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FACTS Petitioner Manuel Isip (and his wife Marietta) were convicted of EstafabeforetheRTCofCaviteCity.Marites,however,diedduring the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The spouses were engaged in the buying and selling of pledged and unredeemed jewelry pawned by gambling habitus. However, in their dealings withComplainantAtty.LeonardoJose,theyfailedtoaccountforthe jewelries given to them to be sold on commission. Also, certain checks theyve issued in favor of Jose bounced. Procedurally, petitioner contends that the RTC of Cavite has no jurisdiction over the case since the elements of the crime did not occur there. Instead, he argues that the case should have been filed in Manila wheretheirsupposedtransactionstookplace. ISSUE:WhethertheRTCofCavitehasjurisdictionoverthecase. RULING: YES. The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlikeincivilcases,isjurisdictional.Theplacewherethecrimewas committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense shouldhavebeencommittedoranyoneofitsessentialingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown,thecourtmayvalidlytakecognizanceofthecase.However, iftheevidenceadducedduringthetrialshowsthattheoffensewas committedsomewhereelse,thecourtshoulddismisstheactionfor wantofjurisdiction. Complainanthadsufficientlyshownthatthetransactioncoveredby thecasetookplaceinhisancestralhomeinCaviteCitywhenhewas onapprovedleaveofabsencefromtheBureauofCustoms.Sinceit hasbeenshownthatvenuewasproperlylaid,itisnowpetitioner's task to prove otherwise, since he claims that the transaction was entered into in Manila. He who alleges must prove his allegations applies. Here, petitioner failed to prove that the transaction happened in Manila.Hearguesthatsinceheandhislatewifeactuallyresidedin Manila, convenience suggests that the transaction was entered there. The Court wasnt persuaded. The fact that Cavite is a bit far fromManiladoesntnecessarilymeanthatthetransactioncannotor did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any person from




goingtoadistantplacewherehecanprocuregoodsthathecansell sothathecanearnaliving.Itisnotimprobableorimpossiblethem tohavegone,notonce,buttwiceinoneday,toCaviteifthatisthe numberoftimestheyreceivedpiecesofjewelryfromcomplainant. Also, the fact that the checks issued were drawn against accounts withbanksinManilaorMakati doesntmeanthatthetransactions werenotenteredintoinCaviteCity. When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves greatweight,andisevenconclusiveandbinding,ifnottaintedwith arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight andinfluence.

FACTS Belista is the owner of 8 parcels of land placed by the Dept. of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (PD No. 27 & EO No. 228). He and DAR/LBP disagreed on theamountofjustcompensationhedeserved,whichcausedhimto file a Petition for Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation beforetheDARABRegionalAdjudicatorforRegionV(RARADV).The RARADV decided in his favor. Aggrieved, LBP filed an original PetitionforDeterminationofJustCompensationatthesamesalaof theRTCsittingasSAC.Itwasdismissedonthegroundoffailureto exhaustadministrativeremedies. ISSUE Whether it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under RA No. 6657 that the decision of the AdjudicatormustfirstbeappealedtotheDARABbeforeapartycan resorttotheRTCsittingasSAC. RULING Sections50and57ofRANo.6657provide: Section 50. Quasijudicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarianreformmattersandshallhaveexclusiveoriginaljurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DepartmentofAgriculture(DA)andtheDepartmentofEnvironment andNaturalResources(DENR)xxx Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecutionofallcriminaloffensesunderthisAct.xxx


Clearly,underSection50,DARhasprimaryjurisdictiontodetermine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarianreform,exceptthosefallingundertheexclusivejurisdiction oftheDAandtheDENR.FurtherexceptiontotheDAR'soriginaland exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offensesunderRANo.6657,whicharewithinthejurisdictionofthe RTC sitting as a SAC. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases forthetakingoflandsunderRANo.6657isvestedinthecourts. Here, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was heldbeforetheDARAB,LBPwasabletoperformitslegalmandate of initially determining the value of Wycoco's land pursuant to ExecutiveOrderNo.405,Seriesof1990. Inaccordancewithsettledprinciplesofadministrativelaw,primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation for the lands taken under the agrarian reform program, but such determination is subject to challenge before the courts. The resolution of just compensation cases for the taking of lands under agrarian reform is, after all, essentiallyajudicialfunction. W/Nthejudgeisadministrativelyliable? HELD: YES.Thejudgeisadministrativelyliable. CircularNo.3997limitstheauthoritytoissueholddepartureorders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. ParagraphNo.1ofthesaidcircularspecificallyprovidesthathold departure orders shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts. Clearly then, criminalcaseswithintheexclusivejurisdictionoffirstlevelcourtsdo notfallwithintheambitofthecircular,andit wasanerroronthe partofrespondentjudgetohaveissuedoneintheinstantcase.








Vicente Foz (columnist) and Danny Fajardo (editorpublisher) of Panay News were charged with libel for writing and publishing an article against Dr. Edgar Portigo1. The RTC found them guilty as charged which was affirmed by the CA hence this petition for review.FozandFajardoraisedforthefirsttimethattheinformation chargingthemwithlibeldidnotcontainallegationssufficienttovest jurisdictionintheRTCofIloiloCity. Issue:W/NtheRTCofIloilohadjurisdictionovertheoffense Held:NO Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. The offense should have been committed or any one of its essential elements took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Thejurisdictionofthecourtisdeterminedbytheallegationsinthe complaintorinformation. Therulesonvenueforwrittendefamationareasfollows: 1. Whenoffendedpartyisapublicofficialoraprivateperson =filedinRTCofprovinceorcitywherethelibelousarticle isprintedandfirstpublished Whenoffendedpartyisaprivateindividual=filedinRTC of province where he actually resided at the time of commissionofoffense Whenoffendedpartyisapublicofficerwhoseofficeisin Manila=filedinRTCofManila

FACTS: Mondejar seeks to hold Judge Buban of the Tacloban City MTCC administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, partiality, seriousirregularityandgravemisconduct,inrelationtoaBP22case against Mondejar. Judge Buban allegedly issued a hold departure orderagainsther,inviolationofSCCircularNo.3997,whichsays that hold departure orders may only be issued in criminal cases withintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheRTC.Shealsoclaimsthatsaid orderwasissuedwithoutgivingheranopportunitytobeheard. The judge responded, stating that he was onlymadeaware ofsaid order when he instructed his staff to secure a copy from the ExecutiveJudgeoftheRTCofTacloban.Afterwhich,heimmediately issuedanordersettingasideandliftingtheholddepartureorder. Asregardsthesupposeddueprocess,hesentanoticeofhearingto herandhercounsel,butneitherappeared. CourtAdministratorrecommendedaseverereprimandwithastern warning that should it happen again, he would be dealt with more severely. ISSUE:



ThatacertainLitaPayunanconsultedwithDr.Portigo\thatshehadrectummyoma and had to undergoan operation. Even after surgeryshe stillexperienced difficulty in urinating and defecating. On her 2nd operation, she woke to find that her anus and vaginawereclosedandaholewithacatheterpunchedonherrightside.\shefoundout shehadcancer.\theyspentP150,000forwrongdiagnosis\


4. When offended party is a public officer holding office outsideManila=filedinRTCofprovinceorcitywherehe heldofficeatthetimeofcommissionoftheoffense The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing VictoriaAmanteofviolatingSection89ofP.D.No.1445allegingthat with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, wilfully,unlawfullyandcriminallyfailtoliquidatesaidcashadvances of P71,095.00. The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of violating Section 89 of P.D.No.1445, Amante countered by saying amongst others that Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because respondent Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade 26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 providesthattheSandiganbayanshallhaveoriginaljurisdictiononly in cases wherethe accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position ClassificationActof1989,R.A.No.6758. ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Salary Grade 26 who was charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RULING: The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amendedbySection2ofR.A.No.7975whichtookeffectonMay16, 1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of theInformationwasonMay21,2004.Thejurisdictionofacourtto tryacriminalcaseistobedeterminedatthetimeoftheinstitution oftheaction,notatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense.The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.Thelastclauseoftheopeningsentenceofparagraph(a) ofthesaidtwoprovisionsstates: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive originaljurisdictioninallcasesinvolving: A.ViolationsofRepublicActNo.3019,asamended,otherknownas theAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,RepublicActNo.1379,and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense ThepresentcasefallsunderSection4(b)whereotheroffensesand felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to

Dr.Portigoisaprivateindividualatthetimeofthepublicationofthe libelous article, the venue may be the RTC of the province/city wherethelibelousarticlewasprintedandfirstpublishedORwhere heactuallyresidedatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense. The Information [relevant to REM] states only that x x x both the accused as columnists and editorpublisher, respectively of Panay News,adailypublicationwithaconsiderablecirculationintheCity ofIloiloandthroughouttheregionxxx.suchdidnotestablishthat thesaidpublicationwasprintedandpublishedinIloiloCity.Ascited in 2 other cases, the SC held that if it would be held that the information sufficiently vests jurisdiction on the allegation that the publicationwas ingeneralcirculationin[place wherecaseisfiled], there would be no impediment to the filing of the libel action in other location where the publication is in general circulation. Such wasnottheintentofRA4363. OnresidencetheinformationfailedtoallegetheresidenceofDr. Portigo.WhiletheinformationallegesthatDr.Portigoisaphysician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City, it did not clearly and positively indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the timeofthecommissionoftheoffense.Itwaspossiblethathewas actuallyresidinginanotherplace. Residenceofapersonishispersonal,actualorphysicalhabitationor his actual residence or place of abode provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency; no particular length of time is required.Residencemustbemorethantemporary.


