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AUTHORS NOTES...................................................................................................................................... 4

SHELLS .................................................................................................................. 5
1NC (FRENCH PERVERT VERSION)........................................................................................................ 6 1NC (HEIDEGGER) .................................................................................................................................. 12 EXPLANATION ........................................................................................................................................ 20

LINKS ................................................................................................................... 26
OCULAR METAPHORS ........................................................................................................................... 27 OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE.................................................................................................................... 28 OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE (BATAILLE STYLE) ................................................................................ 35 OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE (HEIDEGGER STYLE) ............................................................................. 36

INTERNAL LINKS ............................................................................................. 38


RACISM .................................................................................................................................................... 39 POWER RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 40 SEXISM/GENDER .................................................................................................................................... 41 ETHICS OF THE OTHER (LEVINAS)...................................................................................................... 46 HEIDEGGER ............................................................................................................................................. 50

IMPACTS ............................................................................................................. 58
RACISM .................................................................................................................................................... 59 POWER RELATIONS ............................................................................................................................... 61 GENDER/SEXISM .................................................................................................................................... 65 ETHICS OF THE OTHER (LEVINAS)...................................................................................................... 69

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FRAMEWORK/PRIORITY ................................................................................. 74
LANGUAGE FIRST .................................................................................................................................. 75 ONTOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................. 77 ONTOLOGY OF VISION .......................................................................................................................... 78 ETHICS FIRST .......................................................................................................................................... 79 GENDER K FIRST .................................................................................................................................... 84 FRAMEWORKS BAD - EXCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 85

ALTERNATIVES ................................................................................................ 87
AURALITY................................................................................................................................................ 88 OTHELLOS HANDKERCHIEF ............................................................................................................... 92 SPECTRALITY (ETHICS)......................................................................................................................... 94 WEEPING (ETHICS) ................................................................................................................................. 96 BATAILLE ................................................................................................................................................ 97 GENDER (HAPTIC) ................................................................................................................................ 111 HEIDEGGER ........................................................................................................................................... 112

2NC ANSWERS ................................................................................................. 114


A/T PERM................................................................................................................................................ 115 A/T SUKRIS - NO TRANSGRESSION ................................................................................................... 118 A/T SUKRIS YOU ERASE WOMEN ................................................................................................... 121 A/T FOUCAULT IS BAD ........................................................................................................................ 124 A/T BACTRACKING (APOLOGIES, SEVERANCE, ETC).................................................................... 125 A/T PERM (HEIDEGGER) ...................................................................................................................... 127 A/T ESSENTIALISM ............................................................................................................................... 130 A/T VISION GOOD ................................................................................................................................. 132 A/T ALT FAILS (HEIDEGGER) ............................................................................................................. 133

AFF ANSWERS ................................................................................................. 135


PERM SOLVENCY (AURALITY) .......................................................................................................... 136 PERM SOLVENCY (ETHICS) ................................................................................................................ 140 AURALITY BAD .................................................................................................................................... 143 VISUAL GOOD (A/T FOUCAULT) ........................................................................................................ 144

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VISUAL GOOD (ETHICS) ...................................................................................................................... 145 A/T GENDER .......................................................................................................................................... 148 A/T BATAILLE ....................................................................................................................................... 149 A/T LEVINAS/ETHICS ........................................................................................................................... 152 A/T FOUCAULT ..................................................................................................................................... 154 A/T LACAN ............................................................................................................................................. 155

STUFF I COULDNT CATEGORIZE ............................................................. 156


BATAILLES EYES ................................................................................................................................ 157 LACAN? .................................................................................................................................................. 159

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AUTHORS NOTES

BLOCKS/OVERVIEWS ARE WRITTEN FOR BATTAILLE VERSION BECAUSE , WELL, I LIKE THAT GUY. THE BATAILLE SHELL COULD POTENTIALLY BE SHORTENED BY TAKING OUT THE FIRST CARD AND ONLY READING ONE OF THE STORIES IN THE STORY OF THE EYE, BUT THAT WOULD BASICALLY MAKE YOU A PUSSY. THE LAND EVIDENCE ON PAGE 35 IS A GOOD EXPLANATION OF THE SORT OF UNDERLYING ASSUMPTION/THESIS OF THE CRITICISM, SO IT IS A POTENTIONAL SUBSTITUTE FOR THE OVERVIEW EVIDENCE ABOUT OTHELLO. FOR THE HEIDEGGERIANS OUT THERE, THERES A SHELL WRITTEN UP BUT HERES A TIP IF YOU DONT WANNA RUN JUST THIS, AND YOUD RATHER JUST RUN HEIDEGGER WITH AN OCULARCENTRISM LINK, YOU CAN READ PAGE 109, THE HEIDEGGER ALT AS AN OCULARCENTRIMS LINK. THE CARD HAS AN INTERNAL TO ENFRAMING ALREADY IN IT, AND IS EXPLICITLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ALT YOURE ALREADY READING. ID RECOMMEND READING ANYTHING FLAGGED AS HEIDEGGER AS IT MAY BE USEFUL IN YOUR BROADER JOURNEYS DOWN WOODPATHS. USE LEVINAS VERSION/CARDS AGAINST CASES THAT CLAIM RIGHTS, ETHICS, DEHUM, ETC. THEY ARE SWEET FOR YOU OBJECT THOSE YOU TRY TO SAVE, YOUR ETHICS ARE DA FAIL LINKS APPEAR SLIM, BUT THERES ONLY ONE LINK STORY TO BE TOLD FOR EVERY DIFFERENT POSSIBLE MODULE YOU SAID OBSERVATION ONE AND THERE IS VERY GOOD, VERY SPECIFIC INTERNAL LINK EVIDENCE THAT CAN DOUBLE AS A LINK. I DIDNT INCLUDE ANSWERS TO AUTHOR INDICTS BECAUSE THEYRE EASILY OBTAINABLE FROM CAMP FILES.

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SHELLS

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1NC (FRENCH PERVERT VERSION) WE BEGIN WITH BATAILLES SOLAR ANUS AS THE SIGHT OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE SUN AS A FIGURE OF ILLUMINATION AND KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWING GAZE. BATAILLE PRESENTS US INSTEAD WITH A SUN THAT BLINDS THE GAZE, LOVES ITS INVERSE, AND DISCOVERS ITS OWN IMPOTENCE. IT IS PRECISELY AT THE MOMENT THAT THE SUN, KNOWLEDGE, ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT ITS DOMINANCE OVER THE DARK MYSTERIES OF NIGHT THAT IT MUST HAVE ITS THROAT SLASHED, MUST BE RENDERED THE BLACK SOLAR ANUS. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, The Solar Anus, p. 9) Love, then, screams in my own throat; I am the Jesuve, the filthy parody of the torrid and blinding sun. I want to have my throat slashed while violating the girl to whom I am to say: you are the night. The Sun exclusively loves the Night and directs its luminous violence, its ignoble shaft, toward the earth, but it finds itself incapable of reaching the gaze or the night, even though the nocturnal terrestrial expanses head continuously toward the indecency of the solar ray. The solar annulus is the intact anus of her body at eighteen years to which nothing sufficiently blinding can be compared except the sun, even though the anus is the night.

IT IS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT WE TURN TO THE FIRST AFFIRMATIVE CONSTRUCTION. THE 1ACS SUBMISSION OF KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE SIGN OF VISIBLE, THEIR IMPLIED ASSERTION THAT THEY ARE ABLE TO PERFECTLY SEE AND DIAGNOSE THE WORLD, PLACES ALL OF KNOWLEDGE AND REALITY UNDER THE DOMINANCE OF THE VISUAL. THEY BELIEVE IN THE VIRILE POWER OF THE SUN TO ILLUMINATE THE WORLD PERFECTLY BEFORE THEIR PENETRATING GAZE. THIS SUBMISSION IS NOT WITHOUT CONSEQUENCE IT IS THE VERY LOGIC OF THE PRIMACY OF VISION, THE PANOPTIC TRIUMPH THAT UNDERPINS THE CLINICAL GAZE AT THE HEART OF BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL. AT THE HEART OF THE NOTION THAT POPULATIONS CAN BE DIAGNOSED AND ANESTHETIZED IS THE ASSUMED ABILITY OF THE STATE TO PERFECTLY SEE AND KNOW THE BODY POLITIC. Siisininen 2008 (Lauri, political science researcher @ U of Jyvskyl, From the Empire of the Gaze to Noisy Bodies: Foucault, Audition, and Medical
Power Theory and Event, 11:1)
y y When it comes to the role of audition in the sensorial triangle of clinical experience, Foucault's argumentation takes quite an interesting turn:

"But one must not loose sight of the essential. The tactile and auditory dimensions did not purely and simply come to be added to the domain of vision. The sensorial triangulation indispensable to anatomo-clinical perception remains under the dominant sign of the visible (sous le signe dominant du visible): firstly, because this multisensorial perception is nothing but a manner of anticipating that triumph of the gaze (ce triomphe du regard), which will

be the autopsy; the ear and hand are nothing but temporary substitute organs (des organes provisoires de remplacement) anticipating for the death to render to the truth the luminous presence of the visible (la prsence lumineuse du visible). . . And above all, the alterations discovered by anatomy concern 'the shape, the size, the position and the direction' of organs or their tissues. . . that is, spatial data (des donnes spatiales) that belong by right of origin (par droit d'origine) to the gaze." 13 y As it comes out in this passage, Foucault argues that one should not let the appearance of the sensorial triangulation lead to any illusions about the equality between the three senses at play. Even if touch and audition did have a role in the formation of clinical perception, it was actually limited to their function as nothing but vision's temporary substitutes or "representatives", ones that were in the end reducible to visual experience. In other words, Foucault's strong thesis is that in the formation of clinical perception in the first opening of the individual body to medical knowledge and intervention touch and audition did not have any irreducible, indispensable or autonomous significance, the sort of significance reserved for the gaze and visual experience. In stead, the only

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place left for audition was a position of dependency and submission a subservient position under the dominant sign of the visible. ? The passage quoted shows also that in Foucault's understanding, the truth constituted in the clinical-medical discourse was still determined (in rather classical sense, we could add) utterly by the interrelated terms of visibility, luminosity and presence, accomplished (in practice) only in the opening of the dead corps in autopsy. This means that auditory perception (hearing and the ear) as such did not strictly speaking participate directly to the medical truth and knowledge, the truth of health/pathology, normality/abnormality of an individual body. The clinical-medical truth was constituted by the visible presence of the body to the gaze, not to auditory experience. The only possible "legitimate" contribution of audition to the formation of truth in the clinical discourse was that of a subservient instrument or a temporary, dispensable substitute for vision, one that itself was lacking the capacity of "luminous presence" of truth. The fate of audition in the clinical form of knowledge was to become in the end extinguished in the true goal and fulfillment of medical examination: i.e., in the final triumph of the gaze, in the grasping of the visible truth, where auditory experience no longer has anything to contribute. Thus, the "sensory hierarchy" organizing the triangle becomes quite clearly stated: audition remains firmly submitted under the pre-eminence of vision. In the hierarchic setting, the fate of audition is to become subjugated under, reduced to and in the end extinguished in and by the dominant sign of the visible.
2. The "Right-of-Origin"- Argument and the Empire of the Gaze
y There is still one turn in Foucault's argumentation on the role of audition in clinical experience one that becomes articulate in the quotation already

As the quotation already shows, Foucault presents an argument concerning what belongs by right of origin (par droit d'origine) to vision and not to hearing. The capacity to collect spatial facts or spatial data (des donnes spatiales), the capacity to discover spatial objects are capacities that belong "by right of origin" to vision, not audition. As it comes to the anatomo-clinical perception and experience, this means that the capacity to locate "the being of the disease with its causes and effects in a three-dimensional space", 14 as also the capacity to grasp "the shape, the size, the position and the direction of organs or their tissues", 15 in other words the central functions determining clinical experience, belong by right of origin to sight, not to hearing. It is in this irreparable lack, in the incapacity to form spatial-objective experience, that we find the actual reason why audition did not and cannot make any "equal" or symmetrical, irreducible, autonomous and dispensable contribution (but only as a temporary, subservient, indispensable substitute operating under the dominance of vision and gaze) to clinical-medical knowledge or, as it seems logical, to any form of knowledge determined by the spatial-objective form. We should notice, that although auditory perception is defined by the non-spatiality,
discussed in need of particular emphasis here. Foucault doesn't argue that auditory perception would be defined by temporality. Only the lack, the incapacity of spatiality becomes the defining characteristic of audition distinguishing it from vision. y The reader should notice that Foucault does not in fact develop this right-of-origin argument by any reference to the corpus of historical documents he otherwise uses in the study (the works of Lannec and others). The argument is not actually presented as an interpretation of historical sources at all. It is Michel Foucault himself, who argues here on the right-of-origin difference between vision and audition. It is Foucault himself who states the difference, the juxtaposition of "audio" and "visual", in terms of the unique capacity of vision and the essential incapacity of audition, when it comes to spatial-objective experience. Foucault's argument might come as a surprise, for it is hardly archaeological (in the sense Foucault gives to this term) in character: It is not about the historical conditions of possibility, the difference in capacity/incapacity between vision and audition in the context of a specific historical discursive formation. To argue what vision can and what audition cannot do by right of origin that is, irrespective of any historical-discursive context seems to come close to arguing on the conditions of possibility as such, on the trans-historical limits of experience and on the difference between faculties in the strong (transcendental) Kantian sense. 16 y It is by relying on the idea of audition as the essentially non-spatial and non-objective sense, as opposed to the spatial-objective capacities of vision, not on the basis of historical analysis that Foucault can deny the possibility of audition's equal/indispensable/autonomous contribution and significance to the birth of the clinic and argue for the necessity of audition's reduction to and subjugation under the domination of the gaze. If this is the case, how can one avoid reaching the conclusion that in presenting the right-of-origin- argument, Foucault commits himself to what he first of all consistently set out to dismantle in his archaeologies (and subsequently in his genealogies): the conception of the subject as the possessor of different faculties, with a given, trans-historical coherence and a permanent structure? y As we know, the formation of clinical experience making the individual subject/body into the object of medical knowledge and intervention is a thoroughly

The birth of the clinical experience bringing to knowledge and truth the normality/pathology of the individual/singular body was intrinsically interrelated to the development of the modern form of power and politics. It is through the development of clinical experience that the exercise of this modern form of power, surveying and taking charge of the health/normality of each singular living body and of the social body as a whole, took a decisive step forwards. As we know, in his later works as well, Foucault recurrently comes back to the formation of clinical-medical perception, observation and surveillance, still giving these a central political significance in the modern disciplinary, normative and bio-political
political event for Foucault (this is the case already in The Birth of the Clinic).

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dispositive or governmentality. In its operation, the medical power means the traversal and penetration of the whole social space by the clinical perception and experience. Thus, the issue of "audio-visual" difference, their right-of-origin juxtaposition, turns out to be a deeply political issue as well.17 y Inasmuch as Foucault argues (this we have already seen) audition to be, by right of origin, without any independent, irreducible significance in the formation of clinical experience (remaining firmly submitted under the dominant sign of the visible), it follows that audition cannot have any significance in the medicalized form of power- and politics either. In the last instance, the meaning of medicalization is brought back to the circulation of the medical gaze (le regard mdical). It is the gaze, not audition, which exercises "in the entire space, all the time, a mobile and differentiated surveillance." 18 Foucault concludes his analysis of medicalized power/politics in rather categorical terms, well in line with the right-of-origin- argument: "the gaze that sees is a gaze that dominates (le regard qui voit est un regard qui domine)", making the modern society as such the "empire of the gaze without partitions (l'empire sans cloison du regard)." 19 THIS REVALS THE BLINDSPOT IN THEIR OBSERVING - THE DARK UNDERSIDE OF THEIR KNWOING SUN, THE UGLINESS OF THE AFFIRMATIVES UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS AND KNOWLEDGE AS A VISIBILE BODY TO BE SURVEILLED, MANAGED, PROJECTED, AND ULTIMATELY DIAGNOSED AND CURED IS THE POWER TO ASSIGN VALUE AND ELIMINATE UNDERSIRABLE ELEMENTS WHICH PLAYS OUT AS RACISM AND GENOCIDE DEPLOYED IN THE NAME OF DEFENDING LIFE AND TRUTH. Giroux 6 (Henry, the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, Reading Hurricane
Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability, College Literature, Vol. 33, No. 3)

Within the last few decades, matters of state sovereignty in the new world order have been retheorized so as to provide a range of theoretical insights about the relationship between power and politics, the political nature of social and cultural life, and the merging of life and politics as a new form of biopolitics. While the notion of biopolitics differs significantly among its most prominent theorists, including Michel Foucault (1990, 1997), Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2002, 2003), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004), what these theorists share is an attempt to think through the convergence of life and politics, locating matters of life and death within our ways of thinking about and imagining politics (Dean 2004, 17).Within this discourse, politics is no longer understood exclusively through a disciplinary technology centered on the individual bodya body to be measured, surveilled, managed, and included in forecasts, surveys, and statistical projections. Biopolitics points to new relations of power that are more capacious, concerned not only with the body as an object of disciplinary techniques that render it both useful and docile but also with a body that needs to be regularized, subject to those immaterial means of production that produce ways of life that enlarge the targets of control and regulation (Foucault 1997, 249). This shift in the workings of both sovereignty and power and the emergence of biopolitics are made clear by Foucault, for whom biopower replaces the power to dispense fear and death with

that of a power to foster lifeor disallow it to the point of death. . . . [Biopower] is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism (Ojakangas 2005, 6). As Foucault insists, the logic of biopower is dialectical, productive, and positive 178 College Literature 33.3
[Summer 2006] (1990, 136).Yet he also argues that biopolitics does not remove itself from introducing a break into the domain of life that is under powers control: the break between what must live and what must die (1997, 255). Foucault believes that the death-function in the economy of biopolitics is justified primarily through a form of racism in which biopower is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power (258).

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WHEN I WAS A LITTLE KID MY MOTHER TOLD ME NOT TO STARE INTO THE SUN. SO ONCE WHEN I WAS SIX, I DID. THE DOCTORS DIDN'T KNOW IF MY EYES WOULD EVER HEAL. I WAS TERRIFIED, ALONE IN THAT DARKNESS.* FOR THE ALTERNATIVE WE TURN ONCE AGAIN TO GEORGES BATAILLE. BATAILLES NOTION OF THE BLIND, UPROOTED EYE IN THE STORY OF THE EYE IMPLODES THE CARTESIAN UNDERPININGS OF THE MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF VISION THAT ATTEMPTS TO PERFECTLY SEE AND THUS PERFECTLY KNOW THE WORLD. BATAILLE DOES THIS THROUGH TRANSGRESSION, WHICH IS PUSHING A CONCEPT TO ITS LIMIT UNTIL IT EXPLODES. IN TERMS OF VISUALITY THEN BATAILLE PRESENTS AN EYE THAT IS TORN OUT AND BLINDED. THE STORY OF THE EYE FURTHERMORE SIGNALS MOMENT WHEN LANGUAGE EXPLODES AND RADICALLY CHALLENGES ITSELF BY DISCOVERING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN DEATH AND LANGUAGE IN THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LIMIT AND BEING. THE REPULSIVE NATURE OF BATAILLES STORY IS ESSENTIAL TO ITS TRANSGRESSION. Focault 63 (Michel, A Preface to Transgression, Religion and Culture Michel Foucault, ed. By Jeremy Carrette, pp 57-71) *Max Cohen in Pi by Darren
Aronofsky. Essentially the product of fissures, abrupt descents and broken contours, this misshapen and craglike language describes a circle; it refers to itself and is folded back on a questioning of its limits as if it were nothing more than a small night lamp that flashes with a strange light, signaling the void from which it arises and to which it addresses everything it illuminates and touches. Perhaps, it is this curious configuration which explains why Bataille attributed such obstinate prestige to the Eye. Throughout his career (from his first novel to Larmes dEros), the eye was to keep its value as a figure of inner experience: When at the height of anguish, I gently solicit a strange absurdity, an eye opens at the summit, in the middle of my skull. This is because the eye, a small white globe encloses its darkness, traces a limiting circle that only sight can cross. And the darkness within, the sombre core of the eye, pours out into the world like a fountain which sees, that is, which lights up the world; but it is transformed into the bright night of an image. The eye is mirror and lamp: it discharges its light into the word around it, while in a movement that is not necessarily contradictory, it precipitates this same light into the transparency of its well. Its globe has the expansive quality of a marvelous seed like an egg imploding towards the centre of night and extreme light, which it is and which it has just ceased to be. It

is the figure of being in the act of

transgressing its own limit.


The eye, in a philosophy of reflection, derives form its capacity to observe the power of becoming always more interior to itself. Lying behind each eye that sees, there exists a more tenuous one, an eye so discreet and yet so agile that its all-powerful glance can be said to eat away at the flesh of its white globe; behind this particular eye, there exists another, and, then, still others, each progressively more subtle until we arrive at the eye whose entire substance is nothing but the transparency of vision. This inner movement is finally resolved in a non-material centre where the intangible forms of truth are created and combined, in this heart of

reverses this entire direction: sight, crossing the globular limit of the eye, constitutes the eye in its instantaneous being; sight carries it away in this luminous stream (an outpouring fountain, streaming tears and, shortly, blood), hurls the eye outside itself, conducts it to the limit where it bursts out immediately extinguished flash of its being. Only a small white ball, veined with blood, is left behind, only an exorbitated eye to which all sight is now denied. And in the place from which sight had once passed, only a cranial cavity remains, only this black globe which the uprooted eye has made to close upon its sphere, depriving it of vision, but offering to this absence the spectacle of that indestructible core which now imprisons the dead glance. In the distance created by this violence and uprooting, the eye is seen absolutely, but denied any possibility of sight: the philosophizing subject has been dispossessed and pursued to its limit; and the sovereignty of philosophical language can now be heard from the distance, in the measureless void left behind by the exorbitated subject. But perhaps the eye accomplishes the most essential aspect of its play when, forced from its ordinary position, it is made to turn upwards in a movement that leads it back to the nocturnal and starred interior of the skull and it is made to show us its usually concealed surface, white and unseeing: it shuts out the day in a movement that manifests its own whiteness (whiteness being undoubtedly the image of clarity, its surface reflection, but for this very reason, it cannot communicate with it, nor communicate it); and the circular night of the iris is made to address the central absence which it illuminates with a flash, revealing it as night. The upturned orb suggests both the most open and the most impenetrable eye: causing its sphere to pivot, while remaining exactly the same and in the same place, it overturns day and night, crosses their limit, but only to find it again on the same line and from the other side; and the white hemisphere that appears momentarily at the place where the pupil once opened is like the being of the eye as it crosses the limit of its vision when it

things which is the sovereign subject. Bataille

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transgresses this opening to the light of day which defined the transgression of every sight. If man did not imperiously close his eyes, he would finally be unable to see the things worth seeing. But what we need to see does not involve any interior secret or the discovery of a more nocturnal world. Torn from its ordinary position and made to turn inwards in its orbit, the eye now pours its light only into a bony cavern. This turning up of its globe may seem a betrayal of la petite mort, but, more exactly, it simply indicates the death that it experiences in its natural location, in this springing up in place which causes the eye to rotate. Death, for the eye, is not the always elevated line of the horizon, but the limit it ceaselessly transgresses in its natural location, in the hollow where every vision originates, and where this limit is elevated into an absolute limit by an ecstatic movements which allows the eye to spring up from the other side. The upturned eye discovers the bond that links language and death at the moment that it acts out this relationship of the limit and being; and it is perhaps from scenes that interrupt Batailles stories invariably concern the spectacle of erotic deaths, where upturned eyes display their limits and rotate inwards in gigantic and empty orbits. Bleu du ciel gies a singularly precise outline of this movement: early in November, when the earth of
German cemetery is alive with the twinkling lights of candles and candle stubs, the narrator is lying with Dorothy among the tombstones; making love among the dead, the earth around him appears like the sky on a bright night. And the sky above forms a great hollow orbit, a death mask, in which he recognizes his inevitable end at the moment that pleasure overturns the four globes of flesh, causing the revolution of his sight. The earth under Dorothys body was open like a tomb, her belly opened itself to me like a fresh grave. We were struck with stupor, making love on a starred cemetery. Each light marked a skeleton in a grave and formed a wavering sky as perturbed as our mingled bodies. I unfastened Dorothys dress, I dirtied her clothes and her breast with the fresh earth which was stuck to my fingers. Our bodies trembled like two rows of clattering teeth. But what might this mean at the heart of thought? What significance has this insistent eye which appears to encompass what Bataille successively designated the inner experience, the extreme possibility, the comic process, or simply meditation? It is certainly no more metaphoric than Descartess phrasing of the clear perception of sight or this sharp point of mind which he called aceis mentis. In the point of fact, the upturned eye has no meaning in Batailles language, can have

indicates the moment when language, arriving at its confines, overlaps itself, explodes and radically challenges itself in laughter, tears, the overturned eye of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacrifice, and where it remains fixed in this way at the limits of its void, speaking of itself in a second language in which the absence of a sovereign subject outlines its essential emptiness and incessantly fractures the unity of its discourse. The enucleated or upturned eye marks the zone of Batailles philosophical language, the void into which it pours and loses itself, but in which it never stops talking somewhat like the interior, diaphanous and
illuminated eye of mystics and spiritualists that marks the point at which the secret language of prayer is embedded and choked by a marvelous communication which silences it. Similarly, but in an inverted manner, the eye in Bataille delineates the zone shared by language and death, the place where language discovers its being in the crossing of its limits: the non-dialectical form of philosophical language. This eye, as the fundamental figure of the place from which Bataille speaks and in which his broken language finds it uninterrupted domain, establishes the connection, prior to any form of discourse, that exists between the death of God (a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world), the experience of finitude (springing up in death, twisting the light which is extinguished as it discovers that the interior is an empty skull, a central absence), and the turning back of language upon itself at the moment that it fails a conjunction which undoubtedly has no other equivalent than the association, well known in other philosophies, of sight to truth or of contemplation to the absolute. Revealed to this eye, which in its pivoting conceals itself for all time, is the being of the limit: I will never forget the violent and marvelous experience that comes from the will to open ones eyes, facing what exists, what happens. Perhaps in the movement which carries it to a total night, the experience of transgression brings to light this relationship of finitude to being, this moment of the limit which anthropological thought, since Kant, could only designate from the distance and from the exterior through language of dialectics.

meaning since it marks its limit. It

WE WILL NOW TEAR OUT THEIR EYES, SLASH THE THROAT OF THEIR SUN VIA A READING OF GEORGES BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE. BE WARNED TRANSGRESSION REQUIRES BRAVERY. BATAILLE, LIKE SADE BEFORE HIM, ISNT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART OR EASILY OFFENDED. PARDON MY FRENCH. Bataille 1928 (Georges, french pervert, the story of the eye, supervert.com ) It really was totally out of the question for Simone to lift her dress and place her bare behind in the dish of raw balls. All she could do was hold the dish in her lap. I told her I would like to fuck her again before Granero returned to fight the fourth bull, but she refused, and she sat there, keenly involved, despite everything, in the disembowelments of horses, followed, as she childishly put it, by "death and destruction, namely the cataract of bowels. Little by little, the sun's radiance sucked us into an unreality that fitted our malaise-the wordless and powerless desire to explode and get up of our behinds. We grimaced, because our eyes were blinded and because we were thirsty, our senses ruffled, and there was no possibility of quenching our desires.

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We three had managed to share in the morose dissolution that leaves no harmony between the various spasms of the body. We were so far gone that even Granero's return could not pull us out of that stupefying absorption. Besides, the bull opposite him was distrustful and seemed unresponsive; the combat went on just as drearily as before. The events that followed were without transition or connection, not because they weren't actually related, but because my attention was so absent as to remain absolutely dissociated. In just a few seconds: first, Simone bit into one of the raw balls, to my dismay; then Granero advanced towards the bull, waving his scarlet cloth; finally, almost at once, Simone, with a blood-red face and a suffocating lewdness, uncovered her long white thighs up to her moist vulva, into which she slowly and surely fitted the second pale globule-Granero was thrown back by the bull and wedged against the balustrade; the horns struck the balustrade three times at full speed; at the third blow, one horn plunged into the right eye and through the head. A shriek of unmeasured horror coincided with a brief orgasm for Simone, who was lifted up from the stones eat only to be flung back with a bleeding nose, under a blinding sun; men instantly rushed over to haul away Granero's body, the right eye dangling from the head. Thus, two globes of equal size and consistency had suddenly been propelled in opposite directions at once. One, the white ball of the bull, had been thrust into the "pink and dark" cunt that Simone had bared in the crowd; the other, a human eye, had spurted from Granero's head with the same force as a bundle of innards from a belly. This coincidence, tied to death and to a sort of urinary liquefaction of the sky, first brought us back to Marcella in a moment that was so brief and almost insubstantial, yet so uneasily vivid that I stepped forward like a sleepwalker as though about to touch her at eye level.

THE STORY CONTINUES A BIT LATER... "Sir Edmund," she said, rubbing her cheek gently on his shoulder, "I want you to do something.""I shall do anything you like," he replied. She made me come over to the corpse: she knelt down and completely opened the eye that the fly had perched on. "Do you see the eye?" she asked me. "Well?""It's an egg," she concluded in all simplicity. "All right," I urged her, extremely disturbed, what are you getting at?" "I want to play with this eye." "What do you mean?" "Listen, Sir Edmund," she finally let it out, "you must give me this at once, tear it out at once, I want it!" Sir Edmund was always poker-faced except when he turned purple. Nor did he bat an eyelash now; but the blood did shoot to his face. He removed a pair of fine scissors from his wallet, knelt down, then nimbly inserted the fingers of his left hand into the socket and drew out the eye, while his right hand snipped the obstinate ligaments. Next, he presented the small whitish eyeball in a hand reddened with blood. Simone gazed at the absurdity and finally took it in her hand, completely distraught; yet she had no qualms, and instantly amused herself by fondling the depth of her thighs and inserting this apparently fluid object. The caress of the eye over the skin is so utterly, so extraordinarily gentle, and the sensation is so bizarre that it has something of a rooster's horrible crowing. Simone meanwhile amused herself by slipping the eye into the profound crevice of her ass, and after lying down on her back and raising her legs and bottom, she tried to keep the eye there simply by squeezing her buttocks together. But all at once, it spat out like a stone squeezed from a cherry, and dropped on the thin belly of the corpse, an inch or so from the cock. In the meantime, I had let Sir Edmund undress me, so that I could pounce
stark naked on the crouching body of the girl; my entire cock vanished at one lunge into the hairy crevice, and I fucked her hard while Sir Edmund played with the eye,

it up my ass, Sir Edmund," Simone shouted. And Sir Edmund delicately glided the eye between her buttocks. But finally, Simone left me, grabbed the beautiful eyeball from the hands of the tall Englishman, and with a staid and regular pressure from her hands, she slid it into hers lobbery flesh, in the midst of the fur. And then she promptly drew me over, clutching my neck between her arms and smashing her lips on mine so forcefully that I came without touching her and my come shot all over her fur. Now I stood up and, while Simone lay on her side, I drew her thighs apart, and found myself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for a neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror; in Simone's hairy vagina, I saw the wan blue eye of Marcelle, gazing at me through tears of urine. Streaks of come in the steaming hair helped give that dreamy vision a disastrous sadness. I held the thighs open while Simone was convulsed by the urinary spasm, and the burning urine streamed out from under the eye down to the thighs below

rolling it, in between the contortions of our bodies, on the skin of our bellies and breasts. For an instant, the eye was trapped between our navels." Put

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1NC (HEIDEGGER) THE STRUCTURE OF THE 1AC REVEALS THAT IT WORKS WITHIN THE RULE OF ENFRAMING THEY OBSERVE THE KNOWLEDGE PRESENTED UNDER THE GUISE OF OBJECTIVITY, ATTEMPTING TO PERFECTLY UNDERSTAND IT AND ULTIMATELY TO ARRIVE AT SOME CERTAIN TRUTH. THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE YOU BY INSISTING UPON THIS MONOPOLY OVER TRUTH SERVE TO SHUT DOWN MEDITATIVE THINKING AND FURTHERMORE DESTROY THE ESSENCE OF THINGS BY ECLIPSING THEIR CONCRETENESS AND IGNORING THEIR ESSENTIAL CONTEXTS. A MEDITATIVE APPROACH TO OBSERVING WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO THE REVEALING OF THINGS AS THINGS AND RESPECT THE MYSTERY INHERENT IN THAT REVEAL AND THEREFORE ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE BY AWAKENING THAT TRUTH WITHUIN WHICH THE LISTENER IS ALREADY PRESENT. WE APPROACH TRUTH NOT AS SOMETHING TO BE FULLY AND FINALLY UNCOVERED, BUT AS SOMETHING PRESENT ALREADY BEFORE US TO WHICH WE MIGHT BE MORE ATTUNED. Joseph 2000 (Aloysius, Duquesne University, Speaking Differently: Deconstruction/Meditative Thinking as the Heart of "the Faculty of Observing", Janushead, 3.1, http://www.janushead.org/3-1/ajoseph.cfm )
Introduction Aristotle, in Book I, Chapter 2, of his Rhetoric says, "Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Roberts, 1954, p. 24). This probable ("may be") definition of rhetoric is significant. First, it lends itself to be read in many ways, and second, it shows us that what is at the heart of epideictic rhetoric is probability and not certainty. In this paper I offer a meditative (thinking) reading of the phrase, "the faculty of observing" in conjunction with discerning the available means of persuasion as posited in this definition.1 At the outset it can be stated that meditative thinking/deconstruction2 is not aimed at specifying a technique to choose "the available means of persuasion." Rather it is that which describes the "essence" of observation. Hence, in this paper I also wish to show that the genuine rhetor is one "who dwells" as one would in meditative thinking. Observation as meditative thinking: "a letting be"

From a Heideggerian perspective, the phrase, "the faculty of observing" has significant implications for meditative thinking/deconstruction. If as Cicero says, "Eloquence is wisdom spoken wisely," then observation facilitates the rhetor to speak wisely so as to be able to persuade and stir up a disposition amidst the audience. Heidegger (1953/1996) alludes to this in his phenomenal work, Being and Time, when he writes, "Publicness as the kind of being of the they not only has its attunedness, it uses mood and 'makes' it for itself. The speaker speaks to it and from it. He needs the understanding of the possibility of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way" (138-139). Hence, to be persuasive a rhetor needs first of all to observe. It could then be said that "observation" is the condition upon which choosing the appropriate means of persuasion rests. But we may ask, "Is this not common sense?" It reminds us of the English proverb, "Look before you leap." Yet what is to be borne in
mind is that because the rational-scientific framework has permeated common sense so much, it cannot be taken for granted that observing or looking is merely a commonsensical activity. The

technological and commercial Enframing of this epoch has such a powerful grip over every aspect of

human life that common sense has lost its place as conventional wisdom. Besides, in trying to make human life comfortable and highly efficient, technology has

succeeded in creating a desensitized human world. Looking or observing loses its passion in such a world that prioritizes distant, dispassionate and objective observation. Hence, from a rationalistic and technological perspective, observation or looking is detached seeing. The goal of detached seeing is to arrive at certain knowledge and truth. The observer through detached seeing abstracts the essential qualities of a thing in the effort to understand and interpret it. This leads to clear and valid knowledge. But from an existential-phenomenological perspective, such an approach is impoverished. First of all, such a disengaged (detached seeing) activity robs a thing of its concreteness and its embodiment. Second, this process of abstraction/detached seeing (however convincing and certain it is) is oblivious to the context which makes the thing what it is. These two aspects make observation as detached seeing, in the rational-scientific system, a barren and passionless activity. But observation in a radical sense is respect for the phenomena. In his essay, "The Thing," Heidegger (1971b) points to this radical sense of observation which can be characterized as the "essence" of meditative thinking. He writes, "If we let the thing be present in this thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing" (p. 181). Observation as meditative thinking is radical because the rhetor lets the thing be thing in the way it

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shows itself -- in its concreteness ("thinging") and its situatedness ("worlding world"). But for the rhetor who affiliates with the rational-scientific tradition, an abstract, passionless and decontextualized observation has its payoffs. The persuasion that arises out of such an affiliation is commercially viable given the profit-oriented and competitive socio-cultural arena that every discipline (arts and sciences) has unwittingly bought into. Within such a structure, the skilful and persuasive speaker is one who possesses the skill to convince the listeners to concede to truth irrespective of its concreteness and situatedness. The monopoly over truth at which this approach arrives is gained through a process of elimination and exclusion such that the listeners are precluded from its multiple and genuine alternatives and possibilities. Through such exclusionary means the speaker and all those who subscribe to such a prescriptive approach to truth thereby become the sole owners of the truth by means of expropriation and exploitation. On the other hand, a rhetor (the one who observes with a passion) enables/facilitates/shows how we live and move in truth through inclusive and non-reductionistic ways. This is truly pedagogical and educative for it persuades by "bringing forth"; not because the speaker has a monopoly over truth, but because the listeners live and share in it already. The work of the rhetor is to awaken them to what they already know. It is in this context that epideictic rhetoric is important. We have no new information introduced; rather, the quality of the phenomena is amplified. From a Heideggerian perspective, observing takes on a different meaning as it is based on a radically different assumption. As Hoy (1993) writing on the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger points out:
Heidegger's strategy is different from the Cartesian strategy, which starts by assuming a basic ontological disconnection (e.g., between mental and physical substance) and then looks for instances of epistemological connection that cannot be doubted (e.g., the knowledge of the existence of a thinking subject). Heidegger's strategy is to see Dasein as already in the world, which suggests that what needs to be explained is not the connection, which is the basis, but the disconnection (p. 176). The disconnection or the disruption is that which is appealing to the eye of the rhetor who observes by participating. Hence, observation as meditative thinking is to pay attention to the "disconnection" that shows itself in the activity of hovering over as long as we can endure it. To take this a step further, we could say that when the rhetor can endure or stay persistent with this unsettling experience, then the circularity of hermeneutics (through a persistent inhabitation of the phenomenon) gives way to an elliptical movement that is in "essence" elusive and indeterminate. Derrida (1973) calls our attention to this radical difference in what can be called a "project" of deconstruction. He makes an appropriate observation in this regard when he writes: There is then, probably no choice to be made between two lines of thought; our task is rather to reflect on the circularity, which makes the one pass into the other indefinitely. And, by strictly repeating this circle in its own historical possibility, we allow the production of some elliptical change of site, within the difference involved in repetition; this displacement is no doubt deficient, but with a deficiency that is not yet, or is already no longer, absence, negativity, nonbeing, lack, silence. Neither matter nor form, it is nothing that any philosopheme, that is, any dialectic, however determinate, can capture. It is an ellipsis of both meaning and form; it is neither plenary speech nor perfectly circular. More and less, neither more nor less -- it is perhaps an entirely different question. (p. 128)

On the part of the rhetor who endures, the latter movement allows for a "re-cognition" of this elusive and disruptive/displacing nature of that which shows itself. In this sense, observation as meditative thinking/deconstruction is respect for the phenomena. In such a movement, we could contend with John D. Caputo (1987) that the observer-participant rhetor is never in a privileged position or the sole owner in regard to what shows itself in meditative thinking/deconstruction. He observes: In an a-lethic view, whatever shows itself, whatever comes forth, issues from hidden depths. We know we cannot touch bottom here, that we cannot squeeze what stirs here between our conceptual hands, cannot get it within our grip, cannot seize it round about. The mystery is self-withdrawing, self-sheltering. And that is what gives rise to respect. (p. 276) Hence, in Heideggerian terms, observation could be seen as akin to letting go or "letting be," which is radical detachment or detached attachment. The genuine rhetor is one who cultivates a respectful disposition as regards the "faculty of observing" and "the available means of persuasion" vis--vis that which needs to be spoken about.

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THE 1AC CLAIM TO OBSERVE KNOWLEDGE IS FUNDAMENTALLY BASED ON THEIR ROLE AS SEEING, KNOWING SUBJECT AND THE 1AC AS A PERMANENT, STATIC, OBJECT PROJECTED AND REPRESENTED FROM THEIR SUBJECTIVITY. THIS IS THE MODERN GESTELL, RULED BY ENFRAMING, MEANING THEY ENGAGE THE 1AC VIOLENTLY AS A RESOURCE STANDING IN RESERVE TO BE CONSUMED. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
In order to understand the perceptual Gestalt as a site and instance of enframing, it is necessary to reflect on perception as a process of articulation, a process of bringing-forth. What

is distinctive about the way that perception under the sway of enframing articulates and brings forth a figure-ground Gestalt? Enframing, Heidegger says, challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view of the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the relation [of human beings] to the essence of truth. Although enframing comes to pass as a destining of revealing it is a destining that gathers together into the revealing that challenges forth. Although, under the spell of enframing, perception still takes part in a process of unconcealment and effects a certain bringing-forth, its interaction with the presencing of being tends to become a challenging-forth into ordering, an ordering of the real as standing reserve. Such perception is of course disclosive, but it is also at the same time deeply forgetful, willfully concealing the openness of the ground, the gift of the field in which, and by grace of which, it takes place and even repressing the fact of this willful concealment: The Open [itself] becomes an object, and is thus twisted around toward human beings.Under the spell of enframing, then, perception is never far from violence; its knowledge, in fact, is a power that can only come from aggression and torture. The Gestalt, therefore, essentially undergoes a process that it would not be an exaggeration to describe as its disfigurement: the original emergence and coming-to-be of energies,becomes a visibility of things that are already therethe eye, vision, becomes a mere looking-at or looking-over or gaping-at. These words come from Heideggers 1936 Introduction to Metaphysics. But it is clear that he the cold stare of the gaze, the spontaneously emerging power presencing in and as the Gestalt is hardened into a state of permanent presence, deprived of the possibility of appearing spontaneously deprived, also, of its radiance, its Schein. With regard to the question of this dullness, this loss of radiance, perhaps it will suffice for the moment to note, here, just two decisive passages: [1] in Being and Time, Heidegger asserts that, in setting down the subject, we dim entities down to focus. [2] In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger says that Enframing blocks off the shining forth and holding sway of truth. With regard to the hardening into permanence, Heidegger argues, in Basic Concepts, that presencing does not mean mere presence, but emerging and opening upmere presence, in the sense of the present-at-hand, has already set a limit to presencing, emergence, and has thus given up presencing. In elaborating this point, he observes that what presences only presences in emerging and precisely not in the presence that has congealed into permanence. It belongs, he says, to the essence of presencing that its possible non-essence of hardening into something permanent is repelled in it. All these assertions gain significance when they are understood concretely as
phenomenological observations referring to the emergence and dissolution of the figure-ground structures that form in the event of perception and depend on the way

already understood this point much earlier, because, in Being and Time, a work which leads us through a strenuous learning-process toward the achievement of a moment of vision, he called attention to our inveterate tendency to fall into a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Under

our looking and seeing let them emerge, bringing down, drawing them forth, out of the encompassing field of visibility. Most in question, perhaps, and most

at stake, is our attitude towards the ground: whether or not its dynamism, its openness, its dimensionality, is granted by the corresponding receptive openness of our perception our willingness, for example, to let perception be decentered, drawn into abysses of invisibility, radically surprised. As an ontologically oriented capacity, perception calls upon to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every becoming comes to stand. Elaborating this point, with words (not to lose myself) that echo Schellings, quoted at the beginning of this study, Heidegger explains that: To engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them. Moreover, this comportment requires an acceptance of concealment: letting-be, he says is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of

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Daseinthere is concealment. We need to give thought to the social, cultural, and political significance of the disruptive and anarchic ontological standard or measure implicit in this engagement, this way of looking and seeing. Gestalt psychology has demonstrated the organic interdependencies, the reciprocally altering interactions that are constitutive of an undisturbed Gestalt formation process. Insisting that a theory of perception must be a field theory, Kohler points out, for example, that objects show a considerable change in size when they are located within a region which has been strongly influenced by a figure. This means, he says, that the after-effects of such figure-forming processes tend to alter given visual objects. Prolonged inspection of any specific visual trends, he notes, to change its organization. Moreover, other objects which are afterwards shown in the same region of the field are also affected, namely displaced or distorted. Consequently, as

the fixation of a staring gaze, the enframing typical of Gestell interrupts the figure-ground interplay and distorts both figure and ground. Instead of a dynamic, spontaneously, flowing interaction between figure and ground, a looser, freer, softer differentiation between the periphery and the center of focus, deconstructing the metaphysical dualism that prioritizes the center, there is a freezing of the flow, interrupting the work of time the emergence and dissolution of perceptual configurations. And when the figure is subject to such reifying intensity, it becomes detached from its ground, although it is the opening openness, the end-less origin of the figures that enframing brings forth, its presencing is either forgotten, suppressed, neglected, or else it is submitted to the most extreme ontic reduction as if it could be possessed by the ecological subject as just another figure. Herbert Guenther notes that the openness of the perceptual ground is present in and actually presupposed by every determinate form. Every
determinate entity evolves out of something indeterminate and to a certain extent maintains its connection with this indeterminacy; it is never completely isolated from

The enframing gaze cannot, will not, let the ground be ground; it cannot, will not, tolerate its immeasurableness, its withdrawal from the grasp of perception, its refusal to be totalized, reified, possessed. Instead of a gaze that is softly focusing, gently hovering, open and receptive to the dynamics of change, open and receptive to the spontaneous emergence of new configurations taking place in the dimensions of the surrounding field; instead of a gaze that withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves, in the epoch of enframing there is a tendency for the gaze to become aggressively dualistic sharp, linear, and atomizing. This is the gaze that has installed and continues to serve a metaphysics of reified presence, a metaphysics of closure, violence and mortification. This reification is a persistent theme in Heideggers thought, something he clearly articulated in Being and Time and repeatedly emphasized in
subsequent lectures and writings. In a 1941 course on Anaximander, for example, Heidegger declared that permanence is contrary to theessence of beingbut what presences essentially and yet contrary to the essence is the non-essenceto the extent that what respectively presences corresponds to the essence of presencing, it does not consist in and solidify into duration unto permanence. What resists measure, limitation, finitude, what refuses the ordinance of time, that Anaximander regards as , injustice. According to Heidegger, in the world of Greek antiquity people did not relate to what is as to an inwardly conceived image or representation. For

it. Because the indeterminate entity is not isolated from the indeterminacy, our attention can shift back and forth between one and the other.

the Greeks, what is is what presences; and this experience with perception did not involve looking at what is and having a representation of it in mind; nor did it involved making the one who is looking into a subject and making what is presencing into an object. This construction is a distinctive mark of modernity. It is only in the modern period the period beginning with the self-affirmation of Man in the humanism of the sixteenth century and with a way of looking at the world
reintroduced and carried forward, albeit in very different projects, by the Cartesianism and empiricism of the seventeenth century and by the rationalism and romanticism of the eighteenth that what is present is determined [1] as an ob-ject, [2] as being there for a subject, [3] as (re)presented by the subject to itself, [4] as placed to lie before the subject, and finally, therefore, [5] as present in the form of a representation. In and with this determination of what is present, the ever increasing power of the subject is claimed and asserted. As Derrida correctly remarks in Sending: On Representation, Vorstellung marks the gesture which consists of placing, of causing to stand before one, of installing in front of oneself as available, of localizing ready-to-hand, within the availability of the prepositionThe subject is what can or believes it can offer itself representations, disposing them and disposing of them.Now, Heidegger argues that what is distinctive of modernity and the cause of his concern is not so much the fact that experience can be a process of representation as it is the fact that representation is universalized, that it becomes the sole medium for all experiencing, and that its way of relating to what is present encourages us in the attitude of domination. And this means that it encourages us in an attitude that does violence to the background of perception, either by simply forgetting its way of presencing, or by gathering it into the Gestalt in a reified re-presentation of presencing.

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A WORLD SUBSUMED BY CALCULATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL THOUGHT DESTROYS OUR ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP IN SUCH A WAY THAT THINGS CEASE TO BE THINGS IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY. OUR INSTANT ACCESS TO EVERYTHING AS A TOOL FOR USE OBLITERATES THE ESSENTIAL BEING OF ALL THINGS MAKING EVEN TOTAL PLANETARY DESTRUCTION A RADICALLY LESS IMPORTANT ISSUE AND A LIKELY INNEVITABILITY. CAPUTO 93 (JOHN, Demythologizing Heidegger, p. 136-41) The essence of technology is nothing technological; the essence of language is nothing linguistic; the essence of starvation has nothing to do with being hungry; the essence of homelessness has nothing to do with being out in the cold. Is this
not to repeat a most classical philosophical gesture, to submit to the oldest philosophical desire of all, the desire for the pure and uncontaminated, not to mention the safe and

Heidegger remarks upon the prospect of a nuclear conflagration which could extinguish all human life: Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that what has long since taken place and has already happened expels from itself as its last emission the atom bomb and its explosionnot to mention the single nuclear bomb, whose triggering, thought through to its utmost potential, might be enough to snuff out all life on earth. (VA, 165/PLT, 166). In a parallel passage, he remarks: ... [Man finds himself in a perilous situation. Why? Just because a third world war might break out unexpectedly and bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth? No. In this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatensprecisely when the danger of a third world war has been removed. A strange assertion! Strange indeed, but only as long as we do not meditate. (G, 27/DT, 56). The thinker is menaced by a more radical threat, is endangered by a more radical explosiveness, let us say by a more essential bomb, capable of an emission (hinauswerfen) of such primordiality that the explosion (Explosion) of the atom bomb would be but its last ejection. Indeed, the point is even stronger: even a nuclear bomb, or a wholesale exchange of nuclear bombs between nuclear megapowers, which would put an end to "all life on earth," which would annihilate every living being, human and nonhuman, is a derivative threat compared to this more primordial destructiveness. There is a prospect that is more dangerous and uncanny unheimhcherthan the mere fact that everything could be blown apart (Auseinanderplatzen von allem). There is something that would bring about more homelessness, more not-beingat-home (un-Heimlich) than the destruction of cities and towns and of their inhabitants. What is truly unsettling, dis-placing (ent-setzen), the thing that is really terrifying (das Entsetzende), is not the prospect of the destruction of human life on the planet, of annihilating its places and its settlers. Furthermore, this truly terrifying thing has already happened and has actually been around for quite some time. This more essential explosive has already been set off; things have already been destroyed, even though the nuclear holocaust has not yet happened. What then is the truly terrifying? The terrifying is that which sets everything that is outside (heraussitzl) of its own essence (Wesen)'. What is this dis-placing [Entsetzendel? It shows itself and conceals itself in the way in which everything presences (anwest), namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent. (VA, 165/P1.T, 166) The truly terrifying explosion, the more essential destruction is that which dis-places a thing front its Wesen, its essential nature, its ownmost coming to presence. The essential destruction occurs in the Being of a thing, not in its entitative actuality; it is a disaster that befalls Being, not beings. The destructiveness of this more essential destruction is aimed not directly at man but at "things" (Dirge), in the distinctively Heideggerian sense. The Wesen of things is their nearness, and it is nearness which has been decimated by technological proximity and speed. Things have ceased to have true nearness and farness, have sunk into the indifference of that which, being a great distance away, can be brought close in the flash of a technological instant. Thereby, things have ceased to be things, have sunk into indifferent nothingness. Something profoundly disruptive has occurred on the level of the Being of things that has already destroyed them, already cast them out of (herauswerfen) their Being. Beings have been brought close to Us technologically; enormous distances are spanned in seconds. Satellite technology can make events occurring on the other side of the globe present in a flash; supersonic jets cross the great oceans in a few hours. Yet, far from bringing things "near," this massive technological removal of distance has actually abolished nearness, for nearness is precisely what withdraws in the
secure? (2) In his essay "The Thing"

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midst of such technological frenzy. Nearness is the nearing of earth and heavens, mortals and gods, in the handmade jug, or the old bridge at Heidelberg, and it can be experienced only in the quiet meditativeness which renounces haste. Thus the real destruction of the thing, the one that abolishes its most essential Being and Wesen, occurs when the scientific determination of things prevails and compels our assent. The thingliness of the jug is to serve as the place which gathers together the fruit of earth and sun in mortal offering to the gods above. But all that is destroyed when pouring this libation becomes instead the displacement of air by a liquid; at that moment science has succeeded in reducing the jug-thing to a nonentity (Nichtige). Science, or rather the dominion of scientific representation, the rule of science over what comes to presence, what is called the Wesen, which is at work in science and technology, that is the truly explosivedestructive thing, the more essential dis-placing. The gathering of earth and sky, mortals and gods, that holds sway in the thingfor "gathering" is what the Old High German thing meansis scattered to the four winds, and that more essential annihilation occurs even if the bomb never goes off: Science's knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb's explosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of the long-since accomplished annihilation of the thing. (VA, 168/PLT, 170J When things have been annihilated in their thingness, the mushroom clouds of the bomb cannot be far behind. So whether or not the bomb goes off is not essential, does not penetrate to the essence of what comes to presence in the present age of technological proximities and reduced distances. What is essential is the loss of genuine nearness, authentic and true nearness, following which the actual physical annihilation of planetary life would be a "gross" confirmation, an unrefined, external, physical destruction that would be but a follow-up, another afterthought, a less subtle counterpart to a more inward, profound, essential, authentic, ontological destruction.

