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HPHTWELL DESIGNRISKS

LESSONSLEARNEDREPORT

Doc.No.: 118-1826-WDRLLR D3) (Rev Richard Miller LeadProject Engineer VikingEngineering Dr. Michael Payne Program Manager Bp

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Exhibit No. Worldwide Court Inc.

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Tableof Contents
1 2 3 Well Design Lessons......... 3.1 AnnularPressqre-8uitdupt3............... 3.2 Zonallsolationat't................... 3.3 Gro,vth3'6'7..... Welfhead 3.4 Conneclions3!' -Well Design 3.5 Conclusions Lessons Metallurgical .........9 ...,......-..................9 ..-.............1E -....-.-----.....--.---..22 .-.......-.......26 .......-.....................31 Summar....... Executive ..............5

4.3 4.4

718 Hangers3 ConclusionsMetallurgical Lessons

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Formation 5.1 Compaction Subsiden Reservoir and cele'2o'21'222224 5.2 salt Loading2s 5.3 Conclusions Formation Lessons 6 7 Tables andFpures-................ References Glossary. and 7.1

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List of Tables
Table1 Table 2 Table3 Table4 Pro/Con Evidence Hydrate for Dissolution Source Marlin as ol TubingOvalization ........----.....--.-......-57 Pro/ConEvidence Pro(tuctlon tor Collapseas Sourceol MarlinTubingOvalization..............-58 Casing Summary ARCOHigh-Clearance of CasingConnection Failures.......... ........................59 Chemical Additions Erskine to CaCl2 PackerF1uid......,........ ..........-........60

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List of Figures
Figure1 Gulf of MexicoDeepwater HpHT prospects...........,..... .........-...............61 Figure2 Typical Ternperature lncreases Tubular production..... in and AnnuliDuring --.............62 Figure3 SchematicofMarlinWell A-2 ........-.........63 Figure4 Marlin WellA-2 Flowand pressure History through MajorLeakEvent............ ............64 Figure sonic cariperIndicating 5 colrapse MarrinA-21u3t4"production of casing .................65 Figure Pompano 6 A-31Wellbore Schematic atTime ol Failure ...--....................66 Figure7 Recovered, Collapsed Casing..... 16" ........62 Flgure8 Recovered, Collapsed Casing 16" from pompano WellA_3i ...............6g Figure9 Sheanuater SWO8(22l30bAl ) Observed WellheadGrowth.......... ........69 prot of sLX Test Datawith Vastar Figure10 Normarized Loadconditionstndicated... ..-...........70 'f1 Judge Figure DigbyTubingHandting Damage._... .........--..........71 Figure Hightsland 12 Faiture l3CrAlloy. of ..-..........72 Figure13 Erskine Faiture 25CrDuplex of SS.....-........... ............23 Figure15 views of cracked 3.5" Diameter 22cr Production TubingRetrieved from DeepAloxwe1..............75 Figure16 Sheanryater 719 TubingHanger........... Altoy .......-......._..26 Figure17 Erskine CasingDefamation to Compaction Subsidence-.. Due and .....-...-..............-..11 '18 Figure Schematic potential of Casing Designs Through Salt.-...........-..- - . .....,.-.-.-..._...-.:...............r,

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1 EXEGUTIVE SUMMARY
Overthe years,a numberof highprofilefieldfailureshaveresulted improved in understanding downhole of conditions the requirements placeon equipment and they and materials.This reportreviews lessons key leamedfrom BP andotheroperatbfsfields. The reporlfocuseson casingand tubingdesignand is brokeninto threeseciions; wetl engineering lessons, metallurgical lessons, formation and lessons. arisedue to a lackof understanding the complete of situation. lepeatedly, problems Connection technology advanced has only as the operators pushedfor testingto their downhole conditions. lncorrect assumptions overly and simplified models wellhead of growthproduced nontonservativeresults; actualwellhead growththreatened flowline integrity.An anomalous duplexmicrostructure resLilted a partedtubing,yet neitherthe in manufacturer the end usercan exptain nor with certainty what causedthb microstruclure, let alonehow to avoidlhe problem fromreoccurring. Theselessonsshoutdstrengthen the casefor devotingengineering resources providecomprehensive design-s are to well that independently reviewed Someof the lessons highlighted the reportinclude: in The cost of an APBfailurecan be enormous; therefore APB shouldbe addressed for bothdrilling and producing operations. Non-uniform loads, whether imposed an outerstringcollapse by formation by or movement, causeovalization stringsevenwhena uniformpressure similar can of of magnitude lessthanthe casing is coltapse rating. Cement be beneficialfor zonalisolation in redistributing can both and non-uniform loads. Propercement execution job may take a multi-disciplinary aplroach. Performance claimsfor proprietary connections mustbe verifiedfor specificoperating conditions, including path{ependant any loadsequences. Specific materials mustbe qualified the downhole for environment an individual of field. completion fluidchemistry shouldbe included the evaluation. in The massivesaltsabovedeepwater Gulfof Mexicoreservoirs not causethe do problems associated with rapidholeclosurein dirtysalt intervals.Uniform satt closureappearsto loadcasingmoresymmetrically. BP continues pushinto morechallenging conditions its effortto discover to well in and exploitlargehydrocarbon reservoirs. contextof this reportis the currentengineering A activilies focused developing unidentified on an deepwater of Mexico Gulf HPHTRelO ivitn conditions beyond thoseat Thunder Horse.During engineering ihis effort, is beneficialto it reviewthe lessonslearned frompastprojects, Ooth capture to whatwas learnedand to appreciate magnitude the taskin preventing the of future failures.

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2 INTRODUCTION
Drillingworldclasswells is a complicated expensive and endeavor.A deepwater Gulfof Mexicofield development may takesix or sevenyearslo progress from an initialdiscovery to a producing unit. Thistimeframeis required g"n"ra[" g";obgicatano 6 ptans, reservoir specifytheappropriate. drilling,comp,letion fac'ilitie. and methods, and drill -and complete initialwells, design and buildptatforms.ano "q,iipr"nt suusdiequipment, o"uLrop technology necessary.to meetobjectives fall outsidetne esiaulished "no that "ny experienc"t"r.. The challenge great,for one significant is mistakecan leadto-rhrt-in produhion-, o*u"n worse,an eventthat threatenshealth,safety,and/orthe environment. tendsto increase with temperature pressure.The trendfor Gulf of and llol-ect complexity Mexicoexploration to reachtargetsthat havehigheruottimfrore is pressures and hotter reservoir temperatures than thosefor currentproducing fields. Figurer oepicrsnis reno. Thunder Horseconditions highlighted are in.Figure a"s curenr frontier pressure I ne of and temperature deepwater.The futuie may tieit conditionJ in beyond rhunder HorseHighpressures complicate drilling operations. Though number rigshavethe capability a of of containing ksiat the mudlinL, rig hasan 18--3/4" 15 no bore20 rsi eop stack. r_jige diameterproduction tybula.ry capable oflontainin-s_20 ksiiequireli"r,i""liirgi|"iil,ig,h and the potential sourservicemayeliminate higneststren$fi'carton for tni 1{9131s' steel (l-Acs) gradesand the lowercost varieties corrosion of resistaniailoys ,6; lciA). pressures also lead to the us_e highstrength can of CRAsin wellhead ao*nt oi". equipment components-TheseCF|Asfiay cosGn orderof magnitude "no than carbon more steel,be moredifficultto machine, and limitme selection coilpatiolecompletion ot fluids. Hightemperatures may. h.ave evengreaterimpacton drillingand completions.Elastomer an seleclionis difficultat high temperaturJs. Downhole sensorsa"nd gauges noi asieliable at increased lemperatures.Highproducing "* lemperatures cruse can significant thermal yieldderating complicates that caiing design.. Theycan alsoleaoto largepressure increases trapped in annuriwhich mist beierieueobr mitil"i"J. to exploreand..develop prospects al.conditions lrgpSring beyondBp,s experience tiakes a holisticapproach detaired.enjineering. to oesrgning ;;;-;;p"nent a may take a yearor two of focusedresearch and development, the successof that designhasfar-reaching yet consequences otheraspeclsof the project. on Forexample, newsubsurface a s.afety valvemay be desired.During designphase, the a statement requirements identiiy maximum of may a outside diameter, rninimum a inside diameter, operating an pressure, axialloadrating, acceptable an ano materialfor construction' Thesesafety valveparameters alio usedin casing are ano tuuinj oesignand in selecting othercompretion components. the nnaid".d;;;;" not meeta1of the r objectives, overalt lhe welldesignmaybejeopardized, anith" lostdevelopment may time causefurtherdelaysin.reworking othercomponents. largersafetyvalveoutsidediameter A maynot fit inside planned the production caiing,rorcing ;;ae-on between a usinga higher strength thinner wallcasingor a smaller valvewithcholedflowrates.A smaller valve insidediameter mav rgnd.eiflowcontrotequipment in*rp"liui". ;il;;;"iffin"rn", limitthe weight the trrhing.string, of forcing'the of eitnersmaiter use tubingor a higher strength alloy' Changes the tubingm"-yn"""sritate a change to in completion fluids, which
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design of casingdesignloads. The consequences missing and impact may alterthe density into However, buildingtoo muchconservatism the initial objectives may be widespread. improveproiecteconomics, so to opportunities significantly requirements may eliminate penal$for aiming lowtoo imposing thereis an equally are designchallenges hardlynewto the industry. Manyexistingdevelopments Complicated were oncethe cuttingedgefrontierswherenewtechnologywasintroduced.Occasionally, did implementations notwork as planned. lt is helpfulto reviewthe thesetechnology the these pastexperiences.Understanding causeof failuresmay help lessonslearnedfrom that to preventrepeatperformances.Understanding thereare morelessonsto be leamed to strategic staffing,technology may motivatea more rigorousapproach projectplanning, planning, and execution. well engineedng, systems integration quality lessons, sections; welldesignlessons, metallurgical This reportis divided intothreeprimary relating welldesignand to and formation compaction lessons.Onlylessons and to but construction addressed-This reportis not intended be comprehensive, ratherit are will illustratethe varietyof issuesthat can emergein a cuttingedgewell. whichis discussed several in HpUt gas development, Of specialnoteis the Sheanratei placesthroughout report. Shearwater highlighted a veryrecentproject as that this is and wellhead experienced varie$ of failures,from metallurgicalproblems excessive a growthto formationcompaction.Lessons from Shearwater particular in demonstrate the HPHTproject. vast complexity planning executing offshore in and an

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3 WELLDESIGN LESSONS
3.1 AnnularPressure Buildupt',
Annular Pressure Build.up (APP)is a phenomenon during whichannular fluidsexpand when hegtedby production.Whenthe annulusis sealed,annilar fluidexpansion generates substantial pressures. pressures reachlevelshighenouin to inJuce annular can -These catastrophic structural failureof thewell eitherthroughan internal prissure iipture oian outer.casing throughan extemalpressure or collapse an innercasing. Themagnitude of of APB influences casingdesignandApB mitigation strategy development. The APB phenomenon requires that an additional of well designperformance set criteriabe considered.The processof conventional and tubulardesignis govemedby well Oeiignfor rr inte.mal pressure capa.city sustaincontingency controleients tor driltingand to well protective casingsand to sustainshut-in well pressures production for casingind tubingconventionaltubular designsalso include contingency coniideration sorie collapse for eventsalthough thesecollapseloadstypically apptyt6 the designof production linei and the lowersectionof production casings.WellswithAp-grisksnot o-nly requireconsideration of APB criteria thewelldesign, conventional in but tubular designloadsas well. APB.scenari-o_s_require the independent designof eachannulusforthe rnaximum anticipatedAPB pressures. Tubulars compriling eachannutus mustbe ableto sustain ApB pressures (including appropriate an safetyfactor)withoutconsideration supporting of ApB froman adjacent annulus. The potential ior.leaki in the well sptem requiresihisoeiign approach.Thereare too manypotential leakpathsto assumethatwell integrity G will assuredby offsetting APB in adjacent annuli. Reviewof operational experie-nc6 risf anO analysis studies showAPBpressure mitigation, usingformation leak-ofis an openshoe, via to be unreliableDueto formation collapieor solids?ndbarite setfling, annuti trduentty get pluggedand cannotbe rerieduponto siay openfor ventingof ApB. Experience beenaccumulated simulating has by APB behaviors a largenumber on of deepwater subsea and developments. workhasresulted a number key This in of conclusions: o APB risksare r.liohel outercasings.This is due to several for factors. Theseannuli are shallower closerto the mudiine) hencetheiraverage (i.e. and undisturbed temperafures lower. Sinceaveragetemperature are changeinlhe annutusdrives lhe resultant AP_B pressure, theseannuli.have potentia.ito lhe buildthe highest pressures.Additionally, theselargercasingstendio havelowerinternal and erternal pressure resistance-APB risksare thushighfor surfacecasing(e.g-20") and driling stringsincluding deepprotective casingslik; 16", 13-5/g"or t glgia'l rigure i a typicalproduction thermalprofileror i deepwater "no*, well,whichillustrateitne hrger average temperature changes shallower in annuli. ' WhenAPBanalyses performed the B annulus, are on i.e.the annulus directfy outside the production casing, results tendto showthatthe riskof ApB failure1i.e. pioouction cas!9 collapse).is lowercompared outercasings.Thisis the resutt the fact to of that the D/t and Graderequired the production for to iustaln MASp for the weil """ilrg
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tendsto producehighermllapse resistance the stringon the ordernecessary for to sustainthe APB load. Althoughthesegeneralfindingsare the resultof analyses a largenumberof projects, on eachfield type andwell designtend to be uniqueand thorough APB analyses should alwaysbe performed. Prediction APB pressures of requires useof advanced the thermalsimulation numerical and techniques account the PW behavior the subjectannularfluid. Accurate to for of APB prediction complex.As a roughrule of thumbhowever, predicted is APB pressures may be psi on the orderof 70 - 12O / oF- Thus,for a 100oFheat-up an annulus in during production, induced APB pressures be on the orderof 7,000psi to 12;000psi. Clearly, will these pressures severeand must be addressed-Experience sfrownthat due to the are has severityof the pressures and the impactthatAPB can have,it is not cost effective and in manyses not evenfeasibleto try and addressAPB loadings strengthening uprating via or of the subject casings.The welldesigner thuscautioned is against designing well and the tubulars sustain to APB. Rather, welldesign the mustincorporate specific mitigation methods thatreduce eliminate pressures resuhfrom or the that APB. 3.1.1 Marlin

