MT 2011 01 WDA Web

Issue1/2011
Vol. XXXV ISSN 0722-3226

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THE
WORLD
DEFENCE ALMANAC
2011
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2 Military Technology MILTECH 1/2011
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Contents
No. 1/2011
Editorial:
From White Mans Burden To Right to Protect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Imperialism with a Gentler Face
Dr. Ezio Bonsignore
Regional Data
North America
Charting the US Armys Challenging Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Robert M. Gates
Central and South America
A New President for Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Dilma Rousseff Has a Tough Act to Follow
Europe
Building Security in an Age of Austerity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Europe Cannot Afford to Get Out of the Security Business
Anders Fogh Rasmussen
Commonwealth of Independent States
Pipelineistan War in Central Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
Anteing up, and Bluffing in the new Great Game
Pepe Escobar
North Africa and Middle East
Security Cooperation in the Gulf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239
Sheik Khalid Bin Ahmed Bin Mohamed Al Khalifa
Sub-Saharan Africa
Quelling Terrorism Threat in the Sahel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Fresh Approach Needed
Asia and Far East
Renewing the Regional Security Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325
Teo Chee Hean
Oceania
New Zealand Defence White Paper 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383
(Summary of the official document as published in early November 2010)
The WORLD DEFENCE ALMANAC is the most up-to-date study of defence forces in
the world. As a reference, it provides a comprehensive review of force structures,
organisation and inventories.
The editorial closing date for this issue was 15 May 2011.
Any new data received after this date will be included in a subsequent issue.
Important Note on the Financial Data
The WDA not being a financial publication, the data about the economy of the various
countries are inserted for the sole purpose of enabling a broad assessment of their res-
pective financial muscle in relative terms, i.e. in relation with each other.
For this reason, the figures for the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) are expressed in terms
of Purchasing Power Parity (so-called Parkinson formula). While this approach is useful
for our purposes, readers must be aware that it results in values, that can be markedly
different than presented by official bodies, or calculated by independent agencies, and
then transformed in US $ at the official exchange rate.
Our Purchasing Power Parity GDP figures tend to be lower than the official exchange rate
ones in the case of countries, with advanced economies and high standards of living, and
higher in the case of developing countries. For instance, we give the GDP for Germany
at US$2.81 trillion as against an official figure of US$3.53 trillion, and for Colombia at
US$401.5 billion as against an official figure of US$228.8 billion.
World Defence Almanac
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North America
Canada .............................. 23
United States of America.. 28
Central and South America
Argentina ........................... 57
The Bahamas .................... 60
Belize ................................. 61
Bolivia ................................ 61
Brazil .................................. 63
Chile................................... 68
Colombia ........................... 72
Costa Rica......................... 75
Cuba.................................. 75
Dominican Republic.......... 76
Ecuador ............................. 77
El Salvador ........................ 79
Grenada............................. 80
Guatemala ......................... 80
Guyana .............................. 82
Haiti.................................... 82
Honduras........................... 83
Jamaica ............................. 84
Mexico............................... 85
Nicaragua .......................... 87
Panama ............................. 89
Paraguay ........................... 89
Peru ................................... 91
Suriname ........................... 94
Trinidad & Tobago............. 94
Uruguay ............................. 96
Venezuela .......................... 97
Europe
Albania............................. 108
Austria.............................. 110
Belgium............................ 112
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 115
Bulgaria............................ 116
Contents
Croatia............................. 119
Cyprus ............................. 120
Czech Republic............... 121
Denmark.......................... 124
Estonia............................. 126
Finland............................. 128
France.............................. 130
Germany.......................... 139
Greece............................. 152
Hungary........................... 154
Iceland............................. 155
Ireland.............................. 156
Italy .................................. 158
Kosovo ............................ 164
Latvia ............................... 165
Lithuania.......................... 167
Luxembourg.................... 168
Macedonia....................... 169
Malta................................ 170
Montenegro..................... 171
The Netherlands.............. 172
Norway ............................ 175
Poland ............................. 177
Portugal ........................... 182
Romania .......................... 184
Serbia .............................. 186
Slovakia ........................... 189
Slovenia........................... 190
Spain................................ 192
Sweden............................ 198
Switzerland...................... 202
Turkey.............................. 208
United Kingdom.............. 211
Commonwealth
of Independent States
Armenia ........................... 220
Azerbaijan........................ 221
Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
Georgia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Kazakhstan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Moldova . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Russian Federation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Tajikistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
Turkmenistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
Uzbekistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
North Africa and Middle East
Algeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
Bahrain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Jordan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259
Kuwait. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263
Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265
Oman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Qatar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268
Saudi Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269
Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273
Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
Tunisia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
United Arab Emirates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277
Yemen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Sub-Saharan Africa
Angola. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Benin. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Burkina Faso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Cameroon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Cape Verde. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
Central African Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Chad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Congo (Rep. of) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Congo (The Democratic Rep. of). . . . . . 291
Cte dIvoire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Djibouti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
Equatorial Guinea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295
Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Ethiopia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296
Gabon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297
The Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Ghana. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299
Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300
Guinea Bissau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Contents
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Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Liberia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Mauritania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
Mozambique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
Namibia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308
Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310
Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311
Senegal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313
Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Somalia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Uganda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322
Zimbabwe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Asia and Far East
Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
Bangladesh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 330
Brunei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331
Cambodia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 334
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Korea (North) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352
Korea (South) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354
Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Malaysia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Mongolia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
Myanmar. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 362
Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 369
Singapore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Sri Lanka. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 374
Thailand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 377
Timor Leste . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Vietnam. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 381
Oceania
Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
Fiji . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390
Papua New Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
Contents
14 Military Technology MIL TECH 1/2011
Concealing ones own objectives of strategic
dominance and economic exploitation behind
the fig leaf of an alleged moral imperative to
rescue foreign populations from a perceived
or even only feared plight, and in the process
freeing them from rulers and forms of govern-
ment whose behaviour we disapprove to, has
traditionally always been a very convenient way
to try and justify the most blatant forms of
imperialism, colonialism and armed aggres-
sion. Indeed, the more salivating the bounty to
be won through a colonial war (particularly in
terms of control over strategic raw materials
reserves), and the strongest the moral impera-
tive to get there in a hurry. It used to be called
the White Mans Burden.
Why, everybody knows that the British were
in India solely because the locals, if left to their
own devices, would happily burn widows on
their deceased husbands funerary pyres and
skin goats alive. And Frances only goal in
Algeria and Indochina certainly was to make
the populace there savour the noble concepts
of Libert, Egalit and Fraternit. There could
also be no doubt that Leopold I, King of the
Belgians was moved by the purest of humani-
tarian concerns in mercilessly exploiting the
Congo not even as a colony, but as its own pri-
vate property land, men and animals alike.
Plus, the Italians did admittedly invade Ethiopia
and turn it into their Fascist Empire, but this
was only to free the pretty girls there from slav-
ery (there even was a march song to that
effect). Examples abound.
One could have rationally expected that the
evolution of political consciousness and
responsibility amongst the Western public
opinion ever since the halcyon days of
European colonialism would have made such
arguments totally untenable in the 21st
Century. One could have expected that, say,
the notion of NATO attacking a country, that
was not posing the slightest threat against any
member of the Alliance, simply because that
countrys legitimate government could have
resorted to means we regards as too brutal, in
order to fight an armed uprising, would have
been received with some perplexity. One could
have expected for at least the educated part of
the Western public to see clearly through the
veil of flimsy humanitarian pretexts, and per-
ceive the real strategic dominance goals. But
nothing of that sort.
Over the past twelve years or so, a very deep
shift has taken place in the overall strategic
posture of, when not the West as a whole, then
certainly some leading Western countries. This
shift basically implies a renewed willingness
and preparedness to use military force at the
slightest provocation (or even without provoca-
tion at all, as in the case of Libya) in the pursuit
of a variety of rather murky strategic and eco-
nomic interests interests that following the
end of the colonial period and the 1956 Suez
crisis had long remained dormant under the
constrains of the Cold War, but are now resur-
facing with a vengeance. In the particular case
of countries such as the United States and the
UK, this willingness is further reinforced by the
mounting perception of military force as virtual-
ly the only residual tool available to the respec-
tive governments to try and fend off a precipi-
tous decline triggered by the threatening finan-
cial and economic collapse.
This shift in strategic attitudes has been
accompanied, paralleled and indeed enabled
by a propaganda and disinformation campaign
of absolutely unprecedented magnitude and
effectiveness, whose results now show in all of
their sinister splendour. The Western public
opinion has been skilfully manipulated and con-
ditioned to such an extent, that would make the
USSR under Stalin pale in comparison, and
turn Orwells 1984 into a blandly optimistic
forecast. Doublethink reigns supreme, and
any serious attempt at discussing the real
strategic goals and implications of the war
against Libya is made exceedingly difficult by
the fact that virtually all Western mass media,
and the majority of political commentators, do
subscribe (or at least feign to) to the obscene lie
of this being a humanitarian mission aimed at
protecting the civilian population. And in
broader terms beyond the specific Libyan con-
tingency, nobody but nobody would doubt,
even for a moment that our self-attributed
Right to Protect (R2P for short) is a most
wonderful thing, and something we do out of
our moral commitment towards helping the
whole world.
It all started back in 1998-1999 with the
Kosovo War and the NATO attack against
Yugoslavia, and it is a rather meagre satisfac-
tion for this writer to recall that I saw only too
clearly what it meant, and warned against the
inherent pitfalls and dangers. President Clinton,
Secretary of State Albright and the politicians of
NATO member states used a variety of
humanitarian pretexts to justify the war, from
imposing a peace ultimatum and protecting
refugees (largely created by the NATO bomb-
ing campaign itself) to stopping alleged Serb
atrocities against Albanian rebels. Four years
later, when George W. Bush invaded Iraq, his
pretexts were less humanitarian, but no less
fictitious; Saddam Hussein had been involved
in the 9/11 attacks and possessed WMDs
ready to strike within 45 minutes, we were
told, and the overwhelming majority of the
Western public actually believed it. Imperialist
policy has now come full circle, and the powers
WORD FROM THE EDI TOR
From White Mans
Burden To
Right to Protect
Imperialism with a Gentler Face
The Right to Protect in action: Peter the Hermit rallying the Crusaders
on the eve of the final attack on Jerusalem on 14 July 1099.
wda 2011 editorial_wda 2010 editorial 5/16/11 8:47 AM Seite 14
that be are back to attaching the humanitarian
intervention label to whatever military endeav-
our might become purposeful to foster their
interests.
It is difficult not to comment that the West
has thus consistently been following a foreign
policy, based predominantly when not exclu-
sively on distortions, exaggerations and flat
lies. There has admittedly been a certain loss of
gravity and style over the years, because we
have gone from the impressive performance of
Colin Powell brandishing the Iraqi anthrax vial
at the UN, to Susan Rice fantasising about
Ghaddafis rape squads and their unlimited
supply of free Viagra but, hey, a poor diplo-
mat can only use the arguments, that the
PsyOp department invents for him/her.