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THE OBJECTIFICATTION OF THE WORLD AT THE HANDS OF THE GAZE OF THE 1AC IS THE ROOT OF SUFFERING AND VIOELNCE AND IS INSEPERABLE FROM RACISM AND ALL FORMS OF HATRED. AS AN ATTEMPT TO POSIT AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO VISUALITY WE ATTEMPT TO OPEN OUR EYES TO BLINDNESS WE APPROACH VISION AS WHAT HEIDEGGER CALLS THE LIGHTING WHICH IS TO SAY AS A HERMENEUTICAL INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONCEALMENT AND UNCONCEALMENT WHICH RESPECTS THE ABYSS OF THAT WHICH IS UNCONCEALED AND THEREBY SUBVERTING THE SOVREIGNTY OF THE GAZE AND DENYING ITS POWER. THIS MOVE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN THAT ANY INCLUSION OF THE WILL TO POWER DRIVEN GAZE OF THE 1AC DESTROYS THE ALTERNATIVE AND RESULTS IN TOTALITARIAN TYRANNY. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
Following the passage on the interpretation of which we have just been reflecting, Heidegger asks: Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the object and its objectivity, and the subjectivity, and hence is prior to the realm of their recipricrocity? Carrying this question forward in the direction that Heideggers preceding discussion would suggest, we are led to the thought that subject

and object are gathered together and belong together in and by grace of the field of the field of the lighting-that elemental presencing of being which opens up, lays down, and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that first joins subject and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that, in its configuration as ground, offers and submits itself to the conditions of perceptivity that rule in the life of a mortal. But in modern times, this mortal has become an ego-logical subject: someone who, constituting himself as a subject, focuses on what is present and turns it into an object, a figure split off from the dynamic ground, the surrounding contextual referential field. If our time is our of joint, so is the figure-ground Gestalt. This splitting off, of subject from object, figure from ground, and the Gestalt itself from the presence of the lighting, is symptomatic of the antagonisms that persist in our deeply divided and still unreconciled society. And when we consider what this splitting means when the object of the gaze in another subject when it is a question of how another subject is looked at, faced, seen, made to figure in the figure-ground Gestell-then we are approaching the root of the suffering, rage, and violence distinctive of the contemporary world. How different social relations would be if they could be deeply rooted, by virtue of an awareness (Stimmung) that does not presently form very often, in a felt sense of being gathered together in to the underlying unity of the lighting, a felt sense of belonging together in the Laying-down-that-gathers-and of having always already belonged together, gathered through the gift of that lighting, in a dimension of being prior to the realm of their reciprocity ! Stereotyped, reifying perceptions of the other, ways of looking at others that are inseparable from racism, nationalism, and ethnic hatreds, would be more difficult to sustain, if the awareness toward which Heidegger is gesturing were to be cultivated as the subsoil in which our vision needs to be well rooted. To be sure, as Heidegger says, the jointure thanks to which revealing and concealing are mutually joined must remain the invisible of all invisibles, since it [is that which] bestows shining on whatever appears. It must be certainly protected from the will to total visibility, because if not properly cared for, its gift of light and darkness would fall and negation, placed at the disposal of the dominant will to power; and the peoples of the world would eventually be left without any place to hide from totalitarian tyranny and terror. But this possibility, this danger, makes it all the more necessary that we not let the invisibility, the withdrawal of the jointure fall into total oblivion, absolute negation. We need to make this jointure visible in our world: visible, however, as the invisible of all invisibles. And this means that our looking and seeing must let themselves be appropriate by this invisibility, becoming, through their capacity for ontological recollection, its hermeneutic organ, protecting and preserving its necessary withdrawal. This interpretation points toward the need for a historically different way of looking and seeing a way of looking and seeing that obeys in care the way of the lighting. Heidegger continues:

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If we think it [i.e., the presencing of being] as lighting, this includes not only the brilliance, but also the openness wherein everything, especially the reciprocally related, comes into shining. Lighting is therefore more illuminating, and also more than laying bare. Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open. It is the bestowal of presencing. According to Heidegger, The event of lighting [das Ereignis der Lichtung) is the world. The meditatively gathering lighting which brings into the open is revealing; [but] it abides in self-concealing. Thus it is necessary that, in virtue of our way of looking and seeing, we protect and preserve the self-concealment of the lighting, while at the same time opening to this event and letting it come into its own by gathering it into our way and making it visible hermeneutically as that which opens up our world.
Heideggers discussion of the lighting is haunted, however, by deep-and well-founded-anxieties. What concerns him is the danger that, in spite of all his precautions, reference to this lighting will be misunderstood. For the self-giving of the lighting both is and is not a lighting, a light we can see. Taking place within the realm of the visible, it can appear only as that which visibly withdraws from the reach of our vision. Thus, most of all, Heidegger is worried that the event, the giving, of the lighting- the wonder of gift, that there is light- will be degraded by a reduction to the physics and optics of light. The lighting, he says, is no mere brightening and lightening. And that is because what he is trying to get us to see is a revealing-concealing lighting concerned with the presencing of what is present. Appealing, in spite of the terrible dangers, to our capacity, our potential for vision, he tells us that the lighting not only illuminates what is present, but gathers it together and secures it in advance in presencing. Thus, were our own way of looking and seeing to become a recollection and mimetic repetition of this gift of lighting-or, in other words, were our way to become an ontologically appropriate, ontologically appropriated, it would, in its own way, become a gathering, a vision of the Geviert, gathering earth and sky, gods and mortals. Because we are being gifted with a capacity-to-see the potential of which still remains unrealized and unfulfilled, the gift of the lighting-the wonder that Es gibt lighting-makes a claim on us: a claim that burdens us with the responsibility to realize our great potential for vision, our capacity for responsiveness, our responseability. Gods and men, says Heidegger, Are not only illuminated in the lighting, but are also enlightened from it and toward it. Thus they can, in their own way, accomplish the lighting (bringing it to the fullness of its essence) and thereby protect it.... [moreover, because they receive this lighting and are dependent on it,] they are appropriated into the event of lighting, and are never concealed. On the contrary, they are revealed, thought in still another sense [i.e., in that the claim of this lighting on their responsiveness, e.g., on their responsibility for using their capacity to perceive it, puts them on trial]. Just as those who are far distant belong to the distance, so are the revealed-in the sense now to be thought-entrusted [zugertraut] to the lighting that keeps and shelters them. As beings of sight, we are dependent on the gift of the lighting, and therefore are entrusted to it. But we are also thereby entrusted with it, because the lighting can come into its own, or come back to itself in fullness of its essence (as Heidegger puts it), only through the mediation of our way of looking and seeing. For it is only by (the) virtue of our looking and seeing that the lighting can be made visible hermeneutically, visible as the coming of the lighting which first makes our vision possible. Furthermore, the coming of the lighting, as the interplay of concealment and unconcealment within which all that is comes to presence, can be protected and preserved only by (the) virtue of a way of seeing and looking that [1] makes it visible in its invisibility, acknowledging our finitude, our limited horizons, and the immeasurable abyss of the invisible, and that thereby [2] respects the withdrawal and self-concealment of the lighting, protecting and preserving it, instead of violently penetrating its abodes of concealment with an insolent demand for total visibility, total clarity, total control. The lighting gives us light but it also subverts that sovereignty of the gaze, leading it into the shadows, into the dark, into the realms of semblance and deception; obstructing its powers of penetration; compelling submission to the invisible beyond being. The lighting opens our eyes-to blindness. Following Heraclitue, who was merciless in criticizing the ways of his contemporaries, Heidegger formulates his own criticism of the looking and seeing that predominates in the contemporary world. He writes: Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights everything present in its presencing. But they turn from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present, which is what immediately concerns them in their everyday commerce with each other.... They have no inkling of what they have been entrusted with: presencing, which in its lighting first allows what is present to come to appearance. In the lighting of which they come and go, remains concealed from them and forgotten.

recollection of the lighting cannot take place in a perception, a way of looking and seeing, for example, that is grasping, possessive, driven by the will to power: The golden gleam of the lightings invisible shining cannot be grasped, because it is not itself something grasping. Rather, it is the purely appropriating even [das reine Ereignen]. The invisible shining of the lighting streams from the wholesome self-keeping in the selfrestraining preservation of destiny [Geschick].

As Heidegger is quick to point out, however, the

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EXPLANATION

SINCE PLATOS ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND PERHAPS EVEN BEFORE VISION AND LIGHT HAVE BEEN THE DOMINANT METAPHORS FOR KNOWLEDGE. THESE METAPHORS ESTABLISH A WAY OF KNOWING THE WORLD WHERE WE BELIEVE, MUCH LIKE THE RAYS OF THE SUN EXTINGUISH THE NIGHT, THAT EVERYTHING IS PERFECTLY KNOWABLE AND FURTHER, JUST AS OUR EYES CAPTURE THAT WHICH ILLUMINATED BY THE SUN, THAT WE ARE THE SUBJECTS WHICH ARE ABLE TO OBSERVE THESE ILLUMINATED OBJECTS. THIS SUBEJCT/OBJECT DUALISM RENDERS ALL KNOWLEDGE, ALL THAT WE ENCOUTER AS AN OJBECT TO BE APPREHENDED. THE 1AC PERFORMS THIS KNOWING OF THE WORLD IN THE WAY THEY CONSTRUCT THEIR 1AC. THE ORGANIZE PICTURE OF THE WORLD, EXPLICITLY LABELING THEM OBSERVATIONS, AND THUS SUBMIT THE WORLD OF THE 1AC TO THE DOMINANCE OF THEIR OWN SUBJECTIVE GAZE. OUR LINKS EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT THIS IS THE ROOT OF MODERN DISCIPLINARY POWER. MEDICAL POWER MEANS THEPENETRATION OF THE WHOLE SOCIAL SPACE BY THE CLINICAL PERCEPTION THE VERY MEANING OF MEDICALIZATION IS BROUGHT BACK TO CIRCULATION BY THE MEDICAL GAZE. JUST AS THE CLINICAL GAZE IDENTIFIES PATHOLOGIES AND EXTERMINATES THEM IN THE NAME OF THE HEALTH OF THE BODY, SO TOO DOES THE 1AC DIAGNOSE PROBLEMS IT IS ABLE TO PERCIEVE UNDER ITS ALL KNOWING OBSERVATION. THE GIROUX EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THIS POWER TO SURVEILLE THE WORLD AND ITS ATTENDANT POWER TO REGULATE THE HEALTH OF THE BODY POLITIC INVOLVES AS ITS COUNTERPART THE POWER TO RENDER POPULATIONS DOCILE, CONTROLLED, AND ULTIMATELY DISALLOW THEM LIFE. THE VERY PRESCRIPTIONS AFFORDED BY THEIR POWER-KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES UNDERPIN THE ABILITY TO DECIDE WHICH SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION ARE HEALTHY AND WHICH MUST BE EXTINGUISHED. IT IS THIS MANIFESTATION OF BIOPOWER THAT IS AT THE HEART OF RACISM, GENOCIDE, AND ALL FORMS OF STATE VIOLENCE. IN ORDER TO IMASCULATE THIS POWER, TO DETHRONE THE PRIMACY OF THE EYE, THE ALTERNATIVE PRESENTS BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE IN ALL ITS TRANSGRESSIVE UGLINESS. BATILLES STORY NOT ONLY SYMBOLICALLY RIPS THE EYE FROM THE HEAD AND TURNS IT UPON THE SUN, BLINDING IT, BUT ALSO EXPLICITLY CONNECTS THE EYE WITH BASE MATERIAL AND SEXUALITY. BY RETURNING THE EYE TO THE DARK CAVERN OF PHYSICALITY FROM WHENCE IT CAME, BATAILLE REVEALS THE EYE AS A SELF TRANSGRESSION A BLACK LIMIT WITHIN A WHITE INFINITY, NOW THE MEETING OF THE EROTIC, LINGUISTIC, OCULAR, BLIND, LIFE AFFIRMING, AND DEAD IF MAN DID NOT IMPERILOUSLY CLOSE HIS EYES, HE WOULD FINALLY BE UNABLE TO SEE THE THINGS WORTH SEEING. [at this point you can either stop, or if you have enough time to read this long as k first card, it is pretty sweet]

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IN AN ATTEMPT TO EXPLAIN WHY THE CRITIQUE IS A PREREQUISITE TO THE 1AC, WE TURN TO THE BARD. THE 1AC COUPLING OF OCULAR LANGUAGE WITH CLAIMS TO EMPIRICAL TRUTH IS CONSTRUCTED IN ORDER TO CORRELATE THOSE CLAIMS WITH VERIFIABLE FACT, BUT IT IGNORES THAT IT IS PRIMARILY A DISCURSIVE AND HISTORICAL CONSTRUCT AND NOT A MATERIAL REALITY. THEIR ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE THE 1AC CLAIMS MIRRORS IAGOS MANIPULATION OF OTHELLO TOWARD AN OBSESSIVE DESIRE FOR OCULAR PROOF. THEY ATTEMPT TO KNOW THE WORLD AND ACCESS TRUTH THROUGH VISION BUT, AS IAGO REMINDS US, THAT KNOWLEDGE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE PAST CANNOT BE WITNESSED. IN THE CASE OF THE 1AC, THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THAT THEY DESCRIBE THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PAST. IAGOS MANIPULATION OF THE OCULAR LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF THE MATERIAL HANDKERCHIEF SHAPES THE REALITY OF OTHELLOS UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY REMINDS US OF THE 1AC SHAPING THEIR TRUTH CLAIMS IN TERMS OF THE NOTION THE OCULAR PROOF OF THE HISTORICAL, VERIFIABILITY. THE ABILITY OF THE AFF TEAM TO SERVE AS PLAYWRIGHT FOR THE 1AC AND MANIPULATE THE DETAILS OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS HIGHLIGHTS THE POWER OF LANGUAGE TO SHAPE REALITY JUST AS DOES BIANCAS UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AND OTHELLOS STORYTELLING PROWESS. THIS MANIPULATION OF THE DETAILS OF THEIR NARRATIVE THEN OVERRIDES THE TRUTH AND COMES TO SIGNIFY ITS OWN REALITY - LEAVING THE 1AC LITERALLY WITHOUT ANY VALID EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING. Knapp 2003 (James, assoc. prof. of English @ Eastern Mich. Ocular Proof: Archival Revelations and Aesthetic Response Poetics Today. 24.4, pp695-727)
The "ocular

proof" of my title alludes, of course, to Shakespeare's Othello, speaking at the height of his transformation from loyal husband to jealous victim. The centrality of vision in the process of this transformation makes the play particularly instructive for the present attempt to examine the space between thing and theory. Martin Jay (1993a: 1) has playfully reminded us that, "if we actively focus our attention on [the ubiquity of visual metaphors], vigilantly keeping an eye out for those deeply embedded as well as those on the surface, we can gain an illuminating insight into the complex mirroring of perception and language." My goal in the following reading of Othello is to isolate some of the most stubborn and long-standing tendencies in the practice of historical criticism that stem from the kind of mirroring that Jay indicates. I read Othello as a parable, hoping that the internal simplicity of its message might translate into the larger context of current critical practice. Specifically, the stories Shakespeare's characters tell in hopes of establishing the truth can be seen to possess a peculiar emphasis on the visible, a category that is identified (by the characters) with the language of objectivity grounded in a material, empiricist epistemology, but which the play reveals to be a category discursively constructed to suit the narrative logic of the characters. The appeal to the language of vision as the language of proof relies on what might be more properly termed rhetorical or aesthetic characteristics for its powerthe certainty of the "eye witness" compared with the untrustworthy "hearsay" mentioned above, for example. What is crucial to the present discussion is the striking reliance in both the play and in current materialist criticism of the rhetorical invocation of materiality as the ground for a shared, multiply witnessed text. In both cases the language of the visual serves to underwrite the authority of the account, even as the conceptual, linguistic, or ideal can be identified as the overarching concern of the account. David Michael Levin (1997: 7) highlights the problem as it persists in philosophy; he argues that "the 'nature' of [End Page 705]the visual perception (vision, sight, seeing) about which philosophers talk, and which they claim to be 'describing' and critically examining, primarily in the context of an epistemology, is, and must explicitly be recognized as, a discursive construction, and indeed a historical construction in the force field of philosophical discourse. The 'visual perception' is never just a simple immediate, straightforward, unproblematic presentation of the phenomenon and experience of vision." By introducing distortion or mediation before the point of translation from visual perception to verbal description, Levin extends the established critique of the transparency of visual representation to the entire realm

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to perceive of the visual characteristics of cultural products as straightforward while reserving complexity for language. Language is

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of visual experience (we must interpret not only artificial signs, but natural signs as well). That Levin has to make the argument is testimony to the persistent tendency

thus replete with

visual metaphors that serve to anchor the arbitrary world of signs to the world of things. Levin's point is relevant for the present discussion because it reminds us that the visible realm is subject to the same pitfalls as the world of ideas. Failure to heed Levin's warning can lead to the production of a false ground. Consider David Scott Kastan's (1999: 3940) attempt to give the
material surface of the text priority over theoretical abstraction: The material text is where the conditions and constraints of authorship become legible, where its authority is at once asserted and undermined, as the author's dependency upon other agents becomes obvious and the literary object reveals its inevitably multiple histories and significations . . . . All aspects of the text's materiality signify and its inescapable materiality is witness to the collaborative nature of the text and textuality. Such an understanding, however, must necessarily redirect attention . . . to the plenitude implicit in the networks of dependency in which meaning is actually produced. It should, indeed, shift the very axis of the activity of interpretation from the vertical to the horizontal, moving us from a critical practice that would look through the surface of the text in search of the authenticand authorialmeanings supposedly lurking somewhere (where?) below to one that aggressively looks at the text, where meanings are in fact collaboratively made and engaged, constructed and contested. This is not, I would insist, to evade the necessity of reading by replacing a fantasy of authorial presence with a new one of self-evident materiality; it is only to clarify what it is that is read. (Emphasis original.) Despite Kastan's insistence that his formulation does not call on a "fantasy" of "self-evident materiality," in the end, it is not clear why not. We are asked to replace our desire for authorial presence or textual ideality with a respect for the "inescapable" materiality where meaning is "actually" [End Page 706]and "in fact" produced. The argument is not particularly new; more than a decade ago Jerome McGann (1991: 13) argued that "we must turn our attention to much more than the formal and linguistic features of poems or other imaginative fictions. We must attend to textual materials which are not regularly studied by those interested in 'poetry': to typefaces, bindings, book prices, page format, and all those textual phenomena usually regarded as (at best) peripheral to 'poetry' or 'the text as such.'" Kastan's caveat that we are to "read" the material surface of the text does not adequately answer the objection he anticipatesthe charge that his method invokes a fantasy of "self-evident materiality"for the notion that we can "clarify what it is that is read" relies on a belief that we can see the surface to which he would direct our attention. This assumption is precisely what Merleau-Ponty is challenging in the passage with which I began. In the paragraphs from Kastan quoted above, we are called upon to "look" not "through" (implying an overwrought penchant for abstraction) but "at" the text if we are to actually see what it signifies (where constraints "become legible" and "the literary object reveals its inevitably multiple histories and significations"). Such a position, Kastan argues, is simply to "clarify" what is read, that is, to make "clear," to "bring to light." Consider, for example, the Latin claro, "to make bright," claritas, "clearness, brightness," clareo, "to be bright, to shine," clarus, "bright, clear, distinct"; the French clarvoyant, "seer," etc. My point, like Jay's, is that the language of 19 abstraction and the language of objectivity are equally penetrated by the language of vision. The suggestion that to look through the text to discern its meaning is effectively to misapprehend the actual text serves to reinstate an empiricism grounded in the sense of sight but not attendant upon the particularity of vision. Such a 20 position assumes that we know what it means to look at the text and (more importantly) that all could agree on what it is we are looking at. As with the other examples from critics mentioned above, I am less interested [End Page 707]in Kastan's call for increased attention to the material text (in many ways a welcome development) than the rhetorical form that his plea takes. For the very language of this plea demonstrates the affective pull that the rhetoric of the visual possesses over discussions of methodological validity and truth at the same time that it ignores what Mitchell might call the "immanent vernacular" of the visual. 21 Both Kastan and McGann use the imperative "must" to signal the urgency of the material text in the production of meaning, but can we not question the claim that meaning is only ("actually" and "in fact") made, as Kastan suggests, at the surface of the text? Though arguing for a shift in reading practices, especially those of Shakespearean scholars, Kastan calls on the language of visuality as proof in defending the validity of his method without attending to the important differences that obtain among visual and verbal materials culled from the archive. By suggesting that all the materials of the archive "signify," Kastan reduces the materiality of the archive to a linguistic operation. This move, in itself innocent enough, becomes problematic when it serves to mask the circularity of this form of critical practice: the effort to present more history rests on the authorizing power of the materiality of the surface at the same time that the surface is denied its materiality as a result of its transformation into one sign or another.

In order to bring the relations of vision, artifact, and history into better focus, I want to turn to the example of Othello, which provides a parable of responsible interpretation organized around the problematic connection between seeing and understanding. Prior to his transformation, Othello's confidence rests in his knowledge that Desdemona has seen him, and until he sees something to make him doubt her honesty, he will remain unshaken: Nor from mine own weak merits will I draw The smallest fear or doubt of her revolt, For she had eyes, and chose me. No, Iago, I'll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; And on the proof, there is no more but this Away at once with love or jealousy!
(Othello 3.3.18792)
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While Othello's response is an object lesson in reason, that most abstract of human inventions, it finds its ground in empirical evidence provided by the sense of sight. Iago admits that as long as Othello is of this mind, the only thing that could convince him would be for the Moor to become the "supervisor," 23 to "grossly gape on""behold her topp'd": It were a tedious difficulty, I think, To bring them to that prospect; damn them then, If ever mortal eyes do see them bolster More than their own! What then? How then? What shall I say? Where's satisfaction?

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It is impossible you should see this, Were they as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys, As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross As ignorance made drunk. But yet, I say, If imputation and strong circumstances Which lead directly to the door of truth Will give you satisfaction, you might have't. (3.3.395408) Othello's response"Give me a living reason she's disloyal"and the implicit rejection of "imputation and strong circumstances" lead directly to an object: the fateful handkerchief, which ultimately constitutes Othello's "ocular proof." 24But in fact, Iago had already given away the game when he admitted that the thing was "impossible to see." It would be not only emotionally unbearable, but truly impossible to see, for Othello asks to see what cannot be seen: a moment past; he seeks, in other words, historical knowledge. 25
The "tedious difficulty," which Othello is initially unwilling to abandon, [End Page 709]is a central concern of historical inquiry. How does one, in fact, interpret that which is not immediately available? And, moreover, if immediacy is the precondition of knowledge, how can any interpretation of the past be considered knowledge? In an attempt to reconcile hermeneutics and historicism, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1995 [1960]: 261) offers the following solution in Truth and Method: Even though historical knowledge receives its justification from the forestructure of Dasein, this is no reason for anyone to interfere with the immanent criteria of what is called knowledge. For Heidegger too historical knowledge is not a projection in the sense of a plan, the extrapolation of aims of the will, an ordering of things according to the wishes, prejudices, or promptings of the powerful; rather it remains something adapted to the object, a mensuratio ad rem [from the act of measuring to the thing]. Yet this thing is not a factum brutum, not something merely at hand, something that can simply be established and measured, but it itself has the same mode of being as Dasein. Following Heidegger, Gadamer's solution is to assert that, while

historical knowledge cannot come into being without the confirmation of an individual's preconceptions (it "receives its justification in the fore-structure of Dasein"), this does not mean that historical knowledge is radically relative, "the extrapolation of aims of the will," or simply instrumental, "a projection in the sense of a plan,"

predisposed, that is, in a dogmatic, pejorative sense. Elsewhere Gadamer (1976: 9) emphasizes the need to recuperate the positive valence of the concept of prejudice: "Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. . . . They are simply conditions whereby we experience something whereby what we encounter says something to us." All knowledge, not simply knowledge of the past, is here shown to hinge on the operation by which conscious observers bring their experience with the world into line with what is conceivably recognizable in light of their own historically conditioned preconceptions. In his recuperation of prejudice as a positive term, Gadamer thus seeks to redefine the relationship between the conscious observer and the world, which had been falsely rendered through the illusion of a sharp distinction between subjects and objects. However, the passage from Truth and Method continues:

It does not mean simply that there is a "homogeneity" between the knower and the known. . . . In fact . . . the coordination of all knowing activity with what is known is not based on the fact that they have the same mode of being but draws its significance from the particular nature of the mode of being that is common to [End Page 710] them. It consists in the fact that neither the knower nor the known is "present at hand" in an "ontic" way, but in a "historical" onei.e., they both have the mode of being of historicity . . . . Thus there is no understanding or interpretation in which the totality of this existential structure does not function, even if the intention of the knower is simply to read "what is there" and to discover from his sources "how it really was." (Gadamer 1995 [1960]: 26162) To draw out the subtlety of this account, I return to Shakespeare's play, for it dramatizes the mode of being of historicity to which Gadamer refers. The example of Othello is of particular interest for the present discussion because the historical knowledge sought is linked explicitly to an objectthe handkerchiefwhich appears to be present in an "ontic" sense, the traditional hermeneutic sense (as neutral evidence), but which, in fact, exists for the characters of the play only through the mode of being of historicity: its meaning (and the knowledge suggested by it) obtains in the overlap between the historicity of the observing character and the history of the object. For in addition to being a thing, the handkerchief is specifically identified as a thing-seen. And as I will argue, the modulation between these two modalities constitutes the ground on which the third termthe object as evidenceis constructed. Though Gadamer (1976: 3) explicitly identifies language as "the fundamental mode of operation of our 'being-in-theworld,'" I do not think it is a coincidence that his own metaphor for the place of overlap between the past life-world and the present world of the historical observer is visual: the "fusion of horizons." As will become clear below, I believe that the force of the visual metaphor is crucial for the project of historical reconstruction, a project in which even Gadamer's limited, historicized hermeneutics is invested. The handkerchief's imputed status as a thing suggests precisely that it is present in an ontic way, while its status as a thing-seen suggests that it possesses [End Page 711]the mode of being of historicity. This is simple enough. What
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is interesting about the dynamic modulation between the

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handkerchief as thing and thing-seen (as object) in Othello is how explicitly it unveils the necessity of the ontically present (neutral) thing for the production of the category of material evidence at the same time that it demonstrates the impossibility of neutral materiality. Iago asks Othello: "tell me but this / Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief / Spotted with strawberries in your wive's hand?" (3.3.43334). And though the specificity of the handkerchief is confirmed in Othello's response, "I gave her such a one; t'was my first gift," his reference is to the object's history rather than its "spotted" appearance. Aware that the history of the handkerchief is the source of its power over Othello, but sensitive to the fact that such a history cannot be seen, Iago lies that he "knows not that"that the evidence he is about to present is unrelated to the object's history; instead he returns to the realm of the visible: "but such a handkerchief / (I am sure it was your wive's) did I today / See Cassio wipe his beard with" (3.3.43739). Of course, Iago hasn't seen any such thing, and it wouldn't have mattered if he had. The force of his declaration is a reference to the act of seeing as an empirical rather than a historical mode of perception; in the logic of Iago's declaration, sight, unlike narrative comprehension, does not need to unfold in time.
While narrative comprehension or understanding relies on the connections implicit in the temporal sequence for its coherence (connections that are always supplied by

play dumb by emphasizing that his "evidence" is preconceptual; and it is only after the fact (the fact of perception) that his interpretive faculty led him to become suspicious. The implication, in other words, is that Iago's suspicions were produced by his value-neutral perceptual experience. It is worth drawing attention to this fact in the context of a play ostensibly concerned with the disastrous effect of a man's preconceptions on his perception of "reality." While Iago's rhetorical virtuosity resides in his ability to convince Othello of the epistemological priority of visual experience over any lesssensible evidence, he only succeeds when his narrative moves Othello to accept the verbal account as if it were the ocular proof he demanded. Robert Heilman (1956: 58) explains the process well: "When Othello is being conspicuously deceived by the seeming, he is under the illusion that he is seeing particularly well, for Iago has tutored his vision." It is no accident that Iago's rhetorical strategy relies on the language of vision for its authority. Though Othello has seen nothing of the "ocular proof" he earlier demanded, he nonetheless proclaims that his "bloody thoughts, with violent pace, / Shall nev'r look back, nev'r ebb to humble love, / Till that a capable and wide revenge / Swallow them up" (3.3.457460). In the [End Page 712]subsequent scenes of the play, he continues to seek visual confirmation of the affair, but from this point on his search proceeds from the belief that Desdemona is guilty.
It is at this point that things get interesting. For rather than allow his plan to rest on a secondhand account of Cassio's possession of the handkerchief, Iago is fully

the consciousness attempting comprehension), Iago can

staging the scene between himself and Cassio, Iago reveals for a second time that the process by which the realm of the visual is granted its evidentiary status actually unveils the contingency of perception and history. Looking on from the wings as Iago speaks to Cassio of his flirtations with Bianca, Othello "sees for himself" the two men discussing Cassio's affair with Desdemona. In a wonderful dramatic moment
borrowed from farce and so familiar in Shakespearethe playwright is able to map two coherent narratives onto a single visual field. The scene is not finessed in any way, as Iago tells us exactly what he plans to do and exactly what will happen: Now I will question Cassio of Bianca, A huswife that by selling her desires Buys herself bread and clothes. It is a creature That dotes on Cassio (as 'tis the strumpet's plague To beguile many and be beguil'd by one); He when he hears of her, cannot restrain From the excess of laughter . . . ........... As he shall smile, Othello shall go mad; And his unbookish jealousy must conster Poor Cassio's smiles, gestures, and light behaviors Quite in the wrong. (4.1.93103)

prepared to provide Othello with the satisfaction he originally demanded. In

Only the unexpected entrance of Bianca with the handkerchief falls outside the manipulative domain of Iago's plan. But rather than reveal the staged quality of the encounter between Cassio and Iago, Bianca's entrance, and especially her possession of the handkerchief, lend the scene further authenticity in Othello's eyes. It is at this

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point that one is reminded of the playwright's ultimate power over the dramatic action, as even the accidental is made to fit neatly into the villain's scheme. 27
Though there is much to say about the way fiction and fact are construed by all involved in this scene, I am particularly interested in the way that [End Page 713]the handkerchief functions in the process of validating the various histories which accrue to it over the course of the play. For

Othello, Bianca's mere possession of the handkerchief is enough to confirm the worst about Desdemona. But why? That possession itself is not proof of anything without the narrative history Iago has provided. While a good deal of attention has been given to
the question of whether or not Othello succumbs too quickly to Iago's suggestions, I would submit that an examination of the handkerchief's various histories 28 complicates any simple account of Othello as dupe to Iago's boundless, manipulative power. For in addition to it being his "first gift" to Desdemona, Othello relates that the handkerchief has "magic in the web of it," a revelation that contrasts sharply with his own earlier account of their courtship. Significantly, Othello had denied any knowledge of magic when defending himself before the Duke in the opening scenes of the play. In response to Brabantio's assertion that he could never have honestly won Desdemona's hand"For nature so preposterously to err / (Being not deficient, blind, or lame of sense) / Sans witchcraft [it] could not" (1.3.6264) Othello offers only a "round unvarnished tale." Of course, the tale he tells belies his own claim that he is "rude . . . in . . . speech, / and little blesse'd with the soft phrase of peace" (1.3.8182). The power of Othello's language is revealed in both the eloquence of his account of their courtship and the basis of his defense: the only witchcraft Othello claims to have used was the art of storytelling, "[she] bade me, if I had a friend that lov'd her, / I should but teach him how to tell my story, / And that would woo her" (1.3.16466). As with the confusion of the material handkerchief and the stories that make it available to the understanding (what Martin Heidegger would call its "coming into presence"), Desdemona is wooed as much by Othello's account of his acts as she is by the acts "themselves." 29The history that Othello later tells of the

handkerchief, which would have confirmed the worst of Brabantio's fears, calls into question Othello's account of the relationship: That handkerchief Did an Egyptian to my mother give; She was a charmer, and could almost read [End Page 714] The thoughts of people: she told her, while she kept it, 'Twould make her amiable and subdue my father Entirely to her love, but if she lost it, Or made gift of it, my father's eye Should hold her loathed and his spirits should hunt After new fancies. She, dying, gave it me, And bid me, when my fate would have me wiv'd, To give it her. I did so, and take heed on't, Make it a darling like your precious eye. To lose't or give't away were such perdition As nothing else could match. (3.4.5568) Othello's fantastic history further complicates the multiple histories that are attributed to the handkerchief by Iago and Biancathe former with the intent to deceive and the latter with the intent to unveil the truth. Eschewing Othello's romantic history of the handkerchief as "his first gift," Iago offers an image of Cassio using the handkerchief to wipe his beard. Similarly, Bianca rejects Cassio's story on the grounds of its implausibility: "A likely piece of work, that you should find it in your chamber, and know not who left it there! This is some minx's token" (4.1.15153). Iago immediately picks up on the suggestion, taunting Othello that Desdemona has given the handkerchief to Cassio who cared so little "he hath giv'n it his whore" (4.1.177).

While neither Iago nor Bianca offers the "true" history of the handkerchief, the histories they tell have power by virtue of their ability to elicit recognition from both Othello and the audience. Such recognition relies in part on what Roland Barthes famously termed the "reality effect," as the details of each story produce a sense of mundane authenticity. The details can be seen (are seen by Othello) as, to use Barthes's (1974 [1970]: 81) words, "notations whose very insignificance authenticates, signs, signifies 'reality.'" Such histories of the handkerchief override the truth of the larger story known to the viewers of the play. One can picture a guilty Cassio wiping his beard with the sacred objectas Oliver Parker demonstrated in the 1995 film version of the playand the image is powerful despite the knowledge that Cassio is innocent. One might ventureas does Othellothat Iago's account of Cassio wiping his beard is "unmistakably uninvented," if it weren't for our being in on the game. 30

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LINKS

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OCULAR METAPHORS THE CONSTRUCTION OF TEXTS AND SPEECH ACTS WITHIN VISUAL METAPHORS, IE AS BODIES OF KNOWLEDGE THAT ARE UNDERSTOOD THROUGH OBSERVATIONS IS BOTH ROOTED IN AND REINFORCES WESTERN THINKING PRIMARILY VISUALISTIC UNDERSTANDING Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm )

While American legal discourse has embraced a range of figurative expressions evoking all sorts of sensory experience,2 it has long favored visual metaphors. We frequently consider law as a matter of looking: we "observe" it; we evaluate claims "in the eye of the law";3 our high courts "review" the decisions of inferior tribunals. Alternatively, we speak of law as something one would usually look at: it is a "body," a "text," a "structure," a "bulwark of freedom,"4 a "seamless web,"5 and even a "magic mirror."6 We identify particular legal concepts with striking visual images: property rights are a "bundle of sticks";7 a longstanding constitutional principle is a "fixed star";8 a sequence of ownership is a "chain of title."9 We associate legal reasoning with the manipulation of visible geometric forms: we try to "square" precedents with one another;10 we

repeatedly agonize over "where the line [between different doctrines and situations] can be drawn."11 We discuss legality in terms of light and darkness: we search for "brightline"12 tests; we consider an area of concurrent jurisdiction to be a "zone of twilight";13 we seek to extend constitutional protections by probing the shadowy
"penumbras"14 of well-known guarantees. With the aid of metaphor, we go so far as to give law the visual quality of hue: we may make a property claim under "color of title";15 we discourage "yellow dog" contracts 16 and make securities trading subject to "blue sky" laws;17 for good or ill, we frequently adhere to "black letter" rules.18

HIBBITS CONTNIUES A BIT LATER English law, William Blackstone set his Commentaries in a metaphoric language that was strikingly visualist, especially considering that his work was born as a series of lectures wherein aural metaphors would have been tolerated and even naturally expected. Blackstone repeatedly made "observations,"171 analyzed legal powers from various "views" or "points of view,"172 and reported that truths
"appear."173 He notably regarded himself as offering the prospective law student "a general map" of the law,174 which he later described in visual terms as a magnificent, if somewhat antiquated, "Gothic castle."175 In American law, visuality similarly manifested itself in the form, and even arguably in some of the features, of the written Constitution approved at Philadelphia.176 Thomas Jefferson proclaimed that the Constitution was "a good canvas, on which some strokes only want retouching";177 he called the principles protected in the Bill of Rights a "bright constellation" which had guided the republic through the course of revolution and reformation.178 Early in the nineteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall's constitutional jurisprudence was fraught with visual metaphors, some of which were inspired by the very visibility of the document he was construing.179 Later in the nineteenth century, such English and American legal educators as A1bert Venn Dicey, Frederick Pollock, and Christopher Columbus Langdell employed the radically disembodied visual metaphor of law as geometry 180 to reconceive freedom "as a set of barriers against coercive intrusion into zones of autonomous conduct."181 English legal historian Frederic Maitland pioneered the similarly abstract characterization of law as a visible "seamless web."182 It was nonetheless another [2.24] In

jurist, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who best reflected the sensory bias of the age. Holmes repeatedly approached law, not to mention life and language,183 as a matter of looking. It was he who first described law as a "magic mirror";184 it was he who first advanced the notion that law could be found in a "penumbra."185 Such metaphoric language gave law, not to mention his own words, extraordinary power and presence in an unprecedentedly visualist culture. [2.25] The added boost that print provided to the social and intellectual status of vision gradually undermined the position still occupied by the other forms of sensory experience in the Western tradition. In societies no longer so
unfamiliar or uncomfortable with the visible word that they needed sound, touch, or savor to ensure their own survival, those senses could be abandoned as primary carriers of information; in some instances they could even be condemned. Aurality suffered especially. From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries (with perhaps a brief interruption during the consciously nostalgic days of Romanticism),186 speech was radically severed from writing and reading; the latter became almost universally understood as silent practices having a distinct and superior syntactic style.187 Rhetoric was transformed into the more visual study of composition and belles-lettres.188 At least among the "reading" middle and upper classes, silence became a powerful norm of social etiquette and order.189 Aural concepts such as the "music of the spheres" were driven from the realm of Newtonian science.190 Written literature cast off most of the aural forms it had previously assumed. The dialogue first became strangely "monologic,"191 and then was virtually abandoned as a leading literary device.192 Poetry, to the extent it was not supplanted by less aurally appealing prose,193 was increasingly written not for the ear, but for the eye.194 Once again, the form as a whole was analogized to painting-ut pictura poesis.195

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OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE THE KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS POSITED BY THE 1AC ARE CONSTRUCTED WITHIN THE PROMISE THAT SEEING IS BELIEVING. THAT IS TO SAY, BY LABELING THEIR DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WORLD AS OBSERVATIONS THEY HAVE CREATED AN OCULAR PARADIGM FOR TRUTH. THIS PARADIGM RELIES ON THE MATERIAL AS EVIDENCE AND THUS DOUBLY OBJECTIFIES THEIR KNOWLEDGE CLAIMS IT NOT ONLY EXISTS AS AN ARTIFACT BUT ALSO IS ASSUMED TO BE FACT ALL OF WHICH IGNORES THE DISCURSIVE WEB IN WHICH THE MEANING OF THE 1AC IS CONSTRUCTED, WHICH IS MORE IMPORTANT IN THE INTEROGATION OF THE TRUTH OF THEIR CLAIMS THAN THEIR MATERLITY AS SOME SORT OF ARCHIVE OF REALITY. Knapp 2003 (James, assoc. prof. of English @ Eastern Mich. Ocular Proof: Archival Revelations and Aesthetic Response Poetics Today. 24.4, pp695-727) growing emphasis on materiality spans the spectrum from highly theoretical speculations on matter to the careful analysis of physical artifacts. A [End Page 697] recent issue of Critical Inquiry on "Things," edited by Bill Brown, includes essays on topics as farranging as Romanticism, Russian flapper dresses, and Ren Descartes's geometry. The emergence of "Book History" as an interdisciplinary formation has forced a reconsideration of historical analysis on the basis of the material characteristics of the books and documents that comprise the archive. As Ezra Greenspan and Jonathan Rose (1998: ix) put it, book history turns our attention from the documents that "historians have always relied on . . . to reconstruct the past," to "the history of documents themselves." And there has been an increasing interconnection between literary studies and the archaeological study of material culture: the study of human 4 artifacts. Even if it is still unclear precisely what is meant by material, materiality, or even "material culture," it is difficult to deny the importance of these terms in the 5 current debates over cultural theory. I suggest that the The emergence of interest in "material culture," distanced from an explicitly Marxist critical context, is not limited to Renaissance studies. A

renewed emphasis on the notion of materiality (and on the archive) in such a wide range of sophisticated historical and cultural criticism can be linked to two developments in recent critical thought. The first involves the current
kind of text, no longer seems to describe the critical landscape. According to W. J. T. Mitchell (1994: 9), Rorty's turn has been surpassed by a
7 6

debate over the competing epistemologies that have underwritten cultural theory in its various phases over the course of the twentieth century. Specifically, Richard Rorty's influential notion that the twentieth century witnessed a "linguistic turn," in which philosophical inquiry came to treat its multiform subjects as one or another

"pictorial

turn"which he describes as "the way modern thought has re-oriented itself around visual paradigms that seem to threaten and
overwhelm any possibility of discursive mastery." Mitchell's turn is evident [End Page 698]in both popular and academic trends of the late twentieth century. In America, the popular form can be found in the belief that youth culture is dominated by an emphasis on television, film, and electronic media: the so-called "MTV generation." Similarly,

the Anglo-American academy has been transformed by the emergence of "Visual Culture Studies," a disciplinary formation that extends the formerly limited scope of art history to include practically all culturally produced visual material and submitting this newly defined visual culture to critical methods culled from literary, philosophical, psychological, and anthropological practice. 8While the linguistic turn was conducive to text-based paradigms in literary and cultural studies, ranging from the New Criticism to Deconstruction, the pictorial turn poses specific threats to critical orientations organized around a linguistic understanding of text. 9

The second important development to emerge alongside Mitchell's "pictorial [End Page 699]turn" is the return to history. When J. Hillis Miller identified a "historical turn" in literary and cultural criticism in the mid-eighties, critical interest was still focused on the linguistic form of texts (e.g., New Historicism's debt to "high" theory, especially Michel Foucault). As mentioned in the introduction to this special issue, it is important to recognize that New Historicism was as much an extension of New Criticism and the subsequent poststructuralist critique as it was a return to the historical record. Early critics of the New Historical method noted the cavalier treatment of history, and it ought to be no surprise that an attempt is now underway to make historical scholarship "more historical."

emergence of interest in visual culture, together with a drive to make historical scholarship more historical than the New Historicism, has led to a return to the archive and its promise of material (ocular) proof. Like Sinfield's tangible stuff ("it doesn't get any more material than that"), in the present critical context it seems that "seeing is believing." 11 But the recourse to stuffto thingsas a corrective to the endless possibilities of language leads back to Merleau-Ponty's commonsense announcement with which I began: "We see the things themselves, the world is what we see." Without a basic belief in the stability of the empirical world, how can an attention to the archive, to materiality, to "pins," "inventories, account books" make us any more historical, supply us with any "more facts"? If a return to the things contained in the archive promises relief from the interminable difficulties of interpretive debate, it does so by suggesting that the material artifacts still visible to the historical observer can somehow offer a less-mediated interaction with the past.

10

I suggest that the

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common way to avoid this charge is to focus less on the things and more on the idea that things "materialize" concepts; consider [End Page 700] Peter

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Most new materialist critics are aware of the objection that an attention to things is liable to slip into a form of positivism, long since out of critical fashion. The most

Stallybrass and Ann Rosalind Jones's (2001: 123) discussion of a pair of gloves in Titian's Man with a Ripped Glove: "the pair of gloves vividly materializes the unpairing of the hands, one hand naked and powerful, the other draped in aristocratic ease but marked by what looks like a violent assault. It is as if the marks of identity have been transferred from the anonymous and unwrinkled face to the torn glove that he wears." Despite the claim that the painting "vividly materializes the unpairing of the hands," it is clear that this materiality is not of the variety Sinfield identifies with stuff. We are at several removes from the world of things: the world of aristocratic sartorial performance, Titian's meditation on a single aspect of that performance, and Stallybrass and Jones's own account all direct our attention away from the thing (the glove-object that is the ostensible topic of the article) to the discursive web in which an idea, image, or reference to the glove accumulates meaning. This
form of criticism, it would seem, shares quite a lot with New Historicism, and it has already begun to yield illuminating studies of the cultural atmosphere of early modern England (to name just one place and time). At the same time, though, the

gesture toward the thing is carried out as if it does something different than the New Historicist's anecdote, somehow gets us closer, even if its ultimate insights are somewhat similar. There is a sense that the attention to materiality confirms the account by virtue of the power of reference: we can see it. 12If the new materialism is an advance over New Historicism, it is because the anecdote of the New Historicist account somehow falls into the category of "impressionistic evidence," while the material thing is taken to provide the critic with a different starting point: a "fact." Attractive as the distinction between material facts and literary or impressionistic evidence appears, it seems to me that the archival discovery and the interpretive discovery have an equal purchase on (and operate at an equal distance from) the events of history. The difference at present is in the way these two forms of evidence are positioned rhetorically by advocates of the new materialist approach to historical scholarship. In what follows, I will stress the peculiar nature of visual experience in this process of establishing facts from the material record, because in this instance, it seems to [End Page 701] me, the visual has a unique purchase on the realm of evidence (compare the notion of "hearsay" to the "eyewitness account," where the former is a dismissive term and the latter is invested with authority). I am not suggesting that any sense is closer to the real, the world of things, but that vision is culturally privileged in this area. If the study of the material record is to become a productive locus for the examination of the cultural past, its practitioners must attend to the complex relation between the processes of historical understanding and of apprehension in the archive. Frances Dolan (2001: 379) points out that "a new question leads to research 'discoveries' in the field more often than does a new document." In other words, our predisposition toward cultural artifacts used to re-create the past and our methods for incorporating them into the discursive fabric of history are ultimately more important than their physical, material presence. And yet in the current critical context, it is often precisely the physical materiality that is evoked in order to authorize interpretation.
In the context of this special issue, Merleau-Ponty's three questions quoted above"what is this we, what seeing is, and what thing or world is"can be seen to offer a neat division of the problems raised by the space "between thing and theory." Indeed, much twentieth-century literary and cultural criticism has been preoccupied with the first and last questions, which align roughly with critical interest in subjects (recent studies of class, race, and gender identity) and objects (the earlier New Critical 13 interest in the organic work of art as well as the more recent interest in "material" culture) respectively. And while the nature of the "thing" has given way over the last three decades to the nature of the "we," the central question"what seeing is"has continued to animate and elude the practice of cultural criticism. For the heart of the questionthe nature of perception, and its subsets of viewing, reading, feeling, hearing, tasting, etc.has been approached (understandably enough) through 14 examinations of either the object or the subject (the thing or the we). Plenty has been said about the dangers of overlooking the role of the observer (the subject) in the 15 formation of the historical account at both the moment of its writing and that of [End Page 702] its reception. Similarly, poststructuralist theory has highlighted the radical instability of all objects of study by pointing out the necessity of mediation at every level of understanding. But while the historical contingency of subjecthood and objecthood may be widely acknowledged, the notion that historical study might yieldor at least approximatea glimpse of the past as it was remains oddly compelling.

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THE 1AC COUPLING OF OCULAR LANGUAGE WITH CLAIMS TO EMPIRICAL TRUTH IS CONSTRUCTED IN ORDER TO CORRELATE THOSE CLAIMS WITH VERIFIABLE FACT, BUT IT IGNORES THAT IT IS PRIMARILY A DISCURSIVE AND HISTORICAL CONSTRUCT AND NOT A MATERIAL REALITY. THEIR ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE THE 1AC CLAIMS MIRRORS IAGOS MANIPULATION OF OTHELLO TOWARD AN OBSESSIVE DESIRE FOR OCULAR PROOF. THEY ATTEMPT TO KNOW THE WORLD AND ACCESS TRUTH THROUGH VISION BUT, AS IAGO REMINDS US, THAT KNOWLEDGE IS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE PAST CANNOT BE WITNESSED. IN THE CASE OF THE 1AC, THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE GIVEN THAT THEY DESCRIBE THE FUTURE RATHER THAN THE PAST. IAGOS MANIPULATION OF THE OCULAR LINGUISTIC CONSTRUCTION OF THE MATERIAL HANDKERCHIEF SHAPES THE REALITY OF OTHELLOS UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORY REMINDS US OF THE 1AC SHAPING THEIR TRUTH CLAIMS IN TERMS OF THE NOTION THE OCULAR PROOF OF THE HISTORICAL, VERIFIABILITY. THE ABILITY OF THE AFF TEAM TO SERVE AS PLAYWRIGHT FOR THE 1AC AND MANIPULATE THE DETAILS OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS HIGHLIGHTS THE POWER OF LANGUAGE TO SHAPE REALITY JUST AS DOES BIANCAS UNEXPECTED ARRIVAL AND OTHELLOS STORYTELLING PROWESS. THIS MANIPULATION OF THE DETAILS OF THEIR NARRATIVE THEN OVERRIDES THE TRUTH AND COMES TO SIGNIFY ITS OWN REALITY - LEAVING THE 1AC LITERALLY WITHOUT ANY VALID EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNING. Knapp 2003 (James, assoc. prof. of English @ Eastern Mich. Ocular Proof: Archival Revelations and Aesthetic Response Poetics Today. 24.4, pp695-727)
The "ocular

proof" of my title alludes, of course, to Shakespeare's Othello, speaking at the height of his transformation from loyal husband to jealous victim. The centrality of vision in the process of this transformation makes the play particularly instructive for the present attempt to examine the space between thing and theory. Martin Jay (1993a: 1) has playfully reminded us that, "if we actively focus our attention on [the ubiquity of visual metaphors], vigilantly keeping an eye out for those deeply embedded as well as those on the surface, we can gain an illuminating insight into the complex mirroring of perception and language." My goal in the following reading of Othello is to isolate some of the most stubborn and long-standing tendencies in the practice of historical criticism that stem from the kind of mirroring that Jay indicates. I read Othello as a parable, hoping that the internal simplicity of its message might translate into the larger context of current critical practice. Specifically, the stories Shakespeare's characters tell in hopes of establishing the truth can be seen to possess a peculiar emphasis on the visible, a category that is identified (by the characters) with the language of objectivity grounded in a material, empiricist epistemology, but which the play reveals to be a category discursively constructed to suit the narrative logic of the characters. The appeal to the language of vision as the language of proof relies on what might be more properly termed rhetorical or aesthetic characteristics for its powerthe certainty of the "eye witness" compared with the untrustworthy "hearsay" mentioned above, for example. What is crucial to the present discussion is the striking reliance in both the play and in current materialist criticism of the rhetorical invocation of materiality as the ground for a shared, multiply witnessed text. In both cases the language of the visual serves to underwrite the authority of the account, even as the conceptual, linguistic, or ideal can be identified as the overarching concern of the account. David Michael Levin (1997: 7) highlights the problem as it persists in philosophy; he argues that "the 'nature' of [End Page 705]the visual perception (vision, sight, seeing) about which philosophers talk, and which they claim to be 'describing' and critically examining, primarily in the context of an epistemology, is, and must explicitly be recognized as, a discursive construction, and indeed a historical construction in the force field of philosophical discourse. The 'visual perception' is never just a simple immediate, straightforward, unproblematic presentation of the phenomenon and experience of vision." By introducing distortion or mediation before the point of translation from visual perception to verbal description, Levin extends the established critique of the transparency of visual representation to the entire realm
of visual experience (we must interpret not only artificial signs, but natural signs as well). That Levin has to make the argument is testimony to the persistent tendency

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to perceive of the visual characteristics of cultural products as straightforward while reserving complexity for language. Language is thus replete with visual metaphors that serve to anchor the arbitrary world of signs to the world of things. Levin's point is relevant for the present discussion because it reminds us that the visible realm is subject to the same pitfalls as the world of ideas. Failure to heed Levin's warning can lead to the production of a false ground. Consider David Scott Kastan's (1999: 3940) attempt to give the material surface of the text priority over theoretical abstraction: The material text is where the conditions and constraints of authorship become legible, where its authority is at once asserted and undermined, as the author's dependency upon other agents becomes obvious and the literary object reveals its inevitably multiple histories and significations . . . . All aspects of the text's materiality signify and its inescapable materiality is witness to the collaborative nature of the text and textuality. Such an understanding, however, must necessarily redirect attention . . . to the plenitude implicit in the networks of dependency in which meaning is actually produced. It should, indeed, shift the very axis of the activity of interpretation from the vertical to the horizontal, moving us from a critical practice that would look through the surface of the text in search of the authenticand authorialmeanings supposedly lurking somewhere (where?) below to one that aggressively looks at the text, where meanings are in fact collaboratively made and engaged, constructed and contested. This is not, I would insist, to evade the necessity of reading by replacing a fantasy of authorial presence with a new one of self-evident materiality; it is only to clarify what it is that is read. (Emphasis original.) Despite Kastan's insistence that his formulation does not call on a "fantasy" of "self-evident materiality," in the end, it is not clear why not. We are asked to replace our desire for authorial presence or textual ideality with a respect for the "inescapable" materiality where meaning is "actually" [End Page 706]and "in fact" produced. The argument is not particularly new; more than a decade ago Jerome McGann (1991: 13) argued that "we must turn our attention to much more than the formal and linguistic features of poems or other imaginative fictions. We must attend to textual materials which are not regularly studied by those interested in 'poetry': to typefaces, bindings, book prices, page format, and all those textual phenomena usually regarded as (at best) peripheral to 'poetry' or 'the text as such.'" Kastan's caveat that we are to "read" the material surface of the text does not adequately answer the objection he anticipatesthe charge that his method invokes a fantasy of "self-evident materiality"for the notion that we can "clarify what it is that is read" relies on a belief that we can see the surface to which he would direct our attention. This assumption is precisely what Merleau-Ponty is challenging in the passage with which I began. In the paragraphs from Kastan quoted above, we are called upon to "look" not "through" (implying an overwrought penchant for abstraction) but "at" the text if we are to actually see what it signifies (where constraints "become legible" and "the literary object reveals its inevitably multiple histories and significations"). Such a position, Kastan argues, is simply to "clarify" what is read, that is, to make "clear," to "bring to light." Consider, for example, the Latin claro, "to make bright," claritas, "clearness, brightness," clareo, "to be bright, to shine," clarus, "bright, clear, distinct"; the French clarvoyant, "seer," etc. My point, like Jay's, is that the language of 19 abstraction and the language of objectivity are equally penetrated by the language of vision. The suggestion that to look through the text to discern its meaning is effectively to misapprehend the actual text serves to reinstate an empiricism grounded in the sense of sight but not attendant upon the particularity of vision. Such a 20 position assumes that we know what it means to look at the text and (more importantly) that all could agree on what it is we are looking at. As with the other examples from critics mentioned above, I am less interested [End Page 707]in Kastan's call for increased attention to the material text (in many ways a welcome development) than the rhetorical form that his plea takes. For the very language of this plea demonstrates the affective pull that the rhetoric of the visual possesses over discussions of methodological validity and truth at the same time that it ignores what Mitchell might call the "immanent vernacular" of the visual. 21 Both Kastan and McGann use the imperative "must" to signal the urgency of the material text in the production of meaning, but can we not question the claim that meaning is only ("actually" and "in fact") made, as Kastan suggests, at the surface of the text? Though arguing for a shift in reading practices, especially those of Shakespearean scholars, Kastan calls on the language of visuality as proof in defending the validity of his method without attending to the important differences that obtain among visual and verbal materials culled from the archive. By suggesting that all the materials of the archive "signify," Kastan reduces the materiality of the archive to a linguistic operation. This move, in itself innocent enough, becomes problematic when it serves to mask the circularity of this form of critical practice: the effort to present more history rests on the authorizing power of the materiality of the surface at the same time that the surface is denied its materiality as a result of its transformation into one sign or another.

In order to bring the relations of vision, artifact, and history into better focus, I want to turn to the example of Othello, which provides a parable of responsible interpretation organized around the problematic connection between seeing and understanding. Prior to his transformation, Othello's confidence rests in his knowledge that Desdemona has seen him, and until he sees something to make him doubt her honesty, he will remain unshaken: Nor from mine own weak merits will I draw The smallest fear or doubt of her revolt, For she had eyes, and chose me. No, Iago, I'll see before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; And on the proof, there is no more but this Away at once with love or jealousy!
(Othello 3.3.18792)
22

[End Page 708]

While Othello's response is an object lesson in reason, that most abstract of human inventions, it finds its ground in empirical evidence provided by the sense of sight. Iago admits that as long as Othello is of this mind, the only thing that could convince him would be for the Moor to become the "supervisor," 23 to "grossly gape on""behold her topp'd": It were a tedious difficulty, I think, To bring them to that prospect; damn them then, If ever mortal eyes do see them bolster More than their own! What then? How then? What shall I say? Where's satisfaction?