FACTS: Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of ToledoCity,ProvinceofCebuatthetimepertinenttothiscase.On January14,1994,shewasabletogetholdofacashadvanceinthe amount of P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher in order to defray seminar expenses of the Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. As of December 19, 1995, or after almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was made. Commission on Audit sent a report to Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which then issued a resolution recommending the filing of an Information for violating the Auditing Code of the Philippines against respondent Amante. TheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutor(OSP),uponreviewoftheOMB Visayas' Resolution, on April 6, 2001, prepared a memorandum findingprobablecausetoindictrespondentAmante.


their office are involved. Under the said provision, no exception is contained.Thus,thegeneralrulethatjurisdictionofacourttotrya criminalcaseistobedeterminedatthetimeoftheinstitutionofthe action, not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in thispresentcase.SincethepresentcasewasinstitutedonMay21, 2004,theprovisionsofR.A.No.8249shallgovern. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance,thoughimproperorirregular,ofhisofficialfunctions, therebeingnopersonalmotivetocommitthecrimeandhadthe accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committedinrelation"tohisoffice. Notealsothat: ThosethatareclassifiedasGrade26andbelowmaystillfallwithin the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by R.A. No. 3019. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vicegovernors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vicemayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers , and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the positionasconsulandhigher;Philippinearmyandairforcecolonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutorsandtheirassistants,andofficialsandprosecutorsinthe Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of governmentowned or controlledcorporations,stateuniversitiesoreducationalinstitutions orfoundations.Inconnectiontherewith,Section4(b)ofthesamelaw providesthatotheroffensesorfeloniescommittedbypublicofficials andemployeesmentionedinsubsection(a)inrelationtotheiroffice alsofallunderthejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayan. Ombudsman. And the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probablecausetoindictSeranaandherbrotherforestafa. Serana moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense chargedoroverherperson,inhercapacityasUPstudentregent. Issue: WhetherSandiganbayanhasjurisdictiontotryagovernmentscholar and a student regent, along with her brother (a private individual), ofswindlinggovernmentfunds?YES Ratio: 1.ThejurisdictionoftheSandiganbayanissetbyP.D.No.1606,as amended,notbyR.A.No.3019,asamended. Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: A. xxx (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regionaldirectorandhigher,otherwiseclassifiedasGrade"27"and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (RepublicActNo.6758),specificallyincluding: xxx " (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. 2.Sandiganbayanhasjurisdictionovertheoffenseofestafa. Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B.Otheroffensesorfelonieswhethersimpleorcomplexedwithother crimescommittedbythepublicofficialsandemployeesmentionedin subsection a of this section in relation to their office. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) theoffenseiscommittedbypublicofficialsandemployeesandthat (b)theoffenseiscommittedinrelationtotheiroffice.Plainly,estafa is one of those other felonies. 3. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer. PetitionerclaimsthatsheisnotapublicofficerwithSalaryGrade27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition feepaying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdictionoverotherofficersenumeratedinP.D.No.1606. While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 andhigherbutwhoarebyexpressprovisionoflawplacedunderthe jurisdictionofthesaidcourt.Petitionerfallsunderthejurisdictionof the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions

Facts: SeranawasaseniorstudentandagovernmentscholarofUPCebu. ShewasappointedbythenPresidentEstradaasastudentregentof UP,toserveaoneyearterm.ShediscussedwithPresidentEstrada therenovationofVinzonsHallAnnexinUPDiliman. With her siblings and relatives, Serana registered with the SEC the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projectsoftheOSRFIwastherenovationoftheVinzonsHallAnnex. PresidentEstradagaveP15MtotheOSRFIasfinancialassistancefor theproposedrenovation.Thesourceofthefunds,accordingtothe information, was the Office of the President. However,therenovationofVinzonsHallAnnexfailedtomaterialize. Hence, the succeeding student regent, filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the


similar to those of a board of trustees of a nonstock corporation. Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essentialelementofpublicoffice.Atmost,itismerelyincidentalto the public office. 4.Theoffensechargedwascommittedinrelationtopublicoffice, accordingtotheInformation. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in theinformation.Inthecaseatbench,theinformationalleged,inno uncertaintermsthatpetitioner,beingthenastudentregentofU.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offenseinrelationtoherofficeandtakingadvantageofherposition, withintenttogain elevatethemattertotheSCallegingGADLEJintheissuanceofthe resolutionofthedeputyombudsman. Petitioners theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over their persons as they hold positions excluded in Republic Act No. 7975. As the positions of municipal mayors andbarangaycaptains are not mentioned therein, they claim they arenotcoveredbysaidlawundertheprincipleofexpressiouniusest exclusioalterius. ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases againstbothMayorEsquivelandEboyEsquivel. HELD/RATIO: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Esquivels are wrong! Petitioners claim lacks merit. InRodrigo, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,Binay vs. Sandiganbayan,andLayus vs. Sandiganbayan,we already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Nor canBarangayCaptain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.R.A.7975,asamendedbyR.A.No.8249,providesthatit isonlyincaseswhere"noneoftheaccused(underscoringsupplied) are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher"that "exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended."Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27.SinceBarangayCaptain Esquivel is the coaccused in Criminal CaseNo.24777ofMayorEsquivel,whosepositionfallsundersalary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretioninassumingjurisdictionoversaidcriminalcase,aswellas over Criminal Case No. 24778, involving both of them. Hence, the writofcertioraricannotissueinpetitionersfavor.

FACTS: PO2 Eduardo and SPO1 Catacutan are assigned to the Regional Intelligence and Investigation Division of San Fernando Pampanga. They filed their complaintaffidavits with the CIDG against petitioners Antonio Esquivel (the municipal mayor Jaen, NuevaEcija)andhisbrotherEboyEsquivel.Theycrimescomplained ofwereillegalarrest,arbitrarydetention,maltreatment,attempted murderandgravethreats.Severalotherpoliceofficerswereaccused withtheEsquivels. The initial investigation showed that on March 1998, Eduardowasinhisparentshouse,abouttoeatlunchwhenEquivels arrivedwithotherpoliceofficers.TheydisarmedEduardoandforced himtoboardtheirvehicleandbroughthimtothemunicipalhall.On the way, Mayor Esquivel mauled him and threatened to kill him whilepointingagunatEduardo. Upon arrival at the town hall, Mayor Esquivel ordered a certainSPO1EspiritutokillEduardobutSPO1Catacutanarrivedto verify what happened to Eduardo. The mayor threatened him as well. The mayor continued to harass, threaten and inflict physical injuries upon Eduardo until he lost consciousness. When he woke up,hewasreleasedbutnobeforehesignedastatementinapolice blotter that he was in good physical condition. The alleged motive for this was because the mayor believed Eduardo and Catacutan wereamongthelawenforcerswhoraidedajuetengdenconnected tothemayor. Afterinvestigation,theCIDGforwardedthefindingstothe Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, which conducted a preliminary investigation and required the submission of counteraffidavits. In their counteraffidavits, the Esquivels allege that Eduardo was actuallyafugitivewithawarrantofarrestformalversationandthey justconfiscatedhisgunforillegalpossession. InJune1998,theDeputyOmbudsmanissuedaresolution recommending that both Esquivels be indicted for less serious physical injuries and grave threats. As to the charges against other petitioners, they were dismissed. Then Ombudsman Desierto approvedthis.So,theseparateinformationswerefiledagainst the EsquivelsintheSandiganbayan. Accused filed an MR but this was denied. Esquivels were arraigned, pleaded not guilty. With the denial of their MR, they


FACTS: AllegingthatshewasaformerundercoveragentofthePresidential AntiOrganized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine NationalPolice(PNP)NarcoticsGroup,MaryOngfiledacomplaint affidavitonbeforetheOmbudsmanagainstPNPGeneralPanfiloM. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, other highranking officials of the PNP, and several private individuals. Her complaint affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses imputedtorespondentsLacsonandAquino.TheOmbudsmanfound thecomplaintaffidavitofMaryOngsufficientinformandsubstance and thus required the respondents therein to file their counter affidavits on the charges. On February 28, 2001, said respondents submitted their counteraffidavits and prayed that the charges againstthembedismissed. Subsequently, on March 9, 2001, Mary Ong and other witnesses executedswornstatementsbeforetheNBI,allegingthesamefacts andcircumstancesrevealedbyMaryOnginhercomplaintaffidavit


beforetheOmbudsman.NBIDirectorWycoco,inaletterdatedMay 4, 2001 addressed to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez, recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials, and private individuals for the following alleged crimes: kidnappingforransomandmurderofseveralindividuals.OnMay7, 2001, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson, et al named in the witnesses sworn statements directing them to submit their counteraffidavits and controverting evidence atthescheduledpreliminaryinvestigationonthecomplaintfiledby the NBI. However, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter dated May18,2001thattheDOJpanelofprosecutorsshoulddismissthe complaint filed therewith by Mary Ong since there are complaints pending before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against the same respondents, and claimed that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private respondent.DOJ,whichconstruedtheletterasamotiontodismiss, deniedthemotion. Lacson, et al. filed before the RTC a petition for prohibition, which the RTC granted, saying that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the case, and directing the DOJ to desist from conducting preliminaryinvestigation.Thus,theDOJfiledaPetitionforcertiorari andprohibitionintheSC. ISSUE/RULING: W/N the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts, and circumstancesNO RATIO: ThequestioniswhetherornottheOmbudsmanhasineffecttaken over the investigation of the case or cases in question to the exclusion of other investigatory agencies, including the DOJ. Since theOmbudsmanhastakenholdofthesituationofthepartiesinthe exercise of its primary jurisdiction over the matter, respondents cannotinsistonconductingapreliminaryinvestigationonthesame matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In thefinalanalysis,theresolutiononthematterbytheOmbudsmanis final.InthepreliminaryinvestigationconductedbytheOmbudsman itself, the other investigative agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the Ombudsmans investigation. Only in matters where the other investigative agencies are expressly allowed by the Ombudsman to make preliminary investigation may such agencies conduct the investigation,subjecttothefinaldecisionoftheOmbudsman. Thepublicrespondentscannotfindcomfortinthatprovisionofthe law that the Ombudsman may take over, at any stage, from any investigative agency of the Government, the investigation of cases involving public officials, including police and military officials such asthepetitioners.Thatsituationpresupposestheconductbyother Government agencies of preliminary investigations involving public officials in cases not theretofore being taken cognizance of by the Ombudsman.IftheOmbudsman,asinthecase,hasalreadytaken holdofthesituationoftheparties,itcannottakeover,atanystage of the proceedings, the investigation being conducted by another agency.Ithasthecasebeforeit.Rudimentarycommonsenseand becoming respect for power and authority would thus require the respondentstodesistfrominterferingwiththecasealreadyhandled bytheOmbudsman.Indeed,asconcededbytherespondents,they aredeputizedprosecutorsbytheOmbudsman.Ifthatisso,andthat is the truth, the exercise by the principal of the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and authority.Thehierarchyofpowersmustberemembered. Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equaljurisdictiontodealwiththesamesubjectmatter,thesettled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaintshallexercisejurisdictiontotheexclusionoftheothers. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to be taken as an unrestrainedfreedomtofilethesamecasebeforebothbodiesor be viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsmanbeforewhomthecomplaintwasinitiallyfiled.Hence, ithastheauthoritytoproceedwiththepreliminaryinvestigationto theexclusionoftheDOJ. The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conductofpreliminaryinvestigationoverthecasesfiledagainstthe respondents would not promote an orderly administration of justice.Althoughapreliminaryinvestigationisnotatrial,itisnota casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficientgroundtoengenderawellfoundedbeliefthatacrimehas beencommittedandtherespondentisprobablyguiltythereofand should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed. This would leave haplesslitigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is yet another undesirable consequence. There is the distinct possibility thatthetwobodiesexercisingjurisdictionatthesametimewould come up with conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents.