In political terms, the most extraordinary
result of the above is the emergence of sort of
a unholy alliance between those forces and
individuals who used to be classified as
hawks or right wing on the one hand, and
the former libertarians, left wing or paci-
fists on the other. Unilateralists and multi-lat-
eralists, neocons and libertarian interventionists
now enthusiastically rally side-by-side behind
the R2P banners of a gentler, kinder imperial-
ism, even though their justifications for doing
so might differ. Indeed, the German Greens
(supposedly a left-wing, ecologist party) are
tearing their vests apart over Chancellor
Merkels refusal to join the Unified Protector
bandwagon, while in France and Italy the most
vociferous support for escalating the war on
Libya originates from circles with a Communist
background.
In terms of social control, this unholy alli -
ance with the resulting lack of a principled
and powerful political or ideological/moral
opposition to the attack against Libya, and
more in general to the whole R2P concept is
exactly what made it possible to achieve the
current extraordinary level of acquiescence
amongst the Western public, without resorting
to the paraphernalia of secret police, infor-
mants, show trials and gulags other regimes
had to use in the past to achieve similar results.
When hearing a certain French new philoso-
pher thunder about the moral imperative to
attack Libya, one has the distinct impression of
having been brought back in time over a mil-
lennium, and to be listening to Peter the Hermit
preaching the Crusade. The same blind fanati-
cism, the same arrogant conviction that ones
own ideas and beliefs are the Absolute Truth,
the same total disdain and hate for all of those
who would rather dare to wish to live according
to their own customs and religion. And it fig-
ures, because Peter preached the Crusade
based exactly on the Right to Protect: why,
those vile Muslims were harassing and tor-
menting the Christian pilgrims travelling to the
Holy Places, and it was the sacred duty of all
Knights to rush and rescue them by the sword.
So pervasive and generalised is this support
for the war and its official rationale, that even
those political figures who stand to lose much
from the fall of the Ghaddafi regime do hesitate
to call as spade a spade and an aggression an
aggression. Italys Prime Minister Silvio
Berluconi used all the tricks and manoeuvres
as available to him to limit Italys participation
to the conflict to a bare face-saving minimum
while trying to throw a wrench or two into the
gear of the French/British war machinery,
before being eventually forced to capitulate by
the joint personal interventions of Presidents
Obama and Sarkozy. But even he, despite
being in control of a sizeable portion of the
Italian mass media, didnt have the nerve to
bluntly tell his fellow countrymen and voters
that one of the main goals of Paris and London
consists precisely in destroying the dominant
position of Italys ENI State-owned energy con-
cern in controlling Libyan oil and natural gas
supplies, and that this is thus also a war against
Italys interests in the Mediterranean.
That much as regards trying to explain how
we did come to the current state of affairs. But
what matters even more are the future-oriented
strategic implications.
NATOs formal assumption of the Right to
Protect as part and parcel of its strategy and
raison dtre, building as it does on the previ-
ous Global War on Terror and much expand-
ing it, effectively amounts to a declaration of
permanent war against all the rest of the world.
The R2P concept is the final repudiation of the
principle of non ingerence that had dominated
the relationship between Western or Western-
oriented countries ever since the Treaty of
Westphalia, and it implies that all nations out-
side of NATO maintain some semblance of
sovereignty but at Western sufferance. Further,
such sovereignty can and will be cancelled
through military intervention in circumstances,
that we will chose to define as involving geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
ethnic cleansing (plus a strong push for natural
disasters, ecological mismanagement, gender
equality issues, gay rights and so on being
hopefully added in the near future).
In formal terms, the Right to Protect is of
course a responsibility of the international com-
munity as a whole (however defined), while the
authority to call for the use of military force
rests solely with the UN (Security Council and
General Assembly). Why, even a three-year old
kid would know that. In practical terms, howev-
er, it so happens that due to a series of very
curious circumstances, the only military inter-
ventions to be approved by the UN under R2P
criteria are those, that are proposed by leading
members of the NATO/Western community,
are aimed at countries with limited means to
defend themselves, and beyond their stated
humanitarian goals do incidentally provide
some useful opportunity to advance the above
leading members strategic interests. Even
admitting that the original vision was actually
based on the noblest and purest of intentions
(but the risks should have been painfully evi-
dent), the Right to Protect has quickly degen-
erated into nothing more than a new version of
the old, worn-out mask of Western imperialism.
We claim the right to protect those whom we
would chose to regard as useful puppets and
cronies, while bombing everybody other as we
damn please.
The world will most certainly take notice, the
more so because the case of Libya shows only
too clearly that even coming to terms with the
West, bowing to Western diktats and actively
supporting the West in its fight against other
enemies does not automatically provide a guar-
antee for permanent benevolence of even less
so survival. Rather, everybody but everybody
out there is liable of being attacked at the first
favourable occasion and under the vaguest
pretexts, if such an attack is being perceived as
potentially advantageous. Yemens President
Ali Abdullah Saleh, Bahrains al-Khalifa ruling
family and other assorted satraps and tyrants
can go on shooting, torturing and imprisoning
their unhappy subjects to their hearths delight
because they are still being perceived as valid
Western assets, but Ghaddafi has simply out-
lived his usefulness though not for lack of try-
ing on his part. As regards this latter aspect,
though, it could perhaps be argued that the
Libyan dictators fatal flaw consisted in not hav-
ing implemented the preliminary deals he
signed with President Sarkozy for the supply of
$5 billion-worth of military materiel as well as
two nuclear power plants. This failure to open
the purses strings to the benefit of French
industries was admittedly a crime against
humanity that could not be forgotten or for -
given.
The key strategic question of our times is,
thus, what the rest of the world will or would do
to face the Western interventionist approach
based on the Right to Protect. At first glance,
the answer would seem to be precious noth-
ing. Those who are strong enough to bring
even the most blatant supporters of R2P to
prudent second thoughts have, and will contin-
ue to have nothing to fear; there will be no
attempt at humanitarian operations in the
Russian Caucasus or in Tibet, unless Arma -
geddon descends upon us. As for those who
are too weak to provide some sort of a deter-
rent, they are basically left with the choice of
giving themselves up, or else resorting to a
guerrilla war of resistance with its terrible
human costs.
But a more careful analysis shows a much
different picture. The abysmal way in which the
operations against Libya are being carried out,
with nobody firmly in command, without a
clearly stated (and perhaps not even formulat-
ed) strategic goal, and amidst a nearly com-
plete chaos as regards responsibilities and
roles, unmistakably points at a gnawing gap
between NATOs ambitions and appetites on
the one hand, and the relative modesty of its
military assets and C2 means on the other at
least, when the US is not directly involved. The
original wildly optimistic operational concept
of swiftly causing the collapse of the Libyan
government through a bombing campaign has
utterly failed, as has the fall-back strategy of
obtaining the same result by attriting the Libyan
armed forces and trying to educate the self-
styled rebels into conducting more meaning-
ful military operations than shooting wildly in
the air (and occasionally hitting their own air-
craft) for the benefit of Western TV cameras.
We are thus reduced to the desperate expedi-
ent of trying to assassinate Col. Ghaddafi and
his family, while hopefully scaring away all of
those who would choose to remain around him.
Should even this fail, we will have no other
choice than engineering some form of partition,
with oil- and gas-rich Cyrenaica under a
Western-friendly government while Ghaddafi
would be left to control the sand box of
Tripolitania, or else going along the well-estab-
lished Vietnam road: from military advisors to
support personnel to limited forces to full-scale
invasion and occupation by land troops. But I
doubt very much whether even a lobotomised
European public could be made to accept that
on top of the ongoing Afghanistan commit-
ment.
Unified Protector is thus spreading the
message around that the myth of Western mil-
itary superiority is largely bogus, if the US is not
throwing in its weight. It was being said that
NATO could not afford to fail in its effort to sub-
due the fierce Afghani tribes, because such a
failure would undermine its credibility. Well, it
turns out that NATO, plus coalition forces but
without the US is not even able to subdue the
buffonesque Libyan regime, despite the opera-
tion having been launched and being carried
out under the most favourable circumstances.
Now hows that for credibility?
One could blame the cuts in defence spend-
ing since the end of the Cold War, parochial
national interests taking precedence over com-
mon goals, European armed forces being still
insufficiently equipped and trained for expedi-
tionary operations whatever. Those who like
to indulge in conspiracy theories might even
wish to think in terms of President Obama hav-
ing skilfully manoeuvred to trap France and the
UK into a repeat of the 1956 Suez crisis humil-
iation, forcing them to show their impotence in
front of the whole world. Be this as it may, the
ultimate conclusion remains that even coun-
tries such as France and the UK nuclear pow-
ers, permanent members of the US Security
Council, leading partners in NATO, and recent
signatories of a bilateral military alliance pact
specifically intended in view of endeavours
such as the attack on Libya while certainly
more than capable of defending themselves
against any conceivable military threat, at the
same time do not have an adequate military
muscle and strategic brain to properly support
their renewed imperialist ambitions in terms of
power projection. The rest of Europe NATO is
not even worth mentioning in this regard.
Furthermore, and even ignoring the brain issue,
a variety of factors from the worsening eco-
nomic conditions to demographic trends
make it highly unlikely that such military muscle
could be reconstituted in the short/medium
term. Indeed, the recent drastic cuts in defence
spending implemented in countries such as the
UK and the Netherlands rather point at an
accelerated process of further decline. The bot-
tom line is, NATOs R2P-based interventionism
can be deterred and if need be resisted, at least
when not supported by the US.
The final result is thus likely to be a global
arms race of unprecedented proportion, as
countries and regional alliances all over the
world not directly linked to NATO or more
broadly to the West scramble to acquire the
military capabilities to keep imperialism gone
berserk at bay. Until a recent past, trying to do
so would have been regarded as hopelessly
futile and a waste of resources, but the Libyan
experience suggests otherwise.
The first and foremost aspect of this coming
arms race is very likely to be the demise of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a
race to nuclear weapons and their delivery
means. A very convincing argument can be
made for nukes as by far the best tool to deter
a much stronger potential aggressor, with total
costs that are but a small fraction of the price
tag for the acquisition and maintenance of a
correspondingly efficient conventional military
instrument. The NPT has been sustained so far
basically because most countries around the
world did not perceive a compelling rationale
for going nuclear, but our self-appointed Right
to Protect is very likely to force quite a few
governments into seeing things under a much
different light.
But should future issue of the WDA show the
number of declared nuclear powers to
increase, year after year, dont get unduly
alarmed, and most importantly dont start hav-
ing afterthoughts about what we have been
doing. Just keep reciting the mantra: We in the
West have the exclusive authority to establish
what is Right and what is Wrong We are the
standard bearers of democracy and human
rights We have a moral obligation to bring the
whole world, by force if necessary, in line with
our principles Our governments actions are
motivated by the purest concerns We dont
wage wars of aggression, we just carry out
humanitarian interventions based on the
right to protect. Stick to that, and youll quick-
ly become convinced that everything is going
for the best, in the best of all possible worlds.