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It is impossible you should see this, Were they as prime as goats, as hot as monkeys, As salt as wolves in pride, and fools as gross As ignorance made drunk. But yet, I say, If imputation and strong circumstances Which lead directly to the door of truth Will give you satisfaction, you might have't. (3.3.395408) Othello's response"Give me a living reason she's disloyal"and the implicit rejection of "imputation and strong circumstances" lead directly to an object: the fateful handkerchief, which ultimately constitutes Othello's "ocular proof." 24But in fact, Iago had already given away the game when he admitted that the thing was "impossible to see." It would be not only emotionally unbearable, but truly impossible to see, for Othello asks to see what cannot be seen: a moment past; he seeks, in other words, historical knowledge. 25
The "tedious difficulty," which Othello is initially unwilling to abandon, [End Page 709]is a central concern of historical inquiry. How does one, in fact, interpret that which is not immediately available? And, moreover, if immediacy is the precondition of knowledge, how can any interpretation of the past be considered knowledge? In an attempt to reconcile hermeneutics and historicism, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1995 [1960]: 261) offers the following solution in Truth and Method: Even though historical knowledge receives its justification from the forestructure of Dasein, this is no reason for anyone to interfere with the immanent criteria of what is called knowledge. For Heidegger too historical knowledge is not a projection in the sense of a plan, the extrapolation of aims of the will, an ordering of things according to the wishes, prejudices, or promptings of the powerful; rather it remains something adapted to the object, a mensuratio ad rem [from the act of measuring to the thing]. Yet this thing is not a factum brutum, not something merely at hand, something that can simply be established and measured, but it itself has the same mode of being as Dasein. Following Heidegger, Gadamer's solution is to assert that, while

historical knowledge cannot come into being without the confirmation of an individual's preconceptions (it "receives its justification in the fore-structure of Dasein"), this does not mean that historical knowledge is radically relative, "the extrapolation of aims of the will," or simply instrumental, "a projection in the sense of a plan,"

predisposed, that is, in a dogmatic, pejorative sense. Elsewhere Gadamer (1976: 9) emphasizes the need to recuperate the positive valence of the concept of prejudice: "Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. . . . They are simply conditions whereby we experience something whereby what we encounter says something to us." All knowledge, not simply knowledge of the past, is here shown to hinge on the operation by which conscious observers bring their experience with the world into line with what is conceivably recognizable in light of their own historically conditioned preconceptions. In his recuperation of prejudice as a positive term, Gadamer thus seeks to redefine the relationship between the conscious observer and the world, which had been falsely rendered through the illusion of a sharp distinction between subjects and objects. However, the passage from Truth and Method continues:

It does not mean simply that there is a "homogeneity" between the knower and the known. . . . In fact . . . the coordination of all knowing activity with what is known is not based on the fact that they have the same mode of being but draws its significance from the particular nature of the mode of being that is common to [End Page 710] them. It consists in the fact that neither the knower nor the known is "present at hand" in an "ontic" way, but in a "historical" onei.e., they both have the mode of being of historicity . . . . Thus there is no understanding or interpretation in which the totality of this existential structure does not function, even if the intention of the knower is simply to read "what is there" and to discover from his sources "how it really was." (Gadamer 1995 [1960]: 26162) To draw out the subtlety of this account, I return to Shakespeare's play, for it dramatizes the mode of being of historicity to which Gadamer refers. The example of Othello is of particular interest for the present discussion because the historical knowledge sought is linked explicitly to an objectthe handkerchiefwhich appears to be present in an "ontic" sense, the traditional hermeneutic sense (as neutral evidence), but which, in fact, exists for the characters of the play only through the mode of being of historicity: its meaning (and the knowledge suggested by it) obtains in the overlap between the historicity of the observing character and the history of the object. For in addition to being a thing, the handkerchief is specifically identified as a thing-seen. And as I will argue, the modulation between these two modalities constitutes the ground on which the third termthe object as evidenceis constructed. Though Gadamer (1976: 3) explicitly identifies language as "the fundamental mode of operation of our 'being-in-theworld,'" I do not think it is a coincidence that his own metaphor for the place of overlap between the past life-world and the present world of the historical observer is visual: the "fusion of horizons." As will become clear below, I believe that the force of the visual metaphor is crucial for the project of historical reconstruction, a project in which even Gadamer's limited, historicized hermeneutics is invested. The handkerchief's imputed status as a thing suggests precisely that it is present in an ontic way, while its status as a thing-seen suggests that it possesses [End Page 711]the mode of being of historicity. This is simple enough. What
26

is interesting about the dynamic modulation between the

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handkerchief as thing and thing-seen (as object) in Othello is how explicitly it unveils the necessity of the ontically present (neutral) thing for the production of the category of material evidence at the same time that it demonstrates the impossibility of neutral materiality. Iago asks Othello: "tell me but this / Have you not sometimes seen a handkerchief / Spotted with strawberries in your wive's hand?" (3.3.43334). And though the specificity of the handkerchief is confirmed in Othello's response, "I gave her such a one; t'was my first gift," his reference is to the object's history rather than its "spotted" appearance. Aware that the history of the handkerchief is the source of its power over Othello, but sensitive to the fact that such a history cannot be seen, Iago lies that he "knows not that"that the evidence he is about to present is unrelated to the object's history; instead he returns to the realm of the visible: "but such a handkerchief / (I am sure it was your wive's) did I today / See Cassio wipe his beard with" (3.3.43739). Of course, Iago hasn't seen any such thing, and it wouldn't have mattered if he had. The force of his declaration is a reference to the act of seeing as an empirical rather than a historical mode of perception; in the logic of Iago's declaration, sight, unlike narrative comprehension, does not need to unfold in time.
While narrative comprehension or understanding relies on the connections implicit in the temporal sequence for its coherence (connections that are always supplied by

play dumb by emphasizing that his "evidence" is preconceptual; and it is only after the fact (the fact of perception) that his interpretive faculty led him to become suspicious. The implication, in other words, is that Iago's suspicions were produced by his value-neutral perceptual experience. It is worth drawing attention to this fact in the context of a play ostensibly concerned with the disastrous effect of a man's preconceptions on his perception of "reality." While Iago's rhetorical virtuosity resides in his ability to convince Othello of the epistemological priority of visual experience over any lesssensible evidence, he only succeeds when his narrative moves Othello to accept the verbal account as if it were the ocular proof he demanded. Robert Heilman (1956: 58) explains the process well: "When Othello is being conspicuously deceived by the seeming, he is under the illusion that he is seeing particularly well, for Iago has tutored his vision." It is no accident that Iago's rhetorical strategy relies on the language of vision for its authority. Though Othello has seen nothing of the "ocular proof" he earlier demanded, he nonetheless proclaims that his "bloody thoughts, with violent pace, / Shall nev'r look back, nev'r ebb to humble love, / Till that a capable and wide revenge / Swallow them up" (3.3.457460). In the [End Page 712]subsequent scenes of the play, he continues to seek visual confirmation of the affair, but from this point on his search proceeds from the belief that Desdemona is guilty.
It is at this point that things get interesting. For rather than allow his plan to rest on a secondhand account of Cassio's possession of the handkerchief, Iago is fully

the consciousness attempting comprehension), Iago can

staging the scene between himself and Cassio, Iago reveals for a second time that the process by which the realm of the visual is granted its evidentiary status actually unveils the contingency of perception and history. Looking on from the wings as Iago speaks to Cassio of his flirtations with Bianca, Othello "sees for himself" the two men discussing Cassio's affair with Desdemona. In a wonderful dramatic moment
borrowed from farce and so familiar in Shakespearethe playwright is able to map two coherent narratives onto a single visual field. The scene is not finessed in any way, as Iago tells us exactly what he plans to do and exactly what will happen: Now I will question Cassio of Bianca, A huswife that by selling her desires Buys herself bread and clothes. It is a creature That dotes on Cassio (as 'tis the strumpet's plague To beguile many and be beguil'd by one); He when he hears of her, cannot restrain From the excess of laughter . . . ........... As he shall smile, Othello shall go mad; And his unbookish jealousy must conster Poor Cassio's smiles, gestures, and light behaviors Quite in the wrong. (4.1.93103)

prepared to provide Othello with the satisfaction he originally demanded. In

Only the unexpected entrance of Bianca with the handkerchief falls outside the manipulative domain of Iago's plan. But rather than reveal the staged quality of the encounter between Cassio and Iago, Bianca's entrance, and especially her possession of the handkerchief, lend the scene further authenticity in Othello's eyes. It is at this

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point that one is reminded of the playwright's ultimate power over the dramatic action, as even the accidental is made to fit neatly into the villain's scheme. 27
Though there is much to say about the way fiction and fact are construed by all involved in this scene, I am particularly interested in the way that [End Page 713]the handkerchief functions in the process of validating the various histories which accrue to it over the course of the play. For

Othello, Bianca's mere possession of the handkerchief is enough to confirm the worst about Desdemona. But why? That possession itself is not proof of anything without the narrative history Iago has provided. While a good deal of attention has been given to
the question of whether or not Othello succumbs too quickly to Iago's suggestions, I would submit that an examination of the handkerchief's various histories 28 complicates any simple account of Othello as dupe to Iago's boundless, manipulative power. For in addition to it being his "first gift" to Desdemona, Othello relates that the handkerchief has "magic in the web of it," a revelation that contrasts sharply with his own earlier account of their courtship. Significantly, Othello had denied any knowledge of magic when defending himself before the Duke in the opening scenes of the play. In response to Brabantio's assertion that he could never have honestly won Desdemona's hand"For nature so preposterously to err / (Being not deficient, blind, or lame of sense) / Sans witchcraft [it] could not" (1.3.6264) Othello offers only a "round unvarnished tale." Of course, the tale he tells belies his own claim that he is "rude . . . in . . . speech, / and little blesse'd with the soft phrase of peace" (1.3.8182). The power of Othello's language is revealed in both the eloquence of his account of their courtship and the basis of his defense: the only witchcraft Othello claims to have used was the art of storytelling, "[she] bade me, if I had a friend that lov'd her, / I should but teach him how to tell my story, / And that would woo her" (1.3.16466). As with the confusion of the material handkerchief and the stories that make it available to the understanding (what Martin Heidegger would call its "coming into presence"), Desdemona is wooed as much by Othello's account of his acts as she is by the acts "themselves." 29The history that Othello later tells of the

handkerchief, which would have confirmed the worst of Brabantio's fears, calls into question Othello's account of the relationship: That handkerchief Did an Egyptian to my mother give; She was a charmer, and could almost read [End Page 714] The thoughts of people: she told her, while she kept it, 'Twould make her amiable and subdue my father Entirely to her love, but if she lost it, Or made gift of it, my father's eye Should hold her loathed and his spirits should hunt After new fancies. She, dying, gave it me, And bid me, when my fate would have me wiv'd, To give it her. I did so, and take heed on't, Make it a darling like your precious eye. To lose't or give't away were such perdition As nothing else could match. (3.4.5568) Othello's fantastic history further complicates the multiple histories that are attributed to the handkerchief by Iago and Biancathe former with the intent to deceive and the latter with the intent to unveil the truth. Eschewing Othello's romantic history of the handkerchief as "his first gift," Iago offers an image of Cassio using the handkerchief to wipe his beard. Similarly, Bianca rejects Cassio's story on the grounds of its implausibility: "A likely piece of work, that you should find it in your chamber, and know not who left it there! This is some minx's token" (4.1.15153). Iago immediately picks up on the suggestion, taunting Othello that Desdemona has given the handkerchief to Cassio who cared so little "he hath giv'n it his whore" (4.1.177).

While neither Iago nor Bianca offers the "true" history of the handkerchief, the histories they tell have power by virtue of their ability to elicit recognition from both Othello and the audience. Such recognition relies in part on what Roland Barthes famously termed the "reality effect," as the details of each story produce a sense of mundane authenticity. The details can be seen (are seen by Othello) as, to use Barthes's (1974 [1970]: 81) words, "notations whose very insignificance authenticates, signs, signifies 'reality.'" Such histories of the handkerchief override the truth of the larger story known to the viewers of the play. One can picture a guilty Cassio wiping his beard with the sacred objectas Oliver Parker demonstrated in the 1995 film version of the playand the image is powerful despite the knowledge that Cassio is innocent. One might ventureas does Othellothat Iago's account of Cassio wiping his beard is "unmistakably uninvented," if it weren't for our being in on the game. 30

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OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE (BATAILLE STYLE) THE MODEL OF WESTERN KNOWLEDGE POSITS THE SUN AS A CORRELARY TO REASON THE PINNACLE OF ILLUMINATION, THE ULTIMATE POWER OF TRUTH. THE 1ACS STRUCTURING OF KNOWLEDGE INTO OBSERVATIONS IS ROOTED IN THIS SAME DRIVE TO PERFECTLY SEE AND KNOW THE WORLD Land 92 [Nick, Continental Philo Lecturer @ Warwick Univ., The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (An Essay in Atheistic
Religion).The Curse of the Sun, pg 19-24] It is the green parts of the plants of the solid earth and the seas which endlessly operate the appropriation of an important part of the suns luminous energy. It is in this way that lightthe sunproduces us, animates us, and engenders our excess. This excess, this animation are the effect of the light (we are basically nothing but an effect of the sun) [VII10]. The solar ray that we are recovers in the end its nature and the sense of the sun: it is necessary that it gives itself, loses itself without reckoning [VII 10].The peoples of ancient Mexico united man with the glory of the universe: the sun was the fruit of a sacrificial madness [VII 192].There is no philosophical story more famous than that narrated in the Seventh Book of Platos Republic, in which Socrates tells Glaucon of a peculiar dream. It begins in the depths of a sort of subterranean cavern [PCD 747], in which fettered humans are buried from the sun, their heads constrained, to prevent them seeing anything but shadows cast upon a wall by a fire. The

ascent through various levels of illusion to the naked light of the sun is the most powerful myth of the philosophical project, but it is also the account of a political struggle, in which Socrates anticipates his death. The denizens of the cave
violently defend their own benightedness, to such an extent that Socrates asks: if it were possible to lay hands on and to kill the man who tried to release them and lead them up, would they not kill him? [PCD 749]. Glaucon immediately concurs with this suggestion. Such violence is not unilateral. The

philosopher, after all, has an interest in the sun that is not purely a matter of knowledge. To have witnessed the sun is a gain and an entitlement; a supra-terrestrial invitation (however reluctantly accepted) to rule: So our cities will be governed by us and you with waking minds, and not, as most cities now which are inhabited and ruled darkly as in a dream by men who fight one another for shadows and wrangle for office as if that were a great good, when the truth is that the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to hold office must needs be best administered and most free from dissension, and the state that gets the contrary type of ruler will be the opposite of this [PCD 752].Light, desire, and politics are tangled together in this story; knotted in the darkness. For there is still something Promethean about Socrates; an attempt to extract power from the sun. (Bataille says: The eagle is at one and the same time the animal of Zeus and that of Prometheus, which is to say that Prometheus is himself an eagle (Atheus-Prometheus),going to steal fire from heaven [II 40].)To gaze upon the sun directly, without the intervention of screens, reflections, or metaphorsto look upon the sun itself and see its true nature, not by reflections in water or phantasms of it in an alien setting, but in and by itself in its own place [PCD 748]has been the European aspiration most relentlessly harmonized with the valorization of truth. Any aspiration or wish is the reconstruction of a desire (drive) at the level of representation, but the longing for unimpeded vision of the sun is something more; a ideological consolidation of representation as such. The sun is the pure illumination that would be simultaneous with truth, the perfect solidarity of knowing with the real, the identity of exteriority and its manifestation. To contemplate the sun would be the definitive confirmation of enlightenment. Gazing into the golden rage of the sun shreds vision into scraps of light and darkness. A white sun is congealed from patches of light, floating ephemerally at the edge of blindness. This is the illuminating sun, giving what we can keep, the sun whose outpourings are acquired by the body as nutrition, and by the eye as (assimilable) sensation. Platos sun is of this kind; a distilled sun, a sun which is the very essence of purity, the metaphor of beauty, truth, and goodness. Throughout the cold months, when nature seems to wither and retreat, one awaits the return of this sun in its full radiance. The bounty of the autumn seems to pay homage to it, as the ancients also did.

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OBSERVING KNOWLEDGE (HEIDEGGER STYLE) THE STRUCTURE OF THE 1AC REVEALS THAT IT WORKS WITHIN THE RULE OF ENFRAMING THEY OBSERVE THE KNOWLEDGE PRESENTED UNDER THE GUISE OF OBJECTIVITY, ATTEMPTING TO PERFECTLY UNDERSTAND IT AND ULTIMATELY TO ARRIVE AT SOME CERTAIN TRUTH. THEIR ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE YOU BY INSISTING UPON THIS MONOPOLY OVER TRUTH SERVE TO SHUT DOWN MEDITATIVE THINKING AND FURTHERMORE DESTROY THE ESSENCE OF THINGS BY ECLIPSING THEIR CONCRETENESS AND IGNORING THEIR ESSENTIAL CONTEXTS. A MEDITATIVE APPROACH TO OBSERVING WOULD REMAIN OPEN TO THE REVEALING OF THINGS AS THINGS AND RESPECT THE MYSTERY INHERENT IN THAT REVEAL AND THEREFORE ATTEMPTS TO PERSUADE BY AWAKENING THAT TRUTH WITHUIN WHICH THE LISTENER IS ALREADY PRESENT. WE APPROACH TRUTH NOT AS SOMETHING TO BE FULLY AND FINALLY UNCOVERED, BUT AS SOMETHING PRESENT ALREADY BEFORE US TO WHICH WE MIGHT BE MORE ATTUNED. Joseph 2000 (Aloysius, Duquesne University, Speaking Differently: Deconstruction/Meditative Thinking as the Heart of "the Faculty of Observing", Janushead, 3.1, http://www.janushead.org/3-1/ajoseph.cfm )
Introduction Aristotle, in Book I, Chapter 2, of his Rhetoric says, "Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Roberts, 1954, p. 24). This probable ("may be") definition of rhetoric is significant. First, it lends itself to be read in many ways, and second, it shows us that what is at the heart of epideictic rhetoric is probability and not certainty. In this paper I offer a meditative (thinking) reading of the phrase, "the faculty of observing" in conjunction with discerning the available means of persuasion as posited in this definition.1 At the outset it can be stated that meditative thinking/deconstruction2 is not aimed at specifying a technique to choose "the available means of persuasion." Rather it is that which describes the "essence" of observation. Hence, in this paper I also wish to show that the genuine rhetor is one "who dwells" as one would in meditative thinking. Observation as meditative thinking: "a letting be"

From a Heideggerian perspective, the phrase, "the faculty of observing" has significant implications for meditative thinking/deconstruction. If as Cicero says, "Eloquence is wisdom spoken wisely," then observation facilitates the rhetor to speak wisely so as to be able to persuade and stir up a disposition amidst the audience. Heidegger (1953/1996) alludes to this in his phenomenal work, Being and Time, when he writes, "Publicness as the kind of being of the they not only has its attunedness, it uses mood and 'makes' it for itself. The speaker speaks to it and from it. He needs the understanding of the possibility of mood in order to arouse and direct it in the right way" (138-139). Hence, to be persuasive a rhetor needs first of all to observe. It could then be said that "observation" is the condition upon which choosing the appropriate means of persuasion rests. But we may ask, "Is this not common sense?" It reminds us of the English proverb, "Look before you leap." Yet what is to be borne in
mind is that because the rational-scientific framework has permeated common sense so much, it cannot be taken for granted that observing or looking is merely a commonsensical activity. The

technological and commercial Enframing of this epoch has such a powerful grip over every aspect of human life that common sense has lost its place as conventional wisdom. Besides, in trying to make human life comfortable and highly efficient, technology has succeeded in creating a desensitized human world. Looking or observing loses its passion in such a world that prioritizes distant, dispassionate and objective observation. Hence, from a rationalistic and technological perspective, observation or looking is detached seeing. The goal of detached seeing is to arrive at certain knowledge and truth. The observer through detached seeing abstracts the essential qualities of a thing in the effort to understand and interpret it. This leads to clear and valid knowledge. But from an existential-phenomenological perspective, such an approach is impoverished. First of all, such a disengaged (detached seeing) activity robs a thing of its concreteness and its embodiment. Second, this process of abstraction/detached seeing (however convincing and certain it is) is oblivious to the context which makes the thing what it is. These two aspects make observation as detached seeing, in the rational-scientific system, a barren and passionless activity. But observation in a radical sense is respect for the phenomena. In his essay, "The Thing," Heidegger (1971b) points to this radical sense of observation which can be characterized as the "essence" of meditative thinking. He writes, "If we let the thing be present in this thinging from out of the worlding world, then we are thinking of the thing as thing"

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(p. 181). Observation as meditative thinking is radical because the rhetor lets the thing be thing in the way it shows itself -- in its concreteness ("thinging") and its situatedness ("worlding world"). But for the rhetor who affiliates with the rational-scientific tradition, an abstract, passionless and decontextualized observation has its payoffs. The persuasion that arises out of such an affiliation is commercially viable given the profit-oriented and competitive socio-cultural arena that every discipline (arts and sciences) has unwittingly bought into. Within such a structure, the skilful and persuasive speaker is one who possesses the skill to convince the listeners to concede to truth irrespective of its concreteness and situatedness. The monopoly over truth at which this approach arrives is gained through a process of elimination and exclusion such that the listeners are precluded from its multiple and genuine alternatives and possibilities. Through such exclusionary means the speaker and all those who subscribe to such a prescriptive approach to truth thereby become the sole owners of the truth by means of expropriation and exploitation. On the other hand, a rhetor (the one who observes with a passion) enables/facilitates/shows how we live and move in truth through inclusive and non-reductionistic ways. This is truly pedagogical and educative for it persuades by "bringing forth"; not because the speaker has a monopoly over truth, but because the listeners live and share in it already. The work of the rhetor is to awaken them to what they already know. It is in this context that epideictic rhetoric is important. We have no new information introduced; rather, the quality of the phenomena is amplified. From a Heideggerian perspective, observing takes on a different meaning as it is based on a radically different assumption. As Hoy (1993) writing on the hermeneutic turn in Heidegger points out:
Heidegger's strategy is different from the Cartesian strategy, which starts by assuming a basic ontological disconnection (e.g., between mental and physical substance) and then looks for instances of epistemological connection that cannot be doubted (e.g., the knowledge of the existence of a thinking subject). Heidegger's strategy is to see Dasein as already in the world, which suggests that what needs to be explained is not the connection, which is the basis, but the disconnection (p. 176). The disconnection or the disruption is that which is appealing to the eye of the rhetor who observes by participating. Hence, observation as meditative thinking is to pay attention to the "disconnection" that shows itself in the activity of hovering over as long as we can endure it. To take this a step further, we could say that when the rhetor can endure or stay persistent with this unsettling experience, then the circularity of hermeneutics (through a persistent inhabitation of the phenomenon) gives way to an elliptical movement that is in "essence" elusive and indeterminate. Derrida (1973) calls our attention to this radical difference in what can be called a "project" of deconstruction. He makes an appropriate observation in this regard when he writes: There is then, probably no choice to be made between two lines of thought; our task is rather to reflect on the circularity, which makes the one pass into the other indefinitely. And, by strictly repeating this circle in its own historical possibility, we allow the production of some elliptical change of site, within the difference involved in repetition; this displacement is no doubt deficient, but with a deficiency that is not yet, or is already no longer, absence, negativity, nonbeing, lack, silence. Neither matter nor form, it is nothing that any philosopheme, that is, any dialectic, however determinate, can capture. It is an ellipsis of both meaning and form; it is neither plenary speech nor perfectly circular. More and less, neither more nor less -- it is perhaps an entirely different question. (p. 128)

On the part of the rhetor who endures, the latter movement allows for a "re-cognition" of this elusive and disruptive/displacing nature of that which shows itself. In this sense, observation as meditative thinking/deconstruction is respect for the phenomena. In such a movement, we could contend with John D. Caputo (1987) that the observer-participant rhetor is never in a privileged position or the sole owner in regard to what shows itself in meditative thinking/deconstruction. He observes: In an a-lethic view, whatever shows itself, whatever comes forth, issues from hidden depths. We know we cannot touch bottom here, that we cannot squeeze what stirs here between our conceptual hands, cannot get it within our grip, cannot seize it round about. The mystery is self-withdrawing, self-sheltering. And that is what gives rise to respect. (p. 276) Hence, in Heideggerian terms, observation could be seen as akin to letting go or "letting be," which is radical detachment or detached attachment. The genuine rhetor is one who cultivates a respectful disposition as regards the "faculty of observing" and "the available means of persuasion" vis--vis that which needs to be spoken about.

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INTERNAL LINKS

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RACISM

VISUAL METAPHORS ARE ROOTED IN A CULTURAL BIAS TOWARD VISUALITY THE NOTION THAT A THING MUST BE VISIBLE TO BE REAL. THIS VISUALITY SHAPES OUR NOTIONS OF IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE FORMING THAT BASIS FOR RACISM. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) A. Seeing Culture [2.2] In Part I of this Article I argued that metaphors can reflect the circumstances and attitudes of the society that generates them. In light of this point, it seems reasonable to suggest that the

traditional popularity of visual metaphors in American legal language has much to do with the bias towards visual expression and experience that has traditionally characterized American culture and, inevitably, American law. [2.3] The traditional American bias towards the visual is aptly captured by the observation that "[i]n our society, . . . to be real, a thing must be visible."45 We46 demonstrate our visual bias in numerous ways and in numerous contexts, usually without recognizing that such a bias even exists. Every time we sing the first line of the national anthem, we ask a question about looking: "Oh say can you see . . .?" We pay for goods and services with dollar bills that bear a staring eye on their backs.47 We go on vacation not to hear the sounds, but to "see the sights"; we take along cameras, not tape recorders.48 [2.4] We give aesthetic priority to visual effect. Our glass and steel buildings are monuments to the power of sight, rather than sound or touch.49 Our idea of personal beauty is primarily visual.50 So is our idea of art, to the point where, in ordinary discourse, that term denotes purely visual painting, not music or dance.51 Our visual orientation even colors our approach to art forms which, at least in theory, are not altogether dependent on visual appreciation: we regularly highlight the visuality of sculpture-and, at the same time, neutralize its tactility-by posting signs in our museums and art galleries that read "Do Not Touch." Is it any wonder that in such a context, our sculpture should have become "painterly,"52 i.e., designed much more for seeing than feeling? [2.5] Less obviously, but more fundamentally, our visuality shapes our sense of social identity and difference. We tend to group one another more on the basis of similar visual appearance than on, say, similar accent.53 This is most obvious when we categorize individuals according to the color of their skin: in our visualist culture, most Americans are "white" or "black." Visual identity has indeed become so important to us that we not only differentiate, but actually discriminate against one another on a visual basis. Having skin of a certain color may in practice entitle us to, or alternatively, it may disqualify us from educational opportunity, economic wealth, and political power.

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POWER RELATIONS BASED IN THE CARTESIAN NOTION OF THE SUBJECT, VISUAL METAPHORS AND THE PRIMACY ON THE VISUAL THAT SPAWNS THEM ARE AN EXPRESSION THE WORST KINDS OF POWER RELATIONS RANGING FROM DOMINATION OF NATURE AND BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL OF POPULATIONS TO IMPERIALISM. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [2.21] The invention of the printing press in the mid-fifteenth century and its spread throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries encouraged a further increase in personal and social literacy levels and, with that, a further increase in cultural respect for, and interest in, vision.146 In the changing spirit of the time, the English poet Robert Herrick wrote "[w]e credit most our sight; one eye doth please/Our trust . . . more than ten eare-witnesses [sic]."147

The French philosopher Ren Descartes pointedly analogized vision and thought: "We shall learn how to employ our mental intuition by comparing it with the way that we employ our eyes."148 A child of the black and white printed text rather than of the colorful iconographic manuscript, Descartes was more interested in the disembodied "mind's eye" of the imagination149 than in the physical perception of images,150 but he regarded cogitation as a "seeing" notwithstanding.151 [2.22] Consistent with the textualized immateriality of Cartesian vision, seals gave way to signatures on ordinary legal
documents.152 Law books gradually lost most of their illustrations and allegorical settings,153 while courtrooms across Europe (like many churches) were stripped of much of their artwork.154 The working robes of many lawyers and judges faded to a combination of black and white that incidentally evoked the colors (and in doing so, perhaps also the authority) of the printed page.155 The ancient figure of Justice was blindfolded to save her from distracting images.156 Under the impetus of line and letters, the general visuality of law was nonetheless preserved and even magnified. Following in the footsteps of Continental rhetorician Peter Ramus, leading

scholars such as Sir Edward Coke and Henry Finch promoted the usage of schematic, dichotomizing diagrams to clarify legal concepts and arguments.157 Jurists became more willing to deal with legal treatises as visual and not figuratively aural works.158 They frequently, if not yet consistently, regarded themselves and their readers as "observers."159 Some expressly offered the public a "view" or "image" of the law;160 a few conceived of legal wisdom as a metaphorical matter of light.161 Referring to a surveyor's
measuring instrument, Coke at one point called law a "golden metewand."162 Late in the seventeenth century, the German legal philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz elaborated the ancient Aristotelian notion of law as geometry.163 [2.23] In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, writing and visuality matured together. European and American literacy rates reached unprecedented levels.164 Philosophers actually proclaimed the 1700s the "Age of Enlightenment." In the 1800s, paeans to sight became commonplace.165 John Ruskin wrote that "[t]he greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to see something. . . . To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion, all in one."166 Ralph Waldo Emerson declared that at the moment of epiphany, "I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all."167 In

English legal

a variety of contexts, vision became a sensory cipher for the exercise of power. Styles of landscape gardening that provided the upper-class householder with a pleasing view of his estate gave him power over nature.168 Designs for asylums and prisons (such as Jeremy Bentham's "Panopticon") that enabled authorities to continually survey their inmates gave the sane power over the insane, and the law-abiding power over the criminal.169 Vision even became an instrument of imperialism, as didactic and theatric exhibitions at home of exotic colonial lifestyles abroad gave Europeans psychological power over their overseas possessions.170

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SEXISM/GENDER

VISUALITY IS THE CONTEXT FOR WHITE MALE PROTESTANT DOMINATION A HISTORICALLY PRIVELEGED ACCESS TO WRITING AND LEGAL POWER AND A PREFERENCE FOR VISUALITY ON THE PART OF THE ELITE CREATED THE PRECONDITIONS FOR LEGAL OPPRESSION. VISUALITY AND ITS EXPRESSION IN VISUAL METAPHOR ARE BOTH THE ORIGIN AND MECAHNISM OF OPPRESSION. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [2.29] The traditional visuality of American legal metaphor has, however, been more than just a function of general cultural circumstance. It has also been the product of power: the power of American men over women, the power of American whites over blacks, the power of American "Anglos" over Hispanics, and the power of American Protestants over Catholics and Jews. By making special use of the written word to secure or extend their cultural authority, members of the former groups have gained a special respect for vision and the visual that they have unilaterally made the standard for "American" culture as a whole. In conditions where their literacy has been involuntarily restricted or their own traditions have set limits to their trust of writing, members of the latter groups have either been forced or have chosen to grant relatively more respect to aural expression and experience.213 As American men, whites, Anglos, and Protestants have used their cultural authority to first monopolize, and then numerically and politically dominate the ranks of the American legal profession, they and those whom they have coerced or co-opted have indulged their visuality in, among other things, a consistent preference for visual legal metaphor. They have literally shaped American legal language in their own images. [2.30] Generalizing about the circumstances or perspectives shared by the members of any group is a risky business. One must steer between the Scylla of "essentialism" and the Charybdis of "antiessentialism," recognizing on the one hand that individuals falling into a single category may, as individuals, be different in many respects,214 while acknowledging on the other hand that diverse individuals sharing a particular identity may, fortunately or unfortunately, have had similar experiences or developed similar views by virtue of that identity or society's reaction to it.215 In this portion of the Article, I nonetheless focus on differences between groups more than on differences between individuals because I fear that following the latter course would compromise our appreciation of important power relationships that have historically operated for and against certain Americans by virtue of their gender, racial, ethnic, and religious associations. Here I should stress a point I previously made in passing:216 the group generalizations to be discussed are strictly limited by being contingent constructs of culture, not inevitable incidents of biology. They moreover illustrate differences of degree, rather than of kind. They reveal, if you like, human differences mediated by human sameness.217Keeping all this in mind, I will spend the next few pages exploring how greater exposure to, dependence on, and even literal faith in writing have traditionally encouraged some American groups to embrace visuality more enthusiastically than have others. I will then examine how the members of these former groups have imposed their visuality on American legal culture and, in that course, on American legal language. [2.31] I begin with the observation that American men's culture has traditionally enjoyed a closer, more intense association with the written word than has the culture comprised of American women.218 This was true from the earliest days of the republic.219 Many

American men absorbed the finer points of reading, writing, and literate learning as youngsters in grammar schools and universities which for a long time were open only to them. As adults, a good number engaged in businesses or professional callings (most of which, again, were open only to men) that required them to spend some portion of the day reading or writing correspondence, contracts, or other texts. Into the twentieth century, American men frequently assumed responsibility at home for reading such standard writings as the Bible and the newspaper aloud to female members of their families. Today some American feminists still consider the written word-at least in its traditional semantic and syntactic incarnations-to be fundamentally "male."220 [2.32] It may be argued that the extent of their involvement with written material has led American men as a group-like men in other Western societies-to take a great interest in the phenomenon of visual observation that has been the source of so much of their textual knowledge and authority.221 As modern feminist scholarship has taken pains to emphasize (if not necessarily explain), the "gaze" has historically been more of a "male" than a "female" medium.222 In the American tradition, men have been primarily responsible for reducing the world-and, in the process, women-to visual, twodimensional texts, paintings, photographs,223 electronic images,224 diagrams, and equations.225 In their

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capacities as school administrators, college professors, historians, curators, and archivists, American men have long been in charge of preserving and perpetuating the corpus of American visual culture over time. As scientists and philosophers, they have further indulged their visuality by using mostly visual metaphors to describe the central intellectual operations of thinking and knowing: they have made "observations," offered "perspectives," and "speculated" on the nature of reality.226
[2.33] The desire and even the need to look that has animated American male experience has frequently been coupled with a limited and somewhat selective devaluation of aurality and evocatively aural forms. At least since the late eighteenth century, most American men have rejected dialogue and story as respectable vehicles for the communication of important written information.227 More generally, American

men as a group have been eager to prescribe silence as a positive personal and social value for others, if not necessarily for themselves.228 This latter strategy has been feasible in part because many American men have had access to a visual medium of communication (writing) which in their experience has not depended on sound to provide its sense. The strategy has moreover been politically useful because it has enabled American men to consolidate their control of other groups that have been more dependent on aural expression. The command that women (not to mention children) be "seen and not heard"-implicitly evoked from the anti-scolding laws of the seventeenth century229 through the marital evidence laws of the nineteenth century230-has been a prime guarantor of patriarchal power. [2.37] Somewhat analogously to the relative circumstances of American men's and women's culture, white American culture has historically been more dependent on the written word than has African American culture.
The first white American colonists came from European countries that by the seventeenth century had already developed significant textual traditions.257 The first white

American settlements were themselves creatures of authoritative writings-royal charters or (in the case of the Pilgrims) the Mayflower Compact. Learning

to read was a hallmark of white American education from its beginning.258 Over the years, literacy and familiarity with a wide range of written materials gradually encouraged the white American community to privilege sight and seeing. Through the lens of books and newspapers, tracts and magazines, its members learned to literally look out at the world; they conveniently came to regard texts and paintings as primary measures of cultural worth. Thus was born the phenomenon that some African American intellectuals have pejoratively, if accurately, labelled the "white gaze."259

[2.38] In favoring the visual, white American culture did not reject aurality completely.260 For instance, for a long while the culture continued to produce, trust, and even revere great speakers.261 From the mid- to late nineteenth century, however, as white Americans approached "universal" literacy under the impetus of new developments in printing technology,262 many seemed less confident in what they said or heard. Within

the white community, public speech became more dependent on visual, written scripts;263 old-fashioned oratory was increasingly dismissed as "mere rhetoric."264 Storytelling survived, but it was largely, if not altogether accurately, associated with children, members of less literate lower classes, and inhabitants of backward rural areas. Most white American authors jettisoned the more obvious aural mannerisms and formats that had characterized so much American literature in the antebellum era.265 At the same time, white Americans gradually embraced silence as both a social norm and a primary means of social discipline. Increasingly used to sitting

quietly in front of texts, white American theater- and concert-goers who had formerly been inclined to spontaneously talk to each other and interact with stage performers266 became more willing to sit in silent (or at least suspended) judgment on the musicians and actors who appeared before them.267 In the schoolroom where white American teachers had once taught their students to read by recitation, the most important meta-lesson became, as it today remains, how to sit, write, and read in contented quiet.268 [2.39] The

black Africans who were transported to America from the 1620s onward hailed from cultures that had only limited experience with writing. Mostly living as slaves on the other side of the Middle Passage, blacks were given neither the literate instruction nor the exposure to the written word that many American whites took for granted. Southern "slave codes" of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in fact prohibited anyone from teaching blacks to read and write, for fear that they might become vulnerable to abolitionist tracts or use their skills to communicate with each other and foment rebellion.269 These prohibitions were lifted after the Civil War, but African Americans in the South and the North alike continued to face discrimination and prejudice which formally and informally prevented them from gaining equal access either to the schools where basic literacy was taught, or to the universities where students mastered entire fields of written learning.270 The impossibility in these circumstances of black Americans (as a group) becoming highly dependent upon, and therefore partial toward, the written word has largely precluded vision and visual forms from achieving the same prominence in the African American community as they have attained in white America.271 Notwithstanding black achievements in the literary and visual arts, contemporary African American cultural critic Michele Wallace actually claims

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that there exists a "visual void in black discourse"272 attributable to "intra-racial pain and outside intervention."273 Exclusively visual expression and experience-including reading and writing-have even been denigrated by some members of the African American community as being either secondary repositories of the African American heritage274 or, more provocatively, undesirable marks of racial assimilation and oppression.275
[2.40] Both by force and by choice, African American culture has retained an appreciation and respect for its own oral tradition that white American culture has largely lost. That tradition began with the bits and pieces of ancient African lore-songs and stories, proverbs and parables-that individual Africans held in their heads when they were taken as slaves from their homelands.276 Later generations of black Americans developed and elaborated upon it according to their own unique needs and conditions.277 Today it lives most vibrantly in storytelling,278preaching,279 "toasts,"280 "signifying,"281 jazz,282 and rap.283 It is a defining even privileged, element in African American culture:284 as Cornel West has recently noted, the "organic intellectual traditions in African-American life . . . are oral, improvisational, and histrionic . . . ."285 White Americans have tended to interpret this aurality as a mark of ongoing African American disempowerment, but for many African Americans it is equally a mark of survival and resistance.286 Such an historical and political commitment to speech and sound has understandably induced in the African American community a certain suspicion of silence, which by definition would suppress oral interaction and hence compromise cultural continuity.287 [2.41] Oral traditions and forms have notably resonated in the corpus of African American literature which has come into existence since the American Revolution.288 In the mid-nineteenth century, Frederick Douglass's writings rang with the rhythmic cadences of speech.289 In 1903, W.E.B. Du Bois set The Souls of Black Folk in an additive, metered, and somewhat repetitive prose style that almost literally echoed the most effective forms of oral presentation;290 he introduced his chapters with musical epigraphs (bars from African American "sorrow songs") that overtly testified to the cultural power of aurality.291 In the 1930s and 1940s, Langston Hughes's poetry consciously captured the syncopated nuances of jazz and "be-bop."292 More recently, Maya Angelou has declared of her own work: I write for the Black voice and any ear which can hear it. As a composer writes for musical instruments and a choreographer creates for the body, I search for sound, tempos, and rhythms to ride through the vocal cord over the tongue, and out of the lips of Black people. . . . I accept the glory of stridencies and purrings, trumpetings and somber sonorities.293 Music and oral storytelling have additionally provided the narrative frameworks or have been particularly prominent themes in the writings of a variety of African American novelists.294 [2.42] On the levels of language and ethnicity as distinguished from "race," Americans from the loosely defined "Anglo" community may also be said to have had, as a group, a relatively closer association with the written word than have Americans from "Hispanic" backgrounds. As native English-speakers, Anglos have had a distinct advantage in the English-based American educational system which has taught them to read and write. Their bias towards writing has only been magnified by their ancestral or psychological allegiance to broader English culture, which has traditionally placed greater emphasis on literacy295 than have certain of its European counterparts. Both in and out of school, many Anglo-Americans additionally have had physical and economic recourse to a good deal of written English language material. Finally, Anglos have traditionally controlled the major American print media and have been in a unique position to set the aesthetic standards for the American visual arts. All these factors have encouraged AngloAmericans, as a group, to take a greater interest in, and become more dependent upon, visual expression and experience.

Americans from Hispanic backgrounds have traditionally been burdened by discriminatory Anglo attitudes and policies that have directly and indirectly kept them at the margins of American written culture.296 Hispanic Americans have faced enormous linguistic barriers: in a culture which has informally (and in some jurisdictions, formally) adopted English as its official language, English language literacy has been a prerequisite for educational advancement. The difficulty of learning to read English in English language classrooms at a stage of life when Spanish speaking children have not yet mastered Spanish has been a leading cause of the high dropout rates traditionally encountered among Hispanic American school students.297 At the same time, the successful cultivation of Spanish language literacy has been rendered problematic because of the intolerance or lack of facilities for Spanish language instruction in most American schools and universities.298 With much written material in both English and Spanish having thus been rendered largely meaningless or inaccessible, American Hispanic culture has not been pulled towards visuality in the same manner as has its Anglo counterpart.299 Instead, many Hispanics have repeatedly found themselves drawn and sometimes forced back into the soundscapes of their own ethnic
[2.43] communities. Here, aurality born of discrimination and necessity has been positively reinforced by strong Spanish and Native American oral traditions,300 with the result that aural expression has been the primary conduit of Hispanic language and culture.301 Today the power and attraction of aurality in Hispanic American life is manifested in the strength of contemporary Hispanic storytelling, in the ongoing popularity of dialogic "competitive" and "collective" recollections offered by Hispanic elders,302 and in the cultural prominence of traditional Hispanic ballads (corridos).303 Somewhat less directly, the same aurality is reflected in Hispanic American novels that draw on cuentos (traditional oral tales),304 in Hispanic American poetry inspired by corridos305 or written with the specific intention of being read aloud,306 and in the variety of oral histories that have begun to document different aspects of the Hispanic American experience.307 [2.44] With

respect to religion, the American Protestant community's special affection for the written word is born of the traditional Protestant conviction that only the written Bible contains the pure and true word of God (sola scriptura). In this context, reading has been considered as more than just a skill; it has been regarded as a sure route to salvation. The initial Protestant (largely Lutheran) enthusiasm for the spoken word during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries308 may be construed
as a temporary response to the realities of then limited European literacy; in the short term, what was written might at least be heard by all if it could not yet be read by all.309 As

their religious beliefs encouraged Protestants to become more literate, however, the textualist theologies of John Calvin and Huldrych Zwingli gained ground310 and Protestantism as a whole became more visualist. The American Puritans notably thought of God less as a speaker than as a spectator. The pulpits of many New England meetinghouses bore but a single graphic device: "an enormous, carefully painted, staring eye, a terrible

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and suggestive illustration to youthful wrong-doers of the great all-seeing eye of God."311 Men could help God by watching each other. In the Puritan meetinghouse, the elders sat underneath the pulpit so that they could see the congregation;312 outside the meetinghouse, "holy-watching" over one's neighbors was part of a man's civic and religious duty.313 American Quakers sought a metaphorically visual "Inner Light" and adopted as their primary form of collective worship the so-called "silent meeting" in which they "waited upon the Spirit" with only occasional spoken interjections.314 American Shakerism also had a strong visionary component: according to Shaker theology, "righteousness involved seeing rightly."315 Contemporary American Protestantism certainly has neither abandoned nor rejected aurality out of hand (witness the speech practices associated with American Fundamentalism),316 but it is noteworthy that even the most voluble Protestant preachers not only insist upon citing chapter and verse from a Biblical text, but frequently carry that text about with them as a visible totem of their authority. [2.45] The practices and doctrines of both the Catholic and Jewish faiths have arguably disinclined their American adherents (as groups) from embracing the written word as unreservedly as have American Protestants. Catholicism
has always had considerable respect for a clerical interpretation of Scripture dependant upon the aural and sometimes actually catechistic relationship between priest and parishioner. The

Catholic Church still subscribes to a resolution of the 1546 Council of Trent that declared oral dogma to be equivalent in stature to the Scriptures themselves: it had been "received by the apostles from the lips of Christ himself, or
by the same apostles at the dictation of the Holy Spirit."317 The Catholic emphasis on oral revelation has not dissuaded many American Catholics from developing a high degree of reliance on the written word, but it has made such a reliance less necessary to their spiritual well-being. As

a result, American (and for that matter, North American) Catholic culture has been relatively less committed to a strictly visualist interpretation of existence, to the extent that two of the foremost investigators and exponents of aurality since the 1960s have been a Catholic convert
(Marshall McLuhan)318 and a Jesuit priest (Walter Ong). [2.46] The various strands of American Jewish culture have likewise shared a broader sensory base. Jews have frequently been called "People of the Book," but this reference to the importance of written scripture in Judaism should not be permitted to mask a significant aurality rooted in the Jewish experience of God.319 In

marked contrast to the visibility of Christ in the New Testament,320 Yahweh in the Hebrew Bible preferred not to show Himself or permit Himself to be shown (thus the Second Commandment: "You shall not make yourself a graven image . . .").321 Instead, Yahweh spoke to Israel either directly or through his prophets (hence the classic formula "Hear, O Israel").322 The relationship between God and his people became implicitly and sometimes explicitly dialogic.323 Several commentators have suggested that this pattern of aural interaction had profound epistemological consequences within the Jewish community. The Jewish theologian and philosopher Martin Buber, noting early in this century that "the most vivid descriptions in ancient Jewish writing are acoustic in nature," ventured that "[t]he Jew of antiquity was more of an aural than a visual man."324 More recently, rabbinic scholar Jos Faur has posited that "[f]or the Hebrews, the highest form of truth is perceived at the auditory level. . . . The highest expression of reality is found in communicative speech. The outer aspect of things is unimportant. Neither Scripture nor the rabbis gave visual descriptions of things or people."325
[2.47] Aurality still animates many aspects of Jewish life and belief. Reflecting a long tradition of oral recitation, the books of the Hebrew Bible are known to Jews by a form of incipit, in this instance the first significant word in the book's text.326 Part of the Torah remains expressly "Oral" (Torah shebe'al-peh, literally "the Torah that is memorized").327 Although actually written down since the third century C.E., it must not be publicly taught from a document.328 The Talmud pointedly preserves the sayings of the rabbis (thus the standard Talmudic formula, "Rabbi X said . . ."). Since the early sixteenth century the Talmud has been printed in a way which literally surrounds the principal text with later commentaries, thereby perpetuating an implicitly dialogic relationship between the text and the commentary on the same page, or better yet, between the original "speaker" and the commentators.329 When studying aloud that portion of the Talmud called the Gemara "students expressing the argument on the page [of the text] tend to speak for and with the sages in their confrontations, as if the sages were talking to each other today."330 Even the "silent meditation" of the Amidah, the Jewish prayer service, is a faintly audible process: to quote the Talmud, "words in the heart are not words."331 Finally, no consideration of the aural aspects of contemporary Judaism would be complete without mention of Yiddish, the usually spoken but (at least until recently) rarely written folk language that has long served as "the vehicle of . . . social and political cohesion" in the Jewish community.332 [2.48] Taking

advantage of the social power that their relatively greater access, exposure, and commitment to writing has helped to give them, American men, whites, Anglos, and Protestants have filled the ranks of the American legal profession from its very beginnings. Inevitably, they have brought their own sensory preferences into American legal life. It is they who have been principally responsible for designing courts and legal rules that have directly and indirectly favored visual experience.333 It is they who have established and perpetuated norms of legal interpretation and legal scholarship that, at least until recently, have largely marginalized and delegitimized aurality, aural styles, and aurally based written forms.334 It is they who (as we shall see) have pushed legal philosophy towards values that have traditionally been associated with vision. [2.49]
When they have spoken the actual language of the law, individuals from the more visualist American groups have analogously been drawn to metaphors and figures of

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speech appealing to their visualist predelictions. In the sundry expressions we encountered in the Introduction to this Article, they

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have presented law not so a looking, something to see and be seen. This language has inevitably empowered them by making the law more recognizable and accessible. At the same time, visualist legal metaphors have, perhaps not entirely by accident, disempowered and alienated members of American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups which have not been so visually oriented. Law expressed in visual terms has literally not resonated with their particular experiences.
much as a speaking or as any other kind of aural enterprise, but as

VISUALITY AS A DOMINANT FORCE IN UNDERSTANDING CANNOT REPRESENT WOMENS SEXUALITY AND IN FACT ASSIGNS WOMEN THE ROLE OF PASSIVE, EROTICIZED OBJECT. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Phallogocentrism: Derrida and
Irigaray pp.493-542) But even such a speculum remains too dependent on the visual to do justice to the womans body, in particular to her sexuality. Although the eye can get inside the vagina a feat Irigaray notes was litereally depicted in Batailles Story of the Eye it will be one unable to take in the whole of the female sexual equipment with one look, as some of it will have remained outside. In a certain sense, the womans body is like the tain of the mirror, outside of any specular representation, although on some level the material support of that representation. Womens sexuality is thus best understood in nonvisual terms. As she put it in an essay entitled This Sex Which is Not One, Within this logic [that of western though], the predominance of the visual, of the discrimination of form and invidualization of form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from touching than form looking, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful object of contemplation. While her body finds itself thus eroticized, and called to a double movement of exhibition and of chaste retreat in order to stimulate the drives of the subject, her sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see.

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ETHICS OF THE OTHER (LEVINAS) OCCULARCENTRISM MAKES ETHICS IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE IT ATTEMPTS TO ENCLOSE THE ALTERITY OF THE OTHER AS CONTENT WITHIN THE EYE (I) RATHER THAN ACCEPTING IT AS SIMPLY RADICALLY OTHER. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2) In Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas opposes the Greek interest in aesthetics, luminosity, and the plastic form to the rejection of the image in Hebraic philosophy and ethics. Christianity, in making the Word flesh, repeats the Greek desire for the visible, the artistically manifested need to see God, in contradistinction to Judaism, in which God is heard rather than seen, manifesting Himself in language, both aural and written, rather than in form. Levinas thus follows

the Hebraic tradition in describing the ethical relation as taking place in a face-to-face encounter with the other which is nevertheless a "manifestation of the face over and beyond form," occurring in language rather than in sight (Totality and Infinity 61 [66]).1 Levinas explains: "Form--incessantly betraying its own manifestation, congealing into plastic form, for it is adequate to the same--alienates the exteriority of the other" (Totality and Infinity 61 [66]). To encounter the other as a face is to encounter her in her absolute alterity from myself, to be faced by her as unthematizable, escaping all my attempts to understand and thus to assimilate her. The face makes it impossible for me to reduce the other to myself, to my ideas of her, to my theories, categories, and knowledge. Since form betrays the other, for Levinas, the face of ethics is not the face whose form we take in with our eyes. On the contrary, the way we look at (and also touch2) faces is said to foreclose ethics: "The face is present in its refusal to be contained. In this sense it cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched--for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content"
(Totality and Infinity 211 [194]).

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ATTEMPTS TO APPROACH THE OTHER THROUGH A VISUAL KNOWING ABSORBS THE OTHER AS FORM, AS OBJECT, UNDERSTANDABLE ONLY IN TERMS OF THE SELF SAME WHICH DESTROYS THE ALTERITY OF THE OTHER THAT IS NECESSARY TO GROUND AN ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP. THIS DEVASTATION OF OTHERNESS IN THE MODEL OF THE SAME CONSTRUCTS ALL OTHERNESS IN RACIST TERMS. A LINGUISTIC DIALOGUE WITH THE OTHER IS CRITICAL TO PROVIDE AN AVENUE FOR THE OTHER TO SLIP THROUGH OUR ATTEMPTS TO MAKE THEM SAME VIA EITHER VERBAL RESPONSE OR THROUGH SILENT EVASION. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)

The "face" of ethics, according to Levinas, occurs in discourse rather than in visual form. While seeing the other entails enveloping her into the same, language "slices" through this knowledge that vision imposes: "Speech cuts across vision" ("La parole tranche sur la vision") (Totality and Infinity 212 [195]). The slicing of language divides or differentiates the other from me. Discourse, like vision, may try to thematize the other, but while vision succeeds, the other can always evade the categorizations of language, slip behind the Said, remain a Saying, even in silence: "Words are said, be it only by the silence kept, whose weight acknowledges this evasion of the Other" (Totality and Infinity 212 [195]). The other, an interlocutor, can engage with me in language, while she cannot respond in a similar way to having been seen. While being seen is simply an absorption of the other to which she cannot answer, she may always avoid similar absorption in the case of discourse. According to Levinas, in language the self and other enter into a relation in which difference is established and cannot be overcome, even if only because of the weight of the other's silence upon me. y In "Violence and Metaphysics," Derrida focuses on Levinas's critique of the visual metaphor in Greco-Christian philosophy. Specifically, Derrida draws out the manners in which Levinas describes the interconnected concepts of vision, sun, light, and truth as functioning to abolish the otherness of the face-to-face or ethical relation in the works of philosophers from Plato to Heidegger.
y

Derrida describes Levinas's first book, Thorie de l'intuition dans la phnomnologie de Husserl, as a first attempt at developing "a philosophical discourse against light" (126 [85]), and against the pre-determining gaze which this light allows. In this work, "the imperialism of theoria already bothered Levinas. More than any other philosophy, phenomenology, in the wake of Plato, was to be struck with light" (126 [85]). In phenomenological philosophy, for Levinas, vision

predetermines the other who is seen, not allowing her to appear in her otherness as she may do in language. As Derrida

observes, Levinas raises an even stronger critique later against Heidegger, who is described as continuing to write within "a Greco-Platonic tradition under the surveillance of the agency of the glance and the metaphor of light . . . light, unveiling, comprehension or precomprehension" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 131 [88]).

Vision already assumes an understanding of the other, for Levinas, and this pre-understanding prior to the visual encounter is forced onto the other in a violent unveiling within the clearing of light. The critique which Derrida describes Levinas as directing at the history of philosophy, and at Husserl and Heidegger in particular, is that through its search for the light of Being and of phenomena, it abolishes difference and imposes the One and the Same on the other. Greco-phenomenological philosophy creates a world of light and of unity, a "philosophy of a world of light, a world without time." In this heliopolitics, "the social ideal will be sought in an ideal of fusion . . . the subject . . . losing himself in a collective representation, in a common ideal . . . . It is the collectivity which says "us," and which, turned toward the intelligible sun, toward the truth, experience, the other at his side and not face to face with him . . . . Miteinandersein also remains the collectivity of the with." ("Violence and Metaphysics" 134 [90]) In his final summation of Levinas's critique of visuality and of heliological philosophy, Derrida writes therefore, there is a soliloquy of reason and a solitude of light. Incapable of respecting the Being and meaning of the other, phenomenology and ontology would be philosophies of violence. Through them, the entire philosophical tradition, in its meaning and at bottom, would make common cause with oppression and with the totalitarianism of the same. The ancient clandestine friendship between light and power, the ancient complicity between theoretical objectivity and technico-political possession . . . . To see and to know, to have and to will, unfold only within the oppressive and luminous identity of the same. ("Violence and Metaphysics" 136 [91-2])
In contrast, in Totality and Infinity, as Derrida describes this work, Levinas theorizes the face as "appearing" in language and not only to vision, as a "certain non-light" which counteracts the violence of visuality ("Violence and Metaphysics" 126 [85]).