FACTS: The FactFinding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a Complaintaffidavit, charging petitioners Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined and penalizedunderArticle220oftheRPCandviolationofSection3(a) and (e) of RA 3019. The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use of Congressman Lazatin of his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996 (he was both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF; he signed


vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, eighteen (18) checksamountingtoP4,868,277.08).Thus,Lazatin,withthehelpof Morales, Pelayo, David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash. A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) thereafter issuedaresolutionrecommendingthefilingagainstpetitionersof14 countseachofMalversationofPublicFundsandviolationofSection 3(e) of RA 3019. This resolution was approved by Ombudsman Desierto. Hence, 28 informations were filed against petitioners in theSandiganbayan. PetitionersLazatinetal.filedtheirrespectiveMotionsfor reconsideration/reinvestigation which were granted. The Office of Special Prosecutors (OSP) recommended the dismissal of the cases forlackorinsufficiencyofevidence.However,Desiertoorderedthe Office of the Legal Affiars (OLP) to review the OSP resolution. In a memorandum, the OLA recommended that the OSP resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial. Desierto adopted the OLA memorandum. The cases were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for continuation of criminal proceedings. Hence, petitioners Lazatin et al. filed a petition for certiorariunderRule65.TheycontendthattheOmbudsmanhadno authority to overturn the OSP's Resolution because, under Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman is clothed onlywiththepowertowatch,investigateandrecommendthefiling of proper cases against erring officials, but it was not granted the powertoprosecute.TheypointoutthatundertheConstitution,the powertoprosecutebelongstotheOSP,whichwasintendedbythe framers to be a separate and distinct entity from the Office of the Ombudsman.Petitioners conclude that, as provided by the Constitution, the OSP being a separate and distinct entity, the Ombudsman should have no power and authority over the OSP.Thus, petitioners maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the OSP an organic componentoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman,shouldbestruckdown forbeingunconstitutional. ISSUE:WhetherOmbudsmanDesiertoactedwithGADLEJNO. HELD: Petitioners' attack against the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770isstale.IthaslongbeensettledthattheprovisionsofR.A.No. 6770 granting the Office of the Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and placing the OSP under said office have no constitutional infirmity. The Court cited the case of Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman. In that case, the Court held that giving prosecutorial powerstotheOmbudsmanisinaccordancewiththeConstitutionas paragraph 8, Section 13, Article XI provides that the Ombudsman shallexercisesuchotherfunctionsordutiesasmaybeprovidedby law. The constitutionality of Section 3 of R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSPunder the Office of the Ombudsman, was likewiseupheldbytheCourtinAcop. Morerecently,inOfficeoftheOmbudsmanv.Valera,the CourtdeclaredthattheOSPismerelyacomponentoftheOfficeof the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling inAcopthat the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute basedonR.A.No.6770wasauthorizedbytheConstitutionwasalso made the foundation for the decision inPerez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the powertoauthorizethefilingofinformations,whichpowerhadnot beendelegatedtotheOSP.Itis,therefore,beyondcavilthatunder the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP undertheOfficeoftheOmbudsman.


Facts: President Fidel Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating the Presidential AdHoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans. Orlando S. Salvador, in his capacity as PCGG consultant, executed three separate Sworn Statements stating that among the loan accountsreferredbytheAssetsPrivatizationTrusttotheCommittee for investigation, report and recommendation are those of the following corporations: P.R. Garcia and Sons Development and Investment Corporation (PRGS), Golden River Mining Corporation (Golden River), and Filipinas Carbon and Mining Corporation (Filcarbon). Ondifferentoccasions,thesethreecompaniesobtainedloansfrom the Development Bank of the Philippines (PRGS and Golden River), and the National Investment Development Corporation (Filcarbon), amounting to tens of millions of pesos for various purposes in a period spanning from 1967 to 1982. Filcarbons loan in particular was favorably recommended by the President of the Philippine National Bank. Salvador alleged that, based on the evidence submittedtotheCommittee,thesethreecorporationsdidnothave sufficientcollateralsfortheloanstheyobtained,exceptwithrespect to the loans obtained by Golden River in 1975 and 1977. Salvador also alleged that the abovementioned corporations did not have adequatecapitaltoensurenotonlytheviabilityoftheiroperations but also their ability to repay all their loans. Accordingly, the Committee found the loan accounts of the abovementioned three corporationsasbehestloans.TheCommitteesubmitteditsreportto


President Ramos who instructed then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo, sitting as the Committee's exofficio Chairman, to file the necessary charges against the DBP Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, the former PNB President and former NIDC GeneralManager,togetherwiththerespectivestockholders/officers of the three corporations. Salvadors Sworn Statements were used bytheCommitteeasitsbasesinfilingseparatecomplaintswiththe Office of the Ombudsman against herein private respondents for allegedviolationoftheAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct. Complaints were filed against the aforementioned parties in the Office of the Ombudsman but upon the recommendation of the EvaluationandPreliminaryInvestigationBureau,complaintsagainst the respondents were dismissed. The Ombudsman ruled that, except with respect to the two loan transactions entered into by GoldenRiverin 1982,alltheoffensesallegedbytheCommitteeas having been committed by herein respondents had already prescribedundertheprovisionsofSection11ofR.A.No.3019.Asto the two 1982 transactions of Golden River, the Ombudsman found that, contrary to the claims of the Commission, the loan accounts obtained by the said corporation have sufficient collaterals. The subsequentMotionforReconsiderationwaslikewisedenied. Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman was empowered to dismiss the complaint motu propio, without requiring the respondents to file their counteraffidavit or conducting preliminary investigation? (REM TOPIC) Ruling: Yes. The Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretiontodeterminewhetheracriminalcase,givenitsfactsand circumstances,shouldbefiledornot.Itisbasicallyhiscall.Hemay dismissthecomplaintforthwithshouldhefindittobeinsufficientin formandsubstanceor,shouldhefinditotherwise,tocontinuewith theinquiry;orhemayproceedwiththeinvestigationif,inhisview, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance. Quite relevantistheCourt'srulinginEspinosav.OfficeoftheOmbudsman andreiteratedinthecaseofThePresidentialAdHocFactFinding CommitteeonBehestLoansv.Hon.Desierto,towit: The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the ConstitutionaswellasR.A.6770hasendowedit with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. Thiscourtconsistentlyrefrains frominterfering withtheexerciseofitspowers,andrespectsthe initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsmanwho,beholdentonoone,actsas the champion of the people and the preserver oftheintegrityofthepublicservice. Asarule,theCourtshallnotundulyinterfereintheOmbudsmans exerciseofhisinvestigatoryandprosecutorypowers,asprovidedin the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. The basis for this rule was provided in the case of OcampoIVv.OmbudsmanwheretheCourtheldasfollows: Theruleisbasednotonlyuponrespectforthe investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed beforeit,inmuchthesamewaythatthecourts wouldbeextremelyswampediftheywouldbe compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an informationincourtordismissacomplaintbya privatecomplainant. ItisquiteclearunderSection2(a),RuleIIoftheRulesofProcedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, that it may dismiss a complaint outrightforwantofpalpablemerit.Atthatpoint,theOmbudsman doesnothavetoconductapreliminaryinvestigationuponreceiptof a complaint. Should the investigating officer find the complaint devoidofmerit,thenhemayrecommenditsoutrightdismissal.The Ombudsman has discretion to determine whether a preliminary investigationisproper.ItisonlywhentheOmbudsmanoptsnotto dismissthecomplaintoutrightforlackofpalpablemeritwouldthe Ombudsman be expected to require the respondents to file their counteraffidavitandpetitioner,itsreply.