www.amgeneral.com

The Secretary of
Defense, the
Hon. Robert M. Gates
had good and
not-so-good news to
tell when he addressed
the entire US Army
Corps of Cadets
in Eisenhower Hall
at West Point on
24 February 2011.
(Photo: US Army)
This will be the fourth and final
time that I address the cadets of
the US Military Academy as
Secretary of Defense. I did want to
take this last opportunity to share
some thoughts with you, and
through you to the Army as a
whole, about the institution you will
someday lead the United States
Army and how it can better pre-
pare itself, and in particular its
leaders, for a complex and uncer-
tain future.
No doubt the Armys challenges are daunt-
ing and diverse supporting families, caring for
wounded warriors, dealing with post-traumatic
stress, doing right by soldiers, strengthening
the NCO corps, training and equipping for the
future, and finding a way to pay for it all. Today,
Id like to focus on three interrelated issues:
The future of conflict, and the implications for
the Army;
How best to institutionalise the diverse capa-
bilities that will be required; and
The kinds of officers the Army will need for
the 21st Century, and how the service must
change to retain and empower those l -
eaders.
An Army
Transformed
by War
When you receive your commission and walk
off the parade field for the last time, you will join
an Army that, more than any other part of
Americas military, is an institution transformed
by war. The change has been wrenching for a
service that a decade ago was essentially a
garrison army, a smaller version of the Cold
War force that faced down the Soviets in
Europe and routed Saddams divisions from
Kuwait a force mainly organised, trained, and
equipped to defeat another large modern army.
The Armys ability to learn and adapt in
recent years allowed us to pull Iraq back from
the brink of chaos in 2007 and, over the past
year, to roll back the Taliban from their strong-
Robert M. Gates
Charting the
US Armys
Challenging
Future
NORTH AMER I CA
*Number affected globally by climatic crises by 2015 projection from oxfam.org.uk
Any future Defense Secretary who advises
the President to again send a big American
land army into Asia or into the Middle East or
Africa should have his head examined
2011 na 1_mt 1/10 einleitung asia 5/13/11 5:30 PM Seite 18
holds in Afghanistan. As one of your former
professors from the SOSH department, now
the Armys vice Chief of Staff, General Pete
Chiarelli, once said it is important that the hard
fought lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not
merely observed but truly learned incorporat-
ed into the Services DNA and institutional
memory.
Which leads to the first major challenge I see
facing the Army: How will it structure itself, how
will it train and equip, for the extraordinarily
diverse range of missions it will face in the
future?
There has been an overwhelming tendency
of our defence bureaucracy to focus on prepar-
ing for future high-end conflicts priorities
often based, ironically, on what transpired in
the last century as opposed to the messy
fights in Iraq and Afghanistan. But without suc-
cumbing to what I once called next-war-itis, I
do think it important to think about what the
Army will look like and must be able to do after
large US combat units are substantially drawn
down in Afghanistan, and what that means for
young leaders entering the force.
The Future of Warfare
We cant know with absolute certainty what
the future of warfare will hold, but we do know
it will be exceedingly complex, unpredictable,
and as they say in the staff colleges
unstructured. Just think about the range of
security challenges we face right now beyond
Iraq and Afghanistan: terrorism and terrorists in
search of weapons of mass destruction, Iran,
North Korea, military modernisation program -
mes in Russia and China, failed and failing
states, revolution in the Middle East, cyber,
piracy, proliferation, natural and man-made
disasters, and more. And I must tell you, when
it comes to predicting the nature and location
of our next military engagements, since
Vietnam, our record has been perfect: We have
never once gotten it right, from the MAYAGUEZ
to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans,
Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more we had no idea
a year before any of these missions that we
would be so engaged.
The need for heavy armour and firepower to
survive, close with, and destroy the enemy will
always be there, as veterans of Sadr City and
Fallujah can no doubt attest. And one of the
benefits of the drawdown in Iraq is the oppor-
tunity to conduct the kind of full-spectrum
training including mechanised combined
arms exercises that was neglected to meet
the demands of the current wars. Looking
ahead, though, in the competition for tight de -
fence dollars within and between the Services,
the Army also must confront the reality that the
most plausible, high-end scenarios for the US
military are primarily naval and air engage-
ments whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or
elsewhere. The strategic rationale for swift-
moving expeditionary forces, be they Army or
Marines, airborne infantry or special opera-
tions, is self-evident given the likelihood of
counter-terrorism, rapid reaction, disaster
response, or stability or security force assis-
tance missions. But in my opinion, any future
Defense Secretary who advises the president
to again send a big American land army into
Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should
have his head examined, as General
MacArthur so delicately put it.
By no means am I suggesting that the US
Army will or should turn into a Victorian
nation-building constabulary, designed to chase
guerrillas, build schools, or sip tea. But as the
prospects for another head-on clash of large
mechanised land armies seem less likely, the
Army will be increasingly challenged to justify the
number, size, and cost of its heavy formations to
those in the leadership of the Pentagon, and on
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, who ulti-
mately make policy and set budgets.
What we can expect in the future is that
potential adversaries be they terrorists, insur-
gents, militia groups, rogue states, or emerging
powers will seek to frustrate Americas tradi-
tional advantages, in particular our ability to
shoot, move and communicate with speed and
precision. From the look of things, the Army will
not repeat the mistakes of the past, where
irregular warfare was shunted to the side after
Vietnam. The odds of repeating another
NORTH AMER I CA
Robert M. Gates is the outgoing US Defense Sec re -
tary. This article is a slightly edited version of a speech,
that was delivered by DefSec Gates at the US Military
Academy in West Point on 25 February 2011.
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Heavy armour will remain
indispensable, but the
current fleet sizes will
come under increasing
question. The M1A2 is
the latest version of the
ABRAMS MBT, currently
being distributed to
operational units.
(Photo: US Army)
Afghanistan or Iraq invading, pacifying, and
administering a large Third World country
may be low. But in what General Casey has
called an era of persistent conflict, those
unconventional capabilities will still be needed
at various levels and in various locations most
critically, to prevent festering problems from
growing into full-blown crises which require
costly, and controversial, large-scale American
military intervention.
Adapting the Armys Culture
A second challenge that I believe faces
todays and tomorrows Army is whether and
how the Army can adapt its practices and cul-
ture to these strategic realities. From the begin-
ning of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, our
soldiers and junior- and mid-level leaders down
range have been adjusting and improvising to
the complex and evolving challenges on the
ground in many cases using the Internet,
especially tools of social media, to share tacti-
cal lessons learned in real time with their col-
leagues at the front or preparing to deploy back
here in the United States.
As one would expect, it
took some time for the
bureaucracies here at
home an Army and a
Defense Department struc-
tured primarily to prepare
for war, not to wage war
to respond with remotely
similar agility. But with inspired leadership and
creative thinking the progress has been
real. For example, the doctrine for the new
Advise and Assist Brigades was developed and
fielded in a couple of months, and over the past
two years these reconfigured units have played
a key role in the successful transition to full Iraqi
security responsibility.
But the important question then is: how can
the Army prepare, train, and retain officers with
the necessary multifaceted experience to take
on a broad range of missions and roles? Where
there is not one, but many doctrines in play,
often simultaneously. For example, given the
ongoing and prospective requirements to train,
equip and advise foreign armies and police,
how do we institutionalise security force assis-
tance into the Armys regular force structure,
and make the related experience and skill set a
career enhancing pursuit?
I hope you take some instruction and inspi-
ration from the career of Russell Volckmann,
Class of 1934. At the outbreak of WW2
Volckmann was serving as a full-time embed in
the Philippine Army. After the Japanese inva-
sion, Volckmann fought alongside his Philip -
pine unit, and rather than surrender, he disap-
peared into the jungles and raised a guerrilla
army of more than 22,000 men that fought the
Japanese for the next three years. When the
Japanese commander finally decided to sur-
render, he made the initial overtures not to
General MacArthur, but to Volckmann, who
went on after the war to help create the Green
Berets. My point: if you chart a different path,
theres no telling the impact you could have
on the Army, and on history.
Indeed, the Army has always needed entre-
preneurial leaders with a broad perspective and
a diverse range of skills. As President Kennedy
put it, speaking on these grounds half a centu-
ry ago, your military responsibilities will require
a versatility and an adaptability never before
required in war or in peace. And for an era of
full spectrum conflict, when we confront secu-
rity dilemmas that Kennedy called new in
intensity, ancient in origin, America can suc-
ceed only with leaders who are themselves full-
spectrum in their thinking. The military will not
be able to train or educate you to have all the
right answers as you might find in a manual
but you should look for those experiences and
pursuits in your career that will help you at least
ask the right questions.
Maxwell Taylor, class of 22, was an Asia for-
eign area specialist in the 1930s before becom-
ing the famed commander of the 101st
Airborne, superintendent of West Point, and
later Army Chief of Staff and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs. He once observed of his fellow
academy grads that, the goats of my acquain-
tance who have leapfrogged their classmates
are men who continue their intellectual growth
after graduation.
So in addition to the essential troop com-
mand and staff assignments, you should look
for opportunities that in the past were off the
beaten path, if not a career dead end _ and the
institutional Army should not only tolerate, but
encourage you in the effort. Such opportunities
might include further study at grad school,
teaching at this or another-first rate university,
spending time at a think tank, being a congres-
sional fellow, working in a different government
agency, or becoming a foreign area specialist.
On that last note, I would encourage you to
become a master of other languages and cul-
tures, a priority of mine since taking this post. A
pilot programme begun in 2008 to incentivize
ROTC cadets to learn foreign languages has
grown from a couple dozen participants to
some 1,800 today.
It is incumbent on the Army to promote in
every sense of the word these choices and
experiences for its next generation of leaders,
the junior- and mid-grade officers in Army
ranks who represent the most battle-tested
group in its history. More so, in fact, than many
of the superiors they might report to. The US
military has always distinguished itself from
other countries by the degree of trust and
responsibility placed on its small unit leaders.
But Iraq and Afghanistan called the captains
wars have taken this trend to a new level,
where officers of lower and lower rank were put
in the position of making decisions of higher
and higher degrees of consequence and com-
plexity. Officers now poised to take what
theyve learned to shape the institution to
which theyve given so much. The diversity of
experiences and essential adaptability of this
generation are crucial to dealing the complexi-
ty of conflict in this century.
Creating the Next Generation
of Military Leaders
Which brings me to the third and greatest
challenge facing your Army, and frankly, my
main worry. How can the Army can break-up
the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigid-
ity in its assignments and promotion process-
es, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its
best, brightest, and most-battled tested young
officers to lead the service in the future? After
the major Afghan troop deployments end in
2014, how do we keep you and those 5 or 10
years older than you in our Army? This is some-
thing Ive discussed many times with the cur-
rent Service leadership and with General
Dempsey, the TRADOC commander, before
recommending him to the President as the next
Army Chief of Staff.
The context for this discussion is that the
institutional Army, for the better part of the past
decade has understandably, and appropriately,
been consumed by force generation man-
ning units for deployment to Iraq and
Afghanistan in response to the orders of
Americas civilian leadership. I will never forget
NORTH AMER I CA
Combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
has deeply transformed the US Army.
