exists,

and that

stands

in

Thus phenomena. we do know something about it, and it is

relations
to

the

therefore

not the
it.

case

that

we can know

nothing about

have put forward does not say that we can know nothing about
I

But the theory which

the causes of sensations.

It

only says that

we do
all

not

know

that they are like the sensa-

tion they cause.

Even

if

this

should destroy

knowledge of them except of the fact that they were causes, it would not be a general
assertion of the impossibility of
of

any knowledge and so there would be no inconsisthem, tency in saying that we knew they were
causes.

To know

of

anything

is

incon-

48
sistent

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
with being unable to
it,

know anything
know-

about

but

it is

quite consistent with

it

ing nothing about

except m.

Nor does
else

it

follow that

about the causes of

we know nothing our sensations if we

cannot conclude that they resemble the sen-

might be possible, as various philosophers have maintained, to determine the qualities which must belong to every subsations.
It

stance in virtue of
it

being a substance. And might turn out that this could give us a conits

siderable

knowledge

of the

nature

of

these

substances.

We

might, for example, be led

to the conclusion that all substance

was

spirit.

But we cannot

here do more than point out

the possibility of such a result.

And we have

thus,

think,

original contention that the self

of the activities of its

proved our cannot be one

If

own

body.

the self
it

were, as such a theory would require

be,

to

merely a way in which matter behaved under certain circumstances, it would be

possible
to

explain

the

self

satisfactorily

ij^

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
terms of matter.
that a

49

those

would be possible state of things should exist in which circumstances, which determine the
it

And

activity of

matter to take the form of

spirit

occurred

nowhere

in

the

universe,

which
from

would then be a universe

any consciousness.

of matter without
far is this
see,

But so

being the case that, as

we now

we have

no reason
all,

to

and

to

suppose that matter exists at talk of matter existing without

is

consciousness

absurd.

Matter

is

so

far
self
it

from being the sole is only an activity,

is

reality, of

which the

that,

taken

by

itself,

not a reality at

all.

The only

things

which

have, in any sense, the qualities attributed to

matter,
selves.

are

the

sensations

experienced

by

In place of an independent reality

we

find

events in men's minds which are real,

indeed, but not an independent reality.

is si

Matter

mply our

illegitimate inference

from these

events.

This
is

may be

put in another way.

If

my
4

self

one

of the activities of

my

body, then, smce

50

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
as

what appears
life of

my

body

is

only events in the

some conscious
to

being,

my

self

must

also

be events in the
It is

life of

some conscious
suppose that
I

being.

clearly absurd

am

an

activity of

my
it is

body, as
I

my body

is

myself, for then

life.

should be events

known to in my own

But

equally impossible that

activities of its

my

self

should be one of the

as perceived

own body
of another

the
self
it

self

by some other self. would be events in the

In that case
life

B,

But how about

B?

By

the same rule

life

also will
self.

have to be events in the

If

of

another

this self is A^ the absurdity

wiii recur in an

aggravated form.

For then

would be the events which happened in a self which was itself events in A, But if we say
that

is

events in the

life

of a third self C,

the same question will arise about C, and so

on without end.
in the life of

If

every

self is
self,

only events
self is ex-

some other

no

plicable until
infinite

we have reached

the end of an
is

series

that
we

is,

no

self

explicable

at

all.

And

so

are brought back to the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
conclusion that the
of
its
I

51

self

cannot be an activity

body.
to

may be thought
on
this point.

have dwelt unnecesit

sarily
it is

Surely,

may be

said,

obvious that the theory that the self is an activity of the body must fall with the theory
of the

independent existence of matter. Surely no one would maintain that the body only

existed for spirit, and at the

spirit

was an
what

activity of

same time, that body. Yet this has

have maintained
nothing but
is

been done.
that
I

Men
call

of ability

matter

my

thoughts and sensations, and, at the same time, that my thoughts and sensations are nothing
but an activity of

my

brain

which,
it

being
!

matter, will itself be thoughts

and sensations

The bearing

of this discussion
is

on the quesdisproves a

tion of our immortality

that

hypothesis which would render immortality

incredible.
If

the

self

was an

activity of the

body,

it

would be impossible

that

it

should

continue to exist
to exist.

when

the body had ceased

We

might

as well suppose, in that

52
case, that

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
the digestion

survived

the

body
as

as that the self did.

But the body,

we

have

now

seen,
it,

only exists for the

selves

which observe
reduce any
body.
It

and we cannot,

therefore,
its

self to

be an activity of

own
is

has been admitted, indeed, that there

reality external to

myself

the

reality

which
sensa-

includes the external part-causes of

tions

although we are not

my

justified in regard-

ing that reality as material.

And

nothing that

we have
self

said excludes the possibility that

my

may be

a product or activity of
is

some other

reality,

and one which

destined to cease
takes place in
its

to exist

when some change

this

cause.

view has not been refuted, there is not any reason, that I can see, why it should be held to be true, or even probable.

But while

There

is

no reason why we should regard our

any other

selves as the product or activity of

reality whatever,
if

no reason why, we did regard them as such products or

and there

is

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
activities,

53
likely to

we should

consider

them

cease/
If

the external reality had been indepenit

dently existing matter,

different.

would have been

In that case there

would have been,

as

we saw

above, a strong tendency to regard

matter as the only ultimate reality, and the self as an activity of its body. The tendency

would not be due

the facts, as

to a logical necessity, since

we have

seen,

would not be

in-

consistent with the hypothesis that spirit

and

matter were independent, though connected,

realities.

But the tendency would be very

to our desire to find as
If

strong,

owing

much

unity as possible in the universe.

is

the self

an independent

reality,

it

is

a non-material
exist-

reality.
^

And, granted the independent

It is commonly held that human selves are not products of non-divine realities, but that they are all

produced by God.

have given in Some Dogmas of

Religion (Chapter VI.) the reasons v^rhy this view does not seem to me to be necessary. But, supposing that they are produced in this way, we should have no ground for supposing that their divine production involved their

subsequent destruction, though it compatible with such destruction.

is

not, of course, in-

54

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

ence of matter, more unity would be gained

by denying the independent reality of spirit. But without independently existing matter the
case
is

changed.

No
self

by making the
thing
else,

gained a mere activity of someis

increased unity

is

unless that something else

already

known
nature.

to exist

and

to

be of a non-spiritual

Independently existing matter would, of course, be of a non-spiritual nature. But,

when we have
to believe

rejected this,

have no reason
is

that

the reality outside myself

I

non-spiritual,

and so

should gain no

in-

creased unity for the universe by denying the

independent

reality of
if

my

self.
is

And,
body,
it

again,

the self

an activity of

its

must be
is

a temporary activity, since

the body
matter.

only a temporary combination of

if

But

the

self

were an

activity of

some non-material
would be nothing

reality outside itself, there

though,

of the state of things

of

permanence which produces the self course, there would equally be

to disprove the

nothing which proves that permanence.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

55

We
tion.

must now pass on

to

our second ques-

My

self

cannot be a form of the activity

of

my

body.

But
self

it

is

still

possible that the

of

nature of

my

makes the perception

my
my
and
self
it

present body, by

my
it

self or

other selves, a

necessary condition of
self.

the

existence of

In that case

would be an

inevitable

inference that
ceases to

when my body be known as a body

also.
If

dissolves,
at all,

my

must have ceased

exists, is necessarily

Aj whenever

accompanied by B, then
is

the

cessation

of

B
is

sure

sign

of

the

cessation of A,

What
a view
?

evidence
In

there in favour of such

place, while

the

first

plenty of
bodies,
selves

experience of selves

we have who possess

we have no indubitable experience of who exist without bodies, or after their

exist.

bodies have ceased to

Besides

this,

the

existence of a self seems to involve the experi-

ence of sensations.

