Valisno vs. Adriano No. L-37409 Facts: Valisno bought the parcel of land owned by Adrianos sister Honorata.

It was planted with fruits and vegetables and which adjoins Adrianos land on the bank of the river. Both lands were inherited from defendants and vendees father Eladio. When it was sold, the land has irrigation from the Pampanga River through a canal 70 meters long traversing Adrianos land. He now leveled a portion of the canal which prevented the flow of water and deprived Valisno of cultivating his land. He filed complaint for deprivation of water rights in the Bureau of Public Works and Communications and it ordered Adriano to rebuild the irrigational canal. But this he did not do and instead Valisno constructed it by his own money. He also filed for payment of damages against defendant in the trial court. However, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications dismissed the complaint as the water rights granted to Eladio in 1923, which was conveyed to Valisno in the sale, ceased in 1936 or 1937 for its non-use. No water right then was transferred to his heirs, and so Valisno did not acquire such water right. The trial court, invoking the Irrigation Law, held that Valisno has no right to pass through Adrianos land to draw water from the river, and the decision of the Bureaus Secretary is final unless an appeal was taken from within 30 days. Issue: Whether or not the provisions of the Irrigation Act shall apply in the resolution of the controversy. Held: The Bureau has already said in its decision that issue concerning servitude of waters shall be governed by the Civil Code and such special laws if the code provides no guidelines thereof as provided under Article 168 of the code. Concerning the dispute on water servitude, since the irrigation canal was built at the time of the lands conveyance to Valisno, he obtained therefrom an equivalent title to the water rights from Honorata to continue using it as provided for under Article 624. Such water right was passed to him, as well as improvements to Honorarias property, at the time of the conveyance. APPEALED DECISION SET ASIDE.

Amor vs. Florentino, et al. No. 48384 Facts: Maria Florentino, owner of a house and a warehouse, bequeathed her house and lot to Gabriel and Jose Florentino, and the warehouse and lot to her niece Maria Encarnacion Florentino upon his death. IN 1911, Maria Encarnacion later sold her inheritance to Severo Amor. In 1938, he destroyed the old warehouse to build a two-story house. On the same year, respondents filed an action to prohibit petitioner from building a higher structure as it would obstruct the light and air that passes through the four windows to the house. Pending the decision of the trial court, Amor continued building the house. Finding that an easement was established but that the construction of the new building was almost complete, the court denied the writ for preliminary injunction. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals, upheld the constitution of the easement at the time of Marias death which in 1892 and ordered Amor to remove any obstruction from the easement of light and view on the windows and abstain from building the new structure. Issue: Whether or not an easement was constituted on the four windows of the inherited property. Held: The Court held that an easement of light and view was constituted on the four windows by the time the heirs inherited the property for upon acceptance of it, they tolerated the existence of an easement by the way of the four windows. The Court affirmed appellate courts decision that a title to the easement was acquired because of its continued existence upon partition of property to heirs and did not stipulate to the contrary as under Article 541 of the Civil Code. They acquired a title to the easement, upon toleration of the existence of the easement which was an implied contract to the continuation of the easement, by way of prescription. Further, petitioner cannot allege that he was an innocent purchaser because he was duty bound to ascertain that the property he bought was bound to an easement of light and view and easement of altius non tollendi. Whether or not the original owner died on 1982 or 1885 which he alleged, still the easements remains to be constituted when he bought the property of Maria Encarnacion. DECISION AFFIRMED Art. 541 Art. 621

Quimen vs. CA G.R. No. 112331 Facts: Private respondent Yolanda Oliveros bought the lot belonging to his uncle Antonio Quimen, a land without access to the road public, with an inducement by her petitioner Aunt Anastacia that she will give her a right of way on her adjoining property for P200 per square meter. When Yolanda offered Anastacia the payment, the latter refused to accept denying the promise of right of way to her once she bought the property. Yolanda filed an action with a prayer of right of way through Anastacias property. The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the space at the back of her fathers house which a store was situation was the better right of way because it is shorter than that of Anastacias property. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that respondent has the right of way through petitioners property and as it was the one which will cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a right of way through petitioners property. Held: The Court held that she has. Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the right of way must be the one which has the shortest route and which will cause the least damage and detriment to the servient state. Though the easement to petitioners property in the case at bar is longer than the one located at the back of respondents house which has a store blocking it, the requirement that it can bring the least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the shortness of the route to the public highway. The less damage will be incurred not as when the store made of strong materials should be removed. More so, the conditions for a valid grant of right of way through petitioners property, which are: 1. the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to public highway 2. the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity 3. the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate 4. the right of way being claimed is the least prejudicial to the servient estate are met by the circumstances at hand. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Villarico vs. Sarmiento G.R. No. 136438 Facts: Petioners lot was separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue, a public highway, by a strip of land belonging to the government. The department of Public Works and Highways constructed stairways thereon for people to have access to the highway. In 1991, respondents build a house on that portion of government land and constructed establishments for commercial purposes. In 1993, petitioner acquired title over the 74.30 square meter of that government land by exchange of real property and such was registered to his name. He now instituted accion publiciana as against respondents to assert his right of way which was blocked by reason of the structures they built thereon. The trial court ruled that he was not deprived a right of way and that he could use another street as passageway. The Court of Appeals held the same. Issue: Whether or not petitioner has a right of way over the land under the possession of respondents. Held: The Court held that he has none. Article 420 of the Civil Code provides that government land cannot be subject of commerce nor can be burdened by any voluntary easement. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim his right of way over the land under possession by respondents. Also, he cannot use accion publiciana as a remedy to obtain a right of way. However, he can have a claim against respondents on the portion already conveyed to him by the government. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

National Power Corporation vs. Tiangco G.R. No. 170846 Facts: Private respondents Aurellano, Lourdes, and Nestor Tiangco are owners of the 152, 187 square meter land in Tanay, Rizal where 19, 423 of which was sought to be expropriated by the National Power Corporation (NPC). The petitioner, which is a government-owned and controlled corporation, was authorized to acquire private property and to exercise the right of eminent domain by its charter Republic Act 6395. It negotiated with respondents about the sale of that portion of their land planted with fruitbearing trees but to no avail. And so, on November 20, 1990, NPC filed an expropriation complaint before the trial court of Tanay, Rizal. The trial court issued a condemnation order granting the NPC the right to take possession of the property. After the valuation for the just compensation presented by parties, the trial court ruled that NPC has to give P40,959 to respondents as payment of just compensation based on 1984 tax declaration of the land and P324,750 for compensation for improvements on the land expropriated with legal interest. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the just compensation of the land was to be at P116,538 as from 1993 tax declaration and the compensation for the land improvements be at P325,025. Issue: Whether or not the valuation for the just compensation be based at the 1984 or 1993 tax declaration, and whether or not NPC should pay for the value of the land or only 10% of the lands market value as under Presidential Decree 938. Held: The Court held that the value of the just compensation for the land should be computed for its value at the time of its talking which was in 1990 when NPC filed for the expropriation proceedings and should not be based in the 1984 or 1993 tax declarations. Also, since the burden on the property by way easement of right of way is perpetual in nature where NPC can expand the structure it is going to build, expropriator should pay for the value of the land sought to be expropriated and not only for the 10% of its value. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS.