Picture shows Paratroopers from
3rd Platoon, Company B, 3rd Battalion,
509th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
4th Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry
Division, as they prepare to load a CH-47
CHINOOK helicopter in the Bermel District
of the Paktika province in eastern
Afghanistan.
(Photo: US Army)
one of my first decisions as Secretary of De -
fense in early 2007, which was to extend Army
combat tours from 12 to 15 months, including
for units that had spent less than a year at
home. This was perhaps my most difficult deci-
sion over the past four years because I knew
the hardship this would place on those who
had already borne so much for this country. But
the alternative was a disaster for our country
and for Iraq. And the Army did as ordered and
much more. One result is that you will be join-
ing a force that has been decisively engaged
for nearly a decade. And while it is resilient, it is
also stressed and tired.
The effect of the Armys necessary focus on
preparing and manning units for Iraq or
Afghanistan has provided younger officers,
especially those in high demand combat and
support specialties, little opportunity to do
more than catch their breath and then get ready
for the next deployment.
And on top of the repeat deployments, there
is the garrison mindset and personnel bureau-
cracy that awaits them back home _ often cited
as primary factors causing promising officers to
leave the Army just as they are best positioned
to have a positive impact on the institution.
Consider that, in theatre, junior leaders are
given extraordinary opportunities to be innova-
tive, take risks, and be responsible and recog-
nised for the consequences. The opposite is
too often true in the rear-echelon headquarters
and stateside bureaucracies in which so many
of our mid-level officers are warehoused. Men
and women in the prime of their professional
important to really focus on the top 20 percent
of your people and, though it may be politically
incorrect to say so, the bottom 20 percent as
well. The former to elevate and give more
responsibility and opportunity, the latter to tran-
sition out, albeit with consideration and respect
for the service they have rendered. Failure to do
this risks frustrating, demoralising and ultimate-
ly losing the leaders we will most need for the
future.
The promotion rates have started to de -
crease and, as a matter of course, will decrease
further as overseas deployments wind
down. Ive tried to do my small part to alleviate
this situation by ordering the military to pare
down the size and number of its headquarters
along with reducing the number of general and
admirals by nearly 100 and twice as many
civilian executives. One hoped-for effect of
these reforms is to reduce the number of per-
sonal staff and support positions, and in turn
alleviate somewhat the demand on the military
services to produce the field grade officers to
fill those billets. This is an effort Ive encour-
aged the Services to continue, including the
Army, in the years ahead.
A more merit-based, more individualised
approach to officer evaluations could also do
much to combat the risk-averse, zero-defect
culture that can take over any large, hierarchi-
cal organisation. One that too often incentivis-
es officers to keep their head down, avoid mak-
ing waves, or disagree with superiors. The
Army has been fortunate throughout its history
to have officers who, at critical times, exercise
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lives, who may have been responsible for the
lives of scores or hundreds of troops, or mil-
lions of dollars in assistance, or engaging in
reconciling warring tribes, they may find them-
selves in a cube all day re-formatting power
point slides, preparing quarterly training briefs,
or assigned an ever expanding array of clerical
duties. The consequences of this terrify me.
Furthermore, the creation and increasing
number of autonomous Brigade Combat
Teams, the substantive growth of other agen-
cies, headquarters and support bureaucracies,
and simply meeting the needs of a bigger Army
at war have created a voracious demand for
mid-level staff officers. The result of meeting
these shortfalls has been essentially automatic
promotion for elevation to Major and Lieutenant
Colonel.
A few years ago a brigade commander in
Baghdad Colonel, now Brigadier General,
J.B. Burton wrote a memo reflecting on the
feedback he was getting from some of his offi-
cers about the factors that influenced them to
stay in or leave. They talked about finding
respite from the deployment treadmill, getting
an opportunity to start or re-acquaint them-
selves with their families, to develop them-
selves intellectually through graduate educa-
tion or other non-conventional assignments.
One of the chief complaints was that the per-
sonnel system was, Numb to individual perfor-
mance and [had] begun to see every officer as
equal.
One thing I have learned from decades of
leading large public organisations is that it is
respectful, principled dissent. Men like General
George Marshall, who rose to high rank and
greatness even as he told blunt truths to supe-
riors ranging from Blackjack Pershing to
Franklin D. Roosevelt. But no doubt that takes
courage, and entails real risk, especially given
the current system. In an article for Military
Review following his tenure as a corps com-
mander in Iraq, General Chiarelli suggested
that, while the opinions of an officers superiors
should hold the most sway, its time that the
Armys officer evaluations also consider input
from peers and, yes, subordinates in my view
the people hardest to fool by posturing, B.S.
and flattery. And as two Iraq veterans, then-
Lieutenant Colonels John Nagl and Paul
Yingling, wrote in a professional journal some
years ago, the best way to change the organ-
isational culture of the Army is to change the
pathways for professional advancement within
the officer corps. The Army will become more
adaptive only when being adaptive offers the
surest path to promotion.
Several years ago, it caused something of a
stir when we brought General Petraeus back
from Iraq to chair a promotion board, to make
sure that those colonels who had distinguished
themselves in war including those who
advised Iraqi and Afghan forces got due con-
sideration for elevation to brigadier ge ne -
ral. And since then, due to statutory changes
and cultural shifts, officers who dont have
cookie-cutter backgrounds, who may not have
punched all the traditional tickets, have more of
an opportunity to reach higher rank. But the
tendency of any big bureaucracy is to revert to
business as usual at the first opportunity _ and
for the military, that opportunity is, if not peace-
time, then the unwinding of sustained combat.
There have been a variety of suggestions
and ideas put on the table in various venues
and publications to give officers, after their ini-
tial platoon, company or battalion-level tours,
greater voice in their assignments and flexibili-
ty to develop themselves personally and pro-
fessionally in a way that enhances their career
and promotion prospects. For example, in -
stead of being assigned to new positions every
two or three years, officers would be able to
apply for job openings in a competitive system
more akin to what happens in large organisa-
tions in the private sector. The former Com -
mander of US forces in Afghanistan, Lieutenant
General David Barno, class of 76, has written
that, in a smaller professional force competing
for talent with the Googles of the world,
reforming this system is a must do for the
Army to keep its best and brightest leaders.
The Bottom Line
Having said that, when all is said and done,
this is the United States Army. Its not
Apple. Its not General Electric. And its not the
Red Cross. Taking that oath and accepting that
commission means doing what you are told
and going where you are needed. And as prac-
tical matter, one cannot manage tens of thou-
sands of officers based on What colour is your
parachute? But just as the Army has reset and
reformed itself when it comes to doctrine,
equipment, and training, it must use the even-
tual slackening of overseas deployments as an
opportunity to attack the institutional and
bureaucratic constipation of Big Army, and re-
think the way it deals with the outstanding
young leaders in its lower- and middle-ranks.
I have spent the last few minutes addressing
some of the real challenges facing the Army,
and discussed some of the frustrations experi-
enced by bright young leaders working in any
large bureaucracy. But I would like to close by
telling you why I believe you made the right
choice, and indeed are fortunate, to have cho-
sen this path. Because beyond the hardship,
heartbreak, and the sacrifice and they are
very real there is another side to military ser-
vice. You have an extraordinary opportunity,
not just to protect the lives of your fellow sol-
diers, but for missions and decisions that may
change the course of history. You will be chal-
lenged to go outside your comfort zone and
take a risk in every sense of the word to
expand what you thought you were capable of
doing when it comes to leadership, friendship,
responsibility, agility, selflessness, and above
all, courage. And you will be doing all of this at
an age when many of your peers are reading
spreadsheets and making photocopies.
One of my favourite quotes from the
Revolutionary War era is from a letter Abigail
Adams wrote to her son, John Quincy Adams.
She wrote him, these are times in which a
genius would wish to live. It is not in the still
calm of life or [in] the repose of a pacific station
that great characters are formed. great
necessities call out great virtues.
I typically use that quote in commencement
addresses encouraging public service at civil-
ian universities, but those words apply most of
all to you, on whose brave and broad young
shoulders this eras great necessities will be
borne. Each of you with your talents, your
intelligence, your record of accomplishments
could have chosen something easier or safer
and of course better-paid. But you took on the
mantle of duty, honour and country; you
passed down the Long Gray Line of men and
women who have walked these halls and
strode these grounds before you more than
80 of whom have fallen in battle since 9/11. For
that, you have the profound gratitude and eter-
nal admiration of the American people.
As some of you have heard me say before,
you need to know that I feel personally respon-
sible for each and every one of you, as if you
were my own sons and daughters, for as long
as I am Secretary of Defense that will remain
true. My only prayer is that you serve with hon-
our and return home safely. I personally thank
you for your service from the bottom of my
heart, I bid you farewell and ask God to bless
every one of you.
The nature of ongoing operations has
resulted in junior leaders being given an
unprecedented level of authority and
responsibility. U.S. Army 2nd Lt. Andrew
Smith, right, gives a report to US Army
Capt. Randall Stanford, left, during a
search of the Qual-e Jala village,
Afghanistan, on 21 February 2011.
The two officers are assigned to the
34th Infantry Divisions 2nd Brigade
Combat Team, 1st Squadron,
113th Cavalry Regiment,
Task Force Redhorse.
(Photo: US Army / Staff Sgt. Ashlee Lolkus)
NORTH AMER I CA
Long family separations due to combat
deployments abroad have since become
an unavoidable element of military life.
(Photo: US Army)
Speaking the local language and knowing
the local habits are increasingly important
tools of trade. Picture shows US Army
Col. Stephen Quinn, the commander
of the 189th Infantry Brigade, eating lunch
with Afghan village elders after a shura,
or meeting, at the Shinkai District Centre
in Zabul Province, Afghanistan,
in February 2011.
(Photo: US Air Force /
Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson)
General Data
Area: 9,984,670 sq.km (3,855,103 sq.miles); 5%
arable, 3% meadows and pastures, 35% forest and
woodland, 57% other.
Coastline: 202,080 km (125,566.691 miles).
Maritime claims: territorial waters 22km (12nm),
EEZ 370km (200nm), continental shelf -200m or to
depth of exploitation.
Population: 33,487,208 (July 2010 est.) average
growth rate 0.817% (2010 est.). The population is
British Isles origin 28%, French origin 23%, other
European 15%, Amerindian 2%, other, mostly
Asian, African, Arab 6%, mixed background 26%
(2001 census)
Religions: Roman Catholic 42.6%, Protestant 23.3%
(including United Church 9.5%, Anglican 6.8%,
Baptist 2.4%, Lutheran 2%), other Christian 4.4%,
Muslim 1.9%, other and unspecified 11.8%, none
16% (2001 census)
Languages: English (official) 59.3%, French (offici-
al) 23.2%, other 17.5%.
Literacy rate: 99%
Government
Conventional short form: Canada.
Type: Constitutional monarchy that is also a parlia-
mentary democracy and a federation recognizing
Queen Elizabeth II as sovereign.
