First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey Author(s): Richard W.

Bulliet Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Nov., 1978), pp. 489-495 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/162075 Accessed: 09/12/2010 07:27
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Int. Y. Middle East Stud. 9 (1978) 489-495

Printed in Great Britain

489

Richard W. Bulliet FIRST NAMES AND POLITICAL IN MODERN TURKEY CHANGE

One of the few predictable opportunities for the exercise of free will that comes the way of most human beings is the bestowal of names upon their children. To be sure, local or national custom may legally restrict or otherwise limit the scope of that freedom in some cases; but by and large, there is normally some choice to be made, and the beneficiary of the choice, the child, is inevitably powerless to influence it. A ruthless combing of anthropological literature might well turn up glaring exceptions to these generalizations, but for present purposes they will suffice to make a point. That point is that insofar as the choice of names given children by their parents is a free choice, the names chosen may potentially be considered reflections of the influences impinging upon those parents and guiding their choices. Whether it is worth the effort to tap this potential and to attempt using name choices as indicators of influences acting upon parents may be debated. One consideration alone suggests that the attempt should be made, however. That consideration is that naming is performed by individuals of all educational levels and social stations. Consequently, examination of naming patterns may afford a useful avenue for investigating social and cultural currents in periods and places where sociological sampling is an impossibility. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate some of the possible methods of name-pattern analysis and to illustrate their utility. The problem being investigated is that tough old chestnut, the modernization of Turkey. The initial hypothesis is that political modernization in Turkey might be reflected in the frequency of use of common first names closely associated with the Islamic religion. This hypothesis arises from extensive investigations of medieval Muslim naming patterns which have revealed that the most commonplace Muslim first names vary significantly in popularity over long periods of time.1 The three names that have been chosen for modern Turkey are Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali, all three extremely common names. The most important source used for obtaining large quantities of names was the roster of all of the members who have ever served in the Turkish parliament.2 The birth dates of virtually all of these individuals are recorded, and geographical distribution is guaranteed by the electoral representation procedure. As for class origin and educational
1 See, for example, R. W. Bulliet, 'Conversion to Islam and the Emergence of a Muslim Society in Iran,' in N. Levtzion, ed., Conversion to Islam (New York, 1978).
2 Kazim Oztiirk, Tiirkiye Biiyiik Millet Meclisi Albiimii, 23 Nisan, 1920-r4 (Ankara, 1973).

Ekim, I973

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Richard Bulliet

background of the members' parents who gave them their names, these have not been tested. It is assumed, however, that the social strata producing members of parliament have not changed dramatically during the history of the Turkish Republic, even though the specific characteristics of those strata probably have changed. In other words, the parents of parliament members elected in the most recent election almost certainly have a higher literacy rate than the parents of the members of the first parliament of 1920; on the average, however, they probably do not differ greatly in their place in society from that earlier set of parents. In order to extend the chronological range of the survey back further in time, the names of the fathers of the members of the 1920 parliament have been tabulated and assigned the date I840. This date was chosen by determining that the members of that first parliament were mostly between 33 and 63 years of age at the time of election. This indicates a median birthdate of 1872. If their fathers' age averaged 32 years at the time of their births, then the median date of those fathers' births would be 1840. Hence I840. It is not a very precise date, but it will serve. One still earlier point on the chronological scale has been obtained by tabulating the names of members of the prorogued parliament of 1877-1878 and assuming that they ranged in age from 33 to 63 at the time of their election, as did the members of the 1920 parliament. This yields a median birthdate of
1828.3

Moving forward chronologically, very extensive name samples were obtained through the kind assistance of Professor Miikerrem Hi( of Istanbul University. These samples consist of lists of entering students in the Economics Faculty of that university for the period I974-1977. In addition, Professor Hic's assistants tabulated names in the current enrollment roster of Fatih Elementary School in the Fatih district of Istanbul, grades I through V. Assuming an average age on matriculation in the Economics Faculty of nineteen and an average age on entering elementary school of seven, these tabulations yield figures for groups
born around 1955 and i967.4

The results of all of these tabulations are set forth on the accompanying graph which depicts the fluctuation in the frequency of the names Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali from I828 until 1967. From 1862 until 1935 the popularity of these names is shown every five years according to the birthdates of the members of parliament. Earlier and later points on the graph were determined in the manner already described.
3 Parliament The First members are listed in the appendix of Robert Devereux, Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore, 1963). Only the Muslim members have been counted. 4 It is debatable whether these later name samples are socially comparable, speaking of the parents, to the samples drawn from the Turkish parliaments. Geographical spread would be comparable for students in the Economics Faculty but not for the elementary school students. Unfortunately, tabulation totals only were available from Fatih Elementary School instead of the actual enrollment roster. This has limited the amount of analysis that could be done for 1967.

