CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD

Edited by

ANDRZEJ BOLESTA

Biaystok 2004

Andrzej Bolesta Copyright 2004

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the editor. Edited by Andrzej Bolesta Linguistic assistant: Drussilla Chambati-Bolesta Cover Design: Marek Owieczko Cover Photograph: Bartosz Dominiak

ISBN 83-88463-36-5

Published by Wydawnictwo i Drukarnia PPHU Biaystok, ul. Mickiewicza 66/1 e-mail: libradruk@wp.pl

Printed in Poland

Contents
List of Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Note from the Editor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Incorporation of Displacement into the Logic of War: The Case of Kosovo Thomas M. Pellathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Causes of Internal Displacement of Minority Groups in the Aftermath of the Bombing of Kosovo in 1999: Was Prevention Possible? Naoko Hashimoto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Unique Movements in the Caucasus: The Soviet Legacy in Current Migration Crises Sarah Cross. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Failure of the Postcolonial State and the Generation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo Mulenga Nkula. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Life After the CPA: The Case of Stateless Vietnamese Boat People in Southeast Asia Hoi Trinh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7 9

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Burmese Refugees in Thailand: The Provision of Humanitarian Relief to Karen Refugees on the Thai-Burmese Border Helen K. Brooks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Power and Empowerment in Refugee Camps: Armed Group Activities and the Liminality of Youth Laura Brownlees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 Protection from the Developing World: New Asylum and Immigration Policy in Europe Andrzej Bolesta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

List of Contributors
Andrzej Bolesta is a researcher at the TIGER (Transformation, Integration and Globalization Economic Research) institute and a lecturer of the Leon Kozminski Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management in Warsaw. He holds a Master of Studies in Forced Migration from the University of Oxford and a Master of Science in International Economic and Political Relations from the Warsaw School of Economics. As a stipendiary of the Chinese government he conducted research at Peking University (Bei Da). He also worked as a coordinator of the humanitarian assistance to the flood victims of southern Poland at the Polish Humanitarian Action. He has published articles on international politics and economics in Polish national newspapers. Helen K. Brooks was among the first intake of students to complete the Master of Studies in Forced Migration at the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, from 1998-99. A China specialist by training, she has worked for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office since 1991. She was seconded to the Hong Kong Government during the last few years of British colonial rule. In London, as Head of the United Nations Section of the Human Rights Policy Department from 2000 to 2002, she joined the UK delegation to UN human rights meetings in Geneva and New York. Most recently, she served as Head of the Indonesia and East Timor Section of the South East Asia Department. Laura Brownlees is a policy officer at Save the Children and works on refugee and asylum issues in the UK. Whilst completing an MA in Social Anthropology, Laura worked on a DFID-funded child labour research programme in Nepal. After graduating from the Refugee Studies Centre with a Master of Studies in Forced Migration she worked as a researcher on a project for UNICEF to produce a psychosocial guiding manual for working with children in emergencies. Sarah Cross is currently affiliated with Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service where, as Assistant Director for Grassroots Advocacy and Public Education, she works toward national policy reform on behalf of asylum seekers, unaccompanied children, torture survivors and other vulnerable immigrants. She holds a Bachelors Degree (with Honours) in Russian Studies and Psychology from Bowdoin College, and a Masters Degree (with Distinction) in Forced Migration from the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford. Prior to pursuing her graduate degree, she spent time collecting oral histories among the Russian diaspora

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

in Germany, Australia and Israel, and working with Russian migr youth in San Francisco. Naoko Hashimoto is currently working for the Counter-Trafficking Service of the International Organization for Migration in Geneva as Junior Professional Officer. From 2001 to 2003, she worked for the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations in New York as advisor on human rights and humanitarian affairs, covering, in particular, human rights of women and children, as well as refugee and IDP related issues. She obtained a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the University of the Sacred Heart in Japan in 1998 and Master of Studies in Forced Migration from the Refugee Studies Centre of University of Oxford in 2000. Mulenga Nkula holds a Bachelor of Arts (BA) degree in Development Studies and Economics from the University of Zambia and a Master of Studies in Forced Migration from the University of Oxford. His working experience ranges from being an Economist in the Zambian Government, a Researcher in the Department of Development Studies at the University of Zambia, to (currently) being the National Policy Director for Jesuit Refugee Service Zambia. Thomas M. Pellathy has worked on international migration policy at a think-tank in Vienna, issues relating to refugee returns in Southeast Europe, the role of Hispanic immigrants in rural labour markets in the United States, and the impact of migration on grassroots development in Mexico. He completed a Master of Studies in Forced Migration at Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford in 2002. He is currently pursuing his DPhil in Economic and Social History at Oxford, writing on remittance flows to Mexico from migrants in the United States. Hoi Trinh is an Australian lawyer of Vietnamese origin. He holds a Bachelor of Laws and a Bachelor of Arts from the Melbourne Law School and a Master of Studies in Forced Migration from the University of Oxford. He has worked for Baker and McKenzie. In 1997 he moved to the Philippines where he opened a legal aid office. Since then he has been working pro bono in the Philippines assisting some 2000 Vietnamese refugees who have remained stateless since their escape from Vietnam in the late 1980s.

Note from the Editor

The end of the XX century and the beginning of the XXI have been plagued with local violent conflicts around the world. Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Chechnya, Kosovo, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone and Liberia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and then again Iraq are the most distinctive examples of domestic and local wars which have taken place before our very eyes, and have featured daily in the media. Furthermore, words such as ethnic cleansing, terrorist attacks or insurgency movement have been introduced to the cannon of vocabulary used in description of the current political scene of the developing world. At this very moment, somewhere in the world people are being killed as a result of military activities. The main consequence of violent conflict is displacement, as people, or sometimes entire populations, are forced to flee their habitual area in fear of loss of their lives. Indeed, it is not uncommon that tens of millions of people are on the move in search of a peaceful place of residence. On the contrary, it is estimated that over 50 million persons have in recent years crossed the borders of their own country or are desperate to do so in order to escape dire political conditions. Conflict and Displacement: International Politics in the Developing World is a distinctive voice in the broad discussion on a number of issues concerned with war and forced migration, and undoubtedly a voice which should be heard, as it forms a solid argument in the worldwide debate. Andrzej Bolesta April 2004

Introduction
Annabel Mwangi*

UNHCR currently recognises around twenty million persons as refugees who have crossed international borders in search of protection. In addition to these recognised refugees, many others are recognised as internally displaced. In relation to the enormity of the global refugee problem, however, the number of refugees and displaced persons who seek refuge in other continents is relatively insignificant in terms of aggregates, but has significant implications in terms of reactions and policy. Receiving societies increasingly portray forced migrants as an economic burden and national security problem and, in so doing, substantially compromise their rights to protection. This book identifies the political complexity of contemporary trends in forced migration and examines the adequacy of present efforts of the international community to meet these challenges. It begins with an investigation of the incorporation of forced displacement into the logic of war. Refugees are seen not just as a by-product, but as an intended consequence of conflict, as well as a justification for humanitarian intervention. This leads into an analysis of the practical and theoretical challenges faced by those responding to humanitarian emergencies, with particular reference to the internal displacement which characterises many contemporary population movements and the need to re-assess the role of the international community in the protection of internally displaced persons. The process of nation-state formation and disintegration, and the role of the state in the generation of conflict and the creation of situations that advance forced migration as well as the differential impact of the development of the state model on types of migration is illustrated by informed and comprehensive case studies of the Caucasus region and the Democratic Republic of Congo. This centrality of state both in relation to the generation of, and the protection of, refugees is then starkly contrasted with the situation that arises when the state is absent, through an examination of the current predicament of stateless Vietnamese boat people.
*

Annabel Mwangi holds a Master of Studies in Forced Migration from the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, and a Master of Science in Development Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science. She is currently undertaking doctoral research at Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford. Her research interests include the legitimisation and protection of human rights in non-Western contexts, specifically Africa, the politics of citizen and state in contemporary Africa and the relationship between human rights and refugee law and the development of refugee policy.

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INTRODUCTION

The central theme of this book is the complexity of contemporary forced migration, which has immediate implications for the provision and management of humanitarian relief and protection settings. Comprehensive inquiries into the failure of the Comprehensive Plan of Action in South East Asia, the transition from self-sufficiency to aid-dependency of Karen refugees in Thailand, and disempowerment and social disarticulation in the camp environment with specific reference to Africa, serve to provide the basis for a comparative analysis of the efficacy of various models of refugee protection. In the face of changing immigration and asylum laws in what has been termed a Fortress Europe it is necessary to question the premises that have led to the erection of barriers to keep the influx of refugees out. And there can be no meaningful comprehension of migration to the west that does not take into account the conditions in the south that exacerbate movement. Building higher walls and denying the rights of migrants may offer temporary respite from the chaos beyond our borders. But it does little to relieve the sources of frustration that force them to leave.** This book attempts to bridge those gaps, by examining in a variety of regional contexts, both the causes and consequences of, as well as the responses to, population displacement.

**

Younge, G. (2004) Bitter White Wine, The Guardian, February 24.

The Incorporation of Displacement into the Logic of War: The Case of Kosovo
Thomas M. Pellathy

1. Introduction
The forced displacement of people from their homes has always been associated with armed conflicts. In recent years, however, forced displacement has moved from being a by-product of armed conflict to becoming a key component in the logic of modern war. In conflicts ranging from Somalia to Haiti to the former Yugoslavia, the forced displacement of large numbers of people has played a central role in both the conflict on the ground and the response of the international community. The centrality of forced displacement in armed conflicts reflects the changing dynamics of organized violence on the ground. These new dynamics are most clearly illustrated by the much-quoted statistic that 90% of casualties in todays conflicts are civilians (as opposed to about 10% at the beginning of the twentieth century). While this statistic is reflective of the decentralization of violence away from standard armed forces to non-regular, civilian-based armed groups, it is also indicative of a fundamental shift in the objective of new war conflicts: increasingly, the primary goal of modern organized violence on the ground is the political control of territory through ethnic engineering involving the expulsion of political and ethnic opponents (Kaldor 2000). As a result, civilian populations more and more are the central targets of organized violence, with the explicit aim of inducing large-scale displacements. The forced displacement of large numbers of people thus plays a key component in the calculus of modern conflict. With the displacements of large numbers of people a primary aim of many of todays conflicts, the international community has increasingly been required to consider the importance of forced migration and its cross-border effects in international affairs. Often occurring in economically developing and politically fragile regions of the world, large-scale displacements usually precipitate acute humanitarian crises and carry with them potentially destabilizing pressures on neighbouring states. In some instances, the confluence of humanitarian and security concerns over large-scale population movements has led Western states to intervene militarily in such new war situations, usually through high-altitude bombing campaigns using precision-guided weaponry. Large-scale forced displacements are thus not

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THOMAS M. PELLATHY

only central to the logic of conflicts on the ground in new war situations, but also to the strategic and humanitarian rationale of military intervention by the international community. Because of both the physical and psychological distance for Western audiences created by the spectacle nature of high-level aerial bombing campaigns that characterize Western interventions in new war conflicts, a direct corollary of such interventions is the importance of media representations of the conflict for domestic audiences. In order to maintain domestic political support for military action that has little to do with the everyday lives of most citizens, Western states must wage an on-going media campaign in order to provide a good cause for intervention and bolster public support during the military campaign. Such media campaigns usually focus extensively on the plight of refugees1 because of their immediate, visceral emotive appeal. Moreover, because of the importance of large numbers of displaced people in the justification and rationale behind intervention in the first place, the success of interventions is often judged in terms of refugee returns. Displaced populations are therefore also central to accompanying media campaigns aimed at generating and sustaining support for an intervention, and refugee returns are a clear measure of the success of an intervention. The case of Kosovo can be seen as a culmination of these various dynamics. The conflict on ground was a clear example of a new war, and population displacements from the region provided the key motivations for NATO intervention using aerial bombardments with precision-guided weaponry. Given the spectacle nature of the intervention, a key dimension throughout the NATO campaign was the management of perceptions of the refugee crisis as projected through the international media. The aim of this paper is to use the conflict in Kosovo to illustrate various ways in which the forced displacement has become a central component in the logic of modern war. First, a theoretical framework is briefly developed in Section 2 through an analysis of the dynamics of modern conflict. Section 3 then uses the Kosovo conflict to illustrate the ways in which forced displacement has become central to the dynamics of war. In Section 3.1, the situation on the ground is examined as an example of a new war with large-scale displacements. Section 3.2 examines the role of forced displacements in the response of the international community, culminating in NATOs spectacle war intervention. Section 3.3 looks at the use of forced displacement in the media war between NATO and the Milosevic regime. The paper ends with some conclusions about the consequences of the incorporation of forced displacement into modern war.

1 Throughout this paper, the term refugee will be used in the everyday sense of the word, unless otherwise noted that the more restrictive, legal definition set out by the 1951 Convention is intended.

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2. The New Logic of War

Since the end of the Cold War, the dynamics of conflict have undergone significant transformations. One of the most striking features of the new landscape of organized violence is the proliferation of intra-state conflicts that target civilians, leading to large-scale population movements and humanitarian crises (Rufin 1992). Often referred to as internal or ethnic conflicts, theorists like Mary Kaldor (2001) prefer the term new war in order to highlight the new dimensions of these conflicts from previous forms of organized violence. In particular, Kaldor (2001) points to three main features that distinguish new wars from conflicts of the past. First, the driving force of new wars is identity politics, as opposed to ideological or territorial differences. Usually constructed on the basis of ethnicity or religion, the identity politics of new wars form the basis of a political legitimacy that is inherently exclusive of other groups. Second, following the exclusionary logic of identity politics, the methods of new wars focus on the exertion of political control through the expulsion of those constructed to have a different identity. Usually carried out by decentralized and non-regular armed groups, the goal is simply getting rid of everyone of a different identity (Kaldor 2001). Finally, new wars are distinctive in their method of financing. New war economies are decentralized and irregular, and typically involve connections to the global economy via trafficking in drugs, arms, or precious commodities or through diaspora communities. Most relevant to this paper are the methods of new wars regarding forced displacement. Already in 1992, a Mdecins Sans Frontires publication noted that the goals of these new wars are the control of territory through forced displacement of populations (Jean 1992: 125). Kaldor echoes this analysis when she writes that the massive displacement of people from their homes is not a side-effect of these wars but a primary strategic goal (2000: 6). The techniques used to induce displacement include systematic murder, ethnic cleansing, and making an area so insecure and threatening as to be uninhabitable, usually through the destruction of homes, jobs, infrastructure, religious and culture symbols, population defilements like mass rapes and sexual abuse, and public acts of brutality (Kaldor 2001: 9798). In fact, forced displacement is so central to the process of these types of conflict that population displacements are a relatively good indicator of the seriousness of situations affected by armed violence (Allen 1999: 24). As a result of these large-scale displacements and their cross-border effects, the international community has increasingly been forced to consider forced displacement in international affairs. Situations of forced displacement present both security concerns over peace and stability in a region and humanitarian concerns over the plight of large numbers of displaced people (Lohrmann 2000). These concerns have motivated the international community, led by Western states, to intervene in a number of new wars, including Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo. Because of do-

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mestic political constraints and changes within the global military sector, however, interventions typically take the form of high-level aerial bombing (Kaldor 2001: 3). Due to their distance from the situation on the ground, these interventions have therefore been characterized as spectacle wars or virtual wars (Kaldor 2000; Ignatieff 2001). The dynamics of spectacle wars interventions have grown out of what is known as the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in American strategic studies (see Bacevich and Cohen 2002). Under the RMA paradigm, increasingly sophisticated military technologies, including precision-guided weaponry, are employed in order to reduce military casualties. The forced displacement of people may provide an important justification for intervention, but the techniques that are typically employed have little impact on the dynamics of new wars situations on the ground, which are characterized by high levels of decentralization, personalized violence, and irregular action (Kaldor 2000). This divide also gives rise to the spectacle nature of Western interventions. As Ignatieff argues, the use of RMA technologies and techniques transforms war into something like a spectator sport (2001: 191). A direct result of the spectacle nature of interventions is the importance of the media. As Ignatieff puts it, when war becomes a spectator sport, the media becomes the decisive theatre of operations (2001: 191). Because domestic audiences typically have little at stake, Western governments must utilize the media in order to sustain support for an intervention (Ignatieff 2001). Given the centrality of forced displacement to both the security and humanitarian concerns raised by new wars, these media campaigns usually focus on the desperate situation of refugees. Since spectacle wars do little to directly impact the real situation on the ground, however, the media also becomes the forum in which the success of an intervention is judged. As Ignatieff observes, virtual war is won by being spun (2001: 196). Because a key determinant of whether an intervention is deemed successful is refugee returns, an integral part of this spin is often media images of returning columns of refugees. The dynamics of new wars and spectacle wars and resulting media campaigns represent new developments in the forms of modern organized violence. As the following section will show, the case of Kosovo not only typifies these various changes in modern warfare and highlights how they are interrelated, but also shows how forced displacement has become central to the logic of modern war.

3. The Case of Kosovo

Kosovo clearly typifies a new war situation resulting in a spectacle war intervention by the West. The situation on the ground in Kosovo between Albanian separatists and Serbian forces engaged in a program of ethnic cleansing contained all the elements of a new war (see ICG 1998b). These large-scale population displacements

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created a host of security and humanitarian concerns that motivated NATO to intervene, eventually resulting in a bombing campaign from March 24 to June 10, 1999. The resulting spectacle war did little to positively affect the situation on the ground. As one analyst observed, a high-tech war conducted from high altitudes was completely ineffective in thwarting a low-tech war being conducted with small arms, truncheons, and arson against civilians on the ground (Frelick 1999: 5). In fact, the sharp rise in the number of refugees in the weeks following the start of the NATO campaign sparked an intense media war between NATO and the Milosevic regime over public opinion regarding the intervention, even as forced displacement continued under the blanket of NATO bombs. As Kaldor observes, in effect two wars were waged simultaneously that fed off each other in a reinforcing cycle of violence (2000: 19). At the heart of each was the forced displacement of large numbers of people from the region.

3.1 Displacement and the Methods of New Wars: The Conflict on the Ground
The conflict in Kosovo clearly exemplifies the characteristics of a new war, with tensions driven by identity politics and methods centred on population expulsion. Consistent with the logic of new wars, the methods of conflict in Kosovo centred on the exertion of political control through the forced displacement of people from the region. As Kaldor puts it, the methods of the war [in Kosovo] represented a perfection of the techniques developed in Croatia and Bosnia, the strategy of controlling territory through population displacement (2001: 156). Well before the start of the NATO campaign, Serbian forces were engaged in a process of widespread intimidation and abuse of the Albanian population in Kosovo (ICG 1998a), encouraging a policy of forced displacement long held by factions within the Milosevic regime. The platform of one coalition party within the Milosevic government, for instance, included the expulsion without delay of what it claimed were 360,000 post-war immigrants to Kosovo from Albania and their descendants (Judah 2000: 151-152), while top Serbian security personnel warned Kosovar Albanian leaders in 1997 that if the Albanians persisted with their demands for independence, they would burn every one of [their] villages to the ground (Ignatieff 2001: 57). Using attacks by Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) separatists, with their strong ethnic nationalist ideology and shadowy connections to nationalistic diaspora groups in Switzerland and Germany, in early 1998 as justification, Serbian forces began retaliatory attacks against civilian populations. The situation quickly escalated in February and March of 1998, with a Serbian crackdown in the town of Drenica that left some 80 people dead and prompted a mass exodus of ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo. By early July of 1998, the KLA claimed control of approximately 40% of the province, but a Serbian offensive later in the month pushed back the separatists. Serbian forces by then began implementing scorched earth tactics, and by Septem-

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ber of 1998 UNHCR estimated around 250,000 displaced persons in the region (1999a). By this time, leading newspapers like the New York Times were regularly reporting on the plight of Albanians fleeing from Kosovo. By March of 1999, UNHCR placed the number of displaced people both within and outside of Kosovo at close to 500,000 (1999b). With the start of the NATO campaign on March 24, 1999, the situation went from bad to worse. Within weeks, UNHCR estimated the total number of people displaced from their homes at over a million, with hundreds of thousands of people crossing the border into Macedonia and Albania (1999c). Many were fleeing the insecurity caused by NATO bombardment and fighting between Serbian forces and the KLA. Under the cover of NATO bombing, however, Serbian forces also began implementation of Operation Horseshoe, a broad plan to purge Kosovo of its Albanian population (Ignatieff 2001: 122). Kaldor writes that a week before the bombing began, Serb policemen were marking the houses of Kosovar Albanians with crosses so the cleaners would know where to go (2001: 154). In the weeks that followed, Kaldor argues that Serb forces began a systematic and organized program of forced displacement: Ethnic cleansing was carried out by a combination of regular forces and paramilitary groups augmented by criminals released from prison for the purpose. Local Serbs were also mobilized. Just as in Bosnia, the role of the regular forces was to shell a particular area; then, when the local people were sufficiently weakened and terrorized, the paramilitary groups would enter the area, separating men from women and children, looting all valuables, including documents, burning homes and destroying historic and cultural symbols. Refugees reported that cleansers had informed them that they were under instructions to clean Kosovo within a week. The logistical arrangements for trains and buses to deport Kosovar Albanians clearly illustrate the planned character of the ethnic cleansing (2001: 156-7). Whatever the actual degree of organization, a clear pattern emerged of Serbian police and paramilitary forces targeting civilian populations, burning homes, stripping fleeing ethnic Albanians of documents, and facilitating deportations via bus and train (HRW 2001). As domestic pressure increased and hoped for Russian assistance never materialized, Milosevic eventually capitulated under NATO bombardment on June 10, 1999. As Serbian forces withdrew and NATO troops entered Kosovo, the United Nations began the process of assembling a governing structure for the province. Despite the presence of KFOR troops and UN rhetoric about the protection of human rights and ethnic minorities, the new war logic of the conflict continued. The return of hundreds of thousands of displaced persons to Kosovo precipitated a new wave of violence now targeted against the Serbian population. In the months after entry of KFOR troops in Kosovo, over 100,000 Serbs, as well as tens of thousands of Roma, fled systematic violence by returning KLA forces (ICG 1999; USCR 2000).

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3.2 Displacement and the Motivations for Intervention

Just as forced displacement was an essential feature of the new war conflict on the ground in Kosovo, the large numbers of people fleeing Kosovo was also central to NATOs rationale for intervention. As the situation on the ground deteriorated in the latter half of 1998, the international community began to mobilize for action. The motivation for some form of military intervention grew largely out of security concerns over the destabilizing effects of large-scale population movements from the region on surrounding states. At the same time, the US and Western Europe was loathe to witness another Bosnia just three years after the Dayton Accords put an end to the brutality of civilian massacres, mass rapes, and millions of refugees in Bosnia (Cremasco 2000). At the heart of both these strategic and humanitarian concerns was the on-going displacement of a large number of people. 3.2.1 Displacement and Threats to Security Because of the potential threat to the stability of surrounding states, large population flows have long been recognized as a threat to international security. As early as 1986, the UN General Assembly held that massive flows of refugees may not only affect the domestic order and stability of receiving states but also [] endanger international peace and security (UN 1986). As the number of new wars increased in the 1990s, displacement and security became even more interconnected. In a document addressing security concerns for the new millennium, for instance, the United States places destabilizing refugee flows firmly within its second-tier of national security concerns (The White House 1999). Reflecting evolving notions of security, the UN also increasingly considered forced displacement as a threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In the case of northern Iraq, for example, the Security Council noted in resolution 688 (1991) that the repression of the Kurdish population led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region. While not explicitly sanctioned under Chapter VII, the US-led intervention in Iraq in 1991 set an important precedent for international intervention in conflicts generating large-scale population displacements. The Security Council did invoke Chapter VII to sanction international action in a host of other situations (such as the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Albania, and East Timor) in which forced displacement was a key consideration. The potential for large-scale population displacements from Kosovo posed a number of security concerns for Southeast Europe. One of the biggest concerns for NATO was that large numbers of politically mobilized ethnic Albanians fleeing into Macedonia would upset the fragile ethnic balance of that country, and potentially cause further tension between Greece and Turkey. A second key area of con-

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cern was the potential for destabilization in Albania, which was still recovering from the effects of widespread anarchy in 1997. The Italians in particular were anxious not to see further waves of ethnic Albanians crossing the Adriatic, concerned about the implications of people trafficking and its connections to the arms and drug trade, and fearful that Serbian forces might even carry out attacks against ethnic Albanians in Italy itself (Hein 2000: 139-140). European governments were also concerned with the financial and political costs of enduring another refugee crisis after the experience of Bosnia. Moreover, Western European governments increasingly saw large numbers of asylum seekers as a threat to their societal security, a notion that had been gaining currency within European security circles since the end of the Cold War.2 In September of 1998, the Security Council passed resolution 1199 (1998) under Chapter VII, which recognized that the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region. Because of Russian opposition to intervention, however, it was clear that the Security Council would be unable to authorize the use of force. Under increasing pressure to assert its role within the changing, post-Cold War European security complex (Huysmans 2000) and on-going media coverage of Serbian aggression against civilians, NATO began to prepare for independent action. With the failure of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission and the breakdown of talks at Rambouillet and Paris in February and March of 1999, NATO felt that it had pursued diplomatic channels far enough. On March 24, Operation Allied Force began air strikes against the Milosevic regime. Reflecting the importance of largescale displacements to its security considerations, one of NATOs primary objectives was the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons. 3.2.2 Displacement and Humanitarian Concerns Even as the large-scale refugee flows posed a number of security concerns, the suffering experienced by these displaced people also raised serious humanitarian concerns within Western governments. As the international press and monitors from the OSCE mission continued to document atrocities in Kosovo in late 1998, public concern over the looming humanitarian crisis grew. Then US Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, for example, recalled the concern over the pictures of massacres and stories of refugees on the front page of the New York Times in September of 1998: People were horrified. [] There was a decision then to press ahead for NATO action, to try and sidestep the British, French, German and Russian view that you needed a Security Council mandate (as cited in Judah 2000: 181-2). As people continued fleeing the region, the prospect of another refugee crisis within Europe galvanized political support for humanitarian action in Kosovo.
2

See, for example, Waever, O. et al. (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter.

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In a press report on March 23, Javier Solana clearly stated that in addition to preventing instability from spreading in the region, a primary NATO objective was to bring an end to the humanitarian catastrophe involving a large number of displaced people (1999). This formulation was echoed throughout the NATO intervention, particularly by the governments of President Clinton and Prime Minister Blair. Because of these humanitarian concerns, Adam Roberts argues that the intervention marked a high point in the increasing emphasis on human rights and humanitarian issues (1999: 103). This emphasis on the humanitarian plight of hundreds of thousands of displaced people also played an important role for NATO in justifying their intervention without a Security Council mandate. This followed a similar line of logic used by the administration of President George H.W. Bush in the intervention in northern Iraq in the early 1990s. Despite clear references to international peace and security in Security Council resolution 688 (1991), President Bush stated that I want to underscore that all we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns. [] I think the humanitarian concern, the refugee concern is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of understanding about this (as cited in Chesterman 2001: 198). By portraying the intervention as a humanitarian mission for Kurdish refugees consistent with the aims of the Security Council, the administration thus avoided addressing certain questions of international law. In the case of Kosovo, there was similarly no resolution adopted under Chapter VII authorizing the use of force, although resolution 1199 (1998) made references to a threat to peace and security in the region. Because of the lack of explicit Chapter VII authorization for military intervention, NATO rhetoric tended away from the language of security and towards that of humanitarian concern. The displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from the region and the ensuing refugee crisis was therefore a key justification for non-Chapter VII sanctioned action. NATO instead defended its action on the grounds of achieving the aims of the various Security Council resolutions regarding Kosovo and general principles of humanitarian law (Roberts 1999). Belgium even explicitly argued that the intervention was legally justified in order to prevent an impending [humanitarian] catastrophe recognized as such by the Security Council (as cited in Chesterman 2001: 46). Put rather bluntly, the emphasis on the humanitarian dimension of the operation in response to the refugee crisis provided some semblance of international legal legitimation of a war that violated core legal rules of the interstate system (Gowan 2000: 41). In actuality, the action in Kosovo involved a confluence of security and humanitarian concerns. Whatever the rhetoric lauding the intervention in Kosovo as the first purely humanitarian intervention, the motivation for action in Kosovo was clearly tied to both humanitarian concerns and security concerns regarding large-scale population movements. As Prime Minister Tony Blair stated in a speech in April of 1999, the intervention in Kosovo was fought to uphold humanitarian

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principles, but massive refugee flows also jeopardize state interests by threatening international peace and security and therefore can serve as the basis for intervention.

3.3 Displacement and the Media War

The large-scale displacement of people from Kosovo not only provided the motivations and justifications for NATO action, but also the material for the media war waged between NATO and the Milosevic regime. Because of its importance with regard to the situation on the ground and the strategic and humanitarian justifications for NATOs military intervention, the media campaign waged by NATO focused in large part on the on-going refugee crisis. The media campaign also focused on images of refugees and displaced people because of their emotive power. Desperate images of refugees and displaced people provide a striking illustration to a story of human catastrophe.3 As a result, depictions of refugees as the helpless victims of extreme human suffering are a typical vehicle for mobilizing an international response to humanitarian crises (Harrell-Bond 1986: 11), reinforced by pressures within the media industry to commoditize misery in order to attract viewers (Seaton 1999: 54). Because of the spectacle nature of the intervention and the ubiquitous presence of the media during the NATO military operation, the management of media representations of the refugee crisis formed an essential component of the overall NATO campaign.4 Media representations of displaced people were a critical element of NATOs intervention in a number of different ways. First, media depictions of the on-going refugee crisis were crucial in garnering initial support for intervention, and maintaining it throughout a war with little direct impact on domestic audiences. Second, media representations of the refugee crisis helped determine the international political image of NATO during the military intervention. And finally, media portrayals of thousands of returning refugees towards the end of the conflict helped vindicate the campaign and the underlying rationale for intervention. Because of the emotive impact of refugees, media representations of displaced Albanians played an important role in garnering support among the domestic populations of Western states. The impending humanitarian crisis caused by the conflict on the ground between Serb and ethnic Albanian forces was given a human face
As just an anecdotal example, in the 1999 book The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, nine of ten photographs illustrating the text are of refugees and displaced people. 4 In Waging Modern War (2002) general Wesley Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe during Operation Allied Force, repeatedly recognized the importance of the role of the media in the NATO campaign.
3

THE INCORPORATION OF DISPLACEMENT INTO THE LOGIC OF WAR

21

through images of fleeing refugees. By the summer of 1998, major newspapers like the New York Times were running stories with headlines such as Refugees From Kosovo Cite a Bitter Choice: Flee or Die about the plight of thousands of displaced ethnic Albanians, which helped garner domestic support for military intervention. As one journalist put it, concrete images of human suffering ensure emotional impact (Johnstone 2000: 14), which in turn translates into increased political support for intervention. As the campaign progressed, media portrayals of the refugee crisis continued to be crucial in sustaining a level of domestic support for the intervention. As Tim Judah (2000: 251) argues, if apocalyptic scenes of hundreds of thousand of refugees on television news throughout the West had been replaced by images of bombs and missiles falling on Serbian towns and villages, support for the campaign would have quickly eroded. With the start of Operation Allied Force, media portrayals of displaced people also played a key role in determining the international political image of NATO, especially given NATO rhetoric over the humanitarian catastrophe caused by largescale displacement. Moreover, perceptions of the impact of the NATO bombing campaign on the refugee crisis were made doubly sensitive because of the lack of an explicit UN Security Council mandate, generally seen as the stamp of international legitimacy. With the sharp increase in the number of refugees in the weeks after the beginning of the campaign on March 24, NATOs image hinged on perceptions that the refugee crisis was the cause of and not the result of the intervention (Judah 2000). In the first weeks of the campaign, NATO clearly recognized that images of rapidly increasing outflows of people from Kosovo had to be properly managed to avert a public relations disaster: When the refugees began to come out, NATO officials were at first horrified. [NATO Spokesman] Jamie Shea said: We were faced by accusations of turning a disaster into a catastrophe (Judah 2000: 253). The Milosevic regime also understood what was at stake. As Ignatieff points out, instead of fighting NATO in the air, [Milosevic] fought NATO on the airwaves with images of civilian casualties and refugees caught at the border (2001: 52).5 In an attempt to exploit international political scrutiny of the NATO intervention, spokespersons for the Milosevic regime repeatedly insisted that civilians in Kosovo were primarily fleeing indiscriminate NATO bombing. NATO therefore took proactive steps to manage the refugee crisis. Because UNHCR and other organizations were unprepared for the scale of the outflows (Suhrke et al. 2000), NATO troops were enlisted to build refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia. While criticized by some aid agencies as being a highly visible but ineffective response (Minear et al. 2000: 25), the general consensus is that NATOs rapid construction of camps actually helped avert a large-scale humanitarian
5 The highly covered trial of Milosevic in The Hague is a continuation of this media war. For his part, Milosevic continues to accuse NATO of creating the refugee crisis and, with hundreds of cameras waiting at the border, of using it to justify intervention (NYT 2001).

22

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disaster. When Macedonia refused to accept more displaced people and thousands of refugees were stranded at the Blace border crossing, another potential disaster was averted when the US pushed through a burden-sharing arrangement that included the high-profile evacuation of several thousand ethnic Albanians to the US and Western Europe (Barutciski and Suhrke 2001).6 Throughout the conflict, NATO continued to manage an on-going media campaign in order to both maintain domestic support for its spectacle intervention and project a favourable international political image. The bombing of a refugee convoy on April 14 (1999) that killed scores of civilians, for example, was particularly devastating on both counts, and resulted in a plunge in domestic support for the air campaign and an outcry of international criticism.7 In order to help manage situations like these, Tony Blairs press secretary and a highly experienced media team were sent to NATO headquarters in Brussels to handle the campaign. The need to manage NATOs public image was also recognized by NATO commanders on the ground, and operations in the Macedonia and Albanian theatres shared the sense that NATO would miss an opportunity if its many troops failed to become actively involved in hands-on help to local communities (Minear et al. 2000: 27). Consequently, AFOR, the humanitarian wing of NATO in Albania, was told by NATO brass that all activities undertaken by AFOR should contribute to the enhancement of NATOs public image and the undermining of critics of the NATO campaign (as cited in Minear et al. 2000: 64). NATO troops engaged in highly visible projects like camp construction and distribution of food supplies to refugees. These press opportunities helped maintain NATOs image in the eyes of domestic audiences and diffuse criticism against the intervention. In fact, as the campaign progressed and media coverage in the West was increasingly dominated by the images of desperate displaced people, the main focus of the war became the return of refugees (Judah 2000: 251). As the NATO intervention came to a close in early June of 1999, the media campaign continued to focus heavily on refugees and displaced people. The emphasis, however, was now on the streams of hundreds of thousands of returning refugees. Because of the importance of forced displacement from the region in justifying humanitarian and strategic military intervention, NATO had staked much of its credibility on the successful resolution of the refugee crisis. As a result, the only acceptable outcome for NATO not only involved Milosevics complete capitulation to NATO demands, but also the full and speedy return of refugees (Ignatieff 2001). Given the importance of the media as one of the primary means of assessing the effectiveness of intervention by outside forces, whether humanitarian or military
These ethnic Albanians were met by then First Lady Hilary Rodham Clinton to great media fanfare into a center complete with recreation facilities for children (CNN 1999). 7 There is evidence that Serbian military convoys deliberately mixed with fleeing refugees (HRW 2001). The use of displaced people as human shields is another facet in their incorporation into modern conflict.
6

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(Seaton 1999: 44), images of hundreds of thousands of displaced people spontaneously streaming back to Kosovo within days of a NATO presence on the ground symbolized the success of the military operation and vindicated the underlying rationale and methods of spectacle war intervention.

4. Conclusion
As this paper shows, the forced displacement of populations played a central role in the Kosovo conflict. Forced displacements were at the heart of the conflict on the ground, the motivations and justifications for NATO intervention, and the media campaign waged between NATO and the Milosevic regime. Despite NATO assurances that the intervention in Kosovo was a unique situation and did not set any precedents (Roberts 1999), NATOs bombing campaign grew out of the interrelations between new wars and spectacle wars. As the case of Kosovo illustrates, large-scale displacements with significant cross-border effects are fundamental to new war situations. As long as this is the case, Western states will be pressured to respond when significant security and humanitarian concerns are at stake. When an intervention does occur, the constraints of risk-averse governments and RMA strategies will typically lead to spectacle war actions. A direct corollary to spectacle wars, however, is the need to manage public perceptions as projected in the media, especially regarding the humanitarian crisis that triggered the need for intervention in the first place. The resulting need to manage such images as they are projected through the international media leads to one of the most important consequences of the intervention in Kosovo: the partial transformation of NATO into a humanitarian organization. Clearly the need to respond to the importance of media representations within the context of a spectacle war was not the only reason NATO pursued humanitarian activities on the ground during the Kosovo campaign. Jef Huysmans, for example, provides an excellent account of NATOs efforts to translate humanitarian action into political currency not only within the context of the Kosovo crisis, but also in its struggle to find a new raison dtre within the European security complex (2000). Other reasons certainly exist as well, including a genuine commitment to humanitarian principles. During the refugee crisis in Kosovo, however, the visibility sought by NATO on the ground and the political benefits it thus garnered clashed with NATOs stated policy of complimenting rather than pre-empting the work of humanitarian actors (Minear et al. 2000: 26). In other words, managing its public image during the military intervention in Kosovo prompted NATO to take a lead role in managing the humanitarian situation on the ground. This emphasis on humanitarian activities continues to be reflected in NATOs growing concern for administering relief during humanitarian disasters, defending

24

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values of democracy and human rights, and managing the cross-border effects of crises (NATO 2001). Given the prospect of on-going displacements due to new war situations on the ground throughout the world, NATOs role in managing humanitarian crises seems set to continue in the years to come. It remains to be seen, however, whether this increasingly important humanitarian element of NATO operations will in turn impact the spectacle nature of its military interventions or remain primarily a public relations strategy.