Administrative divisions: 10 provinces and 3 terri-
tories. In November 2006, Parliament approved a
motion to recognise Quebec as a nation within a uni-
fied Canada.
Legal system: Based on English common law,
except in Quebec where civil law based on French
system prevails. The Constitution Act (1867), for-
merly the British North America Act, and its eleven
amendments, form the basic element of Canadas
Constitution. The Constitution Act (1982) allowed
for the patriation of Canadas Constitution from
Britain. The Supreme Court of Canada with its 9
appointed judges heads the Judicial Branch.
Branches of government: Federal executive power
vested in the Queen (represented by Governor Ge -
neral) as Head of State, the Prime Minister as Head
of Government, and the Cabinet. Legislative authori-
ty resides in Parliament of Canada which comprises
the House of Commons, or Lower House, (308 elec-
ted representatives) and the Senate, or Upper House
(105 appointed representatives).
Suffrage: Universal over age 18.
Member of: NATO, NORAD, G-7, G-8, OAS,
Commonwealth, UN, NAFTA, ICAO, Colombo
Plan, IABA, Seabed Committee and others, signa-
tory of the Adapted CFS Treaty.
Economy
GDP: US$1.279 trillion (2009 est.), US$38,200 per
capita; real growth rate -2.5% (2009 est.).
Balance of trade: Imports, US$327.2 billion;
exports, US$323.4 billion (2009 est.)
Budget: Revenues, US$521.6 billion; expenditures,
US$578.7 billion (2009-10 est.).
Defence
Structure:
The Canadian Forces (CF) has a unified command
structure at the national level. The Canadian Forces
has three operational commands: Canada Command
oversees domestic and continental military operati-
ons; Canadian Expeditionary Force Command over-
sees all operations outside North America; and the
Canadian Special Operations Forces Command
(CANSOFCOM) oversees Special Operations
Forces. Logistics support to all three is provided by
Canadian Operational Support Command. Canadas
armed forces are generated predominantly by three
functional commands: Land Forces Command
(LFC), Maritime Command (MARCOM), Air Com -
mand (AIRCOM). The following tabulated data have
been arranged according to traditional categories in
order to prevent confusion.
Canada First Defence Strategy
In May 2008, the Government of Canada formally
announced the Canada First Defence Strategy
(CFDS), which is to provide a blueprint for rebuil-
ding the Canadian Forces over the next 20 years. The
CFDS identifies defending the country and protec-
ting Canadians at home are the main priorities. The
other major priorities are meeting Canadas responsi-
bilities for continental defence and being a robust and
reliable contributor to international security and
humanitarian missions.
The main provisions of the CFDS include:
- Expanding personnel levels to 70,000 Regular
Force and 30,000 Reserve Force;
- Improving key CF infrastructure;
- Increasing the overall readiness of the CF; and
- Proceeding with the major combat fleet replace-
ments of destroyers (in around 2017) and frigates
(2024), fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft
(2015), and fighter aircraft (2017). Further details
are given in the relevant sections.
Canada
North America Canada United States of America
Governor-General:
David Johnston
Prime Minister:
Stephen Harper
Defence Minister:
Peter Gordon
MacKay
Chief of Defence Staff:
Gen. Walter Natynczyk
Head of State: H.M. Queen Elizabeth II
Governor-General: David Johnston
Prime Minister: Stephen Harper
Defence Minister: Peter MacKay
Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel): Dan Ross
Chief of Defence Staff: Gen. Walter Natynczyk
Vice Chief of Defence Staff: Vice-Adm. A.B. Donaldson
Chief of Maritime Staff: Vice-Adm. P.D. McFadden
Chief of Land Staff: Lt.Gen. Peter Devlin
Chief of Air Staff: Lt.Gen. J.P.A. Deschamps
Commander Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM): Lt.Gen. J.G.M. Lessard
Commander Canada Command (Canada COM): Lt.Gen. W. Semianiw
Commander Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM): Maj.Gen. M.E. McQuillan
Commander Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM):
Brig.Gen. D.W. Thompson
Department of National Defence
Maj.Gen. George R. Pearkes Bldg
101 Colonel By Drive
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0K2
Canada
Tel.: +1-613-995-2534
Fax: +1-613-992-4739
National Defence HQ
c/o Department of National Defence
Tel.: +1-613-992-5054
Public Works and Gvt. Services Canada
Place du Portage, Phase III
11 Laurier Street
Hull, Quebec K1A 0S5, Canada
Tel.: +1-800-622-6232 (from Canada or the US)
+1-800-465-7735
(Government Procurement Agency)
Public Works and Government Services Canada
16A1, 102 Corporate Communications, Portage III
Gatineau, Quebec, Canada, K1A 0S5
e-mail: questions@pwgsc.gc.ca
Tel.: +1-800-622-6232-1 (from Canada or the US)
Canada
2011 na 2_europa 2010-1 5/16/11 1:24 AM Seite 23
Total active manpower: 66,949 Regulars; 47,060
Reserve Force members, including 35,056 Primary
Reservists (26, 327 on paid strength), 4,140 Cana -
dian Rangers, 7,864 members of the Cadet Instructor
Cadre (leaders of cadet units); and approximately
28,000 civilian employees (as of October 2009). The
CFDS establishes a goal of 70,000 Regulars and
30,000 Primary Reservists (on paid strength).
Para-military forces: Royal Canadian Mounted
Police (about 26,000). There also are provincial poli-
ce forces in Ontario and Quebec.
Conscription: None, all-voluntary service.
Defence budget: C$18.9 billion (about US$18.5 bil-
lion)(2011-2012).
NB: The CFDS calls for the defence budget to be
increased up to C$30 billion by 2027-28.
Land Forces (Land Forces Command)
Personnel: 22,000 Regular Force plus 21,000
Primary Reserve, 4,000 Rangers, and 6,000 civilian
personnel.
Structure:
Land Force Command has a regional military struc-
ture based upon 4 geographical areas. These areas
(Western, Central, Quebec and Atlantic) provide a
single chain of command for regular and reserve for-
ces in their regions. Land Force HQ is co-located
with NDHQ in Ottawa. The Land Force Doctrine and
Training System form an integral part of Land Force
HQ but is located in Kingston, Ontario. This HQ
controls all individual and collective training and
doctrine development for Land Force Command.
The Land Force is organised into 3 brigade groups
stationed in Western Canada, Ontario and Quebec,
respectively. Each group has 3 infantry battalions (2
mechanised, 1 light), 1 armoured regiment, 1 artillery
regiment (including 1 VSHORADS air defence bat-
tery), 1 engineer regiment, 1 reconnaissance squa-
dron, plus appropriate combat support and combat
service support. Outside this structure remain 1
engineer support regiment and 1 air defence regiment.
The Reserve component of the Land Force is organi-
sed in ten Brigade Groups that in total are comprised
of 17 reconnaissance units, 17 artillery units, 12
engineer units, 51 infantry battalions, 19 logistic
units, 4 military police units, and 4 intelligence units.
Also falling under national authority of Land Force
Command is the Canadian Ranger programme, roug-
hly 4,000 reservists who provide a military presence
in northern remote, isolated and coastal communities
of Canada.
NB: A new 5,000-strong Arctic Force is being crea-
ted based on four existing Reserve units (1st Royal
New Brunswick Regiment, Voltigeurs de Quebec,
Grey and Simcoe Foresters, and The Royal
Winnipeg Rifles).
Equipment:
Adapted CFE Treaty Ceilings: 77 MBTs, 263
AIFVs and HACVs, 32 artillery pieces. (Only
applies to equipment deployed to Europe, of which
there currently is none)
MBTs: 20 LEOPARD 2A6M CANs on loan from
Germany (plus two ARVs)(until September 2012),
20+ LEOPARD 2 A4M CANs, 66 LEOPARD C-2s
(plus 9 AVLBs, 8 ARVs, 9 AEVs) (see notes)
Recce vehicles: 203 COYOTEs
Armoured cars: 100 COUGARs (reserve)
AIFVs and APCs: 959 M113A2s (including 41
M577s and 62 M548s)(see notes), 274 GRIZZLYs,
651 KODIAKs (LAV III)(313 IFVs, 181 Command
Posts, 47 Forward Observer and 44 Engineer vari-
ants), 27 HUSKY AVGP, 191 BISONs (includes 16
mortar carriers, 32 MRTs, 32 Ambulances and 16
EW vehicles)
Artillery: 28 105LG MkII 105mm, 96 C3 105mm,
19C1 105mm (towed), and 37 M777 lightweight
155mm howitzers
RCLs: 935 CARL GUSTAV M2s, 227 CARL
GUSTAV M3s
ATGWs: 40 TOW 2s (infantry), 425 ERYXs, 10
ITAS
SAMs: 16 ADATs on M113 chassis (LLADS)
(see notes).
NB: 20 LEOPARD 2A6s and 80 LEOPARD 2A4s
(20 of which will be converted into variants) have
been purchased from Dutch surplus. The 20 2A6s
will be returned to Germany in September 2012 in
exchange for the similar German tanks originally on
loan, while the 2A4s are being refurbished and
modernised by 2102. Re-deliveries of a first batch of
20 LEOPARD 2A4M CANs commenced in October
2010. An additional 12 LEOPARD 2 hull were
acquired in February 2011 from Swiss surplus for
conversion into ARVs and other specialised variants.
When completed, the Canadian Forces LEOPARD 2
fleet of 100 tanks will include 40 2A4M CANs for
use on operations (2 squadrons), 42 tanks for use in
training in Canada (2 squadrons), 8 ARVs and 10
additional tanks for use in force mobility.
The M113 fleet is being reduced to 341 vehicles upg-
raded to the M113AW/MTVL standard, and most
vehicles will be reconfigured to support variants. All
BISONs and GRIZZLYs are to be converted to spe-
cialised variants (repair, ambulance, EW recovery,
mortar carrier). 64+25 RG-31 mine protected
vehicles, 24 HUSKY mine detection vehicles, 18
BUFFALO and 39 COUGAR protected carriers on
order with deliveries underway. 82 ACTROS-series
trucks with LMT armoured cabs on order, plus 26 on
option.
The Family of Land Combat Vehicles (FLCV) pro-
jects, announced in mid-2010 include the upgrade of
the existing LAV IIIs as well as the procurement of
three new fleets of Close Combat Vehicles (CCV),
Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicles (TAPV) and
Force Mobility Enhancement (FME) vehicles.
Major army bases:
Edmonton, Suffield, and Wainwright Alberta; Shilo,
Manitoba; Petawawa and Kingston, Ontario;
Montreal and Valcartier, Quebec; Gagetown, New
Brunswick.
Navy (Maritime Command)
Personnel: 7,800 Regular Force (Effective
Strength), 4,100 Reserves and 5,200 indeterminate
civilian employees.
Structure:
Maritime Command HQ in Ottawa, Ontario exerci-
ses overall command over Canadian maritime defen-
ce assets located on both the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts, as well as the Naval Reserve.
Maritime Forces Atlantic (MARLANT) and Mari -
time Forces Pacific (MARPAC) are responsible for
fleet operations, readiness and support on their res-
pective coasts.