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In A Thousand Plateaus, Gilles Deleuze and Flix Guattari discuss faces and faciality as neutralizing and deindividualizing rather than as other and unique: "Faces are not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate significations" (168). According to Deleuze and Guattari, the "abstract machine of faciality" produces faces, and these faces are not encountered in their alterity but are rather always in a dichotomized relation to the same. The face "is White Man himself, with his broad white cheeks and the black hole of his eyes. The face is Christ. The face is the typical European" (176). The face, for Deleuze and Guattari, is the face of the average white European man, and this face is taken as the standard from which to measure deviation within a racist system: "If the face is in fact Christ, in other words, your average ordinary White Man, then the first deviances, the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man, men in the second or third category . . . . They must be Christianized, in other words, facialized" (178). While for Levinas the face is exteriority and alterity, for Deleuze and Guattari facialization never abides alterity (it's a Jew, it's an Arab, it's a negro, it's a lunatic . . . ). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no people on the outside . Racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of sameness until those who resist identification have been wiped out. (178)
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Despite the striking differences in the manners in which Levinas and Deleuze and Guattari understand the face, Levinas might in fact agree with Deleuze and Guattari in so far as the latter are discussing a visualized face. While Levinas emphasizes that the face of which he is writing is not the physiognomic or visually encountered face, facialization for Deleuze and Guattari functions through vision: the Christ-face, for instance, is said to have been "exploited" through visual art, through the paintings of the Middle Ages and Renaissance. For Deleuze and Guattari, this neutral "Bunkerface," which has been reproduced in visual media and is encountered with the eyes, must be "destroyed, dismantled" and "escape[d]," and, citing Henry Miller, this can be done by cutting off vision, shutting the eyes: "I no longer look into the eyes of the woman I hold in my arms . . . My eyes are useless, for they render back only the image of the known . . . Therefore I close my ears, my eyes, my mouth" (A Thousand Plateaus 171). In so far as this is a material, visually encountered face, and not the face of transcendence, Levinas might agree that it needs to be escaped since, for Levinas, when it is the eyes which encounter the other's face, Miller is apt in saying that "they render back only the image of the known," that is a representation of the same, the expected, the pre-understood, allowing no surprise or alterity. The face which Levinas is describing, in contrast, is a face which will always allow for surprise. This face is an encounter with the Other as other, and, as described in Totality and Infinity, it is not discovered through the eyes, and is not mediated through visuality or through visual art.
Despite this negative account of the role of vision in our meeting the other, Levinas has chosen "the face" to encapsulate a great deal of his ethical philosophy, and it seems that it functions well for this purpose precisely because it corresponds to the way we frequently experience faces through vision, encountering with our eyes the expressiveness and difference of faces, perceiving them not only as objects of our own gazes but as the site of the other's eyes. Faces strike and evade us, frustrate us with their secrets, are unthematizably complex, inaccessible beneath our gaze. As Sartre notes in his discussion of the other's gaze, faces disconcert us, decentralize and alienate the world from us, precisely because they make us recognize the independence and inaccessibility of the other's subjectivity. Faces make us aware of our inability to grasp the other, the impossibility of knowing what she thinks of us, of knowing what the familiar--now unfamiliar--world (and we in it) is for her. Although there have been tragic and violent attempts throughout history to categorize individuals by facial as well as body types, and although Deleuze and Guattari are correct that the visually-encountered, physiognomic face is submitted to dichotomizing norms, it is also true that we are fascinated by looking at faces in their singularity, and it is often the sight of faces that arrests us, haunts us, moves us to ethical action, pity, compassion, forgiveness, aid, and love. This must at least partly explain why Levinas chooses the face as the shorthand term for his complex understanding of alterity, and why it can convince others of his claims. It would seem, then, that Levinas takes advantage of the compellingness of the visual metaphor of the face, the meaning it holds for us as such, and yet denies that it functions in vision in fact.
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equates seeing and knowing (sa/voir), "knowledge or vision" (Totality and Infinity 212 [195]), and, as Derrida points out, also equates savoir and voir with avoir, with a possessing or pre-possessing of the other such that she is subsumed within the grasp of the knowing or seeing subject. According to such a reading, it would follow that for Levinas we never see without knowing, never look in wonder. We are never spellbound, fascinated, bewildered, paralyzed or surprised by that upon which we gaze. We are never absorbed by what we look at rather than engaged in the absorption of it. We never respond to what we see rather than imposing our knowledge on it. We never have our expectations thwarted by sight. We never see difference, we only see the same, the same as ourselves or the same as our expectations of the other, which is thus allowed to be no other. It is never the seen, therefore, which is active upon our sight, or sight is never passive before the one looked upon, who never acts upon our eyes.
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Although I will complexify this reading below, it appears--and has been widely accepted--that Levinas

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IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE AFFIRMATIVES UNYIELDING OCULAR GAZE WE TURN TO EDGAR ALLEN POES SHORT STORY THE OVAL PORTRAIT IN WHICH A YOUNG ARTIST, THROUGH HIS OWN UNYIELDING GAZE MANIFEST IN HIS ART, COMES TO PERFECTLY KNOW AND REPRESENT HIS WIFE. HE IN FACT CAPTURES HER ESSENCE SO PERFECTLY THAT HE IS LEFT WITH ONLY HIS REPRESENTATIONS AND NOTHING MORE. Poe 1850 (Edgar Allen, high gothic drunken lord, The Oval Portrait http://xroads.virginia.edu/~HYPER/POE/oval.html)
THE CHATEAU into which my valet had ventured to make forcible entrance, rather than permit me, in my desperately wounded condition, to pass a night in the open air, was one of those piles of commingled gloom and grandeur which have so long frowned among the Appennines, not less in fact than in the fancy of Mrs. Radcliffe. To all appearance it had been temporarily and very lately abandoned. We established ourselves in one of the smallest and least sumptuously furnished apartments. It lay in a remote turret of the building. Its decorations were rich, yet tattered and antique. Its walls were hung with tapestry and bedecked with manifold and multiform armorial trophies, together with an unusually great number of very spirited modern paintings in frames of rich golden arabesque. In these paintings, which depended from the walls not only in their main surfaces, but in very many nooks which the bizarre architecture of the chateau rendered necessary- in these paintings my incipient delirium, perhaps, had caused me to take deep interest; so that I bade Pedro to close the heavy shutters of the room- since it was already night- to light the tongues of a tall candelabrum which stood by the head of my bed- and to throw open far and wide the fringed curtains of black velvet which enveloped the bed itself. I wished all this done that I might resign myself, if not to sleep, at least alternately to the contemplation of these pictures, and the perusal of a small volume which had been found upon the pillow, and which purported to criticise and describe them. Long- long I read- and devoutly, devotedly I gazed. Rapidly and gloriously the hours flew by and the deep midnight came. The position of the candelabrum displeased me, and outreaching my hand with difficulty, rather than disturb my slumbering valet, I placed it so as to throw its rays more fully upon the book. But the action produced an effect altogether unanticipated. The rays of the numerous candles (for there were many) now fell within a niche of the room which had

I thus saw in vivid light a picture all unnoticed before. It was the portrait of a young girl just ripening into womanhood. I glanced at the painting hurriedly, and then closed my eyes. Why I did this was not at first apparent even to my own perception. But while my lids remained thus shut, I ran over in my mind my reason for so shutting them. It was an impulsive movement to gain time for thoughtto make sure that my vision had not deceived me- to calm and subdue my fancy for a more sober and more certain gaze. In a very few moments I again looked fixedly at the painting. That I now saw aright I could not and would not doubt; for the first flashing of the candles upon that canvas had seemed to dissipate the dreamy stupor which was stealing over my senses, and to startle me at once into waking life.
hitherto been thrown into deep shade by one of the bed-posts. The portrait, I have already said, was that of a young girl. It was a mere head and shoulders, done in what is technically termed a vignette manner; much in the style of the favorite heads of Sully. The arms, the bosom, and even the ends of the radiant hair melted imperceptibly into the vague yet deep shadow which formed the back-

was oval, richly gilded and filigreed in Moresque. As a thing of art nothing could be more admirable than the painting itself. But it could have been neither the execution of the work, nor the immortal beauty of the countenance, which
had so suddenly and so vehemently moved me. Least of all, could it have been that my fancy, shaken from its half slumber, had mistaken the head for that of a living person. I saw at once that the peculiarities of the design, of the vignetting, and of the frame, must have instantly dispelled such idea- must have prevented even its momentary entertainment. Thinking earnestly upon these points, I

ground of the whole. The frame

remained, for an hour perhaps, half sitting, half reclining, with my vision riveted upon the portrait. At length, satisfied with the true secret of its effect, I fell back within the bed. I had found the spell of the picture in an absolute life-likeliness of expression, which, at first startling, finally confounded, subdued, and appalled me. With deep and reverent awe I replaced the candelabrum in its former position. The cause of my deep agitation being thus shut from view, I sought eagerly the volume which discussed the paintings and their histories. Turning to the number which designated the oval portrait, I there read the vague and quaint words which follow: "She was a maiden of rarest beauty, and not more lovely than full of glee. And evil was the hour when she saw, and loved, and wedded the painter. He, passionate, studious, austere, and having already a bride in his Art; she a maiden of rarest beauty, and not more lovely than full of glee; all light and smiles, and frolicsome as the young fawn; loving and cherishing all things; hating only the Art which was her rival; dreading only the pallet and brushes and other untoward instruments which deprived her of the countenance of her lover. It was thus a terrible thing for this lady to hear the painter speak of his desire to pourtray even his young bride. But she was humble and obedient, and sat meekly for many weeks in the dark, high turret-chamber where the light dripped upon the pale canvas only from overhead. But he, the painter, took glory in his work, which went on from hour to hour, and from day to day. And be was a passionate, and wild, and moody man, who became lost in reveries;

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so that he would not see that the light which fell so ghastly in that lone turret withered the health and the spirits of his bride, who pined visibly to all but him. Yet she smiled on and still on, uncomplainingly, because she saw that the painter (who had high renown) took a fervid and burning pleasure in his task, and wrought day and night to depict her who so loved him, yet who grew daily more dispirited and weak. And in sooth some who beheld the portrait spoke of its resemblance in low words, as of a mighty marvel, and a proof not less of the power of the painter than of his deep love for her whom he depicted so surpassingly well. But at length, as the labor drew nearer to its conclusion, there were admitted none into the turret; for the painter had grown wild with the ardor of his work, and turned his eyes from canvas merely, even to regard the countenance of his wife. And he would not see that the tints which he spread upon the canvas were drawn from the cheeks of her who sate beside him. And when many weeks bad passed, and but little remained to do, save one brush upon the mouth and one tint upon the eye, the spirit of the lady again flickered up as the flame within the socket of the lamp. And then the brush was given, and then the tint was placed; and, for one moment, the painter stood entranced before the work which he had wrought; but in the next, while he yet gazed, he grew tremulous and very pallid, and aghast, and crying with a loud voice, 'This is indeed Life itself!' turned suddenly to regard his beloved:- She was dead!

WE DEPART POES ARTIST THEN AND TURN OUR ATTENTION AGAIN TO THE AFFIRMATIVES GAZE, NOTING THAT JUST LIKE THE YOUNG MAN IN THE STORY THEY HAVE SOUGHT TO PERFECTLY KNOW AND REPRESENT THE OTHER IN THEIR OWN CONSTRUCTION THE 1AC. THE IMPLICATION AS WE UNDERSTAND IT THEN IS THAT THROUGH THEIR PERFECT KNOWLEDGE AND REPRESENTATION OF THE OTHER THEY HAVE UTTERLY AND COMPLETELY EXTINGUISHED THE ALTERITY OF THE OTHER; THEY HAVE CONDEMNED THOSE THEY SOUGHT TO PRESERVE TO THE INFINITE DEATH OF SAMENESS. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)

Derrida discusses Edgar Allan Poe's "The Oval Portrait," in which an artist is so intent on knowing his wife that he keeps her in a room for days to examine her and reproduce exactly what he sees (Memoirs 41). He grasps her form, captures her image, and hence possesses her with literally breath-taking lifelikeness on canvas. This intense being gazed-upon causes the sitter to fall dead at the moment her husband completes her portrait. Indeed, she has been quietly dying with each of her husband's glances. Despite his intense looking, the artist had not noticed his wife's growing pallor, the manner in which her face had been slowly robbed of its color as he placed it on canvas. The artist had gazed upon his wife knowingly, but without visually encountering the alterity of her from his knowledge, of encroaching death. The wife ceases to exist as a separate person from her husband and his art at the moment he has known the last detail of her, and thus her alterity is extinguished through his scrutinizing gaze. Although Derrida does not note this, it is remarkable that when the eyes of the narrator of "The Oval Portrait" first fall
In Memoirs of the Blind, upon this violent picture, his reaction is to close his eyes. Such is the understanding of vision most often assumed by Levinas and Derrida, in which voir is savoir and avoir, and s/a/voir is violence, and what we ought to do is shut our eyes.

HEIDEGGER

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THE AFFIRMATIVES FRONTAL ONTOLOGY INDICATED BY THEIR APPROACH TO THEIR 1AC AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS PRESENT AT HAND FOR THEIR DISPOSAL, UNDERSTANDABLE AS A CLOSED TOTALITY THREATENS NOT ONLY THE ONTOLOGICAL CONDITION OF THE THINGNESS OF ALL THAT IS, BUT OUR OWN RELATIONSHIP TO BEING. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169) In The Unnameable, Beckett articulates, as an experience with vision, the pathology of enframing that holds sway in our time. He writes:
My eyes being fixed always in the same direction I can only see, I shall not say clearly, but as clearly as visibility permits, that which takes place immediately in front of me, that is to say, in the case before us, the collision, followed by the fall and disappearancein a word, I only see what appears immediately in front of me, I only see what appears close beside me, what I best see I see ill. What he describes, here, is the pathology in a reifying way of looking and seeing, eyes that can impose on what they see only that mode of present which is reflected in what Heidegger calls frontal ontology of traditional metaphysical discourse. In Being and Time, Heidegger reminds us that when we merely stare at something, our-just-having-itbefore-us lies before us as a failure to understand it anymore. Heidegger connects staring, as a way of looking and seeing, with an ontological attitude that posits what is there to be seen vorhanden, as being present-at-hand. The history of the West is a story of the increasing reification of the perceptual Gestalt. Thus, in modernity, the Gestalt becomes a manifestation of Gestell. In Das Ge-Stell, a lecture-essay not yet published in English translation, Heidegger, like Hegel, sees the diremptions that have shattered the modern world. And, like Benjamin, Heidegger sees the world constructed in the time of modernity as a world of ruins, a world in which only fragments and traces remain to tell the truth. In Das Ge-Stell, then, he observes that, in the present epoch, our perceptivity has been for the most part subtly pressured into losing or disengaging from its original, spontaneously emergent sense of organic structural integrity, so that were experience the wholeness of structural wholes as mere collections of fragments, shards, splinters. He writes: The fragment [Stuck] is something entirely other than the part [der teil]. The part shares and imparts itself [teilt sich mit] with [by, as, in] parts in the organic whole [das Ganze]. It takes part in the whole, belongs to it. The fragment on the other hand is separated out and indeed is thus as fragment, as what it is, only as long as it is locked up in opposition to other fragments. It never shares and imparts itself in and as part of an organic whole.

The importance of this passage lies, as I read it, in the crucial distinction between an organic whole and a collection of atomic parts in effect the distinction between an oppressive, pathological figure-ground Gestalt, fragmented and disfigured by the enframing conditions operative in the epoch of das Gestell, and a radically different Gestalt released from such conditions. If we distinguish between a totality and a whole, we may say that, whereas the first is a closed totality, the second would be a whole precisely because of its openness, its consent to alterity, the passage of time, the endless justice of emerging and perishing. In the same essay-lecture, Heidegger gives the enframing of das Gestell further definition: The Ge-Stell, he says there, is universal in its imposition [Stellen]. It concerns everything that presences [alles Anwesende]. For in the Ge-Stell the presencing of everything that presences is placed at our disposal and made readily available [zum Bestand]. Why is this dangerous? In Die Gefahr (The Danger), another one of the Bremmer Vortrge, Heidegger asserts that, according to its essence, the Ge-Stell does not protect [wahrt nicht] the truth of the thing as thing. In other words: In the essence of the Ge-Stell it comes to pass that the thing loses its protection [Verwahrlosung] as thing. The very being of the thing is at stake, here. But not only the being of the thing: Our ownmost being as human beings, who we are and who we could become that also is at stake, as the passage from Schelling already suggested.

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THE 1AC CLAIM TO OBSERVE KNOWLEDGE IS FUNDAMENTALLY BASED ON THEIR ROLE AS SEEING, KNOWING SUBJECT AND THE 1AC AS A PERMANENT, STATIC, OBJECT PROJECTED AND REPRESENTED FROM THEIR SUBJECTIVITY. THIS IS THE MODERN GESTELL, RULED BY ENFRAMING, MEANING THEY ENGAGE THE 1AC VIOLENTLY AS A RESOURCE STANDING IN RESERVE TO BE CONSUMED. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
In order to understand the perceptual Gestalt as a site and instance of enframing, it is necessary to reflect on perception as a process of articulation, a process of bringing-forth. What

is distinctive about the way that perception under the sway of enframing articulates and brings forth a figure-ground Gestalt? Enframing, Heidegger says, challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view of the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically endangers the relation [of human beings] to the essence of truth. Although enframing comes to pass as a destining of revealing it is a destining that gathers together into the revealing that challenges forth. Although, under the spell of enframing, perception still takes part in a process of unconcealment and effects a certain bringing-forth, its interaction with the presencing of being tends to become a challenging-forth into ordering, an ordering of the real as standing reserve. Such perception is of course disclosive, but it is also at the same time deeply forgetful, willfully concealing the openness of the ground, the gift of the field in which, and by grace of which, it takes place and even repressing the fact of this willful concealment: The Open [itself] becomes an object, and is thus twisted around toward human beings.Under the spell of enframing, then, perception is never far from violence; its knowledge, in fact, is a power that can only come from aggression and torture. The Gestalt, therefore, essentially undergoes a process that it would not be an exaggeration to describe as its disfigurement: the original emergence and coming-to-be of energies,becomes a visibility of things that are already therethe eye, vision, becomes a mere looking-at or looking-over or gaping-at. These words come from Heideggers 1936 Introduction to Metaphysics. But it is clear that he the cold stare of the gaze, the spontaneously emerging power presencing in and as the Gestalt is hardened into a state of permanent presence, deprived of the possibility of appearing spontaneously deprived, also, of its radiance, its Schein. With regard to the question of this dullness, this loss of radiance, perhaps it will suffice for the moment to note, here, just two decisive passages: [1] in Being and Time, Heidegger asserts that, in setting down the subject, we dim entities down to focus. [2] In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger says that Enframing blocks off the shining forth and holding sway of truth. With regard to the hardening into permanence, Heidegger argues, in Basic Concepts, that presencing does not mean mere presence, but emerging and opening upmere presence, in the sense of the present-at-hand, has already set a limit to presencing, emergence, and has thus given up presencing. In elaborating this point, he observes that what presences only presences in emerging and precisely not in the presence that has congealed into permanence. It belongs, he says, to the essence of presencing that its possible non-essence of hardening into something permanent is repelled in it. All these assertions gain significance when they are understood concretely as
phenomenological observations referring to the emergence and dissolution of the figure-ground structures that form in the event of perception and depend on the way

already understood this point much earlier, because, in Being and Time, a work which leads us through a strenuous learning-process toward the achievement of a moment of vision, he called attention to our inveterate tendency to fall into a fixed staring at something that is purely present-at-hand. Under

our looking and seeing let them emerge, bringing down, drawing them forth, out of the encompassing field of visibility. Most in question, perhaps, and most

at stake, is our attitude towards the ground: whether or not its dynamism, its openness, its dimensionality, is granted by the corresponding receptive openness of our perception our willingness, for example, to let perception be decentered, drawn into abysses of invisibility, radically surprised. As an ontologically oriented capacity, perception calls upon to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every becoming comes to stand. Elaborating this point, with words (not to lose myself) that echo Schellings, quoted at the beginning of this study, Heidegger explains that: To engage oneself with the disclosedness of beings is not to lose oneself in them; rather, such engagement withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves with respect to what and how they are and in order that presentative correspondence might take its standard from them. Moreover, this comportment requires an acceptance of concealment: letting-be, he says is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of

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Daseinthere is concealment. We need to give thought to the social, cultural, and political significance of the disruptive and anarchic ontological standard or measure implicit in this engagement, this way of looking and seeing. Gestalt psychology has demonstrated the organic interdependencies, the reciprocally altering interactions that are constitutive of an undisturbed Gestalt formation process. Insisting that a theory of perception must be a field theory, Kohler points out, for example, that objects show a considerable change in size when they are located within a region which has been strongly influenced by a figure. This means, he says, that the after-effects of such figure-forming processes tend to alter given visual objects. Prolonged inspection of any specific visual trends, he notes, to change its organization. Moreover, other objects which are afterwards shown in the same region of the field are also affected, namely displaced or distorted. Consequently, as

the fixation of a staring gaze, the enframing typical of Gestell interrupts the figure-ground interplay and distorts both figure and ground. Instead of a dynamic, spontaneously, flowing interaction between figure and ground, a looser, freer, softer differentiation between the periphery and the center of focus, deconstructing the metaphysical dualism that prioritizes the center, there is a freezing of the flow, interrupting the work of time the emergence and dissolution of perceptual configurations. And when the figure is subject to such reifying intensity, it becomes detached from its ground, although it is the opening openness, the end-less origin of the figures that enframing brings forth, its presencing is either forgotten, suppressed, neglected, or else it is submitted to the most extreme ontic reduction as if it could be possessed by the ecological subject as just another figure. Herbert Guenther notes that the openness of the perceptual ground is present in and actually presupposed by every determinate form. Every
determinate entity evolves out of something indeterminate and to a certain extent maintains its connection with this indeterminacy; it is never completely isolated from

The enframing gaze cannot, will not, let the ground be ground; it cannot, will not, tolerate its immeasurableness, its withdrawal from the grasp of perception, its refusal to be totalized, reified, possessed. Instead of a gaze that is softly focusing, gently hovering, open and receptive to the dynamics of change, open and receptive to the spontaneous emergence of new configurations taking place in the dimensions of the surrounding field; instead of a gaze that withdraws in the face of beings in order that they might reveal themselves, in the epoch of enframing there is a tendency for the gaze to become aggressively dualistic sharp, linear, and atomizing. This is the gaze that has installed and continues to serve a metaphysics of reified presence, a metaphysics of closure, violence and mortification. This reification is a persistent theme in Heideggers thought, something he clearly articulated in Being and Time and repeatedly emphasized in
subsequent lectures and writings. In a 1941 course on Anaximander, for example, Heidegger declared that permanence is contrary to theessence of beingbut what presences essentially and yet contrary to the essence is the non-essenceto the extent that what respectively presences corresponds to the essence of presencing, it does not consist in and solidify into duration unto permanence. What resists measure, limitation, finitude, what refuses the ordinance of time, that Anaximander regards as , injustice. According to Heidegger, in the world of Greek antiquity people did not relate to what is as to an inwardly conceived image or representation. For

it. Because the indeterminate entity is not isolated from the indeterminacy, our attention can shift back and forth between one and the other.

the Greeks, what is is what presences; and this experience with perception did not involve looking at what is and having a representation of it in mind; nor did it involved making the one who is looking into a subject and making what is presencing into an object. This construction is a distinctive mark of modernity. It is only in the modern period the period beginning with the self-affirmation of Man in the humanism of the sixteenth century and with a way of looking at the world
reintroduced and carried forward, albeit in very different projects, by the Cartesianism and empiricism of the seventeenth century and by the rationalism and romanticism of the eighteenth that what is present is determined [1] as an ob-ject, [2] as being there for a subject, [3] as (re)presented by the subject to itself, [4] as placed to lie before the subject, and finally, therefore, [5] as present in the form of a representation. In and with this determination of what is present, the ever increasing power of the subject is claimed and asserted. As Derrida correctly remarks in Sending: On Representation, Vorstellung marks the gesture which consists of placing, of causing to stand before one, of installing in front of oneself as available, of localizing ready-to-hand, within the availability of the prepositionThe subject is what can or believes it can offer itself representations, disposing them and disposing of them.Now, Heidegger argues that what is distinctive of modernity and the cause of his concern is not so much the fact that experience can be a process of representation as it is the fact that representation is universalized, that it becomes the sole medium for all experiencing, and that its way of relating to what is present encourages us in the attitude of domination. And this means that it encourages us in an attitude that does violence to the background of perception, either by simply forgetting its way of presencing, or by gathering it into the Gestalt in a reified re-presentation of presencing.

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THE AFFIRMATIVES STABILIZING OF KNOWLEDGE UNDER THE GAZE OF OBSERVATION PLACES KNOWLEDGE IN A LINEAR HEIRARCHY IS THE LOGIC THAT SUBORDINATES OUR UNDERSTANDING OF BEING TO THE DOMINATION OF THE SUBJECT.

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THE AFFIRMATIVES MANNER OF OBSERVATIONAL APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE IS DEMONSTRATIVE OF WHAT HEIDEGGER IDENTIFIES AS THE ANCIENT GREEK MATHEMATICAL, TA MATHEMATA, WHICH DEMANDS THAT THE KNOWLEDGE IT OBSERVES CORRESPOND TO THAT WHICH IS LAREADY KNOWN AND LAID DOWN IN ADVANCE AND SUBSEQUENTLY PLAN AND CALCULATES ITS CONSIDERATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE IN ORDER TO REACH CONCLUSIONS. THIS LOGIC REDUCES THAT WHICH IS OBSERVED KNOWLEDGE TO UNIFORM OBJECTS, DISSOLVING IT AND DENYING IT SELF-SHOWING.

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IMPACTS

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RACISM RACISM UNDERSTANDS PEOPLE AS OBJECTS RATHER THAN PEOPLE Lee, and Orfield 2004 (Chungmei and Gary, The Civil Rights Project, Harvard, 1/04, Brown At 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare?,
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu) Martin Luther King made his first important national address on the third anniversary of the Supreme Courts Brown decision, at the Lincoln Memorial at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom. Speaking to a much smaller crowd at the same place where he would give his immortal I Have a Dream speech six years later, King spoke of the Brown decision as simple, eloquent and unequivocal and a joyous daybreak to end the long night of enforced segregation. But, he said, there was ominous opposition to this noble and sublime decision and southern states were in open defiance. He called for a national movement and legislation to give blacks the political power to support enforcing their newly recognized rights.2 For King desegregation was not only a social goal but a profoundly moral and spiritual mission.

There are at least three basic reasons why segregation is evil. The first reason is that segregation inevitably makes for inequality. There was a time that we attempted to live with segregation. there was always a strict enforcement of the separate without the slightest intention to abide by the equal. But even if it had been possible to provide
the Negro with equal facilities in terms of external construction and quantitative distribution we would have still confronted inequality in the sense that they would

equality is not only a matter of mathematics and geometry, but it's a matter of psychology.The doctrine of separate but equal can never be. But not only that, segregation is evil because it scars the soul of both the segregated and the segregator. It gives the segregated a false sense of inferiority and it gives the segregator a false sense of superiority. It does something to the soul. Then there is a third reason why segregation is evil. That is because it ends up depersonalizing the segregated.The segregated becomes merely a thing to be used, not a person to be respected. He is merely a depersonalized cog in a vast economic machine. And this is why segregation is utterly evil and utterly un- Christian. It substitutes an "I/It" relationship for the "I/Thou" relationship. OBJECTIFICATION OF HUMANS IS DEHUMANIZING WHILE UNDREMINING DEMOCRACY AND EVEN THE EXISTENCE OF CIVILIZATION. Tusabe 95 (G.
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Social Reconstruction in Africa, http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-4/chapter_ii.htm)

not have had the opportunity of communicating with all children. You see,

With regard to the co-existent character of human persons, Martin Buber noted two fundamental attitudes found in all human experience. One is the world of "I-thou" relations, which ought always to be lived; and the other is the world of "I-it" relations, which persons ought always to avoid. The "I-thou" form of co-existence is for cooperation. Persons meet in cooperation in order to transform the world, to improve their welfare, for it is in this form of co-existence that the truth and value of democratic ideals is lodged. "I-thou" co-existence is characterized by mutuality and dialogue. These neither impose nor manipulate, but generate a commitment to freedom and guide dialogical persons to focus th0078eir attention on the reality which challenges them.9 In the "I-thou" relation "I not only give but receive; I not only speak but listen; I not only respond but invite response."10 Such "I-thou" co-existence ought to be one of the essential aspects of the normative ethical motivation and criterion of social groups in civil society.

The opposite of the "I-thou" relation is the "I-it" form of co-existence which uses the other person as an object. This relation regards others as means to an end; it is anti-dialogical, dominating and exploitative. People in civil society may form social groups and associations, but if motivated by gross materialism they operate in terms of the "I-it" relation. Such persons refers only to themselves; other people are things.11 To them what is worthwhile is to have more always more even at the unjust cost of others having less or nothing.12 Such an "I-it" tendency toward co-existence dehumanizes; it is an obstacle to, and an enemy of, democracy; and it is a serious threat to the very existence of civilization. Such co-existence is a very likely possibility for civil society, but ought to be guarded against as long as our aim is to reform our society towards higher levels of development.

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RACISM LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR AND EXTINCTION Kovel 70 ( Joel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, "White Racism: a Psychohistory", p. 226) a rise in white reaction, involves the return to authoritarianism and the worship of law and order as ends in themselves, or perhaps as voiced by some of its extreme adherents who slowly gain power as the center gives way under the strain of violenceeven to a new order of fascism. Any further move in this direction would be a calamity, both to the liberal-humanitarian tradition that has been
This change, allowed to flourish alongside the growth of our symbolic matrix, and to the power of the modern Industrial State, which leans itself upon abstracted, technically

Since these cultural elements contain a great deal of aggression, their weakening might induce a turn beyond fascism, into an American version of Nazism i.e., a vicious cycle of endless regression, an orgiastic return to pure unbridled dominative (and anal-sadistic) racism yoked to dreams of world conquest. This gruesome prospect which, implemented with nuclear weaponry, and met by other totalitarian orders, could mean the quietus of humanity itself, is quite imaginable within the overall terms of our culture. For the aggressive energy of that culture, though patiently abstracted and refined over centuries of Western growth, is quite capable of draining into unbridled form, and might in fact choose exactly some such dynamically charged conduit as racism for its expression. Nazi Germany taught us this lesson.
informed, fluid operation, all of which would be seriously compromised under an authoritarian order.

BECAUSE EVERYONE LOVES THE OLD SCHOOLWE MUST REJECT ALL RACISM OR RISK WORLDWIDE DESTRUCTION Barndt 1991 (Joseph, Dismantling Racism: The Continuing Challenge to White America, p. 155-56)
To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger of selfdestruction seems to be drawing ever more near. The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonization, of military buildups and violent aggression, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching the point of no return. A small and predominantly white minority of global population derives its power and privilege from sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue.

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POWER RELATIONS BIOPOLITICAL NORMALIZATION REQUIRES A RACIST LOGIC OF EXTERMINATION THAT CULMINATES IN PERMANENT WAR AND GENOCIDE. MENDIETA 2002 [Eduardo, SUNY at Stone Brook, leader of the Meeting of the Foucalt Circle, To make live and to let die Foucault on Racism,
http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/fac.../foucault.pdf]

emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants, and here I am quoting: the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrire] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism (Foucault 1997, 227) To use the
formulations from his 1982 lecture The Political Technology of Individuals which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lecturesthe power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote

This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the

the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics. (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism, is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology, one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body. Racism makes the killing of the other, of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

more directly, since

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IN THE MODERN BIOPOLITICAL SYSTEM RACISM IS THE PRECONDITION FOR ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCEACCEPTANCE OF THE BIOPOLITICAL STATE ALLOWS THE KILLING OF OTHERS IN ORDER TO PROTECT AGAINST BIOLOGICAL THREATS. Foucault 76 [Michel, Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, p. 254-257 Trans. David Macey]
What in fact is racism? It is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die. The appearance within the biological continuum of the human race of races, the distinction among races, the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls. It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population. It is, in short, a way of establishing a biological type caesura within a population that appears to be a biological domain. This will allow power to treat that population as a mixture of races, or to be more accurate, to treat the species, to subdivide the species it controls, into the subspecies known, precisely, as races. That is the first function of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological continuum addressed by biopower. Racism also has a second function. Its role is, if you like, to allow the establishment of a positive relation of this type: "The more you kill, the more deaths you will cause" or "The very fact that you let more die will allow you to live more." I would say that this relation ("If you want to live, you must take lives, you must be able to kill") was not invented by either racism or the modern State. It is the relationship of war: "In order to live, you must destroy your enemies." But racism does make the relationship of war-"If you want to live, the other must die" -function in a way that is completely new and that is quite compatible with the exercise of biopower. On the one hand, racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between my life and the death of the other that is not a military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but a biological-type relationship: "The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I as species rather than individual-can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate." The fact that the other dies does not mean simply that I live in the sense that his death guarantees my safety; the death of the other, the death of the bad race, of the inferior race (or the degenerate, or the abnormal) is something that will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer. This is not, then, a military, warlike, or political relationship, but a biological relationship. And the reason this mechanism can come into play is that the enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other words, killing or the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological threat to and the improvement of the species or race. There is a direct connection between the two. In a normalizing society, race or racism is the precondition that makes killing acceptable. When you have a normalizing society, you have a power which is, at least superficially, in the first instance, or in the first line a biopower, and racism is the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed. Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State. So you can understand the importance-I almost said the vital importance-of racism to the exercise of such a power: it is the precondition for exercising the right to kill. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. When I say "killing," I obviously do not mean simply murder as such, but also every form of indirect murder: the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on. I think that we are now in a position to understand a number of things. We can understand, first of all, the link that was quickly-I almost said immediately-established between nineteenth-century biological theory and the discourse of power. Basically, evolutionism, understood in the broad sense-or in other words, not so much Darwin's theory itself as a set, a bundle, of notions (such as: the hierarchy of species that grow from common evolutionary tree, the struggle for existence among species, the selection that eliminates the less fit) naturally became within a few years during the nineteenth century not simply a way of transcribing apolitical discourse into biological terms, and not simply a way of dressing up a political discourse in scientific clothing, but a real way of thinking about the relations between colonization, the necessity for wars, criminality, the phenomena of madness and mental illness, the history of societies with their different classes, and so on. Whenever, in other words, there was a confrontation, a killing or the risk of death, the nineteenth century was quite literally obliged to think about them in the form of evolutionism. And we can also understand why racism should have developed in modern societies that function in the biopower mode; we can understand why racism broke out at a number of .privileged moments, and why they were precisely the moments when the right to take life was imperative. Racism first develops with colonization, or in other words, with colonizing genocide. If you are functioning in the biopower mode, how can you justify the need to kill people, to kill populations, and to kill civilizations? By using the themes of evolutionism, by appealing to a racism. War. How can one not only wage war on one's adversaries but also expose one's own citizens to war, and let them be killed by the million (and this is precisely what has been going on since the nineteenth century, or since the second half of the nineteenth century), except by activating the theme of racism? From

this point onward, war is about two things: it is not

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simply a matter of destroying a political adversary, but of destroying the enemy race, of destroying that [sort] of biological threat that those people over there represent to our race. In one sense, this is of course no more than a biological extrapolation from the theme of the political enemy. But there is more to it than that. In the nineteenth century-and this is
completely new-war will be seen not only as a way of improving ones own race by eliminating the enemy race (in accordance with the themes of natural selection and the struggle for existence), but also as a way of regenerating one's own race. As more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer.

THIS IMPERIAL POWER IS NOT SIMPLY THE POWER TO KILL - IT ALSO REPRESENTS THE POWER TO CONTROL THE LIFE OF AN ENTIRE POPULATION - AS THE MECHANISMS FOR THIS CONTROL ARE PERFECTED, THE WORLD IS PUSHED EVER CLOSER TO NUCLEAR OMNICIDE Foucault 78 [Michel, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An Introduction, p. 136-137]
Since the classical age the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and on ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them; making them submit, or destroying them. There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least tendency to align its with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based

Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations. But this formidable power of deathand this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limitsnow presents itself as the counterpart of a power that exert a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battlethat one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because war is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of the population.

on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life.

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BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL BASED ON RACIST JUSTIFICATIONS THAT WILL SEE THEIR CULMINATION IN THE ELILMINATION OF ALL OTHERS. Giroux 6 (Henry, the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department, Reading Hurricane
Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability, College Literature, Vol. 33, No. 3)

Within the last few decades, matters of state sovereignty in the new world order have been retheorized so as to provide a range of theoretical insights about the relationship between power and politics, the political nature of social and cultural life, and the merging of life and politics as a new form of biopolitics. While the notion of biopolitics differs significantly among its most prominent theorists, including Michel Foucault (1990, 1997), Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2002, 2003), and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2004), what these theorists share is an attempt to think through the convergence of life and politics, locating matters of life and death within

is no longer understood exclusively through a disciplinary technology centered on the individual bodya body to be measured, surveilled, managed, and included in forecasts, surveys, and statistical projections. Biopolitics points to new relations of power that are more capacious, concerned not only with the body as an object of disciplinary techniques that render it both useful and docile but also with a body that needs to be regularized, subject to those immaterial means of production that produce ways of life that enlarge the targets of control and regulation
(Foucault 1997, 249). This shift in the workings of both sovereignty and power and the emergence of biopolitics are made clear by Foucault, for whom biopower replaces the power to dispense fear and death with

our ways of thinking about and imagining politics (Dean 2004, 17).Within this discourse, politics

that of a power to foster lifeor disallow it to the point of death. . . . [Biopower] is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism (Ojakangas 2005, 6). As Foucault insists, the logic of biopower is dialectical, productive, and positive 178 College Literature 33.3
[Summer 2006] (1990, 136).Yet he also argues that biopolitics does not remove itself from introducing a break into the domain of life that is under powers control: the break between what must live and what must die (1997, 255). Foucault believes that the death-function in the economy of biopolitics is justified primarily through a form of racism in which biopower is bound up with the workings of a State that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power (258).

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GENDER/SEXISM SEXISM IS THE ROOT OF ALL FORMS OF OTHERIZATION. Peterson 03 (V. Spike, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, A Critical Rewriting of Global Political Economy: Integrating Reproductive,
Productive, and Virtual Economies, p. 10-1)

The legacy of racism is inextricable from histories of slavery, indentured labor, imperialism, and gender ordering. Northern countries reaped the economic advantages of exploiting unfree workers and colonies. They justified this exploitation and subordination in part by constructing ontologies of racial difference and ideologies of social darwinism that continue to naturalize hierarchies of race, nation, and class and to deny denigrated groups equal access to global resources. By attributing feminized characteristics (lack of reason, agency, skills, self-control) to the colonized and invoking the natural or god-given order of male over female, these accounts effectively naturalized multiple, intersecting hierarchies. Racial exclusions are reproduced in todays global apartheid (Mazrui 1994; Richmond 1994)
and its (racialized) stratification of rich and poor within and between nations. 11 Individuals marked by stigmatized race and ethnicity confront arbitrary discrimination in employment and immigration policies.

Worldwide, ethnically/racially marked individuals without class advantage have less access to education, training, (valorized) employment, credit, and public power than those of the privileged ethnicity/race. The racially differentiated consequences of decreased public spending vary by class, national location, and gender (the poor and women being especially affected). At the global level, human rights instruments have made some difference in delegitimizing racism and promoting a regime change in South Africa (Scholte 2000, 258); the rights of indigenous peoples have also achieved global visibility. At the same time, global initiatives to prevent over-population are marked by gender (targeting women more than men) and race (promoting control of reproduction by some groups more than redistributing resources among all groups). Insofar as racially marked countries are members of international organizations, participation in those

organizations is racially diverse but dominated by those who are advantaged by class and gender. Most leadership and decision-making power is concentrated in

Patterns in how social movements are inflected by ethnicity/race are complicated. Ethnic/racially based nationalist movements continue, and are dominated by male leadership. Struggles against ethnic/race hatred continue within some countries but are less visible at the global level. Moreover, the demonization of ethnic and racialized groups appears to be increasing, for example in anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant movements. Mazrui (1994) notes increasing expressions of overt racism in the north and wonders whether the
representatives of richer countries, who are class and gender advantaged and rarely members of a stigmatized ethnicity/race. end of the Cold War ushered in pan-Caucasianism and a new phase of global racism.

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GENDER BINARIES ARE THE ROOR OF ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE Peterson 2000 (V. Spike,
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona, SAIS REVIEW, Rereading Public and Private: The Dichotomy that is Not One. Vol. 20, Isa. 2; pg. II) Gender-sensitive accounts go beyond this by bringing evetyday practices, reproductive processes, and the politics of subjectivity into relation with states, security, and political economy questions. For example, conventional neglect of the family impoverishes our understanding not only of how reproductive labor keeps our worlds working, but also of how individual and collective identities, cultural practices, divisions of labor, group ideologies, and socio-cultural lEnd Page 181 meaning systems are (re)produced and resisted. In various ways, some more direct than others, these are crucial factors in sustaining (and contesting) the state and its legitimacy.

Consider that the family/household is the primary site of reproductive labor that makes all societal production possible, of subject formation and cultural learning that naturalizes ideologies and encouras group identifications (religious, racial/ethnic, national), and of gender-socialization that encourages boys to be independent, competitive, in control, and hard, and girls to be relationship- oriented, non-aggressive, nurturing, and soft. 19 Moreover, neglect of the private (as familial and personal) has prevented IR theorists from taking desire and emotional investments seriously. Modernist dichotomies fuel this bias by casting reason as antithetical to--rather than inseparable from--emotion. Our fear of contaminating objective reason and research by acknowledging the role of emotion and commitment has impoverished our study of and knowledge about major social dynamics. As a consequence, in regard to security studies, we are tragically ill-informed in the face of often violent social forces such as nationalism, neo-fascism, and fundamentalism, in part because scholars avoid dealing with the power of emotional engagement and its effects on political identification and allegiance. Regarding political economy, we deny the effects of subjective identities in structuring labor markets, job
peiforrnance, and national productivity. And we are only beginning to grasp the interaction of dtsires and identities with consumption patterns and hence the global political economy. Even less familiar, but increasingly salient: we are ill-prepared to analyze the dependence of financial markets on psychological phenomena (riskassessment, trust in the stock market), and what we must acknowledge are non-rational features of the international financial system. Regarding security issuesa focal point of IR inquity--feminisis argl]e that

gendered identities are key to manifestations of violence. Empirical evidence indicates that, worldwide, most acts of direct violence are committed by men. 20 Yet not all men are violent, and societies vary dramatically in exhibiting violence, which suggests that biologistic explanations are, at best, nave. 21 Whatever else is entailed in accounting for systematic violence, it is absolutely LEnd Page 19J remarkable--one might even suggest irrational--that so little attention has been devoted to assessing the role of masculinity in this maledominated arena. Feminists insist that ip investigations of violence--from war atrocities to schoolyard killings and domestic battering--take seriously how masculinity is constructed, internalized, enacted, reinforced, and glorified. In IR, such recognition requires that we seriously consider the question: Is militarism without masculinism possible? 22

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GENDER POLARIZATION IS EMPIRICALLY TIED TO BOTH SYSTEMIC AND INTERSTATE VIOLENCE Peterson 2000 (V. Spike,
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona, SAIS REVIEW, Rereading Public and Private: The Dichotomy that is Not One. Vol. 20, Isa. 2; pg. 11)

An extensive literature confirms two key observations: first, that cultures vary significantly in how they construct masculinity (hence. war-making and rape are not universal), and second, that more violent societies evidence more systematic cultivation of gender polarity, rigid heterosexism, male power in physical and symbolic forms, and ideologies of masculine superiority. 23 To ignore this correspondence is to impoverish our understanding of violence and the security questions it raises. A second, related effect of the fir variant is to render natural and invisible the gendered divisions of labor, power, violence, and resources that enable arid sustain social relations generally and the activities of statesmen specifically. In stark contrast to Aristotles depiction, todays
public-private dichotomy effectively denies the dependence of public sphere activities on social reproduction in the private sphere. But it remains the case, as it was in ancient Athens, that social reproductionwhich has been naturalized as womens workis necessary for the realization of public sphere activities and power. In todays global economy, womens work arid informal labor activities more generally are of increasing importance. Phenomenal growth in the service sector has meant more jobs for women, often at the expense of men. But the insecurity, low pay, and minimal benefits of these jobs mean that more women--and men and children-engage in both licit and illicit informal work as family/household survival strategies. The scale and value of these activities is staggering 24 but has yet to be acknowledged by IRs analyses of global restructuring. In addition, relegating women to an invisible private sphere lends authority and legitimacy to excluding women

are not only denied access to more valued and powerful masculine activities but are also assigned to specific roles and images required to enable, support, and legitimate those activities. Hence, we are encouraged to believe that men lead because women are apolitical, men work because women are dependents, and [End Page 20] men are strong and go to war because women are weak and need protection. In spite of lived experience and material conditions that belie these simplistic renderings, they have rhetorical force and emotional resonance that shape how we live--and how some of us die. GENDER POLARIZATION RISKS DESTRUCTION OF THE PLANET Bem 1993 (Sandra, professor of psychology at Cornell, The Lenses of Gender, p. 193)
In addition to the humanist and feminist arguments against gender polarization, there is an overarching moral argument that fuses the antihumanist and antifeminist aspects of gender polarization. The essence of this moral argument is that

from political leadership, military activities, and macroeconomic management. The corollary is that women

by polarizing human values and human experiences into the masculine and feminine, gender polarization not only helps to keep culture in the grip of males themselves; it also keeps the culture in the grip of highly polarized masculine values so emphasize making war over keeping the peace, taking risks over giving care, and even mastering nature over harmonizing with nature that when allowed to dominate societal and even global decision making, they create the danger that humans will destroy not just each other in massive numbers but the planet.

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GENDER EQUITY IS KEY TO ALLEVIATING MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND ECOLOGICAL INSECURITIES Tickner 1992 (J. Ann,
Professor of International Relations at University of South California, Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on

Achieving Global Security, page 128) Previous chapters have also called attention to the extent to which these various forms of military,

economic, and ecological insecurity are

connected with unequal gender relations. The relationship between protectors and protected depends on gender inequalities; a militarized version of
security privileges masculine characteristics and elevates men to the status of first-class citizens by virtue of their role as providers of security. An analysis of economic insecurities suggests similar patterns of gender inequality in the world economy, patterns that result in a larger share of the worlds wealth and the benefits of economic

The traditional association of women with nature, which places both in a subordinate position to men, reflects and provides support for the instrumental and exploitative attitude toward nature characteristic of the modem era, an attitude that contributes to current ecological insecurities. This analysis has also suggested that attempts to alleviate these military, economic, and ecological insecurities cannot be completely successful until the hierarchical social relations, including gender relations, intrinsic to each of these domains are recognized and substantially altered. In other words, the achievement of peace, economic justice, and ecological sustainability is inseparable from overcoming social relations of domination and subordination; genuine security requires not only the absence of war but also the elimination of unjust social relations, including unequal gender relations.
developing accruing to men.

THE HYPERMASCULINE IMPULSE FOR DOMINANCE AND HEGEMONY IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF WARFARE. ESCALATION TO TOTAL NUCLEAR WAR AND THE END OF LIFE ON THE PLANET IS INEVITABLENO INSTITUTION CAN CHECK IT SHORT OF CRITICIZING PATRIARCHY Reardon 1993 (Betty, a UN consultant and human rights education author, Women and Peace- Feminist Visions of Global Security, p. 30-31)
In an article entitled Naming the Cultural Forces That Push Us toward War (1983), Charlene Spretnik focused on some of the

fundamental cultural factors that deeply influence ways of thinking about security. She argues that patriarchy encourages militarist tendencies. Since a major war now could easily bring on massive annihilation of almost unthinkable proportions,
why are discussions in our national forums addressing the madness of the nuclear arms race limited to matters of hardware and statistics? A more comprehensive

A clearly visible element in the escalating tensions among militarized nations is the macho posturing and the patriarchal ideal of dominance, not parity, which motivates defense ministers and government leaders to strut their stuff as we watch with increasing horror. Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance ones character from that of women, to survive the toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it at bayall of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in ritual fashion on the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear missiles 12 because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that war is a necessary evil, that patriarchal assumptions are simply human nature, then we are locked into a lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust. The causes of recurrent warfare are not biological. Neither are they solely economic. They are also a result of patriarchal ways of thinking, which historically have generated considerable pressure for standing armies to be used. (Spretnak 1983)
analysis is badly needed. -.

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ETHICS OF THE OTHER (LEVINAS)

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Heidegger A WORLD SUBSUMED BY CALCULATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL THOUGHT DESTROYS OUR ONTOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP IN SUCH A WAY THAT THINGS CEASE TO BE THINGS IN ANY MEANINGFUL WAY. OUR INSTANT ACCESS TO EVERYTHING AS A TOOL FOR USE OBLITERATES THE ESSENTIAL BEING OF ALL THINGS MAKING EVEN TOTAL PLANETARY DESTRUCTION A RADICALLY LESS IMPORTANT ISSUE AND A LIKELY INNEVITABILITY. CAPUTO 93 (JOHN, Demythologizing Heidegger, p. 136-41) The essence of technology is nothing technological; the essence of language is nothing linguistic; the essence of starvation has nothing to do with being hungry; the essence of homelessness has nothing to do with being out in the cold. Is this
not to repeat a most classical philosophical gesture, to submit to the oldest philosophical desire of all, the desire for the pure and uncontaminated, not to mention the safe and

Heidegger remarks upon the prospect of a nuclear conflagration which could extinguish all human life: Man stares at what the explosion of the atom bomb could bring with it. He does not see that what has long since taken place and has already happened expels from itself as its last emission the atom bomb and its explosionnot to mention the single nuclear bomb, whose triggering, thought through to its utmost potential, might be enough to snuff out all life on earth. (VA, 165/PLT, 166). In a parallel passage, he remarks: ... [Man finds himself in a perilous situation. Why? Just because a third world war might break out unexpectedly and bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth? No. In this dawning atomic age a far greater danger threatensprecisely when the danger of a third world war has been removed. A strange assertion! Strange indeed, but only as long as we do not meditate. (G, 27/DT, 56). The thinker is menaced by a more radical threat, is endangered by a more radical explosiveness, let us say by a more essential bomb, capable of an emission (hinauswerfen) of such primordiality that the explosion (Explosion) of the atom bomb would be but its last ejection. Indeed, the point is even stronger: even a nuclear bomb, or a wholesale exchange of nuclear bombs between nuclear megapowers, which would put an end to "all life on earth," which would annihilate every living being, human and nonhuman, is a derivative threat compared to this more primordial destructiveness. There is a prospect that is more dangerous and uncanny unheimhcherthan the mere fact that everything could be blown apart (Auseinanderplatzen von allem). There is something that would bring about more homelessness, more not-beingat-home (un-Heimlich) than the destruction of cities and towns and of their inhabitants. What is truly unsettling, dis-placing (ent-setzen), the thing that is really terrifying (das Entsetzende), is not the prospect of the destruction of human life on the planet, of annihilating its places and its settlers. Furthermore, this truly terrifying thing has already happened and has actually been around for quite some time. This more essential explosive has already been set off; things have already been destroyed, even though the nuclear holocaust has not yet happened. What then is the truly terrifying? The terrifying is that which sets everything that is outside (heraussitzl) of its own essence (Wesen)'. What is this dis-placing [Entsetzendel? It shows itself and conceals itself in the way in which everything presences (anwest), namely, in the fact that despite all conquest of distances the nearness of things remains absent. (VA, 165/P1.T, 166) The truly terrifying explosion, the more essential destruction is that which dis-places a thing front its Wesen, its essential nature, its ownmost coming to presence. The essential destruction occurs in the Being of a thing, not in its entitative actuality; it is a disaster that befalls Being, not beings. The destructiveness of this more essential destruction is aimed not directly at man but at "things" (Dirge), in the distinctively Heideggerian sense. The Wesen of things is their nearness, and it is nearness which has been decimated by technological proximity and speed. Things have ceased to have true nearness and farness, have sunk into the indifference of that which, being a great distance away, can be brought close in the flash of a technological instant. Thereby, things have ceased to be things, have sunk into indifferent nothingness. Something profoundly disruptive has occurred on the level of the Being of things that has already destroyed them, already cast them out of (herauswerfen) their Being. Beings have been brought close to Us technologically; enormous distances are spanned in seconds. Satellite technology can make events occurring on the other side of the globe
secure? (2) In his essay "The Thing"

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present in a flash; supersonic jets cross the great oceans in a few hours. Yet, far from bringing things "near," this massive technological removal of distance has actually abolished nearness, for nearness is precisely what withdraws in the midst of such technological frenzy. Nearness is the nearing of earth and heavens, mortals and gods, in the handmade jug, or the old bridge at Heidelberg, and it can be experienced only in the quiet meditativeness which renounces haste. Thus the real destruction of the thing, the one that abolishes its most essential Being and Wesen, occurs when the scientific determination of things prevails and compels our assent. The thingliness of the jug is to serve as the place which gathers together the fruit of earth and sun in mortal offering to the gods above. But all that is destroyed when pouring this libation becomes instead the displacement of air by a liquid; at that moment science has succeeded in reducing the jug-thing to a nonentity (Nichtige). Science, or rather the dominion of scientific representation, the rule of science over what comes to presence, what is called the Wesen, which is at work in science and technology, that is the truly explosivedestructive thing, the more essential dis-placing. The gathering of earth and sky, mortals and gods, that holds sway in the thingfor "gathering" is what the Old High German thing meansis scattered to the four winds, and that more essential annihilation occurs even if the bomb never goes off: Science's knowledge, which is compelling within its own sphere, the sphere of objects, already had annihilated things long before the atom bomb exploded. The bomb's explosion is only the grossest of all gross confirmations of the long-since accomplished annihilation of the thing. (VA, 168/PLT, 170J When things have been annihilated in their thingness, the mushroom clouds of the bomb cannot be far behind. So whether or not the bomb goes off is not essential, does not penetrate to the essence of what comes to presence in the present age of technological proximities and reduced distances. What is essential is the loss of genuine nearness, authentic and true nearness, following which the actual physical annihilation of planetary life would be a "gross" confirmation, an unrefined, external, physical destruction that would be but a follow-up, another afterthought, a less subtle counterpart to a more inward, profound, essential, authentic, ontological destruction.

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THE ENFRAMING OF THE WORLD THAT IS ENFORCED BY THE LOGIC OF THE STANDING RESERVE IS THE MOST ESSENTIAL DANGER. STANDING RESERVE REACHES A POINT WHERE THAT WHICH IS OUTSIDE OF THE CALCULATION LOSES STANDING AS ANYTHING AT ALL EVEN OBJECT AND HUMANS NOT EXEMPT. ONCE A PART OF THE STANDING RESERVE THE ESSENCE OF HUMAN BEING IS LOST AND LIFE BECOMES LITTLE MORE THAN A SERIES OF CALCULATIONS BY AND OF OBJECTS. THIS IS PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE ENFRAMING CONCEALS ITSELF AS AN ENFRAMING SINCE IT CANT BE PERCEIVED AS AN OBJECT TO BE MANIPULATED OR CONTROLLED.
HEIDEGGER 77 (Martin, The Question Concerning Technology, pp.25-7)

destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of pursuing and promulgating nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of deriving all his standards on this basis. Through this the
other possibility is blockedthat man might rather be admitted sooner and ever more primally to the essence of what is unconcealed and to its unconcealment, in order that he might experience as his essence the requisite belonging to revealing. Placed between these possibilities, man is endangered by destining. The destining of revealing is as such, in every one of its modes, and therefore necessarily, danger. In whatever way the destining of revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at any given time harbors the danger that man may misconstrue the unconcealed and misinterpret it. Thus where everything that presences exhibits itself in the light of a cause-effect coherence, even God, for representational thinking, can lose all that is exalted and holy, the mysteriousness of his distance. In the light of causality, God can sink to the level of a cause, of causa efficient He then becomes even in theology the God of the philosophers, namely, of those who define the unconcealed and the concealed in terms of the causality of making, without ever considering the essential provenance of this causality. In a similar way the unconcealment in accordance with which nature presents itself as a calculable complex of the effects of forces can indeed permit correct determinations; but precisely through these successes the danger may remain that in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw.

The essence of technology lies in enframing. Its holding sway belongs within destining. Since

The destining of revealing is in itself not just any danger, but the danger. Yet when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme danger. This danger attests itself to us in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile, man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself and postures as lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. Heisenberg has with complete correctness pointed out that the actual must present itself to contemporary man in this way. In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence. Man stands so decisively in subservience to on the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-sists, in terms of his essence, in a realm where he is addressed, so that he can never encounter only himself. But enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into the kind of revealing that is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every
other possibility of revealing. Above all, enframing conceals that revealing which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance. As compared

Where enframing holds sway, regulating and securing of the standing-reserve mark all revealing. They no longer even let their own fundamental characteristic appear, namely, this revealing as such. Thus the challenging-enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing (bringing-forth) but also conceals revealing itself and with it that wherein
with that other revealing, the setting-upon that challenges forth thrusts man into a relation to whatever is that is at once antithetical and rigorously ordered. unconcealment, i.e., truth, propriates. Enframing blocks the shining-forth and holding sway of truth. The destining that sends into ordering is consequently the extreme danger. What is
dangerous is not technology. Technology is not demonic; but its essence is mysterious. The essence of technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger. The transformed meaning of the word "enframing" will perhaps become somewhat more familiar to us now if we think enframing in the sense of destining and danger.The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already afflicted man in his essence. The rule of enframing threatens man with the possibility that it

could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus where enframing reigns, there is danger in the highest sense.

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A WORLD WHERE INDIVIDUALS EXIST ONLY AS CALCULATIONS ALLOWS THEM TO BE DEVALUED, TURNING THE CASE AND LEADING TO THE ZERO POINT OF THE HOLOCAUST. Dillon 99 (Michael Dillon, Professor Political Theory at Lancaster, Political theory, Another Justice, 1999, p. 165)
Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure:036 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encounter with are serve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision.

