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The Passions of the Wise: "Phronsis", Rhetoric, and Aristotle's Passionate Practical Deliberation Author(s): Arash Abizadeh Source:

The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 56, No. 2 (Dec., 2002), pp. 267-296 Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131817 Accessed: 08/12/2009 12:41
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J. here


should litical philosophers in contradistinction cal reason. First, as a hindrance emotions primarily become

WHY contemporary moral and po to Aristotle's account of practi be attentive with views that characterize the to practical moral phi reasoning, with the revived Aris

have impressed losophers increasingly relies on that good practical totelian systematically reasoning insight reason have become in accounts of practical the emotions. Second, to theorize the for political philosophers seeking important creasingly deliberation. democratic My intention principles governing regulative in this paper that Aristotle shows is to demonstrate reason that constructively and deliberation practical emotions level. emotion practical can illuminate I argue key issues about deliberation how an account of the incorporates at the political


(pathos) deliberation:

that, according are constitutive in order deliberation

to Aristotle, and character (ethos) of phronetic features of the process to render a determinate action-specific cannot be

practical judgment, demonstration (apodeixis).

to logical reduced simply I argue, by uncovering This can be seen, an important between the virtue of phron?sis and structural parallel to tease out this structural the art of rhetoric. Second, parallel helps

account of practical deliberation for contem the insights of Aristotle's the ethical democratic porary consequences theory?in particular, and that follow from the fact that passionate deliberation political are unavoidable to in democracy and are always susceptible judgment straying from issuing forth properly ethical outcomes.

to: Department Correspondence CT 06459. Middletown,

The Review Metaphysics of Metaphysics 56 (December 2002):

of Government,






by The Review


268 I


of democracy rests on his fears about critique a regime led by popular leaders who, goguery, by appealing are capable of ingratiating themselves with people's passions, a helpless led to tyrannize to the jority thereby minority?even Aristotle's ment of

dema to the a ma detri

the majority itself. Of course, modern liberal democracies have developed some of the fears that to alleviate various responses so long ago. One of lib and in other ways Aristotle, Plato, articulated eralism's most has answers significant been constitutional to the constraint threat of the tyranny of the on democratic decision

majority making. Yet



the application Obviously, stances cannot be carried this introduces I say is what "written between codified we

the limits of such an anticipates of abstract to particular laws out by the laws the themselves. The

answer. circum


call might because nomos" written laws and

"indeterminacy Aristotle makes nomos:

problem of written

a fundamen the former re

tal distinction fers to the


the by a particular legislated polis, latter refers to the unwritten tacit norms that seem to be agreed upon cannot all and that invariably be codified The by (as abstract rules).1 nomos of written to Aristotle's refers that the indeterminacy thought written abstract rules that constitute specified antecedently are never to issue forth in a determinate sufficient face of particular circumstances. Because the answer Why? to be done codified the written injunction laws in the



ought be fully

in particular circumstances or writing in human speech

of what practical question can never, for Aristotle, as a series of abstract an

rules?there tecedently specified in or by abstract In other logos. nomos is simply the indeterminacy or what I shall call mean to evoke a political of universals the

a remainder is always not captured the indeterminacy of written words, manifestation of a more condition: general when employed of abstract reason and in practical logos" speech). reason, I (and here This inde

"indeterminacy connotations of both

1 Rhetoric 1.10.1368b7-9. 1.13.1373b2-7; 1.13.1374al8-28; Compare with Politics The translations of Aristotle's 3.16.1287b5-9. Politics (hereaf ter, "Pol") and Rhetoric (hereafter, "Rhef) I cite, sometimes with slight mod are On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. ifications, York: Oxford University trans. and The Politics, Kennedy Press, 1991) (New Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).


terminacy to issue stances, ethical of refers both in determinate to (a) the fact normative that abstract injunctions that practical reason in particular

is insufficient circum

fact whether and (b) the parallel philosophy, as a series or political, can never be fully codified in language set of general The practical antecedently specified principles.2 abstract codification that that arise render from several interrelated In part, this features inexactness of

ubiquitous requirement for in situ judgment and the impossibility of

final practical philosophy arises from the fact cover every particular it inexact.3 rules that may

(1) abstract


ex ante cannot developed arise in the future.4 (2)

for me sound ble

is good unconditionally
(or good as they may be in general, in politics, that written itself.6

(hapl?s) may not necessarily

or people).5 turn out sometimes this means nomos be add

be good

for this or that person

rules, (3) Abstract to be inapplica or fairness overridden, reasons that

in particular


that decency occasionally to Aristotle's

(epieikeia) for the sake

requires of justice

One might

2That ethics is in an has been much dis important sense uncodifiable in Aristotle cussed John McDowell, "Virtue scholarship. See, for example, and Reason," The Monist 62, no. 3 (1979): 331-50; Norman O. Dahl, Practical and Weakness of Min Reason, Aristotle, of the Will (Minneapolis: University nesota Press, 1984), 79; Nancy Sherman, The Fabric Character: Aristotle's of Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 16-18; Eugene Garver, Ar istotle's Rhetoric: An Art of Character of Chicago Press, (Chicago: University Daniel T. Devereux makes the interesting statement that "[i]n the case 1994). ... it is the universals of practical knowledge that are indeterminate and im while the judgments about particular acts in particular circumstances precise are precise and determinate. If there is a discrepancy the particular between rule which applies to judgment of the practically wise person and a universal the situation, the defect is on the side of the universal; it is the particular in Aristotle's "Particular and Universal that is authoritative"; Con judgment Review ception of Practical of Metaphysics 39, no. 3 (1986): Knowledge," 483-504 at 497-8. Ethics 1.3.1094bl2-26. The translation of the Nicoma sNicomachean chean Ethics is (hereafter, "NE") I cite, sometimes with slight modification, that of Terence Irwin (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1985). 4itae?l.l3.1374a28-bl. 5 believes that though Concerning goods that are good hapl?s, Aristotle are wrong; "human beings pray for these and pursue the right them, they is good hapl?s will also be good for us, but to thing is to pray that what choose Aristotle makes a paral [only] what is good for us"; NE 5.1.1129b4-7. a regime that is best hap in the Politics where he distinguishes lel distinction l?s from regimes that are best for most cities and those that are best given the circumstances (Pol 4.1.1288b22-8). Compare Garver, Aristotle's Rhetoric,

6 NE




rules cannot also determine (4) abstract cation. it is unreasonable Consequently, the rules ever

of their own appli and

to demand

of moral

political philosophy
act move

(politike), and the written

laws, that they be ex

We cannot re poli reducing to particular determinate? be when in the he

in the way that mathematics be. (akrib?s) might the deliberating from ethics and politics, agent tike to a passive of universal application principles circumstances. is required. Judgment But how an does the individual render indication the of the of what Aristotle's of abstract he appeals his judgment answer would codification to the


get deals with instance fairness) override

indeterminacy laws. Here


exercised the written

or epieikeia (decency the individual may by the moral agent, by which laws for the sake of justice. Aristotle that: says

what is decent is just, but is not what is legally just, but a rectification of it. The reason is that all law is universal, but in some areas no univer a universal sal rule can be correct; and so where rule has to be made, but cannot be correct, the law chooses the [universal rule] that is usu And the law is no ally [correct], well aware of the error being made. less correct on this account; for the source of the error is not the law or the legislator, but the nature of the object itself, since that is what the of action is bound to be like. Hence whenever the law subject-matter makes a universal rule, but in this particular case what happens violates the [intended scope of] the universal rule, here the legislator falls short, an unconditional and has made an error by making rule. Then it is cor rect to rectify the deficiency; this is what the legislator would have said himself if he had been present, and what he would have prescribed, had ... this is the nature of what is decent?rec he known, in his legislation tification of law in so far as the universality it deficient. of law makes is guided by law. For on This is also the reason why not everything some matters is impossible, and so a decree is needed. For legislation the standard applied to what is indefinite is itself indefinite.1 When in mind cates, matters cies Aristotle written as does of uses nomos, the fact the term nomos in this passage, he evidently as the frequent to the legislator reference he uses nomos that here interchangeably That contrasted even more epieikeia to?written clear is making nomos up for and not where has indi with


legislation. is being is made

the deficien to nomos he speaks

as a whole

in On Rhetoric,

as an instance of epieikeia of unwritten nomos.8 But what might the epieikeia of the particular, agent deliberating nomos that written does not, and that allows the proper be providing in Aristotle's treatment The answer discus of particulars? emerges