The Naval Reserve is a readiness formation with HQ
in Quebec City, Qubec, and is responsible for coa-
stal defence, mine warfare, naval control and guidan-
ce for shipping, and fleet augmentation. It also con-
tributes the majority of personnel to operate the
Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDVs).
Organisation:
Maritime Forces Atlantic Fleet: 2 IROQUOIS class
destroyers, 3 VICTORIA class submarines, 7 HALI-
FAX class frigates, 6 KINGSTON class MCDVs, 1
PROTECTEUR class auxiliary oiler replenisher.
Maritime Forces Pacific Fleet: 1 IROQUOIS class
destroyer, 1 VICTORIA class submarine, 5 HALI-
FAX class frigates, 6 KINGSTON class MCDVs, 1
PROTECTEUR class auxiliary oiler replenisher.
The core naval assets are organised into one
Composite Contingency Task Group with two high-
readiness ships assigned from each coastal formati-
on. The Contingency Task Group consists of one
IROQUOIS class destroyer, two HALIFAX class fri-
Canada
Members of 12me Rgiment Blind Canada
(12 RBC) on patrol along Route Hyena
in Kandahar, Afghanistan with one of their
recently delivered LEOPARD 2A4M CAN tanks.
(Photo: Canadian DoD)
Prime Minister Stephen Harper,
accompanied by Peter MacKay,
Minister of National Defence,
announced on 22 February 2011
that the Government will be
building a new helicopter facility
at Patricia Bay, near Victoria,
British Columbia to further
strengthen Canadas West Coast
defences. Part of Canadian Forces
Base Esquimalt, the project includes
a new 20,000 sq.m. facility that
will consolidate the operations
and support functions of the
443 Maritime Helicopter Squadron
into one building. It is anticipated
that the facility will be completed
in the winter prior to the arrival
of nine new CH-148 CYCLONE
helicopters in the spring of 2014.
(Photo: Canadian DoD)
gates and one replenishment ship plus embarked
helicopters. Each formation can also provide a
National Task Group comprised of the formations
two high-readiness units (earmarked for the
Contingency Task Group) and additionally two or
three standard-readiness units.
Naval Reserve:
Responsible for the force generation of naval reser-
vists from 24 Naval Reserve Divisions across
Canada and the Canadian Forces Fleet School
(Quebec) which is devoted to naval reserve training.
Fleet:
Destroyers:
3 IROQUOIS class
Frigates:
12 HALIFAX class
Submarines:
4 VICTORIA class
Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels:
12 KINGSTON class
Support and Auxiliary Vessels:
2 PROTECTEUR-class AORs, 8 ORCA-class patrol
craft training vessels, 2 diving tenders, 2 research
vessels, 1 sail training yacht (HMCS ORIOLE).
NB: Project 2586 (the HALIFAX class modernisati-
on/frigate life extension, FELEX programme) com-
menced on 1 October 2010 with HMCS HALIFAX
entering Halifax Shipyards Limited.
Project 2673 is to acquire/ build two new Joint
Support Ships (JSS) to replace the 40 year-old
PROTECTEUR class AORs.
Project 1216 has been initiated for six to eight Arctic
and Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS).
Project 1336, the Canadian Surface Combatants
(CSC) project, has been initiated to replace the cur-
rent aging fleet of destroyers and will eventually
replace the existing frigates.
Naval bases:
Pacific: Canadian Forces Base Esquimalt,
Victoria, BC
Atlantic: Canadian Forces Base Halifax,
Halifax, Nova Scotia;
Naval Reserve Headquarters:
Quebec City, Quebec.
Air Force (Air Command)
Personnel: Established positions: 12,829 Regular
Force and 3,391 Primary Reserve personnel. Trained
effective personnel: 12,030 Regular Force, 2,284
Primary Reserve and 2,185 civilian personnel.
(All figures as of spring 2010.)
Structure:
The Commander of Air Command (headquartered in
Ottawa, ON) and Chief of the Air Staff is the senior
Air Force officer in the Canadian Forces. He advises
the Chief of the Defence Staff on strategic Air Force
issues and is responsible for training, generating and
maintaining combat capable, multi-purpose air for-
ces to meet Canadas defence objectives.
The operational and tactical control of the Air Force
rests with the Commander of 1 Canadian Air
Division (1 Cdn Air Div), headquartered in Winni -
peg, MB. The Comd of 1 Cdn Air Div is also the
Joint Force Air Component Commander for Canada
Command and Canadian Expeditionary Force Com -
mand, and Commander of the Canadian NORAD
Region (CANR). 1 Cdn Air Div includes personnel
at 13 bases/wings and their assigned squadrons, as
follows:
1 Wing Kingston CFB Kingston, ON: 400 Tactical
Helicopter Sqn (at CFB Borden, ON), 403 Helicopter
Operational Training Sqn (at CFB Gagetown, N.B.),
408 Tactical Helicopter Squa dron (at Edmonton,
AB), 427 Special Ope ra tions Aviation Sqn (at CFB
Petawawa, Ont.), 430 Tactical Helicopter Sqn (at
CFB Valcartier, QC), and 438 Tactical Helicopter
Sqn (at Saint-Hubert, QC) (all CH-146)
3 Wing/CFB Bagotville, QC: 414 Electronic War -
fare Support Sqn (at Ottawa, ON), 425 Tactical
Fighter Sqn (CF-188),439 Combat Support Sqn
(CH-146), 2 Air Expeditionary Support Sqn, 3 Air
Maintenance Sqn and 12 Radar Sqn
4 Wing/CFB Cold Lake, AB: 409 Tactical Fighter
Sqn (CF-188), 410 Tactical Fighter Operational
Training Sqn (CF-188), 417 Combat Support Sqn
(CH-146), 431 Air Demonstration Sqn The Snow -
birds (at 15 Wing Moose Jaw, SK) (CT-114), 1 Air
Maintenance Sqn, 42 Radar Sqn, and 4 Airfield
Engineering Sqn
5 Wing/CFB Goose Bay, NL: 444 Combat Support
Sqn (CH-146).
8 Wing/Trenton, ON: 412 Transport
Sqn (at Ottawa, ON) (CC-144), 424
Transport and Rescue Sqn (CC-130
and CH-146), 426 Transport Training
Canada
The Canadian Navy ordered 28 H-92
airframes from Sikorsky, designated
the CH-148 CYCLONE in Canada.
Sqn (CC-150 and CC-130), 429 Transport Sqn
(CC-177), 436 Transport Sqn (CC-130), 437
Transport Sqn (CC-150), Multi-Engine Utility Flight
(King Air B200), 2 Air Movements Sqn, 8 Air
Communi cations and Control Sqn, and 8 Air
Maintenance Sqn
9 Wing/CFB Gander, NL: 103 Search and Rescue
Sqn (CH-149).
12 Wing Shearwater CFB Halifax, NS: 406
Maritime Operational Training Sqn, 423 Maritime
Helicopter Sqn, 443 Maritime Helicopter Sqn (at
Patricia Bay, BC) (all on CH-124) and 12 Air
Maintenance Sqn.
14 Wing/CFB Greenwood, NS: 404 Long Range
Patrol and Training Sqn (CP-140/CP-140A), 405
Long Range Patrol Sqn (CP-140/CP-140A), 413
Transport and Rescue Sqn (CH-149 and CC-130), 14
Air Maintenance Sqn, 14 Software Engineering Sqn
and 14 Airfield Engineering Sqn.
15 Wing/CFB Moose Jaw, SK: 15 Air Traffic
Control Sqn and home of 431 Air Demonstration
Sqn The Snowbirds
16 Wing Borden/CFB Borden, ON
17 Wing/CFB Winnipeg, MB: 402 Squadron (CT-
142), 435 Transport and Rescue Sqn (CC-130), 440
Transport Sqn (at Yellowknife, NT) (CC-138).
19 Wing/CFB Comox, BC: 407 Long Range Patrol
Sqn (CP-140), 442 Transport and Rescue Sqn (CC-
115 and CH-149) and 19 Air Maintenance Sqn.
22 Wing/North Bay and Canadian Air Defence
Sector (CADS), ON: 21 Aerospace Control and
Warning Sqn, 51 Aerospace Control and Warning
(Operational Training) Sqn and 722 Air Control
Squadron USAF.
2 Canadian Air Division/Air Force Doctrine and
Training Division (2 Cdn Air Div/AFDT Div), which
is headquartered in Winnipeg, MB, is responsible for
Air Force doctrine, initial training and education. It
includes Air Force occupational training establish-
ments located at:
4 Wing/CFB Cold Lake, AB: 419 Tactical Fighter
Training Sqn (CT-155 Hawk).
15 Wing (Moose Jaw, SK): 2 Canadian Forces
Flying Training School (CT-156 HARVARD II and
CT-155 HAWK), and 3 Canadian Forces Flying
Training School (at Portage La Prairie, MB) (CH-
139 JET RANGER, Bell 412 CF, KING AIR C-90B,
and Grob 120A).
16 Wing (Borden, ON): Canadian Forces School of
Aerospace Technology and Engineering (CFSATE),
Air Command Academy (ACA), and Canadian
Forces School of Aerospace Control Operations
(CFSACO at Cornwall, ON).
17 Wing (Winnipeg, MB): 1 Canadian Forces Flying
Training School (formerly Canadian Forces School
of Air Navigation) and the Air Force Training Centre
(AFTC) comprising 402 Sqn (CT-142 DASH-8) and
the following Canadian Forces Schools: Aerospace
Studies (CFSAS), Meteorology (CFS Met), Survival
and Aeromedical Training (CFSSAT), and Search
and Rescue ( CFSAR at 19 Wing Comox, BC), as
well as the CF Aircrew Selection Centre (at 8 Wing
Trenton, ON).
2 Cdn Air Div also includes the Canadian Forces
Aerospace Warfare Centre (CFAWC), located at
Trenton with a detachment in Ottawa. It is the centre
of excellence for aerospace power development,
including concept and doctrine development
(C&DD), education and speciality training (EST),
and lessons learned. CFAWC develops and main-
tains the Air Force aerospace power knowledge repo-
sitory and coordinates efforts to provide advanced
synthetic environment and modelling, as well as
simulation services to assist C&DD, requirements
definition, operational test and evaluation (OT&E)
and mission rehearsal.
Equipment Summary:
Fighters: 77 CF-188 (a.k.a. CF-18) HORNETs (incl.
57 CF-188A single- seaters and 20 CF-18B two-sea-
ters)
Transport: 27 CC-130 HERCULES (5 tanker-capa-
ble), 4 CC-144 CHALLENGERs, 2 CC-144U
CHALLENGERs, 4 CT-142 DASH-8s, 4 CC-138
TWIN OTTERs, 5 CC-150 POLARIS (including 2
multi-role tanker transport), 6 CC-115 BUFFALOs,
4 CC-177 GLOBEMASTER IIIs.
Long Range Patrol: 18 CP-140 AURORAs and 2
CP-140A ARCTURUS.