THE STANDING RESERVE AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DAMNATION THAT COMES FROM IT OUTWEIGHS NUCLEAR WAR--LIFE HAS NO MEANING IN A FRAMEWORK THAT SUSTAINS THE STANDING RESERVE AND DENIES US AN AUTHENTIC RELATIONSHIP WITH BEING. Zimmerman, (Professor of Philosophy at Tulane), 94 (Michael, Contesting the Earths Future, p.104).
Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.53 Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54 This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55 Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56 The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be

equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might
agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

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FRAMEWORK/PRIORITY

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LANGUAGE FIRST THE METAPHORS WE USE HAVE DEEP SEATED IMPLICATIONS ON OUR THOUGHTS AND ACTIONS. VISUAL METAPHORS HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO ALTER OUR EPISTEMOLOGY IN WAYS THAT ARE VIOLENT AND EXCULSIONARY Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) A string of recent articles and books has stressed that metaphors

are commonplace in law.33 The multiple visual and aural metaphors with which I began this Article help to create and sustain what has imaginatively been described as "a magical world . . . where liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and promises run with the land."34 To say that
jurisprudential metaphors exist and even flourish is not, however, to say that they have been uniformly welcomed, even by the most creative lawyers and jurists. In the eighteenth century, England's Lord Mansfield commented that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead than a metaphor."35 In the early years of this century, Yale legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld agreed.36 In 1926, Benjamin Cardozo was willing to tolerate metaphors

in law, but held that they had "to be narrowly watched, for starting out as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."37 [1.4] As we have come to appreciate that metaphor is omnipresent, we have come to take it very seriously.38 Today, few would dismiss it as mere semantic decoration, ornament, or rhetorical device. Some scholars have indeed gone so far in the other direction as to suggest that metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and reasoning-so much a part of the deep structure of our mentality that "our ordinary conceptual system . . . is . . . metaphorical in nature."39 [1.5] As an aspect of our mentality's deep structure, our metaphors can reveal a great deal about us, both as individuals and as members of a broader culture. I may use a certain metaphor because I am, or at least my culture is, familiar with the
metaphor's subject matter. Coming readily to my mind as a pole of comparison, the metaphor will be meaningful to others sharing similar life experiences or backgrounds. For example, using the metaphoric expression "I struck out" to communicate failure suggests a personal and/ or cultural familiarity with baseball. Alternatively, I may use a particular metaphor because I and/or my society value or devalue its subject; using the metaphor can therefore accentuate positive or negative reaction to the metaphor's referent. For instance, were I a libertarian, or were I living in a libertarian culture, I might label government a "parasite." My choice of metaphor would not only communicate my dislike of government, but, by association, my dislike of parasites as well. [1.6] "Modal"

metaphors of the sort examined in this Article can be particularly revealing of our circumstances and values. Modal metaphors directly or indirectly evoke specific modes or forms of human sensory experience: sight, sound, touch, smell, or taste. For example, if I call an attitude an "outlook," I am using a modal metaphor evoking visual experience. Alternatively, if I speak of the "texture" of an argument, I am using a modal metaphor evoking tactile experience. Over time, individuals may develop or demonstrate a penchant for modal metaphors favoring a particular sense. Far from being arbitrary, such a penchant may (as we shall see) reflect a broad cultural bias for that sense, an association with a group which in a specific historical or social context has indulged or has been forced to privilege that sense, and/or an inclination towards values which that sense has been deemed to phenomenologically support or promote. [1.7] Ironically, we may reveal more of ourselves by our general and our modal metaphors than by statements and sayings that are the products of more calculated deliberation. Insofar as metaphors are privy to our most profound thoughts and experiences, they may tap into cultural or personal truths of which we are not at first aware, and into notions of which we may not even approve. Calling a mental crisis a nervous "breakdown" may unwittingly manifest a modern tendency to regard the mind as a machine;40 calling an African American football player "a little monkey" may unwittingly manifest racism.41 In this context, metaphors operate as the "sonar" of our minds, revealing deeply submerged-but nonetheless fundamental-realities that we cannot or will not consciously acknowledge. [1.8] As an integral part of our mentality, metaphors can also shape our thoughts and even our actions.42 Calling chess a battle (or hearing someone else call it a battle) certainly encourages me to conceive of it, however inaccurately, as a harsh, even potentially violent confrontation between grim-faced opponents. The psychological impact of the metaphor may be all the more powerful if I have had little or no previous experience with the game. The way I think about chess may in turn affect my behavior. In light of the metaphor,

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maybe I will decide to play, or maybe I will choose to do something less aggressive. If I do choose to play, the metaphor I used or heard might well influence how I play. For instance, if chess is a battle, an intimidating, combative strategy may seem appropriate. If the "battle" metaphor becomes popular, an entire culture may be led to the same conclusion, and play chess accordingly. [1.9] Modal metaphors can have an especially strong impact on how we think and what we do. If, for example, I call "thought" itself "reflection," I am figuratively characterizing thought as a visual enterprise. Insofar as reflection literally presumes a visual subject, the metaphor may subtly encourage thinkers to believe that they should look for intellectual stimulation, rather than listen for it; in other words, the metaphor may affect their epistemological orientation. The same visual metaphor may alternatively imply that only individuals from visually biased backgrounds can properly engage in thought, prompting individuals from other traditions that prize other senses to be dismissed (or not to regard themselves) as legitimate or competent participants in intellectual inquiry. In this context, the "casual" choice of a "simple" metaphor may have profoundly divisive social implications. Describing thought as "reflection" may even induce thinkers to behave in a manner considered appropriate to a visual process: for example, the metaphor may suggest that thinkers should passively watch the world, rather than become actively engaged with it.

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ONTOLOGY ONTOLOGICAL QUESTIONS COME FIRST BECAUSE ALL OTHER QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ALREADY MAKE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS. Dillon, 99 (Lancaster Politics Lecturer, Moral Spaces, pp. 97-8)
Heirs to all this, we find ourselves in the turbulent and now globalized wake of its confluence. As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political4-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of

thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about anything that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of
that review reverberate throughout the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation.

With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in

which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other
continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or aporia, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words,

whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making.
human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it,

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ONTOLOGY OF VISION OUR RELATIONSHIP TO BEING AND UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE COME TO KNOW VISUALITY IS FOUNDATIONAL TO THAT WHICH WE ACTUALLY KNOW AND SEE. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
We will now turn to Heideggers lectures on Parnenides (winter semester 1942-43), wherein we find the philosopher still struggling with the themes that occupied him in earlier works: truth and illusion, concealment and unconcealment, the lighting and clearing, the gaze. That the Greeks were visual, that they were eye-people, what does this contribute, he asks, to an elucidation of the essence of truth as unconcealedness, openness, and clearing? It does not contribute anything, he replies, because it cannot have the least significance.

That fact cannot mean anything, because the factual functioning of the eyes does not give any information, and cannot give any information, about the relation of man to beings. What is just an eye
without the ability to see? Making the same point he makes in his study on Herclitus, where he asserts that we do not hear because we have ears, but have ears because

do not see because we have eyes, but we have eyes because we can see. But what does it mean to see? he asks. We understand it, in a very broad sense, as the foundation for all physical, physiological, and aesthetic optics: namely, it is what allows for an immediate encounter with beings, things, animals, and other people, in the light. This brings him to breach the question of our relationship, as beings gifted with a certain capacity, a certain
ontological potential for vision, not only to visible beings, but also to the interplay of concealment and unconcealment, the conditions of visibility, in which and as which being presences:

we hear, he goes on to say: We

Of what help... would any light be, no matter how luminous, and what could any optical instrument do, no matter how refined and accommodating, if the power to see did not itself in advance get a being in sight by means of the visual sense and the medium of the light? Just as the eye without the ability to see is nothing, so the ability to see, for its part, remains an inability if it does not come into play in an already established relation of man to visible beings... And how could such a relation of man to beings as such hold sway if man did not stand in relation to being? If man did not already have being in view, then he could not even think the nothing, let alone experience beings... But what else is this relation of being to the essence of man that the clearing and the open which has lighted itself for the unconcealed? If such a clearing did not come into play as the open of being itself, then a human eye could never become and be what it is, namely, the way man looks at the... encountering being.

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ETHICS FIRST

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THE RESPONSIBILITY TO THE OTHER COMES BEFORE QUESTIONS OF ONTOLOGY BECAUSE PRIORITIZES THESE PHILOSOPHICAL QUESTIONS FORCES THE SUFFERING INTO OBSCURITY Patricia Molloy, Ph.D. in Education, 1999, Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politic, p. 220-221

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GENDER K FIRST THE 1ACS FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE EFFECT OF GENDER ON THEIR DEPICTION OF REALITY MAKES THEIR ENTIRE METHODOLOGY SUSPECT. ACTING BASED UPON A FLAWED MAP OF REALITY WILL REPLICATE THE HARMS. ONLY BY INVESTIGATING HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED CAN WE DEVELOP A SOUND BASIS FOR ACTION Peterson and Runyan 1999 (V. Spike and Anne, professor of political science at the University of Arizona and professor of womens studies at Wright State University, Global Gender Issues, 2 edition, p. 1-3)
HOW LENSES WORK.

Whenever we study a topic, we do so through a lens that necessarily focuses our attention in particular ways. By filtering or ordering what we look at, each lens enables us to see some things in greater detail or more accurately or in better relation to certain other things. But this is unavoidably at the expense of seeing other this that are rendered out of focus--filtered out--by each particular lens. According to Paul Viotti and Marl Kauppi, various theoretical perspectives, or images, of international politics contain certain assumptions and lead us to ask certain questions, seek certain types of answers, and use certain methodological tools. For example, different images act as lenses and shape our assumptions about who the significant actors are (individuals? states? multinational corporations?), what their attributes are (rationality? self-interest? power?), how social processes are categorized (politics? cooperation? dependence?), and what outcomes are desirable (peace? national security? global equity?). The images or lenses we use have important consequences because they structure what we look for and are able to see. In Patrick Morgans words, Our conception of FIR acts as a map for directing our attention and distributing our efforts, and using the wrong map can lead us into a swamp instead of taking us to higher ground. 2 What we look for depends a great deal on how we make sense of or order, our experience. We learn our ordering systems

in a variety of contexts. From infancy on, we are taught to make distinctions enabling us to perform appropriately within a particular culture As college students, we are taught the distinctions appropriate to particular disciplines (psychology, anthropology, political Science) and particular schools of thought within them (realism, behavioralism, liberalism, structuralism). No matter in which context we learned them, the categories and ordering frameworks shape the lenses through which we look at, think about, and make sense of the world around us. At the same time, the lenses we adopt shape our experience of the world itself because they shape what we do and how and why we do it. For example, a political science lens focuses our attention on particular categories and events (the meaning of power, democracy, or elections) in ways that variously influence our behavior (questioning authority, protesting abuse of power, or participating in electoral campaigns). By

filtering our ways of thinking about and ordering experience, the categories and images we rely on shape how we behave and thus the world we live in: They have concrete consequences. We observe this readily in the case of selffulfilling prophecies: If we expect hostility, our own behavior (acting superior, displaying power) may elicit responses (defensive posturing, aggression) that we then interpret as confirming our expectations. It is in this sense that we refer to lenses and realities as interactive, interdependent, or mutually constituted. Lenses shape who we are, what we think, and what actions we take, thus shaping the world we live in. At the same time, the world we live in (reality) shapes which lenses are available to us, what we see through them,
and the likelihood of our using theist in particular contexts. In general, as long as our lenses and images seem to work, we keep them and build on them. Lenses simplify our thinking. Like maps, they frame our choices and exploration, enabling us to take advantage of knowledge already gained and to move more effectively toward our objectives. The more useful they appear to be, the more we are inclined to take them for granted and to resist making major changes in them. We forget that

we tend to believe we are seeing reality as it is rather than as our culture or discipline or image interprets or maps reality. It is difficult and sometimes uncomfortable to reflect
critically on our assumptions, to question their accuracy or desirability, and to explore the implications of shifting our vantage point by adopting a different lens. Of course, the world we live in and therefore our experiences are constantly changing; we have to continuously modify our images, mental maps, and ordering systems as well. The required shift in lens may be minor, from liking one type of music to liking another, from being a high school student in a small town to being a college student in an urban environment. Or the shift may be more pronounced: from casual dating to parenting, from the freedom of student lifestyles to the assumption of fulltime job responsibilities, from Newtonian to quantum physics, from East-West rivalry to post-Cold War complexities. Societal shifts are dramatic, as we experience and respond to systemic transformations such as economic restructuring, environmental degradation, or the effects of war. To function effectively as students and scholars of world politics, we must modify our thinking in line with historical developments. That is, as reality changes, our ways of understanding or ordering need to change as well. This is especially the case to the extent that outdated disastrous, guides.

our particular ordering or meaning system is a choice among many alternatives. Instead,

worldviews or lenses place us in danger, distort our understanding,

or lead us away from our objectives. Indeed, as both early explorers and urban drivers know, outdated maps are inadequate, and potentially

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FRAMEWORKS BAD - EXCLUSION ATTEMPTS TO CATEGORICALLY REJECT SCHOLARSHIP, DISCOURSES, AND GROUPS THAT ARE ALTERNATIVES TO THE DOMINANT VISUALIST LEGAL DISCOURSE ARE ROOTED IN THE SAME LOGIC OF EXCLUSION THAT ALLOWED VISUALITY TO KEEP WHITE PROTESTANT MEN AS THE SOLE HEIRS TO LEGAL POWER. THEY LITERALLY PERFORM THE HISTORY OF LEGAL OPPRESSION. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm )

The visuality of American law in general and American legal metaphors in particular has been made all the more compelling and oppressive because individuals from the dominant visualist groups have in the past used their power to exclude from both the legal profession and the legal professoriate members of other gender, racial, ethnic, or religious groups who, left to their own devices, might have preferred different legal procedures, legal standards, and ultimately, different legal language. It is well known that in the face of these efforts, the first American woman lawyer was not admitted to practice until 1869;335 the first woman hired full-time by an American law faculty took up her position in 1927.336 In 1950, only five of 1239 law faculty members were female.337 The first African American to practice law professionally was not admitted to the bar until 1844,338 and only in 1925 was a black law professor hired to teach at a "white" law school.339 Protestants dominated the American bench340 and bar as a whole through the early twentieth century, and in the face of unwelcome "intrusions" by immigrant-class Catholics and Jews, reserved for themselves the "high-ground" of corporate law until very recently.341 Exact figures are hard to come by, but it would be accurate to say that the presence of Catholic and Jewish lawyers on American law faculties was similarly restricted well into this century. Hispanic Americans, the overwhelming majority of whom
are Catholic, are only just beginning to break into mainstream legal practice342 and still have only a toehold in the professoriate.343 In this context, relatively few American lawyers or law professors have come from backgrounds that might have inclined them to push American legal metaphors in a nonvisualist sensory direction.

[2.50]

those American lawyers who have come from less visualist backgrounds have for the most part adopted the visualist idiom. This outcome has been more or less assured by the hurdles to law school and bar admission that were raised from the late nineteenth century by a pedagogically ambitious, but also increasingly nervous male, white, Anglo, and Protestant dominated legal establishment. It will be recalled from the previous section of this Article that, until the late nineteenth century, American legal training had taken the form of either apprenticeship, which despite its textual orientation was still at least residually aural, or lecture and recitationbased classroom instruction for which there were few written or writing-related prerequisites. In the decades after 1870, however, individuals aspiring to the bar were compelled to complete high school (and later two years of college); they then had to attend textbook-based law schools where they learned how to dissect massive quantities of black letter law. They had to pass written examinations before graduating344 or being admitted to the bar in most states.345 Since the 1950s, would-be attorneys have also been subjected to the written Law School Admission Test ("LSAT").346 Surviving such a process, which has obviously put a premium on the development of excellence in visual tasks while rendering aural traditions and talents irrelevant, can only have distanced successful female, African American, Hispanic, and even some Catholic and Jewish lawyers from their relatively more aural roots and any inclination they might have had to evoke those roots in aural legal metaphors. [2.52] Even presuming that a modicum of cultural aurality might have survived the visually skewed professional initiation process, a variety of professional and social circumstances have traditionally conspired to dissuade many female, African American, Hispanic, Catholic, and Jewish jurists from drawing from their own experiences in ways that might have made aurality more prominent in their legal writing.347 Because the number of these individuals within American law firms, law courts, and law faculties has, until recently, been small, these legal scholars have historically lacked the peer support and encouragement

[2.51] Even

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which is so important to the success of any serious intellectual, methodological, or terminological departure. The realities of tenure and promotion within American law schools still dominated by males, whites, Anglos, and Protestants, have moreover discouraged many nontraditional scholars from trying anything too novel, lest they be indirectly punished for doing so.348 Finally, the perspectives represented by these legal scholars have traditionally lacked a critical measure of recognition and legitimacy in American culture at large, leading to preemptive concerns that any scholarship or thought based on these perspectives might well be rejected out of hand.349 In this context, most female, African American, Hispanic, Catholic, and Jewish lawyers - despite their undoubted success in achieving greater social justice for members of their own and other "out groups" have until recently been disinclined to challenge the fundamental visuality of American law and legal metaphor.

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ALTERNATIVES

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AURALITY WE POSE AS THE ALTERNATIVE TO OCULAR DISCOURSE A LEGAL THEORY AND DISCOURSE BASED AROUND THE AURAL, OR SOUND. THIS ALTERNATIVE REQUIRES REJECTION OF THE OCULAR FRAMING OF THE 1AC BECAUSE IT IS FUNDAMENTALLY ANTITEHTICAL TO OUR ADVOCACY. THE ALTERNATIVE WOULD SUSPEND IDENTITY POLITICS BY NECESSITATING THAT WE BECOME THE OTHER AND THEY BECOME US. FURTHERMORE THE AURAL INVOLVES MERGING OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY THUS HUMANIZING RATHER THAN OBJECTIFYING THE OTHER. WHEREAS THE OCULAR IS THE LOCUS OF BOUNDARY AND DEMARCATION, THE AURAL IS HARMONIOUS IT CELEBRATES DIFFERENCE AND MULTIPLICITY AND IS BY ITS NATURE DELIMITING. ALL OF THIS MEANS THAT THE AURAL HAS THE PROFOUNDLY COUNTERHEGEMONIC EFFECT OF DESTROYING EXISTING LEGAL OCULAR THINKING. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm )

A third reason for the increased popularity of aural legal metaphors in contemporary American legal discourse has to do with the correlation between the values of developing "critical" legal theory and our understanding of the phenomenological biases of sound. Because of this correlation, many exponents of critical legal theory have found aural figures of legal speech to be convenient vehicles of ideological expression. [3.41] Critical legal theory, as primarily embraced by feminist legal scholars, critical race theorists, and a number of intellectually progressive white male jurists of various persuasions,659 is - for all of its permutations and combinations - founded on a core group of values which set their adherents in basic opposition to traditional legal attitudes and beliefs. Most critical scholars believe that law is, or at least should be, concrete, relational, subjective, multivariate, dynamic, process-oriented, and transcendent. Law should be concrete in that judges and jurists should take greater account of situated context660 and others' actual lived experience661 instead of depending upon abstract or theoretical constructs.662 It should be relational in that it should be more concerned with preventing and resolving differences by drawing people together in shared interaction and communal commitment instead of driving them apart.663 It should be subjective to the extent that lawmakers and adjudicators should be more willing to recognize their own biases664 while making an effort to compensate for those by empathetically adopting the points of view of the individuals who stand to be affected by their rulings.665 It should be multivariate insofar as it should recognize the existence and legitimacy of different realities, different points of view, and different answers to the same legal question.666 According to many critical scholars, law should be regarded as dynamic:667 instead of being understood as a timeless entity, it should be understood as involving events in time. By the same token, it should be understood as more of a process than a system.668 Finally, law should be transcendent in that it should reject the arbitrary limitations of traditional boundaries and categories.669 [3.42] Each one of these critical values has a counterpart in a traditionally accepted value or quality of sound, which has generally been regarded as the phenomenological-and, ultimately, epistemological-antithesis of sight.670 Sound, for example, is assumed to be concrete. Unlike the image or the written word that we experience as an abstract, disembodied stimulus "out there,"
sound has an immediate physicality. Its tone, tempo, volume, and rhythm give it a complex physical texture. Sound waves literally reach out from their source to touch us; in certain circumstances-in low registers, or at high amplification-we can actually feel sound as physical vibration. Sound, moreover, imposes its concreteness on us by immersing and surrounding us in its field.671 The resultant sense of intimate involvement is only heightened by the fact that although we can shut our eyes, withdraw from touch, and close our mouths at will, we cannot shut our ears:672 in this context, sound makes us part of the real world whether we choose to be or not.673 Finally, because sound is not a very effective "distance" sense, understanding and appreciating sound (or, conversely, communicating through sound) generally requires us to approach its source (or its desired object). We are thereby encouraged to experience aurality in a concrete situation. For example, aural speech "is addressed by a real, living person to another real, living person at a specific time in a real setting which includes always much more than mere words."674 [3.43] Sound

is also presumed to encourage relation, interaction and ultimately, community: in the words of Walter Ong, "[s]ound always tends to socialize."675 Sound socializes because, in the first place, it is hard for anyone to

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ignore a sound. Sounds that we make ourselves tend to evoke responses much more successfully than most of our visible or tangible activities.676 Perhaps others recognize that in speaking we have invested energy and effort and have revealed something intimate of ourselves that deserves acknowledgment.677 Sounds made by others, in turn, not only surround, but actually penetrate and invade us.678 Because sound affects us in this way, and also perhaps because we cannot turn our backs on sound, we feel the urge to respond or react. We generally experience this response as an important completion of ourselves-ignoring the aural stimulus (or being unable to respond to it) frequently leaves one with a gnawing sense of isolation. In the second place, sound socializes because its communicative dependence on physical proximity679 draws and keeps people together.680 It thereby facilitates mutual involvement,681 an involvement which in some sense may be said to "suspend the self." Psychologist Julian Jaynes has expressed this point most provocatively: Consider what it is to listen and understand someone speaking to us. In a certain sense we have to become the other person; or rather, we let him become part of us for a brief second. We suspend our own identities, after which we come back to ourselves and accept or reject what he has said.682 [3.44] Sound tends to be regarded as a subjective sense in that an individual coming (necessarily) close to a sound is likely to evaluate it in light of the identity and character of its physical origin. This is especially true when the sound is speech. An "objective" assessment of spoken words alone is difficult. Spoken words are carried by a personal voice; they are mouthed by a personal presence from which they cannot be readily detached.683 In such a context, objective "meaning" merges with subjective "interpretation," and objective "knowledge" merges with subjective "opinion."684 Because of the physical closeness of most aural relationships and the resultant difficulty in achieving objectivity in such a context, persons in aural contact tend to develop more of a feeling for one another and may be better able to empathetically appreciate each other's position. Even in extreme cases, "addressing . . . and listening to one's enemy, experientially reveals that one's enemy is truly human. This understanding counteracts the strong tendency in disputes to objectify one's enemy . . . ."685 [3.45] Sound has been considered multivariate in that it can accommodate a variety of different realities at the same time. Sound arguably accomplishes this in two ways. First, it is not as uniperspectival - i.e., as directionally selective - as sight. Recall that to see something, we have to turn ourselves towards it, and having done so, we cannot see in other directions. We can, in other words, see only one frame of "reality" at a time. When we listen, however, we can simultaneously appreciate sounds emanating from in front of us, behind, above, and below. All of these sounds from different sources are available for our attention all at once.686 We become conscious of multiplicity. In this context, it is doubtless significant that so-called "multiperspectival art," visual art that depicts an object from several apparently contradictory perspectives simultaneously, has been repeatedly associated with cultural experiences dominated or increasingly influenced by aurality. In explaining a carving done by a member of the Tsimishian aboriginal culture of the Canadian Northwest, it has for instance been said that "what we
ought to be asking ourselves is how the artist's hand might have been guided by the multidirectional world of the ear rather than the unidirectional world of the eye, given that [the artist's] culture is an oral-aural one."687 Modern multiperspectival "cubism" has likewise been described as "one of the painterly forms of acoustic

sound may be considered multivariate insofar as different sounds can be simultaneously combined in the same space without suppressing their component parts. Thus it has been noted that "music is not like vision."689 Unlike visual colors,690 musical tones "may be combined without losing their individuality. What you end up with is a chord, something new, which has its own sound but in which the individual tones are also distinct and identifiable. It's not a blending . . . but something of a different order."691 Harmony and choral "polyphony" depend on such a mixing. In this way as well, the sense of sound may be more tolerant and even celebratory of difference than is the sense of sight. [3.46] We also understand sound as dynamic: "Sound dances timefully within experience. Sound embodies the sense of time."692 A sounded musical note or a spoken word is not a fixed object, but an event. It exists only to go out of existence. Sound, moreover, discloses an event: it is the product of a "doing" of some sort, be that someone walking, a river running, rain falling, or a machine working.693 It is a disclosure that may itself take time; while sight is apparently instantaneous, sound is relatively slow (witness the phenomenon of

space."688 Second,

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"echo").694 Both Plato and Aristotle considered sound uniquely time-bound because of its delay in spreading over a distance.695 In this context, a hearing-oriented world is a world necessarily focused on the ideas of "duration" and "becoming." [3.47]Because sound is both an event in time, and is based on an event in time, it is said to favor the idea of process rather than the idea of system. It is uniquely suited to the understanding and communication of events following one another. Literary critic Northrop Frye realized this when he concluded that while systematic patterns of meaning were in the domain of the eye, narrative was in the domain of the ear (consider, for instance, how much less compelling is a visualized narrative-in a book or a graph-compared to an aurally told tale where one cannot skip to the conclusion or readily go back to the beginning).696 In the context of a similar understanding, feminist philosopher of science Evelyn
Fox Keller has commented that "[k]nowledge likened to the sense of hearing . . . might well lend itself more readily to a process view of reality."697

we frequently consider sound to be transcendent. As we have already seen, vision enables us to recognize sharp distinctions and boundaries: the dividing line is a classic visual construct. Sound, by contrast, is poorly suited to the task of delimitation. "Auditory space," we are told, "[is] a sphere without fixed boundaries, space made by the thing itself, not space containing the thing."698 Because sound floating on the air lacks the precision of the line set on the page, aural differentiations are more often experienced as differentiations of degree rather than of kind. It is easier to distinguish between high and low volume of a given sound than it is to distinguish, at the edge of aural experience, between sound and silence. In this context, sound creates an arena of mutual involvement instead of a division of experience. [3.49] In a previous section of this Article, I argued that the correlation between traditional legal theory and the values of vision may be ascribed to the cultural context in which American law has grown up, to the sensory biases of the groups that have dominated American law to this point, and to the medium used to express and develop traditional American legal theory. The apparent correlation between critical legal theory and the values of sound may be explained in somewhat similar fashion. First of all, critical legal theory has grown up in a more contemporary, and hence, more aurally oriented cultural environment;699 in this situation, critical theory has arguably, if unwittingly, absorbed values and biases that sound is spreading through American culture as a whole. Second, critical legal theory has been significantly shaped by individuals coming from American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups which, relative to others, have had more respect for aural expression and experience. The relative aurality of these groups has arguably disposed their members towards values which sound presumably favors. Given the inclination and opportunity, a growing number of these individuals are now applying the same values to American
legal thought. For instance, the relative aurality of American women may be largely responsible for their traditional, if hardly exclusive700 or essential,701 association with the concrete and contextual, the relational, the subjective, and the processbased.702 Feminist legal scholars seeking to draw on women's lived experience have certainly played a key role in making these values an integral part of critical jurisprudence.703 The relative aurality of African American culture (although again neither exclusive nor essential) has arguably done much to attract African Americans to similar ideals;704 a number of African American legal scholars are now incorporating these into their own brand of critical writing.705 The aurality of Jewish religious experience may equally have encouraged Jews to emphasize context, relation, subjectivity, multivariance, and dynamism in their tradition,706 emphases that are becoming newly evident in the critical works of many Jewish American legal 707 scholars. Third, sound has been brought directly to bear on the development of critical theory insofar as much of

[3.48] Finally,

that theory has been conceived and elaborated not in writing, but in the aural argument, debate, and discussion of scholarly conferences, seminars, and symposia.708 If, indeed "the medium is the message" (or at least part of it), critical legal theory may be said to have both literally and figuratively echoed the circumstances of its birth and development. Taking this point together with the others, it would seem that the overlap between critical legal ideology and aural phenomenology is not at all coincidental. [3.50] The apparent compatibility of critical legal ideology and aural phenomenology has had at least two significant consequences for contemporary American legal scholarship. To begin, it has played a supporting role in encouraging critical legal scholars to experiment with scholarly formats which indirectly and directly draw on aural experience. Setting ideas in story or poetry evokes, if not necessarily duplicates, phenomenological circumstances that may indirectly
reinforce the critical concepts or values (concreteness, relation, subjectivity, process, etc.) which are being explicitly articulated.709 Perhaps this is another reason why

these and other related forms are "powerful means for destroying [the existing] mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal and political discourse takes place."710
[3.51] The same apparent compatibility of ideology and phenomenology has drawn many exponents of critical legal theory to aural legal metaphors. The concrete, subjective nature of law is handily captured by the terms "voice" and "story." The

idea of law both as relation and process is neatly

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communicated by the terms "listening," "dialogue," and "conversation."711 "Polyphony" telegraphs the multivariate character - literally, the many-voicedness712 - of law. By choosing these and other aurally inspired terms,713 critical legal scholars have indirectly but effectively challenged the traditional legal understandings that have so often been supported and even rooted in visual legal language.714 This aural language is arguably so powerful, however, that mere casual usage may have the same "subversive" result: an innocent tendency to describe law as "talk" may, for instance, indirectly support and even encourage the notion that law is concrete, dynamic, and subjective. In this sense aural legal metaphors - like aurally evocative forms of legal scholarship - may themselves be profoundly "counter-hegemonic."

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OTHELLOS HANDKERCHIEF THE FIGURE OF THE HANDKERCHIEF IN OTHELLO DECONSTRUCTS THE FLAWS ENDEMIC TO THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE 1AC BY CONTINUOUSLY BREAKING DOWN THE AUTHORITY OF THE VISUAL, LEAVING ONLY THE STORIES OR LANGUAGE OF THE 1AC ETERNALLY ATTEMPTING TO CONNECT TO SOME UNATTAINABLE MATERIAL FACT. THIS MOVE HIGHLIGHTS THE WAYS THE DISCOURSE AND CONTRIVANCES OF THE 1AC NATURALIZE CONSTRUCTS AS FACTS EFFECTIVELY UNDOING ANY ATTEMPT AT A UNIFYING THEORY OF ABSOLUTE TRUTH POSITED BY THE 1AC. THE ACTION OF THE CRITIQUE IS TO REPLICATE THE ROLE OF THE HANDKERCHIEF IN THE DEBATE ROUND, EXPOSING THE LACK OF FOUNDATION TO THE 1AC EPISTEMOLOGY. Knapp 2003 (James, assoc. prof. of English @ Eastern Mich. Ocular Proof: Archival Revelations and Aesthetic Response Poetics Today. 24.4, pp695-727)
If the histories attributed to the handkerchief by Iago and Bianca position it as proof of an affair between Cassio and Desdemona that never occurred, Othello's own history of the handkerchief further undermines its artifactual status. Ultimately

Shakespeare presents us with an object (the handkerchief) so unstable that it becomes emblematic of the flaws endemic to empiricist (materialist) epistemologies, flaws that become even more pronounced when such epistemologies guide the study of history.
Paul Ricoeur's (1978: 162) caveat concerning historical understanding captures the difficulties presented to both the characters and the audience of Othello: History begins when we no longer have immediate understanding, and when we undertake to reconstruct the sequence of antecedents along lines other than that of the

difficulty for epistemology is precisely to show how explanation is added to, or superimposed on, or even substituted for, the immediate understanding of the course of the past history. Continuously breaking down the authority of the visual (through which we experience the material in the play's epistemology), the play seems to condemn any overzealous acceptance of the truth of things that is grounded in perception. As events unfold, the condemnation extends even to the declarations of love between Othello and Desdemona, uttered before the jealousy set in. When Desdemona claims that she "saw Othello's visage in his mind" (1.3.252), she is essentially saying that what you see is not what you get. Without the ground of visual confirmation, the understanding of the past is left to the ways in which the various explanationsthe stories offered for the handkerchiefare able to convincingly add to, superimpose themselves on, or substitute for the immediate understanding (the truth, the historical fact) that is out of reach. And as I have been suggesting, rather than separate aesthetic qualities from such explanation in the hope of determining the latter's power to persuade, we ought to focus on the way that aesthetic power translates into evidentiary power, thus naturalizing fictions as historical fact. Considered in this way, the history of the handkerchief seems utterly determined for each of the characters by the particular (albeit fictional) consciousness that brings it into language at any given moment in the play. And yet, the final scene adds an important twist to the play's visual epistemology. For the final history attributed to the handkerchief is the one that fulfills the tragedy. Though overcome by his own bloody act, Othello can seek refuge in the fact that he has executed a guilty woman, a fact guaranteed by the gift of the handkerchief, which he saw in Cassio's hands with his own eyes: "she did gratify his amorous works / With that recognizance and pledge of love / Which I first gave
her. I saw it in his hand; / It was a handkerchief, [End Page 716] an antique token / My father gave my mother" (5.2.21317). Contradicting his own account that the

motives and reasons alleged by the actors in the history. The

Othello adapts the story to accommodate the larger structure of the tragedygift from father to mother, not to be lost, is given from Othello to Desdemona, whose loss becomes indeed "such perdition / as nothing else could match" (3.4.6768). In the final scene, all the speculation about the truth is unveiled in a spectacular series of acts, beginning with Othello's murder of Desdemona. Depending on one's reading, it might be said that Othello reveals his true natureeither as a hot-blooded Moor or a valiant VenetianEmilia reveals the power of human agency (though too late), Iago's evil is revealed in his murder of Emilia, and Desdemona's original purity is restored. All of the tidy resolution is put into motion by the handkerchief and its imputed neutrality as a thing.
handkerchief was given to his mother by an Egyptian,

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When the handkerchief's neutrality is shattered, so is Othello's resolve. Katherine Eisaman Maus (1995: 120) has pointed out that "Othello lives out the epistemological dilemma of the English juryman to whom everything is supposed to be manifest, but who is nonetheless forced to depend upon clues and surmises, who must treat as clearly visible that which is inevitably beyond sight." 31The revelation of this compromise comes naturally at the height of the tragedy. Othello's epiphany is brought on by Emilia's revelation that she gave the handkerchief to Iago, and Iago kills Emilia for precisely this declaration. What appears as a proper unmasking of the truth, however, relies on the concealment of the play's seemingly deeper revelation: as the previous discussion was intended to demonstrate, Othello provides a parable about the disaster of confusing things with their stories, conflating what Gadamer (1976: 6994) has called the "nature of things" and the "language of things." Though the play resolves a multitude of misconceptions in this final scene, it does so by reinstating the category of the object as evidence. Comforting as the normative final scene could be, considering the course of events in the play, the late return to the perceptual faith is at best romantic and at worst deeply pessimistic. If the ending of the play is taken as a confirmation (or dramatization) of the belief that "the truth will out," it does so in a deeply ironic manner, undermining or simply rejecting the concept of truth that is conventionally associated with such a comforting understanding of tragic resolution. Othello's final speech
is a speech about how he wants his history told, in which he moves from the objective to the narrative, from the material to the aesthetic: [End Page 717] When you shall these unlucky deeds relate, Speak of me as I am; nothing extenuate, Nor set down aught in malice. Then must you speak Of one who loved not wisely but too well; Of one not easily jealious, but being wrought, Perplexed in the extreme; of one whose hand (Like the base [Indian]) threw a pearl away Richer than all his tribe; one whose subdu'd eyes, Albeit unused to the melting mood, Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees Their medicinable gum. Set you down this. (5.2.34151) Othello places himself and his future history within the narrative genre of the fantastic and of the moral fable; his story is to assume its place among those he told Desdemona during their courtship, for example, "of the Cannibals that each other eat, / The Anthropophagi, and men whose heads / Do grow beneath their shoulders" [1.3.14345]). Only stories of this kind, he suggests, will be able to convey him as he is. The tenuous link that such stories have to the material realities they describe seems unimportant; it is their ability to evoke wonder in the listener that lends them validity. Finally, the indictment of Iago comes in the form of a pronouncement in which the thing is acknowledged as an object imbedded in the language of perception: Lodovico commands that Iago "Look on the tragic loading of this bed; / This is thy work." And though the sight of the bodies constitutes a self-evident confirmation of Iago's deeds, and thus his "true" self, the moment is too terrible to endure. The light of truth is immediately extinguished as the order is given to conceal the visual proof: "The object poisons sight, / Let it be hid" (5.2.36465). Reading Othello as I have points to some of the play's more provocative suggestions concerning the relation between knowledge and the material world. The final act of concealment, in particular, points to one of the play's central epistemological stumbling blocks. The final scene marks the end of a long series of thoughts on seeming, on the peculiar truth that things are not always as they seem: Othello's true nature is not (and then is) consistent with his appearance, Desdemona's purity is called into question only to be confirmed upon her death, Iago's "honesty" is proven false, and so on. Despite the tragic consequences of misrecognition that have resulted in the deaths of the central characters, the revelations of the final scene reinstate the priority of the sensible and especially the visibleworld over the discursive and aesthetic representational textures that generate the tragedy over the course of the play. And yet, in Othello's final words, Iago's silence, and Lodovico's order to conceal the poisoned object, the return of the sensible [End Page 718]is qualified by the implication that the truth is not simply available for all to see. Rather, despite the characters' investments in the visual world (sights such as the handkerchief in Cassio's hand, Lodovico's "loaded bed," Othello's blackness), historical understanding in the play demands something more than mere things.

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SPECTRALITY (ETHICS) THE AFFIRMATIVES POSITION AS OBSERVER PRESUMES A HYPERMASCULINE OPTICAL RIGHT OVER THE OTHER, WHICH ALLOWS DOMINATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF ALTERITY AND AN ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP. WE POSE AS AN ALTERNATIVE A REJECTION OF THE ROLE OF OBSERVER IN FAVOR OF A SPECTRAL RELATIONSHIP TO THE OTHER WHEREIN THE OTHER IS GRANTED AN UNCONDITIONALLY ASSYMETRICAL RIGHT TO SEE US WHEREAS WE ARE UNABLE TO COMPREHEND THE OTHER VISUALLY. THIS BLIND SUBMISSION RENDERS US UNABLE TO RETURN TO A POSITION OF PATRIARCHAL POWER OR TO ABOLISH ALTERITY THROUGH DETERMINATION OF THE OTHER. WE TURN TO THE BARD FOR GUIDANCE AND USE AS A MODEL FOR THIS RELATIONSHIP HAMLETS FATHER AND HIS HELMET. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)

Because the face, for Levinas, at least on the most obvious reading, is not seen, and the face-to-face encounter occurs otherwise than through the gaze, it is immediately appropriate that Derrida would see the blindman as an ethical figure, for all of the blindman's encounters with others must occur without seeing their form.10 In Specters of Marx and Memoirs of the Blind, Derrida considers positions of blindness in terms that, for Levinas, describe ethical relations. A particular form of blindness described in Specters of Marx and Echographies of television is the "visor effect," the situation in which "we do not see who looks at us" (Specters 7). For Derrida, the most dramatic example of such a scenerio of a-reciprocal vision occurs in hauntings: The specter is not simply this visible invisible that I can see, it is someone who watches or concerns me without any possible reciprocity, and who therefore makes the law when I am blind, blind by situation. The specter enjoys the right of absolute inspection. He is the right of inspection itself. (Echographies 137 [121]) The "right of inspection" ("droit de regard") is described earlier in Echographies as "the right to control and surveillance" (42 [34]). This right to see, control, and survey is evoked as a specifically masculine form of power: "the right to penetrate a 'public' or 'private' space, the right to 'introduce' the eye and all these optical prostheses . . . into the 'home' of the other [il s'agisse du droit de pntrer dans un espace 'public' ou 'priv', d'y faire 'entrer,' dans le 'chez-soi' de l'autre]" (Echographies 42 [34]). This phallic vision infiltrates into the intimate spaces of others either through the use of the eye itself or through prosthetic devices such as surveillance cameras, and, as shall be seen, Derrida describes the feminized, blind, and a-reciprocal submission to this masculine gaze in ethical terms. y In Specters of Marx Derrida uses the example of the ghost of Hamlet's father to describe the "visor effect," for the Danish specter wears a helmet through which he can see those whom he haunts without their being able to see him. The visor lets one see nothing of the spectral body, but at the level of the head and beneath the visor, it permits the socalled-father to see and to speak. Some slits are cut into it and adjusted so as to permit him to see without being seen, but to speak in order to be heard. The helmet, like the visor, did not merely offer protection: it topped off the coat of arms and indicated the
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chief's authority, like the blazon of his nobility. (Specters 8)

The masculine, a-reciprocal penetration of the "right of inspection" is described by Derrida as paternal, indicative of the specter's authority, his right to speak and to be heard. Specters are presented by Derrida as having (and indeed as being) the "droit de regard" in so far as they see us, haunt us, even while we cannot look back, with an optical right which entails all other rights (Echographies 42). y As Derrida describes it, we sense specters, feel them, feel their gazes, and even to some degree see them through this sensation of touch, while they remain intangible, ungraspable, and invisible. This "furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible" is presented by Derrida as the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other. And of someone other that we will not hasten to determine as self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit, and so forth . .

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. . This spectral someone other looks at us, we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority . . . and asymmetry, according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion . . . . To feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect . . . . Since we do not see the one who sees us, and who makes the law, who delivers the injunction . . . we cannot identify it in all certainty, we must fall back on its voice. An essentially blind submission to his secret. (Specters 7) In Totality and Infinity, as we have seen, Levinas writes that in the ethical encounter the other is neither seen nor touched (211). In Derrida's description of being haunted by a specter, of this "blind submission to his secret," the other is once again neither seen nor touched, although we sense the visual relation, that we are being seen, not through our own vision but through feeling, "we feel ourselves seen," even while the other remains ungraspable and intangible. Unable to grasp or to see the other, in the spectral encounter as in the ethical encounter for Levinas, we respond to the ghost without being able to abolish his alterity. We realize that the ghost is other without "hasten[ing] to determine" him. We are unable even to categorize him as a self or as a subject, as a consciousness or person, and as such he remains radically unthematizable. As with the Levinasian ethical relation, the haunting of a specter is also asymmetrical in power, for the ghost has the power to penetrate ocularly and bodily into our private spaces, to see and to speak and to be heard and to command, even as we cannot see or grasp this bodily form, and must answer blindly. We are thus asymmetrically submitted to the other, we are vulnerable and exposed, and this submission takes place in language: with specters, according to Derrida, we submit to the other's voice. We must learn to speak to ghosts, which is not to command them--Derrida notes Horatio's inability to speak to ghosts when he "imperiously" "charges" and "conjures" the specter of Hamlet's father. Derrida writes, "as theoreticians or witnesses, spectators, observers, and intellectuals, scholars believe that looking is sufficient. Therefore, they are not always in the most competent position to do what is necessary: speak to the specter" (Specters 11). Looking is once more opposed to language or to speaking, and it is the blind submission to language which is required in the ethical relation, and the absence of sight on the subject's part which gives rise to its possibility. y In multiple ways we have seen that Derrida chooses to explore the haunting of the self in terms that evoke the ethical relation in Levinas, a relation in which the face-to-face encounter is an a-reciprocal response to an elevated other whose alterity I cannot subsume or grasp, which I cannot reduce through vision, touch, or knowledge, and which takes place in language and commands me, in response to which I must listen and speak. The feminized position of being blind in the presence of masculinized and authoritative other, of being unable to return a specifically patriarchal and "male gaze," of being forced to respond to another through language even while the linguistic exchange must take place on the other's terms--which Sartre and a quite a few feminists might describe as a hell of other people (if we were only able to thematize the ghost as such)--is thus presented by Derrida as the condition under which an encounter with alterity--a feminized ethics, for Levinas--may occur.

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WEEPING (ETHICS) WE POSE WEEPING AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE OBSERVERS GAZE OF THE 1AC. WEEPING REJECTS THE VISIONS OF THE 1AC THROUGH THE BLINDNESS ATTENDANT TO TEARS. OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE EYE SETS THE GROUND FOR AN ETHICS TO EXIST AND REVEALS THE TRUTH OF THE EYES JOY. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2) In the final pages of Memoirs, Derrida human function.11 He writes,
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describes weeping as a form of blindness which is the "truth" of the eyes, its most

now if tears come to the eyes, if they well up in them, and if they can also veil sight, perhaps they reveal, in the very course of experience, in this coursing of water, an essence of the eye, of man's eye, in any case, the eye understood in the anthropo-theological space of the sacred allegory. Deep down, deep down inside, the eye would be destined not to see but to weep. For at the very moment they veil sight, tears would unveil what is proper to the eye. And what they cause to surge up out of forgetfulness, there where the gaze or look looks after it, keeps it in reserve, would be nothing less than al_theia, the truth of the eyes, whose ultimate destination they would thereby reveal: to have imploration rather than vision in sight, to address prayer, love, joy, or sadness rather than a look or gaze. Even before it illuminates, revelation is the moment of the "tears of joy."(Memoirs 125
[126])

Weeping, as opposed to seeing, is the supreme function of human eyes for Derrida because, while other animals can see, only humans cry with their eyes (of course, while Derrida does not note this, other animals do cry and respond to the suffering of human and animal others vocally).12 As Derrida also observes, while not all humans can see, all humans, including the blind, can weep. Derrida notes that in representation it is most often women who weep, as in the representations of Mary and other women at the cross13, and so exemplary blindness, like that of the subject encountering the "visor effect" or the a-reciprocal gaze, is thus culturally feminine, as is ethics for Levinas. In Totality and Infinity, the feminine is related to the receptive or welcoming domesticity of ethics, while in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence ethics is associated with maternity. We may think once more of Mary's tears.

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BATAILLE WE BEGIN WITH BATAILLES SOLAR ANUS AS THE SIGHT OF TRANSGRESSION OF THE SUN AS A FIGURE OF ILLUMINATION AND KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWING GAZE. BATAILLE PRESENTS US INSTEAD WITH A SUN THAT BLINDS THE GAZE, LOVES ITS INVERSE, AND DISCOVERS ITS OWN IMPOTENCE. IT IS PRECISELY AT THE MOMENT THAT THE SUN, KNOWLEDGE, ATTEMPTS TO ASSERT ITS DOMINANCE OVER THE DARK MYSTERIES OF NIGHT THAT IT MUST HAVE ITS THROAT SLASHED, MUST BE RENDERED THE BLACK SOLAR ANUS. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, The Solar Anus, p. 9) Love, then, screams in my own throat; I am the Jesuve, the filthy parody of the torrid and blinding sun. I want to have my throat slashed while violating the girl to whom I am to say: you are the night. The Sun exclusively loves the Night and directs its luminous violence, its ignoble shaft, toward the earth, but it finds itself incapable of reaching the gaze or the night, even though the nocturnal terrestrial expanses head continuously toward the indecency of the solar ray. The solar annulus is the intact anus of her body at eighteen years to which nothing sufficiently blinding can be compared except the sun, even though the anus is the night.

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WHEN YOU STARE AT THE SUN, YOU NOT ONLY GO BLIND BUT THE SUN TURNS BLACK. SIMILARLY, IN PLACE OF A LUMINOUS SUN BATAILLE POSITS A BLACK SUN, ONE CONNECTED NOT WITH SEEING AND KNOWING THE WORLD BUT WITH BASE PASSIONS, LITERATURE, AND DEATH- THOSE THINGS WHICH CANNOT BE CALCULATED OR PUT TO WORK, CANNOT BE RATIONALIZED. TURNING THE EYE UPON THE SUN, THE EYE THEN EXPLODES AND THE SUN IS MADE EMPTY. THE ALTERNATIVE UNDERSTANDS KNOWLEDGE AS UNORGANIZABLE, UNPRODUCTIVE, AND RECOGNIZES THE TRANSGRESSIVE NATURE OF THINGS LIKE LITERATURE, EROTICISM, AND WASTE IN THE FACE OF WESTERN ENLIGHTENMENT. Land 92 [Nick, Continental Philo Lecturer @ Warwick Univ., The Thirst for Annihilation: Georges Bataille and Virulent Nihilism (An Essay in Atheistic
Religion).The Curse of the Sun, pg 19-24]

Mixed with this nourishing radiance, as its very heart, is the other sun, the deeper one, dark and contagious, provoking a howl from Bataille: the sun is black [III 75]. From this second sunthe sun of maledictionwe receive not illumination but disease, for whatever it squanders on us we are fated to squander in turn. The sensations we drink from the black sun afflict us as ruinous passion, skewering our senses upon the drive to waste ourselves. If in the final analysis the sun is the sole object of literary description [II 140] this is due less to its illuminative radiance than to its virulence, to the unassimilable fact that the sun is nothing but death [III 81]. How far from Socratesand his hopes of gainare Batailles words: the sickness of being vomits a black sun of spittle [IV 15].In order to succeed in describing the notion of the sun in the spirit of one who must necessarily emasculate it in consequence of the incapacity of the eyes, one must say that this sun has poetically the sense of mathematical serenity and the elevation of the spirit. In contrast if, despite everything, one fixes upon it with sufficient obstinacy, it supposes a certain madness and the notion changes its sense because, in the light, it is not production that appears, but refuse [le dchet], which is to say combustion, well enough expressed, psychologically, by the horror which is released from an incandescent arc-light [I 231].Incandescence is not enlightening, but the indelicate philosophical instrument of presence has atrophied our eyes to such an extent that the dense materiality of light scarcely impinges on our intelligence. Even Plato acknowledges that the impact of light is (at first) pain, because of the dazzle and glitter of the light [PCD 748]. Phenomenology has systematically erased even this concession. Yet it is far from obvious why an absence/presence opposition should be thought the most appropriate grid for registering the impact of intense radiation. It is as if we were still ancient Hellenes, interpreting The thirst for annihilation 20vision as an outward movement of perception, rather than as a subtilized retinal wounding, inflicted by exogenous energies.* * *Everything begins for us with the sun, because
(we shall come to see) even the cavern, the labyrinth, has been spawned by it. In a sense the origin is light, but this must be thought carefully. Our bodies have sucked upon the sun long before we open our eyes, just as our eyes are congealed droplets of the sun before copulating with its outpourings. The flow of dependency is quite clear (lethal):The afflux of solar energy at a critical point of its consequences is humanity [VII14]. The eye is not an origin, but an expenditure. The first text in the Oeuvres Compltes is Batailles earliest published book: The Story of the Eye. It first appearedunder the pseudonym of Lord Auchin 1928, which roughly places it amongst a group of early writings including The Solar Anus (1931), Rotten Sun (1930, quoted above), and the posthumously published The Pineal Eye (manuscripts dated variously 1927 and 1931).The common theme of these writings is the submission of vision to a solar trajectory that escapes it, dashing representational discourse upon a darkness that is inextricable from its own historical aspiration. The Story [Histoire] of the Eye is both the story and the history of the eye, as also The Pineal Eye is a fiction and a history. Every history is a story, which does not mean that the story escapes history, or is anything other than history consummating itself in a blindness which occupies the place of its proper representation. The

Story of the Eye climaxes with the excision of a priests eye, which is made to slip [glisser] into the vulva of the books heroine Simone, once by her own hand, and once by that of Sir Edmond (an English rou). In this way the dark thirst which is the subterranean drive of the sun obliterates vision, drinking it down into the nocturnal labyrinth of the flesh. Similarly, in The Pineal Eye, the opening of an eye especially for the sunappropriate to its ferocious apex at nooninvites an obliteration; blinding and shattering descent. The truth of the sun at the peak of its prodigal

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glory is the necessity of useless waste, where the celestial and the base conspire in the eclipse of rational moderation. By concluding the movement of ascent that is synonymous with humanity, and providing vision with the verticality that is its due, the pineal eye crowns the epoch of reason; opening directly onto the heavens (where it is instantaneously enucleated by the deluge of searing filth which is the suns truth): I represented the eye at the summit of the skull to myself as a horrible volcano in eruption, with exactly the murky and comic character which attaches to the rear and its excretions. But the eye is without doubt the symbol of the dazzling sun, and the one I imagined at the summit of my skull was necessarily inflamed, being dedicated to the contemplation of the sun at its maximum burst [clat] [II 14].The fecal eye of the sun is also torn from its volcanic entrails and the pain of a man who tears out his own eyes with his fingers is no more absurd than that anal setting of the sun [II 28].The perfect identity between representation and its objectblind sun or blinding sun, it matters little [II 14]is thought consistently in these early texts as the direct gaze; an Icarian collapse into the sun which consummates apprehension only by translating it into the register of the intolerable. In the copulation with the sunwhich is no more a gratification than a representationsubject and object fuse at the level of their profound consistency, exhibiting (in blindness) that they were never what they were. The unconsciouslike timeis oblivious to contradiction, as Freud argues. There is only the primary process (Batailles sun), except from the optic of the secondary process (representation) whichat the level of the primary processis still the primary process. This is a logically unmanageable dazzling, quite useless from the perspective of reason, which seeks to differentiate action on the basis of reality. This libidinal consistency, which is (must be) a logically the same as the sun, is the thread of Ariadne, tangled in the labyrinth of impure difference. At the beginning of The Solar Anus Bataille notes that: Ever since phrases have circulated in brains absorbed in thought, a total identification has been produced, since each phrase connects one thing to another by means of copulas; and it would all be visibly connected if one could discover in a single glance the line, in all its entirety, left by Ariadnes thread, leading thought through its own labyrinth [I 81].All human endeavour is built upon the sun, in the same way that a dam is built upon a river, but that there could be a solar society in a stronger sensea society whose gaze was fixed upon the death-core of the sunseems at first to be an impossibility.

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THE 1AC, LIKE ICARUS, FLIES TOO CLOSE TO THE SUN. THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF KNOWLEDGE AS PURELY OBSERVATIONAL, COMPLETELY LUMINOUS AND ASOLUTELY KNOWABLE IN A PRODUCTIVE WAY HAS BEEN MET WITH ITS FALL. IN AN ATTEMPT TO MELT THEIR WAX AN ELICIT THAT FALL WE POSE THE ALTERNATIVE, THE NOTION OF THE ROTTEN SUN THAT IS, WE ATTEMPT TO REVEAL THAT THE SUN AS A MEATPHOR FOR THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 1AC IS BOTH DUPLICITOUS AND TRANSGRESSED. INSTEAD OF UNDERSTANDING IT AS THAT WHICH ILLUMINATES OBJECTS WITHIN OUR GAZE, WE TURN THESE IDEAS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER AND MADLY FIX OUR GAZE UPON THE SUN INVITING BOTH BLINDNESS AND A CHANGED SUN BLINDNESS INDICATING A REJECTION OF OCULARCENTRISM AND THE ROTTEN SUN AS S SUN THAT IS NO LONGER PRODUCTIVE BUT IS INSTEAD EXCESSIVE, WASTED, UGLY, AND SELF DESTRUCTIVE. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, Rotten Sun, p. 57-8) The sun, from the human point of view (in other words, as it is confused with the notion of noon) is the most elevated conception. It is also the most abstract object, since it is impossible to look at it fixedly at that time of day. If we describe the notion of the sun in the mind of one whose weak eyes compel him to emasculate it, that sun must be said to have the poetic meaning of mathematical serenity and spiritual elevation. If on the other hand one obstinately focuses on it, a certain madness is implied, and the notion changes meaning because it is no long a production that appears in light, but refuse or combustion, adequately expressed by the horror emanating from a brilliant arc lamp. In practice the scrutinized sun can be identified with a mental ejaculation, foam on the lips, and an epileptic crisis. In the same way the preceding sun (the on not looked at) is perfectly beautiful, the one that is scrutinized can be considered horribly ugly. In mythology, the scrutinized sun is identified with a man who slays a bull (Mithra), with a vulture that eats the liver
(Prometheus): in other words, with the man who looks along with the slain bull or eaten liver. The Mithraic cult of the sun left to a very widespread religious practice: people stripped in a kind of pit that was covered with a wooden scaffold, on which a priest slashed the throat of a bull; thus they were suddenly doused with hot blood, to the accompaniment of the bulls boisterous struggle and bellowing a simply way of reaping the moral benefits of the blinding sun. of course the bull himself is also an image of the sun, but only with his throat slit. The same goes for the cock, whose horrible and particularly solar cry always approximates the screams of slaughter.

One might add that the sun has also been mythologically expressed by a man slashing his own throat, as well as by an anthropomorphic being deprived of a head. All of this leads one to say that the summit of elevation is in practice confused with a sudden falls of unheard of violence. The myth of Icarus is particularly expressive from this point of view: it clearly splits the sun in two the one that was shining at the moment of Icarus elevation, and the one that melted the wax, causing failure and a screaming fall when Icarus got too close.