7NE 5.10.1137M2-30,




sion ment of written that laws in the Politics. with There written he "to rule in accordance

the argu is addressing in any is foolish [rules] and do not command law that lacking It is lacking

art" because with a view

"laws only speak to circumstances."

of the universal What

is the written circumstances? present


it insensitive

"the passionate man soul necessarily

in law, but every hu itmight has it." On the one hand, Aristotle notes, is element the passionate that "what is unaccompanied be argued by On the other hand, the exist it is innate." to that in which superior in the human that "he soul means ence of this "passionate element" deliberate in finer fashion concerning law, then, is contrasted What The rule of written cases]."9 in turn the intellect," which found in the human soul.10 particulars is identified with [or: in particular with the "rule of

to the particular "is not which element"


the written

element the passionate laws lack in comparison found in his soul: or disadvanta matters of delib


a deliberating element is the passionate agent cite this lack as advantageous different parties might is that "to legislate but the upshot concerning geous, eration

is impossible."11 element if it is the lack of a passionate Now, nomos for matters of deliberation, insufficient practical producing deliberations judgment of an individual render if deliberation itself were from

that then

renders how

written could the

a determinate solely a matter The simply

action of (pas answer a matter is

premises? reasoning sionless) logico-deductive is not deliberation that it could not. But Aristotelian

of logical demonstration. in section In order to make 2,1 will first examine good this claim, in order to demonstrate account deliberation of rhetorical Aristotle's the constitutive role of ethos and pathos there. Then, in section 3, I

8The context to identify "two is Aristotle's of the discussion attempt others unwritten of just and unjust actions (some against written, species law. These are, on to refer to "two species of unwritten laws)." He proceeds of virtue and vice . . . and on the involves an abundance the one hand, what law. Fairness other hand things omitted by the specific and written [epie seems to be just; but fairness is justice that goes beyond ikes], for example, the written emphasis added. So fairness falls un law"; Rhet 1.13.1374al8-28, laws. der the second species of unwritten 9Po?3.15.1286al9-22. 10 Pol 3.16.1287a29-33. 11 Pol 3.16.1287b22-3.

will uncover a structural

the are

between the art of rhetoric and parallel a parallel of phron?sis, virtue that ethos and pathos suggesting as well. constitutive of phronetic deliberation

II to say that the function Aristotle of the art of One might expect is to persuade; but he says instead that "its function is not to rhetoric12 means of persuasion in each case"? but to see the available persuade ric to identify it arises. He defines fallacious where rheto sophistry in each to see the "an ability [dunamis], [particular] case,13 means of persuasion."14 The fact that the rhetorician available does and as of persuasion is precisely what renders a techn? (art or craft): it has not just a given end or external rhetoric The given but also guiding ends or internal constitutive good goods.15 to cite one example of an Aristotelian end of the practice of medicine, shoot directly for the end


to Aristotle, three species of rhetoric are, according (Rhet rhetoric (sumbouleutikon), The first is deliberative whose 1.2.1357a36-b29). or expedient and the harmful, and telos is the advantageous (sumpheron) or dissuasion concerns This is the exhortation about future action. which kind of rhetoric used in the political deliberative councils, which deliberate of the polis, seeking the advantageous about the common matters (compare Pol 4.14.1298a-b). politi (There is a broad and a narrow sense of collective in Aristotle. in the broad sense serves to des cal deliberation "Deliberation" and judicial delib proper [in the councils], ignate both political deliberation deliberation proper eration, but in the narrow sense distinguishes political The locution "deliber from judicial deliberation [compare Pol 7.9.1329a3-5]. The second is judi the term in the restricted ative rhetoric" employs sense.) con whose cial rhetoric (dikanikon), telos is the just and unjust, and which a past action. or defense cerns accusation This is the kind of regarding deliberation seeks a judgment rhetoric that takes place in the courts where that renders justice (compare Pol 7.8,1328b 13-15). The third species of rhet and it involves praising oric is epideictic. Its telos is the noble and shameful, or blaming someone or something I am concerned only with the presently. to the "deliberative" these are the ones appropriate first two species, because element of the polis?the councils and the courts. 13 re that "In each case (peri hekaston) Kennedy notes in his translation in fers to the fact that rhetoric deals with specific circumstances (particular See Aristotle, 36-7. On Rhetoric, dividuals and their actions)." uRhetl.2.lS55b25-6. 15 Rhetoric, chap. 1. Garver, Aristotle's



techn?, may end guiding his dard that be of to maintain the life and health of


techn? well,

procedures ends?via is, fulfill its guiding dures and rules, even if one fails the patient dies.) relation between Of course

but the its patients, is to perform of medicine the doctor qua practitioner stan for instance, certain which involves, following the techn? well? and rules. One can thus perform a masterful to achieve application its given end there were of its proce (for example, no reliable

a techn?

for which

necessity best achieved end

for techn?

the fail to be viable; and given ends would its guiding there are some given ends that are arises because Persuasion is one such them directly. by not pursuing three means

for Aristotle.16 Aristotle identifies

the of persuasion speech: through and logos. "Of the pist?is of ethos, pathos, provided proofs (pist?is) are in the for some there are three species: speech [logos] through in some way, in disposing the listener and some ethos of the speaker, and show some in the argument He goes or seeming to by showing there is persuasion through the trust of the au of the rhetorician gains itself, [logos] on to say that from the speech kind is a certain [logos], not of person." from Fur a

something." insofar as the speech result and that "this should dience, that the speaker previous opinion ethos

occurs when the hearers they are led thermore, persuasion "through And third, regarding to feel pathos the speech logical dem by [logos]." or enthymeme, Aristotle via paradigm onstrations says that "[persua occurs when we show the truth or the arguments sion [logoi] through apparent Two from the truth from whatever are text of is persuasive in each I have flag an case."17 the word feature logos of comments original discussion refer in order. included important

First, in order to the pist?is.

Aristotle's commentators in fact when stricted

to the tripartite for Aristotle all three pist?is call sense the third pistis

pist?is occur

following Although, of ethos, pathos,



"logos," we demonstration logical

in "logos." are using the word (apodeixis),

Aristotle, and logos, In other words, in a re as an

16 29-33. "Unless achieving the exter See Garver, Aristotle's Rhetoric, no one would ever develop an art. Arts do not lose nal end were desirable, ends in addition" their own autonomous their given ends when they develop

l7Rhet 1.2.1356al-20.

instance broader structed The

sense the broader of logos.18 Aristotle's falling within or discursive notion of practical is not con logos rationality in contrast to ethos and pathos?rather, it includes these. or third pistis, refers to strict dem via the use of paradigms and en persuasion logical "I call rhetorical an enthymeme, a rhetorical sullogismos logos, produce logical persuasion and by nothing other than enthymemes a "sullogismos Aristotle calls enthymeme of a or a "rhetorical demonstration And all [speakers] sense of as the


onstration thymemes: induction by means these."19

a paradigm. of paradigms

The [apodeixis]."21 as Burnyeat is key here because, for Ar notes, istotle is the term that suggests It is "apodeixis logical stringency."22 sense this restricted of logos, as a series of logico-deductive demon strations that are thereby to which the notion of the inde codifiable, terminacy of abstract one way logos refers. in which to interpret take Aristotle to be saying is disjunc passages that persuasion operates occasions. In fact, however, logos, on different the role of the three pist?is the conjunctively: that here and logos ethos, pathos, is that Aristotle advances the insufficiency of every operate the conjunc logos (in the re these

In one place and in another sort,"20 to apodeixis reference

Second, tively: one might via

or ethos, pathos, Aristotle understands art of time. rhetoric What

requires is important by explicitly

tive account


18 There is a parallel here in Aristotle's Just as ethos, regime typology. and logos (in a restricted that occur in logos pathos, sense) are three pist?is use the word politeia both to des (in the broad sense), so too does Aristotle and ar ignate "regime" in the broad sense of any regime, including monarchy the specific regime which Anglophone translators istocracy, and to designate call "polity" or "constitutional government." The meaning 19Rhet 1.2.1356b4-7. of the Greek word sullogismos is not in English by the word syllogism, quite the same as what we normally mean so I have left it transliterated with its two premises and conclusion, in the on the Ra original. On this point, see M. F. Burnyeat, "Enthymeme: Aristotle on Aristotle's inEssays ed. A. O. Rorty (Ber tionality of Rhetoric," Rhetoric, of California keley: University Press, 1996), 88-115 at 100. Earlier he had as Aristotle a noted that "a sullogismos it is at least the following: defines in which valid deductive the premises the plural) provide a argument (note for a conclusion distinct from them" (95). logically sufficient justification 20Rhet2.24.U00b37.

22 Burnyeat,




but to persuade in producing a determinate


stricted sense) to the fact that the given end of rhetoric is not just to
persuade, judgment: since rhetoric is concerned with making a judgment (people judge what are also a judgment) it is and judicial proceedings is said in deliberation, not only to look to the argument necessary [logos], that it may be de but also [for the kai pistos] and persuasive monstrative [apodeiktiktos a view of himself as a certain kind of person and speaker] to construct in regard to persua to prepare the judge; for itmakes much difference but also in trials) that the speaker seem in deliberations sion (especially are three reasons why speakers to be a certain kind of person-There are persuasive; for there are three things we trust other than themselves and virtue These are phron?sis [apodeixeis]. logical demonstrations [arete] and good will [eunoia].23 As he goes the path?, change, A broader to elaborate, "goodwill which "are those things come to differ in their have commentators of logos, on and friendliness" which, are matters by that undergoing Aristotle's is not con of


people of host notion

judgements."24 noted the fact of practical an interpretation

in the context


structed in opposition
constitute.25 The main

to pathos

or to the ethos that the path? help

such faces, however,

is chapter 1 of On Rhetoric. As iswell known, in that chapter Aristotle

to pathos to deprecate rhetorical (he says proofs appealing of the soul and pity and anger and such emotions that "verbal attack no to the juryman"),26 and makes do not relate to fact but are appeals would of ethos. However, mention of proofs following Brunschwig,271 appears

1378a6-9. 23i?fa??2.1.1377b20-8, 24i?/^2.1.1378al9-21. 25 to be constitutive takes the proper emotional That Aristotle responses "no good person would be distressed of ethos is, I think, beyond question: meet punishment; for it is right murderers and bloodthirsty when parricides fare well; for to rejoice in such cases, as in the case of those who deservedly ... All these both are just things and cause a fair-minded person to rejoice. come from the same moral character, and opposite feelings from the feelings And elsewhere: "let us go through the kinds Rhet 2.9.1386b26-32. opposite"; and habits of character, considering what they are like in terms of emotions see For discussion, and age of life and fortune [tuche]"; Rhet 2.12.1388b31-2. in Aristotle's Virtues and Feelings L. A. Kosman, Properly Affected: "Being on Aristotle's ed. A. O. Rorty (Berkeley: University Ethics, Ethics," in Essays of California Press, 1980), 103-16. 2GRhet 1.1.1354al6-18. 27 to Dia "Aristotle's Rhetoric As a 'Counterpart' Jacques Brunschwig, on Aristotle's inEssays 34-55 at 45-6. Rhetoric, lectic,"



to pa that far from undermining the claim that logos is related is specifying that relation. For the path? he deprecates Aristotle thos, are those to matters to the subject" at that draw external "attention the kind of pathos In other words, that forms a legitimate hand.28 pis tis is one that is "entechnical," which is found in the speech the relation (that between argues, for is, logos) itself.29 A second ?thos/pathos example, that beliefs nitions suade validity which that

problem and logos for Aristotle

is actually in Aristotle's

to specify

thought. are the emotions emotions; Cooper because that

Nussbaum constituted Sherman


the different of emotions; in general

as constitutive desires (orexeis)

that argues the desires raise affect

by cognitive too sees cog logos can per cognitive

argues claims; perception, Leighton and Wardy that in rhetorical in turn affects argues judgment; our to truthful contexts the proper "enhance path? receptivity view of the relation is im I will that Aristotle's try to show logos"30 paral


it in the context of a structural clarified by examining portantly rhetoric and phronetic lel between deliberation.31 practical

28?fteil.l.l354al5-16. 29 of this issue, and in particular For further discussion chapter l's rela tion to the rest of the work, see Kennedy, On Rhetoric, 27-8; Robert Wardy, on Aristotle's Rhetoric, "Mighty is the Truth and It Shall Prevail?" in Essays to "Is There an Ethical Dimension 56-87 at 62-3, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, on Aristotle's in Essays 116-41 at 131, and Rhetoric?" Aristotelian Rhetoric, in the Rheto and Rhetoric Glenn W. Most, "The Uses of Endoxa: Philosophy ed. A. Nehamas Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, (Princeton: ric," Aristotle's Princeton University clear, my view is different Press, 1994). As will become He sug from J?rgen Sprute's attempt to resolve the apparent discrepancy. 1 is an "ideal rhetoric" de rhetoric of chapter gests that the emotion-free in general"; to rhetoric is essential in order to "determine what scribed Rhetoric: of Rhetoric," Aristotle's "Aristotle and the Legitimacy Sprute, Princeton ed. A. Nehamas University Philosophical Essays, (Princeton: to suppose to emotion and that appeals Press, 1994), 119. Sprute seems are one and the same, and concludes that Aristotle's atechnical pro appeals For ex appeals is also directed against the emotions. scription of atechnical the laws ought "to forbid speaking outside ample, he says that for Aristotle emotions" of persuasion like arousing the subject and hence using means and repre and so concludes that "arousing emotions (119, my emphasis), senting character, are not directly concerned with the subject but have only a are not function in persuading" (122). But arousing emotions supplementary of rhetoric. and ethos and pathos are constitutive pist?is always atechnical,


Since for Aristotle the telos of the polis rhetoric yield is eudaimonia,32 implies a belief judgments


imate political the possibility with the right acterization cian, he says,

role that he assigns can that rhetoric reason

the legit in at least consistent This possi rhetori side of a


of a phronetic



bility is indicated by Aristotle when he immediately follows his char

of rhetoric as a capacity to prove opposites?the on either "should be able to argue persuasively that ethical admonition the parenthetical do both rhetoric (for one should not persuade is a techn? and not itself

question"?with that we may based)."33 phron?sis,

it is "not is de like

actually But since

what a virtue

the standard

plied by a source tle's parenthetical for the admonition On Rhetoric:34 itself must but

must of its outcomes for the Tightness to the art itself. This is perhaps why external is not repeated ethical admonition anywhere is not internal Ethical

be sup Aristo else in

to the art of rhetoric rhetoric

to rhetoric. is given by ethics externally the architectonic be rhetoric by politik?, governed


But since for Aristotle

function of their contribution the mere

the legitimacy of political

to the realization of

the telos of

is a

outcomes is not of yielding ethical daimonia, possibility to rhetoric such a prominent and legiti For Aristotle, giving enough. as art collective the mate practical role, governing political so that deliberation in the polis's deliberation institutions, requires

30 The Therapy Martha Craven Nussbaum, of Desire: Theory and Prac Ethics tice in Hellenistic Press, 1994), 81-8; (Princeton: Princeton University on Aristo "Some Remarks 45; John Cooper, Sherman, Fabric of Character, The Southern Journal tle's Moral Psychology," 27, supplement of Philosophy in "Aristotle and the Emotions," (1988): 25-42 at 34-5; Stephen R. Leighton, on Aristotle's is the 206-37 at 210, 217; Wardy, Rhetoric, Essays "Mighty Truth and It Shall Prevail?" 63. 31 of the treatise "The famous first words [On Rheto Compare Wardy: of dialectic' 'rhetoric is the counterpart flatly rejects Socrates' ric], (1354al), are categorically dis thesis that philosophical arguments uncompromising is the Truth and It Shall Prevail?" tinct from rhetorical pleas"; Wardy, "Mighty

32Pol 7.1.1323al4-1324al3. 33ifae?l.l.l355a29-31. 34 As Kennedy notes, in Aristotle, 35A^1.2.1094a28.

On Rhetoric,

34 n. 27.

have governed wdth phron?sis36 a propensity Aristotle to indeed issue does forth

in judgments think that rhetoric question is how consistent has a pro to explain the the

to yield correct The pensity judgments.37 Aristotle's well-known here.38 optimism in other words, would What, explain of the art of rhetoric to yield propensity as reason ethical of right requirements

the possibility for and outcomes consistent with embodied in the phronimos

and his deliberations?

for this consistency gumentative explain Aristotle's of the techn? ical constraints fails process itself not

My thesis is that the possibility and propensity

is furnished in both by the structural types of deliberation. to the similarity In other internal in the ar I words, constitution

optimism by reference rather than by reference constitutive

to externally eth imposed of the art of rhetoric: for the external

to explain the nature of Aristotle's about the strategy optimism techn? itself. At the same time, however, Aristotle's cannot optimism on collapsing the category of techn? into that of virtue; rather, depend is that the structural constitution of the art of rhetoric my suggestion produces an internally have generated another propensity to induce judgments con

sistent with
then we would a central such

the outcomes

of phronetic


If this is right,

rhetoric assigns in politics: not be a means for outcomes with a propensity to be consistent with right rea generating do so by bypassing the onerous standard son, but it would potentially of full virtue required in monological deliberation.39 phronetic By pro viding structural-technical incentives that substitute for the full virtue rhetoric despite words, in the monological deliberations of the phronimos, required could enable to reach correct institutions outcomes political the ethical shortcomings of the polity's members. In other

for why Aristotle rhetoric only would

361 am tempted to say that collective decisions must have a propensity to coincide with what the phronetic But this formula person would decide. tion faces two objections. person First, it is not clear that every phronetic come up with would the same decision, to Aristotle. according (On this see Am?lie Oksenberg on in Essays question, Rorty, "Structuring Rhetoric," Aristotle's and more significantly, this way of putting Rhetoric, 14.) Second, that it implies, contrary to Aristotle's inten things is open to the objection rea to the outcomes makes no difference of practical tions, that discussion son. To avoid this latter objection, I say instead that ethical rhetoric is "con in the sense that it issues forth in decisions sistent with" phron?sis whose or lightness phronetic wisdom persons can recognize. 31 Rhet 1.1.1355al4-17, 20-3, 36-8. 38 see Wardy, On Aristotle's optimism, "Mighty is the Truth and It Shall Prevail?" 59-60.


rhetoric cessful might be a way for Aristotle to lower the virtue bar

for suc

politics. I have already the key structural feature of collective, identified it is constituted rhetorical deliberation: of persua by three means or not a council or court and logos. Whether is pathos, sion?ethos,

on to render a particular persuaded by a speaker judgment depends reason of pistis three species and not just the demonstrative embod to say that the process ied in argument. This is what it means of rhe is not persuasion sense of the third pistis. ence finds the conclusions torical constituted In collective solely by logos in the restrictive whether the audi deliberation, on of the rhetorician persuasive depends in the argument embodied leading to it.

the ethos, pathos, and logos to argue that, similarly, when Iwant in monological prac engaged or not the individual tical deliberation, whether finds person phronetic a particular on the elements conclusion persuasive depends practical of ethos, pathos, lead (or do not son why rhetoric comes consistent that ethos clusion. The upshot is that ethos and pathos are, along with elements of phron?sis: constitutive all three stration, and its individually conclusions. insufficient This guides structural lead practical between similarity that logical demon are necessary deliberation the virtue the structure and pathos and lead) has in the deliberative logos involved to that conclusion. In other words, an process the key to yield

that rea out


internally the practical of the deliberative with logos

generated propensity deliberations of a phronimos is is similar: in both cases, process to lead the "argument" to its con


to of

and the art of rhetoric is what phron?sis gives the latter the possibility to yield outcomes and internally consistent with propensity generated The practical the former. of the phronimos to a deliberations leading conclusion particular tive demonstrations totle cannot that fit be reduced to a series of into a self-sufficient logico-deduc of ethics: Aris

is precisely the thinker who system captured by a theoretical logos. Ultimately, the legitimate

theory can never tells us that ethics

constructed and prominent

be fully and codified by abstract role that Axis political

39Phronetic deliberation requires the right conclusion, by the correct at the right time, for the correct end (NE 6.9.1142b21-34). "For it is process, not merely a state consistent with correct reason, but the state involving cor ... we rect reason, that is virtue. And it is phron?sis that is correct reason or phronetic without virtue of ethos"; cannot be fully good without phron?sis, A^7.1.1145a26-32.

assigns ethical proper matter proper flected totle rhetoric is a function of the fact

rhetoric, is not just a phron?sis by but is further constituted of logical demonstration by the is re of the phronimos.40 ethos and pathos This, of course, deliberation characterized in what I called the indeterminacy what of abstract logos. that, like

The position
have argued of that

I am attributing to Aristotle has important limits.

for Aristotle accounts the for between outcomes the possibility of rhetorical and and

consistency propensity But of is the fact of their structural deliberation similarity. phronetic a sufficient nor a necessary con course is neither structural similarity outcomes. It is not sufficient: similar structural dition for securing the possibility only furnishes and, at best, an internal pro to secure outcomes. But this propen for rhetoric phronetic pensity as we shall see, rhetoric can be undermined: has problems, and sity similarity is their source. Nor is of variance from phron?sis this possibility a necessary two struc condition for consistency: structural similarity could systematically very different processes yield similar out turally comes. is only that the possibility and propensity So the claim here an explanation, and that the most outcomes for consistent require plausible explanation of their respective ity to be found modes in Aristotle is the structural similar of procedure.

IV The most erations obvious to my claim ethos that the practical delib to render de for ac required it is not ethos

objection person

of a phronetic

terminacy?the tion?would

determinacy be to counter

require of an "ought" according

and pathos judgment to Aristotle,


40See also "An Aristotelian Lyle Johnstone, Christopher Trilogy: Ethics, and Rhetoric and the Search for Moral Truth," Philosophy Rhetoric, Politics, no.l (1980): 1-24, for a similar claim that there is a structural similarity 13, from and rhetoric, deliberation between for Aristotle stemming practical as a sort of internal dialogue: "the activity of deliberation viewing practical in nature" (11). Lois S. Self rhetorical is essentially intellect the practical that and rhetoric, link between makes the explicit phron?sis suggesting link "which derives from the nature of the art there is an integral theoretical of Aristotle's that the ideal practitioner itself; more specifically, [of rhetoric] of human vir model the skills and qualities of Aristotle's Rhetoric employs or 'man of practical wisdom'"; Self, "Rhetoric and Phro tue, the Phronimos and Rhetoric n?sis: The Aristotelian 12, no. 2 (1979): 130 Ideal," Philosophy 45 at 131.



or pathos, but perception that renders determi (aisth?sis) judgment nate. states Aristotle that one reason why ethics is inexact is Indeed, in particular that its application circumstances relies on perception; he further is easily defined, and [since] "nothing perceptible are particulars, of virtuous and vicious action] [circumstances on perception."41 about them depends The objection judgement says formulated as follows: (a) it is perception, and not deliberation these the can it


as I have relied self, that renders determinacy; therefore, (b) insofar on the assumption that practical deliberation must issue forth in de or actions, terminate in order to demonstrate that delibera judgments tion must deliberation faulty be constituted would by ethos and pathos remain indeterminate), (without my which practical rests on a



Against claim (a) I argue that perception

the deliberative so, then itwould

itself is constitutive


and not a separate discrete moment. If that process even if the role of ?thos/pathos were restricted to perception, still be constitutive of deliberation. This rejoinder, if success (b) as well. in deliberation But and I further argue the excellence that

claim ful, addresses both the excellence both of which

are necessary and pathos. Sherman's

to phron?sis43?are

in any case in perception? partly constituted by

the proper Nancy


important way that perception

is relevant here. She argues that one argument in which the proper path? help constitute is phron?sis itself can occur via the emotions. What is required is a

He also states: "practical reason is of the last thing 2.9.1109b21-3. is an object not of science [tou eschatou], which [epist?m?] but of percep InNE 6.11.1143b2-6, he identifies perception of the tion"; NE 6.8.1142a27-8. nous: situation with practical relevant features of a practical "In ethically nous is about the unchanging terms that are first, whereas demonstrations, with respect to what is done in action, it is about the last term . . . the end to be aimed at. . . .We must, then, have perception [aisth?sis] of these particu is nous" lars, and this perception 42John a version of this position. He argues that, ac Cooper provides deliberation does not issue forth in particular individual cording to Aristotle, comes to an end with a determination of only a actions; rather deliberation takes over and then renders a particular type of action, and then perception action. Thus the particulars about which we deliberate with respect to action refer to judgment types of action and not individual ac regarding specific tions themselves. See John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristo tle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), 23, 39-41. For criticism see Fred D. Miller, in Action," Review "Aristotle on Rationality of Metaphysics "Particular and Universal." 37, no. 3 (1984): 499-520, and Devereux, 43A^6.8.1142a22,28.

41 NE

person of a certain her who has character, to the relevant sensitive the proper virtues the kind moral

of emotional features makeup of the particu and the concomi

that makes lar situation.


tant path? those virtues, fail to that constitute simply see what see in its particularity, calls for. For Sherman, the occasion, via the emotions, and subsequent action accompanied by ing properly to exercise the proper emotional is part of what it means responses, phron?sis.44 It might the role, which sensitive agent without ethos has only ply deed, when tion extending be that one might concede Sherman's

of ethos, the agent may

objected cannot to the be


while still restricting the role o? ethos and pathos m phron?sis

fulfilled particularity it to deliberation

(that is,

the by abstract rules, of rendering of the situation) to perception concede that per se. One might but not that this and pathos enters then they are sim In that

and pathos play a role to do with deliberation. at the level of perception to, and not herself

in rendering determinacy If the import of ethos and not constitutive this deliberation,

instrumental Sherman

suggests an agent "fails to notice unequivocal . . . is not that she has deliberated [it] that

deliberation. of, practical when she says restriction, [ethical] features but that there

of a situa is no

about which response registered To complete the argument of of the process constitutive practical right ethical demonstration in determinate First, the outcome nate it needs deliberations emotions (which,

badly, to deliberate."45 the proper



itself?that are

and path? is, that led by

are the the

of the phronetic person and character and not being indeterminate,

in part

simply by right logical would fail to issue forth

practical to be shown of deliberation, (for example

actions)?two that ethos


to be shown. need things a difference to and pathos make that is, that they help to render determi the range of viable argu by determining


44 in what one sees as Nancy Sherman says that "character is expressed as what one does. Knowing how to discern the particulars, Aristotle 4. "Preliminary is a mark of virtue"; Sherman, Fabric of Character, stresses, that the situation requires ac to deciding how to act, one must acknowledge ... much of the work of is thus informed hy the virtues tion. ... Perception and the case, how to describe virtue will rest in knowing how to construe in classify what is before one" (29). Compare with Gisela Striker, "Emotions in the Rhetoric and His Moral of the Passions Treatment Context: Aristotle's on Aristotle's at 297-8, whose 286-302 in Essays Rhetoric, Psychology," view coincides with Sherman's. 45 29. Sherman, Fabric of Character,


it needs Second, ments). ent process of deliberation. analysis of the parallel to be shown I propose rhetoric that they to show also make this by deepening

for a differ the


and phron?sis.

V I have order in which passages end of rhetoric the guiding cited Aristotle indicates that in


of per (to find the means the trust of the audience.46 the speaker must suasion), gain According to Aristotle, in order to gain this trust, the speaker must have quite ex tensive of the particularities of his audience. To find the knowledge to achieve just us au


of persuasion, the speaker must be intimately familiar not common of deliberation47 with the and the customs, subjects legal and constitution of the particular but also with the ages, regime,48 or ethos, character the audience's dience's particular circumstances, as well as its emotional which includes its state of mind, makeup,


are directed, toward which its emotions and for what reasons.49 object so much That is why Aristotle ink on these matters.50 spills Recall that phron?sis per to, and proper required sensitivity salient particular of the circumstance features ception of, the morally at rhetoric's at hand. Now it appears that in aiming end of guiding the means of persuasion, the speaker must via demonstrate, finding an adequate his arguments, features of the grasp of salient particular situation?namely, the constitution, customs, ethos, and path? of his

1378a6-9. 46me?2.1.1377b20-8, 47 Rhet 1.4.1359bl8-1360a38. 48Rhet 1.8.1365b22-1366a23. 49itae?2.1.1378al9-24. 50 Besides the discussion of the subject matters of deliberation (in the re as opposed stricted sense of deliberative to judicial rhetoric) and forms of re in book 1, Aristotle follows chapter 1 of book 2 with gime that he undertakes ten chapters on the pathos of the audience, and five subsequent chapters dis of the young, the old, the middle characters cussing the particular aged, the the wealthy, and the powerful. In book 1, Aristotle also states that well-born, "since pist?is not only come from logical demonstration but from speech that reveals character (for we believe the speaker through his being a certain kind of person, and this is the case if he seems to be good or well disposed to us or with the kinds of character distinctive of both), we should be acquainted each form of constitution; for the character distinctive of each is necessarily to each"; Rhet 1.8.1366a8-13. most persuasive Kennedy notes that this pas of the sage indicates that a speaker should "at least show an understanding 77 n. 159. political views of the community"; On Rhetoric,

audience. So


in seeking to persuade, the rhetorician is required to em seer ? la Sherman. of the good ulate the virtuous The dispositions on the structure is that the constitutive of the techn? point imposes as a matter to acquire, the necessity rhetorician of artful skill, what is a matter in the phronimos of internally virtue, and that this generated reason why feature of rhetoric is one important constitutive it has the to yield outcomes with phron?sis. consistent Thus it is the propensity structure of the deliberative the structure articulated demonstrate relevant) So which process itself,51 and the incentives on the rhetorician, that constrain the arguments imposes in deliberation in such a way that the arguments must an adequate of (what turn out to be ethically perception the council deliberates and then renders a

particulars. it is not that first

determinate tion

by the subsequent application judgment of particulars; the process of deliberation rather, that thus

of good percep itself proceeds

forward the which

of particulars via a perception to persuade.52 We have speaker ethos

is good enough to enable two ways uncovered in

are constitutive of the process of rhetorical and pathos in one case, we are dealing with and deliberation: (i) the character emotions of the speaker/persuader, and in the other case with (ii) the of the audience/persuad?e. enter of (i), the character and emotions of the speaker in or via perception. As I have just argued, the deliberative process use the to find the arguments that persuasively der for the rhetorician character and emotions In the case

pist?is larities, adequate Sherman self.

of ethos such as

and pathos, character

he must and

adequately perceive of this audience. emotions, contextual and features character

the particu But then

perception has shown, of

of these


the emotions (ii), the ethos

In the case

and pathos

as involves, of the speaker him are di of the audience

51 Recall that Aristotle says that the trust must arise from the explicitly in the) speech itself and not from some (ethos of the speaker demonstrated information about the ethos of the speaker (Rhet 1.2.1356a8-10). antecedent 52 to Aristotelian ("Is There an Ethical Dimension Engberg-Pedersen con that Aristotle Rhetoric?" thought that the institutional 124-7) suggests deliberation toward factual, skewed rhetorical text of rhetoric (in Athens) truth. While it seems to me that Engberg-Pedersen's gen ethical, or political can be ac too strong, the valid core of his position is much eral argument that the structure of I have just advanced, counted for by the argument which incentives of relevant particulars. for perception rhetoric provides



of the deliberative in two ways. First (ii.l), process rectly constitutive in the way and character the emotions of the audience just shown, as pist?is, in part to determine the trajectory of arguments combine, can successfully the speaker advance in the process of deliberation, and tic data thereby shape characteristics that can also the final of the outcome. audience Second are (ii.2), these particularis relevant

premises logical demonstra tions of the pistis of logos within deliberation.53 practical at least, perception in rhetorical deliberation cannot be sepa So, rated from the process of deliberation because the arguments that are in deliberation notice are two that sources of that percep require demonstration the reason that this is true is because ethos and is that suggestion deliberation. If, rhetorical deliberation itself


invariably in the strict


persuasive tion?and pathos the same as


in rhetoric.54 of pistis My in the case of monological phronetic

I have


Aristotle's argued, on a structural parallel

lar, that both are constituted account of how ?thos/pathos to illuminate expected course to demonstrate their this

about optimism with phronetic deliberation?in particu our and logos?then by ethos, pathos, constitute role is not rhetorical deliberation in phronetic to "prove" deliberation as well.

can be Of

that phron?sis and rhe toric share a parallel but if Aristotle's account of phron?sis structure; is exclusively and plausibly to this proposed illuminated reference by then we have further grounds for favoring the proposed in parallel, But how could the account of rhetoric trans terpretation. just given late into an account of monological deliberation and phron?sis? For are one and the same here the persuader and persuad?e obviously

53 For example, the fact that the citizens of a certain polis have well es tablished of good will and friendship for citizens of another polis feelings may well be an ethically relevant reason to conduct foreign policy in one way rather than another. 54 Compare Wardy, "Mighty is the Truth and It Shall Prevail?" 63: "Expli he says that 'the orator per cating the second, emotive means of persuasion, suades through his hearers, when they are led into pathos by his logos; for when pained or loving we do not render judgment similarly to when in joy or The possibility is thus left open that the proper use of hating' (1356al4-16). rhetorical skill will indeed speak to our emotions, but only when the path? so formed enhance our receptivity to truthful logos, rather than setting our feel ings at odds with our reasoning."



to rhetoric In fact, the distinctions respect just drawn with person.55 of phron?sis. do help analyze the different aspects to the first case above and character of Parallel (i), the emotions the deliberator deliberative ogy with equately emotions qua persuader via their process enter of arguments) the (or proposer role in adequate The anal perception. context that part of what must be ad suggests are the particular the help of ethos and pathos of character of the agent himself thy ("know first the emotions and charac

the rhetorical via perceived and features

self; this is part of point (ii.2) below).

Parallel to the second case, (ii.l), the be said partly to shape qua persuad?e might to himself that the deliberator adduces of arguments trajectory by which claims he finds persuasive and to determine validity helping a man of cowardly not. character which may find it dif (For example, ter of the deliberator ficult to persuade himself or that the ugly illusion, that insect the monstrous is harmless.) is in fact an apparition Second (ii.2), the emo

55Johnstone to the structural similarity between has previously pointed visual and rhetoric for Aristotle: "Ifwe can reasonably deliberation practical as a sort of internal dialogue, then the practically wise per ize deliberation as both rhetor and auditor. functions The son, when he or she deliberates, of practical wisdom rule' or 'rational principle' is none other than the 'right or observing valid justifications for apprehending for actions"; faculty to illustrate this 12. He cites Isocrates "An Aristotelian Johnstone, Trilogy," in terms of an deliberation tendency of the Greeks to view even monological to such has taken exception Barbara Warnick, internal dialogue. however, an interpretation assimilates "rhetoric to internal reason of Aristotle which Rheto and Aristotle's "Judgment, Probability, ing and dialogue"; Warnick, 9 (1989): 299-311 at 301. Two points need Journal of Speech ric," Quarterly in this connection. to be made objects First, part of the reason that Warnick and rhetoric is that deliberation to drawing a parallel between monological she takes herself to be arguing against a position which betrays the "urge to its emotive dimensions elevate the logical element of rhetoric and to devalue ... to emphasize and ethos" (299). But that is pathos logos and deprecate not the position than mitigating the role of that I am taking?rather precisely their role (in the emotions (in rhetoric), my argument has aimed to highlight concern is that the "need [1] to The second part of Warnick's deliberation). struc to simplify argument audience and values, convictions [2] incorporate and [3] to direct one's claims of the multitude, tures for the comprehension the state and the polis are all neglected when Ar toward decisions affecting himself is applied to forums and situations that Aristotle istotelian rhetoric in the Rhetoric" did not consider point is well taken?rhet (301). Warnick's on all counts?but deliberation oric is obviously not the same as monological that does not mean that they have no important structural similarities.




tional makeup and character of the deliberator rele may be ethically as premises in logical demonstrations the individual considers. the fact that one feels great affection for a friend may (For example, to give special to the friend's welfare.) consideration case (ii.2), the emotional in this and char makeup generally can be said to be something or the person like a repository of the wisdom of past which the experience (empeiria), consult during the course of practical deliberation. Why? reason

be a good More acter memory agent Faced may of

This brings us full circle to the original point with which

with the

I began.

of abstract indeterminacy logos, not all considerations can be gleaned to a particular that are ethically relevant situation from a set of codified reasons in section abstract principles (for (l)-(4) 1). reason why Now we can see another for Aristotle it is ethos and pa thos stances. uncodifiable der that help One's render character in particular determinacy and emotional dispositions practical may circum the in or "Nor partic



for practical is phron?sis about since in other are

of past deliberation universals

necessary experience, experience to take account of particularities. only. action Itmust also come to know and action lack who is about

ulars, Hence

it is concerned areas better also



empeiria "phron?sis

in action with from

who people than others particulars empeiria."57

particulars. but have epist?m? have epist?m?";56 and I feel"

is concerned become a course known

as well

particulars about taking about

as universals, "how Consulting

of action if my

validity on my based formed?insight in the form of an abstract set of principles sense includes reason, logos in the broad is why Aristotle the human says soul means that the existence that "he will

its ethical

provide me with important insight are virtuously character and emotions that is unavailable previous experience may codified both of the ethos in logos. For this and pathos. This element" fashion con in

"passionate deliberate in finer

The parallel with no particulars [or: in particular cerning cases]."58 mos is almost exact. For just as the ethos and pathos of a phronimos form a repository of the uncodified wisdom of past experience, which supplements his abstract logos in the narrow sense, so too does

B6JVE6.7.1141bl5-18. 57JVE6.8.1142al5. 58 Pol 3.15.1286a21-2.

unwritten pository This nomos and the epieikeia experience the perception are not associated

with it represent the written is misguided. a re law.59 Per is consti

of uncodified suggests why and deliberation

that supplements objection

ception tutive of the deliberative liberator of qua

thereby thos of the deliberator deliberative potentially process, persuasive

persuader the deliberative

events; perception and the ethos and pathos of the de process; are constitutive of that perception, and process. Furthermore, are directly the ethos constitutive and pa of the of


qua persuad?e in providing pist?is arguments.

that determine

the range

VI Should signs we celebrate and pathos to take first, account or should we fear the role that Aristotle and with that as

to ethos

generally? to two questions: loom behind this ond, the problem litical deliberation. about the logic


in practical this question the problem

deliberation, up of specifically subjectivism

logos more reference seems to sec

of deception Having of Aristotle's

of phronetic and practical reasoning, in the case of rhetorical-po that arises up to now made I here an exegetical to shift want


argument gears and

show why the position

esting. First, engaged the question

I attribute to Aristotle
of subjectivism.

is philosophically


in practical deliberation, deciding a friend for a wrong he hgs committed him. Let us severely against bal other things, the phronetic also assume person must that, among

Imagine whether

a phronetic person or not to chastise

59 at the Canadian Philosophi Heidi Northwood presented (commentary Annual Congress, June 1999) has sug cal Association Quebec, Sherbrooke, to me that passages such as Pol 3.15.1286a32-5 (in which Aristotle gested is necessarily of a single person says "The judgement corrupted when he is dominated by anger or some other passion of this sort") indicate that it is not that men are able to apply laws to partic because but in spite of the passions can lead indicate are that the passions ular cases. But all that these passages or overwhelm dominate for example, deliberation they astray?if, cognitive saw the emotions in an adverse manner. To suggest that Aristotle processes rea as playing a constructive, role in practical and necessary constitutive, that Aristotle was blind to is not to make the obviously false assertion soning effects that the emotions might and even debilitating the negative cognitive have on practical reasoning.


anee ness the chastisement that demanded demands. by righteous

the forgive justice with has been that on Aristo

My argument friendship in the heat of the moment, tle's account, the phronetic person cannot, for himself settle matters by a purely logical demonstration appealing to abstract of whether to chastise his decision Ultimately, principles.

will rightly be in part informed by what he feels emotionally

is the

nature of those emo of action, and since the dispositional right course tions will be shaped those feelings by his virtuous character, provide an invaluable ethical Now this sort of account invites the guide. to the extent of subjectivism: that the Aristotelian deliberator charge on how he feels course in order to decide the ethical of action, is incapable to the same conclusion of coming by strictly logical in language, to that same extent deduction articulable "ethical" action seems to lack articulable, contestable intersubjectively (rational) relies and and grounds an individual But simply appears to register the subjective preferences circum of logi fact, of one's the fur of

subject.60 to say that the phronetic in the particular person stances is incapable of deciding and acting solely on the basis is not to say that he is incapable, cal demonstrations after the a retrospective for the emotions that justification articulating to his decision is an or action. part short. He emotions is, and this reflexivity an ethical of being being. But if that is the



about Hence and

subjectivism if the appeal thermore into a rational-codifiable phronetic liberation per se, that were as person not I have available has

important falls charge

to the emotions


account, on his emotions

rejoinder, is retrospectively translatable seem then it would that the


logos in the but rather argued, to this agent were

to fill out his practical de sense is indeterminate restricted because the abstract principles after Now,

simply incomplete. a retrospec and having provided having had this practical experience, can revise tive rational the phronetic and fill in person justification, to cover his abstract the offending shows case, which principles that, to the thesis advanced deliberation need not contrary above, practical in principle rely on the emotions.

60 One sort of Thomist I do not canvass here, would be response, which to seek ethical grounding not just in reason but in nature or natural justice, as But this would drawing on NE 5.7.1134bl9-27. require us to see Aristotle that the emotions intuit natural right. saying

This count. say that second misses objection to say that the emotions content is fully the

ac spirit of the Aristotelian are rationally is not to justifiable account. translatable into a rational

First, all their

Second, by rational in discourse?"rational" here. sense In other that

Imean contestable justification intersubjectively does not collapse into logical demonstration is rational in the broad rational words, justification ethos and pathos. The point is that the emotions


but intersubjectively communi "subjective" to the ?thos and so on?in thanks part defensible, cable, criticizable, if not fully articulable in of language?even and paiftos-dimensions form of a logical demonstration. the reflexive the prepositional Third, themselves appeal to reason may may tory narrative to say. ways more phronetic details person be complete; the retrospective justifica in principle for there may be al interminable, I say that the when and most Fourth, important, a rational can now retrospectively provide justifica be never

are not purely

tion for his emotions,

able, tification sulted account

this is not because he has simply filled out the

but his new in principle retrospective fully specifi rational jus

of his previously underspecified, set of abstract Rather, principles. because possible in a change in his ethical for the recent also result may practical in a loss: be is now his

re have may experience a change to vocabulary, designed But this change in vocab experience. relevant features ethically previ new ethical by the vocabulary, be covered subsequently only by char that the phronetic person's that the now distant experiences Ethics does not vocabulary. to an abstract it be reduced col the

ulary may covered ously features the acter partly lapse oretical



obscured can




emotional dispositions lingering as a reminder of maintains informed into mere system second his previous ethical nor

subjectivism; laws of general question


The for tion. tions

in language. codified is that of deception, which



theories A

of democracy,


of communication

ones that emphasize delibera especially the condi of democracy conception privileges in the polity and locates for analysis the legit

in free and unfettered communicative processes imacy of democracy all citizens and meeting of political open to participation by discourse, In part, the problem to which Aristotle's various normative criteria.61 us arises of the comparison be from the limitation account alerts tween rhetoric be recalled, and phronetic is not sufficient deliberation: to ensure structural a consistency similarity, of outcomes. itwill


In book Aristotle 1, chapter


speech, the issue This raises of person."62 in speech is the real ?thos sented

explicitly not from

of ?thos as a pistis, 2 of On Rhetoric, speaking effect "should result from says that the persuasive a previous kind is a certain that the speaker opinion ?thos pre the apparent This is in part the of the speaker. audience and falsely to deceive the of whether and vir charac

of the rhetorician's ability question an appearance of phron?sis to gain its trust by simply creating lacks these character the rhetorician's actually tue, even when teristics. ?thos the artful or rhetorical ?thos

Indeed, of the speaker63 may be quite at variance. embod but the phron?sis and real ?thos of the speaker the phron?sis licenses in "The Rhetoric itself. As Garver ied in the argument argues, from

and the real or practical is not What persuades

inferences to artificial ?thos but bars further argument "^ on is that by playing The problem from artificial ?thos to real ?thos. be able to deceive the rhetorician of the audience, the pathos might ferences the audience in the

about and


not just his own real ?thos but so persuade in a way contrary

the ?thos to ethics

embodied and right

In fact, it is not just the ?thos of the speaker that is problematic;

For it is, in part, the charac equally at issue is the ?thos of the crowd. sorts that dictate what and its emotional ter of the audience makeup Political deliberation will be persuasive. of argument by per proceeds on the pist?is of ?thos and ifwhat will be persuasive depends suasion, and pathos, sesses will with then what in part the unvirtuous it via ?thos particular course the determine crowd the audience and pathos pos The problem of the argument. can is that a popular leader (demagogos)

persuade delight rhetoric

to the base, for they is friendly "tyranny flattery65 since the growth of Aristotle associates in being Hence flattered."66 simi is dangerously with demagoguery demagoguery67?and Recall standard that of rhetoric must the goodness that the architectonic of discipline

lar to a tyrannical regime. be judged by the external

61For a see James survey of the literature on deliberative democracy, Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy," Bohman, "Survey The Journal 6, no. 4 (1998): 400-25. Philosophy of Political Q2Rhet 1.2.1356a8-10. 63 176 and following. Rhetoric, Garver, Aristotle's 64 196. Rhetoric, Garver, Aristotle's 65Po?4.4.1292a21-4. 66PoZ5.11.1314a2-3. 67Po?5.5.1305al3-14.



politik? provides; if rhetoric is not ethical, then it fails to contribute to

of the polis. two problems of deception, which form the basis of Aristo as demagoguery, tle's critique of democracy the dilemma that bring faces into full view. On the one hand, the pathos constitu democracy tive of deliberation the proper treatment of particulars,68 and be helps These cause ble of the insufficiency of abstract rules, deliberation is an inevita of political life. Moreover, component by turning over to an art of rhetoric, collective deliberation institutions political can capitalize on its internally technical to yield generated propensity outcomes consistent with in order to lower phronetic deliberation, necessary the virtue leaving a matter bar necessary open of pathos, for successful to deliberation matters On the other hand, politics. risks abuse?in it is part because of benefit for the treatment of though the argument deliberation o?phron?sis: The problem astray. if rhetoric bypasses at least the virtue of and the proper

may particulars, is particularly acute the demanding

and pathos, nonetheless lead for rhetorical



phron?sis requires the right kind of path? constitutive kind of ?thos.