Helicopters: 27 CH-124A SEA KINGs, 84 CH-146
GRIFFONs, 14 CH-149 CORMORANTs, 5 CH-
47D CHINOOKs.
Training/Combat Support: 25 CT-114 TUTORs,
24 CT-156 HARVARD IIs, 19 CT-155 HAWKs.
NB: The CF-188s have completed a mid-life upgra-
de project to see the fleet through to 2017-2020 time-
frame. Canada has exercised its option to acquire 65
F-35A LIGHTNING IIs to replace the CF-188s as
Canadas next generation fighter. Delivery is schedu-
led to begin in 2016.
17 CC-130Js are being delivered (5 in 2010). 28
Sikorsky CH-148 CYCLONEs are on order under
the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP) to replace
the CH-124 SEA KINGs; delivery of the first interim
aircraft is scheduled to begin in 2011. Six CH-147Ds
were acquired from US surplus for interim use in
Afghanistan and 15 CH-147Fs are on order for deli-
very starting in 2011.
Requirements are being defined for the acquisition of
a new fixed-wing SAR fleet. Initiatives are also
underway to procure UAVs for deployed and dome-
stic operations, and HERON UAVs have been leased
for use in operations in Afghanistan.
Main bases:
Air Wing locations: Comox, British Columbia; Cold
Lake, Alberta; Moose Jaw, Saskatchewan, Winni -
peg, Manitoba; North Bay, Ontario; Borden, Ontario;
Trenton, Ontario; Kingston, Ontario; Bagotville,
Quebec; Greenwood, Nova Scotia; Shearwater,
Nova Scotia, Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labra -
dor; and Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador.
A new helicopter facility is to be built at Patricia Bay,
near Victoria, British Columbia to house the new
CYCLONEs.
Canada
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Deliveries of 65 F-35A LIGHTNING IIs
to the Canadian Air Command are scheduled
to start in 2016. The aircraft will be modified
with respect to this artists impression to include
a refueling probe.
General Data
Area: 9,372,610 sq.km (3,618,764 sq.miles); 20%
arable, 26% meadows and pasture, 29% forest and
woodland, 25% other.
Coastline: 19,924km (12,383 miles).
Maritime claims: Territorial waters 22km (12nm),
contiguous zone 444km (24nm), EEZ 370km
(200nm).
Population: 310,232,863 (July 2010 est.); average
annual growth rate 0.97% (2010 est.). The populati-
on is 83.5% white, 12.4% black, Asian 3.3%,
Amerindian 0.8%.
Religions: Protestants 56%, Roman Catholic 28%,
Jewish 2%, other 4%, none 10%.
Languages: English; Spanish used by sizable mino-
rities.
Literacy rate: 97%.
Government
Long-form or legal name:
United States of America.
Type of government: Federal republic.
Administrative divisions: 50 states and one federal
district, plus 14 dependent areas.
Legal system: Based on English common law; dual
system of courts, state and federal; Supreme Court;
constitution of 1787 adopted 1788; judicial review of
legislative acts.
Branches of government: President elected by
popular vote is both Head of State and Government;
Cabinet appointed by President; bicameral legislatu-
re (House of Representatives and Senate).
Suffrage: Universal at age 18.
Member of: NATO, UN, OECD, NAFTA, APEC,
ANZUS, Colombo Plan, OAS and others. Signatory
of the Adapted CFE Treaty.
Economy
GDP: US$14.14 trillion (2009 est.); US$46,000 per
capita; real growth rate -2.6% (2009 est.)
Balance of trade: Imports, US$1.563 trillion;
exports, US$1.046 trillion (2009 est.).
Budget: Revenues, US$2.104 trillion; expenditures,
US$3.52 trillion (2009 est.)
Defence
National Security Strategy
A new National Security Strategy document was
released in May 2010 to lay out a strategic approach
for advancing American interests. These are defined
to include:
- The security of the United States, its citizens, and
US allies and partners;
- A strong, innovative, and growing US economy in
an open international economic system that promo-
tes opportunity and prosperity;
- Respect for universal values at home and around
the world; and
- An international order advanced by US leadership
that promotes peace, security, and opportunity
through stronger cooperation to meet global chal-
lenges.
Within this framework, the security priorities are
identified as follows:
- Strengthen security and resilience at home;
- Disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaida and its
violent extremist affiliates in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, and around the world;
- Reverse the spread of nuclear and biological wea-
pons and secure nuclear materials;
- Advance peace, security, and opportunity in the
Greater Middle East;
- Invest in the capacity of strong and capable part-
ners;
_ Secure cyberspace.
As regards defence, the National Security Strategy
calls for:
- Strengthen the US military to ensure that it can pre-
vail in todays wars;
- Prevent and deter threats against the United States,
its interests, and its allies and partners; and
- Prepare to defend the United States in a wide range
of contingencies against state and non-state actors.
Military capabilities will be rebalanced to excel at
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, stability opera-
tions, and meeting increasingly sophisticated securi-
ty threats, while ensuring the force is ready to address
the full range of military operations. This includes
preparing for increasingly sophisticated adversaries,
deterring and defeating aggression in anti-access
environments, and defending the United States and
supporting civil authorities at home.
Quadriennal Defense Review
The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was
unveiled in February 2010. The document for the
first time abandons a historic planning requirement
that the US military be prepared to fight two major
conventional regional wars at the same time. Instead,
the Pentagons new strategy calls on the military to
prepare for a much broader set of national security
requirements, that may include traditional combat
against a state adversary, operations against foreign
terrorists, counter-insurgency efforts, missions to
mitigate natural or terrorist disasters at home, and
operations in cyberspace.
Service-related data are summarised in the relevant
sections.
National Military Strategy
A revised National Military Strategy (the original
document dates back to 2004) was unveiled in
February 2011. The document builds on the 2010
National Security Strategy and the latest QDR to
define the ways and means that the military will
advance US national interests. The Strategy states the
US military power is most effective when employed
in support and in concert with other elements of
power as part of whole-of-nation approaches to for-
eign policy, and acknowledges the need for a military
leadership that is redefined for an increasingly com-
plex strategic environment.
The National Military Objectives are designed to
counter violent extremism, deter and defeat aggressi-
on, strengthen international and regional security and
shape the future force. As long as nuclear weapons
exist, the United States must maintain a credible
deterrence force against weapons of mass destruc-
tion. But deterrence doesnt always work, and the
military mission must remain to fight and win wars.
The United States must counter potential adversaries
with anti-access and other strategies that include
defending space and cyberspace.
The biggest change in the Strategy is the emphasis on
strengthening international and regional security.
Under the revision, the US can stand alone if needed,
but the Strategy sees the future in coalitions. US for-
ces will remain globally positioned, and be able to
use foreign bases, ports and airfields.
United States of America
United States
of America
Head of State
and Government:
President
Barak H. Obama
Homeland Security
Secretary:
Janet Napolitano
Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs
of Staff:
Adm. Michael
G. Mullen
Defense Secretary:
Robert M. Gates
National Security
Advisor:
Tom Donilon
Head of State and Government:
President Barak H. Obama
Defense Secretary:
Robert M. Gates
(to step down on 30 June 2011;
Leon E. Panetta to step in)
Homeland Security Secretary:
Janet Napolitano
National Security Advisor:
Tom Donilon
Secretary of the Army:
John M. McHugh
Secretary of the Navy:
Raymond Mabus Jr.
Secretary of the Air Force:
Michael B. Donley
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Adm. Michael G. Mullen
Army Chief of Staff:
Gen. George William Casey Jr.
Chief of Naval Operations:
Adm. Gary Roughead
Air Force Chief of Staff:
Gen. Norton A. Schwartz
Commandant of the Marine Corps:
Gen. James F. Amos
Commandant of the Coast Guard:
Adm. Robert J. Papp, Jr.
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301
USA
Tel.: +1-703-56955261
Command Structure and Organisation
The President is the military Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces, while the Secretary of Defense
has administrative authority over them. The Sec -
retary of Defense is the principal defence policy ad -
viser to the President. Military leadership under the
President consists of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
whose members are the individual service chiefs.
Headed by a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman, the
JCS serve as the principal military advisers to the
Pre sident, the National Security Council, the Sec re -
tary of Defense, and the Secretary of State. The JCS
also act as the Military Staff in the chain of military
command, and advise congressional committees.
The National Security Council serves as the principal
forum for considering national security issues that
require Presidential decisions. Members of the NSC
are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of
State, and the Secretary of Defense.
Civilian secretaries, answerable to the Secretary of
Defense, are responsible for the armed services _ the
Army, the Navy (which takes responsibility for the
Marine Corps) and the Air Force. The Chiefs of
Service are the senior military officers of their res-
pective services and are responsible for keeping the
Secretaries of the Military Departments fully infor-
med on matters considered or acted upon by the JCS,
and are military advisers to the President, the Na tio -
nal Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.
The Department of Homeland Security is responsible
for developing and coordinating all activities to secu-
re the US from terrorist threats or attacks. The
Department has control over 22 major Cabinet
Departments and Agencies (including most notably
the US Coast Guard and the Secret Service), and its
activities cover five major areas: Border and trans -
por tation security; Domestic counter-terrorism;
Emer gency Preparedness and Response; Science and
Technology; and, Information Analysis and Infra -
structure Protection.
A Homeland Security Council is responsible for ad -
vising and assisting the President with respect to all
aspects of homeland security. The Council has its
members the President, the Vice President, the Sec -
re taries of the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Se cu -
rity, Health and Human Services, and Trans por ta -
tion, the Attorney General, the Directors of the
FEMA, the FBI and the CIA, the Assistant to the
President for Homeland Security, and such other
officers of the executive branch as the President may
from time to time designate.
The Coast Guard operates under the Department of
Homeland Security, but would come under the Navy
Department in time of war or when the President
directs so.
Unified Commands
Nine (to be eight) Unified Commands are responsi-
ble to the President and the Secretary of Defense for
accomplishing the military missions assigned to
them. The Commanders of the Unified Commands
exercise command authority over forces assigned to
them as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The
operational chain of command runs from the Presi -
dent to the Secretary of Defense to the Com manders
of the Unified Commands. The Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff functions within the chain of com-
mand by transmitting to the Commanders of the
Unified Commands the orders of the President or the
Secretary of Defense.
Six Commands have territorial responsibilities, while
three (to be two) are task-oriented.
- US Northern Command NORTHCOM)(Peterson
AFB, Col.). NORTHCOM commands all forces
within the US and area waters up to 500nm from
the coastline to counter terrorist and military
attacks, coordinate DoD assistance in natural disa-
sters or other civil difficulties, and provide military
support to civil authorities. The North American
Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is also
under NORTHCOM.
- US European Command (USEUCOM)(Stuttgart-
Vaihingen, FRG). Components: US Army Europe,
US Naval Forces Europe (6th Fleet), US Atlantic
Fleet (2nd Fleet), Marine Forces Atlantic (II MEF),
US Air Forces Europe, Marine Forces Europe,
Special Operations Command Europe.