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THE MOST MEANINGFUL THINGS IN LIFE, THOSE THINGS LIKE THE LAUGHTER OF A PROSTITUTE THAT CANNOT BE PUT TO WORK AND ARE FUNDAMENTALLY LIFE AFFIRMING CORRESPOND TO VERTICALITY, THEY RISE TOWARD THE SKY. HUMANS SIMILIARILY ATTEMPT TO BREAK FREE OF ANIMAL HORIZONTALITY BUT ARE FETTERED TO MISERY BY THE EYE, THE GAZE. THUS WE SUGGEST AS A METAPHOR FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR RELATION TO VISION NOT AN OCULAR EYE BUT A PENIAL EYE ONE THAT IS DEATCHED FROM BOTH THE HORIZONTAL AND THE VISUAL, ONE THAT TRANSFIGURES THE VISUAL BY TEARING IT OUT AND TURNING IT UPON THE SUN AS THE FIGURE OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE TO BE BLINDED AND CONSUMED IN FLAME. THIS FINAL ACT OF TURNING THE OCULAR UPON ITS GREATEST REFERENT IS THE IMAGE OF THE VERY NOTION OF EXPENDITURE THAT BOTH AFFIRMS THE WHORES CACKLES AND LEAVES THE SUN DEAD, COVERED IN SHIT, AND LYING IN ITS GRAVE. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, ThePineal Eye p. 82-5) The eye, at the summit of the skull, opening on the incandescent sun in order to contemplate it in a sinister solitude, is not a product of the understanding, but is instead an immediate existence; it opens and blinds itself like a conflagration, or like a fever that eats the being, or more exactly, the head. And thus it plays the role of a fire in a house; the head, instead of locking up life as money is locked in a safe, spends it without counting, for, and the end of this erotic metamorphosis, the head has received the electric power of points. This great burning head is the image of disagreeable light of the notion of expenditure, beyond the still empty notion as it is elaborated on the basis of methodical analysis. From the first, myth is identified not only with life but with the loss of life with degradation and death, starting from the being who bore it, it is not at all an external product, but the form that this being takes in his lubricious avatars, in the ecstatic gift he makes of himself as obscene and nude victim and a victim not before an obscure and immaterial force, but before great howls of prostitutes laughter. Existence no longer resembles a neatly defined itinerary from one practical sign to another, but a sickly incandescence, a durable orgasm.
IV. The Two Axes of Terrestrial Life No matter how blinding the mythical form, insofar as it is not a simple representation, but the exhausting consumption of being, it is possible, at its first indistinct appearance, to pass from a content to a container, to circumstantial form that, although it is probably unacceptable from the point of view of science, does not seem

The distribution of organic existence on the surface of the earth takes place on two axes: the first, vertical, prolongs the radius of the terrestrial sphere; the second, horizontal, is perpendicular to the first. Vegetation
develops more or less exclusively on the vertical axis (which is also the axis of the fall of bodies); on the other hand, the development of animal life is situated, or tends to be situated, on the horizontal axis. But although, generally speaking, their movements are only slippages parallel to the lines described by the rotation of the terrestrial globe, animals are never completely foreign to the axis of vegetal life. Thus existence makes them raise themselves above the ground when they come into the world and, in a relatively stable way, when they exit from sleep or love (on the other hand, sleep and death abandon bodies to a force directed from high to low). Their skeleton, even in the more regular cases, is not perfectly adjusted to a horizontal trajectory: the skull and thus the orifice of the eye are situated above the level of the anal vertebra. However, even if one refers to the position of the male in coitus, and to the structures of some birds, a complete verticality is never attained. V. The Position of the Human Body and Eyes on the Surface of the Terrestrial Globe.

different from the habitual constructs of the intellect.

Only human beings, tearing themselves away from peaceful animal horizontality, at the cost of the ignoble and painful efforts that can be seen in the faces of the great apes, have succeeded in appropriating the vegetal erection and in letting themselves be polarized, in a certain sense, by the sky.
It is thus that the earth whose immense regions are covered with plants that everywhere flee it in order to offer and destroy themselves endlessly, in order to project themselves into an alternate light and dark celestial void releases to the disappointing immensity of space the totality of laughing or lacerated men.

But, in this liberation of man, which leads to a suffocating absence of limits on the surface of the globe, human nature is far from surrendering without resistance. For if it is true that his blood, bones, and arms, that the shuddering of laughter and his insipid hate are endlessly lost and rise toward a sky as beautiful as death, as pale and implausible as death, his eyes continue to fetter him tightly to the vulgar things, in the midst of which necessity has determined his steps. The horizontal axis of vision, to which the human structure has remained strictly subjected, in the course of mans wrenching rejection of animal nature, is the expression of a misery all the more oppressive in that it is apparently infused with serenity.
VI. The Vertigo-Tree

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For the anthropologist who can only observe it, this contradiction of the axes of the human structure is itself devoid of meaning. And if, without even being able to explain itself, anthropology underscored the importance of the axes, it would only betray an unjustifiable tendency toward mysticism. The description of the perpendicular axes only takes on its value once it becomes possible to construct on these axes the puerile play of a mythological existence, answering no longer to observation or deduction but to a free development of the relations between the immediate and varied consciousness of human life and the supposedly unconscious givens that constitute this life. Thus the pineal eye, detaching itself from the horizontal system of normal ocular vision, appears in a kind of nimbus of tears, like the eye of a tree of, perhaps, like a human tree. At the same time this ocular tree is only a giant (ignoble) pink penis, drunk with the sun and suggesting or soliciting a nauseous malaise, the sickening despair of vertigo. In this transfiguration of nature, during which vision itself, attracted by nausea, is torn out and torn apart by the sunburst into which it stares, the erection ceases to be a painful upheaval on the surface of the earth and, in a vomiting of flavorless blood, it transforms itself into a vertiginous fall in celestial space, accompanied by a horrible cry.
VII. The Sun

The sun, situated at the bottom of the sky like a cadaver at the bottom of a pit, answers this inhuman cry with the spectral attraction of decomposition. Immense nature breaks its chains and collapses into the limitless void. A severed penis, soft and bloody, is substituted for the habitual order of things. It folds, where painful jaws still bite, pus, spittle, and larva accumulate, deposited by enormous flies: fecal like the eye painted at the bottom of a vase, this Sun, now borrowing its brilliance from death, has buried existence in the stench of night.

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WE TURN NOW TO OUR ATTEMPT TO TRANSGRESS THE OCULARCENTERISM OF THE 1AC AND ALL ITS ATTENDANT POWER STRUCTURES AND ASSUMPTIONS VIA A READING OF GEORGES BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE. BE WARNED TRANSGRESSION REQUIRES BRAVERY. BATAILLE, LIKE SADE BEFORE HIM, ISNT FOR THE FAINT OF HEART OR EASILY OFFENDED. Bataille 1928 (Georges, french pervert, the story of the eye, supervert.com ) It really was totally out of the question for Simone to lift her dress and place her bare behind in the dish of raw balls. All she could do was hold the dish in her lap. I told her I would like to fuck her again before Granero returned to fight the fourth bull, but she refused, and she sat there, keenly involved, despite everything, in the disembowelments of horses, followed, as she childishly put it, by "death and destruction, namely the cataract of bowels. Little by little, the sun's radiance sucked us into an unreality that fitted our malaise-the wordless and powerless desire to explode and get up of our behinds. We grimaced, because our eyes were blinded and because we were thirsty, our senses ruffled, and there was no possibility of quenching our desires. We three had managed to share in the morose dissolution that leaves no harmony between the various spasms of the body. We were so far gone that even Granero's return could not pull us out of that stupefying absorption. Besides, the bull opposite him was distrustful and seemed unresponsive; the combat went on just as drearily as before. The events that followed were without transition or connection, not because they weren't actually related, but because my attention was so absent as to remain absolutely dissociated. In just a few seconds: first, Simone bit into one of the raw balls, to my dismay; then Granero advanced towards the bull, waving his scarlet cloth; finally, almost at once, Simone, with a blood-red face and a suffocating lewdness, uncovered her long white thighs up to her moist vulva, into which she slowly and surely fitted the second pale globule-Granero was thrown back by the bull and wedged against the balustrade; the horns struck the balustrade three times at full speed; at the third blow, one horn plunged into the right eye and through the head. A shriek of unmeasured horror coincided with a brief orgasm for Simone, who was lifted up from the stones eat only to be flung back with a bleeding nose, under a blinding sun; men instantly rushed over to haul away Granero's body, the right eye dangling from the head. Thus, two globes of equal size and consistency had suddenly been propelled in opposite directions at once. One, the white ball of the bull, had been thrust into the "pink and dark" cunt that Simone had bared in the crowd; the other, a human eye, had spurted from Granero's head with the same force as a bundle of innards from a belly. This coincidence, tied to death and to a sort of urinary liquefaction of the sky, first brought us back to Marcella in a moment that was so brief and almost insubstantial, yet so uneasily vivid that I stepped forward like a sleepwalker as though about to touch her at eye level.
THE STORY CONTINUES A BIT LATER...

"Sir Edmund," she said, rubbing her cheek gently on his shoulder, "I want you to do something.""I shall do anything you like," he replied. She made me come over to the corpse: she knelt down and completely opened the eye that the fly had perched on. "Do you see the eye?" she asked me. "Well?""It's an egg," she concluded in all simplicity. "All right," I urged her, extremely disturbed, what are you getting at?" "I want to play with this eye." "What do you mean?" "Listen, Sir Edmund," she finally let it out, "you must give me this at once, tear it out at once, I want it!" Sir Edmund was always poker-faced except when he turned purple. Nor did he bat an eyelash now; but the blood did shoot to his face. He removed a pair of fine scissors from his wallet, knelt down, then nimbly inserted the fingers of his left hand into the socket and drew out the eye, while his right hand snipped the obstinate ligaments. Next, he presented the small whitish eyeball in a hand reddened with blood. Simone gazed at the absurdity and finally took it in her hand, completely distraught; yet she had no qualms, and instantly amused herself by fondling the depth of her thighs and inserting this apparently fluid object. The

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caress of the eye over the skin is so utterly, so extraordinarily gentle, and the sensation is so bizarre that it has something of a rooster's horrible crowing. Simone meanwhile amused herself by slipping the eye into the profound crevice of her ass, and after lying down on her back and raising her legs and bottom, she tried to keep the eye there simply by squeezing her buttocks together. But all at once, it spat out like a stone squeezed from a cherry, and dropped on the thin belly of the corpse, an inch or so from the cock. In the meantime, I had let Sir Edmund undress me, so that I could pounce stark naked on the crouching body of the girl; my entire cock vanished at one lunge into the hairy crevice, and I fucked her hard while Sir Edmund played with the eye, rolling it, in between the contortions of our bodies, on the skin of our bellies and breasts. For an instant, the eye was trapped between our navels." Put it up my ass, Sir Edmund," Simone shouted. And Sir Edmund delicately glided the eye between her buttocks. But finally, Simone left me, grabbed the beautiful eyeball from the hands of the tall Englishman, and with a staid and regular pressure from her hands, she slid it into hers lobbery flesh, in the midst of the fur. And then she promptly drew me over, clutching my neck between her arms and smashing her lips on mine so forcefully that I came without touching her and my come shot all over her fur. Now I stood up and, while Simone lay on her side, I drew her thighs apart, and found myself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for a neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror; in Simone's hairy vagina, I saw the wan blue eye of Marcelle, gazing at me through tears of urine. Streaks of come in the steaming hair helped give that dreamy vision a disastrous sadness. I held the thighs open while Simone was convulsed by the urinary spasm, and the burning urine streamed out from under the eye down to the thighs below

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BATAILLES NOTION OF THE BLIND, UPROOTED EYE REVERSES THE CARTESIAN FORMULATION OF VISION BASED IN A SCIENTIFIC QUEST FOR PERFECT UNDERSTANDING BY PUSHING SIGHT TO THE POINT OF THE RUPTURE OF THE EYE, LEAVING IT PURELY PHYSICAL, TORN OUT, AND BLINDED. BATAILLES EYE SIMULTANEOUSLY MARKS THE TRANSGRESSION OF LANGUAGE AND HUMANISM AS WELL AS THE DEATH OF GOD. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, From the Empire of the Gaze to
the Society of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord, pp.400-402)

Foucault's celebration of the heterogeneous interference between the discursive and figural in Roussel and Magritte was no less evident in his contribution to Critique's 1963 homage to its recently deceased founder.77 Noting the "obstinate prestige to the Eye . . . as a figure of inner experi-ence"7s accorded by Bataille, he stressed the difference between vision in a Cartesian philosophy of reflection or a science of observation, on the one hand, and Batailles transgressive vision of depense on the other. Whereas the "former sought pure transparency and truth, the latter reverses this entire direction: sight, crossing the globular limit of the eye, constitutes the eye in its instantaneous being; sight carries it away in this luminous stream (an outpouring foundation, streaming tears, and, short), blood hurls the eye outside of itself, conducts it to the limit where it bursts out in the immediately extinguished flash of its being. Only a small white ball, veined with blood, is left behind, only an exorbitated eye to which all sight is now deniedin the distance created by this violence and uprooting, the eye is seen absolutely, but denied any possibility of sight; the philosophical subject has been dispossessed and pursued to its limit.
So too has the phenomenological subject, who sought meaning in lived experience and the imbrication of the eye in the flesh of the world. Instead, as Hollier has pointed out, the

living eye for Bataille and Foucault is negated in favor of an anonymous visual field ironically seen

by no one.
According to Foucault, moreover, the

upturned, unseeing eye in Bataille also marks the limit of languages ability to signify the moment when language, arriving at its confines, overlaps itself, explodes and radically challenges itself in laughter, tears, the overturned eye of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacrifice. It thus suggests a link between human finitude, languages limits, which cannot be dialectically overcome, and the death of God, a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world. The eclipse of the solar divinity was linked for Foucault, as it had been for Bataille, with the decline of his secular analogue, the humanist concept of Man. Hostility to traditional notions of visual primacy and the critique of humanism were intricately linked in the work that most vividly established Foucault's credentials as an antihumanist, Les mots et les choses of 1966,
translated as The Order of Things." Significantly, the work begins with one of Foucault's most celebrated visual tableaux, his description of Velazquez's Las Meninas, and ends with a no less frequently cited visual metaphor of Man's face etched in the sand being erased by the waves at the edge of the sea.

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BATAILLES ALTERNATIVE TRANSGRESSES THE CENTRAL EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF OCULARCENTRISM Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, From the Empire of the Gaze to the
Society of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord, pp.406-407)

Only with the later triumph of an opaque and self-referential concept of language did the visually determined humanist episteme begin to be effaced enough for Foucault to claim that "man has been a figure occurring between two modes of language." With writers like Roussel and Batailleas well as others Foucault mentions, such as Artaud and Blanchotthe crisis of ocularcentrism had reached a point at which an epistemic shift away from humanism was on the horizon. Now those hitherto forbidden elements that had been consigned to the realm of darkness ever since the onset of the Classical Age, such as madness, difference, and transgressive eroticism, could be rescued from the domination of light, transparency, and homogenizing "sameness." For with the weakening of the Classical and humanist
paradigms went a concomitant questioning of the translucency of language which had accompanied it ever since the breakdown of preclassical unity of word and image. But rather than a return to that prelapsarian state in which latent meaning was available to be deciphered, the post-humanist condition would be characterized more by the mutual opacity Foucault celebrated in his studies of Roussel and Magritte.

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BATAILLES NOTION OF THE BLIND, UPROOTED EYE IMPLODES THE CARTESIAN UNDERPININGS OF THE MODERN UNDERSTANDING OF VISION THAT ATTEMPTS TO PERFECTLY SEE AND THUS PERFECTLY KNOW THE WORLD. BATAILLE DOES THIS THROUGH TRANSGRESSION, WHICH IS PUSHING A CONCEPT TO ITS LIMIT UNTIL IT EXPLODES. IN TERMS OF VISUALITY THEN BATAILLE PRESENTS AN EYE THAT IS TORN OUT AND BLINDED. Focault 63 (Michel, A Preface to Transgression, Religion and Culture Michel Foucault, ed. By Jeremy Carrette, pp 57-71)
Essentially the product of fissures, abrupt descents and broken contours, this misshapen and craglike language describes a circle; it refers to itself and is folded back on a questioning of its limits as if it were nothing more than a small night lamp that flashes with a strange light, signaling the void from which it arises and to which it addresses everything it illuminates and touches. Perhaps, it is this curious configuration which explains why Bataille attributed such obstinate prestige to the Eye. Throughout his career (from his first novel to Larmes dEros), the eye was to keep its value as a figure of inner experience: When at the height of anguish, I gently solicit a strange absurdity, an eye opens at the summit, in the middle of my skull. This is because the eye, a small white globe encloses its darkness, traces a limiting circle that only sight can cross. And the darkness within, the sombre core of the eye, pours out into the world like a fountain which sees, that is, which lights up the world; but it is transformed into the bright night of an image. The eye is mirror and lamp: it discharges its light into the word around it, while in a movement that is not necessarily contradictory, it precipitates this same light into the transparency of its well. Its globe has the expansive quality of a marvelous seed like an egg imploding towards the centre of night and extreme light, which it is and which it has just ceased to be. It

is the figure of being in the act of

transgressing its own limit.


The eye, in a philosophy of reflection, derives form its capacity to observe the power of becoming always more interior to itself. Lying behind each eye that sees, there exists a more tenuous one, an eye so discreet and yet so agile that its all-powerful glance can be said to eat away at the flesh of its white globe; behind this particular eye, there exists another, and, then, still others, each progressively more subtle until we arrive at the eye whose entire substance is nothing but the transparency of vision. This inner movement is finally resolved in a non-material centre where the intangible forms of truth are created and combined, in this heart of things which is the sovereign subject. Bataille reverses this entire direction: sight, crossing the globular limit of the eye, constitutes the eye in its instantaneous being; sight carries it away in this luminous stream (an outpouring fountain, streaming tears and, shortly, blood), hurls the eye outside itself, conducts it to the limit where it bursts out immediately extinguished flash of its being. Only a small white ball, veined with blood, is left behind, only an exorbitated eye to which all sight is now denied. And in the place from which sight had once passed, only a cranial cavity remains, only this black globe which the uprooted eye has made to close upon its sphere, depriving it of vision, but offering to this absence the spectacle of that indestructible core which now imprisons the dead glance. In the distance created by this violence and uprooting, the eye is seen absolutely, but denied any possibility of sight: the philosophizing subject has been dispossessed and pursued to its limit; and the sovereignty of philosophical language can now be heard from the distance, in the measureless void left behind by the exorbitated subject. But perhaps the eye accomplishes the most essential aspect of its play when, forced from its ordinary position, it is made to turn upwards in a movement that leads it back to the nocturnal and starred interior of the skull and it is made to show us its usually concealed surface, white and unseeing: it shuts out the day in a movement that manifests its own whiteness (whiteness being undoubtedly the image of clarity, its surface reflection, but for this very reason, it cannot communicate with it, nor communicate it); and the circular night of the iris is made to address the central absence which it illuminates with a flash, revealing it as night. The upturned orb suggests both the most open and the most impenetrable eye: causing its sphere to pivot, while remaining exactly the same and in the same place, it overturns day and night, crosses their limit, but only to find it again on the same line and from the other side; and the white hemisphere that appears momentarily at the place where the pupil once opened is like the being of the eye as it crosses the limit of its vision when it transgresses this opening to the light of day which defined the transgression of every sight. If man did not imperiously close his eyes, he would finally be unable to see the things worth seeing. But what we need to see does not involve any interior secret or the discovery of a more nocturnal world. Torn from its ordinary position and made to turn inwards in its orbit, the eye now pours its light only into a bony cavern. This turning up of its globe may seem a betrayal of la petite mort, but, more exactly, it simply

for the eye, is not the always elevated line of the horizon, but the limit it ceaselessly transgresses in its natural location, in the hollow where every vision originates, and where this limit is elevated into an absolute limit by an ecstatic movements which allows the eye to spring up from the other side. The upturned eye discovers the bond that links language and death at the moment that
it acts out this relationship of the limit and being; and it is perhaps from scenes that interrupt Batailles stories invariably concern the spectacle of erotic deaths, where upturned eyes display their limits and rotate inwards in gigantic and empty orbits. Bleu du ciel gies a singularly precise outline of this movement: early in November, when the earth of German cemetery is alive with the twinkling lights of candles and candle stubs, the narrator is lying with Dorothy among the tombstones; making love among the dead, the earth around him appears like the sky on a bright night. And the sky above forms a great hollow orbit, a death mask, in which he recognizes his inevitable end at the moment that pleasure overturns the four globes of flesh, causing the revolution of his sight. The earth under Dorothys body was open like a tomb, her belly opened itself to me like a fresh grave. We were struck with stupor, making love on a starred cemetery. Each light marked a skeleton in a grave and formed a wavering sky as perturbed as our mingled bodies. I unfastened Dorothys dress, I dirtied her clothes and her breast with the fresh earth which was stuck to my fingers. Our bodies trembled like two rows of clattering teeth. But what might this mean at the heart of thought? What significance has this insistent eye which appears to encompass what Bataille successively designated the inner experience, the extreme possibility, the comic process, or simply meditation? It is certainly no more metaphoric than Descartess phrasing of the clear perception of sight or this sharp point of mind which he called aceis mentis. In the point of fact, the upturned eye has no meaning in Batailles language, can have meaning since it marks its limit. It

indicates the death that it experiences in its natural location, in this springing up in place which causes the eye to rotate. Death,

indicates the moment when language, arriving at its confines, overlaps itself, explodes

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and radically challenges itself in laughter, tears, the overturned eye of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacrifice, and where it remains fixed in this way at the limits of its void, speaking of itself in a second language in which the absence of a sovereign subject outlines its essential emptiness and incessantly fractures the unity of its discourse. The enucleated or upturned eye marks the zone of Batailles philosophical language, the void into which it pours and loses itself, but in which it never stops talking somewhat like the interior, diaphanous and
illuminated eye of mystics and spiritualists that marks the point at which the secret language of prayer is embedded and choked by a marvelous communication which silences it. Similarly, but in an inverted manner, the eye in Bataille delineates the zone shared by language and death, the place where language discovers its being in the crossing of its limits: the non-dialectical form of philosophical language. This eye, as the fundamental figure of the place from which Bataille speaks and in which his broken language finds it uninterrupted domain, establishes

the connection, prior to any form of discourse, that exists between the death of God (a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world), the experience of finitude (springing up in death, twisting the light which is extinguished as it discovers that the interior is an empty skull, a central absence), and the turning back of language upon itself at the moment that it fails a conjunction which undoubtedly has no other equivalent than the association, well known
in other philosophies, of sight to truth or of contemplation to the absolute. Revealed to this eye, which in its pivoting conceals itself for all time, is the being of the limit: I will never forget the violent and marvelous experience that comes from the will to open ones eyes, facing what exists, what happens. Perhaps in the movement which carries it to a total night, the experience of transgression brings to light this relationship of finitude to being, this moment of the limit which anthropological thought, since Kant, could only designate from the distance and from the exterior through language of dialectics.

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IN ADDITION TO THE LITERAL ENUCLEATION THAT OCCURS IN BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE, OCULARCENTRISM IS REVERSED BY POSING A MODEL OF UNDERSTANDING OF VISION IN WHICH SIGHT IS METAPHORICALLY TRANSFORMED INTO AND METONYMICALLY CONNECTED WITH FETISHIZED OBJECTS AS A RADICAL JUXTAPOSITION THAT TRASNGRESSES NOT ONLY LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY BUT TOPPLES THE EYE. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, The Disenchantment of the Eye:
Bataille and the Surrealists pp.211-262)

Story of the Eye is a pivotal text for our own story of the eyes interrogation for a variety of reasons. Whatever else it may be, the eye in this story is, to borrow Brian Fitchs phrase, loeil qui ne voit pas. Bataille finishes his tale with the enucleated eye of the garroted priest inserted in the anus and then the vagina of the heroine, as the narrator realizes he finds himself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for the neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror. Enucleation is, in fact, a central theme of the story, which reproduces an actual episode Bataille witnessed in 1922: the ripping out of the matador Graneros eye by a bulls horn in
Seville. Until he saw the famous scene of the slit eyeball in the Surrealist masterpiece Un chien andalou by Dali and Bunuel in 1928, about which he wrote enthusiastically in the pages of Documents, he had no more vivid image to express his obsessive fascination with the violent termination of vision. The

enucleated eye was a parodic version of the separation of sight from the body characteristic of the Cartesian tradition; no longer able to see, it was then thrust back into the body through vaginal or anal orifices in ways that
mocked in advance Merleau-Pontys benign re-embodiment of the eye in the flesh of the world.

The novel challenges the primacy of sight in more subtle ways as well. As Barthes pointed out in an essay that in any other context
could innocently be called seminal, Batailles narrative can be read not merely as a sado-masochistic erotic reverie, but also as a linguistic adventure. That is, the

tale is motivated less by the increasingly bizarre couplings of its ostensible protagonists than by the metaphoric transformations of the objects on which they fetishistically focus. The most notable series is that linked to the eye itself, which is enchained with images of eggs, testicles, and the sun. A second train is composed of the liquids associated with them (tears, egg yolks, sperm) and other liquids like urine, blood and milk. According to Barthes, none of these terms is given any privilege, none has any foundational priority: It is the very equivalence of ocular and genital which is original, not one of its terms: the paradigm begins nowhereEverything is given on the surface and without hierarchy, the metaphor is displayed in its entirety; circular and explicit, it refers to no secret. Thus, the time honored function of the penetrating gaze, able to pierce appearance to see the essences beneath, is explicitly rejected. Bataille furthermore links the two metaphoric chains to each other in metonymic ways, so that signifiers from one (e.g. eggs) are coupled with signifiers form others (e.g. urination). The result, Barthes concludes, are typically Surrealist images produced through radically decontextualized juxtapositions (e.g. suns that cry, castrated or pissing eyes, eggs that are sucked like breasts). Thus, what is transgressed is not merely normal sex behavior, but also the rules of conventional language. Because in French, words like couille are near anagrams of cul and oeil, the effect of
linguistic promiscuity is as strong as that of its more obvious sexual counterpart. Barthes structuralist reading, with its strongly texualist rather than experienctial bias, may have its flaws, but it points to one important implication of the novel: that whether understood literally or metaphorically, the eye is toppled form its privileged place in the sensual hierarchy to be linked instead with objects and functions more normally associated with baser human behavior. This is, indeed, the most ignoble eye imaginable. To understand fully the depths of that ignobility, we have to recall the speculative claim Freud was advancing at virtually the same time in Civilization and

Freud conjectured, only began when hominids raised themselves off the ground, stopped sniffing the nether regions of their fellows, and elevated sight to a position of superiority. With that elevation went a concomitant
repression of sexual and aggressive drives and the radical separation of higher spiritual and metal faculties form the lower functions of the body. Bataille was himself in analysis with Dr. Adrien Borel when he wrote Story of the Eye. He later contended that by August 1927, it put an end to the series of dreary mishap and failures in which he had been floundering, but not the state of intellectual intensity, which still persists. Nor would his fascination with Freudian ideas end, as he continued to draw on them throughout his life. Although there is no evidence that he knew of Freuds specific conjectures about the connections between elevated vision and repression indeed, the chronology of their respective publications suggests otherwise, even if it is likely that Freuds ideas were in circulation among analysts before coming into print Story of the Eye can be read as a tacit plea for the reversal of this most fateful of human developments. Bataille s defense of what he called a general as opposed to a restricted economy, one based on depense (waste or

Its Discontents. Human civilization,

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expenditure), loss, transgression, and excess, rather than production, exchange, conservation, and instrumental rationality, was closely tied to this critique of the primacy of vision. The only light cast by the potlatch ceremonies he found so fascinating was produced by the flames consuming the wealth destroyed. So too, Batailles critique of absolute knowledge most notably that sought by Hegel in favor of a non-knowledge or un-knowing which always defeats the ability to think it clearly and distinctly, drew on the same impulse. If, as Robert Sasso puts it, Bataille wanted to gon du savoir au non-savoir, he certainly understood the importance of voir for savoir. It could be undermined only through the explosive sound of laughter or the blurred vision produced by tear.

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GENDER (HAPTIC) A HAPTIC ECONOMY RATHER THAN A SCOPIC ECONOMY IS MORE INCLUSIVE OF FEMALE SEXUALITY AND AVOIDS REDUCTION OF THE FEMININE TO A REPLICATION OF MASCULINITY Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Phallogocentrism: Derrida and
Irigaray pp.493-542) Within a scopic economy, the female genitalia may seem like an absence, but within a haptic one, they are far richer than their male equivalent. Whereas the penis is a singular organ needing something outside itself to provide gratification, the vaginal lips, clitoris, labia, vulva, and so on, are multiple this sex which is not one and thus capable of self-touching. Autoaffection, Irigaray contends, not autorepresentation is the mark of female sexuality. Hidden female lips, she speculated elsewhere, may even have the same etymological source as the word labyrinth, which is so powerful an image in the antiocularcentric discourse. Not only are the female genitalia plural and female sexuality based more on touch than sight, but the womans body is also less firmly divided into inner and outer than the mans. Its form is less unified and solid, closer to the fluidity that is expressed by menstrual blood, milk, and tears. Echoing Batailles defense of informe and the waste products of the body, Irigaray argued that only a mechanics of fluids rather than solids can avoid the reduction of female difference into male sameness. We would thus escape from a dominant scopic economy, she contended, we would be to a greater extent in an economy of flow. Not only would such an alternative call into question the psychological underpinnings of that scopic economy, but it would also challenge its philosophical

Derrida, Irigaray sought to link the hegemonic tradition of Western thought ever since Plate, the tradition of specula(riza)tion, with the privileging of the eye. Like Bataille, she foregrounded the prepressed materiality, irreducible to images of visible matter, that such a tradition rejected as heterogeneous waste. Like Heidegger, she bemoaned the reduction of the world to a standing reserve for the manipulative subject. Like Baudry, she located the fatal starting point of the ocularcentric project in the dream of perfect representation evident in Platos myth of the cave. But more than all of them, she identified that other of heliocentric, idealist rationality with women, who are never anything but the still undifferentiated opaqueness of sensible matter, the store (of) substance for the sublation of self, or being as what is, or what he is (or was), here and now.

correlate (and, she added in a later essay, Western science as well). Like

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HEIDEGGER THE OBJECTIFICATTION OF THE WORLD AT THE HANDS OF THE GAZE OF THE 1AC IS THE ROOT OF SUFFERING AND VIOELNCE AND IS INSEPERABLE FROM RACISM AND ALL FORMS OF HATRED. AS AN ATTEMPT TO POSIT AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO VISUALITY WE ATTEMPT TO OPEN OUR EYES TO BLINDNESS WE APPROACH VISION AS WHAT HEIDEGGER CALLS THE LIGHTING WHICH IS TO SAY AS A HERMENEUTICAL INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONCEALMENT AND UNCONCEALMENT WHICH RESPECTS THE ABYSS OF THAT WHICH IS UNCONCEALED AND THEREBY SUBVERTING THE SOVREIGNTY OF THE GAZE AND DENYING ITS POWER. THIS MOVE IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL IN THAT ANY INCLUSION OF THE WILL TO POWER DRIVEN GAZE OF THE 1AC DESTROYS THE ALTERNATIVE AND RESULTS IN TOTALITARIAN TYRANNY. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
Following the passage on the interpretation of which we have just been reflecting, Heidegger asks: Why is it that we stubbornly resist considering even once whether the belonging-together of subject and object does not arise from something that first imparts their nature to both the object and its objectivity, and the subjectivity, and hence is prior to the realm of their recipricrocity? Carrying this question forward in the direction that Heideggers preceding discussion would suggest, we are led to the thought that subject

and object are gathered together and belong together in and by grace of the field of the field of the lighting-that elemental presencing of being which opens up, lays down, and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that first joins subject and gathers a field of visibility. It is the lighting that, in its configuration as ground, offers and submits itself to the conditions of perceptivity that rule in the life of a mortal. But in modern times, this mortal has become an ego-logical subject: someone who, constituting himself as a subject, focuses on what is present and turns it into an object, a figure split off from the dynamic ground, the surrounding contextual referential field. If our time is our of joint, so is the figure-ground Gestalt. This splitting off, of subject from object, figure from ground, and the Gestalt itself from the presence of the lighting, is symptomatic of the antagonisms that persist in our deeply divided and still unreconciled society. And when we consider what this splitting means when the object of the gaze in another subject when it is a question of how another subject is looked at, faced, seen, made to figure in the figure-ground Gestell-then we are approaching the root of the suffering, rage, and violence distinctive of the contemporary world. How different social relations would be if they could be deeply rooted, by virtue of an awareness (Stimmung) that does not presently form very often, in a felt sense of being gathered together in to the underlying unity of the lighting, a felt sense of belonging together in the Laying-down-that-gathers-and of having always already belonged together, gathered through the gift of that lighting, in a dimension of being prior to the realm of their reciprocity ! Stereotyped, reifying perceptions of the other, ways of looking at others that are inseparable from racism, nationalism, and ethnic hatreds, would be more difficult to sustain, if the awareness toward which Heidegger is gesturing were to be cultivated as the subsoil in which our vision needs to be well rooted. To be sure, as Heidegger says, the jointure thanks to which revealing and concealing are mutually joined must remain the invisible of all invisibles, since it [is that which] bestows shining on whatever appears. It must be certainly protected from the will to total visibility, because if not properly cared for, its gift of light and darkness would fall and negation, placed at the disposal of the dominant will to power; and the peoples of the world would eventually be left without any place to hide from totalitarian tyranny and terror. But this possibility, this danger, makes it all the more necessary that we not let the invisibility, the withdrawal of the jointure fall into total oblivion, absolute negation. We need to make this jointure visible in our world: visible, however, as the invisible of all invisibles. And this means that our looking and seeing must let themselves be appropriate by this invisibility, becoming, through their capacity for ontological recollection, its hermeneutic organ, protecting and preserving its necessary withdrawal.

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This interpretation points toward the need for a historically different way of looking and seeing a way of looking and seeing that obeys in care the way of the lighting. Heidegger continues: If we think it [i.e., the presencing of being] as lighting, this includes not only the brilliance, but also the openness wherein everything, especially the reciprocally related, comes into shining. Lighting is therefore more illuminating, and also more than laying bare. Lighting is the meditatively gathering bringing-before into the open. It is the bestowal of presencing. According to Heidegger, The event of lighting [das Ereignis der Lichtung) is the world. The meditatively gathering lighting which brings into the open is revealing; [but] it abides in self-concealing. Thus it is necessary that, in virtue of our way of looking and seeing, we protect and preserve the self-concealment of the lighting, while at the same time opening to this event and letting it come into its own by gathering it into our way and making it visible hermeneutically as that which opens up our world.
Heideggers discussion of the lighting is haunted, however, by deep-and well-founded-anxieties. What concerns him is the danger that, in spite of all his precautions, reference to this lighting will be misunderstood. For the self-giving of the lighting both is and is not a lighting, a light we can see. Taking place within the realm of the visible, it can appear only as that which visibly withdraws from the reach of our vision. Thus, most of all, Heidegger is worried that the event, the giving, of the lighting- the wonder of gift, that there is light- will be degraded by a reduction to the physics and optics of light. The lighting, he says, is no mere brightening and lightening. And that is because what he is trying to get us to see is a revealing-concealing lighting concerned with the presencing of what is present. Appealing, in spite of the terrible dangers, to our capacity, our potential for vision, he tells us that the lighting not only illuminates what is present, but gathers it together and secures it in advance in presencing. Thus, were our own way of looking and seeing to become a recollection and mimetic repetition of this gift of lighting-or, in other words, were our way to become an ontologically appropriate, ontologically appropriated, it would, in its own way, become a gathering, a vision of the Geviert, gathering earth and sky, gods and mortals. Because we are being gifted with a capacity-to-see the potential of which still remains unrealized and unfulfilled, the gift of the lighting-the wonder that Es gibt lighting-makes a claim on us: a claim that burdens us with the responsibility to realize our great potential for vision, our capacity for responsiveness, our responseability. Gods and men, says Heidegger, Are not only illuminated in the lighting, but are also enlightened from it and toward it. Thus they can, in their own way, accomplish the lighting (bringing it to the fullness of its essence) and thereby protect it.... [moreover, because they receive this lighting and are dependent on it,] they are appropriated into the event of lighting, and are never concealed. On the contrary, they are revealed, thought in still another sense [i.e., in that the claim of this lighting on their responsiveness, e.g., on their responsibility for using their capacity to perceive it, puts them on trial]. Just as those who are far distant belong to the distance, so are the revealed-in the sense now to be thought-entrusted [zugertraut] to the lighting that keeps and shelters them. As beings of sight, we are dependent on the gift of the lighting, and therefore are entrusted to it. But we are also thereby entrusted with it, because the lighting can come into its own, or come back to itself in fullness of its essence (as Heidegger puts it), only through the mediation of our way of looking and seeing. For it is only by (the) virtue of our looking and seeing that the lighting can be made visible hermeneutically, visible as the coming of the lighting which first makes our vision possible.

the coming of the lighting, as the interplay of concealment and unconcealment within which all that is comes to presence, can be protected and preserved only by (the) virtue of a way of seeing and looking that [1] makes it visible in its invisibility, acknowledging our finitude, our limited horizons, and the immeasurable abyss of the invisible, and that thereby [2] respects the withdrawal and self-concealment of the lighting, protecting and preserving it, instead of violently penetrating its abodes of concealment with an insolent demand for total visibility, total clarity, total control. The lighting gives us light but it also subverts that sovereignty of the gaze, leading it into the shadows, into the dark, into the realms of semblance and deception; obstructing its powers of penetration; compelling submission to the invisible beyond being. The lighting opens our eyes-to blindness.
Furthermore, Following Heraclitue, who was merciless in criticizing the ways of his contemporaries, Heidegger formulates his own criticism of the looking and seeing that predominates in the contemporary world. He writes: Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights everything present in its presencing. But they turn from the lighting, and turn only toward what is present, which is what immediately concerns them in their everyday commerce with each other.... They have no inkling of what they have been entrusted with: presencing, which in its lighting first allows what is present to come to appearance. In the lighting of which they come and go, remains concealed from them and forgotten.

recollection of the lighting cannot take place in a perception, a way of looking and seeing, for example, that is grasping, possessive, driven by the will to power: The golden gleam of the lightings invisible shining cannot be grasped, because it is not itself something grasping. Rather, it is the purely appropriating even [das reine Ereignen]. The invisible shining of the lighting streams from the wholesome self-keeping in the selfrestraining preservation of destiny [Geschick].

As Heidegger is quick to point out, however, the

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2NC ANSWERS

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A/T PERM 1. THE PERM FAILS BECAUSE THE LINK SWAMPS THE ALTERNATIVE. CROSS-APPLY THE 1NC LINK EVIDENCE, IT IS VERY EXPLICIT THAT THE ADDING OF THE VISUAL TO OTHER WAYS OF KNOWINGREAMINS UNDER THE DOMINANCE OF THE GAZE. THE PERMUTATIONS ATTEMPT TO COMBINE SENSORY PERCEPTIONS IN THE PURSUIT OF KNOWLEDGE RESULTS IN THE BIOPOLITICAL EMPIRE OF THE GAZE BECAUSE THE AUDITORY HAS NO SIGNIFICANT POSITION IN THE FORMULATION OF CLINICAL PERCEPTION IT WILL ALWAYS BE SUBSUMED AND EXTINGUISHED BY THE VISUAL. THE PERM KILLS THE ALTERNATIVE, LEAVING ONLY THE LINK AND BIOPOLITICAL CONTROL. 2. INCOMPATIBLE THE ENTIRETY OF THE KNOWLEDGE POSITED IN THE 1AC IS CONSTRUCTED AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE BEING ILLUMINATED BY THE SUBJECT, THE SPEAKER. OUR CRITICISM IS ONE THAT SEEKS TO UNDERMINE NOT ONLY THE PRIMACY OF VISUALITY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF KNOWLEDGE AS AN OBJECT, BUT THE FUNDAMENTAL SUBJECT/OBJECT DUALISM UNDERPINNING THEIR 1AC. OUR FOUCAULT EVIDENCE ON THE ALTERNATIVE INDICATES THAT WE ACCOMPLISH THIS VIA BATAILLES TRANSGRESSION, AND THUS THE 1AC IS AT BEST UNNECESSARY AND AT WORST A CORRUPTING ELEMENT IN THE PERMUTATION. 3. THE PERM IS ANOTHER LINK THE PERM IS JUST AN EXTENSION OF THE BLINDING GLARE OF THE SUN. ITS YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT BY THE AFFRIMATIVE TO PERFECTLY KNOW THE WORLD, THIS TIME BY ATTEMPTING TO RATIONALIZE AND MAKE UTILITARIAN THAT WHICH RESISTS KNOWLEDGE THE ALTERNATIVE. BATAILLES IMAGERY IS NOT ACCIDENTAL. WHEN HE TELLS US THAT THE SUN BECOMES DARK, UGLY, AND INCAPABLE IT IS TO EXPOSE PRECISELY THE LACK OF ABILITY OF KNOWLEDGE TO PENETRATE CERTAIN REALMS, PLACES LIKE THE UNPRODUCITVE EXPENDITURES OF SEX AND THE UNINTELLIGIBILITY OF FETISH AND VIOLENCE. WHEN HE BLINDS THE GAZE, TEARS OUT EYES AND PUTS THEM INTO DARK PLACES IT IS TO MAKE THIS CONNECTION EXPLICIT ONCE AGAIN AND TO ILLUSTRATE THE NECESSITY OF UNDERSTANDINGTHIS CONNECTION, THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE PRIMACY OF VISION. 4. THE PERM IS SEVERANCE OUR CRITICISM IS NOT ONLY OF THE WORD OBSERVATION. WE FIND ITS PLACEMENT MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN ITS USAGE AS IT INDICATES THAT EACH ORGANIZED STORY THE AFFIRMATIVE TELLS, ALL THE KNOWLEDGE CONTAINED IN THE 1AC, IS SOMETHING OBSERVABLE, AN OBJECT. THE PERM CANNOT ESCAPE THE LINK WITHOUT UNREADING AND UNORGANIZING THAT 1AC OR ENGAGING IN SOME SORT OF WISHING AWAY OF THE ENTIRETY OF THEIR FIRST SPEECH ACT. WERE PRETTY SURE SEVERANCE IS BAD SINCE IT, ESPECIALLY IN THIS ROUND, WOULD ALLOW THE AFFIRMATIVE TO JUST SAY J/K EVERY ROUND AND AVOID ANYTHING THE NEGATIVE ROUND. THIS SEEMS LIKE SOMETHING THAT WOULD NEGATIVELY IMPACT NEG GROUND (SINCE WE COULDNT GET ANY TO STICK) AND THEREFORE EDUCATION (SINCE WE NEVER TALK ABOUT ANYTHING IN ANY SUBSTANCE) NOT TO MENTION COMPETITIVE EQUITY (SINCE IT BECOMES LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NEG TO WIN).

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5. THE PERM FAILS IN ORDER TO AFFIRM THE MOST MEANINGFUL THINGS IN LIFE, THOSE THINGS LIKE THE LAUGHTER OF A PROSTITUTE THAT CANNOT BE PUT TO WORK AND ARE FUNDAMENTALLY LIFE AFFIRMING CORRESPOND TO VERTICALITY, THEY RISE TOWARD THE SKY WE MUST PUT THE SUN UTTERLY TO DEATH. I OTHER WORDS, THE 1AC HAS NO PLACE IN THE ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO ENJOY LIFE. JUST LIKE THE PERM ATTEMPTS TO BREAK FREE OF THE 1ACS OCULARCENTRISM, HUMANS SIMILIARILY ATTEMPT TO BREAK FREE OF ANIMAL HORIZONTALITY BUT ARE FETTERED TO MISERY BY THE EYE, THE GAZE THE 1AC. OUR ALTERNATIVES ACT OF TURNING THE OCULAR UPON ITS GREATEST REFERENT, THE SUN, IS THE IMAGE OF THE VERY NOTION OF EXPENDITURE THAT BOTH AFFIRMS THE WHORES CACKLES AND LEAVES THE SUN DEAD, COVERED IN SHIT, AND LYING IN ITS GRAVE. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, ThePineal Eye p. 82-5) The eye, at the summit of the skull, opening on the incandescent sun in order to contemplate it in a sinister solitude, is not a product of the understanding, but is instead an immediate existence; it opens and blinds itself like a conflagration, or like a fever that eats the being, or more exactly, the head. And thus it plays the role of a fire in a house; the head, instead of locking up life as money is locked in a safe, spends it without counting, for, and the end of this erotic metamorphosis, the head has received the electric power of points. This great burning head is the image of disagreeable light of the notion of expenditure, beyond the still empty notion as it is elaborated on the basis of methodical analysis. From the first, myth is identified not only with life but with the loss of life with degradation and death, starting from the being who bore it, it is not at all an external product, but the form that this being takes in his lubricious avatars, in the ecstatic gift he makes of himself as obscene and nude victim and a victim not before an obscure and immaterial force, but before great howls of prostitutes laughter. Existence no longer resembles a neatly defined itinerary from one practical sign to another, but a sickly incandescence, a durable orgasm.
IV. The Two Axes of Terrestrial Life No matter how blinding the mythical form, insofar as it is not a simple representation, but the exhausting consumption of being, it is possible, at its first indistinct appearance, to pass from a content to a container, to circumstantial form that, although it is probably unacceptable from the point of view of science, does not seem

The distribution of organic existence on the surface of the earth takes place on two axes: the first, vertical, prolongs the radius of the terrestrial sphere; the second, horizontal, is perpendicular to the first. Vegetation
develops more or less exclusively on the vertical axis (which is also the axis of the fall of bodies); on the other hand, the development of animal life is situated, or tends to be situated, on the horizontal axis. But although, generally speaking, their movements are only slippages parallel to the lines described by the rotation of the terrestrial globe, animals are never completely foreign to the axis of vegetal life. Thus existence makes them raise themselves above the ground when they come into the world and, in a relatively stable way, when they exit from sleep or love (on the other hand, sleep and death abandon bodies to a force directed from high to low). Their skeleton, even in the more regular cases, is not perfectly adjusted to a horizontal trajectory: the skull and thus the orifice of the eye are situated above the level of the anal vertebra. However, even if one refers to the position of the male in coitus, and to the structures of some birds, a complete verticality is never attained. V. The Position of the Human Body and Eyes on the Surface of the Terrestrial Globe.

different from the habitual constructs of the intellect.

Only human beings, tearing themselves away from peaceful animal horizontality, at the cost of the ignoble and painful efforts that can be seen in the faces of the great apes, have succeeded in appropriating the vegetal erection and in letting themselves be polarized, in a certain sense, by the sky.
It is thus that the earth whose immense regions are covered with plants that everywhere flee it in order to offer and destroy themselves endlessly, in order to project themselves into an alternate light and dark celestial void releases to the disappointing immensity of space the totality of laughing or lacerated men.

But, in this liberation of man, which leads to a suffocating absence of limits on the surface of the globe, human nature is far from surrendering without resistance. For if it is true that his blood, bones, and arms, that the shuddering of laughter and his insipid hate are endlessly lost and rise toward a sky as beautiful as death, as pale and implausible as death, his eyes continue to fetter him tightly to the vulgar things, in the midst of which necessity has determined his steps. The horizontal axis of vision, to which the human structure has remained strictly subjected, in the course of mans wrenching rejection of animal nature, is the expression of a misery all the more oppressive in that it is apparently infused with serenity.
VI. The Vertigo-Tree

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For the anthropologist who can only observe it, this contradiction of the axes of the human structure is itself devoid of meaning. And if, without even being able to explain itself, anthropology underscored the importance of the axes, it would only betray an unjustifiable tendency toward mysticism. The description of the perpendicular axes only takes on its value once it becomes possible to construct on these axes the puerile play of a mythological existence, answering no longer to observation or deduction but to a free development of the relations between the immediate and varied consciousness of human life and the supposedly unconscious givens that constitute this life. Thus the pineal eye, detaching itself from the horizontal system of normal ocular vision, appears in a kind of nimbus of tears, like the eye of a tree of, perhaps, like a human tree. At the same time this ocular tree is only a giant (ignoble) pink penis, drunk with the sun and suggesting or soliciting a nauseous malaise, the sickening despair of vertigo. In this transfiguration of nature, during which vision itself, attracted by nausea, is torn out and torn apart by the sunburst into which it stares, the erection ceases to be a painful upheaval on the surface of the earth and, in a vomiting of flavorless blood, it transforms itself into a vertiginous fall in celestial space, accompanied by a horrible cry.
VII. The Sun

The sun, situated at the bottom of the sky like a cadaver at the bottom of a pit, answers this inhuman cry with the spectral attraction of decomposition. Immense nature breaks its chains and collapses into the limitless void. A severed penis, soft and bloody, is substituted for the habitual order of things. It folds, where painful jaws still bite, pus, spittle, and larva accumulate, deposited by enormous flies: fecal like the eye painted at the bottom of a vase, this Sun, now borrowing its brilliance from death, has buried existence in the stench of night. 6. BY POSITING THE QUESTION OF COMBINING IDEAS IN SEARCH OF THE BEST OPTION FOR INTELLECTUAL ENDORSEMENT THE AFFIRMATIVE OPENS UP THE DEBATE FOR ALL TYPES OF COMBINATIONS. WITH RECIPROCITY IN MIND WE THINK THAT IF THE AFFIRMATIVE IS ALLOWED MULTIPLE PERMUTATIONS THEN WE SHOULD BE ALLOWED AT LEAST ONE. IN THE INTEREST OF FAIRNESS WE OFFER THE FOLLOWING COUNTERPERMUTATION: WE WILL DO ALL OF THE ALTERNATIVE AND ONLY THE AFFIRMATIVE PLAN TEXT.NOW, THEY MAY SAY THAT THIS IS UNFAIR, BUT THAT ISNT TRUE. THE EFFECT OF THE COUNTER-PERMUTATION IS TO MAGNIFY THE LINK LEVEL OF THE CRITICISM. OUR CRITICISM IS NOT OF THEIR PLAN TEXT IN A VACUUM AND COMBINED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE, OUR LINK IS DERIVED FROM THE WAY THEY CONSTRUCT THEIR PLAN, CALCULATE ITS OUTCOMES, AND OBJECTIFY THE NATURE ABOUT WHICH IT SPEAKS. THEY ENDORSE ALL OF THIS POST THEIR PERMUTATION. ONLY THE COUNTER PERM EXPOSES THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTION IN THE FACE OF THE ALTERNATIVE.

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A/T SUKRIS - NO TRANSGRESSION THIS IS A MISUNDERSTANDING OF HOW TRANSGRESSION WORKS. SHE ONLY OFFERS US ONE SIDE OF THE PARADOX, THAT THE EYE IS POSITED (WE WATCH THE SCENE). TRANSGRESSION IS ALWAYS TAKING SOMETHING PRESENT AND PUSHING IT TO ITS LIMIT, RUNNING THE MACHINE INTO OVERDRIVE. IT NECESSARILY INVOLVES AT SOME LEVEL AN AFFIRMATION OF THAT WHICH IS TO BE EXPLODED, BUT ONLY AN AFFIRMATION IN ORDER TO TRANSGRESS. THIS IS WHY OUR FOUCAULT EVIDENCE SAYS OF THE EYE Essentially the product of fissures, abrupt descents and broken contours, this misshapen and craglike language describes a circle; it refers to itself and is folded back on a questioning of its limits as if it were nothing more than a small night lamp that flashes with a strange light, signaling the void from which it arises and to which it addresses everything it illuminates and touches. Perhaps, it is this curious configuration which explains why Bataille attributed such obstinate prestige to the Eye. Throughout his career (from his first novel to Larmes dEros), the eye was to keep its value as a figure of inner experience: When at the height of anguish, I gently solicit a strange absurdity, an eye opens at the summit, in the middle of my skull. This is because the eye, a small white globe encloses its darkness, traces a limiting circle that only sight can cross. And the darkness within, the sombre core of the eye, pours out into the world like a fountain which sees, that is, which lights up the world; but it is transformed into the bright night of an image. The eye is mirror and lamp: it discharges its light into the word around it, while in a movement that is not necessarily contradictory, it precipitates this same light into the transparency of its well. Its globe has the expansive quality of a marvelous seed like an egg imploding towards the centre of night and extreme light, which it is and which it has just ceased to be. It is the figure of being in the act of transgressing its own limit. BATAILLES NOTION OF THE BLIND, UPROOTED EYE REVERSES THE CARTESIAN FORMULATION OF VISION BASED IN A SCIENTIFIC QUEST FOR PERFECT UNDERSTANDING BY PUSHING SIGHT TO THE POINT OF THE RUPTURE OF THE EYE, LEAVING IT PURELY PHYSICAL, TORN OUT, AND BLINDED. BATAILLES EYE SIMULTANEOUSLY MARKS THE TRANSGRESSION OF LANGUAGE AND HUMANISM AS WELL AS THE DEATH OF GOD. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, From the Empire of the Gaze to
the Society of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord, pp.400-402)

Foucault's celebration of the heterogeneous interference between the discursive and figural in Roussel and Magritte was no less evident in his contribution to Critique's 1963 homage to its recently deceased founder.77 Noting the "obstinate prestige to the Eye . . . as a figure of inner experi-ence"7s accorded by Bataille, he stressed the difference between vision in a Cartesian philosophy of reflection or a science of observation, on the one hand, and Batailles transgressive vision of depense on the other. Whereas the "former sought pure transparency and truth, the latter reverses this entire direction: sight, crossing the globular limit of the eye, constitutes the eye in its instantaneous being; sight carries it away in this luminous stream (an outpouring foundation, streaming tears, and, short), blood hurls the eye outside of itself, conducts it to the limit where it bursts out in the immediately extinguished flash of its being. Only a small white ball, veined with blood, is left behind, only an exorbitated eye to which all sight is now deniedin the distance created by this violence and uprooting, the eye is seen absolutely, but denied any possibility of sight; the philosophical subject has been dispossessed and pursued to its limit.

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pointed out, the

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So too has the phenomenological subject, who sought meaning in lived experience and the imbrication of the eye in the flesh of the world. Instead, as Hollier has

living eye for Bataille and Foucault is negated in favor of an anonymous visual field ironically seen

by no one.
According to Foucault, moreover, the

upturned, unseeing eye in Bataille also marks the limit of languages ability to signify the moment when language, arriving at its confines, overlaps itself, explodes and radically challenges itself in laughter, tears, the overturned eye of ecstasy, the mute and exorbitated horror of sacrifice. It thus suggests a link between human finitude, languages limits, which cannot be dialectically overcome, and the death of God, a sun that rotates and the great eyelid that closes upon the world. The eclipse of the solar divinity was linked for Foucault, as it had been for Bataille, with the decline of his secular analogue, the humanist concept of Man. Hostility to traditional notions of visual primacy and the critique of humanism were intricately linked in the work that most vividly established Foucault's credentials as an antihumanist, Les mots et les choses of 1966,
translated as The Order of Things." Significantly, the work begins with one of Foucault's most celebrated visual tableaux, his description of Velazquez's Las Meninas, and ends with a no less frequently cited visual metaphor of Man's face etched in the sand being erased by the waves at the edge of the sea.

BATAILLES ALTERNATIVE TRANSGRESSES THE CENTRAL EPISTEMIC FOUNDATIONS OF OCULARCENTRISM Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, From the Empire of the Gaze to the
Society of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord, pp.406-407)

Only with the later triumph of an opaque and self-referential concept of language did the visually determined humanist episteme begin to be effaced enough for Foucault to claim that "man has been a figure occurring between two modes of language." With writers like Roussel and Batailleas well as others Foucault mentions, such as Artaud and Blanchotthe crisis of ocularcentrism had reached a point at which an epistemic shift away from humanism was on the horizon. Now those hitherto forbidden elements that had been consigned to the realm of darkness ever since the onset of the Classical Age, such as madness, difference, and transgressive eroticism, could be rescued from the domination of light, transparency, and homogenizing "sameness." For with the weakening of the Classical and humanist
paradigms went a concomitant questioning of the translucency of language which had accompanied it ever since the breakdown of preclassical unity of word and image. But rather than a return to that prelapsarian state in which latent meaning was available to be deciphered, the post-humanist condition would be characterized more by the mutual opacity Foucault celebrated in his studies of Roussel and Magritte.

IN ADDITION TO THE LITERAL ENUCLEATION THAT OCCURS IN BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE, OCULARCENTRISM IS REVERSED BY POSING A MODEL OF UNDERSTANDING OF VISION IN WHICH SIGHT IS METAPHORICALLY TRANSFORMED INTO AND METONYMICALLY CONNECTED WITH FETISHIZED OBJECTS AS A RADICAL JUXTAPOSITION THAT TRASNGRESSES NOT ONLY LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY BUT TOPPLES THE EYE. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, The Disenchantment of the Eye:
Bataille and the Surrealists pp.211-262)

Story of the Eye is a pivotal text for our own story of the eyes interrogation for a variety of reasons. finishes his tale with the enucleated eye of the garroted priest inserted in the anus and then the vagina of the heroine, as the narrator realizes he finds himself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for the neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror. Enucleation is, in fact, a central theme of the story, which reproduces an actual episode Bataille witnessed in 1922: the ripping out of the matador Graneros eye by a bulls horn in
Whatever else it may be, the eye in this story is, to borrow Brian Fitchs phrase, loeil qui ne voit pas. Bataille Seville. Until he saw the famous scene of the slit eyeball in the Surrealist masterpiece Un chien andalou by Dali and Bunuel in 1928, about which he wrote enthusiastically in the pages of Documents, he had no more vivid image to express his obsessive fascination with the violent termination of vision. The

enucleated eye was a parodic version of the separation of sight from the body characteristic of the Cartesian

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tradition; no longer able to see, it was then thrust back into the body through vaginal or anal orifices in ways that
mocked in advance Merleau-Pontys benign re-embodiment of the eye in the flesh of the world.