FACTS: Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who misappropriated 556K+ of collections.CastropleadedNOTGUILTYonarraignment.OnAug31, 2001, Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdictionandlackofauthorityoftheOmbudsmantoconductthe preliminaryinvestigationandfiletheInformationsinceitfailedtto allege her salary grade a material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,petitioner furtherarguedthatasshewasapublicemployeewithsalarygrade


27,thecasefiledagainstherwascognizablebytheRTCandmaybe investigatedandprosecutedonlybythepublicprosecutor,andnot bytheOmbudsmanwhoseprosecutorialpowerwaslimitedtocases cognizablebytheSandiganbayan. TheRTCdenied&heldthatthe(1)jurisdictionoftheRTCoverthe case did not depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged. It also (2) sustainedtheprosecutorialpowersoftheOmbudsmansinceinthe citedcasethecourtlateroverturnedtheirdecisioninaclarificatory resolution.Finally,itsaidthatthe(3)MotiontoQuashwascontrary to Sec. 1, Rule 117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty undertheInformation. CastrocontendsthattheprevailingjurisprudencefromAug9,1999 til May 20, 2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powersovercasescognizablebytheRTandsincetheinvestigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted by the Ombudsman beginningApril26,2000,thentheAugust9,1999DecisioninUywas applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20, 2001 Resolution. So, the Information that was filed againstpetitionerwasvoidforatthattimetheOmbudsmanhadno investigatoryandprosecutorialpowersoverthecase. CastrofiledanMRwhichwasdeniedsofiledapetitionforcertiorari w/CAalsodismissed.Filed65withSC. ISSUES: 1.W/NtheOmbudsmanhadtheauthoritytofiletheinformationin light of the ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declaredthattheprosecutorialpowersoftheOmbudsmanislimited tocasescognizablebytheSandiganbayan. 2.W/NtheclarificatoryResolutionintheUyvs.Sandiganbayancase can be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision on expost facto laws and denial of the accusedtodueprocess. RULING:YEStoBOTH. In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the regular courts. It held: The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been heldthattheclause"anyillegalactoromissionofanypublicofficial" isbroadenoughtoembraceanycrimecommittedbyapublicofficer oremployee. The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,particularlyinSection15(1)givingtheOmbudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutorypoweroftheOmbudsmantosuchcases. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should notbeequatedwiththelimitedauthorityoftheSpecialProsecutor underSection11ofRA6770.TheOfficeoftheSpecialProsecutoris merelyacomponentoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanandmayonly act under the supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman.Itspowertoconductpreliminaryinvestigationandto prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to thesetypesofcases.TheOmbudsmanismandatedbylawtoacton all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in everycasewheretheevidencewarrants.Tocarryoutthisduty,the lawallowshimtoutilizethepersonnelofhisofficeand/ordesignate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to actasspecialinvestigatororprosecutortoassistintheinvestigation andprosecutionofcertaincases.Thosedesignatedordeputizedto assisthimworkunderhissupervisionandcontrol.Thelawlikewise allows him to direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outsidetheSandiganbayansjurisdictioninaccordancewithSection 11(4c)ofRA6770. In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20, 2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable by the RTC, extends even tocriminalinformationfiledorpendingatthetimewhenitsAugust 9,1999Decisionwastheoperativerulingontheissue.






FACTS PetitionerfiledaverifiedcomplaintaffidavitbeforetheOmbudsman against the respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of RA No. 3019 and for malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public documents. This concerns the alleged conspiracy involving respondents to cheat and defraud thecitygovernmentofGeneralSantosthroughtheillegaldisposition ofLotXoftheMagsaysayParkinviolationoflawanditscharter. TheOmbudsmanissuedaresolutiondismissingthechargesagainst the respondents. Petitioner filed MR which was denied by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informationswerealreadyfiledandthecaseswerealreadypending beforetheSandiganbayanandtheregularcourtsofGeneralSantos City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case. PetitionerfiledthisPetitionforCertiorariunderRule65.


ISSUE: w/n the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of his prosecutor functions, by dismissing the charges against the respondents. HELD:NO 1. Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides: SEC.27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory. A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds: (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directiveordecision; (2) Errorsoflaworirregularities havebeencommittedprejudicialtotheinterest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsiderationshallbeentertained. PetitionerfailedtoestablishthatherMRwasindeedfiled ontime,andthus,failedtorefutetheassertionoftherespondents based on the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the assailed Resolution. There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the MR. We find no justification why the Ombudsman entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the motion for reconsiderationtheassailedResolutionwasalreadyfinal. 2. (relevanttopic) Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigateandprosecuteanyactoromissionofapublicofficeror employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improperorinefficient.WellsettledistherulethatthisCourtwill not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and compellingreasonsthatindicateotherwise.Acontraryrulewould encourageinnumerablepetitionsseekingdismissalofinvestigatory proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman, which would grievously hamper the functions of the office and the courts, in muchthesamewaythatcourtswouldbeswampedbyadelugeof casesiftheyhavetoreviewtheexerciseofdiscretiononthepart ofpublicprosecutorseachtimetheydecidetofileaninformation ordismissacomplaintbyaprivatecomplainant. Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party mayfileapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt whenthefindingoftheOmbudsmanistaintedwithgraveabuseof discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.ThisCourtlaid downthefollowingexceptionstotherule: 1.When necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutionalrightsoftheaccused; 2.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice ortoavoidoppressionormultiplicityofactions; 3.Whenthereisaprejudicialquestionthatissubjudice; 4.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5.Wheretheprosecutionisunderaninvalidlaw, ordinance orregulation; 6.Whendoublejeopardyisclearlyapparent; 7.Wherethecourthasnojurisdictionovertheoffense; 8.Whereitisacaseofpersecutionratherthanprosecution; 9.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by thelustforvengeance; 10. Whenthereisclearlynoprimafaciecaseagainst theaccusedandamotiontoquashonthatgroundhasbeen denied. Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or despotic manner byreasonofpassionorpersonalhostilitysopatentandgrossasto amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. The alleged grave abuseofdiscretionimputedtotheOmbudsmanisfoundwantingin this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the generalrule. 3. Moreover,theelementsoftheoffense,essentialfortheconviction ofanaccusedunderSection3(e),R.A.No.3019,areasfollows: (1) The accused is a public officer or a private personchargedinconspiracywiththeformer; (2) The said public officer commits the prohibited actsduringtheperformanceofhisorherofficialduties,or inrelationtohisorherpublicfunctions; (3) Thatheorshecausesundueinjurytoanyparty, whetherthegovernmentoraprivateparty; (4) Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties;and (5) That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality,evidentbadfaithorgrossinexcusableneglect. As found by the Ombudsman and based on the records, thereisnoshowingofevidentbadfaithand/orgrossnegligencein therespectiveactsoftherespondents.Finally,petitionerspeaksof conspiracyamongtherespondentsandthoseindicted.However,as foundbytheOmbudsman,suchconspiracyallegedinthecomplaint was not supported by ample evidence. Conspiracy must be proved by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of the crime charged



indicative of a common design. This, the petitioner sadly failed to establish. correccionalin its minimum and medium periods or from six(6)monthsandone(1)daytofour(4)yearsandtwo(2) months. 2. No. There is nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure whichrequiresajudgetoissueawarrantofarrestforthe nonappearanceoftheaccusedduringthetrial.Hence,its issuance rests on the sound discretion of the presiding judge.Moresointhiscase,theprivateprosecutordidnot movefortheissuanceofsuchwarrant. 3. No.Respondentconcedesthatduetooversight,shefailed to rule on the charge of violation of R.A. 10 in her initial Resolution.Nonetheless,sheassertsinherCommentWith Motion To Dismiss Administrative Complaint that she conducted a preliminary investigation for the charge of violation of R.A. 10 anddismissed the charge after taking into consideration the affidavits and evidence presented. Complainant does not dispute the fact that indeed a preliminary investigation was conducted for this charge.Thus, when respondent judge dismissed the complaint for violation of R.A. 10, she merely did so to correctanoversight.Itwasthedismissalofthechargefor violation of R.A. 10 that was elevated to the PPO for review. It was imprudent, however, for respondent judge to transmit the entire records of the case to the PPO knowing that the charge for Usurpation of Authority was included in the records of the case. Respondent judge shouldhaveensuredthatatleastonecompletesetofthe records remained in hersalaso that the prosecution for UsurpationofAuthoritywouldnotbeheldup.Injudicious though her actuation was, Respondent judge was not motivatedbyanevilintenttodelaythecase. 4. No. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitledClarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman,which provides "that all prosecutorsarenowdeputizedOmbudsmanprosecutors." Moreover, "[R]esolutions in Ombudsman casesagainst public officers and employees prepared by a deputized assistantprosecutorshallbesubmittedtotheProvincialor CityProsecutorconcernedwhoshall,inturn,forwardthe same to the Deputy Ombudsman of the area with his recommendationfortheapprovalordisapprovalthereof. Thus, Respondent did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law when she forwarded the caseforviolationofR.A.10tothePPO.Thefactthatthe PPO remanded the case to the court for further proceedingsinsteadofforwardingthesametotheDeputy OmbudsmanasrequiredbyAdministrativeOrderNo.8is quite another matter. In any event, respondent judge shouldhavetakenthenecessarystepstoremedythelapse inordertoprecludedelayinthedispositionofthecase. Complaint dismissed for lack of merit. Respondent was nonetheless admonished to be more circumspect in the performanceofherdutiesinthefuture.


FACTS: This case involves a complaint filed by Sesbreo (Complainant) againstMTCJudgeAglugub(Respondent)forGrossIgnoranceofthe Law,NeglectofDutyandConductPrejudicialtotheBestInterestof the Service relative to a criminal case (entitled People v. Enrique Marcelino,etal.).Inthesaidcriminalcase,Complainantfiledthree (3) separate complaints against Marcelino, Nuez, Tabazon, and Carunungan who are all from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna. The criminal complaint was for Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority. The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judges branch and subsequently consolidated for disposition. In a Consolidated Resolution, only the charge of Usurpation was set for arraignment, the rest of the charges having been dismissed. Thereafter, Complainant made a manifestationthatthecomplaintalsochargedthedefendantswith violationofRANo.10accompaniedbyaprayerfortheissuanceof warrantsofarrestsagainstthedefendants.Respondentjudgefound noprobablecauseanddismissedthechargeforviolationofR.A.10. Shealsodeniedcomplainantsprayerfortheissuanceofwarrantsof arrestagainsttheaccusedandorderedtherecordsforwardedtothe Provincial Prosecutors Office (PPO) for review. The PPO affirmed respondentsorderandremandedthecasetothecourtforfurther proceedings on the sole charge of Usurpation of Authority. During thehearingofthecaseonFebruary14,2004,Tabazon,Carunungan and Nuez did not appear. Atty. Sesbreo, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Neither did he objecttothecancellationofthescheduledhearing. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. 4. HELD: Did Respondent err in not conducting a preliminary investigationforthechargeofUsurpationofAuthority? Did Respondent err in not issuing warrants of arrest for failureoftheaccusedtoappearduringtrial? Did Respondent err in issuing herOrder dismissing the complaintforviolationofR.A.10? Did Respondent err in transmitting the records of the casetothePPOinsteadoftheOfficeoftheOmbudsman?