References
ALLEN, T. (1999) Perceiving Contemporary Wars, in Allen, T. and Seaton, J. (eds.) The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, London, Zed Books. BACEVICH, A. and COHEN, E. (eds.) (2002) War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, New York, Columbia University Press. BARUTCISKI, M. and SUHRKE, A. (2001) Lessons from the Kosovo Refugee Crisis: Innovations in Protection and Burden-sharing, Journal of Refugee Studies, 14(2): 95-115. BLAIR, T. (1999) Doctrine of the International Community, Speech given to the Economic Club of Chicago, 22 April. CHESTERMAN, S. (2001) Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press. CLARK, W. (2001) Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Modern Combat, Cambridge, Public Affairs. CNN (1999) Kosovo refugees arrive in US, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9905/05/us.kosovo. refugees/> CREMASCO, M. (2000) The Humanitarian Factor in the Management of the Kosovo Crisis, University of Nebraska Human Rights and Human Diversity Initiative Monograph Series 3(1), 24 October. FISHER, I. and SIMONS, M. (2001) A Defiant Milosevic Continues to Blame NATO at Hague Trial, New York Times, 15 February. FRELICK, B. (1999) The Kosovo Refugee Crisis, Testimony given before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, 14 April. GOWAN, P. (2000) The War and its Aftermath, in Hammond, P. and Herman, E. (eds.) Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, London, Pluto Press. HARRELL-BOND, B.E. (1986) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, Oxford, Oxford University Press. HEDGES, C. (1998) Refugees from Kosovo Cite a Bitter Choice: Flee or Die, New York Times, 5 June. HEIN, C. (2000) Italy: Gateway to Europe, but not the gatekeeper?, in Van Selm, J. (ed.) Kosovos Refugees in the European Union, London, Pinter.

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HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (HRW) (2001) Under Orders: War Crimes in Kosovo, HRW Report. HUYSMANS, J. (2000) Kosovo, Population Flows, and Questions of Security, NATO Fellowship Final Report, 13 September. IGNATIEFF, M. (2001) Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, London, Vintage. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG) (1998a) Kosovo Spring, ICG Report, 20, March. ______ (1998b) Kosovos Long Hot Summer: Briefing on military, humanitarian, and political developments in Kosovo, ICG Balkan Report, 41(2), September. ______ (1999) Violence in Kosovo: Whos Killing Whom?, ICG Balkan Report, 78(2), November. JEAN, F. (1992) Refugees and Displaced Persons: A New Deal, in Jean, F. (ed.) Populations in Danger, London, Mdecins Sans Frontires. JOHNSTONE, D. (2000) Nato and the New World Order: Ideals and Self-Interest, in Hammond, P. and Herman, E. (eds.) Degraded Capability: The Media and the Kosovo Crisis, London, Pluto Press. JUDAH, T. (2000) Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven, Yale University Press. KALDOR, M. (ed.) (2000) Global Insecurity, London, Pinter. ______ (2001) New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Cambridge, Polity Press. LOHRMANN, R. (2000) Migrants, Refugees and Insecurity: Current Threats to Peace?, International Migration, 38(4): 3-21. MINEAR, L., VAN BAARDA, T. and SOMMERS, M. (2000) Occasional Paper #36: NATO and Humanitarian Action in the Kosovo Crisis, Providence, Watson Institute for International Studies. NATO (1999) Statement by Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO, NATO Press Release 040, 23 March. ______ (2001) NATO in the 21st Century, Brussels, NATO Office of Information and Press. ROBERTS, A. (1999) NATOs Humanitarian War Over Kosovo, Survival, 41(3): 102123. RUFIN, J. (1992) New Conflicts, in Jean, F. (ed.) Populations in Danger, London, Mdecins Sans Frontires. SEATON, J. (1999) The New Ethnic Wars and the Media, in Allen, T. and Seaton, J. (eds.) The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence, London, Zed Books. SUHRKE, A., BARUTCISKI, M., SANDISON, P. and GARLOCK, R. (2000) The Kosovo Crisis: An Independent Evaluation of UNHCRs Emergency Preparedness and Response, Geneva, UNHCR. UNITED NATIONS (1986) International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, General Assembly, 41st Session, Special Political Committee, 9 October. A/SPC/41/L.5. ______ (1991) Security Council resolution 688 (1991), 5 April. S/RES/688(1991).

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______ (1998) Security Council resolution 1199 (1998) on the situation in Kosovo, Yugoslavia. 23 September. S/RES/1199(1989). UNHCR (1998) UN Inter-agency Update on Kosovo Situation. Report 59. 1 September. ______ (1999a) Kosovo Crisis Update. 6 April. ______ (1999b) UNHCR seeks more help from governments and urges states to keep borders open as refugee crisis mounts, UNHCR Press Release, 20 April, <http://www.unhcr. ch/news/pr/990420.htm> ______ (1999c) UNHCR and other agencies resume aid program in Kosovo, UNHCR Press Release, 13 June, <http: //www.unhcr/ch/news/pr/pr990613.htm> U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES (USCR) (2000) Reversal of Fortune: Yugoslavias Refugee Crisis since the Ethnic Albanian Return to Kosovo, April. THE WHITE HOUSE (1999) A National Security Strategy for a New Century. December.

The Causes of Internal Displacement of Minority Groups in the Aftermath of the Bombing of Kosovo in 1999: Was Prevention Possible?
Naoko Hashimoto

1. Introduction
Following the signing of a Military Technical Agreement on June 10th, 1999 with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)8 , over 800,000 ethnic Albanians displaced from Kosovo in the previous three months reversed their exodus with an equally dramatic spontaneous repatriation. Within three weeks, an estimated 600,000 Albanian refugees returned to Kosovo, which was recorded as one of the fastest repatriations in modern history.9 The returning Albanians felt a euphoric feeling of victory and liberation after decades of repression and struggles (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999). To the dismay of observers who expected a restoration of peace, the same period witnessed a concomitant steady outflow of non-Albanian minorities, mainly Serbs and Roma, from Kosovo to Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia Herzegovina (BiH) or elsewhere. This movement was even accelerated by the events and developments after the full deployment of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) (Amnesty International 1999a: Report-EUR 70/106/99). By the end of 1999, approximately 240,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Kosovo, including 40,000 to 50,000 Romas, registered in Serbia and Montenegro (UNHCR 2000).10 Although the exact number was contentious, clearly there [was] a significant decrease in the overall non-Albanian population immediately after the bombardment in Kosovo (UNHCR/OSCE 1999b). Simultaneously, those who stayed within Kosovo increasingly concentrated into mono-ethnic enclaves, such as the
8 9

The name of the country changed to Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003. These figures included ethnic Albanians who had fled the area since March 1998 but prior to the bombardment. 10 237,827 as of end January 2000, UNHCR, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Information Bulletin, excluding Kosovo. Also see UNHCR Kosovo: One last chance, (1999: 11).

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settlements of 3,000 Serbs in the northern part of Orahovac town and 1,500 Roma in Oblic.11 As a consequence, the number of ethnically mixed villages shrank day by day.12 This local relocation to enclaves was regarded as an ethnic concentration process, creating new groups of IDPs.13 Most analyses attributed the internal and local displacements of minorities to revenge and retaliation committed generally by the returning Kosovar Albanians motivated by ethnic hatred. The journalistic expression of ethnic cleansing was arbitrarily used by some aid agencies as well as the media.14 While the ethnic implication in the precarious post-conflict developments could not be completely denied, this paper will challenge this reductionistic view as irresponsible of the international community. Instead, this essay will attempt to lay out a wider range of factors which exacerbated the plight of minority IDPs. Was the cause of their flights merely the ethnically motivated revenge? Were the international responses to those who remained in Kosovo adequate and efficient? Could their displacements have been prevented? Bearing these primary questions in mind, this paper will focus on two particular minority groups, namely the Serbs and Roma who had remained in Kosovo until 10 June 1999 but were forced to flee between mid-June and the end of 1999. To be sure, any attempt to understand the root causes for the post-bombing violence and abuses in Kosovo must review the long history of human rights violations in the region, or at least the inexcusable atrocities inflicted by the Serb security forces and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) prior to the campaign of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).15 It is also true that minority groups in Kosovo comprise a variety of other groups such as Krajina Serb refugees, Montenegrins, Croatian Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, Gorani, Muslim Slavs, Turkish, Croats, Cerkezi and other unnamed groups.16 However, by focusing on two particularly ignored and unpopular
Living conditions in the enclaves were described as a ghetto-like situation. UNOHCHR 1999. 12 According to UNHCR, the villages of Banjska, Janjevo, Priluzje, and Landovica had remained peaceful and multi-ethnic as of late July 1999. However, a comprehensive OSCE report in December found no evidence for the viability of large-scale co-existence. 13 For analyses on enclaves, see UNHCR: Kosovo Humanitarian Update, 26 July 1999, and UNHCR/OSCE 1999a. 14 See for example Overseas Development Institute 1999. 15 See for example, Background Papers on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Kosovo, the Centre for Documentation and Research of UNHCR 1996, Geneva; Amnesty International A Decade of Unheeded Warnings, vol. 1 and 2: 1999, United States Committee for Refugees 1999; and Human Rights Watch reports, listed in bibliography. 16 See UNHCR/OSCE 1999a and the UNHCHR report listed in the bibliography. The religious, linguistic, political, cultural, and territorial affiliation and characteristics of other minority groups vary tremendously and sometimes their identities differ even on the personal level
11

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groups that debatably share relatively similar conditions and identities, and on the specific six-month period, this short paper attempts to elucidate the deficiencies of international responses after the bombardment in 1999. The first part of this paper will focus on the exodus from Kosovo. It will seek to identify whether there was any external incentive (pull factor) for minorities to flee Kosovo, by investigating how the IDPs were treated in neighbouring provinces, countries, and other third countries. The following part will evaluate the international commitments firstly in terms of assistance and secondly protection for the minority IDPs who remained within Kosovo. It will be assessed whether such responses were adequate and efficient enough to avoid the new internal displacement to the enclaves in Kosovo. Finally this paper argues that the internal displacements of Serbs and Roma from and within Kosovo could have been prevented if the international involvement had been more legitimate, adequate, and efficient. In the last decade, the eruption of complex emergencies heightened attentions to the role of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the international community on behalf of displaced persons. In particular, the issue of protecting IDPs has increasingly become the subject of practical problems and theoretical controversies.17 Hence, the internal displacement of the Kosovar minority groups seems to epitomise the problems and challenges facing international responses to IDPs, and to provide lessons to be learned for future evolution.

2. Situation outside Kosovo

The first few weeks after the June 10th Agreement, in 1999, witnessed the exodus of thousands of Serbs and Roma from Kosovo mainly to Serbia and Montenegro, and some to other countries. They were by no means treated in a more favourable manner than the minorities within Kosovo. To illustrate the severe conditions facing those who fled Kosovo, this section examines the national, regional, and international reception of Kosovar minorities.

within the same categorical group. Some specialists also assert that the Roma identity is not cohesive but various in terms of allegiances, languages, and religions, and that some of them identify themselves as Albanians or Egyptians. Patterns of movement and the security level of Serbs and Roma therefore differ from municipality to municipality. See also OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999. 17 The focus on IDPs was most obviously exemplified by the appointment of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, and by the presentation of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in April 1998. See also Cohen and Deng 1998, and Forced Migration Review, April 1998.

30 2.1 Serbia

NAOKO HASHIMOTO

As of the end of 1999, approximately 195,000 IDPs congregated in central and southern Serbia (USCR 2000). The reception climate in Serbia was mainly shaped by three factors: policies of the Yugoslav regime, international donors attitude, and local capacity. At least for the initial few months, the Belgrade government continued various ad hoc policies to force IDPs to return to Kosovo, regardless of legitimate fears concerning their physical safety upon return. Since the existence of Serb IDPs inside Serbia represented the failure of the regimes Kosovo policies (UNHCR/OSCE 1999b), several ministries exercised discriminatory, bureaucratic measures.18 Some Kosovo IDPs were physically hampered from entering Serbia by local authorities, while a sizable number of Roma were forcibly returned to Kosovo, on the pretext that the conditions in Kosovo had improved and they would be welcome in transit shelters upon return, which later proved untrue. The second factor was international donors unwillingness to provide aid, which jeopardised the relief situation in Serbia. In spite of the continuous appeals made by UNHCR and other relief agencies on behalf of the affected people in the entire country, the anti-Serbian attitude of major Western donors and the diplomatic isolation of Serbia kept international assistance limited, contrary to the relatively substantial international presence in Montenegro and Kosovo.19 As a consequence, the displaced population in Serbia reportedly received far less humanitarian assistance per capita than those in Kosovo (UNHCR Branch Office Belgrade 1999b). Such international policy, thirdly, strained the already dire local capacity. Even before the war, Serbia together with Montenegro had already hosted half a million refugees from BiH and Croatia from the previous Yugoslav conflicts. In addition to the economic drop by 55 percent due to international sanctions, central and southern Serbia acutely suffered infrastructure destruction caused by the NATO bombings and immediate impacts of socio-political instability20. Thus, the local population could scarcely host more IDPs.21
For example, the Kosovo IDPs were denied fuel rations, pensions, access to employment, school enrolments of pupils, and extension of the validity of expired travel documents in the Republic of Serbia. They were required to firstly deregister in Kosovo, yet no proper authority existed there for this procedure, UNHCR Branch Office Belgrade 1999. 19 The European Union, for instance, decided to lift the sanctions on Montenegro and Kosovo in late 1999 but not on the entire country. 20 However, following historical replacement of the Milosevic regime by Kostunicas democratic government in October 2000, the relationship between the Serbian government and other Western countries immediately began to improve. 21 It was estimated that the population of Serbia living under the poverty line exceeded 36 percent, and the unemployment rate reached 50 percent. USCR Special Report: Crisis in Kosovo, 23 September 1999. Also see UNHCR Information Bulletin of FRY 2000.
18

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In short, the Serbia government and people were from the outset ill-equipped to properly receive additional groups from Kosovo, owing partly to international relations. Facing the precarious reality, some IDPs had no choice but to return to Kosovo, only to find circumstances even harsher.22 In a word, they were left in limbo. Meanwhile, over fifty relief organisations were reportedly operating on behalf of IDPs in Montenegro. The combination of these push and pull factors encouraged some IDPs to move on to Montenegro.

2.2 Montenegro
Montenegro had already hosted a large number of refugees from BiH and Croatia and IDPs from Kosovo prior to June 1999 (UNHCHR 1999). The already meagre situation was further strained by the influx of an estimated 48,000 Kosovo IDPs. Although international aid in Montenegro was more available than in Serbia, needs for collective centres soon surpassed the supply.23 A large proportion of the displaced was therefore hosted in private accommodation. Moreover, the Montenegrin government increasingly reconsidered its association with Belgrade, which mounted political tension vis--vis Serbia.24 It was feared that the sudden influx of IDPs might not only strain the originally scarce resources but also exacerbate the regions political instability (Refugee International 1999).

2.3 Macedonia
The potential instability from a sudden refugee influx was similarly anticipated by the Macedonian government. From the outset, Macedonia was extremely sensitive about any effect on its delicate ethnic composition. This resulted in uncooperative border controls and produced a serious congestion of forced migrants as well as relief goods at the border crossing.25 In fact, the tripartite tensions were reportedly arising between the majority of Serb-speaking Macedonians, the minority ethnic Albanians, and fleeing Roma, as Stankovic II camp housed seThe Yugoslav Red Cross convoys of returning Kosovo Serbs arrived twice a week in Vucitrn and Srbica, but it was doubted how well such returnees had been informed about the volatile conditions in Kosovo. UNHCR/OSCE 1999a. 23 For instance, two large tented camps and make-shift shelters set up near in Konik, near Podgorica, were immediately overwhelmed by thousands of fleeing Roma from Serbia as well as from Kosovo. USCR Special Report, Crisis in Kosovo, September 1999. 24 For example, the airport of Podgorica was taken over by the Yugoslav military for a few days in the mid-December and certain trade flows were blocked between Serbia. 25 For example, a 640-DM customs inspection fee was imposed on all goods transiting the Macedonia, which brought about a serious backlog of supplies. The agreement to preclude any non-cooperation strategy was not reached until December. USCR, email newsletter, 7 December 1999.
22

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veral hundreds Roma, following the official adoption of a non-rejection policy for Roma in late July.26

2.4 Albania
Given the ethnic composition predominated by Albanians and the political and economic instability in Albania, fleeing to Albania was not a conceivable option for Serbs and Roma.27

2.5 Third Countries

Under the UNHCR/IOM Humanitarian Evacuation Programme, 91,057 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated and given a temporary protection status in third countries. However, the discussion of their repatriation was initiated immediately after the cease-fire.28 This fact and the small number of admitted evacuees, compared to hundreds of thousands of other refugees, epitomised the worry of major Western countries about additional burdens from accepting would-be refugees. Some European countries refused even to consider asylum applications of Serbs and Roma fleeing Kosovo, and in some cases, detained and deported them, in contrast to the relatively generous reception of ethnic Albanians earlier fleeing Kosovo.29 For example, the Italian government announced on July 20th, immediately after 1,200 Roma reached the border of Italy, that anyone entering the country from the former Yugoslavia without valid documents would be regarded as an illegal immigrant and forcibly returned to the country of origin (Human Rights Watch 1999a). These preliminary observations on the national, regional, and international reception of the displaced from Kosovo suggest that the situation outside Kosovo provided little incentive for Serbs and Roma to flee Kosovo. There was no pull factor outside Kosovo. According to Refugee International (1999), the majority of Serb and Roma IDPs expressed their wish to return to their home in Kosovo, should the security and shelter situation improve.30 Furthermore, one of the justifications given
The Human Rights Watch report gave some evidence for the generally low esteem held against Roma. Human Rights Watch 1999a 27 For more information on the situation of Albania, see UNHCR 2000, Section 1. 28 The first IOM flight of returnees to Kosovo from Switzerland was organised on 2 August 1999. 29 Such discriminatory treatment and unfair asylum determination procedures undermine the international refugee protection based on the principle of impartiality, and can be seen as an attempt to contain the people in the dangerous situation, Human Rights Watch 1999a. 30 Unlike many Roma elsewhere in Europe, Roma in Kosovo were said to enjoy a commonly settled lifestyle and continuous migration would not be their general preference. See Forced Migration Alert: vol. II, No.48 Kosovo. For more details concerning the change of their identity, also see Radio Free Europe 1999.
26

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for the NATO bombing of FRY was to sustain a multi-ethnic Kosovo. In light of the virtual absence of realistic options available outside Kosovo, the general preference of IDPs themselves, and the international slogan, therefore, it should have been preferable that the Serb and Roma IDPs had remained in Kosovo. In other words, their right to remain in safety and dignity should have been protected.31 Was this the case? In search of an answer, one must examine the situation inside Kosovo.

3. Assistance within Kosovo

3.1 Causality of the Displacements
A number of reports focusing on the human rights and humanitarian situation in Kosovo provided evidence for the numerous cases of atrocities inflicted on Kosovar minorities.32 The security concerns and violations of human rights resulted in restricted movement and lack of access to public services. Under such circumstances, minority groups marginalised from the local society fundamentally relied on external humanitarian aid and physical security in order to remain in Kosovo. In other words, the responsibility of assistance and protection for the endangered groups was inevitably incumbent upon the international community in the absence of a properly functioning authority. In fact, UNHCR, Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), KFOR, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and other agencies concerned made a variety of efforts to ensure security and assistance for minorities (UNHCR/OSCE 1999b). The high density of numerous international NGOs in such a tiny area was almost extraordinary.33 Some, such as Adventist Relief & Development Agency (ADRA), International Catholic Migration
31 According to Goodwin-Gill, the right to remain is conceived as sense of not having to become a refugee, not having to flee, not being displaced by force or want, together with the felt security that comes with being protected. For more debates regarding the notions of the right to remain, protection of IDPs, containment or non-entree policies, and the traditional mechanism of refugee protection by granting asylum, see Barutciski: Forced Migration Review 3: 1998: 11-14, Forced Migration Review: 1999: 29-35, and Shacknove 1993. 32 These included: intimidation, verbal and physical assaults, theft, forced evictions, death threats, arson, detention, burning of houses and other properties, abduction, beatings, disappearance, missing, attacks, shooting, harassment, rape, kidnapping, killing, murder, etc. See UNHCR/OSCE 1999b, and also Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation for Human Rights in Kosovo 1999, for numbers of such incidents. 33 According to the UNHCR Inter-Agency Coordination Unit 1999, approximately 100 NGOs were working or going to work in the field, as of July 10, 1999.

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Mission, and Italian Consortium for Solidarity (ICS), particularly focused on ethnic minorities and Extremely Vulnerable Individuals. Notwithstanding, close scrutiny will reveal some fundamental flaws in the international efforts to assist and protect the particularly endangered minority groups.

3.2 Shortcomings of the Special Distribution Network

UNHCR designed a special distribution network to channel relief aid efficiently to the needy people, using dedicated non-governmental organisations. During the initial phase, UNHCR and international NGOs delivered material aid mainly through an Albanian-run local NGO Mother Teresa Society (MTS)34 and the Yugoslav Red Cross. These two NGOs were identified as the principal local agencies for direct distribution to the affected population (USCR Country Report on Yugoslavia 1999a). From seven distribution hubs opened immediately after UNHCR resumed operations in Kosovo, international aid agencies sent relief supplies to the MTS warehouses, from which some 8000 MTS volunteers directly handed out these supplies to beneficiaries in rural villages. According to UNHCR, MTS remained the main distribution channel for both food and non-food items (UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update July 1999), managing most of the secondary distribution (UNHCR Kosovo Crisis Update June 1999) and covering almost all the villages in Kosovo (UNHCRs Programme of Assistance in Kosovo, July 1999. Emphasis added). Likewise, major international agencies emphasized the effective distribution management of the comprehensive MTS network (UNHCR Kosovo Humanitarian Update July 1999; USCR 2000). The United States Committee for Refuges (USCR), for example, reported that 76 percent of assistance distribution was carried out by MTS and 14 percent by KLA, mostly assisting Albanians. By contrast, no more than 10 percent was delivered by other NGOs, including the Yugoslav Red Cross, which mainly helped Serbs but on a non-discriminatory basis. Even this simple sketch of the excessive reliance on MTS reveals the disproportionate availabilities of relief between Albanians and other minorities. It is said that MTS offices and warehouses represented a symbol of Kosovar autonomy, with its primary beneficiaries being Kosovar Albanians (UNHCR GIS Unit 1999). Therefore, the organisations neutrality and impartiality could be naturally questionable in the eyes of non-Albanians. In fact, Serbs and Roma expressed their anxiety concerning
This local NGO is named after Mother Teresa, the Nobel laureate who was born in Skopje, Macedonia in 1910 and devoted her life to helping the poorest of the poor mainly in India. By 1998, the local network of MTS had developed dramatically, reaching as many as half million people and it became UNHCRs main distribution partner for relief aid. Although many MTS warehouses were looted and torched, and 78 out of 92 clinics were destroyed during the conflicts in 1998 and 1999, most of its aid workers returned within a matter of few weeks after the bombing, and 38 of 44 branches and 500 of 636 sub-branches resumed its operations. UNHCR: Kosovo Emergency Update, 14 July 1999; and Kosovo: One last chance, 1999: 26.
34

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real or perceived discrimination in the delivery of assistance that was predominantly run by Albanians (UNHCR/OSCE 1999a and 1999b). This is by no means to suggest that MTS was deliberately conducting exclusive operations in favour of ethnic Albanians. Yet, the unbalance in distribution management could appear discriminatory and make other minority groups anticipate a shortage of humanitarian assistance. To be sure, the local capacity should not be undermined or completely substituted in the rehabilitation phase. The predominant presence of MTS may also have been understandable in the context of raw emotion and of the virtual lack of alternative distributing mechanism and personnel in the field immediately after the severe conflict. More importantly, the root conundrum may stem from the fact that no international agency is explicitly mandated to distribute material aid to IDPs. Notwithstanding, an extreme sensitivity towards the equilibrium among local groups and a prudent process of identifying local partners should have been crucial prerequisites for maximizing and strengthening of indigenous actors, given the volatile situation in Kosovo (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999). To make matters worse, the strong inclination towards the bi-lateral channels in providing assistance undermined the coordination function of UNHCR and complicated efforts to ensure equity in the aid distribution (Morris 1999a). Coupled with the high media presence, the popular and unpopular refugee problem might have surfaced among NGOs as well (Gibney 1999: 28-30). In short, one could argue that the unbalanced distribution represented the gap in the international assistance system for IDPs within Kosovo as well as the prejudicial international attitude towards Serbs and Roma. As illustrated, while intended to increase access to material assistance and other services, the actual relief management adversely affected the entitlements for Serbs and Roma. In essence, no agency was effectively operating for assisting the minority IDPs with an explicit mandate. Real or perceived discrimination in material distribution was one of the factors precipitating the exodus of those minorities and the emergence of local mono-ethnic enclaves. Their displacement was accelerated not only by the limited humanitarian access but also by protection concerns, as discussed in the following section.

4. Protection inside Kosovo

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, on 10 June 1999, designed a gradual shift of responsibility from KFOR to UNMIK and to local institutions, in order to restore public security, law and order, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their home [in Kosovo]35. However, at no stage was this conceived process without obstacles.
35

Emphasis added by the author. See Un Document S/RES/1244.

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Before examining protection challenges, it seems helpful to clarify the notion of protection at this stage. Conceptual confusion about protection has led to some criticisms being made of UNHCRs limitations in protecting IDPs and its primary concentration on refugee repatriation.36 As the High Commissioner rearticulated, protection for UNHCR means advocating refugees rights and above all the granting of asylum to those fleeing persecution or conflict in accordance with the International Refugee Law, most notably the 1951 Convention on the Statue of Refugee.37 Therefore, physical protection of IDPs within the country of origin goes beyond its original mandate of legally protecting refugees, and UNHCR is equipped neither with policing mechanisms nor with enforcement means.38 In light of the legal mandate and of the available function of UNHCR, it is justifiable that UNHCR prioritised the protection and repatriation programmes for refugees who had fled Kosovo, rather than those who remained. As Morris (1999b) pointed out, moreover, the preparation capacity of UNHCR has been fundamentally influenced by major donor countries policies and priorities. In the context of such a high-profile conflict, particular emphasis seemed to have been put on immediate shelter and assistance programmes for popular refugees (Gibney 1999: 28-30). All things considered, it would be inconsistent and unrealistic to scape-goat UNHCR for the limitations in protecting IDPs or remainees. Protection in terms of physical integrity of internally displaced minorities was fundamentally incumbent upon the international military forces with appropriate mandates and necessary means.

4.2 Demilitarisation
As an essential provision of Resolution 1244, the demilitarisation and reintegration programme of KLA soldiers was initiated in mid-June (UNHCR Kosovo Humanitarian Update 1999).39 It was reported that KLA had been committed to
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999, for example, noted that the physical security of minorities is the most pressing protection challenge facing UNHCR at present. See also UNHCR 2000. 37 The High Commissioners lecture at the Graduate Institute for International Studies: Half a Century on the Humanitarian Frontlines, in Geneva, on 25 November, 1999, <http://www.unhcr. ch/refworld/unhcr/hcspeech/menu.htm> 38 Meanwhile, within its limited mandates and resources, some endeavours were made on behalf of remainees and IDPs, based upon its mandate of pursuing a durable solution, Security Council Resolution 724 in 1991 and 1244 in 1999. For more theoretical arguments concerning protection of IDPs, see Barutciski and McNamara in the bibliography. 39 To facilitate their decommissioning, Information, Counselling and Referral Services provided demilitarized soldiers with employment opportunities and other forms of livelihood assistance.
36

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full disarmament on 21 September 1999 (USCR 1999c). Nonetheless, it was hardly assured that all the members were disarmed, because KLA did not have any centralized command and control, or structured organisation. Although most of the crimes were committed by men in KLA uniform, many of whom represented themselves as belonging to KLA, this did not automatically mean that they were actually members of KLA acting under a certain order.40 In fact, some of the arrested persons in the uniform eventually proved to be unaffiliated with KLA (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Even if the demilitarisation of soldiers could be completed, a high possibility would remain that individuals, including Albanians, Serbs, and others, would hold back weapons and hide arms caches. The insufficient decommissioning arguably reflected the ambivalent attitude of major NATO countries. Though mandated to oversee the demilitarisation, KFOR had no effective monitoring system to implement disarmament and confiscation, and remained particularly unassertive regarding the KLAs illegal exercises.41 As a result, violent incidentscontinuously occurred, in Mitrovica area, for example.

4.3 Shortcomings of KFOR

42

Amid the deteriorating security, KFOR presence and support for protection was underlined as critical for the physical security of the intimidated minorities (UNHCR/OSCE 1999b). Despite a number of efforts taken to increase security within Kosovo,43 responses to abuses against the minority populations were fundamentally belated and uneven. In general, KFOR was severely criticised by international human rights organisations in three ways: inadequacy, lack of uniformity and expertise, and low incentives. Firstly, KFORs presence was neither adequate nor preventive for protecting the threatened minorities.44 Its performance was accused for not being assertive, proactive, comprehensive, preventive, and at best only palliative (Overseas Development Institute 1999).
KLA uniforms were reportedly available for purchase for about 50 DM through criminal networks in Albania. UNHCHR 1999. 41 The comprehensive, thorough confiscation of armament in Kosovo was not conducted until mid February 2000. 42 As of late November 1999, there were about 40-45,000 KFOR troops operating on the ground, consisting mainly of American, British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, and Russian troops, among others. 43 The examples included: registration of persons at risk, set-up of emergency telephone lines, reinforced doors to homes, installation of emergency calling devices in homes, establishment of a hotline between lead agencies and KFOR, satellite phones, special bus services in remote areas, escorting, and 24-hour guard foot patrols. 44 A number of attacks reportedly happened just after a KFOR foot patrol had passed by, or some of the houses were burned despite the KFORs static presence and 24-hour protection. UNHCR/OSCE 1999a.
40

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Secondly, it was a tremendous challenge to ensure uniformity for the mixture of different national contingents. Various interpretations of KFORs mandate, uneven application of protection standards, and differing levels of commitment, disciplines, and efficiencies were particular concerns for the multinational force. The shortage of qualified personnel with the necessary expertise further hampered effective operations. KFOR was a military power, trained in the realm of area security and demilitarization; it was not trained in personal protection, policing, or law enforcement, let alone human or minority rights protection, which were crucial for such low-intensity conflicts (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999). Standardized and appropriate briefing and training on human rights were absent. Finally, the problem was not only inability but also negligence. Some KFOR units were reportedly indifferent or unwilling to take serious initiative (Human Rights Watch 1999b). One chilling episode that illustrated the general lack of motivation was that KFOR troops were not deployed in the village at the time of killings although a request for the dispatch had already been made by intimidated Serbs prior to the incident.45 In reality, the foreign troops might legitimately place higher priority on the security concerns of their own military personnel than on the protection of endangered populations. Yet, alternative ways seem not to have been exhausted to achieve a better environment without risking multinational personnel. As a corollary, KFOR failed to build confidence for Serbs and Roma. Originally, certain national contingents were regarded by some local people as enemies (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999).46 This mistrust was not groundless, given the fact that KFOR fundamentally consisted of major NATO countries which demonised Serbs in general, intentionally or unintentionally killed Serb civilians, and destroyed non-military facilities by aerial operations.47 NATO countries lack of commitment and enthusiasm and the ambivalent relationship with the local populations, in particular Serbs and Roma, were also reflected by UNMIK.

4.4 Delays in the Development of UNMIK

Within the framework of UNMIK, several administrative attempts were made on behalf of the minority groups.48 These efforts should have been simultaneously
This killing of 14 Serb farmers in harvesting took place on July 23rd in Liplijan village It was also reported that many of the KFOR officers expressed their view that the commission of crimes since June was inevitable. Human Rights Watch 1999a. 46 For example the contingents coming from the countries leading the NATO intervention, such as American and British soldiers were mistrusted by Serbs and Roma. 47 During the aerial campaign, numerous leaflets with various messages were dropped by NATO aircraft, one of which warned; Leave your unit and your equipment and get out of Kosovo now. If you choose to stay, NATO will relentlessly attack you from every direction. Amnesty International 1999. 48 Such as the assignment of the Ad Hoc Task Forced on Minorities, chaired by the Deputy
45

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complemented by a timely and effective deployment of an international police force to reestablish law and order. On the contrary, a low level of international commitment, uncertain funding, bureaucratic delays in recruitment, and difficulties in appointing officers with appropriate skills, expertise and quality, significantly delayed the deployment. Initially, 3,100 international police personnel were requested and later expanded to 4,800. Compared to the larger number of KFOR troops, this number was far too little and obviously needed to be at least doubled if meant to be truly effective for sustaining minimal public order and security in Kosovo. Yet, the first deployment as of 9 August 1999 achieved merely 600 personnel and only one-third of the original target was achieved at the end of the year. It is alarming that the same governments, which did not hesitate to use massive high-tech military equipment and huge budgets for bombing campaigns calling for a peaceful and multi-ethnic Kosovo, seemed to have had little interest in the uncertain future of the ignored and destitute minorities. The implication of this delay and insufficiency undermined not only the operation related to UNMIK, but much more widely the notion of Collective Security, which rests at the heart of the UN.

4.5 Local Institutions

Another protection issue for UNMIK was its interaction with local institutions. For example, the justifiability of Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which was established under UNMIK and consisted of some 5000 ex-KLA leaders and members, was doubted by international agencies such as Amnesty International (Amnesty International 1999a: EUR 70/106/99). Similarly, UNMIK established the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) consisting of newly recruited and trained local people.49 The recruitment procedure reportedly faced various contentions and confusions, regarding mandates, selection criteria, background checks of applicants, and ethnic balance. According to the Overseas Development Institute (1999), out of the first batch of 181 recruits, 173 were Albanians and only 8 Serbs, although UNMIK (2000) insisted that 15 percent of the graduates be members of ethnic minorities. In addition, while UN intended to create civil police to serve the public security
Special Representative of Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, and Civil Affairs Minority Officers who resided on a permanent basis in selected villages and communities in Kosovo since mid-September. They met on a weekly basis to plan and coordinate actions to maximise the capacities of the international community in Kosovo, discussing, security strategies, enhancement of civilian policing presence and capacity, among others. UNHCR/OSCE 1999a and 1999b. 49 The structural arrangement of KPS was that a total of 4,000 officers was to be trained in the OSCR-run KPS School in Vucitrn for 33 weeks in democratic policing, human rights, law, etc, and to gradually assume law enforcement duties in the territory under the supervision of UNMIK International Police. Nearly 10,000 applications were reportedly received within a month. UNHCR Kosovo Humanitarian Update, 26 July 1999, and UNMIK 2000.

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irrespective of ethnic groups, Albanian activists tended to regard it as a National Guard. In turn, Serbs perceived the emerging force as a threat and called for a separate Serb Defence Force (Overseas Development Institute. 1999). As the international efforts were retarded, the power vacuum in the local community was quickly occupied by the KLA civil administration. Since this body was based on parallel institutions which had existed for the last decade concomitantly with the official Yugoslav government, it constantly challenged UNMIKs legitimacy (UNHCHR 1999). The well-meant spirit of UNMIK to work with the local political leaders to develop multi-ethnic institutions seemed to have been manipulated by divided local powers and appeared unfruitful. The fundamental question was the extent to which existing indigenous institutions should be respected and prioritised. In this regard, UNMIKs intention of local reconstruction efforts remained ambiguous and ambivalent. As elucidated in the arguments above, law and order, and an appropriate authority with the power to protect all inhabitants were desperately lacking in the post-conflict Kosovo. Given the insufficient access of the minorities to relief aid and the lack of minimum physical security inside Kosovo, the relocation of endangered people to ethnically pure enclaves was resorted to as a provisional solution. While the congregation of the vulnerable people may have temporarily mitigated security concerns, it contributed to minority displacement, ethnic separation, and exclusion. These enclaves reportedly accelerated the establishment of parallel systems in some areas, which postponed any effective measures against restricted movement and ethnic segregation, as exemplified by the divided town of Mitrovica. 50 Those living in rural enclaves were increasingly dependent upon the external humanitarian assistance and the expatriate security presence (UNHCR/OSCE 1999b). 51 In short, the dilemma of the establishing mono-ethnic enclaves for Serbs and Roma was the aspiration of promoting a multi-ethnic society on one hand, and ensuring the physical security of endangered minority groups on the other.

5. Analyses of the Real Causes

As seen in the previous sections, the majority of the Serbs and Roma had no choice but to unwillingly flee Kosovo, while others who dared to remain in Kosovo were increasingly excluded and implicitly or explicitly forced to move to isolated enclaves. One of the plausible explanations for these displacements alleged that re50 51

See the Economist, February 26, 2000, and Guardian, February 14, 2000, for example. One rumour had it that some recycled mines were laid around Serbian enclaves. Overseas Development Institute report 1999.