First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey 491

35 -

a^__~*-~
30 -

Popularityof the namesMehmet,Ahmet, and Ali in modem Turkey

25 -

20-

5I S\

10-

5-

1820

1840

1860

1880

1900

1920

1940

1960

1980

Overall, the graph shows striking changes in the popularity of the three names. From a high plateau in the pre-Tanzimat period, when a third of the male population represented by the samples bore one of the three names, the popularity curve plunges sharply and steadily to a low point in 1885-1889
followed, after a brief recovery, by a still deeper low in 1905-1909 when barely

8 per cent of the male population bore the names. Then comes a steady and
consistent recovery of popularity that lasts until
1920-1924

followed by a sudden

sharp drop to a new plateau that has remained almost stable ever since. Clearly, there is no way of establishing for the thousands of cases involved the actual motivation behind each instance of name giving. After all, there are always uncles and grandfathers to be commemorated, anecdotes and puns to be recorded, vows to be fulfilled, and marital disharmonies to be smoothed; and naming is one way of doing all of these things. Nevertheless, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the major features of the popularity curve of the names Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali coincide precisely with certain major events in the history of modern Turkey. Most notably, the lowest point of the curve occurs at the very moment of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, and the sharp termination of the ensuing recovery of popularity coincides exactly with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. If these correspondences do not absolutely prove a relationship between naming patterns and political change, they at the very least invite a closer examination of the curve as a whole with such a relationship in mind.

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Richard Bulliet

Regarding the long, steady decline in popularity from 1840 to 1885-I889, it is hard to resist the conclusion that modernization of the Tanzimat variety constituted a formidable attack upon the idea that Islam should be the basis of political and social life. It is impossible to establish what proportion of individuals named Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali were so named because of pious feelings on the part of their parents, but it is difficult to conceive of an alternative motivation for name giving that might have undergone so steady and pronounced a change in the period in question. As for the names that were used instead of Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali, no particular group stands out as showing a corresponding increase in popularity. Indeed, virtually all first names appearing in the samples for this period are of Arabic origin and resist being broken down into significant groupings. If the pronounced decline ending in 1885-1889 is seen as a reflection of the steady spread of Tanzimat secularism, the brief recovery that peaks in 1895-I899 must surely reflect the influence of the Islamic religious and political revival sponsored by Abdiilhamit II. It is perhaps noteworthy that it was during the I89os that Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani was carrying on his revivalist campaign in Istanbul under the aegis of the sultan. Both political history and the graph of popularity of the three names point to the fact that Islamic revivalism could make little headway against the modernizing tendencies pushing in the opposite direction. Professor Stanford Shaw has termed the reign of Abdulhamit II the culmination of the Tanzimat, and the cogency of his statement is fully borne out by the graph.5 The nadir in popularity of the three names comes in 1905-1909, the same half decade that saw the success of the Young Turk Revolution and the end of Abdiilhamit's reign. The period of Tanzimat modernization with its secularizing tendencies was at an end. People of all millets may have cheered the triumph of the revolutionaries in I908, but immediately thereafter the Muslims began to turn back toward Islam in their private thinking about their children's names. The trend back to Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali was firm and steep as the Balkan Wars gave way to World War I, which in turn was succeeded by the war against the Greek army of occupation. Whatever specific policies the Ottoman government may have been advocating during these years, an increasing proportion of the populace seems to have experienced them as years in which Islamic identity was threatened and needed reaffirmation in naming. That this is not simply an illusion is clearly shown by the sharp fall in popularity of the three names in 1925-1929 with the consolidation of the new republic and the adoption of Atatiirk's major reforms. The final fifteen years of the Ottoman Empire, disrupted as they were by war and disorder, seem to have had a greater effect upon people's religiosity and need to assert their identity as Muslims than did the famous secularizing reforms of the Atatiirk period. After the initial fall in the popularity of the three names
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1977), chap. 3.
5

First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey 493 following the establishment of the republic, their popularity has remained remarkably steady for some four decades. There has been neither the drop in popularity typical of Tanzimat secularism nor the rise in popularity that might reflect a religious backlash against too much secularism. It might even be concluded that the disestablishment of Islam from its central place in people's lives was primarily a product of Tanzimat modernization and that the Atatiirk reforms simply ratified and made visible what was already an accomplished fact. This is probably the place to stop reading into a simple graph an entire universe of political phenomena, but there is still more to be said about naming patterns. In particular, there is the question of nationalism as expressed in the use of new, distinctly Turkish names. As already mentioned, in the nineteenth century virtually all male names contained in the lists used were of Arabic origin. Today, however, it is evident that names of Turkish linguistic origin are quite common. A question therefore arises as to how the adoption of new names of Turkish linguistic derivation correlates with modern Turkish political history. This question is not as easy to investigate as it sounds. To be sure, it is quite possible to identify names of Turkish origin when they appear, but which is more important: four new names borne by single individuals appearing in a given period of time or a single new name borne by ten individuals? The problem is how to evaluate quantitatively the introduction of new names, and there is no obvious formula for resolving the problem. Nevertheless, an effort can be made. First, it is painfully apparent that however long a list of names one examines, there will always be previously unused names to be added if the list is substantially lengthened. Names of extremely rare occurrence may not be important indicators of anything, of course; but, on the other hand, their cumulative effect may be striking. If half the individuals in a large sample bear names of eccentric individuality while only a handful in a second sample bear such names, it may fairly be concluded that eccentric individuality is more prevalent among the parents of the former group than of the latter. Looking at the names of members of the Turkish parliaments, it is possible to determine in each five-year period what percentage of the names in use have not appeared earlier. What one would expect is that each five-year list would show a smaller proportion of names not previously encountered. That would be the case if the total onomasticon of names in use remained fairly static or if new names were invented at a fairly constant rate. In fact, that is exactly what happens. For example, among the I2 parliament members born between 1870 and 1874 there are 71 names represented, 73 percent of which do not occur among the 93 parliament members born before that date. Looking at the 223 parliament members born between 1905 and I909, however, one finds that 131 names are in use but only 17 per cent of them have not previously been encountered among the I,604 parliament members born before I905. The decrease in the percentage of new names in each five-year age cohort is not perfectly regular, but it is steadily downward with no striking anomalies