1. No.Apreliminaryinvestigationisrequiredbeforethefiling
of a complaint or information for an offense where the penaltyprescribedbylawisatleastfour(4)years,two(2) monthsandone(1)daywithoutregardtothefine.Thus,a preliminary investigation is not required nor was one conducted for the charge of violation of Art. 177 of the Revised Penal Code which is punishable byprision




FACTS: Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors. On Aug. 13,1997,DelaPea,ahouseboarderofthePlatas,wasinfrontofa storeneartheirhousewhenthegroupofRainierPunzalan,Randall Punzalan, Ricky Eugenio, Jose Gregorio, Alex Toto Ofrin, and othersarrived.EugenioshoutedatDelaPea,Hoy,kalbo,saanmo binili ang sumbrero mo? Dela Pea replied, Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa ninyo ako. Irked by the response, Gregorio slapped Dela Pea while Rainier punched him in the mouth.The groupthengangeduponhim.Somebodyshouted,Yariinnayan! Thereafter, Ofrin kicked Dela Pea and tried to stab him with abalisongbutmissed. While Dela Pea was fleeing, he met Robert Cagara, the Platas family driver, who was carrying a gun.He grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group chasing him to scare them.Michael Plata,whowasnearby,intervenedandtriedtowrestlethegunaway from Dela Pea.The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier Punzalanonthethigh.Thegroupranafterthemandwhentheygot to the Platas house, shouted, Lumabas kayo dyan, putang ina ninyo!Papatayinnaminkayo! RainierPunzalanfiledacriminalcomplaintagainstMichael Plata for Attempted Homicide and against Robert Cagara for Illegal PossessionofFirearm. Inturn,Plata,CagaraandDelaPeafiledseveralcounter chargesforgraveoraldefamation,gravethreats,robbery,malicious mischiefandslightphysicalinjuriesagainstthePunzalans,including one for Attempted Murder filed by Dela Pea against Rainier and Randall Punzalan and fourteen others and one for Grave Threats filedbyDelaPeaagainstOfrin. In their counteraffidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were fabricated in order to dissuade them fromtestifyingintheAttemptedHomicideandIllegalPossessionof Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Plata and Cagara, respectively. Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that on October 16, 1997 at the Office of the Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, Rosalinda approached him, and within hearing distance of other people, told him, Hoy Robert, magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo?Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita ng trabaho.In her defense, Rosalinda denied having uttered the allegeddefamatorystatements. On July 28, 1998, the Assistant City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City dismissed the complaint for Grave Oral DefamationagainstRosalindaPunzalan,holdingthatCagarafailedto showthattheallegeddefamatorystatementswouldcastdishonor, discreditorcontemptuponhim.Healsofoundthatthestatements were uttered by Rosalinda in a state of distress and were not actionable.ThechargeofAttemptedMurderagainstRainier,Randall and14otherswasalsodismissedbecausecomplainantDelaPeas claimthatheaccidentallyshotRainierformspartofthedefenseof Michael Plata in the Attempted Homicide case previously filed by Rainieragainstthelatter. DelaPeaandCagaraseparatelyappealedtotheDOJ.On March 23, 2000, then Justice Secretary Artemio Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the AssistantCityProsecutor. Petitioners, Rosalinda, Rainier and Randall Punzalan, together with their corespondents, filed separate MR. On June 6, 2000, the Secretary of Justice set aside the March 23, 2000 Resolution and directed the withdrawal of the Informations againstthemovants,Punzalanetal.(Reason:OralDefamationcase should be dismissed because the alleged defamatory statements were uttered without malice as Rosalinda was then in a state of shockandanger.AnenttheAttemptedHomicidecasefiledbyDela Pea against Rainier, the Secretary held that the allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the AttemptedHomicidecasefiledbyRainieragainstMichaelPlata.He added that Dela Pea failed to prove that Rainier, Randall and his companionsintendedtokillhim.) RespondentsMRwasdenied.Hence,theyfiledapetition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed June 6, 2000 Resolution where Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of informations forslightoraldefamationagainstRosalindaPunzalanandattempted homicideagainsttherespondents. PetitionersMRwasdenied.Hence,theinstantpetitionfor reviewoncertiorariunderRule45. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the resolutions of the SecretaryofJusticeYES HELD/RATIO: YES. The Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse ofdiscretiontojustifyinterferencebytheCourts. A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with graveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction andthereisnoappeal,noranyplain,speedy,andadequateremedy atlaw. We now resolve whether the Secretary of Justice committedgraveabuseofdiscretioninhisResolutionsdatedJune6, 2000andOctober11,2000.UndertheRevisedAdministrativeCode, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power of direct control and



supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors. Supervision and control includes the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the performance of duty; and to approve, reviseormodifyactsanddecisionofsubordinateofficialsorunits. InthecaseofPeoplev.Peralta,wereiteratedtherulethat the right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, theexerciseofwhichdependsonavarietyoffactorswhicharebest appreciatedbyprosecutors. In the case ofHegerty v. Court of Appeals,we declared that: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justificationhasbeenshown,andnosufficientevidenceofguiltnor primafaciecasehasbeenpresentedbythepetitioner. Weneedonlytostressthatthedeterminationofprobable cause during a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Thus, the determinationofthepersonstobeprosecutedrestsprimarilywith theprosecutorwhoisvestedwithdiscretioninthedischargeofthis function. Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and,ultimately,thatoftheSecretaryofJustice. ThereasonsoftheSecretaryofJusticeindirectingtheCity Prosecutor to withdraw the informations for slight oral defamation againstRosalindaPunzalanandforattemptedhomicideagainstthe other respondents other than Rosalinda Punzalan is determinative ofwhetherornothecommittedgraveabuseofdiscretion. First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records showthatthedefamatoryremarkswereutteredwithintheOfficeof the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City. The CA in its Decision stated the settled rule that the assessment of the credibility of witnessesisbestlefttothetrialcourtinviewofitsopportunityto observethedemeanorandconductofthewitnessesonthestand. TheCityProsecutor,theproperofficeratthetimeoftheoccurrence of the incident, is the best person to observe the demeanor and conductofthepartiesandtheirwitnessesanddetermineprobable causewhethertheallegeddefamatoryutterancesweremadewithin the hearing distance of third parties. The investigating prosecutor foundthatnosufficientevidenceexisted.TheSecretaryofJusticein hisResolutionaffirmedthedecisionoftheCityProsecutor. Astothechargeofattemptedhomicideagainsttheherein petitioners other than Rosalinda Punzalan, the Secretary of Justice resolvedtodismissthecomplaintbecauseitwasinthenatureofa countercharge.The DOJ in a Resolution had already directed that Dela Pea be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted homicideinconnectionwiththeshootingincidentthatoccurredon August 13, 1997 making him a party to the case filed by Rainier Punzalan.This resulted in the resolution of the Secretary of Justice that the complaint of Dela Pea should be threshed out in the proceedings relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the seriousinjuryofRainierPunzalan. In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commitgraveabuseofdiscretioncontrarytothefindingofthe CA. It is wellsettled in the recent case ofSamson, et al. v. Guingonathat the Court will not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of informationagainstanoffender.Moreover,hisfindingsarenot subject to review unless shown to have been made with

FACTS It was in 1999 that Pedro Calanayan filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F. Duca and several of her relatives. ThecasewasdecidedinfavorofCalanayan.Decisionbecamefinal andexecutory. Ultimately properties belonging to Cecilia hit the auction block to satisfy judgment and a certificate of sale was issued in favor of JocelynBarque,thehighestbidderintheauctionsale. CeciliaDucawentonfighting.ShefiledanactionfortheDeclaration of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of InjunctionandTemporaryRestrainingorder.Whenthesaid casewasheard,CeciliaDucatestifiedtotheeffectthatthehouse erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is owned by her son Aldrin Duca. This is the core of the controversy: Cecilia (Mother)andArturo(Son)DucafeloniouslypreparedaDeclaration ofRealPropertyoverabungalowtyperesidentialhousebymakingit appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of owner is that of her other son Aldrin F. Duca. This was false of course, as the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the Philippinesonlylongafterthedastardlydeed.



AccusedArturoF.Ducawhoaffixedhisownsignaturethereonand bydoingsocauseddamagetoprivatecomplainantPedroCalanayan. Because of the isrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop from evictingtheplaintiffsfromthepropertyinquestion. BothaccuseddeniedthattheyfalsifiedthesignatureofAldrinDuca. Ceciliatestifiedthatshehadnoparticipationintheexecutionasshe wasinManilaatthattime.Arturoinsistedtherewasnofalsification. The MTC found him guilty. RTC affirmed. Duca filed petition for reviewattheCA. TheCAruledthatArturowasempoweredbyAldrintoissuethattax declaration, hence no crime had been committed. Aggrieved, the SolGen declared that the CA should have given the Republic a chancetobeheardbeforerulingsuch. ISSUE: w/n the CA gravely abused its discretion and acted without discretion by resolving the appeal without giving the SOLGEN a chancetobeheard. HELD:CAabuseditsdiscretion. Petitionerarguesthattheprosecutionwasdenieddueprocesswhen the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendencyofthesameandwithoutrequiringtheSolicitorGeneralto filehiscomment. Petitioner also asserts that once the case is elevated to the CA or thisCourt,itisonlytheSolicitorGeneralwhoisauthorizedtobring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely abuseditsdiscretionwhenitactedonrespondentsappealwithout affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently, the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should beconsideredvoidforbeingviolativeofdueprocess. The authority to representthe State in appeals of criminal cases before the CA and the Supreme Court issolelyvested in the Office oftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG).Section35(1),Chapter12,TitleIIIof BookIVofthe1987AdministrativeCodeexplicitlyprovides,viz.:
SEC.35.PowersandFunctions.TheOffice of the Solicitor General shall representthe Government of thePhilippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,proceeding,investigationormatterrequiring theservicesoflawyers.xxxItshallhavethefollowing specificpowersandfunctions: (1)Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; representthe Government and itsofficersintheSupremeCourtandCourtofAppeals, andallothercourtsortribunalsinallcivilactionsand special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasissupplied)