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turning ethnic Albanians desired to take revenge for atrocities committed by Serb security forces before the entry of KFOR troops in Kosovo. While not completely denying the ethnic or retaliatory implication, this paper revealed that such a view was reductionistic and overlooked the intricately intertwined mixture of external and internal factors in the wider context of international responses. Most atrocities should be understood firstly as opportunistic criminal activities and secondly as politically motivated eviction under the guise of spontaneous reprisal or ethnic animosity. And both elements were significantly influenced by the external variables of international involvement. The first important factor was crime. The absence of legitimate authority after the gross human rights violation created a condition ripe for violence and crimes. The majority of children, elderly and vulnerable persons as well as minorities reportedly became victims of random crimes without any careful targeting for reprisals per se (UNHCR/OSCE 1999a). The violence and abuses against Serbs and Roma could be regarded as part of opportunistic criminal works, masquerading in ethnic hostility, taking advantage of the security vacuum and the concomitant lack of law and order in Kosovo (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Another equally important factor was political motivation. Indeed, the Serb and Roma minorities who allegedly collaborated with the Serbian forces were the most obvious victims, but some of the moderate Kosovar Albanians who were regarded as being disloyal to KLA were increasingly under threat of KLA (Human Rights Watch 1999a; UNHCHR 1999). Similarly, other minorities such as Turks, Muslim Slavs, Bosniaks, who spoke out for reconciliation and a multi-ethnic Kosovo were also marginalised in terms of employment and social welfare.52 Although KFOR and the NATO governments publicly condemned the abuses against minorities, there was little evidence of a practical and real effort or vision to realise a tolerant and peaceful Kosovo where the minorities could live in safety and dignity. While the effective deployment of UNMIK police force and the establishment of interim civil administration were delayed, the political power struggle within the Albanian communities for the future of Kosovo emerged immediately. Even worse, the post-conflict general election to a certain degree exacerbated the growing political competition between extremists seeking ethnic independence, the KLA bloc, and moderate groups calling for multi-ethnic reconciliation, the LDK bloc. 53 For the former, forced eviction of Serbs and other opponents of the KLA might seem beneficial for achieving the independent status of Kosovo. In other words, political
A comment of the spokesman for the Kosovo office of UNHCR, quoted by Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty 1999. 53 As an integral part of the democracy building scheme, an election took place in late October 2000, under UN monitoring. As a result, the LDK bloc led by Mr. Rugova, achieved a land-slide victory, obtaining 57% votes, while the PDK led by Mr. Tachi, who used to lead the KLA, won only 27.3% of votes.
52

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cleansing of minority groups might have been used for the purpose of achieving independence. In sum, careful scrutiny of internal and external factors exposes the limitation and simplicity of the prevailing explanation of ethnic origin of retaliation. The mixed motives were crimes and politics rather than retaliation or ethnicity. And the underlying critical factors were the discriminatory nature of international intervention, the hypocritical notion of a multi-ethnic community, and the inadequacy and insufficiency of the international efforts. First, NATOs military campaign in Kosovo was officially justified by the need to put an end to ethnic cleansing and to make a multi-ethnic Kosovo. Second, Serbs and Roma were hardly able to seek a proper protection remedy outside Kosovo. Third, UNHCR was equipped neither with a legal mandate, nor with resources, nor with enforcement measures for assisting and protecting IDPs. In light of all these variables, it was not only legally and theoretically justifiable, but practically and morally imperative that the international force with the appropriate mandate and capacity should have effectively and immediately surrogated assistance and protection function for the existence and rights of the minorities (Human Rights Watch 1999a; Gibney 1999: 29).

6. Conclusion
The investigation of this paper has elucidated that the root causes for the minority displacements in the aftermath of the Kosovo bombing in 1999 were not only ethnic hostility or retaliatory ambition. More important factors included limited access to humanitarian assistance, and criminal activities and political motivation that took advantage of the absence of legitimate authority and the vacuum of law and order in post-conflict Kosovo. With respect to all factors, the nature of international commitments played a significant role as external variables; including the illegitimate military intervention, inefficient assistance cooperation and inadequate protection efforts. Therefore, it would reflect irresponsibility, inconsistency and reduction to attribute the post-conflict developments only to the alleged ethnic cleansing. Given the external causality, a considerable part of the displacements could have been prevented by more efficient and adequate international responses. Despite the international rhetoric of multi-ethnic Kosovo, local violence and tension still relentlessly continued at the time of writing. Unfortunately, it seemed extremely difficult to bring about a culture of tolerance and respect for differences after the international involvement which had exacerbated the local conflict (UNHCR/OSCE 1999a). Nonetheless, the responsibilities for protecting minority rights and nurturing co-existence were incumbent upon the international community in all forthcoming political, economic, and social rehabilitation and recon-

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struction phases. What was required were long-term serious commitments based upon the sense of responsibility, innovative ideas for elaborating confidence-building measures between the various local groups, and most importantly, a clearer vision for the future status of Kosovo, all of which the international community had yet to actualise54 . At the same time, the establishment of a theoretical and legal foundation for preventive protection of the right to remain seems to be another challenge facing humanitarian and human rights practitioners as well as academics. In this regard, a number of lessons can be drawn from the Kosovo case; such as the need for establishing a standby arrangement of qualified police personnel to be quickly deployed in emergency, elaboration of a human-rights based code of conduct for peace-keepers (Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 1999), enhancing potential and capacity of NGOs in assistance and protection of IDPs, developing counter-measure to disproportionate and excessive media coverage (OSCE/ODIHR 1999; UNHCHR 1999), and increased sensitivity for protecting remainees. The internally displaced minorities inside and outside Kosovo therefore seemed to epitomise these vacuums left in the emerging international IDP regime.

References
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1999) A Decade of Unheeded Warnings: Amnesty Internationals concerns in Kosovo, Vol. 1 (May 1989 December 1997) and Vol. 2 (January 1998 March 1999), London, Amnesty International Secretariat. BARUTCISKI, M. (1999) Western diplomacy and the Kosovo refugee crisis, Forced Migration Review, 5, August 1999, Learning from Kosovo, 8-10. BENNETT, J. (1998) Internal Displacement in Context: The Emergence of a New Politics?, 15-29, in Davies, W. (ed.) Rights have no borders, Oslo/Geneva, NRC. ______ (1998) Problems and Opportunities of Displacement,10-16, in Hampton, J. (ed.) Internally Displaced People, London, Earthscan. COHEN, R. (1998) Recent Trends in Protection and Assistance for Internally Displaced People, 3-9, in Hampton, J. (ed.) Internally Displaced People, London, Earthscan.

54 Following the swift democratisation of the Serbia government, the international climate against the independence of Kosovo was more strengthened. Although some radical activists for independence still continued their movements in and around Kosovo, the general parliamentary election of Kosovo in November 2001 paved the way for multi-ethnic Kosovo. Finally, an interim autonomous government was established in March 2002, with Mr. Rugova as President.

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COHEN, R. and DENG F.M. (eds.) (1998) Masses in Flight: The Global Crises of Internal Displacement. Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press. DENG, F.M. (1998) Flocks Without Shepherds: The International Dilemma of Internal Displacement, 1-12, in Davies, W. (ed.) Rights have no borders, Oslo/Geneva, NRC. GIBNEY, M. (1999) Kosovo and beyond: popular and unpopular refugees, Forced Migration Review 5, August 1999, Learning from Kosovo, 28-30. HELLE, D. (1998) Enhancing the Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, 31-51, in Davies, W. (ed.) Rights have no borders, Oslo/Geneva, NRC. MCNAMARA, D. (1998) UNHCRs Protection Mandate in Relation to Internally Displaced Persons, 53-63, in Davies, W. (ed.) Rights have no borders, Oslo/Geneva, NRC. MORRIS, N. (1999a) UNHCR and Kosovo: a personal view from within UNHCR, Forced Migration Review 5, August 1999, Learning from Kosovo, 14-17. ______ (1999b) Origins of a Crisis in UNHCR, Refugees: Kosovo: One Last Chance, the race against winter yet another exodus, 18-22. NEWLAND, K (1993) Ethnic Conflict and Refugees, in Brown. M.E. (ed.) Ethnic Conflict and International Security, Princeton, Princeton University Press. PLENDER, R. (1994) The Legal Basis of International Jurisdiction to Act with Regard to the Internally Displaced, International Journal of Refugee Law, 6(3): 345-361. OCHA Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement OSCE MISSION IN KOSOVO (1999) Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told, Part II, A Report on the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, June to October, 1999. SCHMEIDL, S. (1998) Comparative Trends in Forced Displacement: IDPs and Refugees, 1964-96, 24-33, in Hampton, J. (ed.) Internally Displaced People, London, Earthscan. SHACKNOVE, A. (1993) From Asylum to Containment, International Journal of Refugee Law, 5(4): 516-533. UNHCR (1999a) Refugees: Kosovo: One Last Chance, the race against winter yet another exodus, 3(116).

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LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) Kosovo: Protection and Peace-Building: Protection of Refugees, Returnees, Internally Displaced Persons, and Minorities, <http://www.lchr.org/feature/kosovo/peacebuilding.htm> (accessed January 2000). OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE (1999) Forced migration Alert, II,(48): Kosovo. <http:// www.soros.org/migrate.html> (accessed December 1999). OSCE/ODIHR (1999) Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting Roma and Sinti Issues, <http://www.osce.org/odihr/docs/shd_roma_sinti.htm> (accessed January 2000). OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE (1999) Peace-Making through Protectorate: Six months in Kosovo, <http://www.oneworld.org/odi.rrn> (accessed December 1999). RADIO FREE EUROPE/ RADIO LIBRARY (1999) The Roma of Obilic, ReliefWeb <http://www.reliefweb.int> (accessed December 1999). REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL (1999) Montenegro: Winter Threatens Displaced Roma and Serbs, <http://www.refintl.org/cgi-bin/docfinder.pl?file=091699RS.BUL.html> (accessed December 1999). UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1999) Report of the HighCommissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, <http://www. unhchr.ch/html/menu2/5/kosovo/kosovo_main.htm> (accessed December 1999). UNHCR, CDR (1996) Background Papers on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from Kosovo, <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/cdr/cdrkos.htm> (accessed July 1999). UNHCR (1999b) Kosovo Crisis Update, 14 July, 1999, <http://www.unhcr.ch/news/media/kosovo.htm> (accessed July 1999). ______ (1999c) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), <http://www. unhcr.ch/world/euro/fryugo.htm> (accessed January 2000). ______ (2000) Evaluation & Policy Analysis: The Kosovo Refugee Crisis: an Independent Evaluation of UNHCRs Emergency Preparedness and Response, <http://www.unhcr.ch/ evaluate/kosovo/toc/htm> (accessed February 2000). UNHCR/OSCE (1999a) UNHCR/OSCE Second Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ethnic_minorities/minorities4.htm> (accessed November 1999). ______ (1999b) UNHCR/OSCE Overview of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/publications/ethnic_minorities/minorities3.htm> (accessed December 2000). UNMIK (2000) The First Six Months, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/six_months/ sixmonths.html> (accessed January 2000). USCR (1999a) Worldwide Refugee Information: Country Report: Yugoslavia, <http:// www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/yugoslavia.htm> (accessed December 1999). ______ (1999b) USCR Special Report: Crisis in Kosovo 18 Oct 1999, <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryindex/yugoslavia.htm> (accessed December 1999). ______ (1999c) USCR Special Report: Crisis in Kosovo 23 Sep 1999, <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryindex/yugoslavia.htm> (accessed December 1999).

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Other Sources
BARUTCISKI, M. (1998) Tensions between the Refugee Concept and the IDP Debate. A seminar paper presented at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, 28 October 1998. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION UNIT, UNHCR, PRISTINA (1999) Kosovo Humanitarian Update, Weekly Issues, No.5, obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 26 July 1999. UNHCR (1999d) Concept Paper on a Proposed Framework for Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons to Kosovo (12 May 1999), obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 26 July 1999. UNHCR BRANCH OFFICE BELGRADE (1999a) Note on IDPs in the federal Republic of Yugoslavia (excluding Kosovo) (13 July 1999), obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 26 July 1999. ______ (1999b) Note on IDPs in the federal Republic of Yugoslavia (excluding Kosovo) (20 July 1999), obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 20 July 1999. UNHCR GIS UNIT, PRISTINA (1999) Rapid Village Assessment, Coverage at 6 July, 1999, obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 20 July 1999. UNHCR/OSCE (1999c) Preliminary Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 26 July 1999. UNHCR PUBLIC INFORMATION SECTION (1999a) Kosovo Emergency Update, UNHCR, obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 14 July 1999. ______ (1999b) Kosovo Emergency Update, UNHCR, obtained in a briefing meeting held by UNHCR in Geneva on 20 July 1999.

Unique Movements in the Caucasus: The Soviet Legacy in Current Migration Crises
Sarah Cross

1. Introduction
In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union over a decade ago, population movements erupted on a scale not witnessed there since the end of World War II. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that during this period, unnoticed by much of the world (UNHCR 1994), up to nine million people were on the move throughout the former Soviet Republics (UNHCR 2001: 185). As formerly internal boundaries took on international significance with newly declared independence, those residing outside their titular republic found themselves suddenly displaced, and subsequent border crossings abruptly rendered migrants refugees. UNHCR, the lead UN agency in the region, declared the movements perhaps the largest, most complex, and potentially most destabilizing to have taken place in any single region of the world since the end of World War II (UNHCR 1996b). While many of the movements underway reflected economic motives and repatriation back to ones native homeland (which, in many cases, was to a home never even seen), this paper will focus instead on the significant movement due to massive population displacement brought about by ethnic and secessionist conflict in the quest for nation-statehood. Nowhere did this post-Soviet transition unleash such violent strife, and consequently, such displacement, as in the Caucasus region (UNHCR 1996a). In particular, the separate, ongoing conflicts in two regions of the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have produced an unparalleled number of internally displaced people (IDPs) and presented the world with the uniquely challenging problem of addressing internal population flows on multiple fronts within a single state boundary. As UNHCR Representative Ekber Menemencioglu observed in 1999, Georgia is perhaps the only country in the world in which the organization is involved in two simultaneous but separate crises (UNHCR 1999). In this ethnically diverse region containing Europes richest patchwork of peoples, languages and cultures (Hewitt 1995: 48), competing interests in the nation-building process have given way to a protracted emergency in which there appears to be no immediate political resolution, and accordingly, no foreseeable prospect

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of return to these conflicted regions for the countless forced migrants in Georgia proper (Deng 2001). The intractability of this situation stems considerably from its deep historical roots in the Soviet ethnic engineering projects of the 1930s and 1940s that forcibly transferred peoples for political purposes, which I intend to explore in this paper. As we shall see, this Soviet scheme profoundly affected the Abkhaz and Osset minorities within their own regions of Georgia; in the former case it did so by demographically manipulating the population in order to create an ethnic Georgian majority in the region, and in the latter case by keeping the South Ossetians of Georgia geographically separated from their ethnic kinsmen across the arbitrarily drawn border with Russia. These Soviet-era deeds, I shall argue, served as an ominous precursor to todays migratory crisis. In the next several pages we shall examine how this Soviet precedent of forced migration and arguably in some cases, ethnic cleansing, proved to be only the introductory phase of the involuntary movements taking place in Georgia today. The immediate problem of returning home the substantial number of involuntary migrants, comprised primarily of ethnic Georgians forced out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, is now predicated on the capacity of competing authorities to develop political settlements that would provide the requisite security to facilitate this return. As I intend to demonstrate, these efforts are impeded to varying degrees by the tenacious legacy of Soviet migration policy, the peculiarities of which have critical, albeit under-explored and under-appreciated, significance in addressing the issue of forced migration in Georgia today.

2. The Current Situation

In order to understand the repercussions of Soviet ethnic manipulation in todays forced migratory flows, we shall first consider the current situation within Georgia, a country of almost five million people that has now seen its status as one of the most prosperous Soviet-era republics disintegrate in a maelstrom of ethnic violence and economic destitution. After looking at the conditions on the ground in each of these two conflict regions, we shall go on to identify Soviet inheritances that currently complicate the situation there. In the following section, we shall turn our attention back to the forced migration precedents set by Soviet policy and examine how this legacy obstructs the process of returning displaced populations to their original homes.

2.1 Abkhazia
Shortly after Georgia declared its independence in 1991, Abkhazia, an autonomous region in the northwest corner of Georgia, reinstated its 1925 constitution

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on 23 July 1992. This constitution, which defined Abkhazia as a Soviet Republic with the right to secede and equal status to Georgia as a treaty partner in the Transcaucasian Federation, had been in effect until 1931.55 The Abkhaz move not only expressed a desire on their part for constitutional standing lost through Georgian annulment of all Soviet legislation (Hewitt 1995: 61), but moreover it reflected a growing concern of minorities throughout Georgia over their fate in an increasingly nationalistic new state (Toft 2002: 133). The nationalistic trend culminated in the rise to power of Georgias first noncommunist leader, Gamsakhurdia, in the states first democratic elections on 28 October 1990. His rallying cry of Georgia for the Georgians produced panic among Georgias minorities (Cohen and Deng 1998: 288), including the Abkhazians, who constituted only 17.8% of the total population of Abkhazia at that time (Goldenberg 1994: 102). Gamsakhurdias jingoism intensified Abkhaz feelings of vulnerability and, as we shall come to understand, served as bitter reminders of the threat of Georgian ethnic domination56 . Invoking their 1925 constitution seemed to the Abkhaz a precautionary measure against encroaching Georgian nationalism. Upon the reinstatement of the Abkhazian constitution, Georgia responded militarily. Armed hostilities ensued between 1992-3, with both sides committing violent atrocities (Hansen 1999). With the retreat of Georgia out of Abkhazia, the latter had gained de facto independence, but by no means peace. Further fighting has erupted intermittently, such as in early 1998, and again in September 2001 when Chechen and ethnic Georgian guerrillas launched attacks upon separatist strongholds in Abkhazia (Radio Free Europe 2001). Most recently, a group of Georgian policemen were killed in a district neighbouring Abkhazia by an armed band (Itar-Tass 2004). Despite the uneasy ceasefire currently in place, there is no immediate prospect of political resolution despite 28 UN Security Council resolutions toward that end that could bolster the regions precarious calm and enable the return of those displaced (Reuters 2004; Deng 2001). As a result of the ongoing armed hostilities, up to 350,000 of Abkhazias estimated population of 525,000 fled the region (UNHCR 1994). Of those, roughly 270,000 57 were ethnic Georgians, who had constituted the largest single group in pre-war Abkhazia (comprising 47% of the population of Abkhazia). While they sought refuge in Georgia proper, others left for the Russian Federation, Armenia,
At this point, Stalin relegated Abkhazias status to that of an Autonomous Republic within Georgia, which has been their status since then. 56 In December 1991 Gamsakhurdia was ousted from power and Eduard Shevardnadze succeeded him at the request of the Military Council in March 1992. In late 2003, Shevardnadze was ousted from power by a peaceful revolt, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, who later won a landslide electoral victory. 57 Although figures do vary according to the source, there is surprising consistency to this estimate across sources.
55

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Greece and other countries (UNHCR 1994), as Abkhaz militias levelled more than 1,500 homes and schools in a frenzy of ethnic cleansing (UNHCR 1999). Most of the displaced Abkhaz, however, remained within the region, though often unable to return to their homes due to destruction of living space or potential violence (Dale 2001). Entire areas of Abkhazia are said to be depopulated, and the region lingers in a kind of social, economic and political limbo, surviving on subsistence agriculture and in temporary housing, rather than undergoing meaningful reconstruction (Norwegian Refugee Council 2002). Meanwhile, ethnic Georgian IDPs have been living in collective centres and with host families, conditioned to believe in the false notion that their return home is imminent (Kharashvili 2001: 11). Despite the lack of UNHCR guarantees on the safety of return, approximately 50,000 of those initially displaced in 1992-93 independently made their way back to their homes in the Gali region which, as the Abhazian buffer zone bordering Georgia, has become the most dangerous faultline in the country (UNHCR 1999). Renewed fighting in 1998 forced some 40,000 of them back out, causing the UNHCR to withhold any further aid to returnees until a permanent peace has been concluded (UNHCR 1999). Because those fleeing have sought refuge in Georgia proper and not crossed any international boundaries, they are considered IDPs. As such, they are unprotected by the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, though in December 1993 UNHCRs assistance mandate was extended to Georgias IDPs. Ninety-six percent of Georgias IDPs are displaced from Abkhazia (NRC 2001), and the crucial issue of return of this population, as we shall see, has brought deadlock to Georgian and Abkhazian authorities attempts to reach a mutually satisfactory permanent settlement (Helton and Veronina 2000: 108). After seventy years of tightly controlled movement, this sudden and overwhelming appearance of involuntary migrants in the post-Soviet era has posed unfamiliar challenges to the unprepared successor states (McCarthy and Vernez 1996), Georgia foremost among them.

2.2 South Ossetia

In the northeastern region of South Ossetia, a similar political impasse regarding desired autonomy inhibits the resolution of another migratory crisis within Georgia. Just before Abkhazia reinstated its constitution, South Ossetia declared autonomy in November 1989. Georgia promptly responded by stripping South Ossetia of its semi-autonomous status and using force to subdue the separatists. Although currently less violence afflicts this area, and the claims to autonomy it advances are less threatening to Georgias interests, settlement of the dispute to date has proven equally elusive. Unlike Abkhazia, South Ossetia never achieved full union republic status, but was instead a semi-autonomous oblast. While not subject as much to the Soviet-era demographic manipulation that rendered the Abkhaz a minority in their own republic, South Ossetia endured a different type of manipulation: an institutional

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and geographic kind that resulted in their separation from North Ossetia, which lay on the other side of the artificial boundary in Russia. In what UNHCR called a crazy mosaic of movement (UNHCR 1999), more than 70,000 civilians were displaced in all directions as a result of the Georgian-South Ossetian conflict. Approximately 50,000 South Ossetians joined their ethnic kinsmen in North Ossetia, effectively becoming refugees within the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, a massive population exchange took place, wherein 23,000 ethnic Georgians fled South Ossetia to Georgia proper and roughly equivalent numbers of ethnic Ossets left Georgia proper for South Ossetia. These Ossets, who had been minorities in their Georgian towns, were compelled to move from non-conflict zones in Georgia to the conflict zone of South Ossetia to rejoin their kinsmen. Another 5,000 people found themselves displaced within South Ossetia itself (Olson 1999). Although the violence is now largely dormant, a great risk of renewed fighting there persists. Despite positive discussions, no decisions have yet been translated into political arrangements (UNHCR 2000b: 338) and the territorial status remains disputed. UNHCR estimates that just over 6,000 of the original 50,000 displaced people have returned since 1997 to their homes in South Ossetia, while some 29,000 remain across the border in North Ossetia (UNHCR 2000b: 357), apparently reluctant to return before peace is officially concluded (UNHCR 2000b: 359). Together with Abkhazia, these regions are plagued by their Soviet inheritance of institutional mechanisms of asymmetric federalism and autonomy arrangements (Hughes and Sasse 2002: 25). In the Osset case, this special administrative arrangement resulted from the drawing of a divisive line through Ossetia and the Soviet bolstering of Ossetian national consciousness there. This elevated status privileged the titular nations of these autonomies and thus gave them institutional resources as well as legitimacy as nations (Toft 2002: 131), which today they are understandably reluctant to relinquish in favour of further integration into the Georgian nation. In both cases, the institutional legacy of the Soviet era, according to which relative degrees of autonomy provided power structures around which these minority populations coalesced to challenge perceived Georgian hegemony, has also contributed to the current political stalemate that precludes return. It is with this legacy that the competing factions must come to grips in order to realize the peace and stability in the region that will alleviate the migratory crisis.

2.3 Soviet Inheritances which Complicate the Current Migratory Crisis

Many outcomes of Soviet influence on movement in the region render the former republic exceptionally ill-prepared to manage the overwhelming and complex migration flows in the wake of the Soviet Unions dissolution. Although the detailed attention they deserve is beyond the immediate scope of this paper, they warrant some mention here. As the UNHCR reported in their 2001 report, After decades of pervasive regimentation at home and tight controls over external con-

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tacts, the Soviet Union was not in a position to deal with [] the large-scale displacement generated by ethnic conflicts on its territory (UNHCR 2000a: 188). The fact that this part of the world had been closed for 70 years puts everyone involved at an immediate disadvantage, as foreign aid agencies struggle to gain an understanding of an area formerly off-limits and entirely unknown to them. Meanwhile, on the part of the local population, lack of exposure to international aid agencies and, moreover, a legacy of deep suspicion of them, had to be overcome in order for progress to be made. The UNHCR describes the former position of the Soviet Union to their organization as hostile (UNHCR 2000a: 186), as the communist state regarded the UN organization suspiciously as an instrument of the Cold War (UNHCR 2000a: 188). These factors, along with the daunting (UNHCR 2000a: 188) nature of the scale and complexity of the displacement problems, (UNHCR 2000a: 188) and the fact that the displaced persons, as IDPs, did not fall within UNHCR mandate, originally inclined the refugee organization to resist involvement. Unfamiliarity with the nations diverse population and terrain has persistently encumbered the process of structuring an appropriate response. Meanwhile, Georgia itself has no experience with any sort of indigenous nongovernmental organizations that cater to community needs. There is little concept of working together for common purposes and no tradition of volunteerism (Radio Free Europe, 2 Aug 1999) and in fact, the Soviet legacy was one of hostility to independent associations with political and social agendas (RFE 1999). Absent this tradition of its own as well as any experience working with the international community to manage forced migration, post-Soviet Georgia poses extraordinary challenges to the West in its efforts to mediate the migratory effects of the Soviet legacy.

3. Historical Roots to the Conflict

Perhaps one of the greatest hindrances to dealing with the migratory crisis in Georgia is the general failure of the West and its humanitarian workers in the region to consider the deep historical roots of forced migration in the Caucasus. To the relatively recent arrivals, the violence and forced migration in the area appear to be simply a natural, albeit alarming, by-product of nation-state formation. Admittedly, it is indeed true that much of the migratory crisis, a phenomenon common to many states in formation, in Georgia also is due simply to its nation-building efforts during post-Soviet transition. However, in overlooking its particular Soviet roots, the international community has largely ignored the fact that the forced migration out of Abkhazia in the post-Soviet era is a result of forced migration into Abkhazia throughout the Soviet era, as this section will demonstrate. It will further show that the current forced migration out of South Ossetia today results from its move

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toward the unification with North Ossetia which was denied them 80 years ago by the nascent Soviet state. That is to say, what is taking place now in these regions of Georgia is in fact a backlash against what was done under communism; it is, at least in the minds of the separatists, an undoing of past wrongs, a sort of historical justice. Sadly, this process inherently involves a new, violent commitment of further wrongs in its course to sort out the past. In this section I will look at how the Soviet policy of the transfer, mixing, and dividing of peoples in the Caucasus uniquely predisposed this area to migratory turbulence in communisms wake. Because Soviet policy affected each region differentially, I will look at its effects on the respective regions each in turn.

3.1 Abkhazia
Both Abkhaz and Georgian officials declare themselves the victim of ethnic cleansing. For their part, Abkhaz perceived a Georgian threat of personal violence directed at them by virtue of their ethnicity, pointing to cases of Georgians either burning down or occupying Abkhaz homes, and even to instances of physical threat, torture and murder targeting Abkhaz civilians (Dale 2001). As the Global IDP project reports, All of these practices certainly constitute ethnically directed violence, even if it was not centralized and coordinated, and the belief that such violence took place is widespread among Abkhaz. Much Abkhaz migration during the 1992-1993 war can be attributed to fear of ethnic violence and at least some post-war migration is attributable to intentional destruction of Abkhaz homes (Dale 2001). The Georgians counter these charges with similar claims, pointing to incidents of violence and destruction or appropriation of property directed at them because of their Georgian ethnicity. The belief that they were forcibly expelled from the region on ethnic grounds is pervasive, and they articulate their experience in such terms as ethnic cleansing and genocide (Dale 2001). However, this grim phenomenon is nothing new to the Caucasus. As Hewitt asserts, the greatest ethnic cleanser of all was Joseph Stalin, who first began his experiments in radical demographic surgery in the 1930s and 1940s (Hewitt 1995: 50) and under whom tens of millions of people were uprooted (UNHCR 2000a: 186). In addition to ordering innumerable summary executions and exile of individuals, and the deportation of entire nations en masse, most notably in this region the Meskhetian Turks58 , Stalin undertook as his special project the ethnic manipulation of populations for a multitude of purposes, primarily involving political control and economic development.

58 It is said that between 1943-44 Stalin deported to the far east eight entire nations purported to be disloyal to the Soviet Union, among whom were approximately 200,000 Meskhetian Turks from the southern Georgian region of Javakh (UNHCR 1996c).

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The primary objective of his migration policy in Georgia was to Georgianize the republic, which involved closing Abkhaz language schools, changing place names, banning the teaching of Abkhaz history and conferring a privileged status upon ethnic Georgians in education and government posts (Coppieters 1999). Justifying the forced assimilation demanded by this policy, Stalin himself wrote, The national problem in the Caucasus can be solved only by drawing the backward nations and peoples into the common stream of a higher culture (Stalin 1913; 48-49) his native Georgian culture presumably the one he had in mind. Throughout the communist years, then, this multi-ethnic population was the target of vacillating nationalities policies that assigned access to power and resources in accordance with official nationality (Dale 2001). As the bearers of this official nationality, Georgians were systematically moved into Abkhazia from the late 1920s onward. This demographic manipulation for the first time linked ethnicity, territory and administration which inherently strengthened national identity (Goldenberg 1994: 41). Moreover, it solidified the idea of nationality being intrinsically tied to competition for advantage. The political success of this system is evident in its containment of ethnic nationalism under Stalin, which largely depended upon the institutional arrangements that produced societal segmentation along the lines of nationality and social class (Zaslavsky 1993: 35). Although under Khrushchev, a policy of indigenisation officially removed most of the anti-Abkhazian measures and actually sought to encourage local Abkhaz culture, in reality the Abkhaz enjoyed only nominal autonomy and assumed only token posts (Hewitt 1995: 58). Moreover, as we are about to see, in demographic terms, the real damage was already done. Citing secret police files released in 1992 (Hewitt 1995: 56), Hewitt contends that that four peoples neighbouring Abkhazia (Georgians, Mingrelians, Svans and Laz, who are all Kartvelian peoples) were consolidated under the nomenclature Georgian for census purposes. As Georgians, they were forced to move into the region, often trucked in and dumped with nowhere to live (Hewitt 1995: 56). This ruthless drive to Georgianize the region manifested itself in a deliberate attempt to swamp the Abkhazians in their homeland (Hewitt 1995: 56). Indeed, a look at the figures does in fact seem to verify Hewitts charge. In 1926, there was a relative balance in the region, with Abkhaz constituting 55,918 of the population, while 67, 494 were, collectively, Kartvelians (officially called Georgians). The number of Georgians rose dramatically over the years, while the Abkhazian population remained relatively stable; by 1970 Abkhazians totalled 77,276 while Kartvelians numbered just under 200,000 (Coppieters 1999). As a proportion of the total population of Abkhazia, in fact, the Abkhaz population actually decreased between 1926 and 1979. (MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield 1996: 9) As the last Soviet census in 1989 attests, by the time the Soviet Union collapsed, the Abkhaz, constituting only 17.8% of the population, had found themselves the casualties of a radically shifted ethnic balance.

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Considering these figures, it comes as no surprise that Abkhazians perceive a threat to the preservation of their ethnic identity within their own territory. It is precisely for this reason that Abkhaz authorities appear reluctant to accept back into their territory substantial numbers of those displaced ethnic Georgians currently living as IDPs within Georgia proper. To do so, they believe, would be to subject themselves once more to demographic domination by Georgians, who are not indigenous to the region, but rather the beneficiaries of an orchestrated resettlement. Therefore, despite professing willingness to welcome back returnees, Abkhaz authorities have in fact placed severe restrictions on their admittance. Among those forbidden to return is anyone who may have fought in or supported Georgia throughout the war (Hansen 1999; Kvarchelia 1999). Furthermore, the return is to be overseen by those same Abkhaz authorities that enacted their expulsion, and the process of reviewing and accepting applications for return has proven painstakingly slow and ineffective (Kozhokin 1996). With the persistent memory of Soviet-era subjugation and this fear of being outnumbered once more, the Abkhaz have little incentive to accept back ethnic Georgians, which would spell doom for Abkhaz leadership and autonomy in any sort of democratic political solution (Nodia 1999). For this reason, as a prerequisite for return, Abkhaz authorities insist upon political resolution one that ideally would incorporate qualifications that create social and political security for the Abkhaz in a jurisdiction in which they are no longer a majority. For the Georgian authorities, who see an ethnic majority there as imperative to bringing Abkhazia into line with Georgian nation-building, this type of agreement is unacceptable. They rebuke Abkhaz stipulations and insist instead upon the unconditional return of displaced persons to the places of original residence in Abkhazia (Helton and Voronina 2000: 111). Increasingly, the Georgian position seeks to tie economic rehabilitation with repatriation as incentive for Abkhazian compliance (Pravda 2003), but the Abkhazian leader, Vladislav Ardzinba, remains firm, declaring continued determination for defending the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Abkhazia (Itar-Tass 2004). The unyielding positions of these two parties undercut any attempt to seek political resolution to the conflict that has caused such ongoing displacement of such astonishing scale and complexity (UNHCR 1996b). It seems that the prolonged displacement this stalemate has brought about today is the unmistakable revenge of the past.

3.2 South Ossetia

The same could be said of the stalemate in the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict, in which there are similarly bleak prospects for political compromise that would assuage the displacement. Although the Ossets, like the Abkhaz, are a minority group constituting only a small percentage of the total Georgian population, their situation differs from the Abkhaz in that they were never so radically outnumbered

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in their own region as the Abkhaz. According to the 1989 census, Ossets made up approximately two thirds of their region, so the Ossets outnumbered the Abkhazians both in real numbers (175,000 Ossets, 93,000 Abkhaz) as well as in the percentage of their population within their own region. For this reason, it is fair to say that in South Ossetia, ethnic animosity does not pose the same kind of obstacle as it does in the demographically manipulated Abkhazia. Rather, the Osset grievance is aimed at a Soviet-era manipulation of a different sort: that of reinforcing imposed boundaries dividing Osset kinsmen between the Russian and Georgian republics. In 1922, a South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was carved out of Georgia (NUPI 2002), with a corresponding North Ossetian region created in Russia in 1924, upon the splitting up of the failed Republic of Transcaucasia, of which both were a part (Toft 2002: 131). After an unsuccessful petition to Stalin for unification within the Russian Republic in 1925, North and South Ossetias geographic division was perpetuated throughout the Soviet era (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI 2002). Many scholars have speculated that Moscows disproportional support of South Ossetian culture within Georgia over North Ossetian culture in its own republic was designed to undermine ethnic cohesion within Georgia (Tishkov 1997: 35-6). To this day Georgians still harbour resentment toward South Ossetia for its desired break from Georgia (Toft 1995:131). The line that was drawn separated the Ossets in geography but not necessarily in ethnic affinity or group consciousness, and consequently, upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, many Ossets favoured reunification with their Northern counterparts. In fact, South Ossetian sympathies with their kinsmen within the Russian federation had long been a source of umbrage among the Georgians, who resented their traditionally pro-Russian stance (UNHCR 2000a: 195). On the whole, however, the Osset position simply favoured a greater degree of autonomy within Georgia, which represents a more benign threat than that posed by the Abkhaz. Because of this less severe threat and the relatively milder animosity between the Ossets and the Georgians, at least some discussion has been underway in an attempt to negotiate reconciliation. Unlike in Abkhazia, political settlement has not been made a precondition for economic and humanitarian programmes, which have received international assistance toward demilitarisation, refugee return, trade and reconstruction (Olson 1999). Nonetheless, like the Abkhaz situation, there has been little breakthrough toward settlement, and the forced migration emergency continues. The seemingly intractable nature of the Osset conflict, like that of the Abkhaz, stems largely from the insecurity the minority population continues to feel in the midst of escalating Georgian nationalism. Georgian efforts at integrating South Ossetia since December 1990, through media suppression, demonstration bans and Georgian language requirements, have fostered acrimony between the groups and have intensified South Ossetian secessionist impulses (NUPI 2002; The Caucasus Foundation 2002). Interestingly, despite their status as a relatively insignificant minority within Georgia, the Ossets, like the Abkhaz, were able to mount a serious

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challenge to Georgian nationalism. This outcome is due again to the Soviet legacy: the institutional inheritance of these regions with respect to some degree of institutional autonomy during the Soviet-era (Hughes and Sasse 2002: 24-25). To their advantage, the Ossets and Abkhaz possessed autonomous political institutions and well-entrenched autonomous political and intellectual elites threatened by Georgian nationalist assertion. This created incentives and structures with which to challenge Georgian hegemony (MacFarlane, Minear and Shenfield 1996: 15). Regardless of this tactical advantage, however, the uncertainty that pervades the Osset and Abkhaz minorities alike are likely to continue to be a prohibitive factor in reaching political settlement, and it is therefore imperative to seek a process of IDP return that addresses these critical minority concerns.

4. Conclusion
Although critical to any comprehensive study of the region, a proposal of a viable solution to this internal displacement is beyond the scope of this paper, and indeed, appears to be beyond the capacity of most of the parties involved, at least for now. It is clear, though, that the renewed commitment to the negotiation process (which will continue with talks in Geneva in February 2004) is vital to ensure the return of countless displaced persons and hence, to the stability of the state. With the recent emergence of this region in the international spotlight, due to its oil reserves and the recent arrival of the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign on its soil, it is clear that the West can no longer afford to ignore the region and its historical legacy discussed here. The tensions arising from a repressive Soviet policy that manipulated demography and geography for political purposes, along with the Soviet institutional inheritance that enabled minority insurgency, profoundly impede efforts to resolve the sustained conflicts and facilitate return of displaced populations. This situation is further complicated by a myriad of other problems that regularly accompany decolonisation, such as a collapse in infrastructure and its corresponding breakdown in trade and industry, poverty, unemployment, inflation and shortages. These issues warrant consideration in their own right regarding their effect on the current forced migration in Georgia; without it any understanding would be only a partial account of what is taking place. Another undeniable obstacle to IDP return worthy of consideration is the psychological impact of the violent conflicts on the local communities and the mutual distrust it has engendered among the neighbouring ethnic groups who question whether they can ever again live side by side (Dale 1997). While all these issues merit attention, however, we must not overlook the critical implications of the past in our efforts to seek future resolution. For the most part, the West has tended to ignore the fact that the regions unique experience

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of Soviet migratory policies over the last seventy years is largely responsible for the intractable nature of todays conflicts that have produced such large-scale, prolonged displacement. While the international community overlooks this legacy, for those involved in the conflict themselves, its effects are very real. The memories of past injustices perceived by the Abkhaz and Osset populations within Georgia have played a vital role in perpetuating conflict. As insecure minorities in a nationalistic state, their desire to protect their territory and identity clash with Georgias pursuit of the territorial integrity of a unified state. Faced with firm international recognition of Georgias claims to territorial integrity59, the Abkhaz fear that self-determination will no longer be possible in a democratic state in which they once again became a marginalized minority. To allow return of the ethnic Georgian IDPs, Hewitt argues, would permit the Tbilisi authorities to win their decades-old aim of artificially swamping the Abkhazians on their native soil, by people they deliberately misidentify as Georgians for the sole purpose of arguing that the territory occupied by Georgians properly belongs to Georgia (Hewitt 1995: 68). The first episode of this swamping created a grievance that was ultimately expressed in the recent removal of the ethnic Georgians, resulting in a double victimization, wherein people became pawns to political logic. Meanwhile, South Ossetians struggle with boundaries arbitrarily drawn in the past by a defunct regime in a country that ceases to exist but that the international community nonetheless continues to recognize as legitimate. The displacement from South Ossetia today stems in large part from the institutional division of the Osset people throughout several decades of Soviet rule. As long as these deep historical roots to the conflict continue to play themselves out in ways unacknowledged by the international community, there is little hope of reaching a settlement that would address the security needs of the minority populations involved, thereby facilitating the return of the masses of people displaced by the conflict.