Pressurebuildupin tnapped annulihas beendiscussed the literature over 15 yearsin for Fluidexpansion been relievedthroughcasingvalveson hot landand platform has wellsfor decades.However, industry the beganto viewAPBin a morecautious mannerfollowing the eventsthat occurred the MarlinA-2 well. Following failure,the entireplatform on that was shut-infor a year at an estimated $2.5 billionlossof cunent revenues.This event kickedoff an extensive researchand development effortto betterunderctand the mechanisms APB and how to engineer of wellsto withstand mitigate potential or the loads. The MarlinFieldis located the Gulfof Mexico, in VioscaKnollBlocks8711915, was and originallyintended be produced to from a TLP via five dry tree penetrations. Firstproduction for the A-2 well beganin November1999. Shortlythereafter minor,but persistent, a tubing leakoccurred.Thewellflowedintermittently between November and November20.On 7 jumpedto shut-in November thecasingpressure 20, tubingpressure, signifying major a tubingfailure. An accidentinvestigation teamdetermined severalpossiblefailurernodesbut one ol the possibilities collapseof the production most interesting was (andlorintefmediate) casing onto the tubing. This particular modewas due to severalpossiblecombinations which of two are considered purposesof this report;a) hydrateformation for outsidethe intermediate casingdue to gas migration from a shallowhydrocarbon zone,with subsequent dissolutions duringinitialproduction b) annularpressure and buildup. Figure is a wellbore 3 sketchof WellA-2. Thewell is located 3,230of water,andtied in backto the MarlinTLP via a single 10-314" production riser. The wellboretrajectory is vertical a depthof 5,400'RKB,the buildsata2-31100'.to a sailangleof 4s". to On November a minorleak haddeveloped lhe flowconduit, 7 in whichwas laterdiagnosed to be abovethe surfacecontrolled sub-surface safetyvalve(ScSSV), and alsoabovethe pack-off tubinghanger (POTH)-Between November and November 1999, 7 20, WellA-2
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was altemately flowingand shut-in,depending shakedown surfaceequipment on of and availability the pipeline. Repeatedly, casing of pressure and dropped the leak the built as was ventedat the surface shownin Figure as 4. On November 1999between 20, 0800and 0900hrsthe leakratejumpsto 1,S00 psi/hr, (thisis approximate to gaugelimitations. thispointthe casing due At pressure, as measured a manual gaugeon the wellhead, by jumpsto shut-in tubingpressure, signifying full communication. Pertinent dataassociated thismajoreventwere: with . The well had beenshut in approximately hourspriorto the majorleak (0400to four 0800hrs November 1999) 20, . The immediately preceding flow rate,roughly mmcfd,was the highestsincewell 50 start-up commenced. . By the timeof the majorleak,theconlents theA annulus of wereuncertain, this as volumehad been repeatedly ventedto controlannuluspressure. Figure5 is an excerptof the downhole ultrasonic indicating log collapseof the 10-3/4' procluction casing. Althoughnumerous potential causesof the failurewere investigated, providethe most plausible two scenarios explanations what happened.Thougi neither for explanation be definitively can proven,it is important recognize bothincorforatehigh to that pressure loadsin trapped outerannuli.Whether pressure the stemmed fromfluidthermai expansion orfrom hydrate dissolution somewfiat is moot,eitherscenario teads the same to general conclusions mitigation. on 3.1.1.1 Explanation1 - HydrateDissolution Gas hydrates form undersuitablecombinations pressure temperature, in the can of and and presence water. The hydratecrystalis a cagedstructure of with water molecutes surrounding molecules.A completely gas saturated cubicfoot of hydrate release170 will standardcubicfeet of gas. lf, upondissolution, volumeintowlrichthe gaseousphase the can expandis limited,significant pressure be generated.Further, fluidstra'pped can any betweena hydrateplug and anotherrestriction, suchas the POTH,can undergopressrre increaseif the fluid heatsfasterthanthe hydrateplugdissolves. Table 1 summarizes pro/conevidence hydrate the for dissolution the sourceof the as observed ovalization the tubingin Well A-2. of HydratePlug The potential forminga hydrateplugcan be addressed of separately the two annuliin for question.ln the caseof the A annulus, potential a hydrate the for piugwasobscured the by uncertainty the annular in fluids,as the annulus was frequenily vented(SeeFigure during 4) the shakedown periodpriorto the deformation. Further,'assrming presen&of the the ingredients hydrate for formation, question remains, io whetheiRannutus as pressures wereconsistently enough penelrate hydrate high to the envelope.Lasfly, scenario this implies tubingor production a packerleakhasto occurfirst,to admitrnepresence or hydrocarbons thisannulus in priorto the majorcollapse failure. Hydrate formation the C annulus, theotherhand,is morelikely.Here,the ambient in on pressure (1'+gO and temperature psi) (40'F)conditions wellwithinthe hydrate are envelopeThe longperiodbetween initialdrilling finalre-entry completion and and allows
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for hydrocarbon migration from a hydrocarbon bearing zone unlessisolatedby a perfect cementsheath. Hydrate formation the B annulus not considered, it wouldnotonlyrequire in is as the hydrocarbon sourcepathas needed A or C annulus for hydrates, an additional but tubular leak to introduce thesehydrocarbons the B annulusto Hydrate Dissolution Dissolution a hydrate plugin eitherthe A or C annulus not, in itself,leadto high of will pressure'In addition, gaseous phasemustbe confined it is beingreleased.lsuch the as likelihood possible the c annulus.consider sequence: is in the ' puring the periodbetween drillingand completion, hydrocarbons migratefrom the 7,100'sand, pastthe 16"shoe,and entertheC annulus.As migrati6n continues towardthe mud.line, nearfteezingtemperatures water (con&nsingfrom the and naturalgas or d.yeto segregation the dritling of mud)are encountereO.-R hydrate plugforms,sealing annulus. the ' The wellis placed production, on heating successive annulisuch that in the C annulus,the pressure-temperature contacts hydratephaseenvelopepath the ' Continued heating the annulus of leadsto ei$er; a) dissociation the hydrate, b) of or traversing hydratephaseline at successively the pressures.The latter unfavorable eventcan generate pressures, is possibte dissolution significant and if initiates the in middleof the hydrate plug,ratherthaneither end'. ' The13-3/8" casingcollapses underexcess pressure fromthe C annulus, point loadingthe 10-3/4" portionof the production tieback, whichin tum collapses the on production tubing..Cascading collapse failures from outerto innerstringshave been demonstrated experimentally numerically. both and Hydratedissolution the C annutusis considered possiblerootcauseof the tubing in a deformation WellA-2. in Closing the 16" Liner Shoe An alternate consequence the formation a hydrate of plugis closing C annulus, a of the in mannersimilar baritesettling-Dependlng the sizeof the hydrat6, annulus to on the will remainclosedand promole pressure annular increase, unless hydiate the dissociates more quicklythan the temperature the C annulus in increases. Because its similarity barite of toa plug'the consequences the scenario be postponed the discussion annular of will to of pressure buildup. Summary All lhe conditions necessary the formation a hydrateplugwere potentially for of presentin WellA-2, particularly the C annulus.Temperafure in increasJduring productidn, coupteo with a confined container withinwhichdissociation migr'tpioceed, 6uld g"ner"t" prJ".ur sufficient collapse l3-3/g' intermediate to the casing, leading a cascading to point loading/collapse sequence the production on tiebacfandtu6ing.

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annulus pr""rur" d"pendson the following quantities: ' The mechanicar thermar and properties the annurar of fluid. . The flexibility the confining of boundary. . The amountof temperature increase. complicating ApB calculation the described aboveare the factsthat: ' Pressures intemaland extemalto the confining boundaryofthe annularcan atso be changing to APB in coincident due annuli.forixample,'th" lo5 of connection leak integrityin the production tiebackcan signilicantly anbrine backuppressure resisting collapse the innerboundary the c innurus of of ie.g-tne i+3/8" x i0_3/4f, intermediate casing). ' The mechanical thermal and properties the annular of fluidare bothpressure and lemperature dependent. example, An increasing pressure the nitrog"n tn" the of in A annulusincreases collapse the backuppru"",i* 'Tiris the production tieback of the innerboundary the B annulus. "ubporting is outweigheJ tn, of benefit, rr6*"u"i, 6y increase densityof the nitrogen, whichunfavorabty rirooin""conduction from the produclion tubing,raising temperature pressur"jin tne e annulus the (and fasterthan the increase A annufus in backup.

in"'""r". ioir'" or :#:::',::,:111.:,llrililtTs anincrementar.fresiut" nccoroinj rigiditv tlll. re crease in dlces n"rponJi g.Yl1t: lf ss: in ; ;; il;;il ;q::::,P:I "o An j|]:nT:.:[]!: ensues in"oi*r'J.iiL'irrii nthe fluid Tl'lalner. eq.uiribrium "v,,nicn and the containerThe incrementaitrapped

Explanation - TrappedAnnurarpressureBuirdup(ApB) 2 At no.time in the periodbetween onselof the leakand full communication the with the annuluswas the extemalpressure differential the tubingsufficient induceconventional on to tubularcollapse.Collapse the productbn of casingstringf,owever, wouldpointload the innertubing' The tubingwouldhaveminimal resisGnceio non-uniform the load. Collapse the production of casingcouldresultfromAPB in the B bnd/orC annulus associated with: a Heatingthe annularfluidduringproduction, subsequent with slowcool down. a stiffeningof the lowerqortiol of the subjectannulusdue to leak pressure -history trapped belowthe PorH at varioustimesin the of eventsup to and including the majorleak. Dueto the configuralion a flappervalue in the porH, tne of nif,rresl pressure realized duringthe leakscenario be storedbelowthe porH. will Abnormalpressure the C annulus in due to the formation a bariteplugpreventing of pressure reliefat the shoeof the 16"liner. Table2 summarizes pro/conevidence casingcollapseas the source the for of the observed ovalization the tubingin WellA-2. of Phenomenologically, tragogdannuluspressure refersto the incrementat pressure generated a fluid heatedin a closedcontiainer. the temperature by As of the fluid is increased, will attemptto expandin accordance its coeficlent it with of thermalexpansion. The volumechangewill be countered the rbidity of tne coniainer. by Resistance the free to

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of boundary the annulus be compdsed a number segments can of The confining of havingdifferent dimensions.

weresealed the top- The B annulus at was In Marlin Well A-2 boththe B and C annuli sealedat its bottomby the production tiebackcementtop. The bottomof the C annulus shouldhavebeensealedonly up to the fracturepressure the formationadjacent the of to 16" shoe. Howeverbaritesettling,a hydrateplugor instability the wellborenearlhe of shoe,can seal the annuluswith sufficient strength renderit a closedcontainer. to Mechanically TrappedPressure temperature the formation in In additionto obviousfactorssuchas the undisturbed and reservoir, of fluids,there flow conditions the tubingand the thermalproperties the annular in existother less obvioussourcesof APB pressure: primary Forthe subseawellhead systemusedat Marlin, single, a setting toolwasusedto run the casing,casinghangerand seal assembly the well- This multi-purpose into tool caniesthe loadof the casingwhilerunning the well. Oncethe casingis in place, tool in the is usedto energizeand loc* downthe seal assembly.lf the seal assemblyis successfully lockeddown,the casingrunningoperation complete and rig activitiesmay continue is as required. The seftingprocedure the seal assembly for slackingoff the drill pipeweight, involves followed shutting the BOPstack. Thisimmobilizes drillstring,requiring tull by in the that energization lockdown of the sealsbe achieved and with pressure.The primarysettingtool is designedsuchthat a leak pastthe sealduringfull energization lock downwill not and properlylock the seal,and itwill be retrieved whenthe runningtool is trippedout of the hole. Shouldthe attempt set the sealassembly the primary fail (usually to debris to with tool due in thewellhead), secondary procedure a setting toolis availableThistool hasa running similar that of the primary to tool,but dueto a difference internal in design, seal the assembly be lockeddownevenwitha leakpastthe seal. Should sealing can the elements pressurein excessof and surfacesenergizeat the end of suchan operation, mechanical pressure the existinghydrostatic can be trappedbelowthe seal assembly. An investigation the ten sealassemblies on the five Marlinwells revealed of run that all but three of the assemblies were successfully installed with lhe primaryrunningtool. Of the threeremaining assemblies, assuming leakpastthe sealdid occurwheh and a usingthe secondary running tool,lhe totalvolume that mightbypass elastomeric priorto lock the seal downwas calculated.ln two instances, involving intermediate casingstrings, calculated the volumeis too largeto go undetected the rig crew. The remaining by candidate was the production tieback the failedWellA-2. Here,the annular on volume was smallenough that a sealleakcouldgo unnoticed duringinstallation, a maximum with associaled trapped pressureestimated be 900 psi. This pressure to wouldbe in additionto the existing pressure hydrostatic normally trapped an annulus in whena sealassembly energized. is FactorsAffecting CollapseBackup Pressure A key learning fromreview the various possible of loadsto whichtheWellA-2tubingcould havebeensubjected that,with regard APB,eachannulus is to shouldbe designed stand to on its own, In particular, follcn'ving the eventsmayalterthe backuppressure would one expectduringan increase wellbore in temperature:
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ConnectionLeak Considering production.tieback, rolumeproduction the high induces axialcompression (a) due to thermalshessand (b) incremeitatincreasL ;;;G;ssure i" due to loadsmovethe tubularstressstate intothe thirdquadrant a'conventional ApB. These of ron Misesyield ellipse,a regionforwhich manythreaded connections knownto have,Ju."ofr"rru'.. are integrity. HeatPipe ln WellA-2,the nitrogen present theA annulus in duringinstallation ar bast partially was replaced priorto thefailureby a seriesof blowdownsujeo to vent the annufus the in of Presence a persistent gr.gw'ng and tubingleak(see.Fi9: nn n annuuJ aI fatti"iry rutror hydrocarbonswould, underwellcooioownlolbwingstrui-in,createa recirculating heat exchanger.ln the vicinityoJthe.leak,hotterhydrocirbons vaporized are by the wellbore temperaturel fromproduction.As thesevaporsreachthe mudline, tney aie coor"ouy tn" proxirnity the seawater of outsidethe riser. The liquidsconoense, fallin'g backin the A annulusto repeatthe cycle. Heatpipesare knownto be efticientheattransfermechanisms.In the effectof sucha cyclewouldbe to coolthe A, and moreimportantty, caseof wellA-2, the B annulusmore-rapidly than its outerneighbor.Thatis, the B annulus wouldue rosing Ai6 pressure rasteiinan tne C annulus' thusrobbing C annulus its collapse the of oacruf."rurther,thisprrenomenon wouldoccurfollowing shut-in,and couldbe usedio lne fact that fire'mapr reat eventoccurred four hoursaftershut_in. "*prain 1' Trapped annularpressures causeloadsthat exceedthoseof conventbnal can casing design. 2' A collapsed outercasingcan imparta non-uniform mechanical loadon innerstrings. A casingstring'sresistance non-uniform to loadsis a traanon its normalcofiapse of resistance. 3' APBin one annulus cannotbe relieduponas backup ApB loadsin an adjacent for annulus.A connection otherleakmaybleedAPBfromone annulus, or resulting in highdifferentialpressures across casing. a 4' The costof an APB failurecan be enormous, therefore ApB mustbe addressed in thewelldesign. Pompano casir.tg failureexperienced Pompano at was attributed ApB whitedriiling. Thiswas to Ih.9 believed be the firsl instance an APBfailuret"rrrtirg to of r"m temperature changes associated with circulating mud. Thisfailure_ not as clomplicated as costtyas what was nor occurred Marlin, at however underscores needto consiierApB in all aspectsot it the welt design. while drilling aheadin saltat g,132'onthe Pompano A-31wellbore (MoskaKnolt9g9A-31, ocs-G-6898)betow 16"shoe(Figure the 6), !d rotary statieJ airuptryandthe dril pipe simultaneously became stuck. nn increase mudflowout of theflov linesurged of overthe gumbobuster.
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was bledoff the 16"x 20' annulus.The fluidinitially 500 Approximately psi pressure to was clear10 ppg brine,but laterchanged a 10-5 from the 16"x 20" annulus recovered placedabovethe cementtop to tantamount the fluid ppg syntheticbasedmud composition in the 16"annulus. Trippingthe drillslring out of the hole required60 kipsto 100 kips at each&3/8" HWDPtool stabilizers joint and 150kipsat the uppermosl of stabilizer. Recover subsequent 14-112" jars. was aidedwith drilling sevenjoints of I-|WDP and the remaining at of taggedan obstruction 253'. diameter 11-314" A caliperloggingtool set for a maximum was Loggingupward,the calipershoweddamagetrom242'to 253'. The wellbore plugs. Subsequent plugging well,pressure to the with abandoned fourcement temporarily strings. between 16'and 20" casing the communication testingindicated of and duringthe initialinvestigation recovery the ovalized16" Pertinentevidencegathered 7 casing(figure and 8) includes: event; , The drillstringstalled an abruptly, indicating instantaneous . There is no evidence of drillingparameters an out-of-the-ordinary from pre-failure occurrence; . The recordedcirculating temperatures 180"Fbotlomholeand 168"Fat the flow line - are high(particularly lafter); the , The 16"annulus x hole the'14-112" 17-112" section; valvewas closedwhiledrilling . The depthof the failureis shallow.Given10.5ppgdrilling fluidoutside 16" the x is an collapse differential 0.052psilppg-ft 250 ft x 10.5ppg= 136 casing, evacuated psi as compared the API collapseratingfor this casingof 1,480psito ratherthan water-based to Of furtherimportance the ABP issueis the fact that a synthetic, mudwas usedto drillthe 17-1D'holesection.Thisswitchin mudcomposition on distinguishes cunent17-112" the hole sectionfrom all but one of its counterparF the platform.Tie 17-1l2 holesection one earlier with of wellwas alsodrilled Pompano synthetic operation, horeveq ran 13-3/8" 72lb|ft N-80casing(2670psi mud. Thisearlier hole. Thus,thewellthatfailedhadthe rather than 16",inthe 17-112" coflapse resistance), as to uniquecombination synthetic of mud and a lowercollapseresistance compared the rest of the drillingprogram. Le-sson learnedfrom the PomoanoAPB failure: 1. APB can happen whiledrilling, just duringproduction. not implications meritthorough 2. Changes a welldesigncan havefar-reaching to and review. 3.1.3 Other APB Incidents

It is oftendifficult obtaindetails failures to experienced otheroperating by companies. on Therewas reportedly APB related an failureat ChevronTexaco's Petronius fieldin deepwater Gulfof Mexico, thoughlittleinformation couldbe foundon it. At Statoil's Gullfaks field,the production casingcollapsed duringclean-up flowto the rig. Evidently failurewas due to APB in the B annulus, the intermediate the for casing was unharmed.Thewellwassavedandthe intermediate casing was strongenough qualify to
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as produclion casing. Pressure controlson lhe A annulus were required this and several for otherwells in the field lo ensurea repeatcollapsedid notoccur. The failureof the Mad DogW1 well is underinvestigation the time of this reportat Althoughthe exactcauseof the failurehas not beendetermined, ApB is a likelyexplanation for the problem.Thewellis lostandwill be plugged abandoned. and pressure the A annuluswas the first indication a problemat Mad DogW1. Persistent on of Diagnostic work eliminated problems any witr the tubingstring,leadingto the concluiion that the produotion casinghad been breached and the tuUing haOovalized.Three candidate failuremodesemerged: . APB in the B annuluscausedthe g-7lg"tiebackto collapse. ' APB behindthe 13-318" causedthat casingto collapse, placinga non-uniform failure loadon the inner9-7lB'. ' Salt ovalization the 13-3/8'casing,wfthsubsequent of ovalization the g-Tlg" of tieback. Galculated valuesof B annulusAPB are not sufficienfly highto collapse 9-Zlg",thus the the firstfailuremodeis unlikely.Similarly, saltmodelirig the 6nducted at Sandia doesnot predictstressessufficient grosslydeformtwo stringsof casing. The mostlikely to explanation APBbehind 13-3t8'. is the A previously downhole run ultrasonic indicates voidin the cementsheathof several log a hundredfeet. lt is possible that the fluid left inthis voidwas subjectto ApB, generating a load sufiicientto collapsethe 13-3/8" casing. The 13-3/8'has an Apl collapseratint of onry 2'880psi. Though is unlikety APBwas highenough collapse d-7l8'""Jng, it that to tne whichhas an APt coilapseratingof 1o,2gopsi, - non-un]form load'imposed the by collapsing 13-3/8" couldcausedeformation thetieback. of

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3.2 Zonal lsolatioll3,4,s


A key objectivefor casingand cernentis to provideisolation sandsthat havethe potential of to flow or to draw fluidsfom elsewhere the wellbore.This sectionlooksat two cases in wherezonal isolation was critical. The firstexampte fromShearwater describes hcnu sustained casingpressures can stemfrom improper isolation.The secondexample from Shah Denizreviewsthe planninginvolved ensurethat a high pressure to watersind is isolatedfrom the nearbyproducing reservoir.