Without them, the

self

would have no material

feeling,

for thought, will, or

self

and

it

is

only in these that the

56
exists.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
Now
there

seems

good

reason

to

suppose that sensations never occur in our minds at present without some corresponding modifications of the body. This is certainly
the case with normal sensations.
if

the evidence for

And, even clairvoyance and thoughtit

transference

were beyond dispute,

For

could

never prove the possibility of sensation without

bodily accompaniments.
it

could
to

not

exclude

the

indeed,
all,

it

seems rather

suggest

existence of bodily accompaniments of

an obscure and unusual kind.

But, after
these considerations would, at

the most, go

to

show
self,

that

some body was

that
its

necessary to

my

and not

present
the

body

was

necessary.

Have

we,

after

any reason to suppose that the death of the body must indicate anyresults already reached,

thing more than that the self had transferred

its

manifestations

to

new body, and

had,

therefore, passed from the knowledge of the survivors, who had only known it through

the old body

The apparent

improbability

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
of this
lies, I

57

think, simply in our instinctive

self is

recurrence to the theory that the

activity of the body.
it

an

In that case, no doubt,

that
it

would be impossible
theory

should

be

successively connected with two bodies.

that

But

we have seen
of

to

be untenable.
is

The most

that a

body can be
the
self.

an essential
then the

accompaniment
supposition
that

And

the

self

has another body

would

fit

the facts quite as well as the sup-

position that the self has ceased to exist.

There seems no reason why such a change should not be instantaneous. But even if it were not so, no additional difficulty would
be created.
of

self,

body is essential to the action the self would be in a state of

If

suspended animation
its

in the interval

possession of

its

two bodies

between

a state

which

we might
existence.

almost

call

one of temporary nonis

But
as

this
far

nothing more than

what happens,

as

we can

observe, in

every case of dreamless sleep. During such a sleep the self, so far as we know, is un-

58

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

conscious

as

unconscious

as

it

could be

without a body. Yet this does not prevent its being the same man who went asleep and

who woke up

again.

Why

should the
?

diffi-

culty be greater in a change of bodies

And

then, have

we any

reason, after

all,

to

suppose that a body is essential to a self ? It seems to me that the facts only support
a

very

different

proposition

namely,
is
life.

that,

while a self has a body, that

body

essentially

connected with the

self's

mental

For example, no
conscious unless
it

self

can be conceived as
its

has sufficient data for

is

mental

activity.

This material

only given,

as far as our observations can go, in the

of sensations,

form

and sensations

again, as far as

our observations can go, seem invariably connected with changes in a body. But it does not follow, because a self which has a body
cannot get
its

data except in connexion with

that body, that

self

without a
It

would be impossible for a body to get data in some other

it

way.

may be just

the existence of the

body

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
which makes these other ways impossible
present.
If

59
at

man

is

shut up in a house, the

is

transparency of the windows condition of his seeing the sky.

not be prudent to infer that,
of the house,
if

an essential

But

it

would

he walked out

he could not see the sky because there was no longer any glass through which
he might see
it.

With regard

to the

connexion of the brain

it

with thought, the chief evidence for

appears

to be that diseases or mutilations of the brain

affect the course of thought.

But

this

does

not prove that, even while a

his thoughts are directly

man

has a brain,
it.

connected with

Many
which

things are capable of disturbing thought,

are not essential to
its

existence.

For

example, a sufficiently severe attack of toothache may render all consecutive abstract

thought impossible. But if the tooth was extracted, I should still be able to think. And,
in the

same way, the

fact that

an abnormal

state of the brain

may

affect

our thoughts does

not prove that the normal states of the brain

are necessary for thought.

6o

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
is
it

Even if the brain while we have bodies,

essential to thought

would not follow

that

when we ceased
think

to

have brains

we could

not

without

them.

The same argument

It

applies here as with the organs of sense.

might be that the present inability of the self to think except in connexion with the body was a limitation which was imposed by the
presence of the body, and which vanished
with
it.

We

have

now considered the two arguments

of

against the immortality of the self

from the death

the body.

which spring But we have

this question

said nothing as to the bearing

on

of stories as to the ghosts of the dead.

stories,

Such

however numerous and well authencould

ticated,

never
self

give

evidence that the

any positive was undying. At the

us

most they could prove that it survived its body for a few centuries. But indirectly the
evidence could be of considerable importance.

For

it

might
the

possibly

prove
its

that

the

self

survived

death of

body.

Now

the

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
death of
that
its

6i

body
for
if

is

by

far the strongest

self's

reason

we have

doubting the

immor-

tahty.

And

the appearance of ghosts could

prove that this reason had no weight, they would have removed the greatest difficulty in
the

way

of the belief. of the evidence offered

Much
is

on

this subject

doubtless utterly untrustworthy.

a

But there
to
in

good deal which investigation has failed break down. And there is much to be said
is

support of the view that, after

all

deductions

have been made for fraud,

ence, there
is
still

error,

and coincidresiduum
to

sufficient

justify the belief that

such apparitions are in some cases caused by the dead man whose

body they represent. But the mere proof

that there

was

this causal

connexion between the dead

apparition

man and

the

would not

dead man
of effects
is

prove that the had survived his death. A chain

suffice to

may

exist long after its original cause

destroyed.

Chatham may be one

of

of the

chief

causes

the

pride

which England

62
excites
in

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

an Englishman to-day, but this proves nothing as to Chatham's present existence.

And,

as

far

as

know,

all

stories

of

apparitions

would be equally well explained

that a

by the theory
death, initiate a

man

might, before his

chain of circumstances which

would cause
death,
alive.

his apparition to appear, after his

under certain conditions, to men still In this case, nothing would be proved

about his existence after death.

This

may appear

improbable.

But, on the

other hand, any attempt to prove empirically

that

man

could survive death would have to

struggle with such an

tive

enormous mass

of nega-

evidence that

its

antecedent improbability
Investigation

would

also not be small.

may

give us more evidence, and evidence incompatible with

vival.

any theory except that of surBut at present it seems to me that we

of proving our im-

have

much more chance

mortality by metaphysics than

research.

by psychical
Is

We

now come

to the third

question.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
there any reason to suppose that

63
self

my

does
I

not

share

the
all

transitory

character which

recognize in

the material objects around

me What
?

exactly

is

this transitory

character

When
does
thing
it

science says that a material object

planet, or a

human body mean ? It does

annihilated.

ceases
not
It

to exist,

what

mean

that anyunits,

is

means

that

which were combined

in a certain

way, are
has

now combined
changed.
before
is

otherwise.

The form

But everything which was there

there now.

need not inquire whether this distinction between an unchanging matter and a
changing form can have more than a rough
approximate correctness.
note that the
It
is

We

sufficient to

weight may us reason to suppose anything to be transitory

except combinations.^
I do not mean to imply that science necessarily accepts any units as indivisible and imperishable. My
*

analogy of science whatever be attached to it does not give

64
Is

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
the self a combination
?

It

certainly reit

sembles a combination in one respect, for

differentiated

is

and contains a
sensations

plurality.
at

We
same

can have

different

the

moment, and

sensations, thoughts,

and desires
it

can exist simultaneously.

follow from this that a self

But
is

does not

a combination.
it is

For

if

whole

is

a combination
exist

of parts

which could

up without being com-

built

bined in that way, while the combination could not exist without them. If the bricks of a

were destroyed, the wall would be destroyed too. But the wall might
wall,

for

instance,

be destroyed by being taken to pieces, and the bricks would remain unchanged.

Do
to
it ?

the parts of the self stand in this relation

Could

my

thoughts,

my

volitions,

my
It

emotions, exist isolated, or in

tions,
point

new combinato exist

?

when my

self

had ceased

is that it tells us that whatever does perish does so only by the separation of the parts of which it is composed. Those parts may themselves be combinations.