References
ARIEFF, I. (2004) Georgia optimistic on Geneva talks on Abkhazia, Reuters, January 28. BBC NEWS (2004) Georgia swears in new president, January 25, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/ go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/3426977.stm> (accessed February 2004). CAUCASUS FOUNDATION (2002) Caucasus Today, <http://www.kafkas.org.tr/english/ BGKAFKAS/bukaf_gosetya.html> (accessed February 2002).
59 These claims were most recently reiterated by the new president, Mikhail Saakashvili, upon his inauguration in January 2004. At that time he vowed, Georgia will unite, Georgia will become strong, and will restore its integrity. (BBC News 2004)

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COHEN, R. and DENG, F. (1998) The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institute. CONCILIATION RESOURCES (2002) Perspectives on the Abkhaz conflict, <http://www. c-r.org/menu.htm> (accessed February 2002). COPPIETERS, B. (1999) The Roots of the Conflict, in Cohen, J. (ed.) A question of sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process. Published by Conciliation Resources in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, <http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/roots.shtml (accessed February 2004). DALE, C. (1997) The Dynamics and Challenges of Ethnic Cleansing: The Georgia-Abkhazia Case, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 16(3): 77-109, <http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/ country/writenet/wrigeo.htm> (accessed February 2002 and February 2004). DENG, F. (2001) Report of the Secretary-General on internally displaced persons. Submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution 2000/53: 24. GOLDENBERG, S. (1994) The Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder, London, Zed Books, Ltd. HANSEN, G. (1999) Displacement and return, in Cohen, J. (ed.) A question of sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process. Published by Conciliation Resources in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, <http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/displace.shtml> (accessed February 2004). HELTON, A. and VERONINA, N. (2000) Forced Displacement and Human Security in the Former Soviet Union: Law and Policy, Transnational Publishers. HEWITT, B.G. (1995) Demographic Manipulation in the Caucasus (with Special Reference to Georgia), Journal of Refugee Studies, 8(1): 48-74. HUGHES, J. and SASSE, G. (2002) Comparing Regional and Ethnic Conflicts in Post-Soviet Transition States, 1-35 in Hughes, J. and Sasse, G. (eds) Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, London, Frank Cass Publishers. ITAR-TASS (2004) UN Security Council discusses situation in Abkhazia, January 28, <http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/prnt.html?NewsID=359597> (accessed February 2004). ITAR-TASS (2004) Four Georgian policemen killed in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict area, January 27, <http://www.itar-tass.com/eng/prnt.html?NewsID=353204> (accessed February 2004). KHARASHVILI, J. (2001) Internal displacement in Georgia: a personal perspective Report of a seminar held in Oslo, Norway, 9 November 2001 organized by the Norwegian Refugee Council in cooperation with the Norwegian University of Technology and Science. KARANIAN, M. (2001) Georgias Forced Migrants. Georgetown University, (unpublished). KOZHOKIN, E. (1996) Georgia-Abkhazia, in Azrael, J. and Payin, E. (eds.) U.S. and Russian Policymaking with Respect to the Use of Force, Santa Monica, RAND CF-129-CRES, <http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129/CF-129.chapter5.html> (accessed February 2004). KVARCHELIA, L. (1999) An Abkhaz perspective, in Cohen, J. (ed) A question of sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process (online). Published by Conciliation Resources

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in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, <http://www.c-r.org/accord/georab/accord7/abkhaz.shtml/> (accessed February 2004). LOESHER, G. (1993). Forced Migration within and From the Former USSR: The Policy Challenges Ahead. Santa Monica, RAND. Prepared for The Ford Foundation. MACFARLANE, N., MINEAR, L. and SHENFIELD, S. (1996) Armed Conflict in Georgia: A Case Study in Humanitarian Action and Peacekeeping, Providence, The Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. MCCARTHY, K. and VERNEZ, G. (1996) Introduction and Overview, in Azrael, J., Payin, E., McCarthy, K. and Vernez, G. (eds.) Cooperation and Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Implications for Migration, Conference Report: RAND, CF-130-CRES, Santa Monica, California. NODIA, G. (1999) Georgian perspectives, in Cohen, J. (ed.) A question of sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process (online). Published by Conciliation Resources in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, <http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/ georgian.shtml> (accessed February 2004). NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS/CENTRE FOR RUSSIAN STUDIES DATABASE, <http://www.nupi.no/russland/database/start.htm> (accessed February 2002). NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL (2002) Global IDP Database, <http://www. db.idpproject.org/Sites/idpSurvey.nsf/wCountries/Georgia> (accessed February 2002, February 2004). OLSON, L. (1999) The South Ossetia Case, in Cohen, J. (ed.) A question of sovereignty: The Georgia-Abkhazia peace process. Published by Conciliation Resources in Accord: An International Review of Peace Initiatives, < http://www.c-r.org/accord/geor-ab/accord7/ sthosstia.shtml> (accessed February 2004). PARTRIDGE, B. (1999) Caucasus/Central Asia: Report Calls Western Approach Too Arrogant, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty August 2. PRAVDA (2004) Tbilisi Accepts Moscows Formula for Refugee Return to Abkhazia, March 10, <http://english.pravda.ru/cis/2003/03/10/44203.html> (accessed February 2004). RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (2001) Caucasus Conflicts Eclipsed by World Focus on Afghanistan, October 26. TISHKOV, V. (1997) Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in and after the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame, London, Sage Publications. TOFT, M. (2002) Multinationality, Regions and State-Building: The Failed Transition in Georgia, 123-142 in Hughes, S. and Sasse, G. (eds.) Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, London, Frank Cass Publishers. UNHCR (1994) Conflict in the Caucasus, Refugees Magazine December 1. ______ (1996a) Conflicts in the Caucasus, Refugees Magazine May 1. ______ (1996b)Forced to move by war or circumstance, Refugees Magazine May 1. ______ (1999) Georgia: A Particularly Complex Problem, Refugees Magazine December 1.

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______ (1996c) Punished peoples: the mass deportations of the 1940s, Refugees Magazine May 1. ______ (2000a) The State of the Worlds Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 185-209. ______ (2000b) UNHCR Global Report 2000, <http://www.unhcr.ch/> (accessed February 2002, February 2004). WESSELINK, E.G. (1992) Minorities in the Republic of Georgia, A Pax Christi Netherlands Report, Brussels, September. ZASLAVSKY, V. (1993) Success and collapse: traditional Soviet nationality policy, 29-41 in Bremmer, I. and Taras, R. (eds.) Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

The Failure of the Postcolonial State and the Generation of Ethnic Conflict in Africa: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Mulenga Nkula

1. Introduction
This paper attempts to analyse some of the major issues behind the failure of the state in the Democratic Republic of Congo (here after DRC) and their implications on the generation of protracted conflicts. Some arguments advanced could apply to other African countries where conflicts have occurred. The paper is based on the premise that the existence of a dichotomy in citizenship (i.e. civic and ethnic citizenship) is one of the major reasons why the postcolonial state has collapsed in most parts of Africa. Further, I contend that it is the failure of the process of nation-state formation under conditions of extreme underdevelopment and poverty augmented by the introduction of liberalization and democratic principles that have significantly contributed to conflict in most parts of Africa, and in particular in the DRC. The paper attempts to answer questions pertaining to the exercise of power in the DRC, the contradictions inherent in the state and explains why these are so apparent in Africa. It also examines the existence of both ethnic and national citizenship in the DRC and analyses the role this state of affairs has played in the generation of conflict in the DRC. In addition, the paper examines the role of external influence and the local political elite in this conflict and offers possible solutions for the failure of the state in the DRC. It is argued that the protracted conflict in the DRC could partly be explained as a product of the failure of the civic power and the persistence of the native (ethnic) authority. In particular, I have argued that the existence of a fragile state coupled with the discriminatory nature of the dichotomous citizenship, has resulted in economic and political exclusion of a large majority of people, and thereby contributing to the proliferation of protracted conflicts in the DRC and other contiguous states.

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2. A Brief Historical Overview of the DRC

The DRC has a population (2002 estimate) of 55,225,478, with a density of 24 persons per sq km (61 per sq mi) (Fegley 2003). It is Africas third largest country, covering 2,345,409 square kilometres (UN 1997: 1). It is divided into ten regions, which are defined by distinct economic and ethnic differences. The DRC has more than 200 ethnic groups, about 80 percent of whom are Bantu-speaking peoples who migrated into the area from the northwest beginning around 300 BC. Nine countries surround it: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo Brazzaville, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The DRC came under Belgian influence in 1876 and was officially recognized as a Belgian colony in 1908. Between 1884 and 1907, it existed as the Congo Free State and was a personal property of King Leopold II. The colony was called the Belgian Congo from 1908 until 1960 when it gained independence. Before the 1950s, the Belgian state used brutal methods of ruling including slavery, forced labour, and other forms of violence. This had a far-reaching impact on the psyches of the colonized people. In other words, resolving of issues by means of violence was valued above reasoning and the colonized people started seeing this as the norm. The liberalizing of colonial control in the 1950s led to the formation of special interest groups and political parties along indigenous lines. Indeed, this was a logical consequence of the divide and rule policies that were encouraged by the Belgian colonial administrators. Further, apart from the nationalist party of Patrice Lumumba, the Mouvement Nationale Congolais, the state tacitly encouraged formation of ethnically based parties. National consciousness was frowned upon by the colonial state. As a result most of the parties were tribal-based or/and secessionist. The DRC was declared independent on 30 June 1960 amid a power struggle between President Joseph Kasavubu of the Bakongo Alliance party and Lumumba. Lumumba became prime minister, and Kasavubu became president. The Belgians were reluctant to leave the DRC and used ethnic political parties to frustrate genuine independence aspirations. It was this unstable situation, exacerbated by secessionist movements and the deadlock in the power struggle between Kasavubu and Lumumba, which enabled army chief of staff Colonel Joseph Dsire Mobutu (later Mobutu Sese Seko), to stage a coup. It also led to the assassination of Lumumba by Moise Tshombe and his secessionist rebels with the connivance of the Belgian and American Governments on January 17, 1961. In 1965, Mobutu staged his second and last coup and declared himself President. Mobutu ruled the country (renamed Zaire in 1971) for more than three decades. Since 1965, the political history of the DRC can be divided into three phases. The first period ran from 1965 to 1990. During this period, the DRC was a one party state and Mobutu ruled as an autocratic ruler. The ruthless military suppression of rebellions in Shaba and Kasai provinces, as well as, outlawing of all forms of organised political opposition defines this period. Only the party led by Mobutu,

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the Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution (MPR), and superimposed on the administrative structure of the state was legal. It is worth noting that the economy of the DRC, like that of many other countries in the region, has been in a state of steady decline since the middle 1960s. The DRC is potentially one of Africas richest countries. It is endowed with abundant mineral and water resources and fertile land. However, the programme of Zaireanization (involving nationalization of all major economic activities and encouraging people to go back to an African way of life) only worked to enrich Mobutu and his supporters while the majority of the people remained impoverished. Paradoxically, in spite of the plunder of national resources, economic mismanagement and the dictatorial rule imposed by Mobutu, western countries regarded the DRC as an ally against the spread of communism. Economic plunder was carried out with the full knowledge of the West. The second phase began in 1990 in the wake of the collapse of the former Soviet Union and internal discontent resulting from political decay and economic bankruptcy. Confronted with pressure from both within and outside, Mobuto reintroduced multi-party politics and by 1991 over 100 political parties had been formed, mostly on sectarian or tribal lines. The move to democracy by Mobutu was not genuine. It was a means of recreating himself in the face of a serious challenge to his continued rule. The events following the introduction of multi-party politics triggered the conflict, which had been brewing for sometime. The conflict in Kivu province, which started in 1993, is one between the indigenous ethnic groups (mainly from the Bahunde ethnic group) and the Banyarwanda. The conflict gathered momentum as other groups sponsored by the Ugandan and Rwandan governments joined in and ultimately led to the fall of the Mobutu regime. This, and the illegitimate foreign installation of Laurent- Desire Kabila, inevitably led to the total collapse of the state machinery and to the generalized protracted conflict resulting in an estimated 1.5 million people being displaced and 4.5 million people killed. The installation of Kabila did nothing to bring stability to the region and only complicated further the geopolitical map of the region (Lemarchand 1997: 12).

3. The Political Organization of Power in the DRC

The conflict in the Great Lakes region has its roots in the colonial era. David Turton explains: the genocidal conflict between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda cannot be explained as the outcome of primordial tribal antagonisms. This is not only because the genocide was planned by the Hutu elite [...] but also because the ethnicity they played upon and orchestrated was largely a product of the recent colonial and postcolonial past (Turton 1997: 75). Furthermore, Chossudovsky (1996) suggests that the administrative reforms initiated in 1926 by the Belgians were decisive

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in shaping socio-economic relations in the DRC. He notes that the Belgians explicitly used and promoted dynastic conflicts to reinforce their territorial control. One of the characteristics of the postcolonial state in equatorial Africa is that the state is an imposition from outside rather than an internally evolved structure. The African political elite has done little to redefine or adapt the state. They simply manipulate it, as did the colonialists, to articulate their personal and class interests, both economic and political. It is important to note that classical liberal and Marxist theories of the state seem not to give us a correct picture of the postcolonial state. Both theories illustrate serious shortcomings in explaining contemporary African states (Alavi 1973: 17). In the sociological tradition of Max Weber, pluralists assume that the pre- capitalist social structures and economic arrangements would be swept aside and be replaced by the institutions of the liberal democratic state. However, the complexity and empirical evidence in postcolonial states suggests otherwise. On the other hand, the absence of well-defined social classes (i.e., in the Marxist sense) in most postcolonial societies make the Marxist view of the state as an instrument of class domination less applicable. However, the idea of the state as a kind of parasite particularly through a privileged, bureaucratic caste might be illuminating (Smith 1997: 175). The classic order of the western model of the state is based on the assumption of a homogenous political entity. It is centred on formal equality in the sense of uniform citizenship rights, which are legislated through the central state (Yasemeni 1985: 22). Further, Yasemeni notes, the historical formation of the modern polity describes a process that encloses citizenship within territorially based national units, and, this closure of citizenship was achieved, on one hand, by the extension of rights and benefits to different strata of civic society, and on the other by attributing some distinctiveness shared values, language, blood, history or culture to the collective citizenry (Yasemeni 1985: 22). The process of attributing some distinctiveness to the citizenry involves the identification and construction of who is a citizen and who is not and this is an essential component of the process of nation-state formation (Croucher 1998: 639). The construction and maintenance of national identity is crucial to the creation, cohesion and survival of the nation state. Consequently, the process of identifying who is a citizen involves identifying the other. It is evident that there is an inherent danger of linking rights to nationality, which inevitably leads to exclusion. This contradiction is more apparent and dangerous in the African context given the fragile and heterogeneous nature of the states there. In Africa, colonial rule reformed the nature of the state. As colonialists attempted to generate support for alien rule, they reformed the western model state and introduced a distorted form on the continent (Smith 1997: 181). According to Mamdani (1998), colonialism introduced the civic state and with it the concept of civic citizenship. The civic state emphasized civil rights. However, African people did not enjoy these rights since they were racialised. Secondly, colonialism intro-

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duced the native authority, and with it ethnic citizenship. A native authority was a system of using pre-existing socio-formations and traditional systems of governance to advance colonial rule. In many cases, ethnic leaders actually had no legitimate power and had been given their native authority by the colonial masters. The colonialists found it in their interest to co-opt traditional systems of government where they existed and where they did not exist they would create new ones. The traditional modes of government were corrupted and used as tools of colonial rule. While the civic state concerned itself with individual citizen rights (which were superficial since they excluded the concept of self-determination), the native authority concerned itself with ethnic group rights (Mamdani 1998: 8). Consequently, the colonial state recognized two types of political identities one civic and the other ethnic. The postcolonial state inherited this structure of citizenship. It is this situation I refer to, when I mention the existence of a dichotomous citizenship in the Great Lakes region. It is this historical background and the failure by the postcolonial state to reform and redefine it that explain the manner in which power is organized in most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa. To understand how power is organized in the Great Lakes Region, one needs to look at the dialectical relationship between the state and the native authority on one hand, and the question of national identity and citizenship on the other. It is critical to note that inherited government structures based on the native/ settler dichotomy undoubtedly are a root cause of instability particularly in that they exacerbate economic and social inequalities and lead to the entrenchment of inefficient and corrupt bureaucracies. The civic/ethnic dichotomy meanwhile explains the lack of political penetration but pertains more to the illegitimacy of government. The existence of a dichotomous citizenship and sequentially the generation of conflicts in the Great Lakes region are closely related to the political and historical settler/native question. This, in turn, is related to the question of national identity. The settler/native question is a historical question because it is embedded in the colonial legacy of the postcolonial state. It is a political question because it is at the core of national identity formation in Africa, and, as such, it is central to the process of nation-state formation. The postcolonial state inherited the distinction between the native and the settler from the colonial state. After independence, both the native and the settler acquired civic rights in that they became members of the civic state. However, unlike the settler, the native, by virtue of also belonging to an ethnic space, also maintained his or her ethnic rights, in particular, the right to land. This is the genesis of political and economic exclusionary policies, which tend to fuel ethnic conflicts in the region (Mamdani 1998: 7). For instance, violent disorders stemming from ethnic disputes, the frustrations of ethnic parties excluded from power and a revolt of Congolese armed forces began within a week of independence in the DRC. Further, in September 1996, near the refugee camps

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along the border with Rwanda and Burundi, a small minority of DRC Tutsi known as the Banyamulenge became targets of harassment by local non-Tutsi and DRC troops. Recent legislation had established new criteria for citizenship, and locals decided to expel the Banyamulenge, who had lived in the area for centuries. The Banyamulenge, armed and trained by the Tutsi Rwandan government in preparation for such an attack, retaliated and, reinforced by Rwandan Tutsi, successfully fought off the DRC army in October. Tension between DRC and Rwanda led to brief cross-border mortar fire around Lake Kivu. In mid-1998 a string of events occurred that were strikingly similar to those of late 1996. The DRC government sought to strip the eastern Banyamulenge Tutsi of Congolese citizenship, and the Banyamulenge rose up in armed revolt with the help of Rwandan soldiers expelled by Kabila (Fegley 2003). Political and economic exclusion based on ethnic identity is the key to the conflicting identity formation in the region. It is not as a result of clashing civilizations and, for that matter, not the continuation of ancient or primordial tribal rivalry. Notwithstanding the pre-colonial historical evidence, the Hutu has been considered to be the typical native and the Tutsi the typical settler in the Great Lakes region. Lemarchand (1997) and Keene (1995) note that it suited the early colonialists to believe in, and foster the myth of the Tutsi as a superior race not dissimilar to Europeans. Turton explains, the policy of institutionalising Tutsi domination and recruiting the indigenous elite entirely from the Tutsi aristocracy was legitimised by the theory that the Tutsi belonged to the superior Hamitic race [...] with roots in Ethiopia (Turton 1997: 78). The stereotypes revolved around a vertical system of stratification in which Tutsi and Hutu stood in ranked relationship to each other with the minority Tutsi having more political power, wealth and status than the majority Hutus. The colonizers may have favoured the Tutsi because they both shared the lack of roots and being conquerors. The colonial state with its misconceived theory of Hamitic race turned the Tutsi into settlers. It is interesting to note that in this kind of state, even the so-called natives would be considered to be settlers or foreigners once they are out of their home areas. Every native authority (ethnic area) makes a distinction between insiders and outsiders. It is this argument that tends to underscore the fact that this distinction is an ethnic one. In the words of Mamdani, every ethnic area made a distinction between those who belonged and those who did not, between ethnic citizens and ethnic strangers (Mamdani 1998: 9). This explains why displaced and armed refugee Diasporas tend to spread ethnic tensions as they move from one place to another. Let us consider the rather complex situation of the Banyarwanda in the Kivu province of Eastern DRC. As noted above, the current conflict in the DRC is closely related to the ethnic clashes in Rwanda and Burundi. Lemarchand notes, in the Great Lakes region, where ethnic fault lines cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to spill over from one area to the next transforming kin solidarities into powerful vectors of trans-

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national violence (Lemarchand 1997: 11). According to Prunier (1997), although the outbreak of the conflict surprised many observers, the Kivu crisis had been building up for several years. It is important to note that different layers of Banyarwanda had arrived in the DRC at different times in history, the oldest group being those groups that lived for centuries in the old Rwanda kingdom before the creation of the colonial state. Those who had been brought in by the colonial authorities to supplement labour for the Belgian Congo followed these aforementioned pre-colonial settlers. The other wave consisted of the relatively recent immigrants (mostly Tutsi) who fled the genocide of 1959 to 1963 in Rwanda. The 1960s and 1970s saw more waves of economic migrants flowing in. Finally, there was the 1994 massive inflow of the Banyarwanda fleeing the genocide in Rwanda and to a lesser extent from Burundi. The Banyarwanda in Kivu were considered as civic citizens but did not belong to any ethnic space. They were considered as settlers. Indeed, this situation tended to precipitate tension between them and the so-called indigenous groups, especially the Bahunde, Banyanga, Bamusisi and the Baruturu. The conflict in Kivu was triggered when the Banyarwanda who are accorded a low social status and have to pay tithes to local tribes raised their demands for reforms. Mamdani explains, so long as the distinction between settler and native is written into the structure of the state, the settler could become a civic citizen but not a native (Mamdani 1998: 11). According to Prunier (1997), the tension remained without exploding until 1991 when the natives attempted to eliminate the Banyarwanda, at first economically, and later physically. One can not overemphasise the fact that the conflict in the Congo is closely related to that in Rwanda and Burundi and it revolves around the question of ethnic citizenship and, sequentially, to the group ethnic right to land. As Lemarchand puts it, this is the instrumental face of ethnicity, which in Rwanda, Burundi and the Congo led to the reconstruction of ethnic selves [and] to a constructivist frame of ethnic reference. The material base of this reconstruction is the ethnic group claim to land (Lemarchand 1997: 8). Perhaps, it is this claim to land and the collapse of the central state machinery, which can help us explain the emergence of armed refugee movements outside their homeland with active support of external forces. Secondly, it can also help us understand why political appeals to ethnic identity can lead to the commitment of such heinous crimes as genocide. Turton explains, one of the explanations of how people who have been living in multi-ethnic, multilingual and multi-religious communities were capable of being aroused to such extremes of ethnocentrism lies in the historical conditions which are beyond the control of individual actors but which ensure that the necessary ethnic materials are ready to hand when needed. The second part lies in the particular techniques and strategies which are deliberately employed by political leaders to turn these materials into a powerful resource for advancing nationalist territorial claims (Turton

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1997: 81). Further, and probably more relevant to my argument, he notes, ethnicity is an effective means of mobilizing groups around common material interests precisely because of its non-material (i.e. symbolic) context, which makes or mystifies those interests for the group members themselves (Turton 1997: 81).

4. The Failure of the Nation State and Ethnic Conflict

For the purposes of this argument, I would like to strongly suggest that in the case of the Great Lakes region, what seems to have collapsed is the civic state while the native authority tends to continue reproducing itself, thriving, so to speak, on chaos and violence. It is necessary to discuss the failure of the state when discussing ethnic conflict in Africa because, in the words of Turton, the atrocities that have been committed in Africa in the name of ethnicity should be seen as profound failures of state craft (Turton 1997). In answering the question: what are the reasons for, and patterns of failure affecting the state in the Congo, I would like to look at the relationship between economic development and the nature of citizenship. Secondly, I would consider the relationship between the introduction of a liberal democratic ethos and the nature of citizenship. As far as the first point is concerned, it is important to note that the conflict in the Congo is embedded in the institutional structure of the postcolonial state and the failure by the modern African political elites to reform it. The evolution of the postcolonial economy played a decisive role in the development of the crisis in the region. The conflict is generated as a contradiction between economic development and the nature of citizenship. According to Mamdani, the more commodity production increases, the more labour is set into motion, and, the more proportion of the non-indigenous (of migrant labour and peasants who have civil and political rights of a civic citizen but not the social cultural rights of ethnic citizens) increases, the more ethnic tension is generated (Mamdani 1998: 8). In other words, the economic exclusionary tendencies are a major source of erosion of the legitimacy of the state and a major contributing factor to its collapse. The second point has to do with the high population densities in the region. Rwanda is one of the smallest countries in the world, with a land area of just over 26,000 square kilometres. Its population density is the highest in Africa. In theory, each square kilometre supports as many as 400 people (UN 1997). The critical shortage of land in both Rwanda and Burundi may explain why the governments in both countries have been reluctant to accept back large numbers of refugees (Lemarchand 1997: 11). Most importantly, though, it may help us explain why group ethnic right to land by the so-called natives and the exclusion there of the settler is a major source of ethnic conflict. The shortage of land and the failure by the central state to design policies aimed at redistributing land equitably laid the foun-

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dation for the collapse of the central authority in the DRC. The reason why the state found it difficult to redistribute land is that as long as the distinction between the settler and the native is written into the state structure, the settler can become a citizen (civic) but not a native. Secondly, finding itself with decreasing support and legitimacy, the state resorted to using land as a political tool in building sycophantic clientele among some social groups. Thirdly, as the political base of the central state continues to get eroded, the residual powers of the native authorities get stronger. The end result of this situation is a continuous process of isolation of the central authority and loss of legitimacy, ultimately resulting in the collapse of the state. Rothchild and Groth note, because the state institutions are fragile and lacking in effectiveness and legitimacy, they are a poor vantage point to mediate the struggle between competing groups. Unable to channel participation along pre-determined lines, the overloaded state becomes isolated and aloof from society, unable to structure the relations between social interests and itself (Rothchild and Groth 1997). In the DRC, the failure of the state is evident in its failure to deal with the question of nationality and citizenship and, hence, the root cause of the conflict. As far as the relationship between a liberal democratic ethos and the nature of citizenship is concerned, it is necessary to note that the demand for maintaining and perpetuating the distinction between civic and ethnic citizenship is constituted as a majority native demand. In other words, it is portrayed as a democratic demand. The introduction of multi-party politics, the popular vote and generally the ethos of democracy provided the proverbial last straw to the failure of the state in the DRC. Unlike the case of Rwanda, the model of democratisation was not based on the assumption of inter-ethnic solidarity, rather it was based on the exclusion of the so-called non-indigenous ethnic groups. Furthermore, the introduction of democracy tended to increase competition for scarce national resources available to the political elite and as a result increased tension. Let us consider the situation in Rwanda before the outbreak of the crisis in the Eastern DRC. When Juvenal Habyarimana (the assassinated Hutu President of Rwanda) supported the creation of the MAGRIVI (Mutualit Agricole des Virungas) organization in Kivu province in 1980, he demanded that all Tutsi be defined as non-indigenous no matter where they lived. He further demanded that the question of citizenship be settled democratically by popular vote (Prunier 1997: 16). A new law adopted in 1981 ensured that the Banyarwanda could technically be considered foreigners. Prunier notes that the tension remained and most probably kept building up until the introduction of multi-party politics and the holding of the 1991 National Conference (Confrence Nationale). The crisis finally erupted when the majority natives tried to monopolize representation in the Assembly and then to use their position to eliminate the Banyarwanda (see UNHCR 1997; Prunier 1997; and Lemarchard 1997). In other words the nationality issue who has got a right to vote and who does not is also critical to the crisis in the Congo.

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As noted elsewhere in this paper, ethnic fault lines cut across geographical boundaries in the region. This fact alone strongly suggests that the situation is equally true in the case of Rwanda and Burundi. According to Lemarchand, the involvement of refugee generating Diasporas in the electoral process created a potentially explosive mix. He notes that the collapse of the state in Rwanda on the eve of the genocide is traceable to the projection of electoral competition onto the intra Hutu power struggles involving alliances with the Rwandan Patriotic Front. In the case of Burundi, the assassination of the newly elected President (Ndadaye) brought an end to the movement towards multi-party politics on the eve of the genocide and created the necessary grounds for the eventual collapse of the state. Ambushed by extremists from both sides, the Burundi state collapsed under the combined assault of Tutsi militias and army men and Hutu rebels (UNHCR 1995: 8). The point is that the introduction of democratic principles in the DRC brought its (democratic) egalitarian ethos in direct conflict with the policies of exclusion, immanent in the very structure of the postcolonial state. In this kind of state, it is possible to admit the potential for violence in the electoral process. As more and more people get organized to get access to national resources, tension is inevitably generated as those in power try to protect their privileged positions. Indeed, the conflict in the DRC goes back in history. Mobutu concealed it through violent suppression of all kinds of opposition but did not eliminate it. The failure to reform the nature of the colonial state is at the core of the failure of the state in the DRC.

5. The Role of External Forces

Both regional geopolitics and external interference have influenced the crises in the DRC. As noted elsewhere, the conflict in the DRC is an extension of the conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda. Further, it is more plausible to consider the conflict within the context of globalisation rather than looking at it as an isolated and internal matter. As noted above, Western nations backed Mobutus regime during the cold war as a bulwark against the spread of Communism in Central Africa. The West provided military aid to Zaire (now DRC), particularly in the late 1970s, to repulse invasions by Katangan secessionists backed by Communist forces in Angola, who were in turn backed by the USSR and Cuba (Fegley 2003). In the aftermath of the 1994 genocide, for instance, more than a million Rwandan refugees flowed into Kivu and set themselves up into camps. The inevitable result of this situation was the generation of tension within Kivu society and externally between Kivu and the authorities in Rwanda. According to Prunier, supplied militarily by the French, the Interhamwe controlled the camps while international Non Governmental Organizations apparently provided food (Prunier 1997: 11).

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This had a devastating effect on the economy and led to the militarisation of ordinary life. This created the necessary pre-conditions for the outbreak of the conflict, which has tended to spread to other areas as armed and displaced refugee Diaspora moved to other areas such as Kasai, Northern Katanga, Equateur, Ituri and the North- eastern town of Bunia. Secondly, it is important to consider the actual physical presence of external military forces that began with the entry of Ugandan and Rwandan forces supporting the rebel groups who were soon to be countered by forces from Angola, Namibia, Sudan and Zimbabwe. Whatever the reasons for being in the Congo, the fact that these forces have influenced the direction of the conflict in more than one way cannot be ignored. Further, the global political structure or the international community is the context for ethnic conflict. Turton explains, we should not be surprised to discover [...] that international intervention in internal wars is prone to sustain and institutionalise the very behaviour it is intended to combat and control (Turton 1997: 89). The presence of the international community can and does contribute to extending conflicts through for instance, providing food to combatants albeit indirectly and sometimes supporting acts of ethnic cleansing by creating safe havens. In addition, according to Turton, when we speak of the international community in this context we are, above all, speaking of the countries which, because of their economic power and political influence, dominate the existing political structure and have most to gain from its continuance (Turton 1997: 89). The third point is related to the role of the spread of the diamonds for guns trade. The illicit trade in diamonds, mostly promoted by Multinational Corporations, international financiers and other interests operating through shadowy cartels, has made it easier for most militia groups to obtain light but lethal weapons especially the AK 47 assault rifle. In the words of Louise, Universal militarisation has been part of the globalisation process. Technological advances, the emergencies of global networks, communication, transportation and rapid advances in trade practices have facilitated the diffusion of weapons. This contraction of the world into a single arena has created a market place for all kinds of commodities, and the development of illegal goods anywhere in the world (Louise 1995: 19). Finally, mass media has been extensively used in spreading information, which tends to promote ethnic tension and, consequently, has been used as a tool of war. Turton (1997) notes that the instant infusion of ideas and information, including the terminology of ethnicity and ethnic cleansing are particularly relevant to the proliferation of ethnic and other forms of intra-state violence. Mass media is often used to spread information meant to precipitate internal violence, mass hypnosis and to influence how external agents react to the conflict.

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6. Conclusion
In this paper, it has been argued that the conflict in the Great Lakes Region is embedded in the very structure of the postcolonial state, which is characterized by a dichotomous citizenship. We noted that in this kind of state, power is organized at two levels - ethnic and civic. I have argued that the political and economic exclusionary policies inherent in this kind of state are the major source of ethnic conflicts in the region. Further, it has been observed that the process of globalisation, including the processes of liberalization and democratisation in addition to internal factors such as economic mismanagement, nepotism and autocratic tendencies contributed considerably to the erosion of the legitimacy of the state and as such to the proliferation of ethnic conflicts. In view of the above, the solution to the conflict lies in resolving the native/ settler question and strengthening the regime of individual rights of all citizens. Theoretically, the total erosion of ethnic authorities and group rights and the reinforcement of individual rights would be a necessary step to the end of ethnic tensions. There is a need to create strong institutional and legal structures necessary for democratic rule. What is more important, though, is the need to reform the very structure of the postcolonial state with the view of removing the political and economic exclusionary tendencies inherent in it. This would mean reforming the very institutions in which these policies are embedded. Both international agencies and regional groupings such as the African Community (AU), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the United Nations (UN) need to assist in this process. The UN has a mandate to monitor the cease-fire and, if necessary, commence diplomatic and economic sanctions and even to maintain a peace- keeping force in the DRC. Through its agencies the UN must play a leading role in the process of reconstruction, repatriation, rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced populations. On the other hand, given the implications of the war on their national security and economic aspirations, countries in the region need to participate in and facilitate negotiations between the belligerents. Finally, it is necessary to redefine and reform the structure of the postcolonial state through the creation of stable democratic institutions and strengthening the human rights regime. In the words of Mamdani, what is required in the context of a former colony is a single citizenship for both settlers and natives [...] in which both settlers and natives are politically reborn as equal members of a single political community. This is about establishing, for the first time; a political order based on consent and not conquest. It is about establishing a political community based on equal and consenting citizens (Mamdani 1998:12).

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References
ALAVI, H. (1972) The State in Post Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, New Left Review, 74. CHOSSUDOVSKY, M. (1996) Hidden Hands Behind the Rwandan Holocaust, Health for Millions, 22(2): 3-34. CROUCHER, S. (1998) South Africans Illegal Aliens: Constructing National Boundaries in a Post Apartheid State, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21(4). FEGLEY, R.A. (2003) Microsoft Encarta Reference Library. KEANE, F. (1994) Seasons of Blood: A Rwandan Journey, London, Penguin Books Limited. LEMARCHAND, R. (1997) Patterns of State Collapse and Reconstruction in Central Africa: Reflections on the Crises in the Great Lakes, Seoul, International Political Science Association. ______ (1995) Burundi: Ethnic conflict and Genocide, New York, Cambridge University Press and Woodrow Wilson Press Center Press. LOUISE, C. (1993) The Social Impact of Light Weapon Availability and Proliferation, Geneva, UNRISD, Discussion Paper, 59. MAMDANI, M. (1998) When Does One Become a Settler? Cape Town, Inaugural Lecture Paper, University of Cape Town. PRUNIER, G. (1997) The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu crisis, WRITENET Country Paper. ROTHCHILD, D. and GROTH, A.J. (1995) Pathological Dimensions of Domestic and International Ethnicity, Political Science Quarterly, 110(1). SMITH, B.C. (1996) Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, London, Macmillan Press LTD. SOYSAL, Y. (1994) The limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post national Membership in Europe, London, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. TURTON, D. (1997) War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence in North East Africa and Former Yugoslavia, Oxford Development Studies, 25(1). UNITED NATIONS (1997) Historical Overview of Zaire, Geneva, Department of Humanitarian Affairs. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES (1998) Background Paper on Refugees and Asylum Seekers from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Geneva, Center for Documentation and Research. ______ (1995) Background Paper on Zairian Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Geneva, Center for Documentation and Research.

Life After the CPA: The Case of Stateless Vietnamese Boat People in Southeast Asia
Hoi Trinh

1. Introduction
In Southeast Asia, the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) has come to a successful conclusion. [] The Vietnamese camps have been closed. It is the end of a saga (Ogata 1997). Echoing the sentiment of the then United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Phyllis Oakley, declared in her statement to the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 31 October 1996: The CPA was a truly multilateral seven year effort. It broke new ground in cooperation [] where all participants helped bear the burden of a regional problem and brought it to a successful conclusion (Oakley 1996). Notwithstanding its achievements and apparent conclusion on 30 June 1996, this paper will argue that the CPA is far from over. It will briefly trace the exodus of people from Vietnam and examine international response to the crisis which reached its turning points in 1979 and more conclusively, in 1989 with the birth of the CPA. The second part of this paper will look specifically at four key aspects relating to the CPA: international cooperation and resettlement; the UNHCR and its supervisory role; the problems and flaws in the refugee status determination process; and the resultant caseload of boat people in Hong Kong. The third part will focus on the current situation of stateless Vietnamese boat people in the Philippines and to a certain extent, the remaining population in Hong Kong. It will be argued that not only did the CPA fail to consider the possibilities of statelessness, it was largely ignored by the UNHCR in order to push through executive agendas to clear the camps and declare its success. The result has been dismal. Human rights abuses continue to exist both in Vietnam and in the asylum countries. A number of stateless boat people have been murdered due to an unwillingness to act on the part of the UNHCR and host states. Others have committed suicide, thanks in part to their statelessness and lack of state protection.