3.2-1

pressure B Annulus shearwater-sustained Gasing on

The Shearwater wells hild problems associated with isolating Hodformation the with cement. This problemsurfacedas sustained casingpressuieon the 14,'by 11gl4" x 9-718. casingannulus annulus).Thisis a big issueforwellsoperations(B The iO-Uq,production casingcollapseratingasexceeded whenlhe externalpressure goesabove3,250irsi,thus B annuluspressuremust be monitored and limited.As wellsheai up, mud is bledoif. As wellscooldownduringshut-in, ethylene glycolmixture injected an is backintothe annulus. Some_wells require constant annulus a B nowto maintain pressures belowthe 3,250psi limitation. The HodFormation encountered the 12-114'hole is in seclion abovethe Fulmar reservoir. Hydrocarbons from the Fulmarreservoir havemigrated throughpreviousty non-sealing fault surfacescreatedoverthe apexof the Sheanrvater structure-ihese faultiurfaces resealed trappinghydrocarbons both in the main Futmarreservoir well as withinthe lowas permeability limestone. Hod There is no mentionwithinthe Shearwater programof a Multi.well Development hydrocarbon driveissuefrom the Hod Formation-However,ihe of cementon the 9-T16, top cementcolumnwas plannedabovethe HodFormation thustheoretically sealingoff the unit as a hydrocarbon source. Fiveout of the six Shearwater weflshaveencountered pressure a driveproblemdue to hydrocarbons entering wellborefromthe Hod Formation migrating the 1Z-1t4" the and up openholeannulus the B annulus.Thepressure into drivehas led to a limited annutus B window, limited the maximum by allowable pt""rrr" oitn" 6'"nnrru" shut-in 99fgoneiating (defined the burstratingof the 13-3/g" by casing). The fivewellsthat haveencountered pressure driveon the B annulus experienced negligible lossesduringthe 9-718" job. lt musttherefore assumed cement cement be that was circulated across HodFormalion thesewells. Thesixthweltsaw complete the in losses duringthe 9-718" cementjob; the inference beingtheremustbe liftteto no cementacross the HodFormation. Thissixthwelldoesnotsuffer fromB annulus pressure drive. Therefore, combination formation a of collapse ontocasing and bridgingroff sotids of must be sufficient holdbackthe Hodin thiswelt. to All Shearwater wellsutilizea sacrificial bentonile WBMspacer thatis designed produce lo increased strengthwith increased gel temperature. This hasthe effectof ietaininj the weighting agentin solution and preserving required the back-up density.However, through
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time this has leadto a fluidthat will not easilytransmitpressures. This has beennoted

1Tpressuredriveproblem. the :g^r*:li?i'l1l

ffiilil;*lin,nn ::ilp",*,t':::,:11".1?'p^:I?'l_"I"-'1ti9ti.;1ivi-dG.r"iffi gel strensth annutar dolsnot fluid appear toiufi"';th;;"r1" ir#1,:firl,illY "uitror" annuri (to expansion 3,:3:::::1.:yI:"^?j::^1lI_"LtEBru pressuresailow rhermar uph read rtnei roca'd; for ) as ro nvJ
i *, ;;;ii ffiffi i"jt","o "fi

The exactpointat whichthe conduitwas formedfor the hydrocarbons to enterthe wellbore is unclear- However whatis clearis that therewas a faitureof the cementbondbetween the rockandthe 9-718" casing, modeortanure the uei.g; ;ilannulus or channel. Thereare four possibre expranations the fairure for scenario: ' The microannulus was created through channelling during cement job. The the ' contentof the channels beingmix waterthat lattertiwas olpaceo bt |"ffi hydrocarbon ' The microannulus was formedas the resuttof the production casingpressure test. The application of.meximum anticipated surfacepr""rui" ouera columnof completion fluid will havecausedsomeballooning the g-zlg, that coutdhave of resulted the cement in beingcrushed. . The microannulus courd havebeencaused the *Ttg" was displaced as to completion (density fluid closeto 1.0s.g.). Thiswouldhavecausedsomeshrinkage of the casingand hencefaitureof the cementbond. A combination the above. of

ercommissionins ,t*"9::tr*:l,S:*:J::atTql?TSjionwag.lecosnizedsoonaft

l5,T:*::"ly:1j..?l"jlglcluoedtnatnernosirii"lv",ilrr"drthffiffi,d;:; jh"j:ln*:.yl"g";d;;;;ilil;;!Jfi";lii#1i,"?iru,"or

1""^o:T?*::,1J3pl
::",,::,?::j=,*?:_1T1lllll.l
l.{muarror alti^,,^x lhr Stfinol

r{aeinnc designsa n d rreviewedL ^ L ^ - - a and a v i a . . , , l lthe benefits- ' both ratexand foamcementsof r

;;;r-fi;ii*;il;;

tu:;"'."; rherFE have weus "i;;;;t sisniricanuy r#;;;i.iJ"""iir'H"o ljlls^L^l?f,y:r' llhgrgh n3",,'.",ltllil.1:*yl.:h"-:ggrrromanyoro;;;#A;;ili,ruffi;rL,l,'iill qg e i b6"d; ; ffi: # li:l ^,-,^,:. !:ri"-"^t th faIedcement ;;i;t"'; ;;;ffi;i"; temperature the flexstone on polymens
Trr ...^rr^ L .

theErsin Frankrin deveropmenr. rFEdesign rhe

h"r;;;;;'iil;;

timeand hightemperatures-

i.e. the elasticproperties flexstone of diminish with

shell considered that lhe properties foamare bettersuit6ofor the large of stressvariations, specifically the point.of at displacing A annulus pacierRulo.rney suggest the to thatthe nitrogen bubbles proYg: moieRexiiility radial.stresses to ti-".'iiompressure tests).At the time,Shellhad no uKcS experience foam;however with foamhasvvvrr utrlrz's\r beenutilized ri^rsr ertensively throughout North
Amgrica.

As suchfoamcement was utilized the sw-0g sidetrack. for shell pumped the slurry half as foamand the second without as to secure harf so a strongg-7tg" shoe. Thejob was successfully performed minimal with losses downhole.lt-must therefore assumed be that the foam cementwas placedacrossthe iod formationJuly 2O05 BP CONFIDENTIAL

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lnitiallythe SW{8 foam cementstrategy was @nsidered success isolatethe Hod. a to However, over time the B annuluspressures havebeenseento riseto the pointthat Hod hydrocarbons now seen at surface. Therefore, foam cementin Shearwater are the sidetracks not beensuccessful isolating Hodformation. has in the Currently, thereis no cementsolution guarantee to Hodisolation a conventionalcasing with design. Lessonslearnedfron the Sheanraterzonal isolation: 1. Standard cementmay not be sufficient caterfor the degreeof stresscyclingin an to HPHTwell. 2. Reviewcurrentcemenltechnology a productthatwill increase radialshear for the properties the cementbondin HPHTconditions. of Reviewalternative casingdesignoptionswhichmay improvethe chanceof isolating troubleformations, suchas a linerandtieback configurationShah Deniz Shah Denizpresentsa severeset of challenges annularsealantselection.Basicaily for threetypes of loadingare of concern: Displacement from highweightmudto watersomeweeksafterthe cementjob (casing contraction). a Reservoir compaction inclined in wells introduces bendingstressesin the liner. a Tectonicloadingassociated with the area. Earlypeer reviewsshowedthat a high pressure waler sand in the middleof the produc.tive sandsequence was amongthe top risksto delivery these$40MM $50MMwells. of to pressurebetweenwaterand hydrocarbon D_{ferenlal zonesreaches10,000psi over 213' 'So, (69t). The facilitiesdesigndoes accommodate highwaterproduction- effective with isolation required is acrossthe Batvlil (gas),spl (water), Sp2 (gas),and Sp3 igas)sands over the life of the wells. A taskforcewas established Schlumberger with WCSto identify pathfor cementing a success withthesechallenges. Schlumberger A cementing expert was embedded the into wellsteamfor design, planning, job execution. and ShahDenizalsosentteammembers to review deepTuscaloosa Matagorda the and lstand fieldswithsimilar zonalisolation challenges. The practice usinggritblasted of pipeto enhance bonding was adapted from the Forties field. Cement slurryproperties placement and weremodeled usingbothSchlumberger's and tools an independent finiteelement model.Alternate cement formulations were invJstigated for minimizing stressconcentrations failureof the cement and sheath. The plancalledfor making conditioning priorto running linerand making a trip the a separate to set the linertop packer.A heavywaltlinerwas selected parttdminimize trip in ballooning the associated and potential forming micro-annulus. for a Finally, peerassist a meeting was heldto reviewand improve plans. The_ job aclualcement on well SDA-01 was executed according plan. Two vendors' to evaluation toolswererun to evaluate cement the bond. Thebondiogswereperformed at
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the.drilled mudweightratherthan a reduced displacement weightwhichcouldleadto fluid de'bonding-The postjob analysis showedgooouonoquatityicros, the criticalintervats. 1' I lt is crucialtoidentiff key risksand thenstaffengineering teamsaccorctingly priorto designing wells. the

z- | y-stgms approach, incruding modering, and - testing, reamings anarogous from fields, leads a more to robust blution. 3. lndependent veriftcation vendor of modering a necessary is step. 4. Gritblasted casing enhance can cement bonding.

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3.3 WellheadGrowth3'6'7
in the causestubularsto Whenwellsare broughtonto produetion, increase temperatures pressure due up. Annular buildup to the sametemperature elongate forcethe wellhead and can increase can also resultin upwardforceson the wellhead. Flowline configuration place throughlockdowns limitson hov muchwellheadmotionis acceptable.Limitingmovement can placehighcompressive loadson stringsand impactsconnection selectionand integrity. growthanalysishas historically Wellhead beenrathersimplistic.Lessonslearnedthrough the following exampleshas established requirement performing muchmore the for a rigorous analysis algorithms formation for involvingmore complicated interaction. 3.3.1 Yacheng

The Yachengdevelopment was a 3 TCF gas discovery the SouthChinaSea whichwas in developed with primaryproductsalesintothe HongKongmarkel ln the wellsdrilledduring YachengPhasel, the wellheads to were observed moveupwardduringproduction as by muchas 7". In preparation drillphasellwells,ARCOChinaInc.wishedto determine to the expected wellheadgrowthsinceits magrnitude important the designof surface in was facilities. Following requestfor wellheadgrowthcalculations, linearelasticwellheadgrowthmodel a a knownas the ElasticSpringModel,similarto the Landmark model,was assembled AEPT at in late December 1998. The AEPT modelaccounted thermalchanges for and redistribution of loadsin a series tubularstrings dueto the net displacement thewellhead.Unlike of of the Landmark for of model, AEPTmodeldid notaccount buckling innerstrings the thatgo intocompression.However, was verifiedthat the impactof this effecton wellhead it govemedby the thermalgrowthand movement fairlylow. Wellheadgrowthis primarily is loadThewellheads the Yacheng13 development in wellsmovedupward duringproduction. Whenthe wellheadmovement was recorded a functionof the rateof gas production, as it was foundthatthe wellheads movedupward as muchas 7". Therelationship by between wellheadmovement and the chokepositionas a functionof time indicates that: . Movement dependson the production and rate,i.e. it increases decreases with flow rate. . Whenthewellis shut in the wellhead growth doesnot return zero. (Examination to of growthdataby Dr Junius otherwellhead Allenin 1996indicates wellscontract that by 507o 670/o the previous growth.Theseobservations to of weremadewhenwells wereshutin individually across platform and the respectively.) Post-mortems wellhead of movement calculations Dr. Junius and by Allen(in 1992and 1996)indicate the onlywayto explain growth the orderof 7" in the Yacheng that of wellsis thatthe conductor pushed was upwarden rnasse thermalforces generated the inner by in strings, thusimplying movement the shoe. Thisassumption consistent the at is with operational history conductor of grorth at the surface. installation withthe observed and

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oftheconductors Yacheng were inthe weus marked bythe fouowing I*:r'ff'otion ' theconductor encountered littte very resistance sank and through the fitJ*tfiudline,
Following this, it was hammere.d refusalor untiloccasional to shellfragmenbwere reached. ' lf thesehardstreakswere encounlered, the shellfragments weredrilled with a22" pilotholeto 690'. . Conduclor was drivendeeperto its final settingdepthof 759,. Previous wellheadq.ror1lh models,including Landmark the model,assumed notionof an the effective pointof fixitvalongthe l"irglh oitlie werroore suli'iii"i sectionsof the stringsabovethis pointmovetogeth'er. ""r"nted This.isessentially equivalent statingthat the to lengthof eachtubularthat contributes wellheaomoverirenils to an unknown quantity since the point.of fixityby definitionimpliesthatthe cementtr"r uroren toosedownto some oe.?t!' The work performed Yacheng for placeda rricinnJ torceon the conductordue to soil shearstressesr3therthan relyon g[ressing tre.corrJ poiit ornxity- Thoughrhis treatment shearstre.sses a simitifiedsiigle of was varuerJJ"l, it shouldbe notedthat Bp,s cunentwellheadgrowthmodeling metirodologyietieJ a ruiinnit" elementtreatment on of theformation. The wellheadgrowth..study phasell drillingled to recommendations for on hangingand cementing 1&5/8'' stringto minimize an gt?*i! duringp.Jraio" An improved conductor wasalso recommended '

ffi"i31

fornew frelbtnar oia-not aireaiv nave crive in tnl pipe

1' Thermalgrowsrof innercasingstringscan pushup the conductor massewhen en net upwardforcesexceedthe conductor's shear when the well cools,the weilhead not dropbackfufiyto its originar "i*"gth wiil position."-'2' Growthcalculations basedon an effective.point' fixityrequireguessing of "----''the depth wherecementrigidly holdsthe casing place. in 3' A moreaccuratemodelusessoil shearstresses to resistupwardwellheadrnotion. 3.3.2 Sheanrater The.greater than expected welthead groMh at Shearwater the potential threaten had to flowfine In particular,gy 0s exferiencedgt"ut"tih"n expected ilt"gt'!y' growthdue ro a combination inadequ.ate of modering, unsuccessfur20" an job, cement anda disengaged 20' x 30" mudline lockdown tha't'prevented transfeilorn" ring load structural casing. Theoriginal engineering evaluation assumed complete fixityat theseabed withno conductor growth-calculations q" estimated to s"'oiw"llnJ.o'gro^h. Actualwellhead growth was measured excesg 8" (Figure wtrich in of 9), ,"i""J Jon"erns growth that could exceed 12"limitation the placed theflJwline'onc" on th";;tir" platform was brought online. A full investigalion launched determine was to the causeof the ligner gro6h and howto mitigale excessive flowline movementJuly2O05

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Doc. l',1o.: 18-l82SWDRLLR (Rev D3) 1

flawswhichledto a grossunderWellCatmodelhad several The originalLandmark casing prediction wellheadgrowth. The growthmodelassumed the 30" structural that of was rigidlyfixed belowthe mudlineand that lhe innerstringswerefirmlytied to this soilfriction the and interaction between ignores dynamic the This assumption foundation. length casing. In reality,the drivepipe is heldin placeby frictionactingoverthe contiaci betweenformationand sleel. This frictionforceis not uniformoverthe length,and at leasta portionof the pipewill thermally upwardforce expandand contract.Furthermore, heating around eachwellwillcausesome andformation fromthe innerstrings transmitted that in movement the pipebelowmudline.The net resultis a foundation has significant growth willbe worsethan is rigid, wellhead flexibility.Sincethe foundation not perfectly predictedby a rigidmodel. Oncethe modelwas updated, of movement for was predicted 4" with half comingfrom thermalexpansion halffrom relieving and the 30" belowthe mudline, whenthe innerstrings elongate. compression grorth measuremenls obtained against The rigidfoundation modelwasthencalibrated overestimated, duringa flow test. However, temperatures the flow test were heavily for growthoccurred temperature at changes muchlowerthan assumed. which meansobserved growthto the hightemperatures, mudwas included the model in To fit measured oil that becauseit gave"betterresults"eventhoughitwas understood thosefluidswere water based. Calibration with overestimated temperatures in model resulted a non-conservative production. that underpredicts wellheadgrowthfor sustained contributed an These two modeleffors;a rigidfoundation inaccurate and calibration, to overallwellheadgrowthestimation 4" to 5". Actualgrowthin excessof 8" was measured of when SW-08was broughtonline. The modelwasupdatedto incorporate new this production.Newpredictions measurement then run for long-term and were between11" and 12" of wellheadgrowth,whichencroached the limitsdefined the flowline. on for Apart from modelerrors,the Sheanrvater designhad someweaknesses well which complicated wellhead limiting movement. The 1G3/4"and 14"strings havemudline growthwith pistoneffects. However, mudlinehangers hangersthat exacerbate the were neededbecausethe 20" casingconnection an inadequate compression ratingfor had carrying subsequent stringloads. Therewerealsoconcems full withunrestricted inner stringgrowthdue to the compression limitson the 'lO-314'NKK-HWSL connection. For SW-08,the lockdownring between 20'and 30" failedto fansfer loadsout to the lhe conductor,rendering supportworthless.In fact,the presence the 30' madethe the of situationworse becauseit actedas an insulator, retaining heatfromtransferdng the to formation, Manydifferentworkoverprocedures werecontemplated, from circulating fluid in the 20" x 30" annulus mechanically to reslraining 2O"or 30" strings.Future the wellshad modified procedures spudding wellto minimize operational for the seabed disruption strengthen and the wellbore. The 20" cementing practices were alteredto increase chanceof fixingthe the 20" to the 30",thereby creating muchmorerigidfourxdation. a Finally, installation the 20" of x 30" lockdown was critical completing structuralfoundation. ring for the

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Doc. No.: 11&l82O.WDRLLR(Rev D3)

Lessons learnedfrom the shearw?terwellheadqrovvthproblem: 1. Engineering modelsshouldreflectthe mostaccurate algorithms available. Incorrect assumptions inputdata can havedetrimental on effects. 2. The basisfor rating connections engineered and equipment shouldbe undemtood, especially when theseratingspotentially a weltdesign. limit 3. Welldesigns shouldbe comprehensive. component limitthe useor One may selection other components. Shearwater, of At @nnection selection hindered the abilityto constrain wellheadmotion.