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until 1955. The two previous age cohorts, 1925-I929 and I930-1941, contain i8 per cent and 23 per cent previously unencountered names, respectively. In 1955, however, almost 37 per cent of the 332 names in use had never before appeared. This means that after recording the names of 3,126 parliament members, instead of finding ever fewer new names one encounters a greatly increased quantity of new names in I955. What this clearly indicates is that between 1940 and I955 a new era set in in Turkish naming practices. What characterizes this new era? As expected, the figures indicate that the most distinctive characteristic is the replacement of Arabic names with names of Turkish linguistic origin.6 Of the previously unencountered names that appear in I9I0-I914, for example, only 8 per cent are of Turkish linguistic origin. A greater number, 15 per cent, come from Persian! By 1925-1929, however, 32 per cent of the previously unencountered names are Turkish and for the period 1930-1941 65 per cent. In I955 the figure for Turkish names is still very high, amounting to 59 per cent of all previously unencountered names. Naming patterns, therefore, clearly seem to reflect a rise in Turkish national identity in the republican period, although not any earlier. Still, it must be remembered that before 1940 there was still, overall, no startling increase in the total number of names in use. Although the percentages of Turkish names among the group of newly encountered names are fairly high between 1925 and 1941, these new Turkish names represent only 5 per cent of the names in use in 1925-1929 and 14 per cent of those in use in 1930-I941. By way of contrast, in 1955 the new trend is full-blown with 22 per cent of the names in use being names of Turkish origin which had not previously appeared. The total percentage of Turkish origin names in use in 1955 is obviously higher still. This all may seem to belabor the obvious since it is commonly understood that a concomitant of the growth of Turkish nationalism has been a growth in the popularity of Turkish names. Several interesting points deserve to be made, however. The first is that while the use of common names with a fundamental religious significance mirrors the course of Turkish political history almost to the exact year, Turkish nationalism in naming lags far behind the main political steps taken toward realizing nationalist goals. The 1908 revolution sparked no increase in nationalistic names, nor did the establishment of the republic in 1923. In fact, the new trend in Turkish naming seems to proceed quite slowly throughout the Atatfirk period. From this it might be concluded that Turkish nationalism penetrated the population quite slowly. A more socially discriminating examination of naming practices might elucidate this possibility. It is also possible, however, that the abandonment of the Arabic script in 1928 was a prerequisite for a turn toward Turkish naming. It may be important that the first generation of Turks to be educated in the Latin script came of child6 Linguistic identification of names was facilitated by Kemal Zeki Genqosman's Ansiklopedik Turk Isimleri SQzliiUii(Istanbul, 1975). My thanks to Professor Mikerrem Hi9, for procuring this book for me and for his helpful discussions of several matters raised in this article.

First Names and Political Change in Modern Turkey 495 bearing age between I940 and 1955 when the great jump sets in in the use of Turkish names. If this is the case, then it might be questioned whether the trend toward using Turkish names represents nationalist feeling at all. It could be more a linguistically based phenomenon. Possibly the most important observation to make, however, is that the new trend toward the use of Turkish names does not appear to be at the expense of the names Mehmet, Ahmet, and Ali. The popularity of these three names remains quite steady as the new trend comes into evidence. Since in the prerepublican period these three names had been so very sensitive to political changes, it is interesting that they remain so steady during a period of startling changes in all aspects of life. Does this suggest that the impact of modernization during the republican period has had less effect upon private religious feelings than is often stated? Does it mean that modernization in the prerepublican period was felt to involve religious customs to a greater degree than in the period of Atatiirk? Does it imply that Turkey has become divided into one section of the population with deep and unmovable feelings rooted in Islam and another section that is responsive to the appeals of modernization and secular nationalism? All of these questions and more arise from a consideration of changes in naming patterns. The consideration that has been given to the subject in this article has been rather slight. More could be done, and more sophisticated methods of analysis could be devised. It could also prove enlightening to make a comparative study of name-pattern changes in other Islamic countries. I hope that the results put forth here have been intriguing enough to lead others to pursue investigations along similar lines.
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY