Ed Rogers 5/21/11

The Left and Labor: The Achilles Heel of Allendes Chile?

Chilean labor has received its fair share of study throughout the twentieth century and today. With the election of socialist president Salvador Allende in 1970 and his eventual overthrow in 1973, much of the research has focused on the political landscape that enabled Allende to come to power and at the same time, how that same political landscape would ultimately help bring about his demise. The external pressures put on the Allende government that led to his downfall are significant. Covert/overt pressure from the United States and its allies in the form of economic blockades (hoping to squeeze the life out of the Chilean economy) to military training and intelligence towards the right-wing military camps that opposed this movement towards socialism, without a doubt put the Allende government in a precarious position. As equally damning to Allendes plan of instituting a socialist government in Chile was his inability to galvanize the Left in a common plan of transition from capitalism to socialism. But if we step back a minute and address Latin American labor as a whole, of which Chile figures significantly in the field, we find that Latin American labor historians put considerable more emphasis on questions relating to politics and organization.1 Thus it is difficult to write about labor/unions in Latin America without addressing the political significance that the labor movement and unions were a huge part. Understanding the historical framework that labor found itself in Latin America is necessary to understand the economic scenario in Chile that labor and Left existed. In his groundbreaking work, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Andre Gunder Frank addresses the economic structure that Latin America finds itself in today. One of his two case

George Reid Andrews, Review Essay: Latin American Workers, Journal of Social History Vol. 21, Issue 2 Winter (1987): 311.

studies is Chile. Frank argues, and I concur that Chile has been subjected to the contradictions of the capitalist system well before its independence from Spain. The Spanish conquest incorporated and fully integrated Chile into the expanding mercantile capitalist system of the sixteenth century.2 Chile, like many Latin American countries, is victim of the internal contradictions of capitalism itself. The contradictions that Frank argues are: the expropriation of economic surplus from the many and its appropriation by the few, the polarization of the capitalist system into metropolitan center and peripheral satellites, and the continuity of fundamental structure of the capitalist system due to the fact that these contradictions recreate themselves.3 Once Chile was brought into this capitalist system it suffered from the contradictions of that system. Underdevelopment of the Chilean economy was one significant bi-product of capitalism. Franks argues that this structural underdevelopment will continue for Chile until the Chileans liberate themselves from capitalism itself; which to the detriment of Franks book he never offers a clear cut answer to this liberation other than veiled references to Marxist ideology. Despite this shortcoming, Frank paints a clear understanding of the predicament that four centuries of capitalist development has placed Chile. The first contradiction that Frank writes about, the expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus most closely relates to labor in Chile. The monopolistic control by the few in this realm of Franks argument is what affects labor and unions most directly. Those controlling the economic affairs of Chile in this model are not the workers, but in fact a select few of foreign/national capitalists. In Franks argument, this contradiction runs through the entire
2

Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), 3. 3 Frank,3.

Chilean economy, past and present.4 The exploitation that takes place along these lines further links workers into the system at an extreme disadvantage. This exploitation lies within the expropriation/appropriation of economic surplus within the capitalist system. By looking at Chiles role within the world capitalist system it is easier to understand the underdevelopment that has taken place. Chile has been subject to a high degree of external and internal monopoly, where foreign interests and a small local upper class controlled the economic fortunes of the country, pre/post independence. This external monopoly has resulted in the expropriation of economic surplus by another world capitalist system.5This chain of exploitative relationships, benefit the few capitalists who exercise monopoly power over the many levels below them. The workers and laborers, the lowest in this capitalist chain, suffer the most because they feel the brunt of this system. The expropriation of economic surplus by the national and international metropolises at the expense of the local producers continues the dependency amongst the lower class. This expropriation comes at the expense of re-investment of the infrastructure of the producing country, in this case Chile. At each point along the way, the capitalist system generates economic development for very few (the select, few capitalists) and underdevelopment for many (where labor finds itself). This dependent capitalism, where the producing countries and their workers are held hostage by the controlling monopoly of a few, where natural resources are exploited at the cost of the producing nation have put Chile and many Latin American countries into a precarious position. For Marxist historians/economist, this development of the civilized world by a

4 5

Frank, 7. Frank, 6.

handful of capitalist nations results in dire consequences for the majority of people/countries. The colonization of Latin America made possible the rapid development of capitalism in Europe and North America. But to those in the Third World, capitalism brought ruin, poverty, and political oppression. The extremely contradictory character of progress under capitalism applies even to different regions of one and the same country. The comparatively rapid development of the towns and industrial centers is, as a rule, accompanied by lagging and decline in the agricultural centers.6 Labor/unions and the fight for greater control is a very important element in changing the nature of economics in Latin America. Obviously, labor has been fighting against this capitalist system that consolidates wealth, power, and production in the hands of a few, in hopes of bringing about a more equal and fair distribution of wealth. For some like Charles Bergquist, in his book Labor in Latin America, he argues workers are the central, single most important social force in determining recent (post-1900) course of Latin American history.7 Bergquist focuses on one aspect of labor that fits nicely in to Franks analysis of capitalist underdevelopment. Export sector workers were the driving force of social, economic, and political change in Chile from the Left. Increasingly industrialized capitalist countries of Europe and America generated a rapidly expanding market for primary commodities. Multinational interests targeted Chile for its abundant supply of nitrates, which had many military and agricultural uses, including explosives and fertilizer. Frank argued it produced massive underdevelopment, Bergquist argues that it did provide political stability in Chile and brought about some military power within the region
6

Otto Kuusinen, Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, N.D.), 247248. 7 Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 3.

(1879-1883 wars against Bolivia/Peru provided territory that the nitrate mines were located). Despite the fact the Chile benefitted monetarily from nitrate exports, for the most part ownership was in the hands of foreign nationals, in this case primarily the British. Chileans did however control one important aspect of the nitrate industry, labor. Workers in the North (where nitrate mining/production to place) understood the importance of this industry to the overall health of the national economy. Nitrate workers became involved in such collective action on a large scale as early as 1890. Many of the strikes that punctuated the next four decades began as spontaneous protests against procedures for determining pay, discounts on fichas (or the exchange rate Chilean pesos to pounds sterling), and prices and false scales in company stores.8 Other concerns for the workers were adequate safety devices, termination notices, free schooling, and public recognition of the organizations used to press their agenda forward. These demands challenged the existing capitalist mindset where companies and their managers sought to maximize the control and exploitation of labor, especially in the nitrate regions. Despite the entrenched strength and pull of liberal assumptions, and the great risks associated with workers who participated in leftist politics, significant numbers of nitrate workers became anarchists and socialists.9 Society in the North was divided into two classes; one controlled the capital, wealthy. The other worked and was poor. The capital was foreign and the labor was Chilean. The foreign held capital exploited labor, and the two were locked in a never-ending battle in which the companies and managers, assisted by the state, looked to crush the beginnings of the labor movement in Chile. This phenomenon produced the

8 9

Charles Bergquist, Labor in Latin America (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 55. Bergquist, 57.

political/social forces necessary which pushes Chile to the left throughout the 1900s, the culmination of which is the election of Salvador Allende in 1970.10 The election of Allende was a landmark moment in Latin American history, for the first time in the continents history a self-proclaimed Marxist-socialist was democratically elected. The scholarship on Chile crosses the spectrum and for the most part can be explained by the ideological beliefs that guide the scholars. The basic concern of the Left is to explain why the construction of a Socialist society was not possible in Chile.11 For those in the Center, the literature seems to focus on trying to explain why Chiles vaunted democratic institutions crumbled. The Right looks to explain how a country proud of its national and military traditions would allow such an alien movement and ideology to threaten it from within. The most compelling of all literature on Chile during the time of Allendes rise to power and election is the work that focuses on the Left. It is here that the road to socialism fails for Allende. The literature addresses key points to the internal problems that the Left faced in bringing about this historic change. A key point brought up in the research is the conflict within Unidad Popular (UP), a coalition of left wing, socialist and communist political parties, as a major obstacle in deciding on the tactics that should be used in this transformation of Chile. Politically, Allende faced problems holding his UP coalition together, pacifying the more leftist elements inside and outside UP and, above all, coping with the increasingly implacable opposition. Within UP, the

10

George Reid Andrews, Review Essay: Latin American Workers, Journal of Social History 21, Issue 2 (1987): 311326. 11 Arturo and J. Samuel Valenzuela, Visions of Chile, Latin American Research Review Volume 10, No. 3 (Autumn, 1975): 155-175.

largest party was the Socialist Party. Although composed of multiple factions, the Socialist Party pressed Allende to accelerate the transition toward socialism. The second most important element was the Peoples Communist Party of Chile (PCCh), which favored a more gradual, legalist approach. Outside the UP, the most significant left-wing organization was Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), a tiny but influential group that admired the Cuban Revolution and encouraged workers and peasants to take the revolutionary process into their own hands, much faster than Allende was prepared to go. The diversity within the UP coalition proved problematic in implementing Allendes socialist dream. Central to this theme is the conflict between UP parties and the revolutionary process; those within the Left who opposed Allendes goal of building socialism through traditional bourgeois structure were critical of the speed of the revolution. Peter Winn in his book, Weavers of Revolution, analzyes the contradictory nature of the Chilean Left, highlighting the dilemma faced by Allende and the government when cotton workers at the Yarur mill took control of production at the plant and began a revolution from below. The action taken by the mill workers directly contradicts Allendes desire to proceed through institutional, constitutional structures. The example of the Yarur textile mill epitomized two major problems between the Left, labor, and la via chilena: pace and direction of the revolution. With the peoples candidate in power, workers at the Yarur factory accelerated their goal of nationalizing the mill, far more rapidly than Allende and his planners had wanted. The action of the workers was the polar opposite of Allendes goal of bringing about revolution through the legal apparatus of the state, a revolution from above. The workers movement at the Yarur factory forced Allende and his planners to accelerate the revolution. The actions of a

populist, workers movement set off a wave of nationalizations and pushed Chile farther and faster towards socialism, in turn, brought about increasingly radical reactions from the Right. In his book, Chile: Del triunfo popular al golpe fascista, Carlos Mistral harkens back to Franks thesis that Chile was a dependent capitalist society, dominated by foreign interests and their domestic allies. Mistral agrees that the inevitable contradictions inherent to capitalism, coupled with a nationalistic desire to sever ties of economic dependence, rendered the country ripe for a transition to socialism.12 If that is the case, then what caused the failure of la via chilena? For many on the Left, Allende was not a true revolutionary, but a reformer. His desire to institute change from the top down, failed to capture the fervor of the workers movement. The Yarur factory in Winns book was but one example of worker-inspired socialism. This vision holds that failure was principally due to the misguided reformism of the UP government, particularly of the Communist Party and of Allende himself.13 The Chilean Experiment failed because of Allendes belief he could persuade the old order (middle class, bourgeois) in helping to implement a new Chile. Paul Sweezy summarizes the argument from Allendes critics from the Left, the bourgeois state exists for the purpose of protecting the bourgeois social order. It follows that it cannot be used to transform the social order; it must be broken up and replaced by a state representing the interests of the exploited classes. Only after this has been accomplished does it make sense to talk about a transition to socialism.14 Sweezy goes on further to state that those who benefit from the current economic system are unwilling to relinquish control peacefully. Inevitably, they must turn to the military to defend their
12 13

Carlos Mistral, Chile: Del triunfo popular al golpe fascista (Mexico: Ediciones Era, S.A., 1974), 93. Les Evans, editor, Disaster in Chile (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974). 12-15. 14 Paul Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, editors Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Chile (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974), 11-12.

privileges. According to Sweezy, the Chilean tragedy confirmsthat there is no such thing as a peaceful road to socialismThe reason is simply that the beneficiaries of the existing system (in this case the contradictory, exploitive capitalism that Chile found itself wrapped up in), including many who only imagine themselves to be its beneficiaries, are not going to give up without a struggle or renounce any means available to them in waging the struggleAt some stage of the process violent confrontation is inevitable.15 The Maximalist Left, a term coined by Arturo and Samuel Valenzuela, felt that UPs failure to predict middle class backlash by the move towards a socialist Chile, further crippled the movement. UP leadership should have seen this type of internal resistance coming and been prepared to meet the opposition. Some authors suggest that after impressive showings in the municipal elections of 1971, the UP should have capitalized and strengthened popular community organizations. By providing these groups with both ideological and military training, a potential single revolutionary party would have developed, capable of defending the working class. Much to the chagrin of commentators from the Maximalist Left, the government not only failed to pursue such a strategy, it deliberately undermined the revolutionary potential of the working class.16 Committees that were formed within the UP to help in the 1970 election campaign this provided the infrastructure necessary for creating a revolutionary working class party; however for scholars in the Maximalist Left camp, the Allende government ignored these committees and missed a vital opportunity.

15 16

Ibid, 11, 156-160. Carlos Mistral, Chile: Del triunfo popular al golpe fascista (Mexico: Ediciones Era, S.A., 1974), 113.

Cordones Industriales, established by the working class to combat companies within Chile that failed to implement Allendes economic reforms and refused to accept workers rights, also posed peculiar problems for the Allende government. The cordones also exerted pressure on the government to accelerate the move to socialism, and became a political power base for the working class, independent from the establish bureaucracies and official trade unions. From the Maximalist Lefts point of view, the failure of the revolution falls squarely in the lap of Unidad Popular and Allende. They failed to grasp the revolutionary spirit of the working class/unions personified within the cordones industriales by holding on to the utopian dream of a revolution from above within the confines of the existing socio/political system. As Sweezy noted earlier, there was no chance of a peaceful road to socialism for Chile. Even after the aborted coup of June 29, 1973 the government refused to arm the workers, who could have been ready to defend against the governments enemies, and in fact disarmed some cordones. Furthermore, the government foolishly placed its trust in the armed forces that were already plotting his overthrow. The lack of visionary planning by Allende and his advisors draws additional critique. Sweezy argues the revolutionary process must be ready to defend, with force, its goals. Preparation at every level to have a coordinated response to counterrevolutionary forces is tantamount to the success of the revolution. An organized mass movement, which the workers/unions offered Allende, is an integral part of the revolutionary process. Les Evans notes that what was missing in Chile was a mass revolutionary party with a perspective of

struggling against the military for power, not collaborating with the generals and urging the workers to trust the local agents of imperialism.17 Like the Maximalist, the Gradualist Left also shared a desire to uncover the failure of the socialist plan in Chile. They differ from the Maximalist in the belief the road to socialism was doomed for failure. The assumption that Chile was caught in a dependent, capitalist system is agreed on by both camps; however analysts from the Gradualist Left are more critical in the belief that the working class was in a position to transform itself into a mass, popular movement. This viewpoint critiques the arguments from the Maximalists, who insisted that the workers movement was ready and capable of armed struggle. For Gradualists, this armed struggle would have been catastrophic for both the workers movement and the government. As Joan Garces notes: It would be a blatant error to think that the Popular Unity government would have had the time and means to distribute arms among the workersBoth loyal and disloyal officers would have reacted like one man. The labor movement would have found itself isolated, facing a united Armed Force willing to defend their only power: the monopoly of force.18 Extreme elements of the Left, despite Allendes desire to form relationships with those elements and the middle class and centrist parties, made it difficult for Allende to forged needed alliances for his programs. To those in the Gradualists camp, the extreme Lefts action forced not only the center parties towards the right, but caused the Christian Democratic Left to hesitate on supporting Allende and UP programs, thus stalling the road to socialism. The failure of the Allende program and subsequent coup was multifaceted in the eyes of the

17 18

Les Evans, editor Disaster in Chile (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1974), 14. Joan Garces, Democratie et contrerevolution: Le problem Chilien (Verviers, Belgium: Maraba Publishers, 1975), 9.

Gradualist Left. The errors in strategy, pressures from the Left, weakness of the Center, external elements (CIA operatives inside Chile, the Nixon Administration terminating financial assistance and blocking loans from multilateral organizations), and ultimately the treason by the armed forces all played a significant role in the coup. For this camp (Gradualist) the blame is spread out much wider than Maximalist authors. The Centrist authors look less at the failure of socialism and more towards what they feel was a collapse of Chilean democracy. The coup was a final example of a failed democratic camp. One of the most significant scholars is Genaro Arriagadas De la via chilena al via insurreccional. Arriagadas main theme is that rigid, fanatic ideological forces were determined in wrecking the socialist movement: The unrealistic dogmatism, the uncontrolled process of ideologization that reached not only the Marxist sectors, but also others in the country, prevented many from seeing the precipice toward which we walked.19 For Arriagada the Marxist parties were the principal agents of the failure of socialism. UP, in Arriagadas opinion, never took seriously the idea of a Chilean Way to Socialism, which included achieving the socialist dream through constitutional/democratic means. Their political position, weakened by the coalition it found necessary to form, transformed this movement not as one of the proletariat, but a Marxist dictatorship of party elites. For Arriagada, Allende was never interested in democracy, as evidenced by his support of Carlos Altamirano, a staunch Marxist, to become president of the Socialist party in 1971. Within this framework of Arriagadas argument, Allendes choice of Altamirano is not seen as an attempt to co-opt and neutralize the

19

Genero Arriagada, De la via chilena al via insurreccional (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1974), 23.

extreme elements of the Socialist party.20 Unlike scholars on the Left, these in the Center say nothing critical about actions taken and not taken by the forces of the Right. Historians on the Right make arguments similar in critique to Arriagada. However, the tone of this literature is highly critical of Allende and argues that he was committed to a totalitarian solution, while at the same time drawing a picture of a degenerate president surrounded by a motley band of international extremists bent not only on establishing Communism but on personal enrichment.21 The majority of the books from the Right focus on Plan Zeta, a proposed scheme, allegedly attributed to Allende, to assassinate members of the armed forces and opposition. Citing documents found after the coup, scholars on the Right view the plan as irrefutable proof the military had to intervene when it did. Many among the Left and Center do not accept this claim from the Right. They contest that many of these documents were produced by extreme elements of the Left. So while the documents might be legitimate, the idea that Allende was involved is highly disputed. Many books from the Right are based on official publications of the military government which overthrew Allende; these sources must be seen in the context of the political and social realm imposed by the junta (the crackdown on democratic freedoms, press, criticisms of the junta). Books on the Right praise the actions of the military junta in saving Chile from the socialist menace. The writers argue Allende and Unidad Popular violated the constitution, circumvented the congress, and disregarded the power of the judiciary. In this light, not only was the intervention of the armed forces justified because of this alleged violation of democratic constitutional order, but the

20 21

Ibid, 25. Ricardo Boizard, El ultimo dia de Allende (Santiago: Editorial del Pacifico, 1973), 69-75.