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3.4 Connections3,8,e,1o
Shearwater DiscoveryWell Redrill The initialNorthSea block22l30b (Sheanrvater) exploration suffereda blowout.Arco successfully redrilledthe discovery well. Duringthe planning stagesof the redrill,Arco lookedat usingsumitomo,s SMHW connection the thickwall production for tubulars.ExxonwaJa partnerin the well and indicatedto Arco that the connection appeared be weak in eitemal pressure. to Subsequent testingdemonstrated the SMHWleakedat extemalpressure that levelsof 40 o/o 5Ao/o the casing b of collapserating. Thiswas a significant finding,ror uirtrallyno testing of premiumconnections considered pressurel elrtemal ProductionCasing ffp SW{! tubingfailurebroughtto light a problem with the production casing. The small pressurerelelsedirom the comptetion yglyme of high reservoir tuningat thelime of the tubinghanger failure was sufficient detect presence an A to B annulus to the of communication problem. An A to B investigation program was executed duringthe SW-08well abandonment operation.Attempts were madeto establish loca-tion the leakpathby runningOLf the of packersat progressively deeperpointsin the well. The packerrunscouldnot ioeniiryany potentialleak. The leak pathwas only detectedafter the production casingwas retrieved surfaceand a to washoutdiscovered.The positionof the washout was .cros" an NKK-HWSL The root causefailurehas been identified insufficient as make-up.The sections """pfig. been that have takenthrough coupling the ctearly demonstrate the connection that required aloifional two turnsto be fultymadeup-lt is uncertain whether was due to negligence thisfailure this but is not uniqueto HpHT developments. SurfaceCasing Shell suspects that the RL4Scoupledsections the 20" surfacecasingleak under of compressionFluidflowhas beenwitnessed fromthe D annurus * zo"l on sw-og (30" duringwellstartup. Therearetwo possible explanations tne observed to leakbetween the C and D annuli: . A leakrelating the 3O" 20,'lockdownring,evenl-, to x . Eitherthe RL4Sor SR2O connections in compression. leak It is considered unlikely the leakis retated the mudline that to lockdown event. ring The 20" casing designcatlsfor the top of cemenr be takenbackto the mudline to (the excessbeingremove-{ the washports the mudline by in systemj. ThecasingJ"iig;.r"" callsfor the vetco sR2o coupling be runabovethe muotine to io thewellhead, Vetco with
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RL4Sbeingrun belowthe mudlineto the shoe. The reasonfor the SR20abovethe mudtine is that it canwithstand largecompressive loads. Thereis evidence suggestthat the 20" cement was lessthan optimal- lt is likelythat to job the practices usedto drillthe 26" holesectionresulted washouts in and an inegular-sted hole- lt is also likelythat the cement did not include conectexcessto accountfor the job the holecondition.As such,it has beenconcluded Shellthat the SW48 well has a poor20' by cemenlintegrity. Shellsuspects thetop of cement deeper the well,belowthemudline, thata that is in and sectionof RLaScoupled20'casing is exposed.lf this is the case,the exposed iLaS ZO" sectionwillsee the full compressive loadof the well,beingthat it is not supported -coupling by cement. Thiscompressive load is considered be sufficient allowtor tne RLaS to to to unseal andfor the C annulus (20"x 14')to weepintothe D annulus contents (aO'; iO';l i Shellhas concluded as the C annulus non critical, that is thbre is no requiremeni either to investigate further,or, containthe excessfluidsin lhe D annulus whichare allowedto spill overboard1. Conneclion performance shouldbe verifiedfor alt downhole toading scenarios, including externalpressure. manufactureis The ratings maynotG reliable. 2. 'Routine" operations, suchas connection make-up, deservethe samescrutinyas moreunique HPHToperations. 3- Conneclion selection shouldbe madeon the basisof a robustset of possiblebads. The casingdesignprocessshouldincfude investigation loadsassociated an of with a job. non-optimal cement Mobile Bay The-Mobile Area Norphlet eslimated containan ultimatenaturalgas resource Bay is to base of 20 TCF. HzSconcentrations rangefrom50 ppmto 10%o COzconc6ntrations up and are lo 4o/oProduction alsoinclude may brineandelementalsulfur. Formation intervals betow 20,000'haveboftomholetemperaturesexcessof 400'F and initialbottomhole in pi"orr". from10,000 psito 20,000psi. In the mid 1980's, extemalpressure the resistance the connections not commonly of was testedor validated.Mobil'sMobileBaycasingdesignsutilizeda heavystringof 7" production casing, the heavywallconnection weakunderexternal and wls fressureproduction, pressure the B annulus in outsidethe production casingwas allowedto Pu.|lg buildto a pointthat it deformed heavywall connection the sealsand causJda bak. A rem.arkable cosUy and workover was pe*ormed,millingthousands feet of tne proouction of casing, backing a connection out downhole, thenirakingup thedownhole and connection to a new production string. This failure,alongwith the heavywall connection investigation the Shearwater for discovery well,highlights needto verifyconnection the performan6underdesign condirions rather thandepend vendorratings on and data. 3.4.2

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BP-HZN-21 7eMDL01 11 e662

Doq.No.: 118-182&WDRLLR D3) (Rev

3.4.3

ARCO and DEA 27

Between 1979and 1985, ARCOexperienced flush-joint 9 casing (seeTable3). failures The averagecost of eachfailurewas over $1MM,which provided sufficient motivation to research flush-jointconnections. joint industry A studywas formedthroughthe Drilling Engineering (DEA-27).This effortproduced industry Association the standard flushor for near-fl connection ush testing. The programhad a majorimpacton the technology highclearance of connections. Successful testsrevealed whichconnections werequalified service. Othertests for revealeddeficiencies performance in characteristics. Someof the connections whichdid not passwere revisedand subsequenily retested successfullyThe test program consisted five specimens product: per of . Specimen was failedin puretension. 1 . . Specimen was failed undercappedend pressure 2 loadingSpecimen was straingaugedand failedundercombinedinternalpressure 3 and tension- Failureoccunedafterstraingaugedata was recorded a varietyof for pressure and forcecombinations.

o Specimen was failedundera combination intemal 4 pressure, of tension, and bending. ' Specimen wasfailedundera combination internal 5 pressure, of compression, and bending. Specimen3 was sequenced throughten majorelasticloadcombinations, involving approximately 150loadsteps,priorto failure.Straingaugedatacotlected thisspecimen on provedmeaningfulfur analyzing conditions connection test performance. bther and The specimens weretakento failureusing10 to 1Sloadsteps. Seven products weretested. Threedesignsdemonstrated goodperformance. One was deemedinadequate and, due to commercial reasons, effortswere madeto resolvethe no deficiency.Two othersdemonslrated performance were modified inadequate but and subsequently exhibited performance. finalconnection adequate A demonstrated inadequate performance designmodiftcations and were considered not completed but duringthe DEA-27 evaluation. Lessons learnedfrom the DEA-27ioint industrv proiect 1. Connection failuresare costly. Performance claimsshouldbe veriliedto reducethe chanceof a fieldfailure- Operators musttake an activerole in performance verificalion. 2- Jointindustry programs can be effective investigating solvingwidespread at and problems. 3- Performance problems revealed throughtestingcan be corrected, resulting a in connection approved service lhoseconditions. for at

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BP-HZN-217gMDL01s6621 2

. No.: 11&1826.WDRLLR

3.4.4

Vastar MC941#2

Mississppi (MC)941#2 was a VastarHeritage in MC block941. lt had Canyon weil a pfanned depthof 22,500' with 15.2ppg mudand is to&teo in 3,950'ofwater. rne criticat casingdesignissueswere uncertainty the maximum in shut-iniubingpressure tne anO integrity semi-flush of connections undera combined loadof collapsE'and *rpi"irion. The production tubularswere a 10-314" 65.70(0.595"wall) Q-125sLX by a $7/g- 62.g0 (0.625'wall) P-110 SLXtieback,ag-718" 62.80P-l10 tiner, a Z-te;gg.bo (b.500" ind wal) Q-125liner. The criticalloadcasefor the 10-314" casingwas an APB scenario that placed6,g20psi ApB on an externalcolumn 15.2ppg mudand hydrostatic ppgpacreinuidinside,irrln.n of 8.4 combined with elevatedproducing temperatures, toadnidur-ti 621 tips compiession the in and6,977psi differentiaf collapse pressure 190"Fat The criticalloadcasefor the g-7t8liner was an evacuation packerftuid balance of to an oil gradientat reservoir depth. This scenario rgggltsin 8,48GpsiJirerentiaimil"p""'pr!""ur" and 683 kips compression the 9-7lg, at22g"F. on A plot of available SLX test data is shownin Figure10. Sincethis plotshowsdatafrom a varietyof connection sizes,it is normalized the strength the pipebody. The intemal to of pressure axis reflectsthe ratioof the test pressure dividld by the'pipeTrijxial maximum internal pressure basedon minimalwallthickness actuaiyieloitrengm. rneleiiernat and pressure axis reflectsthe externalpressure dividedby the ApisC3 cot6-pse t"tilg i;; externalpressure basedon actualyieldstrength. Slmitarly, axiatforceaxis is-theratioof the the appliedforceto the pipe bodyyieldstrengthbasedon-nominal cross-sectional and area actualyieldstrength.The criticalloadsfor the 1G3/4"and g7lg" stringsare indlcated on the plol. Furtherreviewof the SLX test data showedthat the closesttest pointswereconducted at ambienttemperature.Also,a previousg-7lg'SLXtest leakedsubsequent a comUineO to internalpressure compression whichovalized specimen. and load the Thus,conn"ction performance bepath dependent the sequence loadsis importani. may and of Final acceptance was contingent passinga fuil connection on test. Aconnectiontest protocolwaswrittenlo evaluate SLXthroughall fourcombinations the of internal extemalpressure or and tensionor compression. The connection wouldcyclethree timesthrough fourquadrants thevon Misesequivalent the of rynnglstress floiin.i*n ln Figure10- TheSLXdid not passthe cyclicalload test,whichL"""r" referred the as "Vastar Test". GrantPrideco's ANJO,VAM'S SLIJ-ll,and Hunting's SLSFconnections wereallsubjected to testingunderload cyclesthroughall four quadrants the performance of t tone of the connections initially passed Vastar the "nu"topl.' Test. Afterfurther evatuations, decided VAM to modifythe performance envelope claims the SLIJ-Il for and subsequenfly passeJ ne test. Theindustry-testing procedure defined ISO 13679 by was beingfinalized during the timeframe thesesemi-flush of tests. A motivation ISO 13676was the highcost of testang for connections- is notfeasible investigate possible lt to all combinations toa?sequenc"", of
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BP-HZN-21 79MDL01 96621 3

Doc. No.: 118-1826,WDRLLR(Rev D3)

including temperature, bending, manufacturing and tolerances. Thus,a stiandardized test protocolwas developed providea rigorous to evaluation a limitednumberof specimens, of betweenthree and eightdepending the connection on application levelsought. Testsat the highestmnnectionapplication levelinvestigate impactof thermaland mechanical the cycles and coverall four quadrants the VME performance of envelope, including bending. Althoughindividual well conditions may requirefurtherfocusedevaluation, ISO 13679 the testingstandardprovidesa methodto evaluate manufacture/s claimsin an efiicient and uniform fashion. Lessons learneddurino the Vastar conneclignreviewand subsequent testino: 1. Threadedconnections geometry involvecomplex that may behavedifferently depending a sequenee loads. Vendorsmay not havefully investigated on of their products2. Extemalpressureresistance remains cfrallenge semi-flush a for integralconnections. 3. lt is crucialto understand detailsbehinda connection data point. tn addition the test to the absolutepressure and axialforce,the loadsequenbe, temperature, test and amountof bending importantfactors determining are in acceptance. 4. ISO 13679providesan efficienttestingprotocoltoevaluate connections underall combinations pressure of and axialforce. However, focusedfollow-up evaluations may be required specificwell conditions. fior

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BP-HZN-2179MDL0196621 4

3.5 Conclusions WellDesign Lessons


Designing deepwater HPHTwellsis a comptex challenge. Hightemperature swingscan caule fluidexpansion, resulting highAPB if the fluidis trapped-The Marlin in Apd'failure resulted a $2.5billion in impactto BP'srevenue slream, modivating development the of severalmethods mitigate to APB. The hightemperature swingscan also resuitin significant groMh that mustbe considered subseaarchitecture Zonalisolation weffhead in catin. difficultto accomplish within_the ctearances narro\/ drillingmargins the tight and of deepwater Gulfof Mexico. Connections continue be an areawhereOetalleO to evatuation and testingis required. minimizeproblems the field- All of theseissuesplacelarge to in demands engineering on resources. lessons leamed from other hioh profile proiects should be carried 9evera!,-kev forward: 1 . The cost of an APB failurecan be enormous; therefore APB mustbe addressed in the well design. APB can occurover a rangeof drillingand producing scenarios. 2 . A mechanical collapse to APB in an outerannulus ptacea non-uniform due can toad on the produciion casing. The string'sresistiance non-uniform to loadsis muchlower thanits normalcollapse rating. 3. Cementing prac{ices HPHTwellsmay requirea multidisciplinary for reviewtoensure radialshearproperties sufficient maintain are to zonalisolation ovei a rangeof pressure temperature and cycles. grorth lessonsunderscore importance verifiingvendormodelsand 4. Wellhead the of analyses' Simplified modelsmay producemisleading nonionservativeresults. and 5. Conneclion designhas improved overthe years- However, focusedacceptance lests are still neededto verifyperformance underspecific well loadingscenarios. 6 . Welldesigns shouldbe comprehensive, integrating requirements technologies and acrossall engineering disciplines.

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. No.:1t&1

4 METALLURGICAL LESSONS
gasses corrode crack These can or uninhib-itedailoy tow caiil; steel tuointstrings, it-qcsy leadingto costlyworkovers.
corrosionresistant alloy(cRA) tubingcan be usedto extendthe life of a well. Thereare a wide varietyof cRAs in use,fromchromium steel1qlign ni&eiattoys. Ho airovi, appropriate all applications. for Temperature, HzSlCOz, pH, chtorides, strengtfi req.uirements; projectecenomics and allfaaoiinto ne opfimarcnn sejectionl Somehigh nicke.lalloys withstand harshest can the downhole envirJnm.nt, ney canalsoue out prohibitively expensive. 13Crtubiirg relatively is inexpensive is suitaUe limited Out for applicationsThereis an understandaole inceniive use tne leastexpensive to Cp,4suitable for the project, selecting inadequate but an materialcan havenegative consequences. This section focuseson materials commonly foundin Bp HPHTprojects. 4.1 fi9t11,12,13 4.1.1 ETAP HTHPwellsfrequentlyhavethe potential producing for someHzSor COz,due to either reservoir fluidcomposition H2Sproducing or bacteriaintroou""othroughwaterflooding.

In the mid 1990's' successfulprequalification led Bp to selectSuper13Cralby tubing trials for the NorthSea ETAPfieldsof Machar, Mungo,ano Marnoc[. tt *"" also intended use to super13Crbarctock cornpletion for equipmentl. However, tne'prequalification testint found thatthe super13Grbarstoc*, material les toterant was to'H2siharithe supert3crtioulars and unsuitabfe the application.Highermetallurgy for atloys-nalto be selected, this case in alloy 450. This led to the technobgyprogram evaluate sour resistance the to the of super13Cr barstock materials the asiociatedrequirements prequaiirv and to specificmaterial chemistries manufacturing and processes specific for whereprevious relevant prequalification is notavailable. data "'ppia*tioir High tstand At Highlslandon the of .G_r{f^Mgxicosh6lf,a modified13Cr alloywith a 11oksi minimum yieldstrength failedat 2.00 250"Fin 12 ppg CaClz/CaBiz to p""i."r fluid. The weltwas kiiled withan 18.3ppgZnBrz was disptaced that 6v_t1e cicwciblrpacker fluidaneig oavs. ns recommended the by the.19.3ppg ZnBr2killftuidwai'not teated with an o*yg"n ' scav.e.nger. is.likely:.ue.eJier, lt that the packer fluid becamecontaminated ZnBr2and with the resulting pH packerfluidcausedchloride low (halide)stresscoirosioncrack-ing *itnin matterof days (Figure12). The failurewas exacerbiteony 'identification " groJu".;.uion ' the couplings, whichhavesincebeenremoved newtunint.for 4.1.3 Tuscaloosa In 2001,a majortubingleakandwashout wasobserved the partange (Bp operated, at 10 onshoreuS) wellin theTuscaloosa trend.Thewashout madethe tubingunable to
July2005 BP CONFIDENT]AL Page 33 of 83

4.1.2

CONFIDENTIAL

BP-HZN-217eMDL01s66217

(Rev Doc.No.:118-182S'WDRLLR D3)

pressureand keepthe well on production.A subsequent maintain investigation found sulphidestresscracksstartingfromthe extemalsurface,mainlyat tong damaged numerous areasas shownin Figure11. Thewellconfiguration packer-less, bothinsideand is thus outsidetubingsurfaces were in contactwith the sour production fluids. The tubingwas replaced with l3Cr5NilMo material, whichis moretoleranttoHzSthanthe l3Cr4NilMo alloypreviously used. In addition, tongsthatdeveloped minimaldamage wereusedto run the replacement tubing. This exampleshowsthe importance pre4ualityingmaterials of and havinga better understanding theirlimits.The manufacturer of yet claimed materialwas the fitfor service, prequalification testsorthe development an alloyspecificapplication of regimediagram wouldhaveindicated materials the unsuitability. ln another Tuscaloosa well,modified yieldstrength 13Cralloywith a 95 ksi minimum failed at around 400'F via an extemalchloride (halide) stressconosion oackingmechanism. An investigation the failureindicated presence a zinc rich scalein the regionof the into the of cracking. lt was suspected packerfluidwas accidentally thata ZnBr2 used in placeof the more@nventional system, GaBrz resulting the rapidcnacking failureof thetubing. in and Thesefailures (andothers) to the development guidelines the treatment brines ted of on of withinBP,as well as a Technology Program considerfuture to brinetreatments and brine/materialinteractions- previously The described Hightslandexample alsoshowsthe importance ensuringgood resistance cracking of to evenat high stresses, closeto yield,to avoidfailuresat regionsof stressconcentration to avoidstressconcentrator and details wherepossible.

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BP-HZN-21 7eMDL096621 1 8

. No.:11&1

4.2 DuPlex3'l 1'14'15'16't7 4.2.1 Sheanrater

In March2003,The Pentland SW-05well suffered tubinghangerpup failure. Initialshut-in a tubingpressurewas 11,524 psi. Aftertwo weeksof prodriction,-netu'Uing headfressure,A annulus, chemical and injection pressures read8,250psi. The B innuluspressure line all was 3,260psi. Afterconfirmation an A to B annulus of leak,tirewellwasshut-in ior workover. A regionof brittlefracturewas observed the bottomsectionof the failedpup and wasthe on initiation for the overallfailure. This regionof fractureinitiation the pirp'ODconsisted site on of an areaof approximately orientated the longitudinal 5' in direction. rnorehiinAeiof the failurewas ductilein nature. The crackmorphology the britflesectiondisplayed of typical environmentally-assisted cracking characteristics.- areawas locatedin'a rlgidbt This longitudinalgrinding, whichstretched alongthe entirelength the pup- n regid oihign of hardnessanomalous microstructure observed the initiation and at-other was at site areas alongthe groundregion. The mechanical chemicat and properties the butkmaterial of were checkedagainstthe Sumitomo specification no significant and deviationswere observed. Theinvestigation the Shearwaler into failurenotedthat crackinitiation occunedon the outsidesurfaceof the production joint. The crackinitiation was sectioned pup site anO examined.The duplexmicrostructure beenmodified someway during had in manufacturingThis microstructure differedsignificanily fromthat of otnerpiles. The modifiedmicrostructure mostsevereat the surface, was decreasing sevirity intothe in material overthe first0.08". A corresponding increase microhardness measured, in was with the hardestmaterialat the surface- Hardness not returnto normaluntil0.20'below did the surface,well beyondthe regionof anomalous microstructure- areawas coveredby The a surfacegrindcaniedout duringmanufacturing. anomalous The microstructure extendecl in a straight overthe length the pupjoint,though depthwas not uniform. line of the Subsequent investigations ShellandSumitomo by failed replicate modified to the microstructure below0-002'fromthe surface.lt was concluOe'O tnattfr" moOifreJ microstructure not the resultof surfacegrinding. was postulated the modified Shellhas that microstructure occurred duringthe colddrawing resulting froqa scuff,lap,orotherlubrication related problem.Themanufalturt Proces_s, through grinding, thisdid notaddress surface but frealedvisualsignsof the problem the localized highhardness modified nor microstructureSubsequent manufacturing, to shallowcrackslikelyformedin the anomalous microstructure region.Thesecracks allowed suitable environmental conditions iorm,ultimately to promoting cracking throughthe bulk material.The highhoopstresses occurring fromthe maximum surfacepressure actingon a reduced wall[hickness resulted a rupiureor the in pipe. Eddycurrent inspection methods havebeendeveloped identify to similar regions of anomalous microstructure.. technique The requires humaninterpretation ine shapeof the of eddycurrenlresponse signature. or Thus,material acceptancetrrejection subjective. is A
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conservative acceptance criterionresultsin rejection largequantities expensive of of CRA A liberalacceptance criterion raises potenlialfor the including anomalous the microstructure in a downholetubingstring. Morer,rrcrk appearsto be required betterunderstand to and detectthe microstructure. pointscaptured The followingexcerptreflectsdiscussion duringa joint meetingamong partners Shell,BP,and ExxonMobil regarding SW-05material: the The effectof hydrogen the behavior duplexstainless on of steelis not fully understood the particular for condilions were experienced SW-05. However, that in it was agreedthat SW-05did notfail dueto a non-environmental mechanical) (i.e. cleavagefailuremechanism, demonsfatedby slowstrainrate tests. The final as failureligament the lD surface the tubing at of wasductile. The most probablecauseof failurewas due to a chloride type SCC,with orwithout the presence sulphur of containing species_ A bursttest showedconclusive proofthatthe modified microstructure observed on SW-05was presentin the materialbeforefailureand was not the consequence the of final rupture. The mostlikelycauserelatedto the manuhcturing process,possibly froma combination the finalcolddrawing of process subsequent grinding. and ptayeda significant in the sw-Os fiailure, it was not The microstructure role but possibleto conclusively statewhatthis rolewas. Possibilities are: o Presenceof cracksin the microstructure allornringmncentration the a of environment present theA annulus; in o The higherhardness the materialresulted a lowercrackresistance; of in o Or a combination thesetwo scenarios. It would be beneficial gaina betterunderstanding the effectof the modified to of microstructure increased and hardness, cracking on susceptibility environments in relevant SW45. lo The remaining shearwaterwells shouldbe in a safeoperating window dueto significantly reducedflowingpressures.The magnitude this safetymarginwas not of fully understood consideration and shouldbe givento fracturemechanics testingto providea betterunderstanding. Thiswouldalso helpfuturedecisions regarding reperforation existing of wells. The environments testedto datewere conoentrated CaCl2 and concentrated MgCl2. Theseare severeenvironments mayor may not be possible form downh-ole and to througha high degreeof evaporation A annulus of freshwater knownto havebeen contaminated with sea water- Forfuturetests,concentrated CaCl2couldbe laken as a practical'worstcase'environment.The presence sulphur of was unknown and couldgive rise to a worseenvironment relative concentrated to caclz. Currentmanufacturing specifications neededto be reviewed and updatedto encompass recentlearnings. Therewouldbe significant benefits fromdeveloping a common standard couldbe adopted the mainusersof 2sCrtubutars. that by

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BP-HZN-21 7eMDL0 s66220 1

No.: 11&.l82&WDRLLR

L"""ons learn.d from the sh"ar*at"r sw-os tubinq f,"iture: 1. Duplex stainless steelisgetting widespread for HPHTtubingandproduction use liners-The behaviorand performanceof duplexin someprooucing environments is not fully understood. 2. The anomalous duplexmicrostructure whichcrackedat SW{S has not been reproduced Sumitomo.The sourceof this microstruc-ture by shoutdbe identified to reducethe chanceof a repeatfaifure. 3. Advancedinspection qualityassuran@ crilicalfor projectsuccess. and is Erskine The Erskine fieldwas an equalinterest development Texacoand Bp. lt was the first by producing HPHTdevelopment the UK Nortfrsea. Tire richgas condensate in fieldwas discovered 1981;delineation thethreeseparate in of reservoirl continued ttrrough rgbg. The undisturbed temperature pressure and weie 3so"F and 14,@0psi res[ctiJJy.-Erskine was developed a normilly unmanned as wellheadptafform linkedto Bp's Lomond platform that provides control,processing accessto exportpipelines.Drilling, and completion workoveractivities conducted and are jackupdrillini rig. from a cantilever, Production commenced December in 19g7. The completion a simple,monobore is design,with a polished borereceptacte (pBR) and sealassembly the top of a 5', 2BCrnickel at alloyproduction tiner. ThetuOing S, x e.s", ii 25Cr duplexstainless.steg] witn srriace controlted, !Q_SS) a 4-5 fu[-noretubingretrievable, sub-surface safetyvalve(SSSV). The linerand tubingmetaiiurgy were selected be to resislant corrosion the produced to by fluidsthat contain4o/o CO2and ppmto 30 ppm 15 HzS. The packerfluid usedconsisted 11.3ppg calciumchloride(CaClz) of with additions of biocide, oxygenscavenger an inorganic and conosion inhibitor listedin Table4. as was 1997.Firstproduction followed January in I!: wa completion runin December 199g. Wellswere attendedfroq drillingrig untilJune 1998,and thereafter operated,normalry lhe unatlended'under controlfromthe Lomondplatform.Around40 shut4own/start-up cycles were experienced varioustimespriorto December at 1998. Then,shorilyaftera restart, rapidhydraulic fluid losswas detected fromthe commonSSSVhydraulifsystem.The leak was tracedto W4 whichremained shut-inwhen production was restarled fromthe other wells. No wireline mastwas available carryout preliminary to investigative work. Therefore, only limited information aboutthefailure couldbe determined thiabsenceof a drilling in - rig. fn 1999, during maintenance visits the normally to unmanned " Jalusry and February installation, hydrocarbons werefoundin the w4 production annulrs aho uott sssv hydraulic lines. Tubingto annutus communication alsoidentified. was Different failure modes were considered, including possibility thetubinghadpartedcausing the that failure of both controllines. Peerreviewsof the workover program were conducted with TexacoGlobalDrilling and otherHPHToperators the NorthSea. Thesewereusefulin identifying in risksani developing mitigation strategies the intervention. for
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4.2.2

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BP-HZN-2179MDL01s66221

Doc. No.: 118-

Some theissues of considered were:


Production annulus exposure well killpressures. to Wax and hydrateprevention. Polymers losscontrolmaterials useat hightemperature. and for Pressure and temperature limitations chemical of cuttersfor 25cr tubing. Compatibility calcium of bromide (CaBr2) brinewith25Crtubing. Coiled tubingcontingencies. The planto re-instate well with the samecompletion the stringdesign,sincetherewas no knownbasisfor makingdesignchanges.The Erskinewellshad all-originally been completed with non-killweight fluid,due to safety,environmental fracti&l and considerations using 18.0ppg completion of fluid. Reservoir depletion allowedr+ completion killweightfluid. with withoutproblems. 5' and 4.5"jointswere numbered All to Lh" q: tubingwas recovered i<lentify their installedlocations.The onlyapparent failurewas in the 6e fulljoint out that had been 194'belowthe tubinghangerin the throughwaterzone- The failu:re shownin is Figure13. lt was characterized by: o A burstbeforeleak appearance showedno apparentplasticdeformation; that Crackinginitiatedat the extemalsurface with extensive secondary crackingadjacent to the primaryfracture; 'woodgrained' a A distinctive appearance the extemalsurface; of o No conosionor otherdamagein the bore. Original markings allowed millheatand ori,ginalcertification the documents the splitjoint of to be identified.Subsequent tests showedthe materialto be 'as specified' and 'as lertified'. Apartfromthefailure, crackdepths variedfrom10%to 50o/o the 0.40g,' of tubingwall. The primaryfracturesurfaceshowedthat at failurethe crackhad atmostpenetrated tubing the wall and was about7" long at the outersurface. Microsections showedbranching cracks propagating both phases,with transgranular in crackpathsin the fenite and aust6nite phasesand a tendencyfor the cracksto run alongfenitelaustenite grainboundaries. The^metallurgical investigation concluded failureresulted the fromexternalpittingfollowed by SCC. For DSS,at Erskinewellheadtemperatures, thesecorrosion pro"isseJ reluire similarenvironmental conditions, ie: o a chloride containing waterphase; . an oxidizing agent(mostcommonly oxygen) an acid. or SCCadditionally requires tensilestress.Thismaybe residualor a apptied. Bothwere presentin the colcf-worked DSStubing. The absente of any one of ti-rbse requirer"nt" prevents pitting conosionandSCC. Annulus conditions not normally do threaten pitting and SCCof dupfex stainless steeltubing despitethe widespread of chloridebrinei andleawater as packerfluids. use Conventionally, is achieved the useof an oxygen this by s"uu"ng.r in packer fluidsand sealing operating the annulitoexcluded air.
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. No.:11&l82&.WDRLLR

The metallurgical analysis not identify oxidantrequired causepiftingand SCC. did the to The primary suspect\,l/ias oxygenrgsul_tilr9 air ingress.A secondary from pojsiOllity was sulphurin the sodiumthiocyanate (NaSCN) conosioninhibitor ihat had UeenaAdedto Erskine completion brines- This inhibitor understood form a protective is to sulphide on film carbonsteelsbut has no intended interaction DSS. Howevei,although with srilpnur compounds act as oxidizing can agentsundersomecircumstances is suc'h, known and, are to promotepittingof stainless steels,no datawas foundto indicate thiocyanate aionewas a primary concern undertheW4 annulus conditions. Lessonsleamedfrom the Erskinetubinq faiture: 1. The Erskine completion successfully contained tubingrupfure, per design, a as and permitted safeearlyJife a rarorkover. 2. The.tubing failedby extemalchloride stresscorrosion cracking the 11.3ppg in calciumchloridepackerfluid,mostprobably, a resuttof airingressto th6'a-nnulus. as 3. Traceamounts airthreaten of SCCof duplex stainless steelunder HpHTannulus the conditions described. Annulusconditions complex.Betterunderstanding definition corrosion are and of concerns required assislwelldesigners. is to

4.2.3

Deep Alex

The DeepAlexwellis a gaswelloperated Shellin the GuffofMexico by with a bottomhole temperature approximately3TO'F pressure 16,800psi. The gas contain"ffrS of and of of "t " laximum partialpressure 0.25psi and co2 partialpiessureof 672!si, i.e-,at bottomhole. The wellwas completed a 22Grctupiex with staintess ste6lluNS S31g03)that had beencolddrawnto a minimum yieldof 125ksi. The lubingstringwas a mixedstring sizs in the top sec*ion thewell the tubingwas 3-l/2" diametir g.gTbs/ft (0.2gg"wallf in of the bottom section trwas2-TlB" diameter 7.66lbs/ft(0.226" wall). The production environment within environmentaHimits established this was the Shell for 22Crduplex stainless steelcoldworked thisstrength to level(125ksito145ksi yield;g62 and its pr6perties comptied NACE atso w1h l{19 !9]000 MPa). The useof thetubing MR0175. The annular completion was 11.0ppgCaCl2 contained inorganic fluid that an oxygen sc.venger hightemperature and inorganic conosioninhibitocthe compositions oitne additives were not indicated the time of comptetion. at The well sat idle for threedaysaflerthe completion beforefull production was attempled. After.one r.nonth produclion gasfromthi DeepAlexwell in 1999,the proouctioiiuuing of of failed,-forcing wellto be shut-in.Recovery mostof the 3-1/2" the of tubing'showed that muftipfeioints experienced failure shownin Figures and15;noneoithe z-zg" tubing as 14 was recovered. A failure analysis was performed thetubingon Laboratory experiments wereperformed on C-ring specimens machined fromtubing recovered fromthe DeepAtexwell,unused 22Cr tubingfromthe sameorderand sizetnit raiteoin the well, *"it as2ZCr tubingfrom another supplier.Environmentalcracking "s slu.dies wereperformed thesesam-ples on in autoclave environments contained 11.0ppgto i t.o ppg at temperatures that th; from200"F
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to 370"F,with andwithoutoxygen,and with and withouttheadditives foundin the completion in the DeepAlexwell. fluid The 22Crmaterialmet specifications. sigmaphasecouldbe detected. Examination No of the tubingrevealed that all crackswere longitudinal primarily the fenite. Most cracks and in were deepand very tight,originating the outsidediameter at surface.The causeof the failurewas determined be environmentally to assistedcracking.The comptetion fluid additives were laterdiscovered be ammonium to bisulfite(NH4FISOj the oxygen for scavenger and sodiumthiocyanate (NaSCN) the hightemperature for corrosion inhibitor, respectively. The cracking modefoundin the tubingat the top of the wellvyhere was connected the it to hangeroccunedin boththe austenite and ferritephasewith the pathprimarilyin the lubing ferritebut at the interface between thesetwo phaseswith stronganodicdissolution' character. The coldworked22Cr duplexstainless steeldid not crackin laboratory tests conducted in fullydeaera!90_t],0 CaClecompletion at temperatures hignas 370"Fin the ppg fluid as absenceof NaSCN. Evenmoderate techniques deaeration, of e.g.,the presence carbon of steel,were effective preventing in SCC. Therefore, was concluded the materialwas it that suitablefor servicein the annularcompletion fluid if it had beenproperly deaerated. of the 22Crduplexoccured in CaCtz with oxygenat temperatures from 2S0"Fto 99_9 in at {q:l- Crackgrowthwas at least0.25 inches/day a test wiih oxygenconducted 290'F- ln the orygenatedbrines,the crackingmoOe was mostsimilir to that found in the tubingat the top of the wetlwhereit was connected the tubing- SCCdid not occur in to oxygenated 11.6ppgCaClz 200'F. at Environmentally assisted q?9!ng ot the22Crduplexstainless steeloccunedin 11.0ppg caCl2completion fluid at 320'F and 370"Fwhenihe orygen was scavenged using ammonium bisulfite followedby the addition the sodiumthbcyanatecogosioninhibitor. of The cracking modewas mostsimilar thatfoundin the tubingdeepin the wellwherethe to initial cracking occurred. gas Quantitative chromatographic analysis the covergas, afterseveralexperiments of in wltighthe oxygenwas scavenged fromthe CaCl2usingimmonium bisulfrte iollrwed by the additionof the sodiumthiocyanate corrosion, reveabdlhat one or bothof theseadditives had decomposed pr!{y9e^plmgrilyHzSwith smaileramountsof carbondisulfide to lCSz), and methylmercaptan (CHgSH).The analyses indicated that a partialpressure S irsi of of HzSexistedin the covergas afterone of the testsin vrhichthe 22}rcracked. Tfris pbrtiat pressure H2Sis 17 timesthe Shell's of in-house limitfor the useof coldworked22Crin production environmentsBaseduponthe field failureanalysis, tilerature a review,and the resutts from extensive laboralory testing, was concluded the DeepAlexwellfailure it that wascausedby the "high temperature" decomposition sodium of thiocyanate and/orammonium bisulfite inine tt-o C19l: annular completion fluids. Thedemmposition produced H2Sat a partialpo""ur" sufficient causethe cold-worked to 22Crduplexstainless steelproductioir tuuinbto fail by environmentally-assisted cracking muliiple in locations-

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Doc.No.:11&

Lessonslearnedfrom the Alex failure: 1- Operators shouldknowand understand what vendorsare including their in completion fluids. 2. Complexchemical.interactions haveunintended may consequences. Decomposition of packerfluid additives generated HzSconcentrations exceedthe safe oierating that environment duplex for stainless steel.

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No.:118-1

4.3 7 18 Hangers3'11,13,18 4.3.1 Sheamater

Duringthe commissioning the Shearwater of SW-08well,the boxon the tubinghanger partedcausingthe completion stringto fall partway downthe production casin!. Fortunately, BakerTRSSSVfail-safeshutand contained full reservoir the tire iressure from the production casing. The failureof the tubinghangeroccuned simultaneously a shockload. Atthe time,the with shockload couldnot be adequately explained; disputed a theorywas that a 20. conductor cenlralizerpoppedthrougha jacketguidedue toa combination initialinconectpoiitioning of and wellheadgrowth. tvasgenerally at the time thatthis .release fett energy il; !t insufficient accountfor the imposed to shockloading.The shockloadhas laierbeen associated with the failureof the 30" x 20" mudlinelockdown dueto inconect ring installation. The failureis shownin Figure16. Keyfailure mechanisms as follows: are DeltaPhaseMicrostructure Investigation the failedtubinghangerrevealed of that the component had not beensufftcienlly heat-treated remove nignlevelsof to tne inherentdeltaphase. Deltaphaseis knownto increase material susceptibility to hydrogen embrittlement. HydrogenEmbriftlement The areaaroundthe failurepointof the tubinghangerbox was confirmed beingaffectedby hydrogen as embriftlement. sourceof the The hydrogen was pointedat the coppercoatthat was appliedto the boxthread. Dynamic ShockLoading- fVlost likelycausedby the 30" x 20" mudlinelockdown ring disengaging fromthe mudline suspension system. Thefailuremodeis considered combination all three. a of Additional noteworthy items: ElginFranklin alsorecorded has highdeltaphaseand highlevels hydrogen their of in hangers.The TFE hangers 5" and are iignificanfly are siongertnanine 7; hangers used at sheanarater. exactcasefor safetythat rFE put tigether is unclear The althoughit is believedto relateto the tubinghinger stresses biing managed belorv the theoretical propagation stress. Areas.ofhigh stress(i.e. boxthreads)with prcgressively increasing loads(but below the ultimate tensilestrength) havethe ereit or reoucing tensile str6ngrth. The hydrogen contenthas beenrelatedto the copperplatethat is appliedto the box threadof the hanger. lt is notconsidered possible the hydrogen havebeen thai will introduccd fromany othersource The copperplating SW-08was substandard. appeared a blurred on lt as diffuselay withhydrogen otherimpurities. the tidr! of the SW48 failure, and At !o"999 Shell took the sparehangerto the sw-Og batchand optimized coppercoatingprocess the to ensureuniform coverage minimal and hydrogensw-04, 0g lno 09 havethis improved process applied theirhangers. to
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Doc.No.:1'l&1

It is understood crackspropagate highdelta,high hydrogen that in environments and thatthey are less likelyto propagate low delta,low hydrogen in environments. is lt not understood how the cracksinitiate. Shellis also lookingat alternative designs fortheir hangers.Sinceboxeshave higher tensile hoopstresses thanpins,Shellis looking redesigning hangers into the to be extended neckpindown.Additionally, Shellstates subsea that tubinghangers havemorematerialinthe box couplings than do surfacehangers-The subsea designshouldbe usedin surfacehangers offermoreredundancy. to Two additional Shearwater wellswere confirmed beingof the samebatchas SW{8. as Thesewellswere SW-09and SW-04. A decision was madein 2001that boththesewells wouldrequiretop-hole workovers replace highdeltacontaining to the tubinghangers. This activitywas conducted 2002. in Thisfailure directly to the generation theAPI specification led of lor718 (Apl 6A218) and the BP Guidelines 718. for Lessons leamed from the Sheanrvater hanqer fiailure: 1. Ensurethat the manufacturing specification includes required the heat-treating criteria. 2. A full understanding hanger of loadsis necessary. This mayinctude advanced loadingscenarios discovered growthorApB analyses. throughwellhead 3. Threadcoatings shoutdbe compatible with basematerials and appliedproperly. 4. Pin downdesignsmay providea u/ayto reducehangerstresses-

4.3.2

Rhum

In 2004 Rhumorderedtubing/casing hangers v/hichusedlarge(20"diameterplus)forgings. ForgeMastersand the equipment vendorsexperienced crackinj of the alloy218 material eitherduringor afterforging. In one instance, crackwas detected a t-hread this profile in afterfinalmachining copperplating.Alloy718 is particularly and difficult machine to and thiscracking resulted considerable in wasted effortand a slipin schedule theforging as had to be replaced.Hadthe cracknot beendetected, component the wouldhavealmosl certainly failedin service resulting a wellfailure.Thisincident to improved in led requirements detailed for quality plansandinspection afterroughmachining.

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4.4 Conclusions Metallurgical Lessons


The trend for deepwater HPHTwellsto moveintohigherpressures and highertemperatures placesa greatimportance developing for economical strength high materiilssuitable the for harshenvironment.Recentmetallurgical lessonsdemonstrate environmental that limitsfor commonlyused materials not fully investigated understood.This is an areafor are and furtherresearchas BP prepares futureHPHTprojects. for Severalkev Metalluroical lessons: 1. A particular materialshouldbe qualified a particutar for environment.Differences betweenmaterials fromdifferentvendorsor in different forms- tubularsversusbar stock- can yielddiverse results2. Completion fluid chemisty is very comptex, especially it is reacting as downhole undervarious producing conditions. Thefluidbehavior mayinvalidatlthe use of someCRAs 3- The sourceof the anomalous duplexmicrostructure discovered Shearwater at remainsunknown.This is a criticalissuebasedon the widespread of duplexin use BP fields. 4. The industrycan reactquicklyonce a metatlurgical problemis identified, as evidenced the rapidcreation adoption theAPI specification 718. by and of for

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5 FORMATION LESSONS
A holisticwellengineering effortshouldconsider life of lhe field,from exploration the throughexploitation finalabandonment. and Lessons relatedto the formation inctuded are hereto highlight impactof reservoir the compaction, subsidence, sattmovement well and on construction. Theseformation problems complicate prevent can or well re-entry for recompletion remedialwork.ln moreextreme or instances, theycan resultin reducedor production evencauseproblems discontinued and with surfacefacilities. The lessonsincluded hereare not strictly fromHPHTfields. Rather, they are summarized to characterize whatcan happendownhole the corresponding and implications nell for design. The ongoingSheanrvater reservoir compaction incident demonstrates HpHTthat fieldsare not immune the problems lowerpressure to of reservoirs, thusthe lessonsare relevant. Similarly, severesalt loadingenoountered the atAnchutzRanchis includedhereto describe whatcan happenwhendir$ saltformations encountered. are Thoughit is believed that the massivesaftsoverlying muchof the potential deeprrater Gulfof Mexico HPHTprospects not posethe samerisksof rapidclosure, lessonsdeservemention do the in case BP's understanding GoMsalt is inmmplete. of

s,zo 5.1 Reservoir Compaction and Subsidence1 21,2''23,24


5.1.1 Golumbia Casingdeformation (ovalization) beenobserved manyre-entered has in wells in Bp's Colombian acreage some operational and problems havebeenattributed this - primarily to restricted accessand failuresdue to reduced collapse resistance.Whiledrillingin ihe area has bee.n plagued the problems by associated severewellboreinstability, with lhere is now compelling evidence demonstrate the somewhat to that unusualrockstressesresutting from the tectonicenvironment also causat theobserved are to deformation casingstringsafter of wellshavebeencompletedAnalogues havenot beenfound. Following earlydetection ovalityin wells,a monitoring of policywas initiated provideboth to a basison whichto characterize changing geometry the and tiey information assessing foi well accessand integrity Previously available predicta dramatic techniques reduction collapseresistance in as ovalization increases, the field experience Golombia but in refutes this. Numerical simulations, validated laboratory by testing,provided both insightand newcollapse equations ovalized pipe. for The most problematic driltinghas occurred the alternating in sand-shale Carbonera sequence, ofien repeated to faulting.ln particular, due lossesand tight hole haveoccuned in the sandier units, andwellbore enlargement occurred the shalier has in units, resuhing in largeamounts cavings causeholecteaning of that problems, stuckpipe,poorcementing and oftenthe needto sidetrack. Following earlyrecognition casing the of deformation a potentialissue, as routine monitoring geometry adopted of casing was through analysis soniccaliper of logs. Thedeformation
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Doc. No.: !18-1S2GWDRLLR (Eev D3)

accompanying formation movement,results ovalization the pipe,and not localshearing in of as mightbe expected from faultmovement.Ovalization often small(justa few is hundredths an inch),but is typicallypresentoverlong intervals sufficient limitaccess of to and impactcollapseresistance.Whileearlydeformation occursin sandstones wherethere is goodcementbehindcasing,there are nowclearcaseswheredeformation startslateras eitherpoorcementor rock comesintocontactwiththe pipe,againdemonstratirg the that formationis squeezing progressively. Althoughthereare few examples catastrophic of failuresthat can be attributed complete to closureof wells,the deformation leadsto lossof accessand potentially significant a reduction casingcollapseresistance.Deformation largei in singtestrinls than in in is concentric strings. The worstdeformation occunedacrosJsingle,Sorly ceirentedstrings. The decayin collapseresistance to ovalityimposed the formation(as opposedto due by manufacturing-induced ovality)was stuclied throughnumeiicalmodeling UObratory airO testing-The studydemonstrated usingconventionalcollapse that equations include that an ovalityterm underpredicted actualcollapseperformance whenthe ovalitywas a resultof e)dernal loads. Rather,the studydemonstrated the collapseresistance unchanged that is for minorimposed ovality,lessthan 2o/o 37o. The coltapse to iesistanceoropJarounJt ov" for an imposed ovali$ of 5o/o. imposed An ovalityof 107o causesa 407ored'uction in collapseresistance. This studyhelpedto better-characterize riskof a catastrophic the failurein the Colombia field,resultswhichassisted decisionprocess the whetherto utilizea concentric stringconfiguralion a scablineror a singte with stringthrough problem the zones. Lessonsleamedfrom Bp Colombia: 1- Non-uniform loadscan ovalizecasing. A smatlamountof ovatization may prevent accessbelowthe troublezone. A largeamountof ovalization may resultin collapsed casing. 2- Goodcementcan partiallyredistribute non-uniform loadsontothe casing- Cemented concentric strings exhibit increaSed resistance non-uniform to loading ajcomparedto singlestrings. 3. Numerical models and physical testing haveledto a method predicting of casing collapseresistance a functionof extemally-imposed as ovalization. Valhall The Valhallfield an initiatly is overpressured, undersaturated UpperCretaceous chalk reservoir locatedin the centralgrabenin the Nonrvegian sectoroi the NorthSea.The reservoir at a depthof approximately is 7,900'subseaand consistsof two oit Oearinj formations, Tor and Hod. The formercontains the roughly two-thirds the oil and iI a soft of chalkcharacterized high purity(95o/o 98%calcitel highporosity(up to by to sol"l *d nign oil saturations (90%and greater;. oit ano gas produaioniroir the fietit b"g* inGi"u"r, 1982. pressure was only500 psilessthanthe 7,000psioverburden ]he.T3r discovery stress, implying minorformation.compaction duringburial.Withdepletion, Tor in particular the has compacted significantly_, inducing tubular failures the reservoir overburden, in and ano subsidence the mudline. at
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Doc. No.:11&182GWDRLLR D3) (Rev

Horizontal wellsare a desirablecomplelion ahernative that, in its earlyapplication Valhail, to was plaguedby the premature failureof the production tubularsassociaied with reservoir drawdown and compaction.Numericalmodeling subsequent and field imptementation has shownthat casingwith sufficiently diameter-to-thickness withstand formation low can the loadsassociated with reservoir compaction.Unfortunately, use of thick-walled the casing presentsdifficulties termsof installing string(torque/drag) limilations tool in the and on passage. diameter A comprehensive engineering studyconsidered integrity horizontal the of wellbores overtre entirelife of the field. Mostof this raorkwas accomplished througha seriesof twodimensional finiteelementsimulations.The studyshowedthat mostof the casingsbess intensity generated is duringthe initialtwo weeksofproduction. stresslevel-needed The to collapsethecasingoccurswithinweeksof initialflow,thus it is verydifficultto predict longevity.Also, perforating casingalonga verticalline induced- stresscompared the less with a hor2ontalline or a distributed paftem. However, mostimportant the factorin minimizing stressesis a goodcement job. A complete cementsheathtendsto loadthe casingin a_ moresymmetrical patternas compared the casewith partially to cemented pipe. Thesefindingsweresuccessfully implemented the Valhallfieldievelopment. into Lessonslearnedfrom Valhallinclude: 1. Compaction horizontal in chalkwellscan impartmostof the peaktubularstresses withinweeksof initialproduction. 2. A full' competent cementsheathcan be effective smoothing in non-uniform loads over the circumference the pipe. of 5.1.3 Ekoflsk The EkofiskFieldis an overpressured, naturally fractured chalkreservoir the Nomregian in sectorof the NorthSea. lt producesa volatileoil from two naturally fractured chalk formations, Ekofisk the and the Tor. The fieldcovers12,000productive acresand avepges 600'thick, withtwothirdsof the original6.4 billion barrels anOtO.eTSCFsotution gas conlained the Ekofisk in formation.Porosity averages 32%,withinitialwater saturitions commonly below10%. The crestof the structure at 9,500'subsea, is with an apparent oilwatercontact near10,700'subsea. Matr* permeability averages mD to z mo, witn 1 fracture enhanced permeability, measured welltests,approaching mD. as on 50 Production began fromthe EkofiskFieldin July1971, fromfourconverted exploration wells. Permanent production facilities became operationalin 1975, whichincluded t'hree produclion platforms.Product'ton ratesin excessof 350,000BOPDwere achieved 1976. by gas All availabfe was reinjected the complelion a gasexport until of pipetine 1g77. Gas in injection continued afte.r mainly gaspioOuceo eicess of the gas of in .1977,consisting contractlimits. Thefield produced with sofution driveand reservoir gas compactioibeing the primary drivemechanisms the startof witer injection 1987.Waterinlection until in was implemented a stepwise in fashionqvera periodof yejrs, following seriesor proiinjection a projects-Voidagebalancing was achieved lggq with awater injlction rateoi eoo,doo m BWPDfrom two waterinjectionplatforms.Cumulative production injection and fromthe Ekofisk Field theendof 1998 at was 1,4g9 MMBO, TSCFgas,115MMBW, TSCF s.9 1.3 gas injection, 2,111MMBWwaterinjection. and
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No.: 11&1826-WDRLLR

Casingdeformation beenobservedin wellsfromall platforms.Theyresultfromthe has verticaland lateraldisplacement formations a consequence compaction of as of and subsidence.Deformation first observedtn 1974and becamea recuningproblem the was in mid 1980's. The deformation prevents reservoir full access, whichis necessary provide to zonal isolationof produced waterand gas. Figure17 showscasingdeformation measured in weff214A-7over a fve-year period. Seabedsubsidence was first noticedat the EkofiskFieldin 1984. At that time, approximately of seabedsubsidence occurred the crestof the field,wherethe 10' had at centralproduction facilityis located. The measured subsidence averaged rate aboutt3 inches/year.This subsidence was the resuttof reservoir compaclion r,Jas to a that due combination the high porosityrock,the largearealextentoi the fietO of relative its burial to depth, largethicknessof the productive interval, and declines reservoir pressure, in whicfr shiftedstressfrom the overpressured reservoir fluidsto the chalkmatrixitself. It was initiallybelievedthat the reduction reservoir pressure in was considered be the to main drivingforce behindthe reservoir compaction.Severaltechnical paperswerewritten on the subiectand concluded that an effective program waterinjection was the onlyway to solvethe subsidence casing and deformation problems. The stepwiseincrease waterinjection Ekofiskfor the purpose pressure of in of mainlenane and enhancedrecovery was expected dow and eventua[yltop subsidence the lo at producingplatforms-However, the pressures as beganto siabiliie in 1993and early 1994, there was little impacton the subsidence rate. The subsidence remained rate essentially unchanged through1998,withcumulative subsidence approaching The conlinued 2B'subsidence after early 1994,in combination with laboratbiy fieiddata,indicated a and that water-weakening phenomenon becomethe primary had mechanism compaction the for in field. The sea floor subsidence rate at the cenlralEkofisk facitities increased the early 1g90,s in froma low of 10'/year a 12-month on average basisin November, 1990to a peaiof 16 inches/year September.l in 993. Voidage balancing, replacement production the of by injeclion a reservoir on volumebasiswas institutedin fieldand achieveO eartytOO+. the Uy Throughout 1994,subsidence declined rate fromthe peakof 16 inches/year u to inches/year.However, ratherthan continue declineas expected, rateincreased to the slightly 15"/year remained to and nearly constant through 1g'9g. Seabedsubsidence becameso severethat the centralfacilities werejackedup to remain abovethe meansea level. This workover operation costaround$t Uittion.Eventually the agingfield becametoo costlyto operate,so.a redesigned Ekofiskll developm"nt *ai begunwith newwellsand a newcentral facility. An exhaustive evaluation the root cause(s) the changein reservoir into of compaction behaviorincludedconsideration petrologic, of iitnongic,geometric, constitutive and operational causes. However,lhe onfyefiective tink-found the ihange in comfaction to behavior was_ changing watersaturation the near-wellbore in region-Biseo uponojen-no6 watersaluration logsand cased-hole Sigmalogs,it was foundt-hat layers the i6ebi"t"ly adjacent the tightzone in the2/4C11 to and Cf tR wells,whichwerebetow waler 4o/o saturalion openhole, werethe onlylayers showing waterbreakthrough an increase and in watersaluration the near-wellbore in area. Thislinkbetween waterbreakthrough and
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increased compaction now beenfirmlyestablished continued has as monitoring both of compaction and breakthrough shownthe initiation a hlghcompaaionrafl as -a has of water breakthrough occursin monitoring first intervat and the oJclinein cbmpiaionLt in intervaloncewatersaturation stabiiized. has "n Otherdata,mostnotablylietd porosity, alsocontributed the understanding has to of the influence watersaluration the compaction the chalk. Sincetn" rd-f gg6,s, of on of as tne understanding reservoir of compactbnimproved, engineers-oecame puzledby the apparentpreservation highporosity, of approaching SOy" rarecases,as in porositylogsfrom newwells. Whileanecdotal niture, the preservationshownon the in of the high porositywas not in keeping with the accepted modelof compiction. The common understanding compaction of suggested the highporosiiycnalkin the fieldshouldhave that undergone mostcompaction, the resulting a neaitotal bsiof thesehighporosity in chalks. The adventof waterweakening chalkhas helpedto explainthe preservation in of high porositychalk- Sincethe constitutive propertiesofthe chalkare nowknownto be a function of watersatunation, very highporo'sity the charkwi0ru"t r;;ter saturation is corsiderablystronger than.originally thought. Consequenfly, porosity high chalkswith low initialwatersaturation that havenoi beenwaierflooded, naveiargelvacteitetasticaity throughthe lifetimeof the lield and haveseen littlecompaction and,thus,litgelossof porosity. 1. Reservoir compaction formation and subsidence causeseverecasing can deformation disruptsurfacefacilities.cosily workovers and may ensue. 2- Pressure maintenance be important minimizing can for compaction. 3. compactionof chalkformations be exacerbated watercontact. can by Sheanrvater The Sheanrvater field has beendescribed gas earlierin this report. The fieldwas designed to be depletedby five production wells,with no in-filtdrillingplanoue to the severeHpHT reseryoir conditions-In June 20o4,afterfour yearsof prodiction,two of the five production wellsstartedto producerocks,suspectdue tocasingoamageas a result of reservoir compaction.By December 2004,the two wellsfailedaftertie tubingwas fiiledwith production solids- The solidshavebeenid'intifiedas snaiei cominftrom in" H"an"r Kimmeridge formations overry producing that the "no Furmer sands. It is suspected that the failuresoccurred a depthnearlhe bottomof the tubing,which at is coincident with the Keather and Kimmeridge interface.Previousty, restriclion been a had discovered the production of another in liner Shearwater al approximatety same welf the depth. The currenthypothesis that the linerfaitedin the overburden is due to eithermovement a in localfaultor movement acrossbedding ptanes.Bothfailure mechanisms wouldbe geomechanically inducedby compaction the reseryoir, of ,rf,i"n has depleteo rroman psidownto around7,000psi. The reservoiiiemperature 9t]giFl 1-5'500 remains above 350"F' Also,it is anticipated the oveiburden that contains relatively smallzonesof original pressure are capable flow. that of
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As of thetimeof thisreporl, Shdl is planning intervention cleanouttheweilandto an to sidetrack, eitherwith coiled pipe tubing jointed trrough snubbing or a unit. Lessonsleamedfrom Sheanrater reservoir comoaction: 1. Casing faitures to reservoir due compaction oocur HPHT can in welts.The Sheanrater reservoir compacted pressures as depleted 15,500 to 7,000 psi from psi. 2. Compaction leadto a lossof production, justrestricted can not ac@ss the to reservoir.

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5.2 Salt Loading25,28


Anschut Ranch d.iscovery 1979, AnschuE in the Ranch Eastfield,located the Northwestem l1n5.1ts on Utah/Southwestem Wyoming border thewestern in overthrust hasunoergone--belt, extensive developmental drilling. withother As deep.luriiJicNugget fieldsin the overthrust oneof themosidifficutt belt, drilling intervals ii in theJurassic Preuss sall. Thesaltsection historically "n"oint"red of dollars has caused many delays, millions of expenditures,
and sacrifices production in clsing goals. To completethe wellswith.dual iniection stringor producer/injection stringcapabilities, 7" cagingis required acrossthe producing ttuggetinierval.To ichLve ttrisloai, i ii-tj'2" holeis drilled 5,000'and intermeiiate?-1l4' holesection to an is drilled irrrougn salt ne sections-Successfuldrilling ca-sing the salt intervat the key and of is to the srftr, oitn.

5.2.1

::::1ll[g.l,1133 severitywithinthe AnschuERanchEastfield. Logsavailable evaluation for throughthesaltintervalconsisted primarily cased-hole of gammaray (GR)cement bon_d (CBL's).The charact"iorft en grrough logs Gi'n-ict< salt (low (stig-htty 1T!io19 is tvpifiedbv generallycl-ean Apt) on witn "airri intervats nigh"i epr GR)' The dirty intervals betieveo ue composed siltstone are tb of and salt,with the siltstone conlenlprobabty high.. Thedirtyintervars variedin number thickne""'dd;;;;"'and vv'v"v"'v primarily the overall seciion on salt thickness. Threemajorintervals movement identified of are withinthe salt section. Theseareas correlate dirtyGR intervals. "dean'sattshowsno rou.r"nt with The of any kind. Thetop dirtyintervalmovesmgre':aPiqry the othertwo. This interval than has been measured to closefrom 12-114" about5" iri 14 hours. A literature to .""r"h dio not revealdocumenled closure ratesfasterthanthisobservation logged the preusssaltintervals. in The measure salt-drilling of success three_fold: is The totaltime(cost) involved drilling saltsection in the and running intermediate the casingstringmustbe as low as possi6le_ The intermediate casingstringmustbe of suchsize that the final porlionof the hole can be drilledand casedwith a 7" production string. ' The intermediate casing stringmustbe designed cemented sucha manner and in that casingcollapse, whichr,rrculd prohibit oritting tn6 's ano.casing tne proouciLn -"- o interval, ., willnotoccur. In the initiald.rilling prograr.n, sevenwellspenetrated over400' of salt. All sevenwellshad excessive drilling time,andsix of themcoutdnot accommodatesubsequent production a 7" string' Severalotherwellswith thinnersalt sections incurred excessive Jn".trg'd";. one of.themostimportant considerations during drilling salt was the stability the hole of thesalt- Originally, 12-l14holewastrifiedwith; the lPoY" freshwater mudthatwas displaced a saltmudpriorto drilling salt. upholeprootems to the ottenensued, requiring
July 2OO5

::[T.:,:1^"::,:Tj::p-t_lllcomnphensive.ensine"ri"s.rd;iio"t"rrt"iii""ptir* .jiglJ9gpanoto9ryr?inthievarian"ce;ilth;;1i_;;;;d'ilrffi;

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manydaysof reamingor evenpremature settingof intermediate casing. Thicksalt sections requirea stableupperholethat allowsoperations be concentrated the salt section to on itself. To overcome holestability challenges, 12-'114" sectionwas switched a the hole to chloride mud. A mixed-salt consisting NaCland KClwasthe optimum of mud syrstem. Noneof the mud systemsexamined showedthe abilityto stabilize movingintervals the in the saltsection.The onlymudparameter foundto impede saltmovementwas the mud weight. Thus,the recommendalion to drillthesalt interval was witha highchloride mud weighted highas possible. as It was foundthat salt sections drilledat higherinclinations typically reportedmore reaming and tightholetimethanwellsdrilled with lessthan5'inclination.Also,a stabilized assembly tendedto minimize doglegseverity.Withoutstabilization, bit tendedto drop the anglerapidly the cleansaltandto buildslightly the dirtyintervals, in in resulting as much in as 3.5'/100'dogleg severity. Small6-3/4"drill collarsand slick BHA'swere usedto drill lhe salt sectionin an aftemptto reduce stuckpipeandfishing the placedlow limitson the fiequency.The smalldrillcollars strenglh jarringcapabilities the BHA. SlickBHA'scouldnot back-ream and of when boreholeclosureoccunedand they contributed highdoglegseverig. lt beqameapparent to that a netrrBHAdesignwas required that couldside'cut,back-ream, provideenough and stifhess for good bit stabilization. After completing salt drillingshldy,eightsalt sections the weredrilledaccording the to practices.For salt sectionsin excessof 400',the averagedrillingtime were recommended cut in half and eacfiwell successfully maintained holesize sufficient run a 7" production to liner. The secondpartof the studyaddressed casingcollapse to salt loading-The due completion objective was to bringthe 7' production linertop backacrossthe salt and cement annulus.No failures the occunedwhen cemented this concentric casinggeometry was achieved.Thereweresix instances wherecasingdeformation experienced was when a singlestringcoveredthe salt. Fiveof theseoccunedwhitedrillingthroughthe intermediate casingpriorto reaching TD. Deformation the intermediate of casingoccurred in 4 to 6 daysfromthe time it was run in the hole. Two of the wellswere finishedwith 8-1/4' bits,whilethe otherthreerequired production drilling linersand smaller liners. Lessonslearnedfrom AnschutzRanchinclude: 1. Rapidsaltmovement borehole and closure tendsto occurin "dir$'intervals. 2. Holestability abovesalt zonesis critical- This allowsoperations focuson drilling lo saltratherthanfixingup-hole trouble. 3. Cemented concentric casingis an effective way lo resistnon-uniform loadsdue to saltmovement_ Gulf of Mexico - Sandia Model of wellsin the deepwater the Gulfof Mexico of throughout the fs9{ip the integrity subsalt field'slifeis a majordrilling engineering challenge. The consequences wellfailures of may 5.2.2
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D o c .N o . : 1 1 &

resultin billionsof dollarsin remedial costsand lost production.On the otherhand,the costsassociated withoverlyconservative designare significant, well whichmotivates systematic analysisof casingloading scenarios-ot for intereit. Significant benefitscan accruefromquantifying magnitude timingof salt loading. the of Difiicultcementing iobs and linerliebackscan oe omitte?and a moreaggressive well designadopted. The simplifie_d design,and the elimination poteiiiaflygount.ior" wgll or operations, leadsto millions dollars costsavings individualwells. of in in The Gulf of Mexicois the.mostactivedeepwater regionin the world,cunenttyproviding someof the greatestchallenges scopeand opportunity ttre indusiry in for U'njldu"r"o, recoverable resources estimated be at least-19 Oiltion are to barrelof oil equivalent looe). However, complexsalt tectonics the and extremewaterand reservoir depthi necessitate very highdevelopment costs,in addition requiring to_ innovative tecfrnotoiyto UrinjUr""" fieldson stream. A well lifetime 10 to 25 yeirs ijintegral to successful of economic development (wherethecostof a singteweitcan be from u.s. $20 millionto Eoomirrony.n significant majori$ of thewells will polentially penetraleconsiderable thicinesses, salt witn 1'000'to 6,000'of salt not uncommon,Therbiore, assuring longevity well casings the of drilledthroughsalt is a majorcasing-design requirement theseJuus6noeveiopmentsfJr It is importanl, therefore, that loading sattis properly by definedand incorporated any in design- Because may typicbtty encountered r"f"tir.ly salt be at F$ng J"ptn" belowmudlinein deepwater wells,weltfailurecausedby salt toading "t "ffo* (e.g.,comfrli o, ruptured casings) mayrequired redrilling entirewetl. Unforeseen the ia1uiecaniin oe"p water,makeentirefield deveropment proiects uneconomical. A reviewof the cited literafure showsthat casingloadingproblems not occurin massive do "clean' salts- The excessive movements hive beei reported, ratesof up to that at linch/hourare limited.todirty'salts(witha high proportion clay-impurities) of oi to salt intervals are interbedded shale. ln contrast, lhat with withina single interval, ,"lean, salt salt (halite)may show n-o movement any kind. Saittopography alsoa factoi. At the of " is CedarCreekanticline (Cabin Creekand LittleBeaverfieidJl, weflfailures most are prominent wherethe saltthickness irregular_with straiigrapnic is high oipr.-in"'""lrUV Pennelfield,wherethe salt is thicker,moie uniform,and retatlvety well failure flat, ratesare one of the lowestin the region. Wheresalt occurswithina few thousand feet of the mudline, thereare benefits, from a drillingperspective, settingcasinga sufficient to distanceintothe salt so that the increased fractu.re pressureis usedto advance settingdepthof the nextcasingstring the as oeepas possible (seeSchematic in Figure18)- Thereare however, A issues regarding mobatity salt and loading that mustbe addressed, First,thereis the question whether saltwill of the remainsuffrciently ingauge s_o driltingcan take ptacewithoutthe riskof tighthole that probfems,Second,a zoneof lowfracturegradient fiequenilyexistsuponexitingthe slat. This-'weak' zonemaypreyenj cementing annulus the between casing the and saltbecause gradient the fracture maybe insufficient holda column even-foameJ to of cement.Thus, witha deep-set casing_through salt,it is probabty the nu*sary thatthe salUcasing annutus remainuncementedThisraises concern lonier-tem i"it movement loidingtne the of and wellcasingadjacent the salt. to

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There is a significant downsideto beingconservative the casingdesign. lf a cemented in annulusis specifiedthroughthe salt, casingwill haveto be set a relatively shortdistance after exitingthe salt (see Schematic in Figure.18). Here,the fracturegradientmay be B closeto or evenlowerthan that existingat a shallower depth. This,a casingstring(or liner tieback)may have to be committed wilhoutnecessarily advancing well significantly the towardits targetformationsat deplh. In this situation, will be necessary set a further it to liner and to reducethe bit size to advancethe well to the samedepthas that achieved the in more aggressive previously.Therefore, designdescribed thereare manybenefits not in cementing salUcasing the annulus and to deep-set casing, wherepossible. Saltencountered alongthe U.S.GulfCoastis usually verypure,oflen>94%halite.This salt is one of the leastmobile. Rule-of-thumb simplified and guidelines, hole-closure casingdesign and manyof which were developed the westernU.S. Overthrust for Belt,are undulyconservative wfrenapplied to Gulf Coasthalite. Manydo not conformto the knowndeformation mechanics salt and of are suspectfor criticalsubsaltwells in the deepwater Gulfof Mexico. Where holequalitycan be assuredwith rotary-steerable BHAs,avoidance bicentered of bits,reaming-while-drifling and by the useof oiLbased synthetic tools, or drilling fluids, is it not considered necessary cementthe casing/borehole to annulus throughthe salt. The subsequent uniformcasingloadingsare insufficient substantially to deformor ovalizethe casing,providing long-tern threatto drillingoperations impingement the inner no or on casingstring. lf hole qualityis poor with significant ovalization, resulting the non-unifonn loadingcan tead to excessive casingdeformation_ Lessonsleamedfrom the Sandiastudv: 1. Deepwater GoM saltappears largely uniform doesnotcontain dirtyintervals and the whichcausedrapidholeclosure Anchutz at Ranch2. Holequality critical drilling salt. Uniform is in the holeclosure loadsthe casingin a morestablemanner, reducing potential deformation. the for 3. Casingrun in uniform,roundholesections does not requirecementto resistsatt foads. Avertingthe needfor cemented concentric stringsacrossthe saltsimplifies welldesignand improves project economics.

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5.3 Conclusions Formation Lessons


Formation-induced casingdamagecan havesevereimplications reservoir on accessand production.Field-wide sustained incidents inrolvingreservoir compaction, formation subsidence, salt loadingare included this reportfor completeness. and in The compaction incidentat Sheanrvater demonstrates HPHTprojects not immuneto thesedifficulties that are relatedto formation movement. Formation movement often resultsin non-uniform loading downhole on tubulars. Lessons learned relating to formation-inducedloads: 1' Non-uniform loadscan ovalizecasingthat wouldolherwise withstand uniform a collapsepressure the samemagnitude. of 2. Cementcan be effective redistributing at non-uniform loadsaroundthe circumference of the casing. concentric stings can provide enhanced . 3. Cemented resistance non-uniform to toads. 4' Waterinjectionprovides way to replaceproduced a flqids,maintain reservoir, and limitreservoir compaction.However, waterinjection chalkreservoirs in can exacerbale compaction. 5. Rapidsalt movement and holectosure historically has occunedin dirtysatt intervals. Salt encountered deepwater in Gulfof Mexico wellsappearsmuchmoreunifrcrm ancl does not exhibitrapidmovement. 6- Uniform closure salt results moresymmetricalloads the casing, in on eliminating the needfor fully cementing casingthroughdeepwater Guffof Mexicosln Ormations.

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This page inlentionallyleft blank

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6 TABLESAND FIGURES

Table 1 ProlGon Evidencefor HydrateDissolution as Source of Marlin Tubing Ovalization


For
Againsi

ln the A Annulus The lengthof deformed tubingis consistent with a long hydrateplug Modelingindicates that duringthe period between initialand majorleak the conditlons were favorable hydrate for formation.Further,hydrates were,at varioustimes in this period,detected insidethe tubing.

pressure the At various times annulus associaled theinitial wasreduced with leak by ventlng annulus the
Either fresh or sea water would be necessary for hydrateformation.

Doesnot explainthe observedcollapseof lhe 1$3/4" tiebackcasing(see Figure5)


ln the C Annulus

(oil) A shallowhydrocarbon bearingzone existsat 7100'just belowthe shoeof the 16"surfaceliner. Well A-2 was shut-inapproxlmatdlylhree yearsbetweeninitialdrillingandfinal completion.

Eithera competenl cementsheathacrossthe shallowhydrocabonzoneor baritesettling couldpreventhydrocarbons from enteringthe C annulus.

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Table 2 Pro/con Evidence for production Gasing collapse as source of Marlin Tubing Ovalization
For Against

The lengthof deformedtubingis consistent with collapseof the production casing Modeling trappedannuluspressure on the produclion and intermediate casing slringsgenerates lnadsclose to initatingcasingcollapse Solldmaterialcirculated from Well A-2 duringa waslFoveroperalionis predominantly casingmalerial.

The well was shut-inat the time of the major leak. That b, lhe final leak did nol ccur jt a time whentrappedannuluspressure wouldbe its grealesl. Althoughthe valuesare close,modelresults cannotquite predictcasingcollapseunderany singlefailureload scenarioimaglned date to

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Table 3 Summary of ARCO High-Clearance Casing Connection Failures

9-t8" 53.5ppf P-l10 9-5/8"47.0 ppf S-95 and p-.t10 May1981 '11-314" ppf 60 P-l10 7" 37 ppf R9140 | 1-3/4'60 ppf P-l 10 7-518" ppf P-1t0 39

5 1t2'2sppfp-t10
9-518" 47.0ppf p-l10 l1-3/4'65ppfp-110

July 20O5

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Table 4 Chemical Additions to Erskine CaCl2Packer Fluid


Functlon Active Ingredienl Trealment

Inorganic Corrosion Inhibitorfor CarbonSteel Biocide OxygenScavenger

SodiumThiocyenale NaSCN
Gtutaraldehyde CsHsOz

0.5 vololo (50% lo 5506solution) 0.02 volo/o (2506solution)

Ammonium Bisulphite NHlHS03

0.013vol% (65%solution)

July 20O5

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D o c .N o . : 1 1 &

Riure developmentwiil morc be challenging thanThunderHorse 30,000 I ExistingDW Derrelopnents 25,000 A ThunderHorse X HPHTProspects
o

CL

0 o 6

g o E E

o, A

u, o

E 20,000 5
15,000 10,000 5,000 0

/**rx
?

-,31?'
rur,

20o

BottomHoleTemperature fFl Feure1 prospects Gulfof MexicoDeepwater HPHT

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Outerannulitypicallyhave highertempenture incrcases and @respondinglyhigherAPBloads 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 7,000 8,000 o E 9,000 10,000 11,000 12,000 13,000 14,000 15,000 16,000
r rl . r o. v rr' r 1 .. t t Tublog Flub Tubfng TublngAnnu&F cashg 1 Caelng I Annutus GeJng2 Caslng2AnnultF cagng3 Gaslng3^nnulos Caslngil Caslng4Annulug undlsiurbed

s9

6o$

""9

^"9

""$ "st

{uog {pS ;;
Temperaturc(oF) Annuti During production

Typicat TemperatureIncreases ,['?;L"re,

""d

July 2OO5

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Doc.No.: 11&1826WDRLLR (RevD3)

WD = 3,230' = BRT-WL + 85' = BRT-ML 3,315'


MD|TVD WDBML 3,ffi7 t3,487 172.

Ovalized tubingfrom 3,510'to 3,568, 10-3/4" Riser

36'Slrucfulral (Jet ln)

P&TGauge 3,39? @ POTH 3,664' @

5,193 5,193 / 1,878. 6,766./6,693 3,368'

2f Surface (26'Hole) 16'Surface Lindr (22'Hole)

KOP-5,400

9,712'I8,703, 5,398' 10,039'/ 8,904' 5,589'

10d4" x &519" Produclion Tubing f 3-3/8'x 1&,3/4" lnt. (1$,1/2 Hote)

Build and hold -45o

P&TGauge@ 12,636. ProdPkr@ 12,754,

r3,648./ 11.364' 7-V8" Produdion Uner 8,049' (F7/B'Hote)


Figure 3 Schematic MarlinWeil A-2 of

GP Pkr@ 12,906'

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jumpedas On November2lthe leak ralte asing and tubing pre*ures qualized

60,000
r r i : ( , r r

1,200
GaslngPressure(psi)

o ll. (, =
(o o t! E c

50,000 40,000
. . 1- , F * Gas(MGFD)

1,000
rtl rtl

800

o 3 a to o
6

.9 (, 30,000
t 'o

e r
|lt (,

il t
rl
I

arl ttl

600 400

E
J qt

20,000 10,000 0

I I I 1l a t rrl t. I

,l

./

rl

llt rt'

) ' rl .i
l-l

200 0

*.+i*+"*"{+\s!".f".fst".t""t..1"',1".tot".t"..1".
Figure4 Marlin Well A-2 Flow and Pressure Historfthrough Malor Leak Event

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Figure 5 Sonic caliperindicating collapse ol Marlin A-z la-3,q'production Gasing

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76'annulusvalve was clo*d while ddllingtllo tu$n'x 17-1t2'hote sect'ry,

1,233 TOC

26Caslng

1,486'1 1,496. MDffVD

Gaslng

405"r40so,
MD/TVD

Planned 16'TOC wasjustblowf!,e 20'shoe

Ercess cr?effor Mritesettlittgcoutd sealthe sioe


16. Caslng 6,212'16,210' MD/TVO

9,13T 18,877' MD/TVD

Figure6 PompanoA-31WellboreSchematicat Time of Failure

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IS2GWDRLLR

;ql!nF*

*-;ed?

-:rlii

{;

t ,,',' "'Figuref ': Recovered, Collapsed16,'Gasing (Thewindow was presumably worn by milling during recovery) .

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FigureI Recovered, Collapsed16'Gasing from pornpanoWell A-31

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Doc.No.: 118-1826-WDRLLR D3) (Rev

Shodtem growth exceeded gredffion and ted to concems steadystategnwth for

r.--Tree Growth .-4-- 20{ Growth ' '- 30" Growth -+- THTUpstroam Ghoke(schl)

shea rwater sw08(22/30J-Xllrel. wetlhead roMh G "*"0

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Doc.No.:118-1826-WDRLLR D3) (Rev

Pipe body SLX

fi a . ,ir o. * , *

B-S/8.40L{O 7/8'f,l.7 L{0 7-518" 29.7 L-80 p-110 T, 32 7"' 29 p-110 5* 21.4T-95 Loads

q I o
NOTE: This data adaptedfrom HYDRILliterature
I

13-518" 88.2Q-125 13-98" 88.2C-l10 11-314'65 P-110 10-3/4"65.7Q-125 9-718" 62.80P-110 9-5t8" S!.5 Q-125

1.4 1,2 1.0 0.8 (' 0.6


(!

E
t

0.4

o o. c o x ut

{, 0.2 o 0.0 4.2 .0.4 4.6 {.8 -1.0 -1.2


-1.2 -1.0 ,0.8 -0.6 -0.4 0.0 0.2 0.4 Tension (ComprcsslonyBodyYield -0.2 0.6 0.8

GI

g
c

Figure10 Normalized Plot of sLX Test Dalawith vastar Load conditions lndicated

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Doc No.:118-1B2GWDRLLR D3) (Rev

Cncks led to maJorwashouts of tubing ,138r4N1!9

Sulfde sfresscracf$ inittqting attong damagedreglons

Notetong da.ge

Figurel1 Judge Digby Tubing HandlingDamage

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(RevD3) Doc.No.: 118-1826-WDRLLR

pH, Erinecontaminiation reduced resulting in csrrpvbnbnackrng chbrtde strHss

Figure 1?
HighlslandFailure 13CrAlloy of

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Tnce amounts air ingress of catsedstressoonosrion cnckingof duplex

Figure13 Erskine- Fajlure of 2SCrDuplex$S

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C- C/ose upof thefrtting (1l4pH andmagnetic) @nnecting ttg cantrollinato lhe harlgw a - C/osCi ubw of cnckeatublng aid atta trc n or contrsltt ne,o:t;nge,l ch t

A - S/derabwshowhgiangeg crecked tubing, @ntrcllines(inped arounA and upp6rsection the hanger) of

D:E4tr,emeolose:up tubingshowing of "britte" appearance cfthefadure

NOTE: The scale shown in each photo ls In inches, but not placed lmmedlately next to the compenents rough guide only

viewsof rherubinsr""i,l?H:ri,ived fromDeep Atex wetl


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wtrl a A r Side0y sidesecttonfromrtru sr,nnJolnn fubirrycontalning viewot an erAea sectron a of cnck. ThE Nnt wasin.senico at a depthd cnck anda viewof a sectim witha hairline at approximately 4,5W''(1370m) in ihewetl, Notebubiog:of|t,e sec{ion topof pttoto

8 - Closervrewof erodedsestron shownin Photo with A remnanls crackat eachandof openirg'' of

Ercdedsectian a cnck that with propagatef fto^ theOD to the /gsrtnlbce. Erosrbnmostlikety occuned durtngattempts to ciruiate fluid whileNllingthe wdll betcretubingretiaval
:iir: ' '

Nida.,rcmnanlscracks at d eayhendof erodedreoion ::: .: 'HCidine longitudinal cnck that .originated theOD sudaceon ln fhrscaseit didnot penetrate tho tubingwallin thelD surfece .NOTE:
C - Aoser view of haidine crack shown in PhotoA

The si:alecan be inferred from PhotoA because the tublng ls 3.5" In dlameter

Figure 5 1 Views of Cracked3.5" Diameter 22CrProductionTubing Retrievedfrom DeepAlex Wetl


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Deltaphasemicrostructwa increased material sceptibitity su to hydrogon lmbrifttement

shearwater o,l'iTiJ ?,oing Hanger

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DECEIIIBER I98,I

t994 JANUARY

ect ct{ 00

co

Figure17 Erskine Casing DefamationDue to Gbmpactionand Subsidence (Well214 - Joint 218- 8,110'- 8,145'MD) A-7

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casrng . Yoo aggressrve desrgn;single asing drinf, across sa/f,annulus uncemented over salt

Cqtseruativecas,;/rg design: fiher fbback across saftand dual-cemented casing string

Figuret8 _ Schematicof potential dasing Designs Through Salt

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(RevD3) Doc.No.: 11&1826-WDRLLR

AND GLOSSARY 7 REFERENCES


7.1 References
S.W.Gosch,P.D.Pattillo, J.W. D.W.,D.G-Fritchie, D.H.Gibson, Jr., 1. Bradford, of Analysis and Redesign; Part1, Description Sharp,and C.E.Taylor,"MarlinFailure at 74528,presented the IADC/SPE Drilling Conference in Failure".IADC/SPE held Dallas,Texas, 26-28February2002. 'Analysis an Annular 2. Pattillo, P.D.,B.W.Cocales, and S.C.Morey, of Pressure presented the SPEAnnual Buildup Failure duringDrillAhead." SPE 89775, at TechnicalConference Exhibition and heldin Houston, Texas,26-29September, 2004. 3. Cumberlege, Dom,"Shearwater Lessons Learned June2003)."Internal flo company draftdocument dated16 May2003. 4. Hibbert,Ashley,"Cementing HostileEnvironments: in Guidelines Obtaining for lsolation Demanding in Wells.' UTG DrillingSunbury- BestPractices document, December2OO2. 5. "HPHTShahDenizBU'presented the inJrouse HPHTGompletions at BP Forum, 1113 November 2003. 6. Allen,Payne, and Sathuvalli, on "Report Wellhead Movement Study- Phasell Drilling the Yacheng13 Field." ln-house of document. 7. Variousnotesand emailsfrom October2000,including "Shearwater Commissioning lssues- WellheadGrowth;Executive Summary GrowthModeting of WorK and Shearwater HPHTWellhead GrowthProblem.' 6. McDermott, J.R.,and B.L. Martinlll,'Completion Despnfor DeepSourNorphlet Gas Wells OffshoreMobile,Alabama." 9PE24772,presented the AnnualTechnical at Conference and Exhibition the Societyof Petroleum of Engineers heldin Washington, October DC, 47,1992. 9. Payne,M.L.,W.T.Asbill,H.L. Davis, and P.D.Pattillo,'lointlndustry Qualification Test Program Highlearance for Casing Connections." SPEilADC 21908, presented the SPUIADCDrilling at Conference in Amsterdam,ll-14March held 1991. 10. ISO 13679,Petroleum Natural and Gas Industries Procedures forTesting Casing and TubingGonnections, Edition, Firsl December 2002,The Intemational Organ izationfor Standardization. 11.Martin, J.W.,"Material SpecificationHistory / Justification Leaming fromPast Experiences." In-house document. 12."Judge presented the in-house HPHTCompletions DigbyOverview" at BP Forum, 11-13November 2003 13-"Down HoleMaterial Corrosion & Guidelines HPHTApptications" for presented the at in-house HPHTCompletions BP Forum,11-13 November 2003. 14.Renton, N.c., D- seymour, Hannah, w. Hughson, NewMethod Material l. and ? of Categorization Super-Duplex for Stainless SteelTubulars" (preprin$. SPE97591,
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/High on Workshop HighPressure Technology presented the 2005SPEApplied at Texas17-19May2005. heldin TheWoodlands, SourWellDesign Temperature notes Feb Meeting 11th 04"meeting Review TubingFailure SW05 l5."Shearwater prepared lreneHannah Shell. of by and FieldHPHTWorkover Wade,"Erskine and D.E.,M.C.Edgerton, E.H.R. 16.Morvat, presented atthe 67T19, SPE/IADC Failure Investigation." TubingCorrosion February-1 The hetd Drilling Conference in Amsterdam, Netherlands,2T SPE/IADC March2001. Conosion and Williams, ScottLester, JohnCasassa,'Stress Robert, Charlie 17.Mack, Tubingin a High SteelProduction of Cracking a ColdWorked22CrDuplexStainless of at DensityClearBrineCaClzPackerFluid- Results the FailureAnalysis Deep paper02467. NACEConosion/O2 Laboratory Experiments." Alex and Associated for of BaseAlloy718 (UNSN07718) Oil 18.APlSpec6A718:2OO4, Specification Nickel Production FirstEdition,March2004,American Equipment, and Gas Drillingand Washington D.C.20005. Institute,1220L Street,Northwest, Petroleum in and Deformation Paftillo, GaryKelso,'Casing Nigel,Santiago Mujica, Phillip 19.Last, IADC/SPE 74560, lmpact,and Management." a TectonicSetting: Evaluation, presented the IADC/SPE heldin Dallas, Texas,26-28 at Drilling Conference February 2002. and 1., 20.Ruddy, MarkA. Andersen, P.D.Pattillo, M. Bishlawl,'Rock Compressibility, and in ChalkReservoir:A CaseStudyof Compaction, Subsidence a High-Porosity presented theSPEAnnual and ValhallField."SPE 18278, Technical at Conference Exhibition heldin Houston, Texas,2-5 1988. October "Analysis HorDontal of in 21.Pattillo, P.D.,andT.G.lffstiansen, Casinglntegrity the presented RockMechanics ValhallField."SPE/ISRM 78204, atthe SPEIISRM held in lrving,Texas20-23Oclober20O2. Conference "Subsidence 22.Schwall, G.H.,andC.A.Denney, lnduced Deformation Casing presented the SPHISRMRock in Mechanics the Ekofisk Field."SPE28091, al Mechanics Petroleum in Engineering held The Netherlands,29Conference in Detft, 31 August1994. 23.Sylte, J.E.,L.K.Thomas, D.W.Rhett, D-D.Bruning, N-8.Nagel, and nVaterInduced Compaction the EkofiskField." SPE5il26 presented the SPEAnnual in at TechnicalConference Exhibition in Houston, and held 1999. Texas,3-6October 24."Drilling Technology - EPTG: Unit Communications 5 of 5 - Success Pack Stories", 200/.. 25.Unger, "Drilling K.W-,and D.C.Howard, lmprove Techniques Success Drilling in and CasingDeepOverthrust Salt."SPE 13108, Belt SPEDrilling Engineering, June pp. 1986, 183-192. "Assessment SaltLoadings Well 26.Willson, S.M.,A.F.Fossum, J.T.Fredrich, and of on Casings." SPEBlB20,SPEDrilling Completion, and March2003,pp. 13-21.

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7.2Gfossary
Glossary Acronyms Abbreviations of and
Meaning

ABS ACI AEPT APB API BHA BOP BOPD

AtKytbenzene Sulfonate ArcoChinalnc ARUOE&PTechnotogy AnnularPressure Build_Up American Petroleum Institute BottomHoleAssembly Etowout Preventers Barels of Oif per Day Bromide Eanetsof Waterpel Day Calcium uementBondLog Chloride Chrome Corrosion Resistant Alloy

Br
BWPD Ca CBL

cl
Cr
CRA Dtl DSS DTU ETAP
ESM

urameter/thickness (ratio) Duplex Stainless Steel


Unit I unlrngTechnology Eastern TroughArea project -Elastic SpringModel Gulfof Mexico -Gallons Minute Per GammaRay Hydrogen Sutfide Hydrocarbon(s)
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GoM GPM
GR

H25
HC
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Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations


Acronym/Abbrevlatlon Irileanlng

HPHT

HighPressure Temperature High


DrillPipe HeavyWeight LowAlloyCarbon Sleel Maximurn Allowable SurfacePressure milliDarcy MudLine Million Barrels Oil of MillionBarrelsof Water Million CubicFeetPerDay Molybdenum MegaPascal Nitrogen NatbnalAssociation ConosionEngineers of Nickel Polished BoreReceptacle Pack-Off TubingHanger Pounds Gallon Per PartsPer Million Pressure (relationship) VolumeTemperature Control QualityAssurance/Quality Reference KellyBushing SpecificGravig StressCorrosion Cracking Surfaced Controlled Sub-Surface SafetyValve
Silicon

HWDP
LACS MASP mD ML MMBO

MMBW
mmcfd Mo
MPa Nz

NACE Ni
PBR

POTH PPG
PPM

PVT
QA/QC

RKB s.g.

scc
ScSSV Si
SSC

SulfideStressCracking

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Glossary of Acronyms and Abbreviations

TotalDepth
TotalFinaElf

Tension platf6rm Leg


TrillionStandard CubicFeet

United Kinddom
United Kingdom Continental Shelf UnifiedNational Standard UltimaleTensileStrength WaterBased Mud WellheadMovement

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