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There are over 2,000 stateless Vietnamese boat people in the Philippines. Supported by no agency, they continue to languish in limbo with no legal status (Lamb 1998: 1). The CPA is not yet over, and life, as this paper will argue, has not been easy for those left behind.

2. Fall of Saigon and Beginning of Exodus: 1975-1979

April 30, 2003 marked the 28th anniversary of the annihilation of Saigon, the former capital of the Republic of Vietnam. For the two million Vietnamese living overseas, the anniversary is always a time to remember the beginning of an exodus that was unprecedented both in scale and in untold suffering. It has been estimated that at least 10% of people leaving Vietnam on boats died (Robinson 1998: 59)60. UNHCR figures put the total number of Vietnamese boat arrivals in asylum countries between 1975 and 1997 at 839,000 people. Following the U.S. evacuation of approximately 140,000 dependents and ranking officials from the defeated regime61, tens of thousands of Vietnamese began leaving their country in rickety boats. For a while, the international community could not understand why. After all, the war had ended. Why were they fleeing peace? The communist victors had their reasons. Over 500,000 ex-servicemen were sent to re-education camps as punishment for their association with the old regime.62 Mass confiscation of properties of the rich and powerful was systematically carried out to create a new utopian state. Intellectuals and writers were forced to write regular self-criticisms of their bourgeois ideas and young adults were denied education due to their family background. Similarly, former public servants and teachers were relocated to New Economic Zones deep in uncultivated territory in order to contain their influence. It was against this background that the exodus began in earnest in the late 1970s. But, as conceded by Robinson (1998) in Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response, a book commissioned by the UNHCR on the Indochinese exodus, the UNHCR from the beginning had favoured the solution of voluntary repatriation (Robinson 1998: 24). The term used at the time to describe the boat people was displaced persons and not refugees.63 As the then High Commissioner,
See also Grant (1979) The Boat People, p. 79. For a discussion on the final number, see Robinson 1998: 18. 62 For an account of a South Vietnameses life in re-education camps, see Ha, Thuc Sinh, Dai Hoc Mau (in Vietnamese, a University of Blood). It was not until 1989 that the last of these prisoners were released after some 14 years of detention. 63 See agreement between the UNHCR and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand, 22
61 60

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Prince Sadruddin, observed, the boat people were an aftermath of the US evacuation which was itself an aftermath of war (Robinson 1998: 21). Owing to this lack of concern, many boat people were left in refugee camps across Southeast Asia without any knowledge of whether or not they would be given permanent refuge. Ships carrying boat people were refused landing. Many were automatically pushed back out to sea.64 But as the new utopian socialist system in Vietnam pressed down, boat departures continued to increase. Coupled with Vietnams new wars with Cambodia in 1978 and its once Northern ally China65, by the middle of 1979, there were some 200,000 Vietnamese scattered in camps throughout the region (Robinson 1998). The principle of temporary asylum was on the brink of collapse.

3. International Response to the Growing Crisis: 1979-1989

At the urging of the U.S., the 1979 International Conference on Indochinese Refugees was convened in Geneva on July 20 and 21, 197966 . The commitments made were wide-ranging and generous. For the first time in the history of the Office of the UNHCR, all arrivals were considered as prima facie refugees, giving them the protection of the UNHCR and an opportunity to seek durable solutions (SEARAC 2002). The political point for the U.S. was obvious. The boat people were fleeing persecution at the hands of the predatory communists in Vietnam. Often cited as the Cold War factor (Chimni 1998), it has been identified as one of the main reasons for the introduction of refugee programs and policies ever since the inception of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the subsequent 1967 Protocol (the Refugee Convention)67 (Hathaway 1991: 6). This ideological approach bears testimony to the fact that the U.S. single-handedly resettled over half of all Indochinese refugees from the end of the war to 199768 . In reaching this agreement on the Indochinese exodus, the international comDecember 1975, reproduced in Robinson (1998) Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response, at p. 20. 64 See Brook (2001) Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: Rule of Law Rhetoric under the Colonial Regime, p. 6. 65 Over border disputes and the expulsion of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam. 66 A total of 65 countries attended the Conference. U.N. Doc. A/34/627 (1979). 67 See also Castles (2000) International migration at the beginning of the twenty-first century: global trends and issues, p. 272. 68 The U.S. resettled 1,287,399 out of a total of 1, 954, 170 people leaving Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos between 1975 and 1997. See Robinson (1998) Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response.

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munity recognised two important points. First, the reasons for the large departures of people were considered legitimate and within the Refugee Convention. Second, it was implicitly agreed that piecemeal measures would not work. International cooperation was the key to finding durable solutions. Almost overnight the pushback of Vietnamese boats was halted. Regional arrival rates fell dramatically as Vietnam made good its promise at the 1979 Conference by cracking down on clandestine departures.69 For the boat people who were fortunate to have made it safely to an asylum shore, it was a short transit stay before their eventual resettlement in the West. For the part it played in the process, the UNHCR was awarded the 1981 Nobel Peace Prize.

4. Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) 1989-1996

As resettlement countries became more selective in their admission of refugees, however, more people were left behind waiting in camps. A surge in boat arrivals in 1988 saw Thailand resuming its boat push-back policy which was soon followed by Malaysia. Most significantly, Hong Kong unilaterally announced that any Vietnamese boat people entering the territory after 16 June 1988 would be subjected to refugee status screening.70 By 1989, there were 100,000 refugees stranded in first asylum camps (Robinson 1998: 183). It had been 10 years since the first agreement was implemented. The birth of the CPA was thus inevitable. The new agreement was brokered in Geneva on 13 and 14 June 1989 under the auspices of the UNHCR grandly named the Comprehensive Plan of Action.71 As its name suggests, the CPA was comprehensive in its solution-oriented approach in solving one of the most protracted, complex, and tragic humanitarian problems [] ever witnessed. The solution-oriented point was made clear by the then High Commissioner, Mrs Sadako Ogata, who presided over the entire CPA life span of seven years (Ogata 1996). The CPAs objectives focused on stemming the exodus, reinforcing more legal departure routes in collaboration with Vietnam, preserving the principle of asylum,
69 As a result, many would-be refugees were caught by the Vietnamese authorities and thrown in jails for indefinite periods. Thousands upon release, however, set sail for the open sea again despite the risks involved. Others missed out on being accorded refugee status altogether either by CPA cut off dates for screening or simply by giving up hope. 70 This was done without prior consultation with the UNHCR and in violation of the agreement made at the 1979 Conference. Hong Kong also openly admitted that the purpose of the screening process was deterrence, a consideration not allowed under international refugee law. See Hong Kong Hansard 1989: 939. 71 The Conference was attended by delegations of 75 states including Vietnam. U.N. Doc. A/44/523 (1989).

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and finding permanent solutions for every exile. The key was individual screening to determine which asylum seekers were refugees fleeing persecution. Those screened-out, it was provided, were subject to repatriation. In short, all ports of asylum would follow Hong Kongs lead in conducting a screening of all post-CPA arrivals. Thus, instead of being criticised for its unilateral action taken in violation of the 1979 Geneva agreement, Hong Kong, or more precisely the U.K., presented its fait accompli. With regards to screening, Part II (D) of the CPA provides for: The early establishment of a consistent region-wide refugee status determination process [] the status of the asylum-seeker will be determined by a qualified and competent national authority [] in accordance with established refugee criteria and procedures, [] and the criteria will be those recognised in the 1951 Convention [] bearing in mind, to the extent appropriate, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other relevant international instruments concerning refugees, and will be applied in a humanitarian spirit taking into account the special situation of the asylum-seekers concerned and the need to respect the family unit. As it turned out, there was no consistency in the implementation of the CPA. Deliberately hard-line, Hong Kong maintained its 16 June 1988 cut-off date while other ports of asylum set different cut-off dates: 14 March 1989 (Malaysia and Thailand), 17 March 1989 (Indonesia), and 21 March 1989 (Philippines). The fact that the CPA was signed on 14 June 1989 and applied retrospectively and inconsistently without any notice given to people who were caught in between such fundamental policy changes appeared not to have been of anyones concern including the UNHCR. Involved in brokering a deal that was unprecedented both in degree and in kind, refugee advocates and human rights lawyers criticised the UNHCR for failing to observe the most fundamental principles in refugee status determination.72 An authoritative expert on international refugee law, James Hathaway, was forthright in his criticisms: The legal status of Vietnamese asylum-seekers has not been defined in a consistently principled way. He also noted that in swinging the pendulum to the other extreme in 1989, the CPA not only ended a presumption of genuine refugee status, but it implicitly stigmatised Vietnamese asylum-seekers as economic migrants (Hathaway 1993: 686). The CPA was thus borne out of frustration and scepticism. (Hathaway 1993: 688). Criticisms aside, no advocates suggested that the CPA was not of relevance. It was certainly successful in stemming migration flows from Indochina. Almost
In 1996, the law firm of Pam Baker & Company in Hong Kong represented, on a pro bono basis, 1241 Vietnamese asylum-seekers who had arrived in Hong Kong between 16 June 1988 and 14 June 1989, challenging the governments policy change to introduce the screening process without warning. Their claim was based on the common law ground of legitimate expectation. The High Court of Hong Kong however refused them leave to apply for judicial review. On appeal, their application for judicial review also failed. See Vo Thi Do and 1240 Ors v The Director of Immigration, CA 210/96, Power ACJ, Litton VP & Mayo JA, 29 November 1996.
72

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overnight it brought an end to the exodus. In 1989, approximately 70,000 Vietnamese fled their country. By 1992, only 41 Vietnamese had arrived in Southeast Asian camps seeking asylum (Robinson 1998: 193). And the numbers have remained negligible ever since. Perhaps, what should be borne in mind are three crucial (yet implicit) agreements acknowledged in Geneva. First, the CPA was about controlling migration (Baker 1996). The 1951 Convention was brought in, not to benefit refugees as its drafters had intended, but rather to shift the wheat from the chaff (Pham 1992). Second, in doing so, the international community indirectly indicated to Hanoi that its continuing denial of basic human rights was no longer top of the worlds agenda (Smith 2001). Consequently, for an agreement borne out of frustration and scepticism and based on policy considerations rather than fundamental principles, it was inevitable that the substantive interpretations of the CPA would fail to be consistent with its explicit human rights mandate. The UNHCR, for its part, preferred to regard the CPA as not an agreement between equal parties but a delicate balance of compromises, concessions, and commitments (Bronee 1993: 543). Except for a few initial hiccups73, the CPA was implemented with vigour and imagination throughout the early to mid 1990s. Hong Kong took the lead by initiating alternatives for clearing its overcrowded detention centres. Forced repatriation began as early as 12 December 1989, it ended just before the handover to China in July 1997 when the last of the screened-out Vietnamese detainees were flown back to Vietnam under the officially named Orderly Return Program (ORP). If CNN footage of Vietnamese men and women gagged and bound, screaming and kicking while being forced onto repatriation flights were proof of any solution found or irony lost, the program was anything but orderly. But as the then Hong Kong Refugee Coordinator, Brian Bresnihan, openly admitted, forced repatriation was a stick to encourage them to go home voluntarily but it must be regular enough to menace the population (Robinson 1998: 189). In the end, all Southeast Asian asylum countries followed Hong Kong by implementing their own brand of forced repatriation. By plane and boats, and regardless of UNHCRs position, host states began repatriation in early 1996 as the UNHCR announced the CPA deadline: 30 June 1996. Except for Hong Kong and the Philippines where some 4,000 screened-out Vietnamese have been allowed to remain temporarily to this day, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia were all successful in clearing their camps before the deadline. The question thus remains: was the CPA brought to a successful and humane conclusion?

73 Malaysia continued its boat push-back policy well into 1990 while Hong Kong insisted on forced repatriation, a consideration not sanctioned by the CPA and the U.S. initially. See Robinson 1998: 189.

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5. Refugee Status Determination Process

As outlined above, Part II (D) of the CPA provided for the 1951 Convention to be applied to Vietnamese asylum seekers arriving after 1989. In addition, it noted that the CPA would be applied in a humanitarian spirit taking into account the special situation of the asylum-seekers. As the CPA was left for host states to implement, however, there were major shortcomings. One major problem was that the CPA did not provide for a lower threshold test of well-founded fear of persecution despite such a category existing in many of the resettlement countries74 . One was either a refugee or an economic migrant. Given the context in which the CPA was established everyone was a refugee before its inception there was a feeling among the boat people that they were cheated out of something to which they were entitled. For many of the screened-out, the prevailing feeling was that refugee status was taken away from them (Baker 1996: 8). Other problems included translation errors, difficulty in obtaining home country information, a lack of understanding of refugee laws and principles, and the non-existence of guidance for the applicants on procedures and their right to appeal (Helton 1993). Decisions were made after a triple translation process had occurred between Vietnamese applicants and immigration officers.75 Added to that was a systematic lack of legal assistance for applicants and an unwillingness of host states to facilitate judicial review of decisions (Poynder 1995). The most damaging flaw undermining the CPA, however, was the extent of corruption among immigration officials, most notably, in the Philippines and Indonesia. As recorded at an Australian Parliament hearing in 1994, eyewitness accounts were given of demands for money and sexual favours in return for the granting of refugee status (Australian Hansard 1994: 201). Detailing a story of two sisters who were forced to have sex with their Filipino immigration officer in order to get a visa for resettlement in the Netherlands (where the younger sister ended up in a mental hospital), journalist Philip Gourevitch used a refugees remark to conclude one of his many findings: its a sad story (Gourevitch 1995: 24). Under the CPA, the UNHCR was tasked with overseeing the screening process and ensuring that it would comply with international standards. However, there was little the UNHCR could do about violations. Its mandate power to overturn negative decisions on the grounds of gross injustice was used in only exceptional
For instance, in the U.K. and Australia, screened-out asylum seekers may be given leave to remain on special humanitarian grounds. 75 In Hong Kong, a screening interview in practice worked as follows: the officer would ask a question in Chinese. The interpreter would then translate the question to Vietnamese. The applicant would reply in Vietnamese which would then be translated into Chinese for the immigration officer. The officer would then record in English his/her summary of what the interpreter said in Chinese.
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circumstances (Brook 2001: 48). Constrained by the need to maintain a co-operative relationship with the host government, the UNHCR often only voiced its concern internally, or where possible, in carefully-worded statements. This, along with a desire to fast-track the CPAs solution-oriented approach meant the UNHCR met with serious condemnation throughout the period. To some, the UNHCR was simply awful in handling the whole question of screening [] the tale is a sorry story of incompetence, delay and bad faith.76 To others, not only did the UNHCR have zero credibility among the asylum seekers, it was no protector of refugees. And this was openly conceded by many on the ground including UNHCR staff and camp workers who were on its payroll (Gourevitch 1995: 33). David Derthick, an American who ran a voluntary repatriation program in 1995 at Palawan Refugee Camp in the Philippines, gave a summary of his assessment of the UNHCR and the CPA: If you want to say the UNHCR is not an advocate for the refugees here thats true. [] Theyre bureaucrats. Theyll never acknowledge screwing up. If theres a big problem here, theyll cover it up. [] If you want screwed-up cases, I can give you screwed-up cases. [] But the screening is history. The camps closing [] so my big interest is to see that happen as quickly and painlessly as possible (Gourevitch 1995: 33). History then it became. By 1996, approximately 100,000 boat people were returned to Vietnam either voluntarily or by force (Mundo 1999). In its Special Report on the CPA in 1996, the Steering Committee concluded that the objectives of the CPA had been met. Thanking countries of first asylum and the donor community, the UNHCR made special note that the Comprehensive Plan of Action has drawn to a close after seven years. It resolved a vast and complex set of problems. Its beneficiaries numbered in the hundreds of thousands. The plans commitment to a common search for peaceful, humanitarian solutions may well be felt for years to come (UNHCR 1996: 23). But at what cost?

6. Stateless Vietnamese in Hong Kong: 1996-2000

In the same report, the UNHCR made two specific references concerning those who could not be repatriated before the deadline: As of June 1996, some 15,000 screened-out Vietnamese remained in Hong Kong camps. In respect of the Philippines authorities have announced that the screened-out population remaining at
76 Letter from a lawyer working in Hong Kong. See also UN unfairly withdrew its mandate power, in which it was noted that an unaccompanied minor committed suicide in response to a UN announcement that refugee status already granted would be taken back. TV Tuan San (Vietnamese), No 377, 16/6/1993, p. 18.

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the end of June 1996 some 2,300 Vietnamese will be permitted to remain in the country upon conclusion of the CPA (UNHCR 1996: 17). Since then no mention of the remaining population has been made by the UNHCR in any of its official publications. As far as its bureaucrats are concerned the boat people exodus is over.77 By June 1998, however, there were only about 1,200 Vietnamese refugees left in Hong Kong who could not be resettled elsewhere and some 700 screened-out Vietnamese who were classified as de facto stateless owing to the fact that they were either not recognised by Vietnam as its nationals or not accepted for return.78 As defined in Article 1 of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons79 (1954 Convention), statelessness means a person who is not considered as a national by any state under the operation of its law. This is, in the strictest sense, the legal definition of de jure stateless persons. Regarding de facto stateless persons, the U.N. document A Study on Statelessness80 describes them as: Persons who, having left the country of which they are nationals, no longer enjoy the protection and assistance of their national authorities, either because these authorities refuse to grant them assistance and protection, or because they themselves renounce the assistance. The Chairman of the 1959 U.N. Conference on the Elimination and Reduction of Future Statelessness consequently confirmed that: Statelessness de facto did not arise from any conflict of national laws, but in most cases from a decision by the person concerned that he no longer wished to seek the assistance of the country whose nationality he possessed.81 Two years later, at a U.N. conference where the 1961 Convention of the Reduction of Statelessness 82 (1961 Convention) was adopted, the then High Commissioner, Felix Schnyder, remarked: The United Nations High Commissioner hopes that persons who are refugees within his mandate and who are de jure or de facto stateless [] will be enabled to benefit equally from the provisions of the Convention on the Reduction of Future Statelessness.83 The Commissioners hope turned out to be woefully false. Though de facto stateless persons were included in a recommendation attached in the Final Act
77 78

Comment made in February 2002 by a UNHCR protection officer based in Geneva. For a thorough discussion of the remaining group, see the Hong Kong Governments Immigration Department <www.info.gov.hk/hab/doc/e-pt2-9.doc> 79 360 UNTS 117; text in UNHCR, Collection of International Instruments relating to Refugees, (1979), 59. 80 U.N. Doc. E/1112 and Add.1 (1949). 81 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/C.1/SR.19, p. 10. 82 989 UNTS 175; text in UNHCR, Collection of International Instruments relating to Refugees (1979), 82. 83 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.9/11 (30 June 1961), p. 4.

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of the 1961 Convention, its definition and the term were not included in any of the Conventions on Statelessness. The recommendation merely provided that State parties to the 1954 Convention and to the 1961 Convention [] may extend their benefit to de facto stateless persons (Lee 1995: 203). The UNHCR, for its part, was requested to act as a provisional tribunal to deal with the phenomena 84 . This ad hoc situation was later adopted by the General Assembly in 1976 committing the UNHCR to continually perform its function as a provisional tribunal to find ways of reducing and solving statelessness (Batchelor 1995: 256). Given the nature of its provisional mandate, however, since then UNHCRs work on behalf of stateless persons has been largely confined to awareness campaigns and training activities (UNHCR 2001). It is worthy of note that as of 2002, there were 54 state parties to the 1954 Convention and only 26 parties to the 1961 Convention (UNHCR 2001). Between 1992 and 1994, despite being consistently denied repatriation and not recognised by Vietnam as its nationals, the group of 700-odd stateless persons in Hong Kong was subjected to indefinite detention pending their removal (Trinh 1996: 64). In 1995, habeas corpus proceedings were initiated on behalf of the group seeking their release on the grounds that their indefinite detention was illegal. After a successful appeal to the UK Privy Council, they were released on recognizance with their detention being described as an affront to mankind.85 In a move said to be criticised by Headquarters in Geneva, the UNHCR Head Mission in Hong Kong at the time, Jean-Noel Wetterwald, wrote to the U.S. appealing for the stateless cases to be considered favourably for resettlement under humanitarian grounds. Classified as non-nationals by the Vietnamese Government, the Head Mission went on, these families [] are de facto stateless as [] they cannot return to Vietnam (Wetterwald 1997). There was no discussion as to why this group was specifically referred to as de facto stateless when it appeared that they may be legally defined as de jure stateless. In any event, this particular initiative undertaken on behalf of the stateless de jure or de facto was ignored by the resettlement countries. Stranded in limbo, it was not until February 2000 that their future was finally decided when the Hong Kong Government announced that this group of stateless Vietnamese would be allowed to remain indefinitely in the territory86 .

84

Signatories to the Conventions could not agree on the establishment of a separate agency to deal with stateless disputes. 85 See Tan Te Lam and Others v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1996] 2 WLR 863. 86 Under Hong Kong laws, they will be eligible for permanent residency after seven years of continuous stay.

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7. Stateless Vietnamese in the Philippines: 1996-2002

Set against a slightly different legal and factual background, the group of some 2,300 de facto stateless Vietnamese in the Philippines resulted from the non-enforcement of the Philippines forced repatriation program87. Then Philippine Foreign Secretary, Domingo Siazon, announced that the remaining Vietnamese population would be allowed to stay in the Philippines until a durable solution is found (US Committee for Refugees 1998). A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)88 was duly signed in July 1996 between the Philippine Government and the Catholic Church providing, among other things, a national policy which will continue to pursue the policy of voluntary repatriation for the remaining Vietnamese nationals [] without prejudice to other durable solutions that may be adopted89. Further, it was provided that the MOU shall continue to be in force until a more durable solution is adopted addressing the problem on the status and condition of the Vietnamese nationals90. Again, there was no evidence of UNHCR involvement with the new and perhaps, refreshing development. Like its mother, the United Nations, one could assume that with no enforcement capacity and no executive power beyond the organisation (Shawcross 2000: 34), the UNHCR was in no position to negotiate innovative deals. In many instances of humanitarian interventions, that indeed has been the case. In this case however, instead of being supportive of the new precedent being set, the UNHCR condemned it as passionately as it could and in the same manner as it did with the U.S. refugee resettlement program for Vietnamese returnees (ROVR) established in the same year91. Without any mention of its humanitarian mandate which commits the High Commissioner to provide international protection to refugees irrespective of any dateline or geographic limitation92, the UNHCR offered two explanations for its standing on the issue. First, by going alone, the Philippines effectively went against
87 Forced repatriation was stopped after the first and only repatriation flight in February 1996 aroused fierce criticisms from both NGOs and the influential Catholic Church. See Philippines Agrees Not to Forcibly Repatriate Vietnamese, Catholic World News, News Brief, 2/15/1996. 88 Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) representing the Philippine Government and the Centre for Assistance to Displaced Persons (CADP) representing the Catholic Church (1996). 89 Article 1. 90 Article 2. 91 Thanks in part to strong UNHCR objections, the U.S. Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees (ROVR) program was first defeated when the proposal was for re-screening to be conducted in asylum camps instead of in Vietnam as it was later compromised. 92 Statute of the Office of the UNHCR, Resolution 428 (V) adopted by the U.N General Assembly, 14 December 1950. See UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, 1979.

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one of the main principles established under the CPA: that all screened-out boat people must be repatriated. Second, the seemingly humanitarian act, it argued, set a dangerous precedent for all future international co-operation efforts in refugee status determination and repatriation (Boat People S.O.S 1996). Not only would the move undermine the CPA in principle (and it did), it was regarded as a slap in the UNHCR face for its solution-oriented approach and insistence on the clearance of the camps by June 1996. Suddenly, the UNHCR had to face up to two realities: its approval on forced repatriation was, for the first time, flatly rejected by a nation state not well known for its human rights track records. In addition, another legal and logistical problem arose without clear indication as to how it might be solved. In the end, the UNHCR chose to opt out altogether. Its bureaucrats packed their bags, closed the camps, and moved onto other hot spots of international concern. More than anything, the unprecedented humanitarian move on the part of the Philippine Government was a major loss of face for the Office of the UNHCR. Naturally, there has been little incentive since then for it to be reminded of the remaining boat people (Liverani 2001: 17). In hindsight, one can understand why the UNHCR took such a strong stand against the screened-out population. Given its bureaucratic structure, any proposal would seem to be at odds with its comprehensive plan, regardless of intention. For many of its staff on the ground, the CPA simply went on for too long [] and cost too much money (UNHCR 1996: 23). As the then High Commissioner, Mrs Sadako Ogata, readily pointed out, we all know that the attention of the international community towards any group of persons, no matter how desperate their circumstance, cannot be unlimited. To those who still linger in the camps in the false hope of being resettled, Mrs Ogata frankly advised: Do not lose any more time [] return home as quickly as possible (Ogata 1995). For practical purposes, the Commissioner made no mention as to why the screened-out chose to remain in the Philippines despite their lack of status. Nevertheless, linger they did in the Philippines and continue to do so to this day. Unless volunteered and accepted for return to Vietnam the prospect of which is non-existent at present the remaining 900 families continue to be denied effective national protection, a pre-requisite condition required to satisfy the legal test of statelessness (Batchelor 1995) 93. As the remaining 2,000 Vietnamese in the Philippines have been denied national protection since 1989 when they fled Vietnam by boat, their de facto statelessness could be said to have started in 1989 and reaffirmed in 1996 when they refused to avail themselves of protection by repatriation. Owing to this lack of state protection and an unwillingness to act on the part of the
It is worthy of note that this particular manifestation applies to all former Vietnamese nationals who have left the country permanently, whether illegally by boat or through normal migration channels, as Vietnam does not recognise dual citizenship nor does it extend recognition to those who renounced its protection.
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authorities, some stateless Vietnamese boat people have since been murdered while for others, suicide appeared to be the only and final choice (Armstrong 2000: 34). Concerning the Philippines, the situation remains just as grim. Despite the MOU and many of its guarantees, no durable solution has been found. This was confirmed by the then Immigration Bureau Commissioner, Rufus Rodriguez, in 1998: The consistent policy of the Philippine Government is to repatriate the remaining Vietnamese nationals to Vietnam, or resettle them to a third country. [] The Philippines has never been, and is not, a resettlement country. It also has no intention of socially integrating persons whose applications for asylum/refugee status it denied in the first place.94 To an extent, UNHCRs original exasperation proved to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Had the screened-out boat people been forced back to Vietnam, they would have had the chance to avail themselves of the U.S. ROVR program mentioned earlier. By the end of 1999, 88% of the 19,926 applicants who were confirmed by UNHCR as economic migrants and repatriated from Southeast Asian camps, were determined to be genuine refugees by U.S. immigration officers95. Not surprisingly, the UNHCR has not offered any comments on the latest developments. In fact, its offices in the Philippines and Geneva have consistently refused to help resolve the existing stateless situation despite its clear mandate provided under Article 11 of the 1961 Convention (Batchelor 1995: 255). Legally, it may well be excused since the term de facto stateless persons was not included in the Conventions on Statelessness, as indicated earlier. However, from a humanitarian perspective a premise upon which the very existence of its Office rested its lack of concern for the stateless Vietnamese in the Philippines undermines not only the integrity of the UNHCR as an humanitarian agency, but it raises doubts as to the ethical and professional standards of its highly paid, well trained protection officers tasked to look after the vulnerable. As succinctly summarised by an Australian volunteer who has worked on behalf of the stateless Vietnamese in the Philippines, the UNHCR is all in all bloody useless. Thankfully, with or without UNHCR intervention, a durable solution has been found for approximately 400 stateless Vietnamese who had been separated from their relatives due to the inflexible adherence to certain parts of the CPA. As stated earlier, the CPA specified that refugee status determination be applied in a humanitarian spirit taking into account [] the need to respect the family unit. In reality, this
Letter dated 23 July 1998 addressed to the writer (unpublished). These newly-found refugees were eventually resettled in the U.S. thanks largely to influential U.S lawmakers and NGOs including Republican Representative Chris Smith, Chairman of the U.S. Congress Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights and Boat People S.O.S., an effective refugee lobbying group based in Washington D.C. For more information on ROVR, see the U.S. State Department information, <www.state.gov/www/global/prm/fs_ 000118_eap.html>
95 94

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provision was plainly ignored. Though grouped as nuclear family units for all practical purposes in refugee camps in which they lived, hundreds of Vietnamese refugees were separated from their family the moment their asylum status was ascertained. For the accepted, the West duly resettled them. For the rejected, Vietnam was said to be the only viable option, irrespective of family ties. Campaigned at the time by UNHCR as a major incentive for the continuing success of its voluntary repatriation program, the resettlement countries agreed in 1994 not to process family reunion cases even if applicants were found eligible for migration under domestic laws. Sustained lobbying campaigns by NGOs in the U.S. and Australia led to policy changes96 . By the year 2000 over 300 stateless Vietnamese had benefited from these changes. A further group of 120 stateless persons had also been allowed to resettle permanently in Australia and the U.K. on special humanitarian grounds.97 Needless to say, it is hoped that this situation will continue with prompt assistance from the moral and legal authority of the Office of the UNHCR (assuming that humanitarian principles will in the final end prevail). That will indeed be a very bright day for the stateless Vietnamese in the Philippines.

8. Conclusion
By all measures, the boat people exodus from Vietnam was unprecedented both in scale and in untold suffering. It prompted the anti-war Left to reflect, the pro-capitalist Right to set its agenda on Cold War strategies and the West to collective action. It also set the stage for the UNHCR to emerge as one of the key U.N. agencies, a position it retains to this day. For a time, however, the UNHCR did not know what to do. If not for the U.S. involvement during the Vietnam War and its concern following the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam, one can only guess at what might have happened to the 200,000 displaced Vietnamese scattered across Southeast Asia in the late 1970s. The 1979 Conference on Indochinese Refugees was the first of its kind to offer en masse resettlement in the West as a matter of policy. It appeared at the time a good investment in the business of containing the evils of communism, not to mention genuine concern for the plight of the persecuted. As a result, over half a million Vietnamese boat people took advantage of this liberal, yet politically strategic course of action. But as time passed, the charm wore off and in the absence
Since 1997, all resettlement countries, most notably Canada, Australia and the U.S. have processed eligible family reunion cases. 97 For more information, refer to the Vietnamese Community in Australia Submission on Stateless Vietnamese in Hong Kong and the Philippines dated February 2000 (unpublished) which was supported by many NGOs and lawmakers from the Philippines and Australia.
96

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of Cold War aggression, the humanitarian impulse was stripped away. Limited in executive power and constrained by its own bureaucracy structure, the UNHCR belatedly called another conference. Born out of frustration and scepticism, the CPA became an easy target for disregard for international human rights principles. In developing countries, it was abused and exploited without much intervention from the UNHCR a major problem which was not simple to solve given the different political and cultural settings. In developed countries of resettlement, it was used to initially shift the wheat from the chaff, and later to coerce the screened-out into repatriation. As evidenced throughout this paper, often this was done in clear violation of the boat peoples human rights and of the terms established under the CPA. Consequently, families were arbitrarily separated and continue to be to this day. Countless others were forcibly returned to Vietnam undermining not only the 1951 Refugee Convention and the principle of non refoulement but also the integrity and reputation of the UNHCR as an humanitarian agency. As shown, the resultant caseloads of stateless Vietnamese in Hong Kong and the Philippines bear testimony to the international failure to find a compromise approach in resolving the boat people exodus. Equipped with its solution-oriented directive, the UNHCR was adamant about closing the chapter with no regard for the boat peoples aspirations or its own humanitarian mandate. This, along with the inadequacy of international protection for stateless persons has resulted in approximately 2,000 Vietnamese boat people still languishing in the Philippines without any protection after 13 years of displacement. Though NGOs and well-intentioned policy makers have been instrumental in the resettlement of some stateless families over the last five years, it is the international community, as represented by the Office of the UNHCR, that has to resolve this decade-long human tragedy. If not, it must be concluded that the CPA has not come to a successful conclusion.

References
ARMSTRONG, K. (2000) Fighting for the Forgotten People, Law Institute Journal, February (Melbourne): 34-5. AUSTRALIAN HANSARD (1994) Evidence of Mr Cuong Vo, President, Vietnamese Community in Australia and Mr Simon Jeans, Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, 5 October, 201-5. BAKER, P. (1996) The Comprehensive Plan of Action and Statelessness in Hong Kong. Paper presented at the Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University, on 23 October. BATCHELOR, C. (1995) Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection, International Journal of Refugee Law, 7(2): 232-259. BOAT PEOPLE S.O.S. (1996) Vietnamese Boat People in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong:

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UNHCRs Failures in the Comprehensive Plan of Action. Report compiled by Boat People S.O.S. in May 1996, Virginia. BRONEE, S (1993) The History of the Comprehensive Plan of Action, International Journal of Refugee Law, 5(4): 534-543. BROOK, R. (2001) Vietnamese Asylum Seekers in Hong Kong: Rule of Law Rhetoric under the Colonial Regime. Dissertation submitted to the Department of Law, University of Hong Kong. CASTLES, S. (2000) International Migration at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: Global Trends and Issues, International Social Science Journal, 165: 269-81. CATHOLIC WORLD NEWS (1996) Philippines Agrees Not to Forcibly Repatriate Vietnamese, News Brief, 15/2/1996, <http://www.cwnews.com/Browse/1996/02/60.htm> CHIMNI, B.S. (1998) The Geo-politics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11: 350-74. GOUREVITCH, P. (1995) The Boat People, Granta, January. GRANT, B. (1979) The Boat People, Penguin Books, New York. HA, S. (1993) Dai Hoc Mau (in Vietnamese), Tu Quynh, California. HATHAWAY, J. (1991) The Law of Refugee Status, Butterworths, Canada. ______ (1993) Labelling the Boat People: The Failure of the Human Rights Mandate of the Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, Human Rights Quarterly, 15: 686-702. HELTON, A. (1993) Refugee Determination under the Comprehensive Plan of Action: Overview and Assessment, International Journal of Refugee Law, 5(4): 544-558. HONG KONG DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION (2002) Vietnamese Asylum Seekers, 61, <http://www.info.gov.hk/hab/doc/e-pt2-9.doc> HONG KONG HANSARD (1989) Comment made by Secretary for Security in Hong Kong Legislative Council on 15 February 1989, 939. LAMB, D. (1998) Leftovers of the War in Vietnam, Los Angeles Times, 4/6/1998. LEE, T. (1995) Stateless Persons and the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, International Journal of Refugee Law, 7(2): 201-31. LIVERANI, M.R. (2001) Award winning Lawyer Urges: Say Yes Minister Lets Wrap Up the Last 500, N.S.W. Law Society Journal, February 2001: 16-7. OAKLEY, P. (1996) Statement made to the Third Committee, United Nations General Assembly, New York on 31 October 1996, <http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/population/press_ releases/961007.html> OGATA, S. (1995) Opening Statement made at the Sixth Meeting of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on Indo-Chinese Refugees in Geneva on 16 March 1995, <www.unhcr.ch> ______ (1996), Speech made on 17 July 1996 at the Fourth Annual Sir Edward Weary Dunlop Asialink Lecture in Melbourne Australia, <www.unhcr.ch> ______ (1997) Statement made at the InterAction Annual Forum, Virginia, U.S. on 5 May 1997, <www.unhcr.ch> PHAM, M. (1992) Vietnamese Boat People: Economic Migrants or Political Refugees?. Honours Thesis submitted to the Department of Government and Public Administration, Sydney University.

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POYNDER, N. (1995) Recent Implementation of the Refugee Convention in Australia and the Law of Accomodations to International Human Rights Treaties. Have We Gone Too Far?, Australian Journal of Human Rights, 2(1). ROBINSON, C. (1998) Terms of Refuge: The Indochinese Exodus and the International Response, Zed Books, London. RODRIGUEZ, R. (1998), Letter addressed to the writer dated 23 July 1998 (not published). SEARAC (2002) Emergency Response to the Refugee Flow (1979-1981). Summary made on SEARACs website at <http://www.searac.org/iractosea.html> SHAWCROSS, W. (2000) Deliver Us From Evil: Peacekeepers, Warlords and a World of Endless Conflict, Simon and Schuster, New York. SMITH, C. (2001) The Clinton Administrations Egregious Record on Vietnamese Refugees and a Republican Response. Paper presented to the Vietnamese Community in the U.S. TRINH, H. (1996) Detained Pending Repatriation, Alternative Law Journal, 21(2): 6466. TV TUAN SAN (1993) U.N. unfairly withdrew its mandate power, TV Tuan San (in Vietnamese), 377: 18. UNHCR (1979a) Collection of International Instruments relating to Refugees, UNHCR, Geneva. ______ (1979b) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, UNHCR, Geneva. ______ (1996) Special Report on the Comprehensive Plan of Action, UNHCR, Geneva. ______ (2000) The State of the Worlds Refugees, UNHCR, Geneva. ______ (2001) Evaluation of UNHCRs role and activities in relation to statelessness, UNHCR, Geneva. U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES (1998) USCR Country Report: Philippines, USCR, Washington. U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT (2000) East Asian Refugee Admissions Program, Fact Sheet, 18 January 2000, <http://www.state.gov/www/global/prm/fs_000118_eap.html> VIETNAMESE COMMUNITY IN AUSTRALIA (2000) Stateless Vietnamese in Hong Kong and the Philippines. Submission presented to Australias Immigration Minister, Phillip Ruddock, in February 2000 (unpublished). WETTERWALD, J.N. (1997), Letter written to Clyde Bishop of the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong dated 10 July 1997 (unpublished).

Cases
Tan Te Lam and Others v Superintendent of Tai A Chau Detention Centre [1996] 2 WLR 863, Privy Council, U.K. Vo Thi Do and 1240 Ors v The Director of Immigration, CA 210/96, Power ACJ, Litton VP and Mayo JA, 29 November 1996, Hong Kong Court of Appeal, Hong Kong.

Burmese Refugees in Thailand: The Provision of Humanitarian Relief to Karen Refugees on the Thai-Burmese Border
98 99

Helen K. Brooks100
In memory of Dr Michael Aris who, during a brief discussion in October 1998, unwittingly inspired me to write this paper. I dedicate this paper to him and to all the Burmese refugees living in Thailand, as well as the countless internally displaced persons in Burma.

1. Introduction
The 1980s saw the emergence of a number of important articles which challenged traditional assumptions about the administration of humanitarian relief and the so-called refugee dependency syndrome (Clark 1985). From her study of the Sahrawi refugees in Algeria conducted in 1981, Harrell-Bond discovered that, because the refugees were given autonomy in the areas where they settled, they were able to mobilise their own resources and cope with problems, even though they were ultimately dependent on capital inputs from outside the camps. She concluded that the dependency syndrome observed among refugees elsewhere was the result of the way aid was managed by humanitarian agencies (1986: 3). In his work with camp refugees in Somalia, Kibreab found evidence that, although the refugees had been dependent on relief aid for over a decade, they still seized any opportunity to earn an income (1993: 335).
The Burmese government renamed the country Myanmar in 1989, and this term is used by UNHCR, Amnesty International and a number of other international organisations. However, I have used the name Burma, which is the form preferred by the leaders of the democracy movement. The British government also uses this name. 99 This paper was first written in early 1999, just as the UNHCR was establishing a formal presence on the Thai-Burmese border. The article has been updated to include more recent developments, although its main focus remains the changing environment in the 1990s. 100 I would like to thank the Burmese Border Consortium (Jack Dunford and Sally Thompson), Ashley South, Sandra Dudley, Edith Bowles, Kevin Heppner, Donna Guest and Kerry Demusz. Without their first-hand knowledge and helpful, expert advice, this paper would not have been possible.
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The specific aim of this paper is to explore the implications of the changing political and security situation on the Thai-Burmese border for the provision of humanitarian relief to Karen refugees since they started fleeing to Thailand in 1984. (It is not possible here to enter into a discussion about the complexities of the refugee community. This does not mean, however, that I consider the Karen refugees to be an homogeneous group, with identical values and interests).101 The circumstances in these border camps have been unusual because of the lack of involvement by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) until late 1998, and the limited nature of the relief provided by humanitarian organisations in the first decade of the refugees presence in Thailand. The early years were largely characterised by relative self-sufficiency in a peaceful environment. The refugees administered their own welfare through camp committees, which coordinated with local officials and a consortium of (both international and local) NGOs. Although this basic structure persists today, it has since the mid-1990s been threatened by a sharp deterioration in the security of the Karen refugees. This has been coupled with an increasing impatience on the part of the Thai authorities as host government to this large number of refugees from Burma. Sadly, by the end of the 1990s, the issue had become one of protection,102 and of how humanitarian relief could best be provided in this volatile political and security situation. It was into this context that the UNHCR established its presence in 1998-99. I chose to focus on the Karen103 for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are by far the largest group of Burmese ethnic minority refugees in Thailand, and they are probably the second largest ethnic group in Burma104 after the Burmans.105 Secondly, their situation is interesting because, unlike most of the other ethnic minority groups, the Karen National Union (KNU) has not until very recently signed a cease-fire agreement with the Burmese military government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).106
Malkki draws attention to the dangers of generalising about refugees, and criticises the tendency to assume that they all share a common condition or nature (1995: 511). Zetter has warned against labelling refugees (1988, 1991), as have Allen and Turton (1996: 7-9). 102 For a discussion about the need for protection in this region, see McCann 1996 and Bowles 1997. 103 Karen is an umbrella term for a large number of sub-groups, with ethnic and religious differences. Most Karen are Buddhists, but about one-fifth are Christians and there is a small number of animists. For a detailed examination of Karen ethnicity, see Keyes 1979 and Smith 1991. 104 Although there are no confirmed figures for the number of Karen living in Burma, Smith estimated in 1994 that, according to anthropologists, there were around four million, of a total population of 42 million in Burma as a whole (Smith 1994: 42). 105 Burman refers to an ethnic group. Burmese refers to all the citizens of Burma and to the language. 106 In January 2004, the KNU and the SPDC signed a provisional cease-fire. At the time of
101

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2. Definitions and Sources

The word relief107 has been chosen because it was a term adopted by the NGO consortium working on the border; but also because, in my opinion, it reflects most clearly the circumstances since the mid-1990s of the Karen refugees living in Thailand: increasingly in need of relief in the sense of emergency assistance.108 This paper confines its discussion to the provision of food and other relief supplies (for example, mosquito nets and blankets) to the Karen camps. It does not attempt to cover medical assistance or educational aid. There has previously been little published material about the situation on the Thai-Burmese border109, and that which exists has tended to focus on the human rights situation and the attitude of the Royal Thai Government (RTG). Information about the assistance programmes is lacking, in part because the RTG has always insisted that they remain low-profile. The issue of the changing political situations impact on the provision of relief remains under-researched (although some valuable work has been done: see Bowles 1997; and Demusz 1998). In the absence of an opportunity for fieldwork in Thailand, I conducted a number of informal interviews with former and current NGO staff with direct experience of the Karen camps. Much of my analysis of events in the late 1990s is based on their testimony. The focus of this paper, then, is an examination of the impact of broader political developments on the refugees self-sufficiency the hallmark of the humanitarian relief effort in this border area. One central purpose is to show that these broader political developments flow from conditions inside Burma, and that any discussion of the situation in Thailand should be located firmly within this context. The discussion is divided into three main periods: pre-1995, the period between 1995 and the arrival of the UNHCR in late 1998, and the situation since 1999. Although this risks oversimplifying the complexity of events, 1995 is a useful dividing line and is one which has been employed by a number of other observers (notably Bowles 1997). Section 3 examines the historical background to the Karen refugees presence on the Thai-Burmese border. Section 4 focuses on the response by the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to the Burmese refugees, both before and
writing, it was too early to assess the implications of this agreement for the Karen refugees living in Thailand. However, after more than 50 years of fighting, it is undoubtedly a significant development. 107 For working purposes, I also use the word assistance in this paper. 108 This is particularly striking in view of the fact that (some of) the Karen refugees have already been in Thailand for fifteen to twenty years. 109 This has changed somewhat with the direct involvement of the UNHCR since 1998. The situation in the border camps has been documented in some detail in the UNHCRs Global Appeals and Global Reports, although there is no specific information in these reports about the Karen refugees.

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since 1995, when a shift in policy became evident. There is some analysis here of the cooperation between the RTG and the UNHCR since 1999. Section 5 describes the role of NGOs working on the border and how the refugee committees have coordinated with these agencies. It examines what factors initially led to a situation of relative self-sufficiency among the refugee community, and how this came under threat in the 1990s. It finishes with a summary of the main developments since the UNHCR established its presence in late 1998, with an analysis of the current situation and prospects for the future. The conclusions appear in Section 6.

3. Historical Background
The historical background to the current Karen refugee presence in Thailand has been well-documented, notably by Smith (1991), and is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in order to set the situation in a proper context, it is necessary to take a brief look at the factors which caused large numbers of Karen people to flee into Thailand in the first place. Burma is home to one of the longest civil wars in the world (Bowles 1997: 2). It gained independence from Britain in 1948, and has been ruled by military governments since 1962. The Karen leadership consider themselves an independent nation, never having agreed to incorporation into the modern nation-state of Burma in 1948 (USCR 1986:3). The Karen National Union (KNU) is one of the main armed opposition groups to the Burmese government, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), which was known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) until 1997. The KNUs armed wing, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), had around 10,000 soldiers at its peak during the 1980s, but these numbers have been substantially reduced.110 The armed opposition groups have had to be largely self-supporting. In the early 1980s, the KNUs major source of revenue was the black market trading that went on between Burma and Thailand. In early 1984, the Burmese army attacked Karen trading centres in an attempt to assert control over the border. During this attack, about 9,000 refugees fled across the border into Tak Province. The SLORC/ SPDC has engaged in a systematic campaign to eliminate support for the opposition groups in the past two decades. This campaign, known as the Four Cuts111 has included annual military offensives against opposition bases along the Thai-Burmese
110 According to Burmese government statistics, the KNLA had around 7,000 soldiers in 2003 (Reliefweb 2004), although international human rights and media organisations have tended to put the figure at between 2,000 and 6,000 since 1999. 111 The Four Cuts refers to a strategy in which civilian populations are targeted in order to cut off food, funds, intelligence and recruits to the ethnic forces (Human Rights Watch 1998: 28).

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border during the dry season (October - May); and forced relocation of villages in Karen State and elsewhere.112 The practice of forced labour, including forced portering has also been documented by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other organisations. In December 1994, a few hundred Buddhist members of the KNLA broke away and established the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA).113 It formed a tactical alliance with the SLORC and, in January 1995, overran the KNU headquarters at Manerplaw in Karen State. The fall of Manerplaw, which resulted in 10,000 more Karen people fleeing to Thailand, was a devastating blow to the Karen. Previously, the KNU had controlled most of the river border, providing de facto protection of the Karen refugees. However, following this offensive, the DKBA swept over the border and started a reign of terror against the Karen camps, in an attempt to force the refugees to return to Burma (Amnesty International 1997: 15). By the end of 1997, the Burmese army had occupied most of the Thai-Burmese border, and the KNU controlled very little territory. The landscape of the camps along the border has undergone a face-lift since 1984. In 1984, there were about 9,000 refugees living in seven camps. By January 1997, this had risen to 80,000 people in 23 camps. In January 1999, 90,000 refugees were living in ten camps, (including one with a population of 30,000) and further consolidations were planned (BBC 1999: 2). In September 2003, an estimated 110,000 refugees were living in nine camps along the border (UNHCR 2003: 208).114

There are a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Burma, from among whom much of the refugee community has come. Although this paper has focused on Karen refugees in Thailand, the IDPs are widely considered to be suffering an even more desperate situation. See Burma Ethnic Research Group and Friedrich Naumann Foundation 1998; Asian Legal Resource Centre 2003). 113 Although the establishment of the DKBA is often portrayed as a simple Christian/Buddhist split within the KNU, it was in fact caused by resentment among the rank-and-file towards the (largely Christian) KNU leadership. There were more Buddhists in the KNLA than the DBKA (personal communication with Kevin Heppner, Karen Human Rights Group, 6 March 1999. See also KHRG 1996). 114 The UNHCR clearly expects these numbers to continue to rise. Its planning figures for January and December 2004 respectively are 131,700 and 142,100. (UNHCR 2003: 208).

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4. The Response of the Royal Thai Government (RTG)115

4.1 Background
Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees, although it does have responsibilities under the principle of non-refoulement, which is considered by many to be a principle of customary international law (Amnesty International 1997: 13). In addition, Thailand is a member of the inter-governmental Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Historically, there was no UNHCR presence on the Thai-Burmese border (unlike the situation on the Thai-Cambodian border), although the UNHCR has had an office in Bangkok since 1977 and has been able to visit the camps with the permission of the Thai authorities. In July 1998, UNHCR and the RTG signed an agreement that would allow UNHCR to set up offices in the border towns of Mae Sot, Kanchanaburi and Mae Hong Son. These had been opened by the end of 1998 (BBC 1999: 1). In December 1999, there were 31 members of staff - 4 international and 27 national - working in the Bangkok Office and the three field offices (UNHCR 2000: 254), but by 2003, the number of staff had almost doubled to 61 - 14 international and 47 national (UNHCR 2003: 210).116 Thailand has never recognised the Burmese people fleeing Thailand as refugees, but has always called them Displaced Persons. In sum, the overt assumption by the RTG has always been that it would be a short-term problem, with repatriation the ultimate objective.

4.2 Pre-1995 Situation

The Thai authorities were fairly tolerant of the refugees when they first arrived in Thailand, due to a number of important factors. These ranged from considerations related to the broader political and economic context of the time, to the simple fact that the areas into which the Karen refugees were fleeing were inhabited by ethnic Karen (of Thai nationality). A history of antagonism and mutual suspicion
It should be noted that the RTG is not an homogeneous organisation, and that the various parts of it which deal with the refugees are not cohesive. Frequent policy disagreements have taken place between different government departments over camp moves (KHRG 1998: 15), and there has been a long-standing struggle between the Thai military and the government for control over the camps (personal communication with Heppner, March 1999). This situation persists today. 116 By 2003, the Bangkok Office was also responsible for activities in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (UNHCR 2003: 210). It also deals with non-Burmese refugees, notably the Rohingya refugees from Bangladesh.
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between the Thai and Burmese armies (Smith 1991) meant that the ethnic minorities in the border areas, including the Karen, served as a useful buffer between the two sides. The Thai authorities also maintained their distance from their Burmese counterparts by engaging in large-scale black-market trading with the resistance groups who controlled the territory along the border. The areas the refugees fled to were not heavily populated and the camps were small, so the impact on the environment and on local resources was minimal. When they first arrived, the refugee leaders negotiated with the local Thai land-owners and district officials, as well as the military, to find sites for the camps (Bowles 1997: 5). Through the imposition of guidelines, the Thai authorities ensured that the NGOs maintained an unobtrusive, low-profile presence, attracting only limited international attention. The contrast with the huge, internationally well-known Indochinese issue is obvious. One of the legacies of that situation was a determination on the part of the Thai authorities to keep assistance low-key, with minimal international interventions, and to avoid the creation of large, closed camps (Demusz 1998: 234).

4.3 1995-1999
In the mid-late 1990s, a growing impatience on the part of the RTG became evident. They relocated and consolidated numerous camps, ostensibly on the grounds of the security problems posed by the DKBA. Admission of newcomers to camps was restricted, and there were cases of refugees being forcibly returned to Burma (HRW 1997: 13-17). A particularly vicious SLORC offensive against KNU-held territory in Burma in February 1997 led to another 20,000 Karen refugees fleeing into Thailand, further antagonising the RTG.117 Following this offensive, the RTG started describing the refugees as Displaced Persons Fleeing Fighting (DPFF).118 This was an attempt to restrict entry to Thailand to people who were directly fleeing conflict, on the basis that they could be returned to Burma once the fighting stopped. In addition, the temporary nature of the situation was emphasised by the RTGs insistence that the new refugee camps be called temporary shelters (Burma Update 1997: 4). One former NGO worker observed, The RTG would really like the whole problem to go away, and controlling the refugees is a way to deter new arrivals and to work towards an eventual repatriation.119
Various human rights organisations produced detailed accounts of this offensive. See KHRG 1997. 118 In 2004, the RTG still describes all the people living in the border camps as displaced persons fleeing fighting. This definition is at odds with that of the UNHCR, which considers all the people in the border camps refugees. The UNHCR also considers other Burmese people of concern living outside the camps to be refugees (UNHCR 2003: 208). 119 Personal communication, 23 February 1999.
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Economic and trade considerations increasingly became a factor in RTG policy towards the refugees as Thailands relations with the Burmese government warmed during the 1990s (USCR 1997). The refugees, once a useful buffer between the Thai and Burmese armies, became an irritant and an embarrassment. Their presence drew attention to the SPDCs appalling human rights record, which had caused them to flee from Burma, and they created an unwelcome obstacle in trade relations between the two governments.120 The camp attacks which took place in the mid-to-late 1990s, although largely carried out by the DKBA, were ordered and organised by the SPDC. The DKBA soldiers tended to operate as adjuncts to the Burmese military units, acting as guides to point out KNU sympathisers. For the Burmese military, this had the added benefit of transferring the blame onto the DKBA, and made Karen hate Karen.121

4.4 The Situation since 1999

Since late 1998, the UNHCR has been working with refugees in the border camps, in close coordination with the RTG and a number of international and national NGOs. The UNHCRs mandate has been one of protection, rather than assistance. In the early days of its formal presence, a number of the UNHCRs main objectives were achieved.122 The refugees in the camps were registered and at least two camps at particular risk were relocated123 (UNHCR 2000: 252). The UNHCRs presence has had a positive impact because it has added legitimacy to the situation in the border camps. It has encouraged NGOs to get more involved in protection issues and has increased awareness and response on some issues such as sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), camp justice and the needs of the extremely vulnerable.124 However, the overall picture of achievement has been mixed. There have been inevitable tensions between the RTG and the UNHCR, partly because of the RTGs ambivalence towards the UNHCR having a status determination role in Thailand125
This pattern is in many ways reminiscent of events on the Thai-Lao border of the 1980s (see Long 1993: 187). 121 Personal communication with Heppner, March 1999. 122 Main objectives in 1999-2000 included the regularisation of the refugee population through a joint registration exercise with the RTG; enhancement of the security of camp populations by relocating a number of camps; respect and implementation in Thailand of the fundamentals of international protection, particularly the principles of asylum and non-refoulement; and implementation of mechanisms to determine refugee admission (UNHCR 1999: 252; UNHCR 2000: 325). 123 Although there have been no cross-border attacks since 1998, the perceived threat of such violence remains. (Personal communication with the Burmese Border Consortium, 9 February 2004). 124 Personal communication with the Burmese Border Consortium, 9 February 2004. 125 The UNHCR is empowered to grant refugee status in Thailand because the country is not
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and partly because of the RTGs increasing impatience with the refugee problem as a whole. For example, in 2000, the RTG denied a UNHCR request to establish a more permanent presence in the camps for fear of creating a pull factor (UNHCR 2002: 336). In the same year, the RTG turned down repeated requests by the UNHCR to move one camp further away from the border on the grounds that only camps at the border would be sure to retain their temporary character (UNHCR 2002: 336). In June 2003, the RTG accused the UNHCR of violating Thai sovereignty by granting refugee status to Burmese exiles.126 Furthermore, UNHCR is still working with the RTG to support the establishment of a full and predictable procedure for status determination and the admission of new arrivals.127 According to the UNHCR and human rights organisations, there is evidence of a number of forcible repatriations by the RTG128 in recent years despite the UNHCRs involvement in the border camps (UNHCR 2000: 253; ALRC 2003). A document called the Working Arrangements was drawn up between the UNHCR and the RTG in 1998, setting out a basic framework for cooperation. Unfortunately, the document is only semi-official and remains open to interpretation. Over the years, the UNHCR has encouraged the RTG to amend the agreement to include more concrete provisions, but no amendments have been made.129 Meanwhile, there are no signs at present that the RTG intends to ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention, although the UNHCR has repeatedly encouraged it to do so. Therefore, the RTGs international legal obligations in this respect remain limited. The RTGs increasingly restrictive policies have doubtless been influenced in part by public opinion, which has grown more hostile towards Burmese refugees since the late 1990s130. This public mood will have strengthened the hand of those

signatory to the 1951 Convention and does not have legislation governing the determination of refugee status. 126 The Thai authorities were probably particularly nervous because the Burmese activists had organised a demonstration calling for the release of democracy leader Aung Sang Suu Kyi. 127 In fact, the UNHCR suspended all screening of new asylum-seekers from Burma with effect from 1 January 2004, under intense pressure from the RTG. In February 2004, this had not been re-instated. 128 The main culprit appears to be the Royal Thai Army Ninth Division, which has been reported by human rights organisations to have forcibly returned refugees and asylum-seekers to insecure locations (ALRC 2003). 129 In a report published in December 2003, the UNHCR seemed resigned to the fact that these arrangements had still not been formalised after five years: Although working arrangements with the Government remain unspecified at a formal level, a pragmatic understanding has been achieved and this has enabled UNHCR and the Government to collaborate effectively. (UNHCR 2003: 208). 130 Public hostility has grown following a number of incidents involving urban refugees in recent years. For example, a siege by Burmese political activists at the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok in October 1999 attracted a good deal of local criticism.

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in the RTG who advocate a greater degree of restrictiveness towards Burmese refugees/migrants. In addition, there has been a noticeable increase in the harshness of the RTGs policies since Prime Minister Thaksin came into office in September 2001. Thaksin has made clear his interest in improving relations with the Burmese regime and the refugee issue is a constant irritant in this relationship. There has been a tendency to direct criticisms mainly at the RTG. While it is entirely reasonable to look to the host government to provide a minimum level of protection for the refugees, criticism of RTG policies must be framed in the context of the broader backdrop of the situation in Burma itself. This is not intended to be an apology for the Thai government, but rather an attempt to return the debate to its proper arena: the desperate conditions in Burma which created the refugee population in the first place and are still causing so many people to flee. Although condemnable in many respects, RTG policies do have to be examined in the context of the numbers involved. Thailand has been one of the major refugee-receiving countries in the world. The Karen population who fled to Tak province in 1984 initially numbered 9,000. By late 1989, this figure had doubled to 20,000, and then grew to over 90,000 by the end of 1998. The total number of Burmese ethnic minority refugees in Thailand was estimated at around 115,000 in 1998.131 In 2003, UNHCR estimated that 110,000 Burmese refugees were living in the border camps. The increased restrictiveness of the Thai governments policies has been a clear attempt to regain control of a situation which has developed far beyond its expectations.

5. The Relief Programme: Coordination Between the NGOs and the Refugee Committees
5.1 Background
When the Karen refugees arrived in 1984, the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), an umbrella organisation, was already in place in Thailand, having been established in 1975 to address the needs of the Indochinese refugees (from Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos). Assuming it would be a temporary problem, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) asked the CCSDPT to provide basic emergency assistance in a low-key way (BBC 1996; Bowles 1997).
131 This included over twenty thousand refugees from two of the other main ethnic groups, the Karenni (who first fled to Thailand in significant numbers in 1989) and the Mon (who fled in 1990, but were largely repatriated in 1996 following a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC).

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From the beginning, the RTG insisted that relief be restricted to essential items, such as staple foods, clothing and medical supplies. In response, the Consortium of Christian Agencies (CCA) was set up in 1984 to assist the Karen refugees (it was renamed the Burmese Border Consortium BBC - in 1989). Its NGO members focused on food and relief supplies (including mosquito nets, blankets and mats), but not on medical assistance, which was provided by Medicins Sans Frontieres and a number of other agencies. No NGO personnel were allowed to live in the camps, and no permanent structures were to be built. The working philosophy of the BBC was to provide relief in cooperation with the RTG and, through the refugee committees, to ensure good coordination; and to keep staff levels to a minimum to promote self-sufficiency, minimise aid-dependency, and to help preserve the cultural identity of the refugee communities (BBC 1996). The Karen refugees who first fled to Thailand quickly organised themselves in order to provide for the communitys needs, allowing for a flourishing of independent refugee initiatives tailored to their specific concerns. As Caouette puts it, [it] provided individuals with a sense of responsibility and empowerment amidst total upheaval and horror (Caouette 1991: 3). During the 1990s, the BBC provided all assistance to Karen refugees in coordination with the Karen Refugee Committee (KRC)132 based in Mae Sot, which reported back to the BBC on a monthly basis.133 The refugee camp committees were responsible for storage and distribution of food and other supplies, although BBC staff purchased the supplies and organised the necessary permits from the local Thai authorities (for transportation, etc).134

5.2 The Pre-1995 Situation: Self-Sufficiency and Participation

Bowles describes in detail the situation which prevailed until the mid-1990s. The camps were open with a village-like atmosphere (Bowles 1997: 7), and the lay-out planned by the refugee communities themselves. The camps had communal buildings, such as hospitals and schools, and also churches and temples. There was unrestricted access to the camps for new arrivals, NGOs and journalists (HRW 1998: 34). Because the KNU controlled much of the border, the refugees were able
132 The KRC, staffed entirely by the refugees themselves, has always been institutionally separate from the KNU, (there are no serving members of the KNU on the KRC), but in reality, they have maintained links (interview with Ashley South, former BBC field coordinator, 28 February 1999). 133 This system is still in place in 2004. 134 Both Bowles (1997: 17) and Demusz (1998: 238-9) have pointed to important limitations of the refugee representation structure, notably the fact that the camp committees were staffed by elites, and had a limited capacity to represent the wider community, particularly the poorer and more vulnerable groups.

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to maintain a degree of integration with Karen communities in Burma, and had good access to resources. During the first ten years, the only food assistance135 the BBC provided was rice, salt and fish paste, as well as relief items, such as blankets, mats and mosquito nets. The refugees foraged for themselves in the surrounding forested areas, and Thai officials generally turned a blind eye to people leaving the camps to work during the day (even though this was prohibited in principle). This helped keep morale high and pre-empted apathy and lethargy, traditional symptoms of dependency (Cuny 1983: 3). Importantly, the NGO policy was informed by an understanding of the wider political and historical context of the situation, and good coordination was a feature from the beginning (Bowles 1997: 12). Slim has pointed to the dangers of interagency competition and humanitarian agencies need for publicity in order to boost their resources and standing. These motives can ultimately have a detrimental effect upon the way an agency operates on the ground (Slim 1997: 253). There is no indication that these were problems on the Thai-Burmese border. The relationship between the refugee communities and the relief agencies has on the whole been one of trust and cooperation (Bowles 1998: 13). The fact that the refugees own camp committees distributed the food supplies helped achieve this goal.

5.3 1995-1999: Moving Towards Aid Dependency

The establishment of the DKBA and its numerous attacks on the camps in the mid-late 1990s had devastating effects on camp security. Bowles describes how the atmosphere in the camps underwent a palpable change in 1995, to one of growing fear and distrust (Bowles 1997: 19). This climate of fear had clear implications for the camp committees, with refugees showing reluctance to take on the position of camp leaders, committee members, or medics, in case they were targeted by DKBA soldiers during an attack. (Bowles 1997: 19). Another symbolic shift away from refugee community participation was the hiring of increasing numbers of expatriate and Thai staff by the BBC and other NGOs. This development was caused by the increase in the camp populations, the restrictions on refugee movements, and mounting bureaucratic requirements imposed by the RTG (Bowles 1997: 22). The camp consolidations also had ramifications for the administration of aid programmes in the Karen camps: the NGOs were increasingly having to provide emergency relief136 to refugees who had lost access to many of their former resources, and who were frequently having to recover from the devastation caused by camp attacks. After the mid-1990s, the BBC had to provide building materials, cooking

135 136

See Bowles (1997: 13-15) for a more detailed description of the food relief programmes. Relief items included plastic sheeting, mats, water drums and cooking and eating utensils (BBC 1996: 29).

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fuel and supplementary food stuffs, such as yellow beans and cooking oil (Bowles 1997: 22), which would have been unheard of in the first decade of the Karen presence in Thailand. In 1996, the BBC started providing firewood as a result of the strains on the environment caused by the creation of larger camps (BBC 1996). The food basket was extended in 1998 to include yellow beans and vegetable oil to all refugees (BBC 1999: 1). After 1997, refugees were not permitted to build bamboo sleeping platforms above the ground. The new temporary sites consisted of very closely-spaced tent-like structures covered with heavy-grade plastic. Conditions also changed at established camps, with new restrictions on building schools and repairing houses. Fences were built around some of the camps. Markets and shops were closed, curfews imposed, and restrictions placed on movement in and out of the camps (Burma Issues 1998: 23). With the frequent consolidations, regular attacks on camps and restrictions on admission to the camps, some refugees took to hiding in the jungle on the border, or joined the ranks of illegal immigrants looking for work in Thailand. The BBC was able to provide food relief to up to 8,000 refugees living outside the camps in the second half of 1998, generally with the cooperation of local Thai officials (BBC 1999: 1).

5.4 But Ever-Resourceful in Changing Circumstances

Clark reminds us that refugees coped well at home, and that there is no reason to assume that they will lose their abilities and resourcefulness when they are uprooted (Clark 1985: 1). In the case of the Karen (and many of the other Burmese refugees in Thailand), their escape to Thailand may have followed years of internal displacement inside Burma. Arguably, the frequent disruptions over the years, and the need to rebuild lives and villages, and start again, helped contribute to a high degree of self-reliance among the refugees.137 Although aid dependency among the Karen refugees was clearly on the increase by the end of the 1990s, it would be an insult to the refugee communitys resourcefulness and resilience to imply that they had become passive recipients of a relief programme. In fact, although there were generally fewer opportunities for refugees to fend for themselves, there were signs of an increase in representativeness on the refugee committees. For example, there is some evidence that the refugee committees responded to the new constraints138 in the late 1990s not by surrendering decision-making powers to the NGOs, but by seizing the opportuInterview with South, February 1999. The KRC was set up in very different times, when there were KNU resources available to support their operations and when bureaucratic requirements were much less demanding (BBC 1999: 7).
138 137

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nity to air new views. When it was strong, the KNU tolerated very little internal dissent, and there were limited opportunities for younger Karen people to question the authority of their leaders. However, as the KNU grew weaker in the face of relentless attacks by the SLORC/SPDC, more voices began to emerge in a way that would have been inconceivable five or ten years earlier. For example, in 1998, active non-KNU self-help groups were springing up among the Karen community.139 Meanwhile, the BBC put an increasing emphasis on capacity-building training programmes for the refugee committees (BBC 1999: 7) and these have borne fruit in recent years.

5.5 The Situation since 1999 and Prospects for the Future
Humanitarian relief on the border is still mainly provided by the NGOs, as was the case during the 1990s. As noted above, the UNHCRs mandate has primarily been one of protection, so its official presence has not had an immediate impact on the provision of humanitarian relief to the Karen refugees.140 Instead, the UNHCR has sought to complement the activities of the NGOs (both Burma-specific organisations, such as the BBC, and international organisations. The BBC is providing more relief than ever before141: full rations of cooking fuel and building supplies to all the camps, as well as used clothing. The BBC also gives more household items, for example, making a distribution of cooking pots every two to three years, and is supporting a weaving project. In January 2004, the BBC introduced blended food to the food basket (vitamin/mineral-enriched flour) to address micro-nutrient deficiencies. The overall aim now is to prevent the need for refugees to leave camp, which would make them vulnerable to arrest and possible abuse.142 In early 2004, an NGO worker on the border commented that we can no longer assume [these] refugees are at all self-sufficient.143 UNHCRs objectives for 2003 and 2004 included the phrase Prepare Myanmar refugees for durable solutions. UNHCR sees the long-term solution as voluntary repatriation, but has stated that the fundamental conditions for this are not in place and that the prospect of voluntary repatriation remains remote. (UNHCR 2003: 208). Meanwhile, the issue of repatriation has come more sharply into focus
Interview with South, February 1999. For example, the NGOs still have bilateral agreements with the RTG, without UNHCR involvement. 141 Although this is mainly due to enforced aid dependency caused by the political and security climate, it is only fair to point out that the NGOs are also having to provide more in order to stay in step with higher donor and/or international standards. 142 In recent years, the Thai authorities have made it increasingly difficult for refugees to leave camp and have stated that they consider people outside the camps to be illegal migrants. 143 Personal communication with the Burmese Border Consortium, 9 February 2004.
140 139

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since 1999. The Thai authorities have frequently made clear that their long-term objective is the return of the refugees (displaced persons) to Burma. At the time of writing in early 2004, there was no concrete plan for repatriation, but it is to be expected that the RTG will sustain the pressure. The signature of a provisional cease-fire between the Burmese government and the KNU in January 2004 was an historic development after fifty years of relentless fighting.144 It is too early to assess the full implications of any lasting agreement for the Karen population living in the border camps. However, there has to be room for optimism, especially as the KNU has said that it wants to address the issues of displacement.

6. Conclusion
Harrell-Bond criticises the common assumption by humanitarian agencies that refugees always require relief, and that material assistance must come from outside the host country (Harrell-Bond 1986: 9). The case of the Karen refugees on the Thai-Burmese border shows that a high degree of self-sufficiency is possible under certain conditions, for example, a relatively tolerant host government, good coordination and planning among NGOs, shared ethnicity on both sides of the border, and a refugee community with resources at their disposal. The success of the original model is all the more poignant for the fact of its erosion since the mid-1990s due to wider political factors. This paper has demonstrated the strong impact political developments can have on the provision of humanitarian relief to refugees, and ultimately on their capacity for self-sufficiency. In this case-study, the loss of KNU territory to the Burmese military exposed the refugees to attacks from across the border, and denied them access to resources they had previously relied upon for their subsistence. The host governments response in consolidating camps and restricting movement in turn led to a need for more comprehensive relief from the NGOs, increasing the tendency towards aid dependency. This paper has argued that the political context which ultimately caused these changes is the desperate situation in Burma, and that any debate about Burmese refugees in Thailand should be shifted back to this starting-point.
144 The Burmese government is planning a national convention in 2004, attended by all rebel ethnic groups, with the aim of drafting a new constitution as part of a roadmap for democracy announced in August 2003. The credibility of this process will rest in large part on the extent of the inclusion of the ethnic groups . At the time of the cease-fire, the KNU was expressing reservations about the national convention and the roadmap, pending further political negotiations (ABC Radio Australia News).

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It has also been noted, however, that it is not simply a question of a broader political context affecting the administration of aid, with the refugees as passive respondents to these events. The challenge now is to continue to find ways to ensure that refugees voices are heard within the constraints of a broader political context which, on the face of it, leaves little room for expressions of autonomy and selfsufficiency. Evidence of resilience and initiative among the refugee community on the Thai-Burmese border has been one of the very few encouraging aspects of this otherwise bleak situation over the past two decades: a thin silver lining which glows with hope for the younger generation.

References
ABC RADIO AUSTRALIA NEWS (2004) Go Asia Pacific Breaking News Asia Burma Government and Karen National Union Reach Deal, <www.abc.net.au> (accessed January 2004). ALLEN, T. and TURTON, D. (1996) Introduction: In Search of Cool Ground, in Allen, T. (ed.) In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight and Homecoming in Northeast Africa, London, James Currey. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1997) Kingdom of Thailand: Human Rights in Transition, London. ______ (1998) Myanmar 19881998: Chronology of Events, London. ______ (1998) Myanmar 19881998: Ethnic Minorities, London. ARTICLE 19 (1996) Fatal Silence? Freedom of Expression and the Right to Health in Burma. ASIAN LEGAL RESOURCE CENTRE (2003) IDPs in Myanmar and forced repatriation from Thailand, written statement by the ALRC to the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights, Geneva. BLACK, R. (1998) Putting Refugees in Camps, Forced Migration Review, 2: 4-7. BOWLES, E. (1997) Assistance, Protection and Policy in Refugee Camps on the ThailandBurma Border: An Overview, (unpublished). ______ (1998) From Village to Camp: Refugee Camp Life in Transition on the ThailandBurma Border, Forced Migration Review, 2: 11-14. BRYANT, R. (1996) Asserting Sovereignty Through Natural Resource Use: Karen Forest Management on the Thai-Burmese Border in Howett, R. (ed.) Resources, Nations and Indigenous Peoples, Oxford University Press. BURMA ETHNIC RESEARCH GROUP AND FRIEDRICH NAUMANN FOUNDATION (1998) Forgotten Victims of a Hidden War: Internally Displaced Karen in Burma. BURMA ISSUES (1997) To Forcibly Repatriate or Not: Thailands Dilemma, Bangkok, Burma Issues. ______ (1998) Anticipating Repatriation, Bangkok, Burma Issues.

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BURMESE BORDER CONSORTIUM (August 1996) Programme Report for Period 1 January to 30 June 1996, Bangkok. ______ (February 1999) Programme Report for Period 1 July to 31 December 1998. CAOUETTE, T. (1991) Community Empowerment: Experiences with Burmese Refugees, paper presented at the Refugee and Displaced Persons Congress, World Federation of Mental Health, Mexico City, August 1991. CLARK, L. (1985) The Refugee Dependency Syndrome: Physician, Heal Thyself!, Washington D.C., Refugee Policy Group. CUNY, F. (1983) Refugee Participation in Emergency Relief Operations, Washington D.C., Refugee Policy Group. DEMUSZ, K. (1998) From Relief to Development: Negotiating the Continuum on the Thai-Burmese Border, Journal of Refugee Studies, 11(3): 231-244. HARRELL-BOND, B.E. (1986) Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees, Oxford, Oxford University Press. ______ (1992) Counting the Refugees: Gifts, Givers, Patrons and Clients in Journal of Refugee Studies, 5(3/4): 205 225. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1997) No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand, New York. ______ (1998) Unwanted and Unprotected: Burmese Refugees in Thailand, New York. JESUIT REFUGEE SERVICE/ASIA PACIFIC (1997) Burma Update #42. KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP (1996) Inside the DKBA, KHRG #96-14. ______ (1997) Attacks on Karen Refugee Camps, KHRG #97-05. ______ (1998) Attacks on Karen Refugee Camps, KHRG#98-04. KEYES, C. (ed.) (1979) Ethnic Adaptation and Identity: the Karen on the Thai Frontier with Burma, Philadelphia, Institute for the Study of Human Issues. KIBREAB, G. (1993) The Myth of Dependency among Camp Refugees in Somalia 1979 1989, Journal of Refugee Studies, 6(4): 321 349. LINTNER, B. (1990) Outrage: Burmas Struggle for Democracy, London and Bangkok, White Lotus. LONG, L. (1993) Ban Vinai: The Refugee Camp, New York, Columbia University Press. MALKKI, L. (1995) Refugees and Exile: from Refugee Studies to the National Order of Things, Annual Review of Anthropology, 24: 495-523. MARTIN, G. (1997) Uncertainty and Despair: The Plight of Karen Refugees on the ThaiBurma Border, London, Parliamentary Human Rights Group. MCCANN, J. (1996) The Use of UNHCR Guidelines for the Protection of Refugees from Burma, Refugee Participation Network, 22: 8-10. RELIEFWEB (2004) Burma: Karen Rebels Call Provisional Cease-fire Talks with Myanmar Junta Continue, <www.reliefweb.int> (accessed January 2004), Source: Jesuit Refugee Service. SLIM, H. (1997) Doing the Right Thing: Relief Agencies, Moral Dilemmas and Moral Responsibility in Political Emergencies and War in Disasters 2(3): 244-257. SMITH, M. (1991) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, London and New Jersey, Zed Books.