The novel challenges the primacy of sight in more subtle ways as well. As Barthes pointed out in an essay that in any other context
could innocently be called seminal, Batailles narrative can be read not merely as a sado-masochistic erotic reverie, but also as a linguistic adventure. That is, the

tale is motivated less by the increasingly bizarre couplings of its ostensible protagonists than by the metaphoric transformations of the objects on which they fetishistically focus. The most notable series is that linked to the eye itself, which is enchained with images of eggs, testicles, and the sun. A second train is composed of the liquids associated with them (tears, egg yolks, sperm) and other liquids like urine, blood and milk. According to Barthes, none of these terms is given any privilege, none has any foundational priority: It is the very equivalence of ocular and genital which is original, not one of its terms: the paradigm begins nowhereEverything is given on the surface and without hierarchy, the metaphor is displayed in its entirety; circular and explicit, it refers to no secret. Thus, the time honored function of the penetrating gaze, able to pierce appearance to see the essences beneath, is explicitly rejected. Bataille furthermore links the two metaphoric chains to each other in metonymic ways, so that signifiers from one (e.g. eggs) are coupled with signifiers form others (e.g. urination). The result, Barthes concludes, are typically Surrealist images produced through radically decontextualized juxtapositions (e.g. suns that cry, castrated or pissing eyes, eggs that are sucked like breasts). Thus, what is transgressed is not merely normal sex behavior, but also the rules of conventional language. Because in French, words like couille are near anagrams of cul and oeil, the effect of
linguistic promiscuity is as strong as that of its more obvious sexual counterpart. Barthes structuralist reading, with its strongly texualist rather than experienctial bias, may have its flaws, but it points to one important implication of the novel: that whether understood literally or metaphorically, the eye is toppled form its privileged place in the sensual hierarchy to be linked instead with objects and functions more normally associated with baser human behavior. This is, indeed, the most ignoble eye imaginable. To understand fully the depths of that ignobility, we have to recall the speculative claim Freud was advancing at virtually the same time in Civilization and

Freud conjectured, only began when hominids raised themselves off the ground, stopped sniffing the nether regions of their fellows, and elevated sight to a position of superiority. With that elevation went a concomitant
repression of sexual and aggressive drives and the radical separation of higher spiritual and metal faculties form the lower functions of the body. Bataille was himself in analysis with Dr. Adrien Borel when he wrote Story of the Eye. He later contended that by August 1927, it put an end to the series of dreary mishap and failures in which he had been floundering, but not the state of intellectual intensity, which still persists. Nor would his fascination with Freudian ideas end, as he continued to draw on them throughout his life. Although there is no evidence that he knew of Freuds specific conjectures about the connections between elevated vision and repression indeed, the chronology of their respective publications suggests otherwise, even if it is likely that Freuds ideas were in circulation among analysts before coming into print Story of the Eye can be read as a tacit plea for the reversal of this most fateful of human developments. Bataille s defense of what he called a general as opposed to a restricted economy, one based on depense (waste or expenditure), loss, transgression, and excess, rather than production, exchange, conservation, and instrumental rationality, was closely tied to this critique of the primacy of vision. The only light cast by the potlatch ceremonies he found so fascinating was produced by the flames consuming the wealth destroyed. So too, Batailles critique of absolute knowledge most notably that sought by Hegel in favor of a non-knowledge or un-knowing which always defeats the ability to think it clearly and distinctly, drew on the same impulse. If, as Robert Sasso puts it, Bataille wanted to gon du savoir au non-savoir, he certainly understood the importance of voir for savoir. It could be undermined only through the explosive sound of laughter or the blurred vision produced by tear.

Its Discontents. Human civilization,

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A/T SUKRIS YOU ERASE WOMEN 1. THIS ARGUMENT IS TOTALLY ILLOGICAL. SURKIS CORRECTLY NOTICES THAT THE EYE IN THE STORY OF THE EYE IS CONNECTED TO THE FEMALE CHARACTER. WELL, YEAH. SHE PUTS THE EYE INSIDE HERSELF A BUNCH OF TIMES. SURKIS SAYS THE EYE PRESENTS AN ABSENCE: THE "IMAGE" OF THE WITNESSES' BLINDNESS TO BLINDNESS, THAT IS, A VISIBLE ABSENCE. SUCH "OBSCENE" PARADOXICAL PRESENT ABSENCES, LIKE THOSE FIGURED IN THE EROTIC DYNAMIC BY THE FEMININE OTHER WHO OFFERS A SPECTACLE OF HER ABSENCE TO AN ON LOOKING PARTNER, ARE REPEATEDLY PRESENTED TO THE NARRATOR OF STORY OF THE EYE. THE EXORBITATED EYE'S LOSS OF VISION--ITS TRANSGRESSION--IS EXPLICITLY CONNECTED WITH THE IMAGE OF A LOST FEMININE OTHER. THIS READING FLAT OUT IGNORES THE FACT THAT THE WOMEN IS NEVER ABSENT FROM THESE TRANSGRESSIONS, SHE IS ALWAYS THE ONE PERFORMING THE TRANSGRESSION. SHE IS THE ONE THAT DEMANDS THE EYE BE TORN OUT, SHE IS THE ONE THAT DEVOURS BULL TESTICLES, AND SHE IS THE ONE THAT PUTS EYES IN HER VAGINA. TO SAY THAT SHE IS SOMEHOW ABSENT, OR SURKIS ASSERTION THAT THE OPTIC TRANSGRESSION IS YET AGAIN ATTRIBUTED TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL/SPEAKING SUBJECT IS JUST FLAT WRONG. 2. SURKIS UNDERESTIMATES THE EXTENT OF BATAILLES TRANSGRESSION. SHE FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE LANGUAGE OF SEXUALITY AND THE FEMININE OTHER IN THE TEXT IS NOT INCIDENTAL, BUT RATHER AN ESSENTIAL PART OF ITS TRANSGRESSIVE NATURE. IN ADDITION TO THE LITERAL ENUCLEATION THAT OCCURS IN BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE, OCULARCENTRISM IS REVERSED BY POSING A MODEL OF UNDERSTANDING OF VISION IN WHICH SIGHT IS METAPHORICALLY TRANSFORMED INTO AND METONYMICALLY CONNECTED WITH FETISHIZED OBJECTS AS A RADICAL JUXTAPOSITION THAT TRASNGRESSES NOT ONLY LANGUAGE AND SEXUALITY BUT TOPPLES THE EYE.
Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, The Disenchantment
of the Eye: Bataille and the Surrealists pp.211-262)

Story of the Eye is a pivotal text for our own story of the eyes interrogation for a variety of reasons. Whatever else it may be, the eye in this story is, to borrow Brian Fitchs phrase, loeil qui ne voit pas. Bataille finishes his tale with the enucleated eye of the garroted priest inserted in the anus and then the vagina of the heroine, as the narrator realizes he finds himself facing something I imagine I had been waiting for in the same way that a guillotine waits for the neck to slice. I even felt as if my eyes were bulging from my head, erectile with horror. Enucleation is, in fact, a central theme of the story, which reproduces an actual episode Bataille
witnessed in 1922: the ripping out of the matador Graneros eye by a bulls horn in Seville. Until he saw the famous scene of the slit eyeball in the Surrealist masterpiece Un chien andalou by Dali and Bunuel in 1928, about which he wrote enthusiastically in the pages of Documents, he had no more vivid image to express his obsessive fascination with the violent termination of vision. The enucleated eye was a parodic version of the separation of sight from the body characteristic of the Cartesian tradition; no longer able to see, it was then thrust back into the body through vaginal or anal orifices in ways that mocked in advance Merleau-Pontys benign reembodiment of the eye in the flesh of the world.

The novel challenges the primacy of sight in more subtle ways as well. As Barthes pointed out in an essay that in any other context could innocently be called seminal, Batailles narrative can be read not merely as a sado-masochistic erotic reverie, but also as a linguistic
adventure. That is, the

tale is motivated less by the increasingly bizarre couplings of its ostensible protagonists than by the metaphoric transformations of the objects on which they fetishistically focus. The most notable series is that linked

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to the eye itself, which is enchained with images of eggs, testicles, and the sun. A second train is composed of the liquids associated with them (tears, egg yolks, sperm) and other liquids like urine, blood and milk. According to Barthes, none of these terms is given any privilege, none has any foundational priority: It is the very equivalence of ocular and genital which is original, not one of its terms: the paradigm begins nowhereEverything is given on the surface and without hierarchy, the metaphor is displayed in its entirety; circular and explicit, it refers to no secret. Thus, the time honored function of the penetrating gaze, able to pierce appearance to see the essences beneath, is explicitly rejected. Bataille furthermore links the two metaphoric chains to each other in metonymic ways, so that signifiers from one (e.g. eggs) are coupled with signifiers form others (e.g. urination). The result, Barthes concludes, are typically Surrealist images produced through radically decontextualized juxtapositions (e.g. suns that cry, castrated or pissing eyes, eggs that are sucked like breasts). Thus, what is transgressed is not merely normal sex behavior, but also the rules of conventional language. Because in French, words like couille are
near anagrams of cul and oeil, the effect of linguistic promiscuity is as strong as that of its more obvious sexual counterpart. Barthes structuralist reading, with its strongly texualist rather than experienctial bias, may have its flaws, but it points to one important implication of the novel: that whether understood

literally or metaphorically, the eye is toppled form its privileged place in the sensual hierarchy to be linked instead with objects and functions more normally associated with baser human behavior. This is, indeed, the most ignoble eye imaginable.
To understand fully the depths of that ignobility, we have to recall the speculative claim Freud was advancing at virtually the same time in Civilization and Its Discontents. Human civilization,

Freud conjectured, only began when hominids raised themselves off the ground, stopped sniffing the nether regions of their fellows, and elevated sight to a position of superiority. With that
elevation went a concomitant repression of sexual and aggressive drives and the radical separation of higher spiritual and metal faculties form the lower functions of the body. Bataille was himself in analysis with Dr. Adrien Borel when he wrote Story of the Eye. He later contended that by August 1927, it put an end to the series of dreary mishap and failures in which he had been floundering, but not the state of intellectual intensity, which still persists. Nor would his fascination with Freudian ideas end, as he continued to draw on them throughout his life. Although there is no evidence that he knew of Freuds specific conjectures about the connections between elevated vision and repression indeed, the chronology of their respective publications suggests otherwise, even if it is likely that Freuds ideas were in circulation among analysts before coming into print Story

of the Eye can be read as a tacit plea

for the reversal of this most fateful of human developments. Bataille s defense of what he called a general as opposed to a
restricted economy, one based on depense (waste or expenditure), loss, transgression, and excess, rather than production, exchange, conservation, and instrumental rationality, was closely tied to this critique of the primacy of vision. The only light cast by the potlatch ceremonies he found so fascinating was produced by the flames consuming the wealth destroyed. So too, Batailles critique of absolute knowledge most notably that sought by Hegel in favor of a non-knowledge or un-knowing which always defeats the ability to think it clearly and distinctly, drew on the same impulse. If, as Robert Sasso puts it, Bataille wanted to gon du savoir au non-savoir, he certainly understood the importance of voir for savoir. It could be undermined only through the explosive sound of laughter or the blurred vision produced by tear.

3. THE PART OF THE SURKIS EVIDENCE WHERE SHE TALKS ABOUT THE WOMAN NAMED DORTHEA IS ABOUT A DIFFERENT BATAILLE WORK CALLED BLUE OF NOON, WHICH WE DONT READ. WERE NOT BATAILLE, WEVE CONSTRUCTED OUR OWN CRITICISM BORROWING FROM HIS WORK IN THE STORY OF THE EYE. WE WILL DEFEND THAT TEXT, AND THE PHILSOPHICAL IDEAS DRAWN FROM IT, AND NOTHING ELSE.

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4. YOU LINK TOO. THIS PART OF THE DEBATE IS A WASH, AND THEYVE FAILED TO IMPACT THIS IN TERMS OF OUR CRITIQUES ABILITY TO SOLVE OCULARCENTRISM, MEANING WE STILL AVOID OUR 1NC IMPACT AND THEY STILL CAUSE IT. VISUALITY AS A DOMINANT FORCE IN UNDERSTANDING CANNOT REPRESENT WOMENS SEXUALITY AND IN FACT ASSIGNS WOMEN THE ROLE OF PASSIVE, EROTICIZED OBJECT.
Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Phallogocentrism:
Derrida and Irigaray pp.493-542) But even such a speculum remains too dependent on the visual to do justice to the womans body, in particular to her sexuality. Although

the eye can get inside the vagina a feat Irigaray notes was litereally depicted in Batailles Story of the Eye it will be one unable to take in the whole of the female sexual equipment with one look, as some of it will have remained outside. In a certain sense, the womans body is like the tain of the mirror, outside of any specular representation, although on some level the material support of that representation. Womens sexuality is thus best understood in nonvisual terms. As she put it in an essay entitled This Sex Which is Not One, Within this logic [that of western though], the predominance of the visual, of the discrimination of form and invidualization of form, is particularly foreign to female eroticism. Woman takes pleasure more from touching than form looking, and her entry into a dominant scopic economy signifies, again, her consignment to passivity: she is to be the beautiful object of contemplation. While her body finds itself thus eroticized, and called to a double movement of exhibition and of chaste retreat in order to stimulate the drives of the subject, her sexual organ represents the horror of nothing to see.

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A/T FOUCAULT IS BAD 1. Cool. Well defend that biopower is bad and his reading of bataille. Your cards dont indict those things. Our alternative is pretty clearly about bataille, not Foucault. [if their evidence does indict biopower, well, I guess you have to win that your impact is bad. There are a few cards in the file, but really I feel like you should be competent enough to do this] [if their evidence indicts foucaults reading of bataille, its almost definitely surkis, to which Ive written blocks.]

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A/T BACTRACKING (APOLOGIES, SEVERANCE, ETC)

1. THIS IS SEVERANCE OUR CRITICISM IS NOT ONLY OF THE WORD OBSERVATION. WE FIND ITS PLACEMENT MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN ITS USAGE AS IT INDICATES THAT EACH ORGANIZED STORY THE AFFIRMATIVE TELLS, ALL THE KNOWLEDGE CONTAINED IN THE 1AC, IS SOMETHING OBSERVABLE, AN OBJECT. THEY CANNOT ESCAPE THE LINK WITHOUT UNREADING AND UNORGANIZING THAT 1AC OR ENGAGING IN SOME SORT OF WISHING AWAY OF THE ENTIRETY OF THEIR FIRST SPEECH ACT. WERE PRETTY SURE SEVERANCE IS BAD SINCE IT, ESPECIALLY IN THIS ROUND, WOULD ALLOW THE AFFIRMATIVE TO JUST SAY J/K EVERY ROUND AND AVOID ANYTHING THE NEGATIVE ROUND. THIS SEEMS LIKE SOMETHING THAT WOULD NEGATIVELY IMPACT NEG GROUND (SINCE WE COULDNT GET ANY TO STICK) AND THEREFORE EDUCATION (SINCE WE NEVER TALK ABOUT ANYTHING IN ANY SUBSTANCE) NOT TO MENTION COMPETITIVE EQUITY (SINCE IT BECOMES LITERALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE NEG TO WIN). IT ALSO MEANS WE AUTOMATICALLY WIN BECAUSE IN ORDER TO ESCAPE THE LINK THEY LITERALLY HAVE TO JUST NEGATE THE 1AC. 2. TURN IN ORDER TO AFFIRM THE MOST MEANINGFUL THINGS IN LIFE, THOSE THINGS LIKE THE LAUGHTER OF A PROSTITUTE THAT CANNOT BE PUT TO WORK AND ARE FUNDAMENTALLY LIFE AFFIRMING CORRESPOND TO VERTICALITY, THEY RISE TOWARD THE SKY WE MUST PUT THE SUN UTTERLY TO DEATH. IN OTHER WORDS, THE 1AC HAS NO PLACE IN THE ALTERNATIVE IF WE ARE TO ENJOY LIFE. JUST LIKE THE THEYVE ATTEMPTED TO BREAK FREE OF THE 1ACS OCULARCENTRISM, HUMANS SIMILIARILY ATTEMPT TO BREAK FREE OF ANIMAL HORIZONTALITY BUT ARE FETTERED TO MISERY BY THE EYE, THE GAZE THE 1AC. OUR ALTERNATIVES ACT OF TURNING THE OCULAR UPON ITS GREATEST REFERENT, THE SUN, IS THE IMAGE OF THE VERY NOTION OF EXPENDITURE THAT BOTH AFFIRMS THE WHORES CACKLES AND LEAVES THE SUN DEAD, COVERED IN SHIT, AND LYING IN ITS GRAVE. Bataille 85 (Georges, French pervert, Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939 Ed. By Allan Stoekl, ThePineal Eye p. 82-5) The eye, at the summit of the skull, opening on the incandescent sun in order to contemplate it in a sinister solitude, is not a product of the understanding, but is instead an immediate existence; it opens and blinds itself like a conflagration, or like a fever that eats the being, or more exactly, the head. And thus it plays the role of a fire in a house; the head, instead of locking up life as money is locked in a safe, spends it without counting, for, and the end of this erotic metamorphosis, the head has received the electric power of points. This great burning head is the image of disagreeable light of the notion of expenditure, beyond the still empty notion as it is elaborated on the basis of methodical analysis. From the first, myth is identified not only with life but with the loss of life with degradation and death, starting from the being who bore it, it is not at all an external product, but the form that this being takes in his lubricious avatars, in the ecstatic gift he makes of himself as obscene and nude victim and a victim not before an obscure and immaterial force, but before great howls of prostitutes laughter. Existence no longer resembles a neatly defined itinerary from one practical sign to another, but a sickly incandescence, a durable orgasm.
IV. The Two Axes of Terrestrial Life No matter how blinding the mythical form, insofar as it is not a simple representation, but the exhausting consumption of being, it is possible, at its first indistinct appearance, to pass from a content to a container, to circumstantial form that, although it is probably unacceptable from the point of view of science, does not seem different from the habitual constructs of the intellect.

The distribution of organic existence on the surface of the earth takes place

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on two axes: the first, vertical, prolongs the radius of the terrestrial sphere; the second, horizontal, is perpendicular to the first. Vegetation develops more or less exclusively on the vertical axis (which is also the axis of the fall of bodies); on the other hand, the development of animal life is situated, or tends to be situated, on the horizontal axis. But although, generally speaking, their movements are only slippages parallel to the lines described by the rotation of the terrestrial globe, animals are never completely foreign to the axis of vegetal life. Thus existence makes them raise themselves above the ground when they come into the world and, in a relatively stable way, when they exit from sleep or love (on the other hand, sleep and death abandon bodies to a force directed from high to low). Their skeleton, even in the more regular cases, is not perfectly adjusted to a horizontal trajectory: the skull and thus the orifice of the eye are situated above the level of the anal vertebra. However, even if one refers to the position of the male in coitus, and to the structures of some birds, a complete verticality is never attained. V. The Position of the Human Body and Eyes on the Surface of the Terrestrial Globe. Only human beings, tearing themselves away from peaceful animal horizontality, at the cost of the ignoble and painful efforts that can be seen in the faces of the great apes, have succeeded in appropriating the vegetal erection and in letting themselves be polarized, in a certain sense, by the sky.
It is thus that the earth whose immense regions are covered with plants that everywhere flee it in order to offer and destroy themselves endlessly, in order to project themselves into an alternate light and dark celestial void releases to the disappointing immensity of space the totality of laughing or lacerated men.

But, in this liberation of man, which leads to a suffocating absence of limits on the surface of the globe, human nature is far from surrendering without resistance. For if it is true that his blood, bones, and arms, that the shuddering of laughter and his insipid hate are endlessly lost and rise toward a sky as beautiful as death, as pale and implausible as death, his eyes continue to fetter him tightly to the vulgar things, in the midst of which necessity has determined his steps. The horizontal axis of vision, to which the human structure has remained strictly subjected, in the course of mans wrenching rejection of animal nature, is the expression of a misery all the more oppressive in that it is apparently infused with serenity.
VI. The Vertigo-Tree

For the anthropologist who can only observe it, this contradiction of the axes of the human structure is itself devoid of meaning. And if, without even being able to explain itself, anthropology underscored the importance of the axes, it would only betray an unjustifiable tendency toward mysticism. The description of the perpendicular axes only takes on its value once it becomes possible to construct on these axes the puerile play of a mythological existence, answering no longer to observation or deduction but to a free development of the relations between the immediate and varied consciousness of human life and the supposedly unconscious givens that constitute this life. Thus the pineal eye, detaching itself from the horizontal system of normal ocular vision, appears in a kind of nimbus of tears, like the eye of a tree of, perhaps, like a human tree. At the same time this ocular tree is only a giant (ignoble) pink penis, drunk with the sun and suggesting or soliciting a nauseous malaise, the sickening despair of vertigo. In this transfiguration of nature, during which vision itself, attracted by nausea, is torn out and torn apart by the sunburst into which it stares, the erection ceases to be a painful upheaval on the surface of the earth and, in a vomiting of flavorless blood, it transforms itself into a vertiginous fall in celestial space, accompanied by a horrible cry.
VII. The Sun

The sun, situated at the bottom of the sky like a cadaver at the bottom of a pit, answers this inhuman cry with the spectral attraction of decomposition. Immense nature breaks its chains and collapses into the limitless void. A severed penis, soft and bloody, is substituted for the habitual order of things. It folds, where painful jaws still bite, pus, spittle, and larva accumulate, deposited by enormous flies: fecal like the eye painted at the bottom of a vase, this Sun, now borrowing its brilliance from death, has buried existence in the stench of night.

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A/T PERM (HEIDEGGER) NOT ONLY ARE THE CRITIQUE AND APPROPRIATION OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE 1AC INCOMPATIBLE, BUT VISION AS AN EXTENSION OF THE WILL TO POWER WILL SUBORDINATE THE ALTERNATIVE IN THER PERMUTATION, MAKING IT A USELESS GESTURE NO DIFFERENT THAN THE 1AC ALONE. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
This analysis of representation is an elaboration of the analysis that figures in his 1942-43 lectures on Parmenides, where he says: Man

is the living being that, by way of representation, fastens upon objects and thus looks upon what is objective, and , in looking, orders objectives, and in this ordering posits back upon himself the ordered as something mastered, as his possession. Since philosophy is not only a reflection on the experience of its time, but is always also-albeit to a greater or lesser extent-a reflection and reproduction of this experience, it should not be surprising that the modern age sees being as objects, and that, in the culture of commodity capitalism, the light cast by the Leibnizian analysis of perception, extending beyond the borders of the philosophical text, should foreshadow a time in which vision becomes an instrument of the egos will to power, an anxiety-driven mechanism, subordinating everything to its greed, its appetite, its concept of endless pleasure. The more our vision commodifies, the more it reifies, splitting off the figure-ground configuration from the lighting of the field, the more, as Heidegger puts it, the lighting of the being of beings, as a lighting, is concealed. To be sure, we must agree with Heidegger that the play of the calling, brightening, expanding light is not actually visible, if by not visible we
understand him to mean that this lighting, which is the very presencing of being, is not visible, and does not allow itself to be made visible, in the same way that things like trees, birds, and stones are visible. But this not actually visible does not mean absolutely invisible, transcending all conceivable forms of visibility, or beyond the possibility of being seen by an appropriately ontological way of seeing. Thus, Heidegger continues, saying: It shines imperceptibly, like morning light upon the quiet splendour of lilies in a field or roses in a garden.

In thinking, with Parmenides, the meaning of Moira and the normative significance of its measurement for our lives in todays world-order, Heidegger asserts that the essence [or say that the dimensionality of the lighting] remains veiled. And he goes on to explain this crucial point by saying that the visibility it bestows allows the presencing of what it present to arise as outer appearance [Aussenhen] and aspect. Consequently the perceptual relation to the presencing of what is present is defined as seeing. Stamped with this character of vision, knowledge cannot renounce their essential derivation from luminous disclosure. Cannot renounce: and yet, of course, this is precisely what the modern way of looking and seeing has tried to accomplish. That this struggle to deny our dependency must inevitably fail does not mean, however, that we cannot for the most part conceal it from ourselves, shutting out the deep enlightenment-and the ground-shaking challenge to our wayswith which might otherwise favor us.
Mortals, Heidegger says, accept.... whatever is immediately, abruptly, and first of all offered to them..... They keep to what is unfolded [i.e., what is present] in the twofold [i.e., the ontological difference between being the beings], and attend only to that aspect which immediately makes a claim upon mortals; that is, they keep to what is present without considering presencing [i.e., the giving of the lighting that opens up and lays down the field of vision]. Read in terms of the figureground Gestalt that is formed in vision, Heidegger would be saying, here, that our looking and seeing keeps so narrowly focused on the figure of the object, the object that figures in the perceptual interest, that they pay no heed to the presencing of the lighting and the contextual ground that surrounds the focal object. This reading is supported by what Heidegger says next in his commentary on Parmenides:

Where ordinary perceptionencounters rise and fall, it is satisfied with the as well as of coming to be, [Entstehen], and passing away, [Vergehen]. It never perceives place, , as an abode, as what the twofold [i.e., the spacing opened up by the ontological difference] offers as a home to the presencing of what is presentordinary perception certainly moves within the lightedness of what is present and sees what is shining out, (VIII, 41), in colour, but is dazzled by changes in colour, , and pays no attention to the still light of the lighting that emanates from duality [i.e., from the spacing of the ontological difference].
On my reading, duality, here, may be taken to refer to the differentiation of figure-ground, a differentiation that instances in the perceptual field the hermeneutical effect of the ontological difference. Heideggers words, then, contain both an ontologically grounded criticism of ordinary perception and also an implicit indication, a hint, pointing toward a different way of looking and seeing. (Beitrge zur Philosophie: in dieser Lichtung warten zu knnen, bis die Winke kommen.) For if paying

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no attention to the lighting that emanates from duality from the differentiation of figure and ground constitutes an errant, fallen way of looking and seeing, a way that deepens the oblivion of being, we may suppose that in a more appropriate way of looking and seeing, the lighting would be taken up into the protection and preservation of what I propose to call, keeping in mind Heideggers remark that die Wchterschaft des Menschen ist der Grun einer anderen Geschichte, a guardian awareness. Would this other history be one in which we would finally see a real reconciliation of the diremptions and contradictions that have defined our modern world?

In Kaufmannsladen (Toy Shop), a note in Minima Moralia, Adorno observes that Disenchantment with the contemplated world is the sensoriums reaction to its objective role as a commodity world. Only when purified of appropriation would things be colourful and useful at once: under universal compulsion the two cannot be reconciled.

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THE PERM FAILS REAL BAD ANY LOOKING WHICH IS REINFORCES THE ROLES OF THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT WILL REVERSE THE ALTERNATIVE. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169)
Delving into the etymology of the Greek words for looking and seeing, Heidegger points out that, (Hinsehen, Zusehen) did

for the ancient Greeks, looking and seeing not mean a representing by which man turns toward beings as objects and grasps them (p. 103 in English; p. 152 in GA 54). Instead, it is a question of a visionary communication in which the one who looks [das Blickende] shows himself, appears, and is there. (p. 103 in English; p. 152 in GA 52). In other words, the one who is looking and seeing is merely an opening to that which appears. The one who is looking and seeing emerges, as unconcealed, into the unconcealed (p. 103 in English; p. 152 in GA 54). Originally experienced, then, looking is not the grasping of something but the self-showing in view of which there first becomes possible a looking that grasps something (p. 103 in English; p. 152 in GA 54). This experience of looking (Blicken) could not be more different from the modern-a grasping, erfassendes Blicken. Indeed, the modern experience overturns, reverses, the ancient: If [modern] man experiences looking only in terms of himself and understands looking precisely out of himself as Ego and subject, then looking is a subjective activity directed to objects. If, however, man does not experience his own looking, i.e., the human look, in reflection on himself as the one who represents himself in looking, but instead man experiences the look, in unrefl;ected letting-be-encountered, as the looking at him of the person who is encountering him, then the look of the encountering person shows itself as that in which someone awaits the other as counter, i.e., appears to the other and is (p. 103 in English; pp. 152-153
in GA 54). In this way, for the Greeks, we show who we are, we reveal the essence of our character, by the character of the way we engage in looking and seeing. The Greeks could accordingly judge people by the character of the way they make visible-and also how they relate to the invisible. Heidegger says: The looking that awaits the other and the human look thus experienced disclose the encountering person himself in the ground of his essence (p. 103 in English; p. 153 in GA 54).

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A/T ESSENTIALISM NO LINK AND TURN WE DONT GENERALIZE ABOUT GROUPS BASED ON BIOLOGICAL PRECONDITIONS BUT RATHER AS CONSTRUCTS OF CULTURE AND UNDERSTAND THE SLIPPAGES AND DIFFERENCES IN DEGREE THAT EXIST WITHIN THOSE CATEGORIES. FURTHERMORE, A BLANKET REJECTION OF ESSENTIALISM REQUIRE A TURN TO EXAMINATION SOLELY OF INDIVIDUAL EXPERIENCES, WHICH IGNORES THE FUNCTION OF POWER RELATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN HISTORICALLY OPPRESSIVE. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm )

Generalizing about the circumstances or perspectives shared by the members of any group is a risky business. One must steer between the Scylla of "essentialism" and the Charybdis of "antiessentialism," recognizing on the one hand that individuals falling into a single category may, as individuals, be different in many respects,214 while acknowledging on the other hand that diverse individuals sharing a particular identity may, fortunately or unfortunately, have had similar experiences or developed similar views by virtue of that identity or society's reaction to it.215 In this portion of the Article, I nonetheless focus on differences between groups more than on differences between individuals because I fear that following the latter course would compromise our appreciation of important power relationships that have historically operated for and against certain Americans by virtue of their gender, racial, ethnic, and religious associations. Here I should stress a point I previously made in passing:216 the group generalizations to be discussed are strictly limited by being contingent constructs of culture, not inevitable incidents of biology. They moreover illustrate differences of degree, rather than of kind. They reveal, if you like, human differences mediated by human sameness.217Keeping all this in mind, I will spend the next few pages exploring how greater exposure to, dependence on, and even literal faith in writing have traditionally encouraged some American groups to embrace visuality more enthusiastically than have others. I will then examine how the members of these former groups have imposed their visuality on American legal culture and, in that course, on American legal language.

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OUR IMPACT ARGUMENTS ARE CULTURAL ANALYSIS, NOT BIOLOGICALLY DETERMINED OR UNIVERSALIZED LIMITATIONS. IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO DENY THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WOMEN AND THE AURAL WITHOUT ENGAGING IN ESSENTIALISM AS MANY WOMEN AND FEMINIST GROUPS EMBRACE THE AURAL AS EMPOWERING AND REJECT THE VISUAL. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [2.34]

Over the course of American history, many American women learned how to read and write during childhood, but well into this century most spent their adult lives segregated in the home. Surrounded there in close quarters by nonliterate infants, semiliterate children, and other women, they had limited incentive and limited opportunity to use or develop their own literate skills.231 During the colonial period, what American women wanted or needed to know to run their households was generally not written down.232 In the years immediately following the Revolution, "republican mothers" were encouraged to do more reading for the sake of their children's good moral upbringing.233 In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many American women read books and popular magazines for their own instruction and diversion, organized and joined reading clubs and literary societies, 234 established public libraries, and actively (if somewhat surreptitiously) participated in literary culture by writing letters and diaries;235 an eclectic minority even overcame the "anxiety of authorship"236 and wrote for general publication. Given restricted access to higher education,237 textual materials, and publishing technology - not to mention a proverbial male aversion to women who have worn the optical aids frequently necessary for full participation in a visualist society238the visuality of American women's culture has nonetheless been qualified. The failure of the available maledominated visual media to adequately address women's concerns or women's reality has only ensured that unmediated looking has not been as important or meaningful to American women as a group, as it has been to American men as a group.239 [2.35] In this context, American women's culture has been relatively more dependent on, or at least relatively more respectful of, aural modes of communication. Compared to men, American women as a group have historically shared a greater proportion of their knowledge, experiences, and thoughts with one another by talking and listening,240 telling stories,241 and engaging in the intimate, detailed dialogue that men have pejoratively called "gossip."242 As readers and writers, American women have traditionally tended to favor forms of literature (such as the novel and poetry) that have featured or strongly evoked the human voice.243 The extent to which American women still define and experience their lives in aural terms is evident in the emphasis that contemporary American feminists place on women's talk (especially "consciousness raising") as a technique of validation and empowerment,244 and on actual silence (or "silencing") as a form of oppression.245 It is also apparent in the prominence of oral history in feminist studies,246 in the tenor of feminist art history which rejects the notion of art as a purely visual experience unmediated by language,247 in the continuing popularity of women's "reading groups" whose members discuss and sometimes even read aloud portions of selected texts,248 in women's complementary experiments in "dialogic" or "collective" writing,249 and in the pointedly personal, consciously conversational style of much feminist scholarship.250

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A/T VISION GOOD THE CRITIQUE OF THE OCULAR METAPHOR ISNT SUGGESTING A LITERAL REJECTION OF VISION BUT RATHER THE GREEK METAPHYSICAL TRADITION CONTAINED WITHIN THE METAPHORICAL LANGUAGE OF VISION THAT ALLOWS US TO IGNORE VIOLENCE AND OPPRESSION. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
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Culture, 16:2) Returning to "Violence and Metaphysics," it is important to note that even while drawing out Levinas's critique of heliological philosophy, Derrida stresses the

itself is given to us through language, and thus that the problematic features of vision are problems not intrinsic to the sense of sight but rather embedded in metaphysical discourse. It is not so simple a matter, therefore, as positing language as an ethical alternative to seeing, for sight only comes to us through its discursive constructions. As such, if we wish to change the violent ways in which we see, we must first change the language of vision. In particular, Derrida highlights the metaphorical sense in which Levinas is speaking of vision and light, or the manner in which the seeing that Levinas describes as violent is not characteristic of the sense of sight per se, nor even of sight as we need necessarily experience it, but is rather the manner in which sight as we practice and think it has been given to us by the Greek metaphysical tradition. As such, Derrida makes clear that it is "the heliological metaphor" which is in question (136 [92]). This metaphor has functioned as an "alibi," Derrida argues, or, in so far as we believe in the literalness of the metaphor, we "innocentize" oppression, we "turn our gazes away" from the violence, and thus, in a sense, the metaphor of light allows us to not see, or prevents us from seeing otherwise than as the metaphor allows: this light in language blinds us and prevents us from seeing the other as she is and from responding to her oppression. As such, Derrida argues that Levinas is not really advocating blindness rather than sight, but is "denouncing the blindness of theoretism" as a metaphysically constructed way of seeing which does not allow us to see the other ("Violence and Metaphysics" 130 [87]). Levinas does not describe a natural history of a sensation, but the history of an experience mediated by language.
manner in which vision

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A/T ALT FAILS (HEIDEGGER) THE AFFIRMATIVE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ALTERNATIVE MUST RESULT IN A SHAPING AND TRANSFORMING OF SOCIETY IS ROOTED IN EXACTLY THE SAME WILL TO POWER THAT WE CRITIQUED AS BEING THE BASIS FOR THEIR VISUALITY. EVEN IF THEYRE RIGHT THAT WE DONT EFFECTUATE CHANGE, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE MOVE BEYOND THE ACTIVE/PASSIVE DUALISM AND INTO AN ONTOLOGICAL AWARENESS AS WAITING IN ORDER TO SUBVERT THE WILL TO POWER. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169) Were there a looking and seeing that could accomplish the lighting and bring it to the fullness of its essence, this would be a way of looking and seeing that, by virtue of its , [i] releases the figure-ground Gestalt which it gathers and lays down from pressure toward closure, keeping it ever open to the immeasurable openness of the ground and field, and correlatively [ii] checks its drive toward total graspability, total visibility, letting what presences be gathered into a Gestalt that opens out into the invisible and lets the invisible be gathered up hermeneutically, i.e., without violence to its being visible. Were there such a looking and seeing, gathering and laying
down in accordance with the ontological normativity of the methodological principles of Heideggers extremely radical conception of hermeneutical phenomenology, the Gestalt would become a Geviert, a gathering of the fourfold. But such a moment of vision,such an Augenblick, as Heidegger calls it in Being and Time, is hardly more than thinkable in todays tragic world. For, however strong the passion and commitment of an individual in regard to the responsibility with which we are

social and cultural conditions. These conditions do not presently exist. But, of course, they cannot come to pass without our engagement, our preparations which does not mean, however, that we can bring about the favorable conditions by imposing our will. For the will to power that holds sway in our time is a major factor in the modern Gestell, a major source of the oblivion of being into which our world has been cast. For this reason, when thinking about the possibility of a new beginning, Heidegger speaks of the need to cultivate an attitude beyond the either-or dualism of the active and the passive an attitude he calls waiting, in which the modern will to power has been radically transformed. (Repeating a point I made earlier): We must be able to wait in this lighting until the hints come. In this waiting, our guardian awareness is crucial, for, as Heidegger puts it in the Beitrge, the guardian awareness of human beings is the ground of another history.

entrusted as beings gifted with a potential for vision that has not yet been realized, little can be accomplished without favorable

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THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE ALTERNATIVE CHALLENGES AND SUBVERTS THE METAPHYSICS OF THE 1ACS OCULARCENTRISM. Levin 99 (David Michael, Ph.D., Prof Em of Philo @ Northwestern, The Philosophers Gaze: Modernity in the Shadows of Enlightenment Gestalt Gestell Geviert: The Way of the Lighting, pp116-169) Precisely because the modern gaze is driven by the will to power, and tends accordingly to assault the invisible, to round it up and hold it hostage in the camps of the totally visible, Heidegger felt compelled to argue, during his 1973 seminar Zahringen, that phenomenology must be practiced as a phenomenology of the nonappearing. This hermeneutical rending of the phenomenology commits it to functioning as a practice of resistance, a practice that would challenge and subvert the metaphysics of unity, totality and reification that circulates in our present culture. In the field of our vision, this involves decentering the gaze, disrupting its tendency to exclude and deny what falls outside its narrow, frontal focus.

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AFF ANSWERS

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PERM SOLVENCY (AURALITY) PERM IS KEY TO SOLVE AMERICAN CULTURE AND TECHNOLOGY, ALONG WITH LEGAL THEORY AND DISCOURSE, WILL INNEVITABLY FAVOR A BLENDING OF THE AURAL AND VISUAL. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm )

language is being reconfigured today, however, what is to prevent it from being transformed tomorrow? Why should the incipient trend I have here identified and discussed not continue to the point where, in the future, the domination of aural legal metaphors becomes as overwhelming as the domination of visual legal metaphors was yesterday? [c.3] Here, one might offer several answers. First, it may be argued that insofar as legal metaphors are shaped by circumstance, neither American culture nor American law will probably be able to sustain a complete or near-complete transition to aurally based legal language.715 Aural technology may have surged in the last century or so, but as I have repeatedly noted in this Article, visual technology has hardly stood still for it. The same age which has given us the telephone, the radio, and the tape recorder has also given us inexpensive photography, motion pictures, television, and the computer. The last three of these "visual" technologies have actually joined sound to sight, promoting a trend towards sensory synthesis that has culminated in today's "multimedia" technology. In this new environment, American culture is likely to embrace both sight and sound rather than encourage a definitive turn from one sense to the other. By the same token, it is not likely to generate or support a legal discourse that would consistently prefer aural over visual metaphors. The likelihood of metaphoric transformation is decreased even further by the certainty that the composition of the American legal academy (not to mention the American legal profession) will in the foreseeable future remain mixed along a variety of gender, racial, ethnic, and religious lines, thereby ensuring the continued participation in American legal discourse of individuals coming from a variety of relatively more visual and relatively more aural traditions. Insofar as individuals of all backgrounds remain willing and able to draw consciously or subconsciously on their own historical experiences for intellectual inspiration, it is likely that some will continue to favor visual legal metaphors, while others will turn to aural legal language. Diversity will
allow for difference.

[c.2] If American legal

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PERM IS KEY TO SOLVE - TOTALIZING REJECTION OF VISUAL METAPHORS ONLY INVERTS THE BINARY AND RECREATES THE SAME HARMS OUTLINED IN THE 1NC. ONLY BY NOT LIMITING OURSELVES EXCLUSIVELY TO AURAL METAPHORS CAN LIBERATION BE ACHIEVED. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [c.4] Apart from what is likely to happen, one might argue that a

complete shift from visual to aural figures of legal speech in American legal discourse would be inadvisable, even for those persons who have thus far gained or been empowered by the increased popularity of aural legal metaphors. In the guise of liberating and validating the relatively more aural experiences of individuals from traditionally marginalized American gender, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, such a transformation might ironically do much to legitimate and validate the circumstances of their marginalization. For instance, when feminist legal scholars embrace aural metaphors such as "dialogue" and "conversation," are they not coining a legal language in large part born of the very conditions of subordination and oppression that they seek to challenge and change? Do not their words-for all their obvious appeal-at some level accept and endorse the sensory limitations that others (in this instance, men) have traditionally imposed on them?716 In this context, the true liberation of individuals from marginalized backgrounds arguably requires that they not arbitrarily limit themselves to-or preemptively define themselves by-aural metaphors that others have in some sense chosen for them.717 [c.5] Undue reliance on aural metaphors might even distance outsider legal theorists from other important aspects of their own cultural histories and experiences. No human culture-however constituted-is ever completely visual or aural, and we all run the risk of misunderstanding and distorting ourselves if we try to redefine the world-or law-along a single sensory line. Here, the historical experience of male, white, Anglo, and Protestant Americans may serve as both a lesson and a warning: in allowing themselves to have been drawn so strongly to visuality, many individuals from these backgrounds have largely forgotten or failed to appreciate the not-insignificant degrees of aurality inherent in their own traditions-an aurality which they are only now rediscovering in an increasingly aural age. Their extreme indulgence of the visual has thus come at a critical cost not only to others, but to themselves.

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PERM SOLVES - THE PROBLEMS OF VISUALITY ARE NOT INHERENT TO THE VISUAL A CHANGE IN OUR THINKING OF THE VISUAL FROM WRITING TOWARDS GESTURE, AS IN THE ACT OF PERFORMING THE SPEECHES IN A DEBATE ROUND, CREATES A VISUALITY THAT IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE CRITIQUE. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [c.6]

A complete shift from visual to aural legal metaphors is moreover unnecessary, even to accomplish or propel the value changes that exponents of critical legal theory in particular may desire. It is true that we have traditionally regarded the values associated with sound as more compatible with critical legal theory than the values associated with sight. This would seem to suggest that visual legal metaphors are almost by definition inadequately expressive of critical ideas and therefore deserve rejection by critical theorists. One must wonder, however, whether the perceived shortcomings of visual legal metaphors are due to some inherent "essence" of visuality or whether they are simply a function of how we have traditionally understood sight. Perhaps sight does not have a phenomenological essence.718 Perhaps it embraces a multiplicity of contradictory values - values which are brought out by different visual media. For instance, perhaps it is our dependence on the visual medium of writing that encourages us (although it certainly does not force us) to believe that sight abstracts, disengages, and objectifies. Writing tends to cut us off from the physical world; traditionally conceived, it facilitates the separation and mutual noninvolvement of writer and reader, and it enables the reader to assess visual information without being burdened by the presence and personality of the writer. But what if - perhaps under the impetus of television, film, and video technology - one were to understand sight more through the lens, say, of gesture?719 In those circumstances, might not "sight" be considered to favor dynamism, multivariance, relation, and subjectivism?720 Would not a focus on gesture give vision a meaning in time? Would not the visual perception and interpretation of movement facilitate the recognition of multiple "truths"?721 Would not its personalized energy and power invite reciprocation?722 Would it not facilitate the association of message and messenger?723 If these things are so, then perhaps sight and, by implication, visual legal metaphors, are in the abstract potentially compatible with critical theory.

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PERM KEY TO SOLVE THE ALTERNATIVES TOTAL EMBRACE OF THE AURAL AND OUT HAND REJECTION OF THE VISUAL WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO BRING ABOUT THE CHANGE IN VALUES DESIRED BY THE CRITIQUE DUE TO THE LACK OF AN ESSENTIAL NATURE OF SOUND AND THE COOPTION OF THE AURAL BY TECHNOLOGY THE PERM IS CRITICAL TO AVOID THIS FAILURE. Hibbits 94 (Bernard J., Assoc. Prof of Law @ Pitt, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse
Cardozo Law Review, 229, http://faculty.law.pitt.edu/hibbitts/meta_int.htm ) [c.7] By the same token, a

total embrace of aural legal metaphor might not be sufficient to the purpose of promoting the aims of critical legal theory. Perhaps sound too is ultimately without a phenomenological essence, regardless of the values that we currently associate with it. For instance, we regard sound as concrete, relational, subjective, and dynamic, but we may do so because we still envisage ourselves experiencing sound in the context of face-toface encounters. What would happen, however, if we ceased thinking of sound in this traditional fashion, and under the influence of ongoing technological change began to view it (as we are increasingly coming to experience it) as a product of technology - a product of the radio, the television, the telephone, the tape recorder, and the computer.724 It could be argued that this technologically based sound could easily embrace and implicitly support values very different from those that we have hitherto associated with the aural.725 For instance, relative to face-to-face conversation, technologically based discourse radically distances and decontextualizes those who are party to it. Insofar as it can be unyielding, technological sound can cut off or preempt interaction rather than facilitate it.726 In the same vein, technological sound is not necessarily subjectifying: indeed, the power of its electronic amplification can make it brutally objectifying.727 Finally, instead of being dynamic, technological sound can be static-something that can be frozen in time, manipulated, and transferred for replay. In this context, prominent aural legal metaphors such as "voice," "speaking," and "listening" (and even "dialogue" and "conversation") that now seem unequivocally positive and supportive of the critical agenda may prove capable of evoking ambivalent or even negative values which would be fatal to their critical purpose. Arbitrarily limiting ourselves to aural figures of legal speech would therefore be as inadvisable as rejecting visual legal metaphors out of hand. [c.8] It seems that into the foreseeable future, American legal discourse will - and, to avoid being painted into a cultural, sociological, or phenomenological corner, probably should - continue to embrace metaphors evoking sight as well as metaphors evoking sound. While we listen with new attention to the "voice" and "conversation" of the law, we can still "observe" and "review" it. In the long run, such an inclusive and potentially synergistic reconfiguration of American legal discourse will help to ensure that, in a new era, American law remains figuratively and literally sensible.

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PERM SOLVENCY (ETHICS) PERM KEY TO SOLVE BECAUSE REJECTION FAILS THE VISUAL METAPHOR IS INESCAPABLE. INSTEAD WE MUST USE THE METAPHOR OF VISION IN ORDER TO TRANSFORM IT AWAY FROM PLATONIC IDEALS AND INTO A LESS VIOLENT, MORE ETHICAL LIGHT. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2) Nevertheless, as Derrida goes on to say, there is no history except that which occurs through language, and Borges is right when he says that "perhaps universal history is but the history of several metaphors," metaphors amongst which the example of light is predominant and inescapable. Indeed, Derrida notes that Levinas himself does not escape the use of this metaphor: "Who will ever dominate it, who will ever pronounce its meaning without first being pronounced by it? What language will ever escape it? How, for example, will the metaphysics of the face as the epiphany of the other free itself of light?" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 137 [92]). The nudity of the other is itself described by Levinas in terms of visuality and manifestation, as epiphany, or, as Levin has noted, as the "shimmer of infinity." As Derrida describes it, "the nudity of the face of the other--this epiphany of a certain non-light before which all violence is to be quieted and disarmed--will still have to be exposed to a certain enlightenment" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 126 [85]). y There is hence no escaping the metaphors of vision, light, enlightenment, and manifestation, and it must therefore be a transformation of that metaphor which Levinas would enact in his writing, or the first steps towards the theorization of other ways of seeing which he is taking, even if by all appearances, or in a more self-conscious way, he seems to be rejecting vision and light altogether. As such, on this more nuanced reading, which may or may not have been Levinas's own, it is not non-vision which would be sought by Levinas, for, in Derrida's words, "light perhaps has no opposite; if it does, it is certainly not night" ("Violence and Metaphysics" 137 [92]). It cannot be darkness and blindness that Levinas would prefer to vision and light, but, as Derrida stresses, a form of seeing which is other than that which the Greco-Christian tradition of philosophy has inscribed in language and history, what Levin calls a "postmetaphysical vision."8 y While Derrida makes it clear, then, that the vision in question is metaphorical, that it is but a "technicopolitical" alibi, as we have seen he suggests that this metaphor is never entirely escapable in its determination of how we see and understand sight. If this is an inescapable metaphor, the only solution to its violence is to transform it, "modifying only the same metaphor and choosing the best light." Derrida cites Borges again: "perhaps universal history is but the history of the diverse intonations of several metaphors" (137 [92]). One is tempted to think that a transformed metaphor that rethinks without escaping light could be moonlight, a gentler, more obscure and mysterious light than the penetrating rays of the philosopher's sun which expose, burn, and may blind the eyes, preventing real seeing. For Derrida, whatever form of light this may be, it is not a community without light, not a blindfolded synagogue, but a community anterior to Platonic light . . . . Only the other, the totally other, can be manifested as what it is before the shared truth, within a certain nonmanifestation and a certain absence. ("Violence and Metaphysics" 135 [91]) Not escaping the language of light, Levinas, in his use of words such as "epiphany" and "shimmering," is choosing the best light, is modifying the metaphor to render it less violent and more ethical. For Levinas it is precisely through language that we can escape the violence of vision as language has produced it, and thus, according to a Levinasian reading of vision that Levinas himself may or may not have intended, it is through language that the experience of light will be, not avoided, but transformed.
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A COMPLETE REJECTION OF VISION OVERLOOKS THE WAYS THAT VISION CAN ESTABLISH ETHICAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE OTHER. WHILE IT MAY BE TRUE THAT VISION CAN ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE KNOWLEDGE, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT A VISION OF TEARS CAN BE A PASSIVE ETHICAL RESPONSE. A TRANSFORMATION OF A THINKING THAT ESTABLISHES RIGID CATEGORIES OF WHAT VISION CAN AND CANNOT DO TOWARDS A THINKING OF VISION THROUGH TEARS RESOLVES THE PROBLEMS OF ETHICS, DEHUMANIZATION, AND GENDER BINARIES. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)
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Derrida concludes his book on blindness with the citation of Marvell's poem, "Eyes and Tears," the concluding line of which is "these weeping eyes, those seeing tears." Derrida's interlocutor asks, "tears that see . . . . Do you believe?" and Derrida answers, "I don't know, one has to believe" (129). Here, Derrida's "step" is hesitant, like that of the blindman or the myopic Cixous; he does not know, and he considers tears that see, and wishes to believe in this vision. Yet, unlike Marvell, Derrida's

discussion of tears has not been of tears that see, nor of eyes in tears which see, but of tears which blind, and of other forms of blindness, of eyes which do not see. It is significant that wet, soft eyes are not blind eyes, and that we can see through tears, and see tears. We see while in tears, and see others in tears, and cry because of what we see. Vision is not blinded by tears, but rather may respond in tears, tears which blur without fully obscuring, veil with transparent matter. Seeing in tears is thus an example of the way in which sight may be confused, unknowing, and thus not always an imposition of knowledge on the object of the gaze. Because we cry at what we see, and cry involuntarily, crying is an instance of sight which is passive, a response to the object of the gaze acting upon the eyes, an example of another way of seeing other than that which has dominated Western metaphysics.
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Derrida illustrates his discussion of tears with an image of a woman at the cross who, weeping, covers her eyes with her hands in the gesture of the blindman, and

think of ways of weeping in which the eyes are not covered, closed, or blinded. Levin, in a chapter of The of seeing, and seeing in tears specifically, not as a form of knowing but of learning. His aim is to "to reintegrate the perceptivity of crying into the larger process of vision, letting it show itself as a moment of extremely important learning." Unlike Derrida, he sees tears not as blinding the eyes, but as enabling them to see in an ethical manner. He elaborates: "With the crying, I began to see, briefly, and with pain. Only with the crying, only then, does vision begin" (Opening of Vision 172): our eyes are not only articulate organs of sight; they are also the emotionally expressive organs of crying . . . . Is it merely an accidental or contingent fact that the eyes are capable of crying as well as seeing? Or is crying in the most intimate, most closely touching relationship to seeing? . . . What is the ontological significance of crying as a mode of visionary being? (PAGE ##?) Like Derrida, Levin notes that only human beings cry with their eyes, and thus that crying may well be what makes our eyes specifically human. Unlike Derrida, however, for Levin crying is also what makes our vision human, rather than blinding that vision. Here it is not a matter of "imploration rather than vision" (Memoirs 125 [126]), but of vision which implores and responds to imploration. Levin argues that crying may "ennoble" vision in the human sphere, the sphere of ethics, and that the absence of the ability to shed tears may be what "marks off the inhuman." This inability describes the Nazi commandant and his victim, neither of whom could cry, having been dehumanized in very different ways. Levin writes: by the "inhuman" I mean the monstrous and the inwardly dead: the Nazi commandant, for example, and his victim, the Jew, locked into a dance of death, neither one, curiously, able to shed a tear: for different reasons, their eyes are dry, empty, hollow. What we have seen, we who are alive today, of human cruelty and evil demands that we give thought to this capacity for crying and examine, looking into ourselves, the nature--or character--of its relation to vision. What does this capacity make visible? What is its truth? What is the truth it sees? What does it know as a "speech"
yet we may Opening of Vision entitled "Crying for a Vision," conceives of our nature? How does it guide our vision? (PAGE ##)

The comparison of tears to speech is interesting in that we are able to think of the eyes (and eyes in tears) as ears, and also as mouths, as speaking to the other in "words" that oral language may not contain or allow, and as a way of responding, of hearing and answering, which is again both extra-linguistic and an other form of
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speech. Levinas, once more, is thus too quick in his opposition of vision and language, of vision as an imposition of sameness and speech as an opening to alterity, because tears can be words, words spoken, words responding to, and also, like writing, words seen. y While, unlike Derrida, Levin does not elaborate on the cultural or stereotypical femininity of tears, he notes that seeing objectively, objectifyingly, with wide, dry eyes, in the manner which philosophy (and feminism) has almost always conceived of vision, with the "right of inspection" or "droit de regard," is perhaps to see, and to see vision, through "masculine" eyes.14 Arguably this talk of "masculinity" and "femininity" in Levinas, Derrida, and Levin raises problems from a feminist perspective,15 but if I am to follow Levinas, Derrida, and Levin for a moment, I would argue that if there can be a transformation of the metaphor of vision and light, if we can conceive of a more "feminine" visuality, then it would be a mistake to separate vision from ethics entirely, or to give vision only to the other in the ethical relation (as in the visor effect). This, however, is what Levinas and Derrida seem at least frequently to have done. Despite some ambivalence, and some self-consciousness of the metaphorical status of what is being rejected, they nevertheless hastily accept vision as an exclusively "masculine" sense organ and deficient as such from the perspective of a "feminine" ethics, rather than explicitly exploring the possibilities of new light-metaphors, of a "feminine" vision--a "feminine" vision which, in fact, like its exemplary capacity to cry, is simply human. Ethical vision as I am here theorizing it is not therefore opposed to the sight of men, but to the hard, dry-eyed sight of Derrida's sclerophthalmic animals. One way of thinking about this ethical vision is through a consideration of the capacity of human eyes to cry.