Thus

it

is

possible that they

infinitum.

may perish, and so on ad But nothing perishes but combinations.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
seems
clear to

65

me the

for discussion

that they cannot.

point

is

too ultimate
It is

incon-

ceivable that a thought, a sensation, a volition,

or an emotion should exist outside of a
self.

And

it is

inconceivable that the same thought,

sensation, volition, or emotion

which was once

com-

part of

my mind
The

could ever be part of someself,

body
it

else's.

we must
It

say,

is

plex, but not a

is

compound.

has parts, but

For, while
just as
it

not built up out of them.

depends on them, they depend on it.

much

The

self,

therefore,
its

cannot cease by the

separation of

parts.
it,

For

its

parts

only

exist as united in

and therefore could not

it

separate from

it.

If

did cease to

exist,

it

could

only be

only that
that the

is It not by annihilation. the form would have changed, but

form and content

alike

would have

perished.

Now
treats

there

is

no

analogy in
this.

science to

suggest the probability of

For science

nothing as perishable except combina5

66
tions.

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
This, indeed, does not give us any safe
self.

analogy for the persistence of the

first

In the

place, there

is

reason to doubt the absolute

validity of the distinction

between content and

it

form,

which science

finds

convenient to

And, in the second place, the difference between a self and matter is too great for
make.
an analogy from one to the other to be very
conclusive.

But

at

any

rate science gives

no

analogy against us.

All this assertion
still

leaves us very far from a positive

of

immortality.
is

Even though
for
self

the the

death of the body

destruction of the

no argument

self,
its

and the
it

cannot be
possible

decomposed
this

into

parts,

is

still

that the self should not be immortal.

And
of

view has been held

It

in

many systems

idealism.

may be

maintained, for example,

that finite individuals only exist to carry out

some divine purpose, and

that an individual
for

that

it

is

possible

may
Or

cease to be necessary
exist.

such a purpose, and so cease to

Lotze's view.
again,
it

This

was

may be main-

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
tained that
there
is

67

in the idea of a self,

something contradictory which prevents us from

regarding
reality,

adequate expression of and that therefore there is no reason

it

as

an

any particular self shares the eternity which is characteristic of true

suppose
reality.

to

that

To meet such doubts

as these

it

would be

necessary to construct a complete metaphysical should have to determine what system.

We

was the

general

nature of

all

reality,

and
of

whether that nature involved the existence

finite selves.

And

if

in this

way we reached
would

the conclusion that the existence of finite selves

was
arise

eternally necessary, the question

whether each

self

was

eternal, or whether,

on the other hand, there was an unending

succession of transitory selves.

And,

if

the

former alternative were accepted, we should have to consider the relation between eternity

and immortality. All that I have endeavoured to do here has been to show that the more
obvious arguments against immortality

those

68

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

which have most weight with most people have no vaUdity.

In spite of
all

arguments, however, the idea

that the self cannot be immortal continually

returns to us.

Reflection

may
it

drive

it

away,

but in unreflective

moments

besets us again.

We

seem
It
it

so small,
is

great.

always hard

when

seems

there are times believe that impossible

to

and the transitory seems so

each of us can be a permanent element in a

universe in which nations and planets are but

momentary shapes.

And
more
the

the belief in immortality seems

all

the
of
it

incredible
believers.

when we

consider

many
in

Many
it

people

believe

because they wish

to

be

true, their desires

blinding their judgments.

Many

believe in

it

on the authority of some religion claiming to be revealed most of which must, on any

hypothesis, be untrustworthy.

It

is

illogical

to conclude that a belief cannot be true be-

cause

it

has generally been believed for misit is

taken reasons, but

difficult, in practice, to

HUMAN IMMORTALITY
keep our
distrust

69

from spreading from the reasons to the beUef. Yet I think that reasons for the belief in immortaUty may be found of
such strength that they should prevail over
difhculties.
all

PART

II

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
I

WISH here

to
if

point out

some reasons
it

for

thinking that,

men

are immortal,

is

more
life,

probable that the beginning of the present

in

which each

of us finds himself

now, was not

the beginning of his whole existence, but that

he lived before

it,

as he will live after

it.

wish, secondly, to

consider the
true,

explanation

which

this theory,

if

would

afford of

some
such

of the facts of our experience,

and

to consider

what would be the

immortality as
it

practical value of

can offer us.

The present
to

attitude of
of

most western thinkers

is

the

doctrine

pre-existence

curious.
after the

Of the many who [regard our

71

life

death of our bodies as certain or probable,

72

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
life

scarcely one regards our

before the birth

of those bodies as a possibility

which deserves

discussion.^

And
and

yet

it

was taught by Buddha

and by
should
that

Plato,

it is

usually associated with

the belief in immortality in the far east.

Why

men who

are so anxious to-day to prove

is

we

shall live after this life

ended regard
beneath con-

the hypothesis that

we have

already survived
is

the end of a
sideration
?

life

as

one which

The

explanation of

this,

suppose,

is

that in

modern western thought

Under

the great support of

the belief in immortality has been the Christian

religion.

these circumstances a form

of the belief

that religion
of

which was never supported by was not likely to be considered

any importance. And, for some reason, Christians have almost unanimously rejected those theories which placed pre-exiwStence by
the side of immortality, although there seems
Lotze, for example, treats it as a serious objection to a particular argument for immortality, that it would lead conclusion of preto the strange and improbable
' '

existence.

Metaphysic, Section 245.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
nothing
in

73

pre-existence

incompatible with
are

any

of

the

dogmas

which

generally

accepted as fundamental to Christianity.

The most
doctrine
of

effective

way

of proving that the

doctrine of pre-existence

bound up with the immortality would be to prove

is

directly that the nature of

it

man was such

that

involved a
life.
I.,

life

both before and after the

I

present
of Part

But, as

said at the beginning

if it is

such a demonstration,
believe
it

possible

at all, as

to be,

would be
it

the scope of this book, since

a determination of

beyond would involve

most funda-

far

some

of the

mental characteristics of
I

reality.

must content myself with stating in a more general manner my grounds for believing that
any evidence which
will also

will

prove immortality

prove pre-existence.

There are two

ways

in

which a proof

of immortality
is

may be
that

attempted.
physical way.

The

first

the

directly metato

We
man
is

may attempt

show

the nature of

such that he cannot cease

74

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
;

to exist while the universe continues to exist

or that his nature

is

eternal,

and

that an eternal
;

nature cannot have an end in time

or pursue

some

similar line of argument.

In this

case

it

seems

to

me
it

that,

if

we
also

succeed

in

proving immortality,
considerations which

will

be by

means

of

would

prove pre-existence. I do not see how existence in future time could be shown to be
necessary in the case of
existence in past time
is

any being whose admitted not to be

necessary.
a

If

the universe got on without

ago,

me

hundred years

what reason could be

it

given for denying that

me

might get on without Or if it is cona hundred years hence ?

with

sistent

my eternal
we

nature that

its

temporal
in

manifestation should begin at

time, could

some point

find any reason for supposing

that the cessation of that manifestation at

some

point in time would be inconsistent with that

nature

do not see

of
I

what kind such a

of

reason could be, nor do

that has

know

any attempt

been made

to establish one.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
There
is

75

another way in which attempts have been made to prove immortahty. This
consists in demonstrating that the universe
is

the

work

of

a benevolent creator, or has a

purpose harmonious with our ideals of morality, and then arguing that the absence of immortality

would be inconsistent with the benevo-

lence of such a creator, or with such a moral

Arguments of this type could prove immortality more readily than they could
purpose.

prove pre-existence.
to the

No wrong
and
it

can be done

non-existent,
a

could hardly be

made

reproach
it

universe that
it

goodness of the had waited a long time before

to

the

produced a particular person. But, once produced, any person has certain moral claims,

and

if

it

could be shown that his annihilation

claims,

was inconsistent with those

we could

argue from the goodness of the universe to the

impossibility of his annihilation.

Can we, however,

validly conclude

from the

goodness of the universe to the impossibility of a particular evil ? It cannot be denied that

76

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
evil

some

does

exist.

The

ultimate nature of

reality,

then,

is

not
evil.

incompatible with the

existence of

some

And when
for an

this is

once

admitted, can
that

we hope

any particular

evil is

a priori proof too bad to be con?

sistent

with the nature of the universe

It

seems to

me

that

we
all

cannot, and that

we must

therefore reject
to

arguments which attempt prove that a thing is unreal because it would

evil.

be

We

may

call

arguments

of this sort ethical,

since they involve the conception of the good.

Modern demonstrations

of

immortality have

almost always been of this character, and not

purely metaphysical, and this
it

explains

why

has often been held in modern times that

immortality was proved, although pre-existence

has almost always been disbelieved.

Even

the

arguments of the eighteenth century, which were attacked by Kant, had an ethical element in them. Their supporters endeavoured, indeed, to prove by purely metaphysical considerations that the nature of man's spirit was

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
such that
it

^^

could not be destroyed in the

But they held that ordinary course of nature. each man had been created by an act of the
divine will, and they admitted that a similar
act could destroy him.

In order to

show

that

God

never would will to destroy a

man whom
back on

he had once created, they either

fell

the asserted evidence of revelation, or con-

tended that such destruction would be inconsistent

with what

we knew

of

God's moral

character, in

which case

their

argument had

passed over into the ethical class. If, as I have maintained, ethical arguments
of this sort are invalid,

we

are forced back

on

the purely metaphysical arguments, and here

we seem
future
that

unable to treat the past and the

differently.

My

conclusion

is,

then,

any demonstration of immortality is likely to show that each of us exists through all
time
to

past

and future

whether

time

is

held

be

finite or infinite.

must now inquire what consequences would follow from the truth of pre-existence

We

78

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
Each man would have
one before
It

and immortality.

at
it,

least three lives, his present life,

and one

after

it.

however, that this

seems more probable, would not be all, and that

his existence before

and

after his present life

would
lives,

be divided into many each bounded by birth and death. This

in

each

case

doctrine of a plurality of future lives and of

past lives

may be

conveniently referred to as

the doctrine of plurality of lives.^

There

is

much

to be said for the

view that a

plurality of lives
alternative,

would be the most probable even on a theory of immortality

which did not include pre-existence. We do not know what is the cause which produces
the limitation of our present lives by birth and
death, but

some cause there must

be,

and a

cause which produces so important an effect

^

In one sense, of course, a belief in pre-existence and

immortality is itself a belief in a plurality of lives, since But it will, I think, be it is a belief in three at least. more convenient to reserve the name for the belief

mentioned above that for each of us existence on one or both sides of the present life would be divided into

more

lives than one.

HUMAN PKE-EXISTENCE
is

79
exist-

one which plays a great part

it

in

our

ence, as long as
If

continues to

act.

we accept immortaUty and reject a

of lives

and

plurality

this is the

most

common opinion,

though plurality
that

of

lives

is

frequently than pre-existence

the
causes,

we

accepted more

must hold

whatever

they are, which

operate on each of us so as to cause his death

once, will never operate again on any of us

through

all

future time.

This

is,

of course,

not impossible.

The
is

true nature of death

may

be such that there

bility, of its

no need, and no possiBut I do not see that repetition.

reason to believe this to be even

we have any
probable.
It is

quite clear that a

life

which stretched

on unendingly without death would in many respects be enormously different from our
attempt to imagine how our present lives would be transformed if neither
present
lives.

An

we

ourselves, nor our fellow-men,

will

had

in future

any chance of death,

make

this evident.

believer

in

immortality

who

denies,

or

8o

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
the
lives,

regards as improbable, the doctrine of

phirahty of

must

assert,

or regard as

probable, that the death which ends his present

life for

each of us

will

change profoundly and

of all future
justification.
life.

permanently the conditions And for this there seems no

If

we

are immortal, the value of our existat

ence either remains permanently

present level, or rises or
the
first

about

its

falls after

death.

In

case,

we should have no
it

reason to
that death
it

suppose that

was so changed

would not

recur.
it

As

have

said,
so.

is

not

impossible that

should be

But when

anything has a particular characteristic, the presumption is that, if that thing continues to
exist, its characteristic will

not suddenly vary.

The presumption
it

is

certainly not strong,

and

can give us no firm belief. But it is, I think, sufficient to render it rather more
probable that the characteristic of periodic mortality will not be left behind at the end of

our present
I

lives.

do not think

that

this

would be very

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
generally denied.
of lives
is

8i

The

denial of the plurality

generally based on the belief that

at the

our

lives

do not remain

same

level after

death.
that
is
it

It is
is

not because

men have

died once
It

held that they cannot die again.

it

because

is

believed that after death they

are in heaven or hell, the one

level of earthly
It
is
life,

the

much above the other much below it.

in

contended that the change effected

this

manner renders further deaths improbable.

is

This

especially maintained with regard to

heaven.

might be admitted that a state of absolute perfection would render further death improbable. But even the best men are not, when
It

they die, in such a state of intellectual and

moral perfection as would fit them to enter heaven immediately, if heaven is taken as a
state of absolute perfection

which renders

all

further
sible.

improvement unnecessary and imposThis is generally recognized, and one

is
is

of

two alternatives
it.

meet

The

first

commonly adopted to that some tremendous

6

82

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

improvement
life

an improvement out of

all

pro-

portion to any which can ever be observed in

takes

place at the

any

rate in the case of

moment of death, at those who die under

this, so far as
I

certain conditions.

For

know,

there are no arguments.

The
that

other and
the

more

probable alternative

is

process of

gradual improvement can go on in each of us

after the

But
present

if

death of our present bodies. our existence immediately after our

life
is

imperfect, and a state of imit

provement and advance,

that

has not yet reached

which might make future deaths improbable. And it seems to

absolute perfection

me

that the natural inference

it

from

this

view

of

though
those

is

not

drawn by the majority

it

who

hold

is

that this life will

it,

be

followed by others like

its

each separated from predecessor and successor by death and

re-birth.

For otherwise we should be limited

to the hypothesis that a process of develop-

ment, begun in a single life bounded by death, would be continued as an indefinitely long

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
life

83
all.

not divided by birth and death at

to suppose, without

And

any reason, such a change from the order of our present experience seems unjustifiable.

Should any persons be destined to attain a state of great and permanent degradation,
there would be
that this
still

less

reason for supposing

all

would exclude

death from their

in-

future existence.

Death may possibly be

it

compatible with absolute perfection, but

has

no characteristic which can be suggested as incompatible with the extreme of human

degradation.

In addition to this
it

we may
is

urge,

as in the case of heaven, that

unreason-

able to

suppose an extreme change at the moment of death, and that, even if the completed degradation was likely to exclude death,

there could be no reason for supposing that the process towards it would do so from the
first.

begun in this life are sometimes finished in it, and sometimes left
Again,
processes

incomplete.

We

continually find that death

84

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
a

leaves a fault without a retribution, a retri-

bution without a repentance,

preparation

without an achievement, while in other cases,

where the
process
If
is

life

has lasted longer,

a similar

complete between birth and death.

men

survive death,

we must
in

expect that

these processes,
death, will

when

not worked out before

a future
life.

be worked out

And

if

the content of our existence after death

has so

much

similarity, in essential features,

with the content of

our present

lives,

the

presumption

is

increased that they have not

as
to

changed so

far

have

shaken

off

the

necessity of periodical death.^

There seems,

therefore,

good

reason for

regarding plurality of lives as the least im-

probable alternative, even

tality
if

if

we

accept immor-

without accepting pre-existence. But pre-existence is also accepted, the case for

a plurality of lives

becomes
alters

stronger.