TheCAalsofailedtofollowSections1and3ofRule42ofthe1997 RulesofCourt:
Sec. 1.How appeal taken; time for filing. A partydesiringtoappealfromadecisionoftheRegional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdictionmayfileaverifiedpetitionforreviewwith the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerkofsaidcourtthecorrespondingdocketandother lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, andfurnishingthe Regional Trial Court andthe adverse party with a copy of the petition.The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) daysfromnoticeofthedecisionsoughttobereviewed orofthedenialofpetitionersmotionfornewtrialor reconsideration filed in due time after judgment.Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review.No further extension shall be granted except for the most compellingreasonandinnocasetoextendfifteen(15) days. Sec. 3.Effect of failure to comply with requirements.Thefailureofthepetitionertocomply with any of the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the depositforcosts, proofofserviceofthepetition,and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petitionshall be sufficient ground for thedismissalthereof.(emphasissupplied)

RespondentDucaappealedtotheCAfromthedecisionoftheRTC via a petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. TherespondentwasmandatedunderSection1,Rule42oftheRules ofCourttoservecopiesofhispetitionforreviewupontheadverse party,inthiscase,thePeopleofthePhilippinesthroughtheOSG. Respondent Duca failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of DagupanCity.TheserviceofacopyofthepetitiononthePeopleof the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the SupremeCourt. Certiorari was thereby granted and the SC remanded the case to theCA





FACTS: Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano, with 2 counts of rape and 1 count of attempted rape in the complaints whichreadasfollows: CriminalCaseNo.96125 That sometime in the year 1993 in the Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,bymeansofforceandintimidation,didthenand there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledgeoftheundersignedMaricarMaricarDimaanoy Victoria,whoishisowndaughter,aminor10yearsofage, againstherwillandconsent.CONTRARYTOLAW. CriminalCaseNo.96150 That on or about the 29thday of December 1995, in the Municipalityof Paranaque,MetroManila, Philippinesand withinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabove named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned Maricar Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, who is his own daughter, a minor 12 years of age, against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW. CriminalCaseNo.96151 That on or about the 1stday of January 1996, in the Municipalityof Paranaque,MetroManila, Philippinesand withinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabove named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of thecrimeofRape,directlybyovertacts,butnevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other thanhisspontaneousdesistancethatisduetothetimely arrivalofthecomplainantsmother.CONTRARYTOLAW. ThetrialcourtfoundEdgardoguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe crimesofrape(2counts)andthecrimeofattemptedrape.TheCA affirmedthedecisionofthetrialcourtwithmodificationsastothe award of damages. In accordance with Sec. 13, Rule 124 of the AmendedRulestoGovernReviewofDeathPenaltyCases(A.M.No.

00503SC, effective 15 October 2004), the case was CERTIFIED to theSupremeCourtforreview. ISSUE: W/Nthecomplaintforattemptedrapewassufficient? RULING:NO. RATIO: We affirm the trial court's conviction for the crimes of rape. However, we acquit Edgardo for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attemptedrape. Forcomplaintorinformationtobesufficient,itmuststatethename oftheaccused;thedesignationoftheoffensegivenbythestatute; theacts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense wascommitted.Whatiscontrollingisnotthetitleofthecomplaint, northedesignationoftheoffensechargedortheparticularlawor partthereofallegedlyviolated,thesebeingmereconclusionsoflaw made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.The acts or omissions complainedofmustbeallegedinsuchformasissufficienttoenable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intendedtobecharged,andenablethecourttopronounceproper judgment. Noinformationforacrimewillbesufficientifitdoesnotaccurately andclearlyallegetheelementsofthecrimecharged.Everyelement of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independentknowledgeofthefactsthatconstitutetheoffense. TheabovecitedcomplaintuponwhichEdgardowasarraigneddoes notallegespecificactsoromissionconstitutingtheelementsofthe crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elementsforcrimesotherthanrape,i.e.,ActsofLasciviousness.The allegation therein that the Edgardo 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rapethe complainant does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a conclusion of law by the onewhodraftedthecomplaint.Thisinsufficiencythereforeprevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction; otherwise we wouldbeviolatingtherightofEdgardotobeinformedofthenature oftheaccusationagainsthim.



Facts: NBAPropetiesInc.isaforeigncorporationwhichownstrademarks andnamesofcertainbasketballteamsregisteredwiththeBureauof TrademarksandPatentsandTechnologyTransfer.Onthebasisofits complaint filed, the NBI conducted an investigation on possible unfair competition under RPC Art 189 against petitioner for the unauthorized use of the trademarks and names owned by NBA Props.Inc. In its report, the NBI discovered that petitioner is engaged in the manufacture , printing, sale and distribution of counterfeit NBA garment products and recommended prosecution of petitioner for unfaircompetition. In the meantime, a Special Power of Attorney(SPA) was drawn by Welts,PresidentofNBAProp.Inc.whichauthorizedtheOrtegalaw firmtofilecasesintheirbehalfinthePhils.Accompanyingitisthe complaintaffidavitmadebyWelts.TheSPAandcomplaintaffidavit were notarized abroad which were authenticated by the Philippine Consul. On the basis of the complaint filed by Welts and the report of the NBI,anInformationwasfiledagainsttheaccusedwiththefollowing accusatoryportion:
That on or about May 9, 1997 and on dates priorthereto,intheCityofManila,Philippines,andwithin the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above named accused ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT of Allandale Sportslines, Inc., did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of "NBA" names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believethatthegoodsofferedbythemarethoseof"NBA" to the damage and prejudice of the NBA Properties, Inc., thetrademarkownerofthe"NBA".

However, under Rule 112 Sec. 3 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it statestheknownaddressoftherespondent,itisaccompaniedby complainants affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents,andtheaffidavitsaresworntobeforeanyfiscal,state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, orin their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.Allthesehavebeendulysatisfiedinthecomplaintfiled beforeProsecutionAttorneyAileenMarieS.Gutierrez.Itmustbe notedthateventheabsenceofanoathinthecomplaintdoesnot necessarilyrenderitinvalid.Wantofoathisameredefectofform, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on themerits. Inthiscase,thebasisoftheinformationisWeltscomplaintaffidavit which though subscribed abroad before a foreign notary public, it bears the authentication of the Phil. Consul. Although what was initially presented was just presented was a photocopy, there was anoffertoproducetheoriginalwhichwasinthehandsofanother prosecutor. Moreover, there are other basis such as the report of theNBIandtheOrtegalawfirmsletteraskingNBIsassistanceand the affidavit of a consulting service commissioned by the prosecutiontoconductinvestigation.
(Onlyifsirasks) Withregardtootherdefects,Section3,Rule117ofthe1985Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was then in force at the time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an information,towit: a)Thatthefactschargeddonotconstituteanoffense; b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offensechargedorthepersonoftheaccused; c) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to doso; d)Thatitdoesnotconformsubstantiallytotheprescribedform; e)Thatmorethanoneoffenseischargedexceptinthosecasesin which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; f)Thatthecriminalactionorliabilityhasbeenextinguished; g) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legalexcuseorjustification;and h)Thatthe accusedhasbeen previously convicted orinjeopardy ofbeingconvicted,oracquittedoftheoffensecharged. Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defectinthecomplaintfiledbeforethefiscalandthecomplainantscapacity tosueasgroundsforamotiontoquash.

PetitionernowfiledamotiontoQuashInformationonthebasisthat thefactschargeddoesnotconstituteanoffenseandthatthecourt has no jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the accused. This was denied by RTC and now under a petition for certiorari. ISSUE: Whether the complaint is sufficient and the denial of the motiontoquashinformationshouldbesustained. HELD:Yes.Petitionerharpsontheinsufficiencyofthechargebased on the following circumstances: formal defects such that complainant has not personally sworn before the investigating prosecutor; complainants lack capacity to sue such that there was no board resolution authorizing Welts(president) to institute the action;andotherexculpatorydefensesagainstthecrime.

FACTS:In an Information filed by Assistant City Prosecutor Evelyn DimaculanganQuerijero ,accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged of selling prohibited drugs (42.410GRAMSof dried marijuana fruiting tops). The case was presided by Judge Jaime