Preysler, Jr. vs. CA G.R. No. 158141 Facts: Petitioner owns lots in the subdivision of private respondent and owns two lots adjacent to the latters land. To enter into his two parcels of land, one has to pass through respondents property. Preysler offered P10,000 as payment for the easement of the right of way but which was refused by respondent. He now barricaded the front gate of Preyslers property so that petitioner and his family cannot enter their property through the subdivision. Petitioner filed a complaint for Right of Way with preliminary prohibitive injunction before the trial court. It ruled that respondent remove the barricade and issued the writ to stop him from obstructing petitioners entry to his property through the subdivision. After then, Preysler used the subdivision to transport heavy equipments and constructions materials to develop his property. Respondent moved to dissolve the writ as petitioners action is a violation to his right to peaceful possession of his property but the trial issued maintained its order for respondent to cease hindering petitioner from entry to his property with amendments extending to Preyslers visitors, guests, contractors, and other persons he authorized entry to respondents property. Upon appeal, CA lifted the writ and reinstated the original writ. Issue: Whether or not there was a legal basis for the issuance of the amended writ and whether or not the right of way for petitioner extends to his visitors, contractors, workers, and authorized persons. Held: The Court held that there was no basis for the amended writ and that the right of way granted under the original writ for petitioners visit and inspection of his property was the only access allowed to him. The extension of right of way to other people connected with petitioner is not covered under the original writ and cannot be applied for to amend it to the present writ. But since there is a need for petitioner to use respondents property for the ongoing construction in his property, he should be granted a temporary easement which is indispensable for construction of petitioners property after payment of proper indemnity to respondent as under Article 656. JUDGMENT MODIFIED. CASE REMANDED TO TRIAL COURT FOR DETERMINATION OF INDEMNITY FOR TEMPORARY EASEMENT.

Fabie vs. Lichauco No. 3598 Facts: Fabie applied for registration of his property but recognizes an easement in favor of the estates of respondent and Hijos de Roxas adjoining to his property. The easement of right of way and drainage was given by the Court of Land Registration in favor of the latter while their claim to easement of light and view. Lichauco, however, insists that since an easement of right of way and of light and view existed at the time where both their properties then belonged to Juan Bautista Santa Coloma was sold now as their two separate properties, those sign of easements became as title for those easements to continue. The easement of light and view claimed by Lichauco is constituted on a window of a gallery in her property. Issue: Whether or not the gallery from which the windows are constituted existed at the time of the division and alienation of Colomas property. Held: The documentary evidence presented at the trial showed that gallery did not existed at the time of the properties alienation. Respondent cannot claim an easement of light of view by virtue of a title for there is no sign of easement of light and view at the point of reckoning. JUDGEMENT AFFIRMED. Art. 622 sign of easement = title

Saenz vs. Hermanos No. 2085 Facts: Saenz and Hermanos owns adjoining lots. The latter built a house out of strong materials where its side was less than two meters from petitioners lot. He also built windows on that side which the trial court found to be less than one meter from the dividing line of Saenzs lot. Invoking Articles 581 and 582 of the Civil Code, petitioner claims that defendant cannot construct his house and open his windows without conforming to the law. However, the trial court ruled in favor of defendant. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not defendant has a claim for an easement of light and view. Held: The Court held that defendant cannot. The way he constructed his house and his windows is prohibited as under Article 582 the structure being less than two meters from the dividing point of petitioners lot. But he can avail of the easement of light and view provided under Article 581 in so much that he will build his windows at a 30 centimeters square dimension with an iron grate embedded in the wall and a wire screen. JUDGMENT REVERSED.