For
life

then the death which

*

my

present

On

this subject

we may

refer to Browning's Evelyn

Hope.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
is

85

no longer an unique event in my existence. One life, if no more, came to an end for me
before

my

present

life

could begin.

Thus any

theory would be false which should try to reject the plurality of lives on the ground that

was probable that death could only occur once in a man's existence. And the plurality
it

of lives could only

if

be regarded as improbable, there was reason to suppose that an event,

which happened twice in a man's existence, would never happen a third time. Now while
might be contended though, as I have said, I do not think it could be rightly contended that there were features about death which
it

in

made

it

probable

it

would only occur once

it

a man's
slightest
is

existence,

is

difficult

to

see the

ground

for the suggestion that there

it

anything about death which should make

it

improbable that
although
it

should occur three times, was known that it occurred twice.

can only accept immortality and preexistence, while rejecting the plurality of lives,
if

We

we hold

that the

causes which break off

86 a
life

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
by a death,
after

remaining dormant

from the beginning of our existence, act twice within an interval of from five minutes to
about a hundred years, and then never act
again through
all

future time.
to

The

result

seems
is

be

that,

that pre-existence

certain,

even granting there can be no

absolute demonstration of plurality of lives,

but that the plurality of lives

probable
still

is

the

more
is

supposition

in

any

case,

and

more probable on the hypothesis

of

of pre-

existence.

There are various features

life

our present
satisfactorily

which can be explained more

on the theory of pre-existence than on any other. I do not, however, wish to suggest
that

the

ease of

explaining

them on

this

hypothesis, or the difficulty of explaining

them

without

it, is

so great as to form any proof of

the doctrine of pre-existence.

I

That doctrine,

be proved by metaphysical arguments of the type mentioned at the bebelieve, can only

ginning of this chapter.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
The most important
be found
of these features
is

87
to

in personal relations.

who have
often

seen but

little

people of each other are

Two

drawn together by a force equal to that whicb is generated in other cases by years of mutual trust and mutual assistance.

The

significance of

this

fact

has been,

think, very

explained,

much underrated.^ when any attempt at

It is

generally
is

explanation

made, by the capriciousness of sexual desire. This explanation is inadequate, because the
fact to

found with as great proportional frequency in friendships which have no connexion with sexual desire.
be explained
is
1

The same may be

said of

all

facts

connected with
another.
to take

the love of one particular

Philosophy and theology,

for

human being for when they profess

it

men's love seriously, generally confine

either to a love
It is

God, or to a passion

for

mankind as a whole.

rarely that the writings of a philosopher or a theologian find anything in a young man's love for his sweetheart

except a mixture of sexual desire and folly, or anything in a young man's love for his comrade except folly pure and simple. Hegel is, I think, to be regarded as an exception. Possibly, also, the writer of the first epistle
of St. John.

88'

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
On the
theory of pre-existence such relations

would naturally be explained by the friendThe love which comes ships of past lives.
and the love which grows up through many years in this life, would be referred to similar causes, whose similarity
at first

sight,

would account

for the similarity of the effects.

Each would have

arisen through long intimacy,

and the only difference between them would be that in one case the intimacy had been
suspended by death and
Again, as a
re-birth.

man grows up
make

certain tendencies

and
him.

qualities

themselves
entirely

manifest

in

They cannot be

due

to

his

environment, for they are often very different in people whose environment has been very
similar.

We

call

these

the

man's natural

character,

and assume

that he

came

into life

with

it.

Such tendencies and

qualities, since

they are not due to anything which happens

after birth,

may be

called innate, as far as the

present

life is

concerned.
look at the natural characters

Now when we

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
of

89

men, we find that

quaUties

in

many

cases they

possess

strongly

resembhng those

which, as

we

learn

by direct experience, can

be produced in the course of a single life. One man seems to start with an impotence to
resist

which exactly resembles the impotence which has been produced in another man by continual yielding

some

particular temptation

to the

same temptation. One man, again, has virtue which through life a calm and serene
another gains only by years of strenuous effort. Others, again, have innate powers of judging
in emercharacter, or of acting with decision

gencies,

which give them, while yet inexperimen enced, advantages to which less fortunate them at all, only by attain, if they attain to Here then we have the experience of years.
characteristics

which

are

born with

us,

and

which closely resemble

in other cases,

characteristics which,
to

we know

be due to the conIf

densed results

of experience.

we hold

the

doctrine of pre-existence,
explain

we

shall

naturally

these

also

as

being

the

condensed

90

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

results of experience

in this case, of experi-

ence

in

an
it

earlier

life.

But,
these

may be
the

said,

can

we

not explain
as well

features of
of

our

life

quite

by

means

theory

of
?

heredity,

without

accepting pre-existence
sonal
relations,
I

In the case of per-

would help us
it

at

do not see that heredity I have admitted that all.

is

not impossible to explain the facts other-

wise than by pre-existence.

The

attraction

may be simply due

acter of each of

something in the charthe two persons, though in

to

many

cases

we cannot

see
it

what
is

that something

could be.

In this case

possible that the

element in question has been produced by

heredity.

But there

is
it

which should make

produce

nothing in heredity likely that it should

this result rather

than another, and

so the abstract possibility that the attraction

is

due

to

some undetected element

is

in the

two

characters

not increased by the suggestion

that the characters

were produced by heredity.

On

the theory of pre-existence, however,

we

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

91

can regard the effects as produced by a cause which would be likely to produce this result
rather

than
in

another

that
can

is,

by

relations

formed

an earlier

life.

Heredity,
satisfactory

however,

produce a more
innate
aptitudes.
is false

explanation of

have
is

My

ancestors

cannot

if

pre-existence

loved

my my

friend,

and therefore there

I

nothing in the fact that

explains

inherit
at

from them
first

that

loving

him
or

sight.

But
sins,

my

ancestors

may

have yielded to certain

practised
certain

or resisted them,

activities,

supposing that I can inherit the results which they have acquired,^

and

then,

there

would be a reason why

which

should have an

innate strength or weakness in certain directions,

closely

resembled similar charac-

teristics

which other men have acquired by

action in the course of their present

their
lives.

own

We
1

must,

however, remember that such

however,
is,

The

possibility of this,

to say the least,

highly uncertain.

92

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
where

innate dispositions often occur in cases

nothing of the sort can be traced among the even if, as sometimes happens, the ancestors

ancestors themselves can be traced for

back.
It
is

many

possible, no doubt, generations that the acquirement of some more remote ancestor may have remained dormant through

the intervening generations and have

now

re-

appeared,

but

the

explanation
it

is

naturally

much

less

probable than

is

in the
is

cases
to

where the ancestral acquirement

have existed.
But, as
I

known

have

said,

while

regard the

explanation of these facts by pre-existence as

better than any
it,

which can be offered without

of

do not regard the superiority

the

explanation as sufficient to give by

itself

any

appreciable probability to pre-existence, which,

if

established at

all,

must be established by
qualities can

more

directly metaphysical arguments.

Whether acquired
or not, there
is

be inherited
is

no doubt that there

a certain

tendency for

men

not

merely their bodies

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
but themselves

93

to
is
it

resemble their ancestors.

that this

And

it

may be thought

would be an
If

objection to our theory of pre-existence.

man's character
lives,

how can

determined by his previous be also determined by the

character of the ancestors by

whose bodies

his

body was generated ? There is, however, no

real difficulty here.

We

may have

reason to believe that a man's

character resembles to
his ancestors, but
it

some extent

that of

would be impossible to demonstrate, and there is no reason to believe, that there are no elements in it which could
not

be derived from that source.