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AURALITY BAD THE NEGATIVES ARGUMENT THAT THE VISUAL WILL SWAMP THE AUDITORY IS FLAT BACKWARDS NOT ONLY IS IT THE AUDITORY THAT SERVES THE PRIMARY FUNCTION IN ESTABLISHING CLINICAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT AND THUS THE DOMINATING SENSE, BUT IT DOES SO INDEPENDENTLY OF THE VISUAL. Siisininen 2008 (Lauri, political science researcher @ U of Jyvskyl, From the Empire of the Gaze to Noisy Bodies: Foucault, Audition, and Medical
Power Theory and Event, 11:1)
y To return to Ren Lannec, if we take his work as a historical document on the birth of the clinic and clinical-medical knowledge this, as we noticed, is what

it is difficult to see how one could on this basis come to a conclusion on the insignificance of audition and its reduction or submission under the domination of vision. In Lannec's treatise on mediate auscultation (l'auscultation mdiate), there is actually nothing referring to such a submission or downplay of auditory perception. On the contrary, Lannec takes auditory signs, auditory perception and the technique of mediate auscultation to be the primary (and in many cases the only), indispensable and independent medium for the opening up of a living individual body, in all its interior dynamism and mobility, to medical knowledge and practices of therapy. As Lannec characterizes this auditory opening of the living body/individual/subject to the medical truth, there is no submission, not even any need for a reference to vision. Lannec's central argument is that audition in the practice of medical/mediate auscultation should be and indeed can be rationalized in its own right, that it can be used as a medium of medical knowledge (about the health/illness, normality/pathology) independently, i.e. without needing any complementation from visual experience, without being submitted to a relation of temporary substitution or anything of the sort. And when it comes to the generation of "spatial data", far from arguing that it belongs exclusively to the capacities sight, Lannec stresses that the ear and hearing can very effectively be articulated into the generation of this data (localization of disease inside the body etc.).24 In this way, in Lannec's account, the formation of clinical experience and knowledge, in the practice of mediate auscultation, in fact transgresses the juxtaposition between "audio" and "visual" (of the non-spatial and spatial perception/experience etc.). y Similarly, when we read Lannec's Treatise, Foucault's reference to the importance of the autopsy as a testimony to the final triumph of the gaze in the clinical-medical truth, appears to be somewhat problematic. Now, if for Lannec the relation between the autopsy, gaze and the visible truth (or the truth as visibility) testifies to anything, it testifies that vision is more apt to grasping the dead corps, not the living one, whereas audition is the sensory medium most apt for reaching the truth of the living individual body. The truth of the living body the most valuable truth setting the standard for modern medicine is not (contrary to what Foucault argues) revealed by the gaze in the "luminous presence of the visible", but in and through the careful listening to the invisible, ephemeral audible signs of the living body's dynamics, movements and forces.25 If there is a hierarchic triangle here, it is much rather submitted under the dominant sign of the audible, not the visible. Reading Lannec's Treatise gives all
Foucault intends to do the more reason to believe that Foucault's right-of-origin downplay of the contribution of audition to the clinical-medical discourse follows from his own theoretical commitment the strong juxtaposition of the eye and the ear that he is not ready to question, even when the historical sources clearly suggest this. Thus, it doesn't come as a surprise that Foucault has recently become the target of quite severe criticism, when it comes to dealing with the history and politics of vision and audition. Next, let me briefly summarize what I take to be the most central points of the criticism.

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VISUAL GOOD (A/T FOUCAULT) TURN THE CRITICISMS BLANKET REJECTION OF THE VISUAL IGNORES THE POSSIBILTIES FOR SUBVERSION AND LIBERATION POSSIBLE WITHIN VISUAL-SCOPIC REGIMES AND DOES SO BASED ON A CONTRADICTORY, BANKRUPT CHRISTIAN ONTO-THEOLOGY. Siisininen 2008 (Lauri, political science researcher @ U of Jyvskyl, From the Empire of the Gaze to Noisy Bodies: Foucault, Audition, and Medical
Power Theory and Event, 11:1)
y Firstly, Foucault has been accused of reducing the sense of vision, visuality and the eye to the dominating/surveying gaze, and of ignoring the multiple possibilities of different visual-scopic regimes with their subversive, equalizing and democratic potentialities. The criticism has ended up classifying Foucault as yet another representative of the 20'th- Century French iconoclast theoretical discourse.26 In contemporary feminist theory, for instance, the criticism has challenged the reduction of the political potentialities of vision to the "patriarchal gaze."27 However, this doesn't mean that these critics would28necessarily show any intention to dispute the reduction of the sense of audition to the "irrational sense" or to grant it any more historical-political significance. Lately, also Foucault's approach to auditory perception has become a subject of critical discussion, above all among those researchers specialized in the research of auditory culture. Most importantly, Jonathan Sterne, in his perceptive studies on the development of modern techniques/technologies of listening (one case being precisely the development of medical auscultation), has argued that Foucault' categorical (by- right- of -origin) reduction of the significance of auscultation in The Birth of the Clinic is a consequence of his adoption of the idea of an inherent, insurmountable difference separating vision and hearing (image and sound), an idea having its roots deep in the tradition of Christian onto-theology (the juxtaposition between the dead letter and the living Word of God).29 Furthermore, others have pointed out (as already mentioned) Foucault's devaluation of the importance of the auditory function in Jeremy Bentham's elaborations of his scheme of panoptical apparatus.30 The conclusion of this criticism seems to be quite severe: when it comes to the history of our ears and to understanding audition politically, there is not much to learn from Foucault. y

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VISUAL GOOD (ETHICS) TURN THE CRITIQUE ENFORCES VIOLENCE AND OPPRESSION. APPROACHING THE OTHER THROUGH VISUALITY IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THE ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP THAT IS CRUCIAL TO AVOID ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST THE OTHER INCLUDING MURDER, POVERTY, EXPLOITATION AND WAR. THE CRITIQUE OF VISION FAILS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THE VISUAL APPROACH TO THE OTHER CAN BE PASSIVE AND THUS AVOID ABOLISHING ALTERITY. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
y

Culture, 16:2) David Michael Levin has repeatedly considered Levinas's complex understanding of vision, most exhaustively in The Philosopher's Gaze. Taking a very different stance towards "blindness" and the narrowing of our human, lidded eyes than, as shall be seen, Derrida does in Memoirs of the Blind, Levin dedicates this book to the "remembrance of centuries of victims brought by inhumanity and cultural blindness, by eyes narrowed in brutal lust, rage, and hate, into depths of pain and suffering--or to even darker cruelties engraved in dust and ashes." Like Derrida, Levin takes an interest in Diderot's writing on blindness, but cites a very different passage: while Derrida will focus on Diderot's writing of a love letter blind (Memoirs 101), Levin

cites Diderot's suspicion that those who do not see

may consequently be impaired in their abilities to feel:


What difference is there to a blind person between a man urinating and a man bleeding to death without speaking? Do we ourselves not cease to feel compassion when distance or the smallness of the object produces the same effect on us as lack of sight does on the blind? Thus do all our virtues depend on our way of apprehending things and on the degree to which external objects affect us . . . . I feel quite sure that were it not for fear of punishment, many people would have fewer qualms at killing a man who was far enough away to appear no larger than a swallow than in butchering a steer with their own hands. And if we feel compassion for a horse in pain though we can crush an ant without a second thought, are these actions not governed by the same principle? (Philosopher's Gaze 4-5) 5

However dubious Diderot's generalizations about the capacity for compassion in blind persons, this passage may have something to say to us today, at a moment when we have available to us ways of killing and enforcing poverty "blindly," or upon vast numbers of sentient beings at a great distance, thus avoiding looking upon the sufferings that we cause: we now place slaughterhouses outside of our cities,6 we exploit child and adult laborers in poverty-stricken countries, and we engage in modern forms of warfare that do not require soldiers to see the people they kill. Violence today is facilitated by our blindness, by our no longer needing to meet our victims face-to-face. Significantly, if we resist denying the relevance of visuality in the face-to-face encounter, we can fruitfully use a Levinasian theory of ethics to consider the grounds of possibility of modern forms of violence. y In citing Diderot, and throughout his writings on vision, Levin is arguing for vision's significance to our humanity and to our capacity for compassion and ethics. If we are to speak of compassion in the philosophy of Levinas, it is necessary to understand it as a passive suffering for the other without identification, a substitution which would not entail understanding or being-with, which is not Miteinandersein. Compassion, for Levinas, must be a response to the other's suffering as other than one's own, a suffering-for and not a sufferingwith, or a passivity which avoids subsuming the other into the same. Levinas writes, "the extreme passivity of 'incarnation'--being exposed to illness, suffering, to death is to be exposed to compassion" (Otherwise than Being 139n12 [195n12]). Following Levin, I would thus be arguing that one may be passively exposed to the other's suffering through the visual encounter, and as such be exposed to compassion as an encounter with alterity. Compassionate substitution as such would not abolish the other's otherness, and would not claim to actively grasp that suffering or to understand, but would be a passive ethical response. y Levin notes that the philosopher has long been a figure who does not look and who thus avoids this form of compassionate suffering. The philosopher is one who talks and writes, turns his eyes towards his books and thoughts, closes his eyes to contemplate, shutting them upon the anguish around him. Even philosophers such as Plato who
have emphasized vision most often spoke of the "eye of the intellect" rather than of the seeing eye, and Democritus put out the latter to "see" with the former. At first glance, then, Derrida and Levinas, in their preference for language over and against vision, may not be novel in their philosophical approach to vision, nor even particularly Hebraic, but rather follow a tradition of philosophers averting their eyes. Yet Levin finds many passages in which Levinas depends on vision for his understanding of ethics, and argues that Levinas's understanding that the visuality of his language is merely metaphoric is not, cannot, and should not be consistently maintained. Noting that Levinas argues that the face "is not a form offered to serene perception," Levin asks, "why must perception be understood as serene, or contemplative?" and notes that it is not so in the phenomenologies of Heidegger and of Merleau-Ponty (Philosopher's Gaze 267). Questioning whether vision must also be active, an imposition upon or absorption of the other, Levin finds moments in Levinas's philosophy in which vision is understood as "passive" and as "subjection,"7 and notes that in the "Preface" to Totality and Infinity ethics is described as an "optics" (Philosopher's Gaze 50, 259). Levin argues further that the consistent decisions on Levinas's part to use visual metaphors to describe the encounter with the other--the "shimmer of infinity," for instance--are diminished if they are not understood visually. Levin asks: "does Levinas risk more

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than paradox, more than he supposes, when he withdraws infinity absolutely from the visible--when, for the sake of the ethical relation, he takes the 'metaphysical' experience of the other entirely out of the visible, out of sight, rather than extending it from the visible into the invisible?" (Philosopher's Gaze 259). Later he asks: "but doesn't this withdrawal of the face from visibility and sight also risk withdrawing from ethics all that might have been gained for it by introducing the face and the faceto-face relation into the discussion?" (265).

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TURN IT IS ONLY A VISUAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE OTHER THAT FORCES AN ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE TO IGNORE OTHER KNOWLEDGES OF INJUSTICE, WHEN CONFRONTED VISUALLY THE IMAGE IS IMPOSED UPON US AND THUS EVOKES A RESPONSE IMMEDIATELY, BEFORE WE ARE ABLE TO TURN AWAY. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)

explicit rejection of vision from ethical relations can and has been nuanced to show an understanding of the manners in which vision may in fact respond to the other, or can give rise to an ethical encounter rather than abolish its possibility, on a few occasions in his writings, beyond realizing that the language of vision can be transformed, Derrida goes so far as to attribute to vision as we already experience it a more positive and ethical function, and
y

Interestingly, just as Levinas's

theorizes "voir et savoir" as "incommensurables" (Echographies 131).17 It is with these moments in Derrida's work that I would like to conclude.

First, it can be noted that in his description of the ethical response to the blindman, Derrida assumes that I respond to the blindman's outstretched hand because I see the sight of him which moves me, and thus respond, am responsible for the Other, through vision. Similarly, in Echographies of Television, Derrida describes another situation in which vision called spectators to ethical and political responsibility, to respond against the violence done to others, and in which sight was passive. In the passage in question, Derrida describes the visual witnessing by television spectators of the police brutality against Rodney King. He writes, for the scene was, unfortunately, banal. Other, much worse scenes happen, alas, here and there, every day. Only there it was, this scene was filmed and shown to the entire nation. No one could look the other way, away from what had, as it were, been put right before his eyes, and even forced into his consciousness or onto his conscience, apparently without intervention, without mediator. And all of a sudden this became intolerable, the scene seemed unbearable, the collective or delegated responsibility proved to be too much. (Echographies 105 [91-2]) In this case, Derrida describes the manner in which vision gave rise to an ethical response as language arguably could not: while Americans knew that there were instances of racial profiling and brutality against visible minorities by the police force every day--and knew this based on having heard and read of such cases--they could (and by and large did) avoid responding to this knowledge, and it was only when confronted with one such scene visually that a collective ethical response immediately occurred. In this case, both the sight of the beating and the ethical response to which it gave rise were "imposed" on the viewers, and thus vision, and the spectator's response to what was seen, are described as passive: a sight is forced upon one's eyes and one cannot help but respond. Although, as Derrida notes, such scenes as the Rodney King beating occur every day, with the televisation of the filming of this particular incident "no one could look the other way" ("personne ne pouvait plus dtourner les yeux"). Unlike the narrator's
y

response in "The Oval Portrait," in Derrida's discussion of the Rodney King video it is ethically crucial that one not turn one's eyes away from the violence one sees. Moreover, one

cannot turn away from this sight or shut one's eyes to it, for vision is already passively captivated by what has "been put right before his eyes," to which one responds "all of a sudden": one is already responding to what has been taken in before one has the choice to look away. Response, the realization that an intolerable situation is occurring and must be responded to, happens all of a sudden through vision, as may not be the case with language. In this discussion we see that, contrary to the other instances in which vision is theorized as active and violent in Derrida's writing, here vision is theorized as the passive imposition of ethical responsibility upon a subject.

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A/T GENDER FEMINIST CRITICISM OF OCULARCENTRISM ESSENTIALIZE WOMEN WHILE RECONSTRUCTING THE VERY BINARIES IT TRIES TO DECONSTRUCT. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Phallogocentrism: Derrida and
Irigaray pp.493-542) Indeed, much of Irigarays work implied that visual experience was inevitably caught in a dialectic of domination in which women were always the victims. As a result, she frequently invited the reproach of essentialism, of remaining within a discourse that reified gender differences into permanent, even biologically given, aspects of the human condition. Her subtle technique of mimicking traditional male assumptions about women, parodically parroting the masters discourse, produced, so some critics charged, mere anodyne displacements rather than effective subversions. Her emphasis on the specific qualities of the female genitalia, although reversing the traditional male horror of their alleged absence, reinforced the assumption of a difference in kind between men and women. Her privileging of the pre-Oedipal mother could lead, other critics worried, to a narcissistic politics of the Imaginary. Even Irigarays claim that fluids should be given equal status with solids was vulnerable to the charge that she was generating a positive term in the way which simply imitated the valorization of positivity characteristic of the dominant discourse. Although it would be unfair to reduce these and other criticisms of Irigaray to a single common denominator, in many cases the larger issue they raise concerns the relation between difference in general and sexual difference. Derrida

resisted turning differences into opposing terms in a binary structure that is visible, as it were, to the eye. Woman was thus a placeholder for difference, not a positive concept, and male/female a dichotomy to be deconstructed. In Irigarays appropriation of Derrida, however, it sometimes seemed as if she reconstructed the dichotomy, albeit with a different evaluation of the terms. Wherea he was content to undermine subject positions of whatever gender, Irigaray often felt compelled to argue for a new feminine subjectivity empowering those who were victims of patriarchal domination. Because of her frequent insistence on the unalterable distinctions between male and female bodies, even her most stalwart defenders were obliged to admit that those victims were not discursively constituted for her in solely cultural or social terms.

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A/T BATAILLE TURN THE CRITIQUE FAILS TO TRANSGRESS THE VISUAL AND ERASES FEMININITY. THE NEGATIVES READING OF BATAILLES STORY OF THE EYE COLLAPSES THE NARRATORS SPECTATORSHIP INTO THE TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE TEXT, EFFECTIVELY IGNORING THE FACT THAT BATAILLES TRANSGRESSIONS FAIL TO COMPLETELY ESCAPE THE OCULARITY OF SPECTATING, MASCULINE SUBJECT WHICH MUST WITNESS AND WRITE THE TRANSGRESSIVE IMAGES THAT IN IN REALITY ONLY A TRANSGRESSIVE LOSS OF THE FEMININE OTHER. Surkis 1996 (Judith, doctoral candidate in history @ Cornell, No Fun and Games Until Someone Loses and Eye: Transgression and Masculinity in Bataille and
Foucault Diacritics, 26.2, pp18-30)

Foucault turns to the eye of Bataille's writing as a figure of "inner experience" and its implicit disruption of philosophical being 7 and concentrates on the significance of the [End Page 25] eye as a "figure of being in the act of transgressing its own limit" [45]. At this point, critical slippages occur in Foucault's argument, for he insistently reads the eye as an image of Bataille's own disruptive inner experiences rather than examining how, in Bataille's writings, the eye's transgressions are persistently witnessed by a narrating writer. In Foucault's readings, Bataille himself (as the tortured subject of
philosophy) seems to experience the transgression of this eye. In effect, Bataille becomes a "figure of being in the act of transgressing its own limit."

Foucault contrasts Bataille's images of the exorbitated and upturned eye to the traditional eye of philosophical reflection. The conventional eye of reflection withdraws into the interior of the self and is, in the process, granted an ever greater "transparency of vision."
Diametrically opposed to this figure, the exorbitated eye is thrown outward rather than drawn inward; its sight is denied rather than accorded an increased transparency.

The subject of this ocular transgression is simultaneously deprived of vision and offered "the spectacle of that indestructible core which now imprisons the dead glance" [45-46]. But who witnesses this spectacle? Foucault writes that, "in the distance created by this violence and uprooting, the eye is seen absolutely, but denied any possibility of sight." Seen absolutely by whom? For Foucault, the "spectacle" is offered to the subject who loses the eye. In the process of exorbitation, "the philosophizing subject has
been dispossessed and pursued to his limit." The "sovereignty of philosophical language" is seen to emerge from "the measureless void left behind by the exorbitated subject" [46]. No longer simply a figure for transgression, exorbitation is framed as an experience in which the philosophizing subject loses himself and accedes to a liberated language. Foucault paradoxically animates Bataille's rhetorical figure for the sovereign philosopher's self-loss, bringing this figurative death to life.

However, if we examine the context of exorbitated eyes in the narrative of Bataille's Story of the Eye, it appears that the exorbitated subject does not coincide with the subject who speaks. Exorbitation is rather consistently offered as a spectacle to be witnessed by the narrating subject. One of two exorbitations in Bataille's Story, the spectacle of the death of Granero the toreador--the scene cited in Foucault's conclusion--presents the image of, in Foucault's words, an eye "seen absolutely, but denied the possibility of sight." The denial of sight presented to the exorbitated eye itself is invisible to the spectators. The eye presents an absence: the "image" of the witnesses' blindness to blindness, that is, a visible absence. Such "obscene" paradoxical present absences, like those figured in the erotic dynamic by the feminine other who offers a spectacle of her absence to an onlooking partner, are repeatedly presented to the narrator of Story of the Eye. The exorbitated eye's loss of vision--its transgression--is explicitly connected with the image of a lost feminine other. Within Bataille's narrative, Marcelle, who "loses herself" by committing suicide, is the privileged figure of/for absence; in the end, she is invoked as a representation of the exorbitated eye's loss of vision. Marcelle is, however, notably absented from Foucault's analysis. Foucault instead traces connections between the exorbitated eye, Bataille's experience as
a witness, and Bataille's writing. He links Bataille's "being brought back to the reality of his own death" to his experience as a spectator at Granero's death. At the corrida, Bataille saw that "the uprooted eye could give substance to this absence[rendre prsente cette absence] of which sexuality has never stopped speaking. . . ." Both the spectacle and Bataille's "language of sexuality" render absence present--a connection which Foucault understands as "crucial for his thought [End Page 26] and characteristic of all his language" [51-52; 768]. Foucault can identify with Bataille's spectatorial experience by reading Bataille. The significance of this identification between Foucault as reader and Bataille as witness becomes clear when we consider how Foucault analyzes the spectator's experience. In

Foucault's reading, the narrator is conflated with the transgressive act itself. After sketching the scene in which the toreador's eye is exorbitated and Simone "swallows" the bull's testicle, Foucault cites Bataille:
Two globes of the same color and consistency were simultaneously activated in opposite directions. A bull's white testicle had penetrated Simone's pink and black flesh; an eye had emerged from the head of the young man. This coincidence, linked until death to a sort of urinary liquification of the sky, gave me [me rendit] Marcelle for a moment. I seemed, in this ungraspable instant, to touch her.[52; 769]

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In this instant, opposites coincide in their simultaneous transgression; the analogous spheres cross the limits of their "normal" positions: the testicle is intruded, the eye extruded. Boundaries between inside and outside are visibly disrupted, imaged before the narrator's eyes. The coincidence "renders" or re-presents the absent Marcelle, offering an image of her absence. But the narrator's access to her is at best approximate. He only seems to reach her in an ungraspable instant. Foucault's reading ignores the asymptotic element here, effacing the final dis-junction between the narrator and Marcelle. He writes: "it is the moment when being necessarily appears in its immediacy and where the act which crosses the limit touches absence itself" [52]. Foucault conflates the narrator's experience as a witness with the images of transgression presented before him. All trace of the narrating subject has disappeared; the narrator's "act" of touching the absent Marcelle is collapsed into the eye/testicle's transgressions, into the crossing of limits performed by the spheres' simultaneous introjection and exorbitation; Foucault elides the requisite specular distance between the narrator and the act, a distance the narrator almost but never fully loses when he attempts to cross the limit in order to reach Marcelle. In Foucault's discussion of Bataille's other ocular figure, the upturned eye, similar slippages appear; the optic transgression is yet again attributed to the philosophical/speaking subject. Like the exorbitated eye, the upturned eye is opposed to
the eye of reflection. Its movement toward the interior does not reveal a transparency of vision, an "interior secret." Instead, "made to turn inward in its orbit, the eye now only pours its light into a bony cavern" [46]. In these instances Foucault yet again invokes the subject who possesses the transgressing eye. However, in crossing the limit of its normal position, reversing night and day (the white of the eye signifies a darkness of vision), the eye both performs and images a transgression. Foucault writes, "The upturned eye discovers the bond that links language and death at the moment that it figures [il figure] this relationship of the limit and being" [47; 764]. The eye simultaneously experiences and figures: it "shuts out the day in a movement that manifests its own whiteness" [46]. There are two eyes here, one that shuts out the day and another to whom the whiteness is manifested. In Bataille's fiction, both perspectives are represented. Like the spectacle of exorbitation, the upturning of the eye is a horizon for rather than an experience of the narrator. In Madame Edwarda, the prostitute presents the ocular figure of transgression. The writer witnesses death in her eyes: "Supporting her nape, I looked into her eyes: they gleamed white. . . . Love was dead in those eyes, they contained a daybreak aureate chill, a transparence wherein I read death's letters [une transparence o je lisais la mort]." [157-58; 51]. The description evokes the moment in Erotism when the lover "glimpses" limitless being through the transparency of the beloved. The narrator reads the death and absence written in the prostitute's eyes. Transgression is marked in and by Edwarda as she presents absence to the narrator. [End Page 27] Foucault's reading consistently obscures this dynamic, collapsing the experience of the upturned eye itself into its significance for an onlooking witness. For Foucault, "the eye of Bataille [l'oeil de Bataille] delineates the zone shared by language and death, the place where language discovers its being in the crossing of its limits: the non-dialectical form of philosophical language" [48]. The discovery that is made by the eye is always also a representation that "delineates." However, the reference here to "the eye of Bataille" maintains the confusion: is this the eye of Bataille as philosophical subject or the eye as a figure in Bataille's writing? Foucault stresses the experience of Bataille as philosophical subject: "Revealed to this eye, which in its pivoting conceals itself for all time, is the being of the limit" [49]. He, in turn, reads transgression and death in Bataille's eye. Foucault consistently effaces Bataille's representation of transgression as a gendered dynamic in order to position Bataille as a figure of/for transgression. He can only repeat Bataille's transgression by obscuring how it is enacted in Bataille's writing. If Foucault were to examine the consistent gendering of transgression, he would have to account for the persistence of the narrator who never completely disappears--who is only proximately rather than totally lost. Foucault turns to "the spectacle of erotic deaths" in Bataille's stories as exemplars of the upturned eye's transgression, metaphorizing Bataille's metaphor by substituting the erotic scene for the ocular figure. This substitution makes explicit what is implicit in the spectacle of the upturned eye--namely, two "perspectives," one gendered as

in his citation of the climactic cemetery scene in Blue of Noon, Foucault yet again effaces the woman and concentrates instead on the revolution in Troppmann the narrator's sight, as the ground
of the cemetery, twinkling with candles marking each grave, takes on the appearance of the sky, and "the sky above forms a hollow orbit, a death mask in which he

"feminine" and the other as "masculine." However,

elides how Dorothea's body becomes an initial "image" of absence and death--as she takes on the aspect of a grave--into which the narrator can proceed to fall. As Foucault cites: "The earth under Dorothea's body was
open like a tomb, her belly opened itself to me like a fresh grave [comme une tombe fraiche]. We were struck with stupor, making love on a starred cemetery. Each light marked a skeleton in a grave and formed a wavering sky as perturbed as our mingled bodies" [47]. The

recognizes his inevitable end" [47]. He

"revolution in sight," the appearance of

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the "starred cemetery," follows Dorothea's "opening" and self-loss; it is subsequent to her imaging of a tomb/fall representation of the narrator's potential loss. However, Troppmann, as the masculine partner, never entirely dissolves; like Bataille in the introduction to Erotism, he remains conscious enough to write. The proximity (rather than completion) of his fall is enacted at the end of the scene. He writes, ". . . we began sliding down the sloping ground. . . . If I hadn't stopped our slide with my foot, we would have fallen into the night, and I might have wondered with amazement if we weren't falling into the void of the sky" [145]. The narrator stops the slide, remaining in a limit position in the face of Dorothea's total loss. As Bataille writes: "We approach the void . . . but not to fall into it. We want to become intoxicated with dizziness and the image of the fall is sufficient" [qtd. in Guerlac 105]. In the scene, Dorothea's body provides an image of a tomb/fall into which Troppmann almost but never completely gets lost. By concentrating exclusively on the narrator's revolution in sight, Foucault excludes the process by which the narrator's loss is (almost) enacted. He ignores both the role played by the feminine "image" of the abyss as well as the explicitly partial character of the narrator's loss. 8 [End Page 28]
(tombe/tombe), her Conclusion

In order for Foucault to envision the horizon of his own loss, he consistently positions Bataille (and his narrators) as already lost, as having always already transgressed. In constructing this horizon, he effaces how Bataille remains "discontinuous" throughout his gestures toward losing himself. Foucault's readings collapse the narrator's/Bataille's attempts at loss with the self-annihilation repeatedly imaged by feminine others: a collapse that is never fully possible. While Bataille might desire to lose himself in an "expenditure without reserve," the persistent gendering of transgression belies a limitless spending. The masculine partner always saves up some of himself at the expense of the feminine partner. What, then, are the consequences of Foucault's reading?
Both David Carroll and Sherry Simon have critiqued Foucault's discussion of transgression on the grounds that it refuses to articulate the position from which he speaks, a problem often raised by critical attempts to "place" Foucault [Carroll 197-98; Simon 180-81]. In "Preface," Foucault's explicit investment in "losing" or transgressing his own philosophical and discursive position raises this problem most acutely. Carroll writes that, in identifying with and collapsing the distance between himself and his privileged "disruptive discourses" (what I have outlined as Foucault's attempt to lose himself in Bataille's loss), Foucault "lightens his load and frees himself of the more tedious but still necessary task of carrying his own critical weight and assuming the philosophical-political consequences of his critical perspective" 9 [197]. I have seen Foucault's effacement of the writing subject's position as particularly symptomatic of this difficulty. His persistent conflation of narrating witnesses with what they see enacts exactly the total loss of position that he desires to achieve in his own reading of Bataille. I would suggest, like Carroll, that the desired "blindness" of this conflation, entailing as it does a loss of all "critical distance," can have questionable political consequences. Although Foucault is wary of reading all discourse as a direct expression of an (ideological) position, a close examination of the dynamic of transgression reveals that a total loss of position is never fully 10 possible for the subject who continues to write. In focusing upon a self-loss that is perpetually deferred as long as he continues to theorize, Foucault finesses and obscures the position he remains in while writing. An analysis of the gendered positions inscribed in Bataille's theory of transgression calls into question the possibility and even viability of the total self-loss that is

account of the gendering of Bataille's transgression demonstrates how it remains within a specular and speculative economy in which the writing subject is always at a certain distance from what he "sees." While he might desire to totally lose himself in the loss of another, the writing subject always remains conscious enough of that loss to theorize. Bataille's transgression may thus be read against itself in [End Page 29] order to demonstrate that the "masculine" writing subject always maintains his position vis--vis a witnessed "feminine" loss, which explains why Foucault shies away from the consideration of gender. We therefore need to examine how transgression underwrites the theoretical/philosophical subject in the process of purportedly undermining it and hence to account for the writing subject's
upheld as its goal. position rather than deny its continued existence.

11

This, it appears to me, is exactly why Foucault consistently effaces the role of gendered partners in eroticism. An

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A/T LEVINAS/ETHICS TURN LEVINAS ALTERNATIVE IGNORES THE WAYS IN WHICH LANGUAGE AND SPECIFICALLY SILENCE CAN WORK TO IMPOSE SAMENESS AND VIOLENCE UPON THE OTHER VIA BEING IGNORED, INTERRUPTED, OR TAKEN AS AGREEMENT. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
Culture, 16:2)

With respect to Levinas's alternative to vision, language, it seems that although Levinas is right in acknowledging silence as too readily accepts silence as response enough, or too hastily assumes that difference will always be able to interrupt the relation between subject and other through discourse. We may question whether it is
y

discursive, in Totality and Infinity he

sufficient to say that the other can always respond in such a way that she will be responded to in language, since silence itself is a response that weighs on her interlocutor, or whether we need more of an account of the functionings of power in discourse, the distribution of access to language, the effects of this distribution such that certain others can respond in language proper while others may only respond in silence. There

are no forms of discourse explored by Levinas to which the other cannot respond, to which the possibility of an other response is foreclosed by the discourse itself.4 Silence is presumed to be heard, is thought to always weigh on me as an evasion of my themes, and Levinas does not theorize the manners in which I can all too easily not hear the other's silence, or can interpret her silence as submission to or agreement with what I have said, that she may be forgotten in her quietude, and thus that silence may not function as an interruption of the Said. We may ask, therefore, whether this is enough of an account of the ways that silence may all too easily be taken as agreement with and adhesion to the same. Indeed, we need an account of how both language and silence may cut (tranche) to do violence, to silence, and not only to divide into an ethics of alterity. Levinas appears to have too readily dismissed vision as an imposition of knowledge on the other, while language has been too hastily accepted as evading such inflictions, as always permitting response. In fact, both vision and discourse function in some cases as impositions of knowledge, power, and sameness on the other, but both may function otherwise, as when the other's speech or silence is heard and responded to, or when sight absorbs, surprises, awes and bewilders the seeing subject, rather than simply absorbing what she sees and hears.

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A TOTALIZING REJECTION OF THE VISUAL FAILS TO COMPREHEND THE WAYS IN WHICH VISION AND ETHICS CAN CO-EXIST. WHEN UNDERSTOOD AS A PASSIVE SUBJECTION RATHER THAN AN APPROPRIATION OF THE OTHER, A SEEING OF TEARS RATHER THAN EYES, VISION CAN BE ETHICAL. Taylor 2006 (Chloe, Philosophy Doctoral Candidate @ Toronto, Hard, Dry Eyes and Eyes That Weep: Vision and Ethics in Levinas and Derrida, Postmodern
y

Culture, 16:2) Levin notes that the philosopher has long been a figure who does not look and who thus avoids this form of compassionate suffering. The philosopher is one who talks and writes, turns his eyes towards his books and thoughts, closes his eyes to contemplate, shutting them upon the anguish around him. Even philosophers such as Plato who have emphasized vision most often spoke of the "eye of the intellect" rather than of the seeing eye, and Democritus put out the latter to "see" with the former. At first glance, then, Derrida and Levinas, in their preference for language over and against vision, may not be novel in their philosophical approach to vision, nor even

particularly Hebraic, but rather follow a tradition of philosophers averting their eyes. Yet Levin finds many passages in which Levinas depends on vision for his understanding of ethics, and argues that Levinas's understanding that the visuality of his language is merely metaphoric is not, cannot, and should not be consistently maintained. Noting that Levinas argues that the face "is not a form offered to serene perception," Levin asks, "why must perception be understood as serene, or contemplative?" and notes that it is not so in the phenomenologies of Heidegger and of Merleau-Ponty (Philosopher's Gaze 267). Questioning whether vision must also be active, an imposition upon or absorption of the other, Levin finds moments in Levinas's philosophy in which vision is understood as "passive" and as "subjection,"7 and notes that in the "Preface" to Totality and Infinity ethics is described as an "optics" (Philosopher's Gaze 50, 259). Levin argues further that the consistent decisions on Levinas's part to use visual metaphors to describe the encounter with the other--the "shimmer of infinity," for instance--are diminished if they are not understood visually. Levin asks: "does Levinas risk more than paradox, more than he supposes, when he withdraws infinity absolutely from the visible-when, for the sake of the ethical relation, he takes the 'metaphysical' experience of the other entirely out of the visible, out of sight, rather than extending it from the visible into the invisible?" (Philosopher's Gaze 259). Later he asks: "but doesn't this withdrawal of the face from visibility and sight also risk withdrawing from ethics all that might have been gained for it by introducing the face and the face-to-face relation into the discussion?" (265). y Levin suggests that Levinas sometimes recognizes that vision functions ethically, otherwise than as philosophers, including Levinas himself, have frequently assumed. For Levin, it is these other ways of seeing that need to be further developed, and not sight that must be rejected tout court. He cites T. S. Eliot's confession, "I see the eyes but not the tears/ This is my affliction," and it seems that this distinction may capture for Levin the two manners of seeing in question: a seeing that does not see tears, and a seeing that sees tears, and that perhaps sees through or in tears as well. Levinas has most often assumed the seeing eye that does not see tears, and that would not shed tears in response to what it sees, that imposes and absorbs rather than being passively struck by the other and her suffering. At other moments, however, and in his consistent use of visual metaphors to describe the ethical encounter, Levinas is developing new ways of thinking about seeing, and thus new ways of seeing in language and in history, ones that depend on an understanding of the second way of seeing, an ethically responsive seeing, a seeing of tears.

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A/T FOUCAULT FOUCAULT NOT ONLY IGNORED THE POTENTIALLY SUBVERSIVE APPLICATIONS OF POWRE AND SPECIFICALLY VISUAL EXPERIENCE BUT HIMSELF ADMITTED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE. HIS PROJECT WASNT ONE THAT SOUGHT TO FIND A SOLUTION, AS HE BELIEVED ALL POWER TO BE BASED IN VISUAL REGIMES, HE RATHER ONLY SOUGHT TO CONSTANTLY PROBLEMATIZE. THE DUDE LITERALLY SAID I AM NOT LOOKING FOR AN ALTERNATIVEI DONT ACCEPT THE WORD ALTERNATIVE.
Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, From the Empire of the Gaze to the Society
of the Spectacle: Foucault and Debord, pp.414-416)

And yet, in

all of his attempts to problematize the given visual order and expand the boundaries of what could be seen, Foucault never provided a genuinely positive alternative. Whether an archaeology, a genealogy or, to invoke one of his final formulations, an
"analytic," Foucault's own method was resolutely antitheoretical precisely because of the time-honored complicity of theory and vision)" As demonstrated by his frequent criticisms of Merleau-Ponty, he also resisted an ontology of embodied vision in which a superior kind of perception might replace problematic "high altitude" philosophies of consciousness. When he invoked vision against the self-sufficiency of language, it was always to emphasize its revelationor perhaps rather constructionof a world of shadows or opacity, never transparency or clarity. As Wilhelm Miklenitsch put it, "His concern has in effect been, at all times, to valorize the experience of the eye's punctum caecumits blind spot, which is found on the retina where the optic nerve is bornin a thought that grasps finitude and Being."121 With characteristic ascetic rigor, Foucault thus resisted exploring vision's reciprocal, intersubjective, communicative potential, that of the mutual glance. Le regard never assumed for him its alternative meaning in English as well as French: to pay heed to or care for someone else. The "care of the self" which he explored in his final work included a visual dimension only to the extent that it involved a "certain manner of acting visible to others."122 But the ethical cum aesthetic self-fashioning he found so compelling did not go beyond a kind of dandiacal display, which left out more interactive affective ties, such as those in the family.123 As de Certeau pointed

may have focused so insistently on the dangers of panopticism that he remained blind to the other micropractices of everyday life that subvert its power. For all his professed interest in resistance, Foucault may have too hastily absorbed all power relations into one hegemonic ocular apparatus)25 Although he may have believed that the disciplinary society of the panopticon was itself being replaced by a new "society of control" based more on computerized than visual surveillanceat least so Deleuze has argued Foucault never explored in any depth the role visual experience might play in resisting it as well.
It is, moreover, unlikely that he held out any hope for another sense as the antidote to the hegemony of the eye, as was the case with certain French feminists. They may have chosen to turn to touch or smell as more consonant with female than male sexuality, but Foucault was always too skeptical of any search for essentializing immediacyand also too unconcerned with women's sexual experienceto feel that this choice provided an answer. Indeed, as

out,124 Foucault

he emphasized in one of his last interviews, "I am not looking for an alternativeWhat I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. I would like to do the genealogy of problems, of problematiques. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous."127 There was therefore no real escape from the current "empire of the gaze" into a more benign heterotopic alternative. For wherever Foucault looked, all he could see were scopic regimes of "malveillance."

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A/T LACAN LACANS CRITIQUE OF THE GAZE MIGHT SUBVERT CARTESIAN ORDERINGS, BUT IT DOES SO WHILE PRIVELEGING THE MALE GAZE BY UNDERSTANDING THE EGO AS HAVING VALUE ONLY IF REFLECTED. THIS CONSTRUCTION TRAPS WOMEN IN AN OBJECTIFYING MASCULINE SPECULAR ECONOMY. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Phallogocentrism: Derrida and
Irigaray pp.493-542) Irigarays critique of Lacans complicated and problematic attitude toward women and the construction of the feminine subject unleashed a flood of polemics on both sides of the question. With reference to the issue of vision, controversy swirled around everything from the implications of his choice of Berninis statue of an ecstatic St. Theresa on the cover of Encore, Seminaire XX (and his claim to know female jouissance just by looking at it) to his personal ownership of Courbets infamous painting of the vagina, The Origin of the World. Although his subtle appreciation of the chiasmic intertwining of the eye and the gaze allowed Lacan to challenge the traditional Cartesian perspectivalist visual order, he had not escaped, his critics charged, the no less traditional privileging of the male gaze in Western culture. Speculum of the Other Woman focused in particular on Lacans mirror stage argument, which is situated in the twin contexts of Freuds theory of child development and Platos theory of ideas. In certain respects, Irigaray implicitly drew on Derridas defense of difference against the tyranny of sameness, as well as his implication of woman with what escapes that tyranny. Both Freud and Lacan, she claimed, remained unaware of the blind spot of an old dream of symmetry between the sexes. This blind spot was evident not only in Lacans privileging of the phallic signifier in the Symbolic stage, but also in his description of the visual constitution of the ego in the Mirror Stage. Like Kristeva, she challenged the notion that the Imaginary must be based on visual experience alone. Like Cixous and Clement, she argued that Freuds was a voyeurs theory. Noting the general dependence of psychoanalysis on photological metaphors (the dark continent of femininity) and its complicity with the Idealist tradition of equating truth with eidos, Irigaray claimed that Freud was still trapped in an economy of presence in which woman could be figured only as a lack, an absence, a default. The critical expression of this bias came in the psychoanalytic descriptions of castration anxiety and penis envy, which were grounded in accounts of visual experience. According to Freud, the alarming sight to the boy of the little girls or mothers absent genitals, her unrepresentable hole, was the mechanism that unleashed these emotions. The little girl, the woman, supposedly has nothing you can see. she exposes, exhibits the possibility of a nothing to see. Or at any rate she shows nothing that is penis-shaped or could substitute for a penis. This is odd, the uncanny thing, as far as the eye can see, this nothing around which lingers in horror, now and forever, an overcathexis of the eye, of the appropriation by the gaze, and of the phallomorphic sexual metaphors, its reassuring accomplices.

The overcathexis of the eye is evident as well in the psychoanalytic claim and here Lacan more than Freud was the target that the ego is formed by a reflection in the mirror. If this ego is to be valuable, Irigaray notes, some mirror is needed to reassure it and re-insure it of its value. Woman will be the foundation for this specular duplication, giving back man his image and repeating it as the same. This mirror is, however, flat and thus replicates the image as if it were merely a precise duplicate of the self. To the extent that woman identify with the narcissistic subject created by such flat mirrors, they are imprisoned in a male specular economy in which they are always devalued as inferior versions of the male subject, as mere objects of exchange, dead commodities, in a hom(m)osexual circuit of sameness (in which the home was the only standard of value). Here a more drastic meconnaissance is added to that
Lacan attributed to the mirror stage in general, especially when what is suppressed is another mother-daughter relationship, the dark continent of the dark continent.

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STUFF I COULDNT CATEGORIZE

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BATAILLES EYES SEEMINGLY RELEVANT BUT TOO ABSTRACT EVEN FOR ME I BRING YOU BATAILLES EYES. Bataille 96 (by Iain White, Encyclopaedia Acephalica, eye 1-5) Because of its poetic virtues, for centuries the eye has served for lyrical comparisons and for allegories. One cannot,
even summarily, compile a list of the writers who have found an analogy between it and the stars. In metallurgy it tends to be regarded as a cavity, a hole: the eye of a crankshaft, eyelet (of a shoe). Then, by extension to the technique of the arts, people have spoken of l'oeild'une oeuvre[the eye, thus the look, of a work] in the sense of appearance. Hence the expression tuen as un oeil, you're looking good. Argot, that poetic language, rich in poetic imagery, and accursed, has naturally made much use of the organ of sight: le quart d'oeil(commissariat of police) derives and in the process outdoes it from the classical proverb ne dormir qued'un oeil, comme le gendarme [to sleep with one eye open, like a policeman].Coco bel oeil, which has passed from slang into polite usage, with a certain old-fashioned military whiff about it, alludes less to the organ of sight than to one of its functions, l'oeillade, the amorous glance or ogle. The eye's fragility quickly led to its being made a term of comparison with something precious: j'y tiens comme laprunelle de mon oeil, I treasure it/him/her like the apple of my eye; then again, by extension, as a sensitive spot not to be touched without good reason, as it emerges from the very formula of lynch law, oeil pour oeil, an eye for an eye. One could hold forth as lengthily on the numerous obscene senses of the word, brought about by its analogy with the private parts: mon oeil,crever l'oeil, and the famous mettrele doigt dans l'oeil[to poke one's finger in one's eye], which, taken initially in a figurative sense to express a concrete action, has been taken up again in the proper sense to express an abstract state (to be mistaken, to make a blunder)admirable ideo-material property of the senses. The expression l'oeil, free, gratis, is the paraphrase of a medieval story in which a poor wretch who having eaten the smell of a roast, pays with the sound of his money; hearing, byway of cash, having been replaced by sight. Pour vos beaux yeux, for your beautiful eyes, was originally a knightly expression. It was rightly estimated that the quality of beautiful eyes was enough to pursue dangerous adventures. It is the debasement of the ethics of love in connection with the evolution of customs which makes it possible today when "dispassionate" people(in both the exact and the figurate sense) consider love to be a trifle to confuse cause with effect, to be of the opinion the mourir pour beauxyeux, to die for beautiful eyes, is not an enviable fate. Ouvrir L'oeil et le bon, literally to open one's best eye, meaning to be on the look-out, to keep a weather eye open, takes us back to the vocabulary of the gendarme. It nonetheless has a scientific justification, since it is rare for a man to have the same acuity of vision in each eye. However there is no doubt an allusion here to the need for a marksman who wishes to aim straight to shut one of his eyes. So it would surely be better to say fermerl'oeil et le mauvais[close your worst eye].Finally we shift the whole to the part, and the words prunelles, pupils, cils, lashes, orbites, sockets, paupires, eyelids, have entered ordinary language and enriched the figurative vocabulary: froncer lessourcils, to knit the brows, to frown, jeter un cil [flick an eyelash], to have a peep, se mirer dans des prunelles, to gaze into someone's eyes, etc., before themselves falling into popular usage. It

is obvious that civilised man is characterised by a frequently inexplicable acuity of horrors. The fear of insects is doubtless one of the most singular and fully developed of these horrors, among which one of the most surprising is the fear of the eye. It seems impossible, in fact, to describe the eye without employing the word seductive, nothing it seems, being more attractive in the bodies of animals and men. But this extreme seductiveness is probably at the very edge of horror. In this respect, one might relate the eye to the edge of a blade whose appearance provokes both intense and contradictory reactions: this is what the makers of Un Chien Andalou[1] must have hideously and obscurely experienced when they decided to make the bloody love affair between these two beings among the earliest images of the film. That a razor might slice open the dazzling eye of a young and charming woman, this is precisely what he would admired to the point of madness, this young man observed by a small cat, who is by chance holding in his hand
a coffee spoon (should he suddenly hanker to place an eye in it).This is obviously a strange desire on the part of white man, from whom the eyes of the cows, sheep, and pigs that he eats have always been hidden. For

although the eye, to employ Stevenson's exquisite phrase, is a cannibal delicacy, it is also for us the object of such anxiety that we will never bite into it. The eye has the same high rank in horror, since among other things it is the eye of conscience. Victor Hugo's poem is sufficiently well known; the obsessive and lugubrious eye, the living eye, the eye of the hideous nightmare experienced just before his death [2]: the criminal "dreams that he has just struck down a man in a dark wood...Human blood has been spilled and, following an expression that presents a ferocious image to the mind's eye, he made an oak sweat.[3] In fact, it is not a man, but a tree trunk... bleeding... who seeks to defend himself... under the murderous weapon. The hands of the victim are raised in supplication, but in vain. Blood continues to flow." An then an enormous eye appears in the black sky, pursuing the criminal through space and to the bottom of the sea, where it devours him after assuming the form of a fish. Innumerable eyes nevertheless multiply beneath the waves. Concerning these, Grandville writes: "Are these the thousand eyes of the crowd attracted by the rumour of an immanent spectacle of torture? "But why would these absurd eyes be attracted, like a cloud of flies, to something so repugnant? Equally, why on the masthead of a perfectly sadistic illustrated weekly, published in Paris between 1907 and 1924, does an eye regularly appear against a red background, above various bloody spectacles? Why does not the Eye of the Police resemble the eye of human justice in

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Grandville's nightmare, perhaps in the end just the expression of a blind thirst for blood? Similar also to the eye of Crampon, condemned to death and approached by the chaplain an instant before the blade's descent: he dismissed the clergyman by enucleating himself and presenting him with the merry gift of his torn-out eye, because
this eye was made of glass The eye, be it strange, vague, or simply beautiful, has always been, and still is, among the civilised as among the Evil Eye: primitives, the doorway for evil influences. Hypnotism is the culminating point of a phenomenon next previous author list entries list home which has lesser degrees, such as the gaze of desire, the curious gaze, or simply the vague gaze that settles on nothing. In all these degrees, the primitive fears it, and we might say that for him every eye is evil. He fears the eyes of all animals, above all those that are round and fixed, he is in still greater terror of the human eye. These ancient beliefs have survived in our civilisations. They have crept into our ordinary language. We speak of "piercing eyes," or "eyes like pistols," of devouring with one's eyes." It would be easy to compile a dictionary of expressions concerned with the magic of the eyes, the stereotyped phraseology of our run-of-the-mill novels and our best poems. To look at an object with desire is to appropriate it, to enjoy it. To desire is to pollute; to desire is to take, and the primitive who has noticed a gaze on a possession of his immediately makes a gift of it, as if it were dangerous for him to keep it any longer, as if the gaze had deposited in the object a force ready to come into play against any stranger. This gift, this abandonment, is above all prophylactic: it banishes a cause of misfortune, and it is to some extent thus that we must explain the majority of gifts made by indigenous peoples. The power of the eye is so strong that it is dangerous even when mere curiosity animates it: as a result of being stared at by a number of soldiers, Antoine D'Abadie (Douze ans dans HauteEthiopie, p.205), had a woman who loved him rush to him and cover him with her robe, crying: "Your accursed eyes will pierce me before seeing him. "Yet the soldiers' curiosity was benevolent. By ascertaining the power of an eye without evil intent, one can gain an idea of the power it wields when it expresses an evil desire. One is not surprised that it "eats the hearts of humans and the insides of cucumbers" (Mignes, Sciencesoccultes, II, 879), that it dries up cows udders and kills little children. It is essential, then, to defend oneself and, for this, men have found many techniques. The commonest consists of an amulet worn round the neck, representing one of two eyes. Magical formulae, written medicines in magic, the utterance or the putting into words of a formula is itself efficacious surround the figure; they form, as it were a solvent containing the evil a vaccine compounded with the dead bacillus and wearing this remedy amounts to inoculating oneself with the evil influence, thus giving immunity. Another means employed in the majority of African countries is the bucrane. This in effect, is the symbol of a powerful defense: it recalls the halting of the animal by a wild beast dropping on its head from a branch. A bucrane stuck on a post in a field, in a tree heavy with fruit, on a millstone our scarecrows have not been conceived only for sparrows, which disregard them or set above a threshold the idea of making it a decorative motif came later is the best fluid-conductor. Its whiteness, the result of vermin and the sun, will at first sight draw the eye of the passer-by or the visitor. It will capture this gaze, the first being the most dangerous and here it seems right and proper to conjure up all the magic of the first time it will suck in through the two holes of the empty sockets, leaving the eye, that stone-shattering lighting, like a flat battery. One might, I believe, class under the same heading a "para-eye" I have observed on the shores of the Red Sea, at Port Sudan. It consists of the skeleton of a fish, probably of an acanthopterousor shiny species, its head impaled on a cane switch thrust into a palisade. In the living creature there is sort of horn over each eye. On the other hand, its vaguely phallic appearance has not, perhaps, been without influence in determining the choice; the phallus, in fact plays a considerable role in the prophylaxis of the evil eye (Otto Jahn,Bse Blick). But this is another question, far too extensive to expound upon here. The Acadmie, presided over by M.Abel Hermant, has carried out revisions upon the expressions: mauvais oeil, evil eye, oeil de perdix, soft corn between the toes, oeil pour oeil, an eye for an eye, tape l'oeil, to ogle, to wink.

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LACAN? LACAN EITHER CRITIQUES, ENDORSES, OR IS AMBIVALENT TOWARD THE GAZE. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Lacan, Althusser, and The
Specular Subject of Ideology, pp.329-380) After some cryptic and hasty remarks on icons, the Jewish taboo on images, and the role of painting in communal settings, Lacan concluded by returning to the link between desire and vision, which he called the appetite of the eye. Modifying the formula I have of desire as unconscious mans desire is the desire of the Other I would say, he explained, that it is a question of a sort of desire on the part of the Other, at the end of which is the showing (le donner-a-voir). That I, the gaze can be thought of as brought about by the Others desire to show itself, a desire that is matched only by the eyes desire to see. But showing and seeing do not harmoniously complement each other or overcome the split in the subject. The violence of their struggle is revealed in the ubiquitous that the eye carries with it the fatal function of being in itself endowed if you will allow me to play on several registers at once with the power to separate. The Latin word for envy, invidia, with its derivation from the verb to see (videre), suggests the yearning to overcome this separation. True envy, Lacan claimed, makes the subject pale before the image of a completeness closed upon itself, before the idea that the petit a, the separated a from which he is hanging, may be for another the possession that gives satisfaction. Such satisfaction is not only impossible, but the fury unleashed by the apparent attempt to attain it may also have a deadly result. For the evil eye operates as the fascinum, that which has the effect of arresting movement and , literally, of killing life. This power may be metaphorical, but it captures the aggressive potential of vision, a potential to which Lacan was sensitive ever since his earliest studies of the links between paranoia and the mirror stage in the 1930s. Significantly, the transcription of this last seminar on vision ends with a question from Jacques-Alain Miller, who wondered if anything in Lacans critique of Merleau-Pontys celebration of a healthy visual ontology had been changed by the publication of The Visible and the Invisible with its acknowledgement of the nondialectical chiasmus in sight. Absolutely nothing, replied the intransigent Lacan.

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LACAN EITHER CRITIQUES, ENDORSES, OR IS AMBIVALENT TOWARD THE GAZE. Jay 93 (Martin, Prof of History @ UC Berkely, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth Century French Thought, Lacan, Althusser, and The
Specular Subject of Ideology, pp.329-380) The objet a (object small a) was Lacans term for the object of lack or the missing object that will seemingly satisfy the drive for plenitude, a being the first letter of the French word for other (lautrui). At its most fundamental level, it is the phallus which the child (of whatever sex, according to Lacan) wishes to be in order to make up for the mothers alleged lack, her apparent castration. It can then be transformed into the Symbolic register as the metonymic object of desire which motivates the split subjects interminable search for a unity it can never achieve. But it operates as well in the realm of the Imaginary, where the object on which depends the phantasy from which the subject is suspended in an essential vacillation is the gaze. From the moment that this gaze appears, the subject tries to adapt himself to it, he becomes that puncitform object, that point of vanishing being with which the subject confuses his own failure. To explicate his cryptic assertion that in scopic relations the gaze functions as the objet a, Lacan turned to the brilliant passages in Sartres Being and Nothingness in which the reifying power of the gaze was explored. Although he challenged Sartres claim that the eye cannot see the eye that looks at it, he agreed that the gaze had the quality of being unseen: The gaze I encounter you can find this in Sartres own writing is, not a seen gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the Other. It is for this reason that le regard can include nonvisual phenomena like the rustling of leaves. More important, the unseen character of the gaze meant it was not necessarily that of another subject looking threateningly at the original subject, but might rather be understood as a function of the desire of the original subject, the desire for the objet a, or perhaps even for the large A that subtends such desire. For further help in explicating this relationship, Lacan turned to anamorphosis, as exemplified by Hans Holbeins The Ambassadors, a painting that was on the cover of the French edition of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. Normal perspective, he noted, corresponded to the Cartesian subjects geometrical mapping of space, a geometricalization that could be based, as Diderot had noted in his Letter on the Blind, on a sightless mans touch. Such a rigid and linear reduction of vision invited comparison, Lacan suggested, with an erect penis, or more precisely, that which appeared as the lack-fulfilling phallus in the mothers Imaginary: How can we not see here, immanent in the geometrical dimension a partial dimension in the field of the gaze, a dimension that has nothing to do with vision as such something symbolic of the function of the lack, of the appearance of the phallic ghost? In The Ambassadors, this phallic gaze, that of the dominant Cartesian perspectivalist scopic regime, was challenged by another, which was expressed by the distorted skull at the bottom of the canvas, a skull whose natural shape could be restored only by an oblique glance from the paintings edge. Such an object, which Lacan compared to such Surrealist images as Dalis soft watches, expressed another kind of desire than that which seeks phallic plenitude. Instead, is suggested the desire of the Symbolic realm which the subject is decentered, split, and comes to terms with its own incompleteness. Holbein makes visible for us here something that is simply the subject as annihilated annihilated in the form, that is, strictly speaking the imaged embodiment of the minus-phi of castration, which for us, centers the whole organization of desires through the framework of the fundamental drives. Rather than an image in the phallic eye of the geometricalized subject,the anamorphic skull thus is to be found in the impersonal, diffuse gaze as such, in its pulsatile, dazzling and spread out function, as it is in this picture. Or to put it differently, the eye is that of the spectacular, Cartesian subject desiring specular plenitude and phallic wholeness, and believing it can find it in a mirror image of itself, whereas the gaze is that of an objective other in a field of pure monstrance. To believe that these two chiasmicaly crossing dimensions of the scopic field could ever be reconciled harmoniously in something like Merleau-Pontys voyure is to forget the lesson that Lacan has absorbed in Kojeves lecture hall: true reciprocity is only an illusion. There is no way, to put it in terms of traditional optics, to reconcile lumen and lux, no way to combine Newtons light with Goethes color. In his next seminar, entitled The Line and the Light, Lacan reformulated and expanded his argument, using triangulated schemas to illustrate the chiasmic interwining of eye and gaze. The first, that of the eye, signified Cartesian perspectivalist vision, in which the viewers monocular eye was at the apex and the object at the far wall of the triangle. The image was on another line parallel to that wall, but halfway between it and eye/apex. The second schema, that of the gaze, put a point of light at the apex, the picture at the far wall, and what Lacan called the screen halfway between. Here the subject is placed not at the apex, but at the midpoint, as if it were an image on a screen in a generalized perceptual field, not a seeing eye. This subject, Lacan contended, is caught, manipulated, captured in the field of vision. Holbeins anarmophosed skull with its invocation of the nothingness of death expresses this subject trapped in a visual field it cannot master. Indeed, Lacan insisted, In this matter of the visible, everything is a trap. There is not a single one of the divisions, a single one of the double sides that the function of vision presents, that is not manifested to us as a labyrinth. The labyrinth, that potent figure Bataille and the Surrealists (and later Derrida and Irigaray) used to challenge the putative clarity of a Gods-eye view of the world, here reappears as Lacan posits a visual field in which light may travel a straight line, but . Is refracted, diffused, it floods, it fills the eye is a sort of bowl it flows over too, it necessitates, around the ocular bowl, a whole series of organs, mechanisms, defenses.

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