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______ (1994) Ethnic Groups in Burma: Development, Democracy and Human Rights, Anti-Slavery International. UNHCR (June 2000) UNHCR Global Report 1999, Geneva, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. ______ (June 2001) UNHCR Global Report 2000, Geneva, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. ______ (June 2002) UNHCR Global Report 2001, Geneva, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. ______ (December 2003) UNHCR Global Appeal 2004, Geneva, Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. USCR (1986) The Karens of Burma: Thailands Other Refugees, Washington D.C., US Committee for Refugees. ______ (1990) The War is Growing Worse and Worse: Refugees and Displaced Persons on the Thai-Burmese Border, US Committee for Refugees. ______ (1997) Thai-Burmese Economic Interests Threaten Burmese Refugees in Thailand, Washington D.C., US Committee for Refugees. ZETTER, R. (1988) Refugees and Refugee Studies A Label and an Agenda, Journal of Refugee Studies, 1(1): 1-6. ______ (1991) Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity, Journal of Refugee Studies, 4(1): 39-62.

List of Abbreviations
ALRC BBC CCA CCSDPT DKBA HRW KHRG KNLA KNU KRC MOI NGO RTG SLORC SPDC UNHCR USCR Asian Legal Resource Centre Burmese Border Consortium Consortium of Christian Agencies Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand Democratic Karen Buddhist Army Human Rights Watch Karen Human Rights Group Karen National Liberation Army Karen National Union Karen Refugee Committee Ministry of the Interior Non-governmental Organisation Royal Thai Government State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United States Committee for Refugees

Power and Empowerment in Refugee Camps: Armed Group Activities and the Liminality of Youth
Laura Brownlees

1. Introduction: Child Soldiers and Camps

It is hard to ignore the phenomenon of the child soldier. Be it a sensationalist article in the media, or the focus of humanitarian agencies, the plight of these children features heavily on the international agenda. Many are chillingly portrayed as a generation of young people abducted by guerrilla groups and forced to reign terror on their own and other communities, innocence lost. For journalists wishing to expose a chaotic continent plunging into anarchy (West 2002: 1) this angle on child soldiers, so prevalent in reports on conflicts in Africa, is particularly loaded. The humanitarians at a more basic level provide us with the facts. As Graca Machel reported in her report on the topic, over 300,000 children have participated in over 30 conflicts (Machel 2001: 119). This paper intends to explore associations between young people, violence and refugee camps. Furthermore, it intends to look at some of the reasons why many young people in refugee camps on the African continent actively choose to join armed groups. It argues that dramatic sensationalistic reporting has clouded understandings of true motivations and circumstantial causes of child fighters, and that explanations of the participation of young people in armed group activities have been based on narrow accounts. To illustrate, there are generally two main adult reactions to child combatants. The first labels them as evil and poorly educated, for example in Sierra Leone and Liberia where young rural combatants are stigmatised as barbarians. The second sees them as victims who are used as tools for undemocratic military regimes or unscrupulous warlords (Peters and Richards 1998: 183). In reality, many under-age combatants choose to fight and defend their choice, sometimes proudly. What these views repeatedly fail to see is that destructive coping skills generally serve a purpose. Against a background of destroyed families and failed educational systems, militia activity offers young people a chance to make their way in the world (Peters and Richards 1998: 183). Analyses of voluntary en-

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listment forward ideology, economic and social factors, cultural reasons and selfprotection as motivating factors. This study intends to draw in more detail on two of these. Cultural explanations help to place the phenomena in the appropriate social context and provide an important backdrop through which to understand local value systems concerning masculinity and manhood. If we are to deepen our understanding of why children fight, we must broaden our understanding of the changing role of youth in African society. Economic and social factors illustrate how for many young people, joining an armed faction often represents the best of a number of bad options. It can provide a means of support and survival especially when the alternative is unemployment (McCallin 1998: 66). The implications of these factors will be explored through the dynamics of the refugee camp. It has long been acknowledged that camps are often highly militarised environments where children are seen as vulnerable to attack and political exploitation (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994: 32). Examples can be seen in the Great Lakes crisis of 1994-97, in southern Sudan, and along the Tanzanian-Burundi border to name just a few. Since the mid 1990s there has been much debate about how the security and physical protection of refugees and those associated with them can be improved (Jacobsen 2000: 6). The UNHCR for example has attempted to combat the threat through initiatives such as the removal of camps from border areas which are often the location of conflict, to the more remote interior. Unfortunately not enough attention has been paid to the fact that many young people choose to enlist, and this is made evident by the lack of research carried out among young people in camps. There is an abundance of literature pointing to the growing presence of small arms in refugee camps and the fact that in these camps youngsters are brandishing M-16 and AK-47 assault rifles (Machel 2001: 121), yet there is no detailed information about the children and why they are carrying these weapons. In the face of this gap this paper argues that the needs of young people have been overlooked, and attempts to make a direct link between life in camps and the taking up of arms, through suggesting that joining armed factions is a powerful and creative alternative to the choices available to young people camps. The refugee camp is a unique environment that challenges and disrupts takenfor-granted norms, leading to cultural, social and economic disruption and change, and very often, the erosion of traditions. It is important to look at these factors, because the implications of camp life on adults, also affects the experiences of children. Disrupting traditional ways of life has dramatic consequences for young people. For example, patterns of learning and socialisation are interrupted and the artificial environments created in traditions place can distort moral development. Generally, refugees are reluctant to move to camps because food aid is not regarded as adequate compensation for the isolation from income sources in local economies, and the lack of freedom and dignity involved in becoming dependent on hand outs. For young people, the long-term placement in camps results in the loss of essential

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life skills such as herding and cultivation, learnt by accompanying parents in their work (Boyden 1994: 258). Through their research with young fighters in Sierra Leone, Peters and Richards (1998: 187) illustrate that time and time again the theme of education is mentioned, and loss of this opportunity is seen as a major factor in the decision to fight, along with frustrations over failed promises of training and job prospects, and it was noted that many guerrilla groups were able to recruit youngsters from the ranks of educational dropouts. This link seems to be a vital one to heed with reference to refugee camps, where many of these feelings are exacerbated in the face of insecure environments which challenges norms while providing few services or chances for self-sufficiency in their place. Turners work in particular offers an insight into the lives of what he terms as angry young men in camps. He suggests that there is a link between young mens feelings of loss and their attempts to find an identity as men and regain a position in society (Turner 1999: 2). In his study, the attempts of young men were often successful, and generally positive rather than destructive. Unfortunately however, there is also evidence to suggest that this is not always the case. The focus of this study is on young men rather than young women in camps. This is not to deny the fact that many young females take up arms in Africa, in fact there is an abundance of evidence supporting this. However, it is the predicament of young men in refugee camps that is of particular relevance, because it can be argued that they are particularly affected by the change in life order associated with life in camps. The challenges young women face are very often mediated by the very reactions and approaches taken by the men to these changes. The study is divided into three main sections. The first looks at life in camps for young people and how they are controlled by a variety of competing power mechanisms operating on both a local and institutional level. It aims to illustrate how the organisation and administration of camps can have particularly disruptive and harmful effects on camp residents. Refugee camps are controlled by a top-down approach which means that traditional sources of power and authority are usurped. In order to comprehend the changes that are taking place, this section also reflects on the traditional role and socialisation mechanisms of young men in African society. Traditionally, weapons and war had a constructive role in socialisation mechanisms, forming part of the warrior tradition. Crucially, this initiation rite was a stable and controlled form of the gradual bestowal of power and autonomy on the young, under the watchful authority of elders. Unfortunately as has already been pointed to, the camp environment skews this authority, meaning that the power of the young is often out of place. With few prospects to rise up and gain respectful and meaningful positions in camp society, young refugee men in Africa must find new means of mobilising themselves and moving beyond disempowerment. As Turner (1967: 99) points out, the phase of being in between (which is personified twice over by youth in camps, both through their life stage and presence in the camp environment) can contain positive elements: undoing and

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dissolution are accompanied by growth, transformation and reformulation of old elements into new patterns. However, while this may be so, it is my contention, and the concern of the international community that when linked with life in camps and experiences of conflict, this liminal life stage has the potential to be extremely destructive. The second section tentatively suggests how some of these problems can be overcome. It argues that observations of disempowerment resonate with findings made in studies of development-induced resettlement. In particular it introduces the term social disarticulation, a phrase used by Cernea (1996) to describe the detrimental impact of resettlement on the social organisation of communities. A great deal of work has been carried out by Cernea and others in an attempt to overcome and address issues of social disarticulation, and so this section attempts to apply some of these solutions to the problems faced in refugee camps. It argues that while the causes of displacement may be different, the type of environments that the displaced find themselves in are often very similar, and the impacts of bad organisation can be just as destructive in both cases. The main observation made by studies of forced resettlement is that settlements fail when the displaced themselves are not consulted or involved in decision-making in the resettlement process. A link is made here between empowering communities and the need to involve young people in this process so as to mitigate the dangerous potentials of the angry young men in camps. Unfortunately, little has been done to bridge the gap and share critical information between studies of refugee and forced resettlement (Allen 1996). Indeed, section three examines the barriers which prevent the lessons learnt from being implemented. While the subtext of the argument is supported at a popular level, the gap is unlikely to be bridged during the current climate. Crucially, the greatest obstruction is the position of the present international refugee regime. Links between relief and development are disregarded because of the messages of integration they carry with them. In the past, self-sufficiency in camps was encouraged and the gradual integration with the surrounding community seen as a lasting solution. Today however, refugee camps occupy a perilous ground. Host governments no longer want refugee communities and there is no incentive to invest time or money on what are being labelled protracted refugee populations. Voluntary return is now the ideal solution and so little time and few resources are allocated to the organisation of refugee camps. The section ends with a warning, its contention being that this serious oversight by the international community could lead to critical and problematic implications for local and regional security in the future, as a potentially production generation is dismissed and has its fundamental needs ignored.

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2. Power in Camps and Implications for Young People

In trying to discern why children carry arms, it is vital to understand their place in society both pre and post conflict. This involves focusing on the whole of society, instead of just isolating children from the bigger picture and focusing on them. War and conflict contribute to a total societal breakdown. It is not just children who find themselves in new and alien circumstances, but the whole of society (Boyden 2001). In general, causes of displacement such as civil war, poverty and the destruction of social structures cause the structures of civil society to be challenged. Unfortunately however, these ruptures are often further exacerbated rather than modified when the displaced finally find themselves in camps. Generally, the main factors or disruption associated with the camp environment revolve around the new and alien rules and values imposed rather than chosen by camp residents (de Smelt 1998: 211). As refugees, these people find themselves in the unique situation of simultaneously undergoing and exercising new forms of power in their new environment. Furthermore these new forms of power are generally delivered through both coercion and discipline (Hyndman 1996: 14). Turners study of Burundian refugee camps demonstrates how the UNHCR has taken the place of the patriarchy and deprives people of any control over their own lives (Turner 1999: 5). Camps are well known for the divisions of power within them, and the hierarchy of authority is maintained and administered by host-government assigned officials and often enforced by paramilitary personnel. The distribution of assistance is carried out by humanitarian agencies who are contracted as parties of the UNHCR (Voutira and Harrell-Bond 1993: 6). Of particular note is the fact that organisation is characterized by an absence of refugee participation in the decision-making process. This leads to concerns, articulated well by Hyndman (1996: 86), that the means by which refugees are managed by human agencies re-inscribes neo-colonial relations of power, predicated on a hierarchy of cultures in the camp, and major asymmetries of power in terms of gender and political status. Their sub-legal status restricts mobility, access to employment and ability to generate an independent livelihood. The fact that refugees rarely have an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking about their lives in camps has severe consequences for the social organisation of camps. It is important to look at some of these more general trends in order to understand the particular roles of young people in camps, and the choices available to them. One of the main areas of disruption noted by refugees is that camps threaten the legitimacy of previously unquestioned patriarchal structures. Turner (1999: 5) found that Big men complained that they couldnt maintain their authority vis--vis the small people because they lived side by side with them without any fence between. Therefore the physical structure of the camp did not permit these men to maintain the illusion of their superiority. Factors such as this are important because they enable some people to question taken-for-granted norms

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and traditions. Furthermore they are able to act on them and so new forms of decision-making units evolve to cope with the frustrations of exile, changes in resource distribution and new legislation (Daley 1991: 253). For example, in Mozambique FRELIMO leaders were often younger than the elders who exercised traditional authority within rural society, and they celebrated the ways in which the insurgency was overturning traditional age and gender based hierarchies, just as it challenged the institutions of colonialism (West 2002: 5). During the 1980s a number of studies145 found that women were being particularly marginalized by camp organisation. In particular they noted the threat to their physical safety. For example, latrines were situated far from the huts and presented a danger to women going there alone. Many changes have occurred since these observations, and relief operations have learnt from their past gender-biased approaches and now operate policies of equality. These however also challenge older patterns of authority. Turner (1992: 2) found that men in the camps felt that women no longer respected them, and that they could no longer provide for their wives and children. Indeed, it was suggested that the women thought the UNHCR to be a better husband. While from an outsider perspective this progression in the delivery of aid would seem beneficial, for many refugees it represents further evidence of a loss of order, represented in the breakdown of traditional gender and age relations. One Somalian refugee in Kenya noted that traditional institutions of crime control had broken down. The protection normally accorded by the parameters of the village or kin group had been destroyed. The situation now is one where people of different clans are confined to one area, thereby inhibiting the application of their traditional means of social control. Most of the elders and people who had authority back in Somalia have now lost their powers and in many cases women have taken over leadership roles (Crisp 2000). For young people the situation in camps is often worse. They, as well as adults, want to take control of their lives, but unfortunately life in camps restricts their choices (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994: 40). There are usually few options for selfsufficiency and little physical or emotional space to develop their skills, capacities and self-confidence (WCRWC 2001: 10). They often feel as though they are missing opportunities for further schooling, training or work, and so life in camps is particularly boring, and only points to a bleak future (de Smelt 1998: 217). Most importantly however, the power dynamics at work in the camp particularly affect their places within traditional hierarchies, and contribute to increased feelings of helplessness and a lack of self-esteem. Their lives also appear full of contradictions, as on one level they find themselves in positions of particular responsibility, whilst on the other they are unable to put this new-found power into practice. As illustrated,

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Daley, P. (1991) Gender, Displacement and Social Reproduction: Settling Burundi Refugees in Western Tanzania in Journal of Refugee Studies, 4(3).

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family structures can be severely disrupted and often lead to social transformation. The surrounding political context and insecure environments mean that all social spaces are contested, for both adults and children. In these shifts of power within communities and families, children often assume leadership roles. In camp settings in particular, adults often find themselves unable to function productively and their sense of loss is generally more acute. Feelings of helplessness are articulated through depression and the inability to provide normal care or provide plausible explanations of events. This results in a shift in the balance of power as adults increasingly lose the ability to control and protect children, and thus also lose their moral authority in the eyes of their children. Children are subsequently exposed to a more threatening environment and often find themselves negotiating on behalf of the family. The result of this can be a strong body of children assuming a protoadult role. The new position many children find themselves in is one rarely offered to them in times of peace and stability (Boyden 2001). Young men in camps are particularly challenged. They are at a life stage where they ought to be finding their place in society as fathers, husbands, protectors and providers (Turner 1999: 1). Instead they find these roles, and their ability to obtain them, artificially suspended. Palestinian psychologists and childcare workers have in fact stated that the political consciousness of children in camps is a product of this desperation and dispossession. Young people feel that they have nothing to lose. Through resisting they are consciously trying to influence and be active in their own futures thus giving them a sense of empowerment (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994: 41). As will be illustrated below, some young people were able to successfully carve a role for themselves in the camp setting in a positive way. For others fewer opportunities are available. Richards (1995: 134) argues that the political culture of youth is key to understanding the spread of endemic, low-intensity warfare. He links their exposure to the international media with their alienation from the state through the collapse of education and formal sector employment opportunities. Young people treat media violence and kung-fu films as a drama in which they read the significant messages about their under-utilised and unrecognised powers of inventiveness and daring (Richards 1995: 136). While this argument is not linked to refugee camps per say, its message of the significance of power among young people carries significance as will be illustrated. For example, nearly all refugees complain that the young no longer respect their elders, and that parents do not bring up their children properly (Turner 1999: 4). Understanding culture requires situating practices within the flow of historical events and processes as well as within the fields of power relations that define these (West 2002: 3). As Schafer (2002: 3) rightly says, the concept of child soldier in the sense in which it is commonly understood in the west, with the implications of childhood vulnerability and innocence, is not a useful paradigm with which to understand the situation in Africa. She illustrates this with the fact that in Mozambique, the process of entering manhood for young men

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begins as early as the age of twelve. The majority of young RENAMO recruits had already been living away from their families and were not really considered children by their communities in the senses in which we understand the term in the west. When considering the concept of the child therefore, it is important to recognize the links with structural relations of power and hierarchy, patriarchy and kinship and the content of those social relationships (2002: 4). Turner (1967: 93) describes the period of youth in Africa as a liminal phase when young initiants must undertake certain rites of passage and cannot be described as either boys or men. Simon Turner (2001) applies this concept of liminality to the predicament of refugees in general. It is significant to note therefore that many young men in camps are in a situation of double liminality through both their suspended life-stage and their identity as refugees. The important place of rites of passage in the transition from boy to manhood in African society cannot be underestimated. In the past, the warrior tradition provided a major link between the individual and society and was pivotal in the distinction between man and boy. For example, in some societies men are not eligible for marriage unless they have risked their life in a dual or battle (Mazrui 1997: 3). The system represented a vital aspect of socialization and presented the young with the potential to rise to respected and honoured positions in society, and without activities such as the initiation of age, the status of certain groups within the population is left undefined. For example, the ascendancy to power of a young warrior was inseparable from the other young men from his generation, and more importantly, political authority was regarded as being vested in the elders of one generation and would be handed over at appropriate intervals (Ocaya-Lakidi 1977: 138-142). The type of organisational structures used by the resistance group RENAMO in Mozambique demonstrates the extent to which traditions play a pivotal motivating role. RENAMO appealed to young men by attempting to fulfil their psychological needs for a family with figures from the military movement. They used the traditional patriarchal framework to make links with local moral codes and avoid alienating fighters from civilians. This involved playing on the image of the leader as father, soldier as kin and the war as a dispute between brothers (Schafer 2002: 5). Any analysis of traditional cultural forms and rites in Mozambique shows that the most important relationship is between a father and his child. The father has absolute authority over his children and complete responsibility. This patriarchal framework became the basis of the relationship between guerrilla fighters and their father figures (2002: 6). Crucially, with regards to child soldiers, the training of warriors was generally a social process rather than a professional one, and military skills were acquired in three phases. The first was through mime and play, the second through adolescent apprenticeship and finally as an adult through experience (Ocaya-Lakidi 1977: 146). This helps point to the importance of social processes in creating the meaning of experiences of violence (West 2002: 3). In fact it has been suggested that ide-

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ology may be one of the most important factors mediating young peoples responses to violence (Boyden 1994: 262). For example, in some settings the participation of children in combat is often highly valued by adults. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill (1994: 38) state that it would be difficult to imagine how Afghan children might have been prevented from engaging in combat, when their participation was so highly valued by the adults most prominent in their lives. Many parents in refugee camps are anxious that their children should not forget or abandon their homeland. This hints to the fact that an effective policy against youth recruitment will have to take account of adult perspectives and values as well as childrens motivations. These observations provide an appropriate platform from which to reflect on the changing nature of the warrior and other traditions in African society, and the extent to which the changes are embellished in refugee camps. The most fundamental change affecting military initiation in Africa has been the influence of western forms of combat (Mazrui 1975: 55). Ocaya-Ladiki (1977: 160) attempts to offer an explanation for the violent use of weapons among African societies through an analysis of the decline of the warrior tradition. He suggests that colonialism destroyed the political context of old loyalties, but without destroying loyalties themselves. The new social structures that were established were unfamiliar and as a result different loyalities have not been able to adapt successfully. Consequently, the advanced technology of destruction has had a disastrous affect on Africas warrior values and manhood once the central pillar is now irrelevant in combat. The significance of the erosion of traditional systems on the place of youth cannot be understated. The loss of the social place of rites of passage has helped destroy much of the social value and worth of youth. Peters (2000: 56) voices this strongly by describing the young in Africa today as doubly humiliated. They are treated with little respect and as second-hand citizens, plus they are not taken seriously and have no executive power over their own lives. In the days of the ritualistic warrior tradition, everyone passed through the initiation stages and thus the liminal stage of youth is accompanied by growth, transformation and the reformulation of old elements in new patterns (Turner 1967: 99). Today however many young people across much of Africa find themselves suspended in this liminality, and there are few positive elements to associate with it. Most fundamental is the fact that the state of manhood is almost impossible to achieve, thus the loss of rites of passage also signifies the erosion of the sense of self as a man (White 1997: 15). Camp life exacerbates the erosion of these systems, and this has a particular impact on the role and status of the young men living in them. The potential dangers associated with the freedom of liminality are traditionally overcome through the absolute authority of the instructors or elders. However as illustrated, the power dynamics in camps mean that most men or elders feel that their role as men has been usurped by organisations such as the UNHCR. The deprivation of a role economically or productively which defines men as men, also affects young men. For example, Sudanese boys in camps in Kenya are unable to look after livestock which

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is a fundamental right of passage (Boyden 2001). The absence of a role or opportunities is a concern, and taken to an extreme means that the process of identity creation is disrupted and refugees find themselves in a new kind of limbo (Turner 1999: 6). While not in a camp setting, the experiences of young fighters in Mozambique illustrate the significance of the erosion of the traditional social order or roles in society. During Mozambiques civil war, many young people chose to enlist with guerrilla groups. One causal factor was the crisis of youth experienced in the country since its independence. By the mid 1980s many young people who had moved to the towns to find work were being sent back by the government as unproductive, and the majority felt that the state was closing its doors on them. As a result this large population of discontented youth rebelled against the central government and joined the opposition, RENAMO, which offered them a purpose in life and the potential of authority that had been denied to them, albeit through the barrel of a gun (Furley 1995: 34). These social and economic explanations for the widespread participation in guerrilla movements helps to explain why such involvement would appeal to young people in camps, where listlessness and powerlessness is further exaggerated. Also, as discussed above, there are often cultural traditions which help to normalize their involvement. However, the camp environment now opens up certain possibilities for transgressing taken for granted norms and customs, and for new social values to emerge (Turner 1999: 7). The goal of many young men in camps is to regain control of their lives and to take back their place in society and the community (Turner 1999: 14), and rather than being paralysed by the associated destructive and disintegrating aspects of life in refugee camps they are often able to grab hold of the liberating aspects because the wider community has far less of a controlling and restraining role over their actions. Turner (1999: 8) found that the young men in Tanzanian camps had been able to conquer territory from an older generation that traditionally held the ultimate authority. He found that a large number of street or village leaders were very young and that many enjoyed substantial influence through working for NGOs and UNHCR. Young people had therefore made use of the social suspension associated with life in camps and tried to change things to their own advantage. At the same time however, the creation of a new and empowering role for younger generations can unleash a more sinister side. Risk-taking carries with it an element that allows young people to feel as if they are freeing themselves from the constraints imposed on them, and thus carry a certain appeal (WCRWC 2001: 50). In insecure environments, a gun represents access to food and a form of selfprotection that is highly compelling for young people (Boyden 2001). For many young men therefore, becoming an armed militant is a way of creating political capital, a medium for empowerment when nothing else is available (Large 1997: 27). Fundamentally, the prestige associated with membership of warrior-like groups

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remains. Faced with few options with which to demonstrate it, the need to achieve pride in their manhood is manifested through cycles of violence, and it has been noted that becoming involved in a war allows boys to look like men (Cairns 1996: 123). It is a lack of alternative options that generally causes young men to take up arms. The sinister side alluded to is the fact that the boys have been awarded a kind of power out of place of any tradition or form of control. The authority of elders has declined, but at the same time in many areas the position of warlords as key political actors has increased (Richards 1995: 134). Crucially, these warlords are already part of the existing social structure and so form a continuation and are thus accepted. Alongside the proliferation of high-tech weapons the order and place of warriorhood in the socialisation process has drastically changed (Schaffer 2002: 5).

3. Bridging the Gap: Social Disarticulation and Development-Induced Resettlement

The fact that a lack of alternative options generally causes men to volunteer for militant groups needs to be addressed, as it poses a profound challenge to general blanket assumptions about military enforcement and more critically to agencies working in community relief programmes (Large 1997: 27). It is clear from these observations that the situations faced by many young refugees carry with them the potential for great destruction and the disintegration of moral fabric of social life. It is also apparent that steps must be taken in order to reverse some of these destructive trends. The World Refugee Survey states that the civilian nature of all refugee camps must be restored, and they must be positioned at a proper distance from borders, with physical protection from coercion (Jacobsen 2000: 10). While it cannot be denied that armed groups have been known to terrorize and pressurize refugees, I would suggest that the goal of restoring the civilian nature of camps is far more complex than changing the location. As has been demonstrated, the traditional civilian nature of societies in camps is eroded and lost through a number of factors. These are the causes that need addressing. What is interesting is that these arguments mirror accounts of the disruptions faced by communities forced to resettle as a result of development projects. Poorly managed forced resettlement projects have been widely studied and criticised for the damage they cause to a communitys ability to sustain itself. In the worst cases, resettlement is seen to tear apart the existing social fabric, fragmenting communities, patterns of social organization, kinship groups, social support mechanisms and other forms of integration, all of which are a vital form of help and support. To describe this particular process of destruction, Cernea (1996) has coined the phrase social disarticulation. Essentially it is a label describing any form of damage to the social networks that once mobilized people to act around common interests.

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Of all the losses associated with forced relocation, this loss of social capital has been identified as being the hardest to rebuild. It leads to the loosening of intimate bonds and leads to a growing sense of distrust and alienation, weakening control of interpersonal behaviour and lowering the cohesion of family structures (Cernea and McDowell 2000: 30). Similarities can be seen in observations of the changing power relations in camps. Intra-group differences are skewed by resettlement, and some people are more affected than others. An important difference is that those who had the most vested in the old system may now find themselves in a different category and less able to get access to development and resources than other groups in the new settlement. For example, in patriarchal societies, older men generally lose the most from resettlement, while women and younger men often take advantage of new opportunities, many of which are acceptable only to those of less status in the old system (Cernea and McDowell 2000). In fact, the impact on socio-economic and cultural factors through both planned and disaster-driven displacement is strikingly similar. Both groups face the same task of physically and culturally surviving disruption by reorganizing their economic and social ways of life (Cernea 1996: 294). Despite this, literature regarding the two still remains side by side and there are few attempts to share information. Critically, little effort has been made by those working in relief to take note of lessons learned from the mistakes of development-induced resettlement. Those working with resettlement communities have attempted to mitigate social disarticulation, the key to which is thought to lie in participatory approaches that include the displaced themselves in decision-making processes. For example, agencies have acknowledged the importance of respecting the specific behavioural expectations associated with people of different age, sex and rank in enabling and controlling process of enculturation (McDowell 1996: 39). In contrast, priority is given to material rather than cultural resources in camps. Crisp (2000) notes that while the majority of camps in Kenya are fully functioning in logistical terms the food pipeline is rarely interrupted, malnutrition rates are low and each refugee has access to water and health centres in social and psychological terms the camps are highly dysfunctional entities, populated by people who are obliged to live in extremely trying circumstances. To an extent this is justifiable because relief is about delivering basic but vital resources. Unfortunately however, this form of aid delivery is top-down, and represents recipients as helpless victims, leading to the diminution of individual and collective capacities and human potential (Hyndman 1996: 107). For example, the collective self-esteem of the Somali community in Kenyan camps has been undermined by decades of aid dependency and the humiliation of refugee life. Despite this real and acknowledged observation, relief operations continue to work with short time horizons and from top-down centralized approaches (Diab 1995: 5). The key issue for agencies working with disaster driven refugees therefore is the trade

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off between short-term relief and long-term redevelopment. Unfortunately however, all too often the kinds of agencies involved in the relief activities for refugees do not know about or adhere to longer-term developmental approaches (1996: 294). Boyden (1994: 256) points to this false and destructive dichotomy between relief operations and development, noting that participatory approaches are frequently abandoned in favour of vertical systems of service delivery, and normal procedures for monitoring and evaluation are disregarded altogether. Refugees are generally assigned to a camp according to date of arrival rather than clan or family affiliations. Many come from different areas and dont know each other when grouped together in units. Typically, this kind of relief programme is neither incremental nor sustainable. It is clear therefore that emergency programmes have an extremely limited scope in the long term. In the face of so many protracted refugee situations, this problem needs to be addressed. What is needed is a long-term approach and perspective that is able to address the cultural and psychological dimensions of life in camps, and social engineering work needs to be seen as a crucial step towards re-establishing the refugee population in new and viable settlements with access to production activities, employment and services (Cernea 1996: 309). Resettlement projects have learnt that social disarticulation and marginalisation can be avoided through strategies that emphasize the reconstruction of communities. For example, this could mean building on education and skills that allow people to use new resources to combat marginalisation (Koenig 2002: 9). In order for this to be achieved it is also important to encourage integration with the surrounding community. An example of self-settled Burundi refugee villages in Tanzania shows that they were able to achieve better and more durable integration with the surrounding local host population than in government established refugee centres (Cernea 1996: 314). Top-down interventions have particular implications for children because of their minority status in most cultures (Laisailly-Jacob 1996: 117), and all too often approaches intending to tackle the phenomena of children with guns have been isolationist and simplistic. Solutions involving the removal of camps inland away from borders will of course mean they are at less risk from attacks by armed militants. However, it will not solve the social problems of a disenfranchised youth. A report by the WCRWC found that refugee adolescents said that if they had land to dig they wouldnt have any problems, yet farming land and moving outside the protected camps is discouraged by camp officials (WCRWC 2001: 32). On a more positive note, the UNHCR acknowledges that a variety of initiatives must be taken to provide children and adolescents with programmes that can reduce their propensity to become involved in crime and violence. Among the components of its programme to address violence in camps are community organisation, recreation and education (Crisp 2000). Children should not have to wait for education. It provides life skills critical for the development and recovery of communities, and a sense of stability and normalcy in the fact of the chaos and disruption of dis-

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placement. For many adults in camps, education is of the same priority as food and water (Herringshaw 2000: 1). This points to the need for communication between agencies and refugees so that these concerns are acknowledged. Unfortunately, the majority of donors still refuse to think about education before other survival needs have been met. If the specific needs of youth are to be met then they must be put on the same agenda as security, food and infrastructural issues (WCRWC 1996: 21). These warnings should be taken as real, rather than token suggestions, especially if the international community is as concerned about children bearing arms as it professes to be. If their needs continue to be overlooked, then it is less surprising that taking up arms can be an attractive choice. Machel points out that the few programmes that do focus on education or vocational training show that the participation of young people in programme design is a key to success. For example, during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 adolescents formed Youth Councils and helped improve conditions in a number of refugee camps (Machel 2001: 32). Policy makers working towards the prevention of the recruitment of children should pay attention to their specific voices and increase their participation in all areas of civic life. A youth-focus must be part of the agenda in the same way that gender and the environment are criteria for development (Peters 2000: 58). As the following quote illustrates, young people want to be heard and respected: During the luta, when we spoke, people listened. Not just other young people, and not just women. Everyone listened to what we said because we were equal to the tasks that were given to us (West 2002: 11). However, feelings of empowerment or in contrast of helplessness and vulnerability are not perception problems but real facts. The solution therefore does not just simply lie in making children feel empowered or secure, but in the actual reduction of repression and the improvement of their capacities to effect change without a gun (Cohn and Goodwin-Gill 1994: 81). This is not an easy task and points to a need to make changes at a deep-rooted ideological level, both in society and through aid approaches, so that children in African society are recognised as legitimate and constructive participants in their own right.

4. Conclusions: Policy, Implications and the Future

There are many lessons to be learnt from development induced resettlement schemes. If the problems of social disarticulation in camps are to be overcome, then it is clear that responses need to combine short-term emergency assistance with medium to long-term support to restore production and services and relocate and reintegrate displaced people (Kanji 1990: 109). However, these observations need to be placed into the broader context of international policy making. Unfortunately from this perspective, the distinction between relief and development aid remains, and many agencies continue to emphasize it because funds for relief

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items such as food are easier to obtain than funds for education. Therefore, most agencies providing aid for displaced communities do not take into account the special needs of children, particularly for schooling and recreational activities (Kanji 1990: 110). Reasons why there is more funding available for relief items rather than in long-term investments can be explained by changes in the refugee regime at an international policy level. The case study of Kenya is a useful one with which to illustrate some of the dynamics in the changing approaches towards dealing with refugee populations. During the 1970s and 1980s Kenyas refugee problem was not particularly acute. The countrys official refugee population was largely composed of Ugandans, who were generally absorbed into the countrys labour market and commercial sector. However, the situation changed dramatically in the 1990s, when armed conflicts and human rights violations in neighbouring countries prompted large numbers of people to cross the border into Kenya. Having allowed the refugees into the country, the Kenyan authorities made it clear that their presence was not particularly welcome (Crisp 2000). These changes in sentiment reflect changes taking place at the international level of the refugee regime. The period of the 1960s 1980s was one of freedom of movement across borders and accommodation in camps and settlements was accompanied by the provision of land and chance to become self-sufficient. Planned land settlements have long been considered the best means for promoting refugee self-sufficiency and local integration (Laisilly-Jacob 1996: 112), and so organized resettlement with long-term planning was seen to be the durable solution for longterm refugee problems and it allowed thousands of people in East and Southern Africa to live decently in exile (Laisilly-Jacob 1996: 123). As a solution therefore, refugees could gradually become integrated locally or wait to repatriate on a voluntary basis. Unfortunately despite the merits of integration and an abundance of evidence supporting its success, the international community has now determined this sort of activity or solution as too costly. In contrast, the period from the 1980s to the present is based on a very different set of assumptions and objectives. It is now thought that displaced people do not have to leave their own country to find protection. The UNHCR, the agency created to afford sufficient protection to refugees feels it not longer has the means to provide a decent future for those in exile, and the focus of the international community is now on countries of origin rather than host countries. If people do move across borders, then asylum is seen as strictly temporary and is not equated with permanent settlement and integration. Crucially therefore, to achieve the objectives of the current refugee regime, it is seen as legitimate to deny refugees freedom of movement, access to land and income-generating opportunities (Crisp 2000a: 3). Host governments are increasingly reluctant to let refugees become long-term settlers, and integration is to be avoided at all costs (Laisailly-Jacob 1996: 113). The refugees currently residing in Kenya therefore have

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little prospect of being allowed to remain and settle in Kenya, yet for the majority the prospects for repatriation are poor, for example to Somalia. As a result of these circumstances, the refugees have effectively been warehoused in camps, with all of the negative social and psychological consequences implied (Crisp 2000). The Kenyan government prohibits refugees from seeking employment or moving around the country, and there is a trend towards restricting and confining refugees to camps where minimal services are available. The UNHCR is careful not to make camps too attractive to potential refugees, and only minimum education and medical services are maintained (Hyndman 1996: 85). A second consequence of current policies is that the predicament of disempowerment that many refugees find themselves facing is exacerbated. Certainly the problem of youth remains a strategic issue few agencies have begun to address. The UNHCR in Sierra Leone has been criticised for its lack of programmes for children and adolescents; the few that it does operate are focused on urban areas where there are only a few refugees. Assistance to unaccompanied minors therefore remains indirect and lacking in organisation, and they are generally targeted as dependents of household heads, meaning they often get a poor share (WCRWC 1996: 19). This is an example of the application of stubborn assumptions and expectations by policy-makers within the humanitarian regime that refugees will eventually go home (Coulter 2001: 42) and so are not worthy of long-term investment. Sadly, this attitude helps to legitimise any reluctance agencies have of handing over decision-making powers to refugee populations, because of the supposed temporality of the situation. In fact, this reluctance resonates at a far deeper level, and continues to be one of the main obstacles faced on the road towards empowerment. Even in development-induced resettlement projects, policies of shared decision-making power are rarely carried out in practice. As de Wet (2001: 29) notes, participatory approaches are political and not everyone can win. Organisations are generally extremely reluctant to consult more and hand over their powers of delegation because of the associated implications of loss of their own prestige and control. Therefore all too often the participatory approaches referred to are simply just token. Clearly the current policy climate is doing little to help mitigate the problems of angry young men in camps, and this concern carries with it a foreboding sense of danger associated with these populations of disaffected young people. In the light of the above information about the direction of current policy, it is clear that a number of basic but fundamental recommendations can be made in a continued but perhaps optimistic attempt to improve the lives of young refugees in camps. Firstly, and most obviously, more use really does need to be made of work already carried out in resettlement situations, and attention should be paid to the recommendations of people such as Colson, Cernea (1996) and Koenig (2002). The result of refusals to see refugee situations as anything other than temporary when in reality so many are protracted has left refugees living in progressively worse and more dangerous conditions. Crisp even goes so far as to accuse the UNHCR

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of selling out to states and giving up its mandate to protect refugees. While some aspects of the current refugee regime provide innovative ways to approach the needs of displaced people, at the same time there is still a need to recognize that there are large numbers of refugees in camps in countries of asylum, many of whom have been there for over 10 years. It is essential to address the problems of those who are stuck in a protracted refugee situation (Crisp 2000a: 6) before they reach crisis point. Secondly, the projection of children as victims or delinquents needs to be overcome. Policy making on children in armed conflict must actively engage with what young people have to say, how they construct their understanding of the world and the priorities they identify as needing attention (Peters 2000: 58). Childrens own constructions of violence and their coping strategies can be ingenious, and reasons for joining armed groups for example are often part of extremely practical survival mechanisms (Boyden 1994: 263). Unfortunately, very little is known about the lives of children in camps. While there is an abundance of literature proclaiming the links between camps and guerrilla movements, there are few studies describing these links, and so much more information is needed about choices perceived as available to children and their attempts at self-empowerment. Again, this problem cannot be extracted from broader policy issues. The fact that integration and self-sufficiency are no longer priorities means that little effort is being made to encourage studies of the lives of those in camps, because of the stubborn refusal to see them as anything but temporary. This point is emphasized by Crisp who comments that the UNHCR is losing contact with the people it assists, and that as an organisation they know less and less about the communities they work with.146 The message carried in this study is clear, and hardly needs repeating. It involves acknowledging the links between lack of choices, disempowerment and the subsequent attraction of guerrilla groups and weapons, and how the organisation of refugee camps can exacerbate these connections. Furthermore it is just as clear that a number of positive steps can be taken to avoid such an outcome, and improve the lives of young people in camps. Unfortunately however, while there is great concern internationally about children bearing arms, it appears that the overriding concerns of international refugee policy are stronger, and it is unlikely that these warning signs and recommendations will be heeded. Young people are eager to learn, act and achieve, yet in refugee camps they are consistently being denied these opportunities. While currently it is the generation of young people who will suffer from these oversights, how they choose to overcome these barriers, and how this will affect regional stability, will ultimately carry implications for policy and the international community. As Peters (2000: 58) warns, policy-making that ignores childrens voices does so at its own peril, and is more likely to fail to bring real gains for the children it aims to benefit.
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Closing remarks at the 7th IRAP: Final Plenary.