Salazar. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded guilty and were sentenced on July 16, 1996 to suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day.Bothaccusedappliedforprobation. On August 28 1996, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Aurora Escasa Ramos filed two separate motions, first, to admit amended Informationand second, to set aside the arraignment of the accused, as well as the decision of the trial court. The prosecutor allegesthattheaccusedshouldratherbechargedfortransportation anddelivery,withintenttosell,45piecesofdriedmarijuanafruiting tops (42.410KILOS)and that it is imperative to file an amended information in order to make it conformable to the evidence on hand. The trial court denied the first motion. However, it granted the second motion for rearraignment it appearing from the published resolution inInaki Gulhoran and Galo Stephen Bobares vs. Hon. FranciscoEscano,Jr.itissaidthatthejurisdictionoverdrugofsmall quantity as in the case at bar should be tried by the Metropolitan TrialCourt,althoughunderthestatuteofR.A.7659,thepenaltyfor possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from prision [correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court which has jurisdiction overacriminalcaseisdependentonthemaximumpenaltyattached bythestatutetothecrime.Thissecondinformationwasassignedto JudgeMoninaZenarosa. Both accused filed a Motion to Quash before the trial court which wasdeniedandsubsequently,apetitionforcertioraribeforetheCA whichwasalsodenied.HencethisPetitionforCertiorariwithprayer forinjunctionandTRO. ISSUESbroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt: (1)W/N there was valid information filed and therefore double jeopardysetsin?YES (2)W/N the original court already obtained jurisdiction over the case?YES ISSUEfurtheraddressedbytheponente: (3)W/Nafterconvictionandapplicationforprobation,information may still be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with? NO. RATIO: (1) To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisitesmustbepresent:(1)avalidcomplaintorinformation;(2) thecourthasjurisdictiontotrythecase;(3)theaccusedhaspleaded tothecharge;and(4)hehasbeenconvictedoracquittedorthecase against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinaryintelligencemayimmediatelyknowwhatismeant,andthe court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The informationwillbesufficientifitdescribesthecrimedefinedbylaw. The first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of thelaw,thatis,toapprisetheaccusedofthenatureofthecharge againstthem,isreasonablycompliedwith.ApplyingRule110Section 6,showsonitsfacethatitisvalid. Section6.Sufficiencyofcomplaintorinformation.Acomplaintor information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complainedofasconstitutingtheoffense;thenameoftheoffended party;theapproximatetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense,and theplacewhereintheoffensewascommitted. Further, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information. Grantingthatallegedalteration/tamperingofinformationtookplace and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the early decision. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedlyparticipatedinbythe accusedmaywellbethesubjectof anotherinquiry. (2)Ontheissueofjurisdiction,thecaseofGulhoranandBobaresv. Escano, Jr., upon which both trial courts justified their claim of jurisdictionwasalreadysupersededbyalaterresolutionwherethe RTCisexclusivelydesignatedtryanddecidecasesofKidnappingFor Ransom,RobberyInBand,RobberyCommittedAgainstABankingOr Financial Institution, Violation Of The Dangerous Drugs Act, and Violation Of The AntiCarnapping Act, and other heinous crimes penalized under Rep. Act No. 7659 committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. This issue is further settled inPeople v. Velascowhere it is stated that[A]ll drugrelated cases, regardless of the quantity involved and the penalty imposable pursuant to R.A. No. 7659,still fall within the exclusive original jurisdictionofRegionalTrialCourts,inviewofSection39ofR.A.No. 6425(theDangerousDrugsActof1972). (3) The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attainedfinalityaftertheaccusedappliedforprobationandthefact thatamendmentisnolongerallowedatthatstage.Rule110ofthe RulesonCriminalProcedureisemphatic: Sec. 14.Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended,insubstanceorform,withoutleaveofcourt,atanytime beforetheaccusedpleads;andthereafterandduringthetrialasto allmattersofform,byleaveandatthediscretionofthecourt,when thesamecanbedonewithoutprejudicetotherightsoftheaccused. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one chargingtheproperoffenseinaccordancewithRule119,Section11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearanceatthetrial. Even appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is whenthetrialcourtactedwithgraveabuseofdiscretionamounting tolackorexcessofjurisdiction,suchaswheretheprosecutionwas deniedtheopportunitytopresentitscaseorwherethetrialwasa sham.



WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from detention. The refiled information did not change the nature of the offense charged, but merely modified the mode by which accused committed the offense. The substance of such modification is not such as to necessitate the conduct of another preliminary investigation. Moreover, no new allegations were made, nor was the criminal liability of the accused upgraded in the refiled information. Thus, newpreliminaryinvestigationisnotinorder. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionwhenitrefused to order the preliminary investigation of the case a quo, when the second Information in the instant case constituted substituted Information whose submission required the conduct of preliminary investigation.NO RULING: Thereisnosubstitutionofinformationtherebeingnochangeinthe natureoftheoffensecharged. While it is true that preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantiverightaccordedtotheaccusedbeforetrial,thedenialof petitionersclaimforanewinvestigation,however,didnotdeprive themoftheirrighttodueprocess.Anexaminationoftherecordsof the case discloses that there was a fullblown preliminary investigationwhereinbothpetitionersactivelyparticipated. Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of RepublicActNo.3019,andthatsuchshiftfromgivingundueinjury to conferring unwarranted benefit constituted, at the very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay daycarecentersforbarangaysMacArthurandUrdaneta,Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary requirements for the prosecutionanddefenseremainthesame. A new preliminary investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons are charged under a new criminal complaintforthesameoffenseornecessarilyincludedtherein;orif under a new criminal complaint, the original charge has been upgraded;orifunderanewcriminalcomplaint,thecriminalliability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counteraffidavitsandevidence. Nosuchcircumstanceisobtaininginthiscase,becausetherewasno modification in the nature of the charged offense.1avvphi1Consequently, a new preliminary investigation is unnecessaryandcannotbedemandedbythepetitioners.

FACTS: The undersigned Prosecutor of the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses, MAYOR QUINTINB.SALUDAGAandSPO2FIELE.GENIO,fortheviolationof Section3(e)ofRepublicAct3019,asamended,otherwiseknownas theAntiGraftandCorruptPracticesAct,committedasfollows: That in or about the months of November and December, 1997 at the Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accusedQUINTINB.SALUDAGA,ahighranking publicofficialbeing then the Mayor of Lavezares, Northern Samar, and committing the crime herein charged while in the discharge of his official administrativefunction,conspiringandconnivingwithaccusedSPO2 FIEL B. GENIO, a member of Lavezares Police Force (PNP) and with thelateOLIMPIOLEGUA,aprivateindividual,withdeliberateintent, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarrantedbenefitoradvantagetothelateOlimpioLegua,anon license contractor and nonaccredited NGO, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality by then and there entering into a Pakyaw Contract with the latter for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers for barangays MacArthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar, in the amount of FORTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P48,500.00) each or a total of NINETYSEVENTHOUSAND PESOS(P97,000.00)PhilippineCurrency, withoutthebenefitofacompetitivepublicbiddingtotheprejudice oftheGovernmentandpublicinterest. PetitionersfiledaMotionforPreliminaryInvestigationdatedJune4, 2008 which was strongly opposed by the prosecution in its OppositiondatedJune18,2008. Petitionerscontendthatthefailureoftheprosecutiontoconducta new preliminary investigation before the filing of the second Information constituted a violation of the law because the latter charged a different offensethat is, violation of Section 3(e) by giving unwarranted benefit to private parties. Hence, there was a substitutionofthefirstInformation.Theyarguethatassumingthat nosubstitutiontookplace,attheveryleast,therewasasubstantial amendment in the new information and that its submission should have been preceded by a new preliminary investigation. Further, theyclaimthatnewlydiscoveredevidencemandatesreexamination ofthefindingofaprimafaciecausetofilethecase. The graft court found that there is no substituted information or substantial amendment that would warrant the conduct of a new preliminaryinvestigation.Itgavethefollowingratiocination:



FACTS: PlanholdersofPacificPlans,Inc.(PPI)awhollyownedsubsidiaryof Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC)who had previously purchased traditional preneed educational plans but were unable tocollectthereonoravailofthebenefitsthereunderafterPPI,due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer forsuspensionofpaymentsbeforetheMakatiRTC,formedPEPCI. PEPCI manages and controls the following websites that served as a forum to seek redress for their pecuniary loss under their policies;www.pepcoalition.com, www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com, as well as a yahoo e group[7]atno2pep2010@yahoogroups.com. These websites are easilyaccessibletothepublicorbyanyoneloggedontotheinternet and were alleged to contain libellous statements against the Yuchengcos. Gimenez, on behalf of the Yuchengco Family and of the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), a criminal complaintbefore the Makati City Prosecutors Office, for thirteen (13) counts oflibelunder Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised PenalCode(RPC)againstpetitioners. The Makati City Prosecutors Office, found probable cause and caused the issuance of the information which was eventually reversedonappealbytheSecretaryofJustice.TheJusticeSecretary opined that the crime of internet libel was nonexistent, hence, theaccusedcouldnotbechargedwithlibelunderArticle353ofthe RPC. Hence, Petitioners, filed a Motion to Quashthe Information on the groundsthatitfailedtovestjurisdictionontheMakatiRTC;theacts complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC; and the Information is fatally defective for failure to designate the offense chargedandtheactsoromissionscomplainedofasconstitutingthe offenseoflibel.Motiongranted. Motion for reconsideration granted and accordingly ordered the public prosecutor to amend the Information to cure the defect of want of venue. The prosecution thereupon moved to admit the AmendedInformationdatedMarch20,2007,theaccusatoryportion ofwhichreads:
That on or about the 25 day of August 2005inMakatiCity,MetroManila,Philippines,aplace within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the trustees of ParentsEnablingParentsCoalitionandassuchtrustees they hold the legal title to the websitewww.pepcoalition.comwhich is of general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does,whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still

unknownandall of themmutually helpingand aidingone another, did then and there willfully, unlawfullyandfeloniouslyandpubliclyandmaliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor andintegrity,characterandreputationofcomplainant Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., Yuchengco Family particularlyAmbassadorAlfonsoYuchengcoandHelen Deeandforfurtherpurposeexposingthecomplainant to public hatred and contempt published an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published in the website said websitewww.pepcoalition.com,a accessibleinMakatiCity,aninjuriousanddefamatory article,which was first published andaccessedby the privatecomplainantinMakatiCity,asfollows: x x x x(emphasis and underscoring in theoriginal;italicssupplied)

ISSUE: whether grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondentsadmissionoftheAmendedInformation. RULING:YES Venueisjurisdictionalincriminalactionssuchthattheplacewhere the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the [33] action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases, given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases. Venueoflibelcaseswherethecomplainantisaprivateindividualis limited to onlyeither of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense;or2)wheretheallegeddefamatoryarticlewasprintedand first published.2The Amended Information in the present case optedtolaythevenuebyavailingofthesecond.Thus,itstatedthat the offending article was first published andaccessedby the private complainant inMakatiCity. In other words, it considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing andfirstpublication.