armed forces, because of their mission, can legitimately be the final judge of that violation.22 There is also contempt for democratic institutions from the Right. The main political party of the Right was Partido Nacional (PN), who were at the forefront of opposition to the Allende government, working closely with elements of the business community. Historians on the Right see the rise of Marxism, what the junta called a corrupt democracy, as a point of contention to lay the blame. Democracy encouraged these ideological extremes which hope to rally the masses with often impossible dreams, often times these causes benefitted selfish interests of the Left. Its effect is to split the community into un-natural factions, destroying national solidarity and opening the way for the corrosive effect of alien ideology.23 Scholars from the Right, in general, justify the actions of those forces determined to overthrow Allende. The military are seen as saviors to a once proud country. Their actions are further strengthened by supporters when seen within the context of the Cold War. Neoliberal forces and Cold War hawks could not allow Chile to turn communist. Chile was not going to be the next Cuba in the critical eyes of the Right. The literature written about the events in Chile from the election of Salvador Allende to the military coup and beyond offer a wide variety of scenarios on the causes; what happened in Chile? From the vantage point of different ideological camps the answer narrows to fit each ones belief. Socialisms lack of success, democracys failure, and the rise of Marxism are all addressed in the literature, each one with a slightly different interpretation. For the Right, the coup was necessary to save Chile from the forces of communism/socialism and restore Chile to

22 23

Hector Rieles, La legitmidad de la Junta de Gobierno, Fundamentos (Santiago: Ediciones Portada, 1973), 126. Pablo Baraona, Fuerzas armadas y seguridad nacional (Santiago: Ediciones Portada, 1973), 73-121.

its once proud nationalist past. From the ashes of the coup neoliberal forces both inside and outside Chile would determine the course of the country. Historians on the Center defend the position of the Christian Democratic Party, and put much of the blame on the Unidad Popular government. The inability of UP to bring centrist parties and the middle class into the UP coalition hurt. The centrist parties and middle class failed to buy into the socialist dream of the newly elected government. But the underlying factor the authors from the Left bring out is the shortcomings of Allende and Popular Unity. Herein lays the overriding reasons for failures of the road to socialism. A more united front by UP would have helped them deal more effectively with the middle class, a key part of Allendes plan to move Chile towards socialism. A more unified front, ideologically, would have helped UP in forging the Left in a more focused, common set of goals. Infighting over ideology by the Left took away needed energy to mobilize the movement against its detractors. The literature from the Left clearly conveys serious problems within Unidad Popular. The ideological rhetoric could only go so far in transforming Chilean society towards socialism. In fact, that rhetoric drove many middle-class groups to move against Allende and align themselves with forces on the Right. Failing to set priorities among its revolutionary goals and underestimating the sacrifices that would have to be made in order to make popular gains, Unidad Popular fell short. As Sergio Bitar noted in his book, Chile: Experiment in Democracy, Popular Unity wished to do many things at onceraise the incomes of working-class citizens and peasants and implement sweeping changes in the economic

systemwithout considering, whether or not these goals were compatible.24 Allende and his advisors misread the middle class, who were too closely tied to the bourgeois system they were planning on overturning. The middle class, key to Allendes overall success, were interested in the long-term survival of themselves as opposed to short-term economic gains. The middle class feared losing their standing in Allendes Chile. This fear paralyzed many in the middle class from throwing their support behind Allende. The fervor of the working-class and unions to accelerate the revolution from a grassroots level, was misinterpreted by the government and they were ill prepared to garner this drive to help facilitate socialist programs. The conflict between government advisors and the populist working-class unions proved to be a huge problem, as well. The failure of UP leaders to address the militancy of the working-class unions proved problematic and showed poor vision within the movement. Was this oversight a result of Chilean Exceptualism? Forces inside and outside of Chile were determined to undermine la via Chilena, but the internal divisions and lack of a unified Left is critical in explaining the failures of Chiles road to socialism and the subsequent coup. The research of the Left, both Maximalist and Gradualist, reveals the internal quandary that Allende and his planners faced, failed to consider, and ultimately cost them in fulfilling their goals.

24

Lois Hecht Oppenheim, The Chilean Road to Socialism Revisited, Latin American Research Review, Volume 24, No. 1 (1999), 179.