At this point, Aristotle appears to suggest another a multitude of persons political remedy: deliberating ble to being led astray by pathos than a few:

of the right

is less


the multitude is more than the few. The judgement of a incorruptible single person is necessarily corrupted when he is dominated by anger or some other passion of this sort, whereas it is hard for all to become an gry and err at the same time.69 But the sentence that follows had immediately qualifies just been given: this remedy,

seeming This were

to take back what

is certainly not easy for many, but if there were a number who both good men and good citizens, is the one ruler more incorrupt Is it not clear that it ible, or rather the larger number who are all good? is the larger number?70 implication seems to be that "both way the multitude good men of referring must and be virtuous



to be preferred. The locution both coincide, is Aristotle's

citizens," good to aristocracy: rule

<?Pol 3.15.1286al0-13, 69Po?3.15.1286a32-6. 70Pol 3.15.1286a38-b2,

21-2. emphasis mine.


of the virtuous. deliberation?both tue, the propensity will be then So now the of it looks rhetorician rhetoric as if unless and the multitude engaging the audience?possesses outcomes consistent

in vir with

phron?sis not virtuous, means tified

If the multitude's ?thos is effectively of the guiding end of rhetoric, to find the the pursuit of persuasion, will not serve the ultimate end of the polis iden and elaborated eudaimonia. by politik?: that this is in part the reason virtue of the individual why phron?sis is, for Aris It is important ruler.71

to yield undermined.

I submit

qua the speaker that is a ruler?"ruler" refers just to the entire deliberative In other words, ethical rhetoric ap body. to require that phron?sis obtain not just in the rhetorician but pears in the audience additionally must be phronetic audience infer the real character of bodied ence's able in his virtue means with that also makes not because the speaker up this enables from The the ruling body. to them properly em the artful character because of the audi the avail the

totle, the paradigm to note here that it is not

speech?this possibility or lack thereof is what of

is barred?but dictates or

the nature not they


rhetoric). to undermine this appears the possibility Unfortunately, litical form of deliberation that can bypass the onerous ethical

persuasion (and in favor of ethical incentives



of a po require if ethical


of phron?sis while

still yielding good outcomes.

for democratic on

The political

would implications deliberation political virtue. "This Liberalism's stitutional ment uitous. is much available theorist

not be heartening were to depend not easy


is certainly

proposed on constraint why ideal

the entire body's possessing for many," Aristotle lamented. con to this problem is to impose response democratic but Aristotle's argu majorities;


this proposal falls short: deliberation is ubiq to the dilemma solution Aristotle's is aristocracy. There reason to doubt was that Aristotle that this solution thought in practice, who rejects answer not available and it is certainly to the democratic the hierarchical of Aristotle's worldview. aspects has been judicial review "virtuous" aristocrats (by and liberalism. Yet the between the


called judges?), but that answer itself serves to highlight the tension
between democracy the deliberators dilemma,

need for deliberation


and the threat of de facto

lack virtue, nonetheless

tyranny that it poses

remains, and tyranny

71 Pol 3.4.1277b26.

is not

an acceptable alternative for modern democrats either. cannot be ignored. critique an analysis of the Aristotelian notion of Nonetheless, provides resources So Aris




identifies?resources cal rhetoric. be ethical

in political deliberation? engaged and crowd?were of virtuous character to begin with, this se speaker vere conclusion is attenuated several Aristotelian considerations. by First, ence must Aristotle mitigates full virtue the conclusion that everyone in the audi

Although unless everyone

some of the problems for overcoming that it for lowering the virtue bar for successful, ethi at first blush it appears that rhetoric could not who

possess to the notion of sunesis: phron?sis" "[s]unesis

concerns says that

accompanied by phron?sis, by appealing a capacity to judge well "on a question that someone when else speaks.72 Halliwell rightly is of general political too is called importance; it provides a

broad ground of civic deliberation

on a normative tus of political istic appraisal this is a virtue in typical phron?sis and deliberation view,

(see Polit. 4.4.1291a28).

for by the whole


appara a real judgment (Polit. 7.9.1329a2-9), of actual constitutions will presumably conclude that more to be expected in exceptional than practitioners of rhetoric."73


a phronetic rhetorician faced with an unvirtu can, when Second, ous crowd, use the power of rhetoric to persuade itself to attempt the not to the virtues audience that the crowd actually holds by appealing now but to an ideal virtuous and the orator rhe image of the crowd which to emulate. the crowd the creative Thus, the audience listeners of an ethical out to become an audience

paints torically inspires act of persuasion would both persuade come and simultaneously inspire the who would indeed choose the structure Similarly, to mitigate, to some extent, toward right the audience, outcome. But such

that outcome. of the rhetorical the fully has phronetic a motive situation virtue itself may required serve of the

rhetorician himself. Where the speaker simply has good will (eunoia)
he already the structure to attempt situation to secure itself a re of the rhetorical

a speaker, in order to deploy the pistis of ?thos, to repre quires as virtuous?a sent himself in his speech creative representation

72A^6.10.1143alO. 73 "The Challenge to Political and Ethical of Rhetoric Stephen Halliwell, on Aristotle's inEssays 175-90 at 178-9. Theory in Aristotle," Rhetoric,


which his in turn can own rhetorical of rhetoric as I have inspire the good-willed Thus the model. itself can speaker internal himself to rise of

up to the


virtue, tue in both ized. The

serve not just of to instill vir to this point, but also actually argued up not previously to a degree real and the crowd the speaker to produce the has the potential act of rhetoric creative course This of action is only the but also to change a potential, of course. deliberation of political analysis both Indeed, An institu structur of the short example, that en

requirements an emulation to impose

for a particular good reasons of the deliberators. character The identifies problem admits

that an Aristotelian of their looks two

have strategies tional response

solution-seeking strategies. resonance in Aristotelian thought. to the ways may in which the some help to overcome themselves?for the deliberators on the


incentives ing of discursive of of the virtues comings by placing institutional

types in political deliberative (The law courts pro settings. joy legitimacy one of the most of a setting institutionalized vide perhaps examples is necessitated Such an institutional for deliberation.74) by approach of attenuation, while of deception, the problem admitting can never be fully resolved. that also suggests But Aristotle's critique as constitutional an institutional is insufficient, response, just by itself, the fact that The second, is insufficient. perhaps complementary, An analysis of the deliberators.75 the virtues must address egy leader qua rhetorician the role that a phronetic oric highlights constraint tentially play the universal Aristotle's in instilling such virtue. strat of rhet


of discourse

participation critique makes

can po to If democracy is committed in the political then of all citizens process, a central of citizen the virtues component

in politi to the fundamental of education importance ship and points to a purely "civic" is not limited this education cal life. For Aristotle, one. This, of course, raises a host of be an ethical but must education such as who thorny problems, the nature of that education philosophically compatible will be granted or how such liberal to determine the power an education be could but the upshot of



74 see Kenneth Baynes, "Liberal Neutrality, More generally, Pluralism, International and Deliberative 12, no. 1 (1992): 50-69, for Politics," Praxis his discussion of institutions. 75 Le Miriam Galston, Seriously: Republican-Oriented "Taking Aristotle of Deliberative Democracy," California gal Theory and the Moral Foundation Law Review 82, no. 2 (1994): 329-99.



is that these are problems be that cannot critique simply ethical and political Aristotle's bracketed. that, con suggests thought to the assumptions of many commentators institutional trary today, on the citizenry are an insufficient basis for democracy? constraints

though in the end he tips his hat in the direction of the institutionalists
to the importance in the education of the laws themselves by pointing use the creative to leaders inclined of the citizenry, and in securing to transform themselves and their audience for of rhetoric powers ethical ends.76



Jill Peter Berkowitz, 761wish to thank Danielle Allen, Seyla Benhabib, Karina Galperin, Patchen Markell, Chad Noyes, Pratap Mehta, Heidi Frank, Richard Tuck, Jennifer Pitts, Dominic Scott, Nancy Schwartz, Northwood, at the Harvard Political Theory Research Workshop and participants (Spring in Association of the Canadian Philosophical 1999); the 43d Annual Congress and Political Ethical Quebec Sherbrooke, (June 1999); and the Wesleyan on previous drafts. Theory Workshop (Spring 2001) for their comments