On

the

other hand, the doctrine of pre-existence does

not compel us to deny
all

influence on a man's

character of the characters of his ancestors

The
him

character which a

man

has at any time

is

modified by circumstances which happen to

at that time,

and may well be modified

is

by the fact that his re-birth descended from ancestors of

character.

in

body

particular

94

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
Thus the two ways
in

which the character

need not

in this Hfe

is

said to be determined

be inconsistent, since they can both co-operate

in the determination, the tendencies inherited

with the body modifying the character as

it

was

left at
is

the end of the previous Hfe.

But

there

no impossibihty in supposing that the characteristics in which we resemble the

ancestors of our bodies,
characteristics

may be

to

some degree
In
it

due

to our previous lives.

walking through the streets of London,

extremely rare
to

is

meet a man whose hat

Hats

shows no

sort of adaptation to his head.

fit

in general

their wearers with far greater

if

accuracy than they would

each man's hat

were assigned to him by lot. And yet there is very seldom any causal connexion between the shape of the head and the shape of the
hat.

man's head

is

never

made
The

to

fit

his

hat, and, in the great majority of cases, his hat

is

not

made

to

fit

his head.

adaptation

by each man selecting, from hats made without any special reference to

comes about

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
his particular head, the hat

95

which

will suit his

particular

head

best.
it

This

may

help us to see that

would be

possible to hold that a

certain characteristics

man whose nature had when he was about to

in a

be re-born, would be re-born

body dein
this

scended from ancestors

of a similar character.

His character when re-born would,

case,

be decided, as
his

far as the points in

ques-

by and not by the character of the ancestors life, of his new body. But it would be the character of the ancestors of the
similarity to his character,

tion went,

character in his previous

new body, and

its

which determined

he was re-born in that body rather than another. The shape of the head
the fact
that
to

go back to our analogy does not determine the shape of the hat, but it does determine the
selection of
ticular head.
this

particular hat for this par-

But how,
with the

it

may be
that
is

asked,

would each

person, in this case, be brought into connexion

new body

most appropriate

to

96

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
?

him

do not see any

various
affinities for

difficulty here.

We
meet

know

that

substances

which have
will

chemical

one another

and combine, separating themselves, to do so, from other substances with which they have
been previously
result as to
truth.
in connexion.

And we do
to recognize

not

find anything so strange or paradoxical in this

make us unwilling
to

its

There seems

me

to

be nothing more

strange or paradoxical in the suggestion that

each person enters into connexion with the body which is most fitted to be connected
with him.
there were
it

And,

if

any

difficulty

in

this

supposition,

is

a difficulty

which would be
adopted by most
reject pre-exist-

just as serious for the theory

believers in immortality
ence.
If

who

no man existed before the formation

still

of his present body, the question

arises

how

did he

become connected with

body

such that his character resembles the characters of

the ancestors of that body

if

The
that

question would not arise

we supposed

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
the whole
character of the
self

97

was simply
difficult

produced by the body.

ordinary view.

But
it

this is not the

Indeed,

would be

to hold this without also holding that the self,

as well as

body.

was produced by the And such a view as this would be all

its

character,

but incompatible

if

not quite incompatible

is

with the belief in immortality.

Again, the question of

how

the connexion

determined, might be considered to have been

answered

if

it

were held that the parents

at the

created the

new person
I
it

time that they

generated the body.

difficultes

will

not discuss the

to

which, as

seems
I

me, are

in-

volved in this view, since

the

am
it.

dealing with

consequences of pre-existence, and not

It is

with the theories which deny

cient to

suffi-

remark here that

this is not the

view

most generally adopted.

is

The common
created,

belief

that

the

person
his

is

not by the

parents of

body,

but

directly

by the

supreme power

of the universe.
still

And

then the question

remains

how
7

gg

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
come
into exist-

does this person get into connexion with the

appropriate body, since they

ence independently

It
It

seems that there are

only two alternatives.

may be

said that the

connexion

is

due

to a special

act of divine
it

providence in each case. But, if mate to invoke such a special act

surely just as legitimate to invoke

is

legitiit

at all,
it

is

to

make

a connexion for a previously existing person

as for a

newly created person.

that

Or

else

it

may
is

be said

the

appropriate connexion

brought about by some general law. And there can be no greater difficulty in supposing

such a law to act on persons who had previously existed than in supposing it to act on
persons newly created.
fore,
if

The

difficulty, there-

there

is

one,

is

no greater

for those

who
deny
Is

accept pre-existence than for those

it.

who

the

truth

of

pre-existence

desirable

How much
to

would an immortality be worth us which was coupled with pre-existence ?

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
The most
serious objection relates to

99

memory.

do not now remember anything of any If, nevertheless, we have lived previous Ufe.
previously,

We

and have forgotten

to expect that

it,

there seems

no reason

we

shall

remember

our present life during subsequent lives. an existence that is cut up into separate
in

Now
lives,

none

of

vious
value.

life,

which memory extends to a premay be thought to have no practical

might as well be mortal, it has as be immortal without a memory

We
said,

been

beyond the present life. The question becomes more serious if not only pre-existence,
but also the plurality of lives
is

true.

For

then

might reasonably be feared that we might lose memory, not only twice in our existence, but an indefinitely large number of times.
it

Sometimes, indeed, it has been asserted that such a state would not be immortality at all. Without memory of my present life, it is said,

my
it,

future

life

would not be mine.

If
I

memory

ceases at the death of

my

body,

cease with

and

am

not immortal.

100
If

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
each
life

no continuity with its successors, and no effect on them, then indeed there might be Uttle meaning in caUing them
lives of

had

the same

person.

But we cannot
If

suppose that this could be the case.

the

same

self

passes through various lives, any

to
it

change which happens

affect its state in the

at

any time must

future time.

time immediately suball

sequent, and, through this, in

Death and

re-birth,

no doubt, are of sufficient

importance to modify a character considerably, but they could only act on what was already present, and the nature with which
each individual
starts

in

any

life

would be

moulded by
the past.
identity
It

his

experiences and actions in

is

And

this

sufficient to

make

the

between the

different lives real.

has also been objected that the re-birth

of a person without a
life

memory

of his previous

would be exactly equivalent to the annihilation of that person and the creation of
a

new person
this
it

of

exactly similar

character.

(By

is

not meant that the

new person

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
would be exactly
similar to the old

loi
at

one

the

moment

of the latter's annihilation, but that

he would be exactly similar to what the old person would have been if he had undergone
the process of re-birth.) Now, it is argued, I should not regard myself as immortal if I

knew
even

that
if

was

to

be annihilated

at death,

knew

that an exactly similar person

would then be

created.

And

therefore,

it

is

concluded, re-birth without

memory

cannot be
self.

considered as real immortality of the

But the objection supposes an impossibility. There could not be another self which would have a character exactly similar to what mine

would have been under the same circumstances.

The

self
is

is

not a 'thing in
its

itself,'

whose nature

independent of

qualities.
it

The

self is

a substance with attributes, and

has no nature except to express itself in its attributes. If the character of the new self,

under

certain

similar to

my

exactly character under the same cirattributes

circumstances,

were

cumstances,

its

would be exactly

102

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
my
attributes.

similar to
also

Then

the substance

would be the same, and I should not be But if there were a new annihilated at all.^
self,

then the difference between the selves

must be expressed by some difference in the Then the new self would not be attributes.
of exactly similar character to

what

should

have been under the same circumstances, and

therefore the creation of a

new

self

would not

be exactly equivalent to

my

re-birth.
is

Thus
suffi-

exact similarity of attributes

always

cient to prove personal identity, not because

it
1

would be

sufficient

if

the substance were

It will be seen that I am assuming here that there cannot be two different substances with exactly similar It does not lie within the scope of this book attributes.

to

discuss

this

Identity of

principle, Indiscernibles.

commonly known
It is

as
for

the

sufficient
is

our

present purpose to remark that the principle by most philosophers of the present day.

accepted
those

And

who deny it, and assert that things which are exactly similar may yet be numerically different, would not
hold that the annihilation of one thing and the creation of another could be exactly equivalent to the continuance of the first, even though the second was exactly
similar to the
first.