Cortes vs. Tu-Tibo No. 911 Facts: House No. 65 in Calle Rosario, owned by petitioners wife, is adjacent to House No. 63 belonging to defendant. When the latter raised the roof of his house, it obstructed House No. 65 from receiving air and light through its windows. The trial court finds that petitioner did not in any way prohibited defendant from doing so. But he claimed that he acquired the easement of light and view from his constant and uninterrupted use of the windows for 59 years which is a positive easement where the period for acquisitive prescription begins at the time of the enjoyment commenced. Defendant, on the other hand, contends that the easement is negative and so the reckoning point must start from the time the prohibition is served against him. The trial court ruled that easement is negative. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not easement is negative. Held: The Court held that easement of light and view constituted on a window of ones own wall contemplates a negative easement which cannot be acquired by prescription as under Article 538 of the Civil Code but by prohibition against the servient estate though a formal act. The indispensable requisite being absent, the easement of light and view has not been acquired. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Timoner vs. People No. L-62050 Facts: Mayor of Daet, Camarines Norte Timoner ordered the fencing off of the stalls in the sidewalks of Maharlika Highway including a barbershop. These establishments, however, were recommended for closure for being harmful to health for failing to follow sanitary requirements by its Municipal Health Officer. They were also declared a public nuisance, as categorized under Article 694, in a civil case, and the barber shop was never able to reopen his business. Timoner was, however, charged guilty of grave coercion. Such decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not the action of petitioner is constitutive of the criminal act of grave coercion. Held: The Court held that it is not. Since the establishments were proved to be a public nuisance and that, as mayor, petitioner acted to abate them, his act of fencing off the stalls within the bounds of his duty as a public officer performing his duty. More so, the third element of absence of authority to restrain the will of another person in the crime of grave coercion is absent. PETITIONER ACQUITTED.

Pearl & Dean vs. Shoemart G.R. No. 148222 Facts: Petitioner is in the business of advertising display units as light boxes. They obtained a copyright of the illuminated display units under the trademark Poster Ads. It has Metro Industrial Services as its manufacturer for their output. SMI and petitioner agreed for the formers lease and installation of the latters light boxes in its branches in Makati and Cubao. However, only the contract in Makati Branch was returned. SMI rescinded the contract for Cubao. Two years later, Metro Industrial Services manufactured light boxes for SMI. It also engaged the service of another corporation to make for itself light boxes. A sister company of SMI was also found out to have been using the light boxes with that design of petitioner. It now filed a case for infringement of copyright and trademark, and unfair competition and for damages. The trial court held respondent guilty of the charges. However, the appellate court reversed the decision holding that there was no copyright to the light boxes themselves but only to the technical drawing. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not there was no infringement of trademark and copyright on petitioners Poster Ads. Held: The Court held that there was no infringement on the trademark Poster Ads because what petitioner did register was for the technical drawing of the light boxes alone which did not extend to the object itself. On the issue of patent, petitioner did not secure a patent for the light boxes and therefore, he cannot prohibit others from using the light boxes though it may be the same as to what they fabricate and thus, there is no cause of action for his complaint. PETITION DENIED.

AC Enterprises, Inc vs. Frabelle Corporation GR. No. 166744 Facts: Petitioner owns the Feliza Building which is sitiated at the rear of the Frabelle Condominium I which is owned by respondent. Feliza has 36 exhaust of blowers from air-conditioning units on its building which produce a continuous, intense and unbearable noise and hot air blasts directed towards the rear of Frabelle Condiminium. Respondent wrote requests to petitioner to abate the nuisance but which was ignored by the latter. Frabelle went filed a complaint before the Pollution Adjudication Board. Pending the decision on the complaint, respondent requested office of the Makati Mayor to cancel petitioners business permit. The complaint was directed to the NCR Environmental management Bureau and it ruled that there the exhaust on the blowers were not the sole factor in the noise pollution. Unsatisfied with the resolution, respondent filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with a prayer for the issuance of preliminary and permanent injunction before the trial court of Malabon City. It ruled that there is a sufficient cause of action for respondent to file a complaint and it ruled in the latters favor. Court of Appeals ruled that respondent has the right to abate the nuisance to protect his property and proprietary rights against business losses. Issue: Whether or not respondent has a cause of action and RTC has the jurisdiction over the case. Held: The Court held that a simple suit for abatement of nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC where it is the one which has the right to declare whether a thing is a nuisance as under Article 694 of the Civil Code. More so, having suffered from the nuisance, respondent has a cause of action where it may institute an action to abate it as under Article 705 and 706. There is cause of action if there is a right in favor one party and an obligation not to violate that right for the other and there is a breach of that obligation. LGUs are not vested with the power to declare a thing a nuisance. PETITION DENIED.