- US Pacific Command (USPACOM)(Honolulu,
HI). Components: US Army Pacific, Marine
Forces Pacific (I and III MEF), US Pacific Fleet
(3rd Fleet, 7th Fleet), US Pacific Air Forces (5th
AF, 7th AF, 11th AF, 13th AF). Components
(Subordinate Commands): US Forces Japan, US
Forces Korea, 8th US Army, Special Operations
Command Pacific, Alaskan Command.
- US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM)
(Miami, FL). Components: 12th Air Force, US
Army South, Marine Forces Atlantic (Detachment
South), US Atlantic Fleet (Detachment South).
- US Central Command (USCENTCOM)(McDill
AFB, FL). Components: US Army Forces Central
Command, US Naval Forces Central Command,
US Air Force Central Command, US Marine
Forces Central Command, Special Operations
Command Central.
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- US Africa Command (USAFRICOM)(Kelley
Barracks in Stuttgart, Germany). AFRICOM over-
sees military and civil/military operations on the
African continent. It operates with a combination
of military and civil resources being assigned from
six difference Agencies on a permanent or ad-hoc
basis. The main military component is currently the
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa
(CJTF-HOA).
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)(Norfolk,
VA). USJFCOM was responsible for helping the
transformation process of the US forces and deve-
loping joint doctrines and warfighting tactics. It is
being disbanded during 2011.
- US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)
(McDill AFB, FL). Components: US Army SO
Command, Naval SO Command, US Air Force SO
Command, USMC Detachment.
- US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
(Scott AFB, IL). Components: Air Mobility Com -
mand, Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command, Military Sealift Command.
- US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)(Offutt
AFB, NE). STRATCOM is responsible for control
of nuclear forces, missile early warning and missi-
le defence, space operations, and computer net-
work operations.
The US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM)(Ft.
Meade, MA) is a subordinate unified command
under USSTRATCOM, with a mission to coordinate
computer-network defence and direct US cyber-
attack operation. Service components include the
Army Forces Cyber Command, the 24th Air Force,
US Navy 10th Fleet and Marine Corps Forces
Cyberspace Command.
The Joint Force HQ National Capital Region (Fort
Lesley, Washington DC) is responsible for the defen-
ce of the US capital.
Total active manpower: 1,406,000 active duty mili-
tary personnel, plus 846,000 Selected Reserves,
464,900 National Guard and 713,900 civilians (does
not include foreign civilians employed abroad)(aut-
horisation request for FY11).
Conscription: None, all-volunteer forces. Draft regi-
stration legally still in force.
Defence budget: US$513 billion (basic operating
budget for FY11), plus US$157.8 billion for what is
now referred to as Overseas Contingency Operations
(OCO). The total budget request is thus US$670.8
billion, some 4.7% of GDP.
The budget request for FY 2012 totals US$553 billi-
on in discretionary funding for the peacetime costs of
the DoD and $5 billion in mandatory funding (total
US$558 billion basic budget), plus US$118 billion
for OCO (total budget request US$676 billion).
NB: The defence budget does not include expenditu-
res for nuclear weapons, naval reactors and other
defence-related nuclear activities, which are under
the Department of Energy budget (some US$17 bil-
lion per year).
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Offensive Forces
Organisation:
The US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is res-
ponsible for command, control and targeting tasks
for all nuclear strategic weapons, including manned
bombers, land-based ICBMs and sea-based SLBMs,
as well as the relevant warheads. STRATCOM does
not have forces permanently assigned to it, and in
peacetime it acts as a planning and coordinating
structure. During a crisis or in wartime, however, all
strategic nuclear assets would be immediately trans-
ferred under STRATCOMs operational command.
The C-in-C of STRATCOM, who alternates between
four stars USAF generals and USN admirals,
would have authority over wartime use of all US stra-
tegic nuclear forces. STRATCOMs responsibilities
also include the mission of conducting worldwide
airborne reconnaissance in support of strategic ope-
rations, as well as missile early warning and ballistic
missile defence.
Arms Reduction Treaties:
The ABM Treaty is no longer in force. The START
I Treaty expired on 31 December 2009.
The Moscow Treaty, signed in May 2002 between
the Russian Federation and the USA, commits each
side towards reducing its arsenal of operationally
deployed warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by
21 December 2012. Within these warhead limits, the
parties will each be free to decide whether or not to
further reduce their respective numbers of strategic
delivery vehicles. The treaty does not require the sig-
natories to destroy the warheads withdrawn from
operational deployment, and does not contain provi-
sions for verification clauses as such. However, the
transparency procedures as established under
START are being maintained. The Moscow Treaty
terminated upon entry into force of the New START
Treaty.
A New START Treaty was signed in Prague on 8
April 2010, and it entered into force on 5 February
2011 following completion of the ratification process
by both parliaments. Under New START, the US
and Russia will be limited to significantly fewer stra-
tegic arms within seven years from the date the
Treaty enters into force (i.e, by early 2018). Each
Party has the flexibility to determine for itself the
structure of its strategic forces within the aggregate
limits of the Treaty. The main provisions of New
START are as follows:
Aggregate limits:
- 1,550 deployed warheads. Warheads on deployed
ICBMs and deployed SLBMs count toward this
limit and each deployed heavy bomber equipped
for nuclear armaments counts as one warhead
toward this limit;
- A combined limit of 800 deployed and non-deploy-
ed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments;
- A separate limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped
for nuclear armaments.
Verification and Transparency: The Treaty has a
verification regime that combines the appropriate
elements of the 1991 START Treaty with new ele-
ments tailored to the limitations of the Treaty.
Measures under the Treaty include on-site inspec-
tions and exhibitions, data exchanges and notificati-
ons related to strategic offensive arms and facilities
covered by the Treaty, and provisions to facilitate the
use of national technical means for treaty monitoring.
To increase confidence and transparency, the Treaty
also provides for the exchange of telemetry.
Treaty Terms: The Treatys duration will be ten
years (i.e. it is to expire in December 2020), unless
superseded by a subsequent agreement. The Parties
may agree to extend the Treaty for a period of no
more than five years. The Treaty includes a withdra-
wal clause that is standard in arms control agree-
ments.
Nuclear Posture Review
A revised Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was relea-
sed on 6 April 2010 to set forth the Obama
Administrations guidance on American nuclear
policy, force structure, and doctrine. The key ele-
ments of the NPR are as follows:
- Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terro-
rism are identified as key objectives of US nuclear
policy, in addition to the traditional aim of deter-
ring major attacks against the United States, its
allies, and its interests overseas;
- The NPR reaffirms the administrations commit-
ment to decreasing the size of the US nuclear arse-
nal, whereby the reductions in nuclear warheads
and delivery vehicles outlined in the New START
Treaty (see above) are only a first step toward dee-
per cuts in the future;
- The US will not retaliate with nuclear weapons
against any non-nuclear weapons state that abides
by its Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commit-
ments, even if the attacker uses chemical or biolo-
gical weapons. Instead, the US will rely on the
threat of conventional military retaliation and mis-
sile defence capabilities to deter (or defend against)
a chemical or biological attack;
- No new nuclear warheads will be developed to
replace the existing arsenal. The US will also not
conduct nuclear tests, and will not pursue new mis-
sions or capabilities for nuclear weapons.
Current Force Levels
Total inventory: Some 9,600 (as of October 2010).
This total figure includes 2,200 operationally deploy-
ed warheads, as well as unspecified numbers of
warheads kept in active reserve (deployable), held in
inactive storage, and retired but not yet dismantled.
Sea Launched: 336 SLBMs with up to 1,747
warheads (target figure under the Moscow Treaty).
This includes 14 OHIO class SSBNs each with 24
TRIDENT II/D5 missiles with 5-plus warheads
each. The TRIDENT IIs can have either W76s
(100kton) or W88s (300-450kton) warheads. (See
notes).
Land Based: 450 MINUTEMAN IIIs with 550
warheads (as of mid-2010).(See notes).
Air Launched: 20 B-2s and 74 B-52Hs are qualified
for nuclear roles with gravity bombs. (see notes).
Tactical nuclear warheads: Carrier-borne aircraft
no longer have a nuclear option capability. Nuclear-
warhead TOMAHAWK cruise missiles (TLAM-N)
have been removed from all surface vessels, but are
still available as an option for SSNs. A nuclear opti-
on for tactical aircraft deployed in Western Europe is
maintained.
NB: The new Nuclear Force Structure under the New
START Treaty has been announced to include the
following steps:
- The MINUTEMAN III ICBM force will be redu-
ced to up to 420 missiles carrying single
warheads;
- The current fleet of 94 nuclear-capable bombers
will be reduced to up to 60 aircraft, the excess 34
planes being converted for conventional roles;
- The current fleet of 14 SSBNs will be maintained,
but each boat will carry 20 SLBMs rather than the
current 24 (four launch tubes permanently disabled
in a verifiable manner).
Strategic Defence Forces
NORAD (North American Aerospace Defense
Command: HQ AFB/Cheyenne Mountain, Co.) is a
joint US-Canadian organisation with three areas and
seven Regional Operations Control Centres.
The early warning and air defence network includes
the satellite early warning system (SEWS), the balli-
stic missile early warning system (BMEWS) with
three stations, the PAVE PAWS phased-array radar
system (four stations), and the North Warning
System line across Alaska, Canada and Greenland.
A National Missile Defence (NMD) system is being
implemented, but its scope and size is being reduced.
16 interceptor missile silos at Fort Greeley (Alaska)
and 4 silos at Vandenberg AFB (Calif.) are in place,
but plans for additional interceptors at Fort Greeley
have been cancelled. 18 AEGIS ships three cruisers
and 15 destroyers have been converted for BMD-
capable roles, and plans have been announced for
another six ships to follow. Existing early warning
radar sites at Fylingdales and Menwith Hill (UK) and
in Greenland are being modified for ABM purposes,
and are supplemented by the sea-based SBX radar.
The Airborne Laser system (ABL) continues as a
pure R&D effort.
Land Forces
Personnel: 547,400 active duty, plus 358,200 Army
National Guard and 205,000 Reserves (authorisation
request for FY11). To decline to 520,000 active duty
by 2015.
Organisation:
A large-scale reorganisation process is underway,
with the main elements to be in place by the end of
FY11 and the entire process to be completed by the
A two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) at
launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif.,
on 6 June 2010. The two-stage GBI is undergoing
developmental testing as part of the Department
of Defenses strategy to invest in a new missile
defence option.
(Photo: Missile Defense Agency)
An unarmed TRIDENT II D5 missile at launch
from the OHIO-class fleet ballistic-missile
submarine USS NEVADA (SSBN 733) off the
coast of Southern California on 1 March 2011.
Based on the new Nuclear Force Posture in line
with the clauses of the New START Treaty,
the 14 OHIO-class SSBNs will be modified
to carry 20 SLBMs rather than the current
24 (four launch tubes permanently disabled
in a verifiable manner).
(Photo: US Navy / Seaman Benjamin Crossley)

MT 2011 01 WDA Web

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Issue1/2011

Vol. XXXV ISSN 0722-3226

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