For, although exactly similar, they

different.

would be numerically

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
different,

103

but because
the same.

it

proves that the sub-

stance

is

We
of

may

say then that, in spite of the loss

it

memory,

is

the

the successive lives.

tality as this

same person who Hves in But has such immorfor the

any value

person

who

is

immortal
I

do not propose
has
all

to discuss

whether any

immortality

any

value.

Some people
is

maintain that

human

existence

evil,

however favourable the conditions.

Others

regard existence as of such value that they

would be prepared
annihilation.
violently,

to choose hell rather than

Among

those

who

differ

less

some regard the

life

of the average

man on
if
it

earth at present as of positive value,

it

while others will only regard

is

as valuable

the necessary preparation for a better

is

life

which

to follow.
life

Such differences

as to

the value of
differences

must obviously produce great

to

as

the value of
I

its

unending

prolongation.
is

All that

shall

maintain here
not render

that the loss of

memory need

104

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
if it

immortality valueless

would not have been

valueless without the loss of

If

memory.

existence

expected to

beyond the present life is not improve, and yet immortality is

regarded as valuable, it must be because a life no better than this is looked on as possessing
value.

Now

it

is

certain that in this

lives,

life
it

we
be

remember no previous
because

whether

we have

forgotten them, or because

there have been none to remember.

this life has value
itself,

And

if

without any

memory beyond

why should not future lives have value without memory beyond themselves ? In that case a man will be better off for his immortality,

since
of

it

will

give

him an unlimited
instead of a

amount
that he

valuable

existence,

limited amount.

And

man who

believed

had

this

immortality would have a

more
if

desirable expectation of the future than

it.

he did not believe

If,

indeed, a

man

should say that he takes no more interest in

his

own

fate, after

memory

of his present life in the fate of

had gone, than he would take

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

105

some unknown person, I do not see how he could be shown to be in the wrong. But I do not beUeve that most men would agree
with him, and to most men, therefore, the
existprospect of a continuance of valuable

ence, even with the periodical loss of

memory,

would
But

still

seem

to

be desirable.
is

immortality
it

not

only,

or

chiefly,
life like

desired because

will give us
Its

more
is

our present
those people
will

life.

attraction

chiefly for
life

who

believe that the future

any rate for many of us, a great improvement on the present. Heaven is longed
be, at
for,

not merely because

it

it

will

be unending,

but because

will

be heaven.

Now
for

it

might be said that our chief ground

for a progressive

hoping

improvement
if

after

death would be destroyed

cally

memory
be

periodi-

argued, might would not only remove us from the field of our activity, but would deprive us of all

ceased.

Death,

it

what we had done, and therefore whatever was gained in one life would be lost

memory

of

io6
at

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
death.

We

could no

more hope

for

permanent improvement than a man on the treadmill can hope to end higher than he
started.

We are
progress
ask,
if

not discussing the chance of future

progress, but only the relative chance of such

memory

ceases at death.
of

We

must
are

therefore,

what elements

value

carried on
future.

by memory from the present to the And then we must consider whether

they can be carried on without memory. I think I shall be in agreement with most
people

when
it

say that

memory

is

chiefly of
first

value in our lives in three ways.

place,

In the

may make

us wiser.

The

events
at

which we have seen, and the conclusions which we have arrived, may be preserved

in

memory, and
virtuous.
it

so

add

to our present
it

In the second

place,

may

knowledge. make us more

The memory of
circumstances
temptation.

a temptation, whether

has been resisted or successful,

may under
resisting
it

various

help us

in

present

In the third place,

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
may now
tell

107

us that people with

the

related are

people
this

whom we are whom we have

enter as an

loved in the past,

and

may
is

element into our present love of them.

The value
means the
virtue,

of

memory,

then,

that

by
If

its

past

may

serve the
of

wisdom, the
the

and the love

the present.

past could help the present in a like

manner

without the aid of memory, the absence of memory need not destroy the chance of an

improvement spreading over many

Let us consider wisdom
first.

lives.

Can we be

wiser by reason of something which

forgotten
is
?

Unquestionably we can. not merely, or chiefly, amassed facts, or even

we have Wisdom

recorded judgements. It depends primarily on a mind qualified to deal with facts, and
to

form judgements. Now the acquisition of knowledge and experience, if wisely conducted,
strengthen the mind.

may
who men

Of

sufficient evidence in this

life.

we have And so a man

that

dies after acquiring

acquire some

might

knowledge
enter his

and
new

all

life,

io8

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

deprived indeed of his knowledge, but not deprived of the increased strength and dehcacy of mind which he had gained in acquiring the knowledge. And, if so, he will be wiser in
the second
in the first.
life

because of what has happened

Of course he

loses

something
it

in losing the
if

actual knowledge.

But

is

sufficient

he

does not lose

all.

advance of a
retreat,

tide,

Most progress is like the whose waves advance and

retreat

but

do

not
is

as

far

as

they
really

advanced.
a gain
ledge,
?

And

not

even

this loss

For the mere accumulation

of

know-

if

memory never

ceased,

would soon
useless.

become overwhelming, and worse than

What
their

better fate could

we wish
the

for than to

leave such accumulations behind us, preserving

greatest

value in

mental faculties

which

have
?

been

strengthened

by

their

acquisition

With

virtue

the point

For the memory

perhaps clearer. of moral experiences is of no

is
it

value to virtue except in so far as

helps to

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
form the moral character, and,
the loss of the
virtue.
if

109

this is

done,

memory would be no

loss to

Now we

cannot doubt that a character

event which
forgotten
evil
life.

may remain determined by an

has been forgotten.
greater
I

have

the
acts

number
I

of

the

good and
present
a trace on

which

have done in

my

And
char-

yet each
acter.

must have
so a

left

my

And

man may

carry over into his

next

life

the dispositions and tendencies which

this

he has gained by the moral contests of

life,

and the value

of those experiences will

not have been destroyed by the death which

has destroyed the

memory of them. There remains love. The problem

here

is

more important, if, as I believe, it is in love, and in nothing else, that we find not only the
supreme value
reality of
life,

of

life,

but also the supreme

of the past gives

and, indeed, of the universe.

The

gain which the

is

us here

that the

memory memory

of past love for

any person can strengthen our present love of him. And this is what must be preserved, if

no

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
is

the value of past love

not to be

lost.

The
which

knowledge we acquire, and the

efforts

we make,
it

are directed to ends not themselves.

itself.

But love has no end but

helps us
us.
little

If it

has gone,
it

that

we keep

anything

has

brought

But past hours of love are past, whether we remember them or not. Yet we do not
count their value to be
lost,

since their

remem-

brance makes

love

in

the

present stronger

and deeper. Now we know that present love can also be stronger and deeper because of Much has past love which we have forgotten.
been forgotten
lasted
in

any friendship which has

for several years within the limits of

life

a single

many confidences, many

present.

services,

many hours of happiness and sorrow. But they have not passed away without leaving
their

mark on the

They

contribute,

though they are forgotten, to the present love which is not forgotten. In the same way, if
the whole

memory

of

the love of a

life
if

is

swept away

at death, its

value ia not lost

the

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
same love
is

iii

stronger in a

new

life

because of

what passed before. Thus what is won

served in another,
the
first
life
if

in

one

life

the people

may be prewho love in

in

love
if

the

same
is

people in the
greater

second, and

their
it

love

the

second because

was there
hope
?

in the first.