Beforearticle360wasamended,therulewasthatacriminal actionforlibelmaybeinstitutedinanyjurisdictionwherethe libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of whereitwaswrittenorprinted(Peoplev.Borja,43Phil.618). Underthatrule,thecriminalactionistransitoryandtheinjured partyhasachoiceofvenue. Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by layingthevenueofthecriminalactioninaremoteordistant place. Toforestallsuchharassment,RepublicActNo.4363was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminalactionsoastopreventtheoffendedpartyinwritten defamationcasesfrominconveniencingtheaccusedbymeans ofoutoftownlibelsuits,meaningcomplaintsfiledinremote municipalcourts



If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for thevenue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularitywherethe defamatory article was printed andfirstpublished, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This precondition becomesnecessaryinordertoforestallanyinclinationtoharass. Thesamemeasurecannotbereasonablyexpectedwhenitpertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining thesitusof its printing and first publication. To credit Gimenezs premise of equating his firstaccessto the defamatory article on petitioners website inMakatiwithprintingandfirstpublicationwouldspawnthevery ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourageandprevent.Ithardlyrequiresmuchimaginationtosee thechaosthatwouldensueinsituationswherethewebsitesauthor orwriter,abloggeroranyonewhopostsmessagesthereincouldbe sued for libel anywhere in thePhilippinesthat the private complainantmayhaveallegedlyaccessedtheoffendingwebsite. Petitioner Ramiscal then filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans finding of probable cause against him. The Sandiganbayanorderedtheprosecutiontoevaluateitsevidenceand report its recommendations on the MR filed. Initially, the prosecution recommended the dropping of petitioner in the cases filed. However, the prosecutions final recommendation was that the MR filed by Petitioner should be denied. Upon receipt of this finding/recommendation, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignmentofPetitioner. Afterwards,Petitionerfiledhis2ndMRoftheOmbudsmansfinding ofprobablecauseagainsthim. Petitionersarraignmentneverthelessfollowed.Hefiledamotionto setasidehisarraignmentpendingresolutionofhis2ndMR. ISSUE:Whetherornot themotiontosetasidearraignmentshould begrantedduetothependingMR? RULING: No. The motion should not be granted even though the resolutionoftheMRwasstillpending. The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a findingofprobablecause,evenduringthependencyofamotionfor reconsideration.Section 7, Rule II of the Rules, as amended, provides: Section Reconsideration. 7.Motion for


FACTS: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, retired Brigadier General of the Armed ForcesofthePhilippines(AFP),wasPresidentoftheAFPRetirement and Separation Benefits System (AFPRSBS) for almost 4 years. Duringhistermaspresident,AFPRSBSboardoftrusteesapproved the acquisition of a parcel of land in General Santos City for developmentashousingprojects. Thus,AFPRSBS,representedbypetitioner,executedbilateraldeeds ofsaleoverthesubjectproperty(attheagreedpriceofP10,500.00 per square meter) withAtty. Nilo J. Flaviano, representing the 12 individualsellers. Subsequently, Flaviano executed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchasepriceofP10,500.00persquaremeter.Thesedeedsofsale were presented for registration and later on became the basis for theTCTsissuedbytheRegisterofDeeds. Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint affidavitagainstpetitioner,alongwith27otherrespondents,for(1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti GraftandCorruptPracticesAct;and(2)malversationofpublicfunds orpropertythroughfalsificationofpublicdocuments. InaResolution,theOmbudsmanfoundpetitionerprobableguiltyof the 2 offenses. Thereafter, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of RA 3019 and 12 informationsforfalsificationofpublicdocumentsagainstPetitioner Ramiscalandtheotherrespondents.

a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases where the information has already been filed in court; b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigationshall not barthe filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of probable cause in the resolution subjectofthemotion.(Emphasissupplied) If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused,whichinthenormalcourseofcriminalprocedurelogically followsthefilingoftheinformation. Moreover,any of grounds for suspension of arraignment as providedforunderSection11,Rule116oftheRulesofCourtisnot present in this case (i.e. accused of unsound mind, prejudicial question,etc.)



Lastly,theCourtalsosaidthatPetitionercannotanymorefilea2nd MR questioning again the same finding of the Ombudsman.Otherwise,therewillbenoendtolitigation.

Facts: Basedfromthefactsculledfromtherecords,in1992,RodrigoCawili borrowedvarioussumsofmoneyamountingtoP1,979,459.00from petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checksinpaymentofthesaidloans.Significantly,allthree(3)checks borethesignaturesofbothCawiliandTongson.Uponpresentment forpaymenton18March1993,thechecksweredishonored,either forinsufficiencyoffundsorbytheclosureoftheaccount.Petitioner madeformaldemandstopaytheamountsofthechecksuponCawili on23May1995anduponTongsonon26June1995,buttonoavail. On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and TongsonforviolatingBatasPambansaBilang22(B.P.Blg.22)before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the preliminary investigation,onlyTongsonappearedandfiledhiscounteraffidavit. However, Tongson claimed that he had been unjustly included as partyrespondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawiliinthelatter'spersonalcapacity.Tongsonaverredthathewas not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson deniedthathehadissuedthebouncedchecksandpointedoutthat his signatures on the said checks had been falsified. To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures, which were purportedly thesameasthoseappearingonthechecks.Healsoshowedacopy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate. Inaresolutiondated6December1995,CityProsecutorIIIEliodoro V.LarafoundprobablecauseonlyagainstCawilianddismissedthe chargesagainstTongson.Petitionerfiledapartialappealbeforethe DepartmentofJustice(DOJ)evenwhilethecaseagainstCawiliwas filed before the proper court. In a letterresolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible for Tongson to cosign the bouncedchecksandthathehaddeliberatelyalteredhissignaturein the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo directed the City Prosecutor of QuezonCitytoconductareinvestigationofthecaseagainstTongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his

motion was denied for lack of merit. On15March1999,AssistantCityProsecutorMa.LelibetS.Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which providesthatviolationspenalizedbyB.P.Blg.22shallprescribeafter four (4) years. Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through UndersecretaryManuelA.J.Teehankee,dismissedthesame,stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326. PetitionerfiledamotionforreconsiderationoftheDOJresolution. On3April2003,theDOJ,thistimethroughthenUndersecretaryMa. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared that the offensehadnotprescribedandthatthefilingofthecomplaintwith the prosecutor's office interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan. However,inaresolutiondated9August2004,theDOJ,presumably actingonamotionforreconsiderationfiledbyTongson,ruledthat the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawalofthethree(3)informationsforviolationofB.P.Blg.22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explainedthatActNo.3326appliestoviolationsofspecialactsthat donotprovideforaprescriptiveperiodfortheoffensesthereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized thereunder. Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner'sfailuretoattachaproperverificationandcertificationof nonforum shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing his petitionontechnicalgroundsandinrulingthatthepetitionbeforeit waspatentlywithoutmeritandthequestionsaretoounsubstantial to require consideration. TheDOJ,initscomment,statesthattheCourtofAppealsdidnoterr in dismissing the petition for noncompliance with the Rules of Court.ItalsoreiteratesthatthefilingofacomplaintwiththeOffice oftheCityProsecutorofQuezonCitydoesnotinterrupttherunning oftheprescriptiveperiodforviolationofB.P.Blg.22.Itarguesthat underB.P.Blg.22,aspeciallawwhichdoesnotprovideforitsown prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. Issue: Whether there is prescriptive period upon violating B.P. Blg.



22perActNo.3326andnotArt.90oftheRPC,ontheinstitutionof judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment? Held:ItmustbepointedoutthatwhenActNo.3326waspassedon 4December1926,preliminaryinvestigationofcriminaloffenseswas conductedbyjusticesofthepeace,thus,thephraseologyinthelaw, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted. Although, Tongson went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his complaintaffidavitwiththeOfficeoftheCityProsecutor(24August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated theactiveprosecutionofthecaseasearlyas24August1995,only tosuffersetbacksbecauseoftheDOJ'sflipfloppingresolutionsand its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrievedparties,especiallythosewhodonotsleepontheirrights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarilyfurthersimplybecauseofcircumstancesbeyondtheir control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. Thecourtrulesandsoholdthattheoffensehasnotyetprescribed. Petitioners filing of his complaintaffidavit before the Office of the CityProsecutoron24August1995signifiedthecommencementof the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectivelyinterruptedtheprescriptiveperiodfortheoffensesthey had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definitefindingofprobablecause,withthedebunkingoftheclaim ofprescriptionthereisnolongeranyimpedimenttothefilingofthe information against petitioner. WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheresolutionsoftheCourt ofAppealsdated29October2004and21March2005areREVERSED andSETASIDE.TheresolutionoftheDepartmentofJusticedated9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of JusticeisORDEREDtoREFILEtheinformationagainstthepetitioner. Nocosts. Judge Ayco allowed the testimony of 2 witnesses in court, despite theabsenceofPinote.Pinote,atthattime,wasundergoingmedical treatmentinthePhilippineHeartCenter. Inthefollowinghearings,despiteordersofAyco,Pinoterefusedto cross examine the witnesses due to his being absent during their direct examinations, contending that the proceedings were void. PinotefiledaManifestationstatingsuch,butJudgeAycoruledthat the prosecution was waiving its right to crossexamine the 2 witnessesinstead. TheCourtAdministratorfoundinfavorofPinote,statingthatAyco violatedRule110,Sec.5oftheRulesofCriminalProcedure. ISSUE: W/NAycoshouldbeheldadministrativelyliable? HELD: YES.Aycoshouldbeheldadministrativelyliable. Asageneralrule,allcriminalactionsshallbeprosecutedunderthe controlanddirectionofthepublicprosecutor. If thescheduleof the public prosecutor does not permit, however, orincasetherearenopublicprosecutors,aprivateprosecutormay beauthorizedinwritingbytheChiefoftheProsecutionOfficeorthe Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the terminationofthetrialevenintheabsenceofapublicprosecutor, unlesstheauthorityisrevokedorotherwisewithdrawn. Aycosactofallowingthepresentationofthedefensewitnessesin the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutordesignatedforthepurposeisthusacleartransgression oftheRuleswhichcouldnotberectifiedbysubsequentlygivingthe prosecutionachancetocrossexaminethewitnesses.

FACTS: State Prosecutor Pinote filed an administrative case against RTC JudgeAycoforgrossignoranceofthelaw,graveabuseofauthority, and grave misconduct. In a criminal case being handled by Pinote,