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References
AFRICAN RIGHTS (1997) Food and Power in Sudan: A Critique of Humanitarianism. BENJAMIN, J. (1998) Issues of power and empowerment in refugee studies: Rwandan womens adaptive behaviour at Benaco refugee camp, Refuge, 17(4). BOYDEN, J. (1994) Childrens Experience of Conflict Related Emergencies: Some Implications for Relief Policy and Practice, Disasters, 18(3). BOYDEN, J. (2001) A Residual Fear of Children. Paper delivered at a seminar series, RSC Weekly Seminar, RSC, Oxford 14th November. CAIRNS, E. (1996) Children and Political Violence Cambridge, Blackwell. CERNEA, M. (1996) Bridging the Research Divide: Studying Refugees and Development Oustees. in Allen, T. (ed.) In Search of Cool Ground: War, Flight and Homecoming in North East Africa, London, James Currey Ltd. CERNEA, M. and McDOWELL, C. (2000) Risks and Reconstructions: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, Washington, World Bank. COHN, I. and GOODWIN-GILL, G. (1994) Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, Oxford, Clarendon Press. COULTER, C. (2001) Organizing people and places: humanitarian discourse and Sierra Leonean refugees Working Papers in Cultural Anthropology. CRISP, J. (2000), Forms and Sources of Violence in Kenyas Refugee Camps, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 19(1). ______ Closing remarks at the 7th IRAP: Final Plenary. ______ (2000a) Managing forced migration: evolving international responses to the refugee problem Paper presented at Conference on international migration and foreign policy, Wilton Park, UK. DALEY, P. (1991) Gender, Displacement and Social Reproduction: Settling Burundi Refugees in Western Tanzania, Journal of Refugee Studies, 4(3). DE WET. C. (2001) Can Everybody Win? Economic Development and Population Displacement, South Africa, Rhodes University. DIAB, M. (1995) Relief-Development linkages: A frustrated experience from Sierra Leone, The World Food Programme. DE SMELT, J. (1998) Child Marriages in Rwandan Refugee Camps, Africa, 68(2). FURLEY, O. (1995) Conflict in Africa, London, Tauris Academic Studies. Global March Against Child Soldiers (2002) Children as Soldiers, <http: //www.globalmarch.org/childsoldiers/unicef2.htm> HERRINGSHAW, V. (2000) Education in Conflict Cannot Wait, CS.org Publications, <http: //www.cs.org/publications/featuredarticles/2000/education.htm> HYNDMAN, J. (1996) Geographies of displacement: Gender, culture and power in UNHCR camps Phd, University of British Columbia. JACOBSEN, K. (2000) A Framework for Exploring the Political and Security Context of Refugee Populated Areas, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 19(1). KAISER, T. (1999) Living in Limbo: Insecurity and the Settlement of Sudanese Refugees

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in Northern Uganda, DPhil, Department of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Oxford University. KANJI, N. (1990) War and Children in Mozambique: Is International Aid Strengthening or Eroding Community-based Policies?, Community Development Journal, 25(2). KOENIG, D. (2002) Towards Local Development and Mitigating Impoverishment in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford University. LAISAILLY-JACOB, V. (1996) Reconstructing Livelihoods Through Land Resettlement Schemes: Comparative Reflections of Refugees and Oustees in Africa, in Cernea, M. and McDowell, C. (eds.) Risks and Reconstructions: Experiences of Resettlers and Refugees, Washington, World Bank. LARGE, J. (1997) Disintegration, conflicts and the restructuring of masculinity, Gender & Development, 5(2), Oxford, Oxfam. MACHEL, G. (2001) The Impact of War on Children, London, Hurst and Co. McCALLIN, M. (1998) Community involvement in the social reintegration of child soldiers, in Bracken, P. and Petty, C. (eds.) Rethinking the Trauma of War, London, Free Association Books. McDOWELL, C. (1996) Understanding Impoverishment: The Consequences of Development Induced Displacement, Oxford, Berghahn Books. MAZRUI, A. (1975) Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: The Making of a Military Ethnocracy, London, Sage. MAZRUI, A. (1977) The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa, London, E. J Brill. OCAYA-LAKIDI, D. (1977) Manhood, Warriorhood and Sex in East Africa, in Mazrui, A. (ed.) The Warrior Tradition in Modern Africa, London, E. J Brill. PETERS, K. and RICHARDS, P. (1998) Why we fight: voices of youth combatants in Sierra Leone, Africa, 68(2). PETERS, K. (2000) Policy-Making on children in conflict: Lessons from Sierra Leone and Liberia, Cultural Survival Quarterly: Rethinking Childhood. RICHARDS, P. (1995) Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: Crisis of Youth?, in Furley, O. (ed.) Conflict in Africa, London, Tauris Academic Studies. SCHAFFER, J. (2002) We are the Sons of the Government: The use of patriarchal images in the civil war in Mozambique and its implications for the reintegration of child soldiers. TURNER, S. (1999) Angry young men in camps: gender, age and class relations among Burundi refugees in Tanzania, Working Paper No. 9, Centre for Documentation and Research, UNHCR. TURNER, V. (1967) Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage, London, Routledge. VOUTIRA, E. and HARRELL-BOND, B. (1993) In search of the locus of trust: the social world of the refugee camp, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford. WEST, H. (2002) Girls with Guns: Narrating the Experience of War of Frelimos Female Detachment, New School for Social Research, New School University.

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WHITE, S. (1997) Men, masculinities and the politics of development, in Men and Masculinities, Oxford, Oxfam. WCRWC (1996) The childrens war: towards peace in Sierra Leone, Womens Commission for Refugee Women and Children. WCRWC (2001) Promoting the Protection and Capacity of Ugandan and Sudanese Adolescents in Northern Uganda.

Protection from the Developing World: New Asylum and Immigration Policy in Europe
Andrzej Bolesta

1. Introduction
In the last dozen or so years, Western European countries have changed their attitudes and taken energetic measures to address the phenomenon of migration. The member states of the European Union have been harmonizing and unifying their immigration policies, which give rise to instruments that regulate the transborder movements of people, and asylum policies, involving regulations and instruments aimed at potential refugees. Their national policies are becoming increasingly restrictive. It is a generally held view that the current measures concentrate on restricting migrants opportunities to move into the European territory. Fortress Europe has already become a household term. In the context of the existing trends and the general sentiments of international public opinion, some questions are in place. What are the new immigration and asylum policies in Europe like? What instruments are used by the European states in connection with the migration movements? Do we see a Fortress Europe being erected that will be an efficient barrier against the influx of refugees?

2. History of the European Immigration and Asylum Policies

People have migrated from time immemorial. In modern Europe, political refugees made their appearance long before the international community noticed this problem. The expulsion of the Jews from Spain (15th century) or the Huguenots from France (17th century) are the best-known historical examples of political persecution. The 19th century initiated a new migration epoch (Zolberg 1997: 286) in view of the major increase in migration movements, especially between Europe and North America; it also brought about the first state regulations pertaining to migration streams. The advent of the new migration epoch was made possible by the advancement of technology, and in particular, the development of new means

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of transport and the transportation infrastructure. Around the turn of the 19th century, a considerable expansion of the railroad network took place.147 Intercontinental transport by sea gained popularity. After the introduction of steamships, people could move from Europe to America in greater numbers and in a shorter time. Consequently, a major outflow of population from Western Europe ensued. At the same time the industrial revolution boosted the demand for workforce, while the changing patterns of family life (fewer children) restricted its supply. Western European countries were thus forced to pursue a liberal immigration policy, so as to attract new labour, while taking a more restrictive stand especially in the first half of the 19th century on emigration. The end of the 19th century witnessed larger-scale movements within Europe, too: the Flemish and Italians would move to France, the Swedes to Denmark, the Finns to Sweden, the Italians to Switzerland, the Poles to Germany (Zolberg 1997: 285). The transformation of Western European countries, the development of industry and the increased migration volumes within the continent resulted in the gradual dwindling of trans-Atlantic movements. The liberal immigration policy and dynamic economic development, which guaranteed a constant supply of new jobs, attracted foreign labour, especially from Central and Eastern Europe, which began to cause apprehensions and tensions among the native populations. As a result, Germany legally restricted immigrants from using their own language in official contexts. In 1905, Great Britain passed a law on immigrants, allowing the authorities to deny entry to certain groups of persons (Zolberg 1997: 299; Layton-Henry 1994: 282). From 1914, entrants were required to have passports and obligatory control by immigration officers was introduced. Subsequently, the laws pertaining to migrants became consolidated in the Alien Act (1920) (Layton-Henry 1994: 282). The next, increasingly large migration waves led to further tightening of the regulations in several stages, so that by the 1920s most states had erected solid walls, with narrow gates to let in specific categories [of migrants] (Zolberg 1997: 294). An important role was played in this process by refugees from Russia, then engulfed in the Bolshevik Revolution, who acted in part as a catalyst of the emergence of the international refugee regime (Suhrke 1998a). The number of refugees further increased as a result of persecution in Nazi Germany. In order to keep the labour within the Third Reich, a decree on foreigners was promulgated (1938) which prohibited, among others, citizens of enemy states from leaving the country. After the Second World War, the numbers of migrants remained high. It was a consequence of several factors. First, following the resettlement during the war and the shifting political borders in Europe afterwards, many people were on the
Great Britain expanded its railroad network from 21,558 km in 1871 to 32,623 km in 1913, Austro-Hungary from 6,112 to 22,981, Russia from 10,731 to 62,300, Norway from 359 to 3,085, Italy from 6,429 to 18,873, the United States from 85,170 (1870) to 386,714 (1910), Canada from 4,211 to 39,799 (Zolberg 1997: 282).
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move to their old or new domiciles. Second, rapid economic growth in Western Europe created a surplus of jobs vis--vis the available labour resources. Third, integration mechanisms started to operate as a result of the signing of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957). Fourth, migration became increasingly globalised, partly because of the progress of civilization and partly because of the full institutionalisation of refugee status on an international scale. Remembering the atrocities of the Second World War and its legacy of tens of millions of the resettled, the international community decided to face the issues of migration and, in particular, refugees. The developments in the Middle East accelerated the steps to provide international legal protection for refugees. The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted (Geneva, 1951), followed by the 1967 Protocol (New York). The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was established (1951). Provisions relating directly to migrants also became included in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Whereas the vast majority of international norms concerned political refugees, whose problems received considerable interest in Western Europe in the late 1940s and early 1950s, attention shifted later on to the creation of immigration policies in the context of regulating the influx of economic migrants from abroad. The main target countries for immigrants were the former colonial empires France and Great Britain as well as Germany, in view of its rapid economic development. Because of their size and potential, these countries were capable of assimilating the greatest number of newcomers. Initially, the main source of migrants were the colonies or former colonies. In the 1950s, the demand for additional labour in the quickly expanding British economy was satisfied by the Irish and immigrants from the New Commonwealth: mainly coming from the West Indies (the Caribbean), India and Pakistan (Layton-Henry 1994). Migrants coming to Germany originated mainly from European states (Yugoslavia, Italy and Turkey), and those arriving in France came from the Maghreb and the colonies in West Africa. France decided to incorporate the provisions of the Geneva Convention into its constitution in 1958 (Art. 55). The main legal act pertaining to foreigners was Ordinance No. 45-2658 from 1945. Furthermore, Ordinance No. 52-893 (of July 25, 1952) established the OFPRA (Office Franais de Protection des Rfugis et Apatrides, that is, the French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons) (Lambert 1995: 114). Germany introduced the right to asylum into its Basic Law, whose Article 16 grants this right to persons persecuted on political grounds. Restrictions on immigration started to appear already in the 1960s for instance, Great Britain restrained the right of entry for nationals of some Commonwealth countries (Layton-Henry 1994); in 1965, Germany promulgated a law on foreigners which notably curtailed their rights (Esser and Korte 1985: 170). How-

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ever, this trend acquired significant proportions only in the 1970s, as a result of the deteriorating economic climate and the recession triggered by the oil crisis of 1973. The British Immigration Act (1971) divided immigrants into those who had the right of residence in the United Kingdom and those devoid of this right, while giving the government full control over immigration issues. The decision-making powers pertaining to potential refugees became delegated to immigration officers, rather than competent authorities capable of verifying an immigrants application. In Germany, the turnaround came in 1973, giving rise to a conflict. Christian Joppke (1998: 124) believes this conflict had two dimensions: territorial (local vs. federal authorities) and ideological (left vs. right). In 197891, no less than eight federal laws were passed, aiming to simplify the asylum procedures (Joppke 1998: 125), as the complexity of the regulations and the existence of multiple decisionmaking levels allowed potential refugees to protract court proceedings.

3. Migration as a Threat to Europe: Tackling the Root Causes

Migrations have always been seen as a threat. The only thing that changed was the intensity of this perception. The decision-making centres in European countries have long been ill-disposed towards migrants and the immigration policy they have pursued allegedly dictated by security concerns reflects this perceived threat. Security, however, as Weiner observes, is an elusive concept that calls up governments concerns to protect their territory and population against threats to the stability of the regime, the social well-being, or to the important societal values of the country (Weiner 1995: 131). Indeed, the decisions of national leaders based on a vague, unclear and philosophically distant concept, obscure to the majority of society, must be defective by their very nature. Potentially faulty as they are, such decisions are nevertheless taken and may even enjoy a broad social support. Refugees are perceived as a threat to the ethnic and cultural identity of the host society. Arriving, as most of them do, from a different cultural sphere, they bring along different mores and often different values systems, which distinguish them from the rest of society. A different ethnic and cultural background is in itself a cause of psychological anxiety and discomfort, inspiring dislike. A highly adverse role is played here by the political centres which point fingers at aliens as a threat to identity. However, threatened identity is not the greatest worry of the modern and liberally oriented societies of Western Europe. Political refugees are seen in the first place as a financial burden to the state, and, consequently, to the taxpayers. The societies of Western Europe have developed extensive social security systems, under which many persons are eligible for benefits. The large majority of refugees do

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make use of these entitlements. Regardless of the actual cost of facilitation, this situation creates an enormous psychological impact. Immigrants are seen as contenders for state funds. Although, nominally, refugees do not normally represent a major strain on the state budget, they do receive much higher transfers than other groups of society on a per capita basis. After September 11, 2001, immigrants are also perceived as a threat to the nations physical security. There is a widespread, if largely unfounded opinion that potential terrorists stem from the developing countries, and thus immigrants from these countries pose a danger to the recipient states. It is often claimed that a permanent solution to the problem of high migration levels is only possible through eliminating their causes. No doubt, unless energetic measures are taken to stop armed conflicts and prevent natural disasters on the one hand, and to ensure steady and rapid economic growth, which translates into better living standards for all social groups, including the poorest ones, on the other, the influx of political and economic refugees will not diminish. The European Union has undertaken limited action in this field by promoting human rights and democracy, as well as stabilization and regional security, using financial incentives. In order to further the aims mentioned above, a number of projects have been initiated, such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the MEDA Democracy Programme (implemented in the framework of EIDHR) for 12 countries in North Africa and the Middle East, or the Cotonou Agreement, pertaining to the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and the South Pacific. Separate programmes have been put into operation targeting the Balkans (CARDS Assistance Program to the Western Balkans, involving Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia & Montenegro and Macedonia) and the former Soviet republics (TACIS). Of special importance for Europe, for security reasons, is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (in view of the large number of Muslim states in geographic proximity to Europe).

4. Harmonization and Unification of the European Union Policy on Asylum and Immigration
The harmonization of the immigration and asylum policies in the European Union should be seen as an element of ever-deepening integration. Even though the entry into force, as of May 1, 2004, of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty might seem to bring this task to successful completion at least with respect to determining the scope of competence and responsibilities the unification process will go on. The Council of Europe was the only major organization on the continent to have addressed the problem of migration in the 1960s. The first document recom-

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mending the harmonization of immigration policies was issued in 1976, and a second one, entitled The Harmonization of National Procedure Related to Asylum, in 1981 (Joly 1996: 47). In the mid-1980s, the European Economic Community decided to take the first short-term measures towards harmonizing the immigration policies of the member states. These were dictated by the following circumstances. First, as the integration of the EEC countries progressed, it was necessary to introduce common policies in various sectors and legal norms applying to the entire territory of the EEC, which inevitably entailed the transfer of diverse prerogatives of the national governments to the European institutions in Brussels. Given the trans-national and trans-territorial character of migrations, the EEC countries decided to begin harmonizing their immigration policies. An additional stimulus was provided by the prospect of internal borders being abolished, which would entail the freedom of movement within the entire territory of the Community. The abolition of borders was provided for by the Single European Act (1986). The first steps in this direction were taken by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg, which signed the Schengen Agreement (1985). Second, the 1980s saw a reorientation of the immigration policy of Western European countries. As economic growth slowed down, the demand for additional labour shrank. The labour market had become saturated and unemployment was on the increase. Moreover, as a result of changes in communist countries, a significant ideological factor, which guaranteed nearly automatically a refugee status to defectors from the East, began to lose importance. At the same time the globalisation of migration processes boosted the numbers of asylum seekers. The harmonization of immigration policies thus became necessary in order to control and regulate the influx of migrants. The first meeting of the ministers responsible for immigration took place in London in October 1986. An Ad-Hoc Group on Immigration was created and asked to look at the following areas of concern: the improvement of checks at the external frontiers of the Community; the value of internal checks; the role of co-operation and possible harmonization of member states visa policies in improving controls; the role and effectiveness of controls at internal frontiers in the fight against illegal immigration; the exchange of information about the operation of spot-check systems; close co-operation to avoid abuse of passports; measures to achieve a common policy to eliminate asylum abuse, in the consultation with Council of Europe and UNHCR; examination of ways in which Community travel can be improved without adding to the illegal immigration (Niessen 1996: 32). Subsequently, a Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on Asylum

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(CIREA) was formed, along with a Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI). Other structures were created as well, whose terms of reference included some aspects of immigration, including: a joint assistance group and a coordinator group for the freedom of movement of persons (Szonert 1999). The most important decisions aiming to give momentum to the harmonization and unification process were taken in 199093, as a result of the Maastricht Agreement (Treaty on European Union). Many suggestions were elaborated by the AdHoc Group on Immigration. Before signing the Maastricht document, a number of declarations and conventions were prepared. In June 1990, the Dublin Convention was signed, which was intended to regulate the matters of responsibility for examining applications for refugee status. By precise designation of the country responsible for this procedure, this instrument was meant to eliminate the phenomenon of refugees in orbit, transferred from country to country without consideration being given to their application for asylum. Although the Convention did introduce some institutional order, it failed to solve the problem through the lack of specific executory provisions. Likewise drafted were the Convention on Crossing of External Borders and the Schengen Convention on the abolition of internal borders (1990). Furthermore, the European Council, meeting in Edinburgh, adopted a declaration on the principles for the external aspects of immigration policy, which advocated the following: the preservation and restoration of peace, and full respect for human rights and the rule of law, which would diminish migratory movements resulting from war and oppressive regimes; the protection and assistance of displaced people in the nearest safe area to their homes; the promotion of liberal trade and economic co-operation with countries of emigration, which would reduce economic motives for migration; targeting development aid and job creation, and the alleviation of poverty; efforts to combat illegal immigration; the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreements with countries of origin or transit, to ensure that illegal immigrants were returned to their home countries; the assessment of home countries practices in readmitting their nationals after they are expelled from the territories of the member states (Niessen 1996: 46). In the Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in November 1993, issues of the harmonization of immigration policies were accorded priority treatment. Pursuant to Art. K9, immigration policy can be delegated to Community structures, while Art. K1 stipulates that, among others, the following areas should be the object of a common policy: asylum policy;

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rules governing the crossing by persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon; immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries. Between 1990 and 1997, several resolutions, motions and joint declarations were adopted which called for the harmonization of immigration policies and formulated common guidelines for the member states of the Community on various policy aspects. In London (1992), the definition was adopted of a manifestly unfounded claim and a third host country, and the concept of a safe country was worked out. A resolution on the harmonization of policies on the reunion of families was also passed (June 1993). Besides, a recommendation was formulated on policies towards countries substantially free from persecution and on matters of expulsion (December 1992), as well as one on illegal employment (June 1993). In 1994 and 1995, a procedural framework was created for the expulsion of candidates whose applications had been rejected. In 19936, solidarity principles in the event of a large influx of refugees were worked out. In June 1995, the Council of Ministers responsible for immigration adopted a resolution setting out the rights and responsibilities related to asylum procedures, and in March 1996, a common definition of refugees for procedural purposes was agreed upon. The most important supranational document to govern the unification of immigration policies (including the policies on refugees) in the coming years seems to be the Amsterdam Treaty. Signed on October 2, 1997, it entered into force on May 1, 1999. Its provisions on migration and asylum will become European law in May 2004. Title IIIa of the Treaty concerns visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons. Pursuant to Art. 73k, the following shall be adopted within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty: 1. measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the Protocol of 1967 within the following areas: criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum submitted by a national of a third country; minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers; minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries as refugees; minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing refugee status; 2. measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas: minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from third countries; promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons; 3. measures on immigration policy within the following areas:

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conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by Member States of long term visas and residence permits; illegal immigration and illegal residence.148 Until that time, decisions will be taken on an intergovernmental level. In accordance with the Treaty, the European Parliament was given the prerogative to be consulted on matters of the common policy, and the European Court of Justice was designated as the court of final appeal. From May 2004, work on the common asylum policy will pass on to the Council of Ministers of the European Union. Currently, matters of immigration policy, including asylum policy, are mainly handled by the European Commission, whose proposals are consulted with the Economic and Social Committee. In accordance with the Committees recommendations for the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, the common immigration policy will have to take into account the conclusions of the European summit at Tampere (1999), where it was decided that the common immigration policy should be based on the norms of the Geneva Convention and the principle of non-refoulement. (Besides, The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, adopted in December 2000, refers to matters of asylum in two articles: Art. 18 guarantees that the provisions of the Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocol will be respected; Art. 19 offers protection against arbitrary removal, expulsion or extradition.) The stress is on the assurance of an equitable asylum procedure, based on common standards.

5. New Policy on Asylum and Immigration: Towards Fortress Europe?

The end of the cold war resulted in what is called a new approach (Chimni 1997: 369) to the problems of immigration and asylum among all Western European countries, which was a reaction to the dynamic increase in migration volumes. It is assumed that the new immigration and asylum policy was initiated in 19912, when the number of potential political refugees significantly increased, as a result of which Western European countries introduced new, far more restrictive regulations and legal norms pertaining to the residence of foreigners. The increased numbers of migrants were caused by the following factors: First, the authoritarian systems in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed and passport regulations were liberalized. Until the late 1980s, the countries of this region pursued a restrictive policy on emigration which efficiently hindered the movement of refugees to Western Europe. The numbers of those who did move out,
148

For details see the Treaty of Amsterdam, Title IIIa, Article 73k, EU Official Journal C 340 (10/11/1997).

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for political, but frequently also economic reasons, were not large enough to strain in any way the absorption capacity of the recipient countries. Besides, there existed a strong political and propaganda imperative to grant the migrants refugee status on an almost automatic basis. Second, the disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 led to a war. From that time until the end of the century, the Balkans were a constant supply of refugees who, in view of the geographic proximity of their native lands, had easy access to Western Europe. Third, the progress of civilization and technology made long-distance travel more affordable. Thanks to easier access to information, migrants had better knowledge about possible target countries, which influenced their choice of destinations. Air travel was now available not only to the richest, but also to the less affluent. The era had come of jet refugees inhabitants of developing countries who started to arrive in western states by air on a mass scale. The largest wave of asylum seekers engulfed Germany, where 438,190 asylum applications were filed in 1992. Currently, the favourite destination is Great Britain, with 84,130 applications in 2002 (IND 2003). The numbers of asylum seekers in 198998 are presented in the table below:
1989 EU 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

282,860 388,220 484,090 667,770 510,780 300,340 263,360 226,120 242,710 291,220

Germany 121,320 193,060 256,110 438,190 322,610 127,210 127,940 116,370 104,350 98,640 Source: Refugees and Others of Concern to UNHCR 1998 Statistical Overview, (www.unhcr.ch)

5.1 New Policy

The term new immigration policy denotes a common tendency to make national policies more restrictive. According to Andrew Shacknove (1993), it has brought about three trends, comprising: greater sophistication of administrative measures; expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus promoting the standardization of procedures; a containment policy aiming to prevent refugees from arriving in the territory of the target country, while calling into question the institution of asylum itself. The first of these trends involves the use of modern technologies by the governments, both for data collection and processing and for operational tasks, such as border patrolling. The second consists in creating a framework for the implementation of programs whereby the government sets out the asylum policy without regard for the actual needs of potential refugees and in conflict with some of the norms

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embodied in the international treaties. An example is provided by the quotas of refugees to be admitted in a specific period. Shacknove points out that such measures mean less tolerance for unexpected and non-standard inflows of refugees. The third trend comprises the attempts of developed countries to stop the flight of refugees from the direct vicinity of conflicts by measures intended to ensure security in the regions in question, an approach labelled internalisation by Joly (1996: 75). The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees identified, in its publication on The State of the Worlds Refugees: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, four components of the new asylum policy. The first one is deterrence per se, blocking the asylum seekers physical access to Europe by way of visa regulations or financial sanctions on carriers who fail to observe the immigration procedures. The second involves instruments to deflect migrant streams by shifting the responsibility onto third countries. This can be exemplified by the notion of safe countries. The third consists in attempts to narrow down the definition of a refugee in line with the Geneva Convention and to create forms of a substitutive status. The fourth is connected with non-preferential treatment which may even amount to intimidation of potential refugees. It appears that the main elements determining the shape of the new immigration policy include: asylum procedures; deterrence regulations; reliance on the concept of a safe country; the introduction of a substitutive status; reliance on the concept of safety zones. The early 1990s saw a number of international initiatives connected with the changing refugee regime. In Europe, the initiatives to make changes in this area proceed from three main sources. The Council of Europe undertook consultations on asylum arrangements in connection with the developments in Central and Eastern Europe. CEFTA countries presented their views at the forum of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE). However, OSCE resolutions are not legally binding and merely represent political declarations. The third and most important decision-making centre was the European Economic Community and its successor, the European Union. The resolution of the European Parliament concerning the main principles of the European policy on refugees (1994) advocated an equitable division of responsibility for refugees. Thus a system of limits was proposed, based on the area, population and GDP of particular EU countries, which were assigned corresponding indicators: Germany 21, France 19, Italy 15, Great Britain 14. The respective figures proposed for the smallest countries were as follows: Portugal 2, Denmark 1, Luxemburg 0.1 (Suhrke 1998a: 410). Thus, for every refugee admission in Denmark, there would be 21 admissions in Germany. When defining new national policies on immigration and asylum, most West-

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ern European countries accelerated the procedures for the acquisition of refugee status, but at the same time tightened up the criteria for granting such a status.149 The concept of a manifestly unfounded claim has been frequently invoked to reduce the influx of asylum seekers. Persons whose applications have been found to be manifestly unfounded undergo accelerated or simplified verification procedures (among other countries, in Austria, Belgium, Switzerland) or, in some cases, are immediately expelled. In Austria, an appeal does not suspend deportation. In Denmark and Great Britain, immigration officers have been given an extensive scope of competence. Persons considered to pose a threat started to be detained (in particular, in Great Britain and the Netherlands). Regulations aiming at deterrence and temporary protection have been promulgated; the concept of a safe country has often been invoked; attempts have also been made to use safety zones as a means to curb the influx of migrants.

5.2 Deterrence Regulations

Visas have become the most effective deterrence means to stop the influx of potential refugees. In combination with fines for carriers, they provide a workable way to keep out asylum seekers. Persons with a low economic status, and thus also potential refugees (it should be borne in mind that economic emigrants all too often invoke the argument of political persecution to gain admission to the country of their choice) had no chance to obtain a visa and hence even to start a journey at the end of which they could submit an asylum application. Besides, carriers were punished for taking aboard people without the required documents. In the 1980s, Great Britain introduced visas for the nationals of some Commonwealth states. Other Western European states took similar steps vis--vis some countries. Currently, the European Union requires visas from the citizens of several dozen countries. Penalties imposed on carriers became another very important instrument for the control of the influx of refugees. As this measure was introduced, airlines, shipping lines, bus and railroad companies became the entity responsible for the preliminary screening of prospective immigrants. This technique is especially widely used by Great Britain, which already in 1987 promulgated the Immigration (Carriers Liability) Act (Layton-Henry 1994: 277).

5.3 The Concept of a Safe Country

As the national regulations incorporated the concept of a safe country, that is, one free from persecution, more categories of potential refugees became rejected
149

Germany (1992), Great Britain (1993), Switzerland (1990), the Netherlands (1991), Belgium (1991), Austria (1992).

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without a verification process. It was, namely, decided that the nationals of such countries have no grounds whatsoever to apply for asylum. However, the problem emerged from the very outset of how to delineate and define the concept in question (some commentators indicate the need to distinguish between a safe third country and a safe country of origin). Although the Report from Immigration Ministers to the European Council Meeting in Maastricht states that a safe country is one which can be clearly shown, in an objective and verifiable way, normally not to generate refugees [] and that circumstances which might in the past have justified recourse to the 1951 Convention have ceased to exist (cited in Hailbronner 1993: 57), each state has been using a definition of its own, interpreting the concept at will. As a result, in 1990 Switzerland pronounced Algeria a safe country, and in the following year Germany did the same with respect to Nigeria. Hailbronner (1993) concludes that the adoption of the safe country concept created a conflict as defined by the Geneva Convention, because the fact that a person has attained a certain level of security in a third country does not preclude that persons eligibility for refugee status. However, it was practically impossible for such individuals to obtain this status in Western Europe in the 1990s, and the residents of safe countries were barred from the asylum procedure. What is more, the introduction of the safe country concept went against the fundamental principle governing the asylum procedures, namely, that every application should be given individual consideration. Such an individualized approach to candidates precluded a decision based solely on the applicants point of departure, whereas the new procedure did allow an application to be rejected without a preliminary analysis. Although, in theory, the incorporation of the notion of a safe country into the national laws did not eliminate the possibility of determining an applicants status on a case-by-case basis, in practice, a person arriving from a safe country had no chance to be granted asylum. In Denmark, for instance, a list of safe countries is compiled by the Immigration Office, and applications originating from these countries are not accepted at all. In the Netherlands, an application from a candidate coming from a safe country is considered to be manifestly unfounded. The same principle applies in Belgium to candidates who have spent at least three months in a safe country. As Hailbronner (1993) further argues, the viability of this concept requires two conditions to be met. First, measures taken by recipient states must comply with the international conventions and agreements. Second, every country must adjust its legal regulations so as to create a separate and fast verification path. The notion of a safe country has been invoked in international bilateral agreements, especially those on readmission (of illegal immigrants), concluded between neighbouring states. Western European countries have created in this way an additional barrier obstructing access to the fortress.

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The concept of temporary asylum was included in the Conclusions of the UNHCR Executive Committee No. 19 (XXXI) of 1980 and No. 22 (XXXII) of 1981. In July 1992, the EU states decided in London to apply temporary protection to refugees from Yugoslavia. The Union adopted this concept as an immigration policy instrument in December 1992. This decision was caused by the recurring waves of refugees from the Balkans, which the authorities of the member states found difficult to handle. In accordance with the adopted definition, to qualify for temporary protection, applicants must be coming directly from an area of combat, be currently in the territory of the European Union, and unable to return home because of the conflict and human rights violations (Joly 1996). The governments of the Twelve explained that this arrangement could benefit a broader group of people than those who met the actual definition of refugee. Temporary protection might also be extended to prisoners of war, persons in need of medical assistance which they could not receive elsewhere, victims of sexual crimes and other persons in direct peril of their lives. Temporary protection was seen as an intermediate stage en route to a longterm solution. This idea, although ostensibly promised security to the possibly broadest group, had many shortcomings. The first was the very rationale behind the introduction of such a mechanism. It was not motivated by humanitarian concerns, but, rather, by the need for additional instruments to handle the influx of refugees. Temporary protection would also be cheaper (temporary refugees would receive social security benefits for a limited time only) and guarantee, in most cases, the return of the refugees to their native country or their ultimate departure and settlement in a third country. Second, temporary protection contradicts the guiding principle of the Geneva Convention (1951) and New York Protocol (1967), as it involves involuntary expulsion. Besides, the UNHCR found that many persons to whom temporary protection was accorded were eligible for the refugee status under the Convention. Third, this arrangement placed some categories of persons in a long-term institutional vacuum. As the UNHCR and the concerned NGOs were quick to realize, temporary protection boiled down in practice to a failure to grant refugee status even to fully qualified applicants. The outcome of this policy was the accumulation of second-class refugees, deprived of constitutional rights. Soon the problems of children and the reunion of families emerged: how can families be reunited, if the person staying in the territory of the Union does not have refugee status and faces expulsion, pending the political developments in the home country? Children proved to be an even more substantial issue. The EU authorities underestimated the duration of many conflicts, including those in the Balkans. Meanwhile, the children of temporary refugees grew up in EU countries, which, for many of them, represented the only familiar civilization and culture. Should they too be expelled from the only native land they ever knew?

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5.5 Safety Zones

The concept of safety zones is yet another element of the new approach to migration issues. The idea behind the compulsory alternative was to stop potential refugees before they reach Western countries. It was also claimed that the formation of safety zones implies the existence of safe regions within a given country which, therefore, might be considered to meet the definition of a safe country, with all the consequences of this fact. The concept of safety zones is an old one. In medieval Europe, this role was played by churches. In 1929, the idea was put forward to create safe havens for civilians (Geneva localities) and in 1934, the proposal was made to identify sanitary cities and localities (Monaco Draft Convention) and then safe towns (Landgren 1995). After the Second World War, this concept was incorporated in various forms into the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Art. 23 (First Convention) pertains to the protection of the wounded and sick150, Art. 14 (Fourth Convention) extends protection to children under fifteen, expectant mothers and mothers of small children, while Art. 15 (Fourth Convention) concerns neutralized zones and states the need for their establishment in areas of armed conflict151. This concept is also invoked by the First Additional Protocol (1977), which states that protection should be given to the entire civilian population in areas of hostilities and defines the criteria a protection zone should meet.152 A safety zone is construed today as a designated area enjoying a special status and special protection, where persons who have fled from an area of conflict may take shelter. Safety zones seemed useful mainly in internal, as opposed to international, conflicts. Since the end of the cold war, most armed conflicts in the world have been civil wars. Furthermore, the proportions of casualties have reversed: in the early 20th century, 90 percent of victims of armed conflicts were soldiers and members of paramilitary forces, that is, physical combatants, whereas now 90 percent of victims are civilians. As a result, the need to increase the security of civilians was felt and the concept of safety zones came to be seen in the early 1990s as a very interesting proposal to remedy the hardships of the population in war areas. But the decisive factor behind the formation of such zones was the need to prevent potential refugees from moving to Western Europe and applying for political asylum. The Wests support for safety zones was motivated by the pragmatic intent to limit the influx of refugees, rather than by humanitarian considerations and the desire to help those in need. The formation of safety zones was part of the new immigration policy.
150

Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 151 Convention relating to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 152 For details see Landgren 1995.

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In the 1990s, several structures were established which might be termed safety zones. All of them were intended to protect civilians. In North Iraq, a no-fly zone was created. In Sri Lanka, so-called open relief centres were established in Madhu Church (Mannar district). The Operation Turquoise in Rwanda involved the formation of the first safe humanitarian zone in the Gikongoro-Cyangugu-Kibuye triangle. In Europe, several safety zones were set up in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Security Council resolutions of April 19 and May 6, 1993. Resolution No. 819 established such a zone in Srebrenica and Resolution No. 824 in Sarajevo, Bihac, Tuzla, Zepa and Gorazde. This decision came about because of the mounting hostilities and the increasingly desperate situation of the Muslim population. The safety zones failed to fulfil their mission of providing shelter to the inhabitants and did not cause any significant improvement in regions where they existed. In Srebrenica, 6,000 Muslims fell victim to genocide perpetrated by the Serbian militia, abetted by the inaction of the UN soldiers.

6. Conclusion
For the last dozen years European states independently and cooperatively have been erecting walls who purpose is to prevent unwanted migration flows coming from the developing world. Harmonising and unifying policy on immigration and asylum within the European Union as well as restricting national policy targeted at potential refugees are clear signs that the rulers of western Europe fear waves of foreigners who might be coming to their countries in search of higher standards of life, and more accessible development opportunities. Indeed, due to violent conflicts, economic and political crises and natural disasters, in various corners of the developing world, people are willing to embark on a journey to an elusive promised land. Although an attractive tool to temporarily satisfying the western societies, building Fortress Europe hardly seems a permanent solution. The only way to solve the problem is by addressing its root causes. Without a long-term policy of development and assistance together with supporting democracy and human rights one can hardly expect that the flows of migrants will dry out. Even if the walls are made of solid brick.

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