Have

we any ground
ditions will

to

that these

two con-

be

fulfilled
first.

Let us take the

is right,

We

have

many

lives

perhaps

shall,

if

my

theory
mil-

many

lions of lives,

and perhaps an
I

infinite

number.

Now
life

if

the fact that

loved a person in this

I

gave

me no
in

reason to suppose that

should

love
of

any other, then the whole value love would be as much confined to a single
as
if

him

life

there were no immortality.

it

And

in

might perhaps be said that the value of life was equally confined, and that
that case

immortality, though real, was worthless.

The chance
life,

of a love recurring in

any future

must depend primarily on the conditions which determine where and how the lovers

112

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
life.
it

are born in the future

For

if

memory

does not survive death,

for love to

will

be impossible

occur in any
If

do not meet.

which people the conditions which deterlife in

mine the

circumstances of

our

birth,

and

through them our juxtapositions throughout life, were themselves determined by chance,
or by
sity,

some merely mechanical

life
is

external neces-

the probability of meeting our friends in

another

would be too small

to

be regarded.

This
but
it

a consideration of great importance,

does not affect the question of the comparative value of immortality with or without

memory. Let us take the more ordinary view according to which our existence after
loss of

this life will

be one and unbroken, with a

possibility of

remembering
it,

in

it,

not only the

events which occur in

of this
is
life.

but also the events

life

If

the course of that future

determined by chance, or by mechanical necessity, there will be no reason for hoping

that

we shall meet beyond death the people whom we have loved in this life. Nor w^ould

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE

113

there be any reason for hoping that the love

thus denied fruition would be able to remain

unextinguished
separation

through

unlimited

ages

of

and new

activities.

Once admit

events to be determined in this way, and there

be gathered from immortality, whether with or without memory, either for

is

no comfort

to

love or for any of our other interests.

If

immortality

is

to give us an assurance or
it

a hope of progressive improvement,

can only

be

if

we have

reason

to

believe that the

interests of spirit are so

predominant a force

in the universe that they will find, in the long

run, satisfaction in the universe.

case, the constitution of

And, in this the universe would be

whether with or without memory, love would have its way. I will not here
such
that,

inquire whether the ultimate

spirit
is

significance of

But it will anything except love. least of all by those who scarcely be denied

feel the difficulties

which

ing

that the

am now
is

consideris

significance of love for spirit

very great.

And,

if

this

so,

then the
8

114

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
significant of their real posiin the

emotional relations which exist between people

must be highly
tions towards

one another

scheme

of

the universe.

In other words, people

who

are joined

by
the

love cannot be dependent for their proximity

to

each

other

and

possibility of their love

on

consequently

for

some chance or

mechanical arrangement whose recurrence we could have no reason to expect. Their love is
not the effect of proximity, but
their love
fact that
is

its

cause.

For

the

expression of the ultimate

is

each of them

more
is

closely con-

nected with the other than he

in general.

with people

proximity in a particular life, like everything else, is the effect or, rather,

And

the

manifestation

under

stances

of those relations which make up the

two people in we have, on the assumption we have
reason for believing

particular

circum-

eternal nature of the universe.

If,

therefore, love has joined

this

life,

been discussing, good

that their existences are

bound up with one

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
another, not for one
life

115

only, but for ever.

This would not involve their meeting in every life, any more than it would involve their

meeting every day of each

stronger for them.
large scale,

life.

Love can
often even
is

survive occasional absences, and

is

And

the universe

on a

which might require long absences.

is that,

What we
tinually

are entitled to believe

while

time remains, their eternal nearness must confind

life.

its

expression

in

proximity in

temporal
,

As

for the

second condition

if

friends are

not to be separated, then certainly the value of love in one life need not perish because there
is

of

no memory of it in the next. If by means it we make our relations stronger and finer,
at
?

then they will be stronger and finer next meeting. What more do we want
past
is
it

the

The

not preserved separately in

exists,

memory,
perfect

but

concentrated and united, in the

is

present.

Death
of the

thus

the

most

example

'collapse into

that mysterious phrase of

immediacy' Hegel's where all

ii6
that

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
was before a mass
has
of hard-earned acquisiin

tions

been

merged

the unity of a

developed character. If we still think that the past is lost, let us ask ourselves, as I suggested before, whether we regard as lost all those
incidents in a friendship which, even before
death, are forgotten.
I

do not deny
it

that in each particular

life

the prospect of the loss of

of
will

memory

at the

end

appear to some extent a loss and

In losing

a breach of continuity.
lose that in

memory we
value.
said,
I

Arguments may convince us as

I

which we have found great

have

think that they ought to convince

not lose
value,
all

us that

we do
highest

the value, or any of the

but

only

the

comparatively

worthless form, a form which the lapse of

years would change to a positive
evil.

But

no doubt we

shall

always have a tendency to

shrink from the loss of memory.

that, as

Yet

believe

we come
may,
I

to understand life better,

loss less

we

shall shrink

from such a

and

less.

We

think, fairly conclude that the

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
much,
if

117

value of immortality would not be lessened

by pre-existence. For the loss of memory which pre-existence renders probable, seems to me the only ground on which
at all,
it

has been held to diminish the value of

immortality.
Pre-existence,

indeed,

as

we have

seen,

renders more
lives.

probable a plurality of

future
of

And

lives
I

perhaps an
griefs,
is

the prospect of a great

infinite

number

think,

could be

gives disproved
dangers,

number, though

this,

us the

prospect of

many
in

many

conflicts,

many
Death

an indefinitely long future. It is a startingnot a haven of rest.

point for fresh labours.

great, so
is

But

if

the

trials

are

the recompense.

We

miss

much

here by our

own

circumstances.

much by Above all, we

folly,

unfavourable

miss much,

because so

many good

things are incompatible.

We
and

cannot spend our youth both in the study

in the saddle.

cannot gain the benefit both of unbroken health and of bodily weakness, both of riches

We

and

of poverty,

both of

ii8

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
isolation,

comradeship and of and of obedience.

both of defiance
learn

We

cannot

the

lessons alike of Galahad

of Caradoc. learn.

and

of Tristram
all

and
to

And Would it

yet they are

so

good
to

not be worth

much
in

be
life

able to

hope that what we missed

one

might come to us in another ? And would it not be worth much to be able to hope that we
might have a chance to succeed hereafter in
the tasks which
It

we

failed in here

may be

that the change, the struggle,

and

the recurrence of death, are endless, or, again,

it

may be

that

the

process will eventually

destroy

itself,^

transcends

all

and merge in a perfection which time and change. Such an end

it

may come,
be near.

perhaps, but at any rate

cannot

But though the way is long, and perhaps endless, it can be no more wearisome than
a single
^
'

life.

For with death we leave behind

altar,

As a God self-slain on his own strange Death lies dead.'

Swinburne

Forsaken Garden.

HUMAN PRE-EXISTENCE
us memory, and old age, and fatigue.
surely death acquires a
nificance

119

And
sig-

new and deeper

it

no longer as a single and unexplained break in an unending

life,

when we regard

but as part of the continually recurring

rhythm of progress and as benevolent

left

as
will

inevitable, as natural,

as sleep.

youth behind

us, as at

have only noon we have left

We

the sunrise.

They

both come back, and

they do not grow old.

POSTSCRIPT
In the nine years which have passed since I first wrote these pages, I have become more
firmly convinced that the nature of reality can be shown to be such as to justify a belief both

and in pre-existence. I hope future time to publish my grounds for this conviction, as part of a treatise on the
in immortality
at

some

general question of the fundamental nature of

reality.
July, 1915.

BILLING

AND

SONS, LTP., PRINTERS,

GUILBFeRD, ENGLAND

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