M.

CHRISTOPHER WHITE SCHOOL OF DIVINITY

PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY: HITCHENS THE FUNDAMENTALIST

SUBMITTED TO DR. PERRY HILDRETH

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

RELI650 PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION SEMINAR

BY

THOMAS J. WHITLEY

1 DECEMBER 2008
 PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY: HITCHENS THE FUNDAMENTALIST

“Religion poisons everything.”1 These are the words with which Christopher Hitchens

concludes the first chapter of his book god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything, which

is titled “Putting it Mildly.” Hitchens, actually, does not put things mildly at all. These three

words are pointed and unambiguous and they are designed to be a heavy, if not fatal, blow to

religion. The entirety of god is not Great is devoted to the task of proving his thesis, that

“religion poisons everything.” Hitchens, however, is not alone. Karl Marx decried religion as the

“opium of the people.”2 Friedrich Nietzsche comments, “The greatest haters in history were, at

all times, priests.”3 There is much negative sentiment toward religion and, as a result, its

various adherents and practitioners. In this paper, however, I will argue that religion does not,

in fact, poison everything, as Hitchens would have all believe. Moreover, I will show how

Hitchens’ argument is foundationally weak and fundamentally flawed by identifying examples

of Hitchens’ practices of over-generalization and of avoiding direct critiques. Finally, I will argue

that Hitchens’ entire argument is in effect humanistic fundamentalism.

Hitchens’ argument is really quite simple. He believes that religion is detestable and he

supplies as many examples as he can scrounge up where religion can be cast in a negative light.

Beyond this, though, Hitchens does offer his four irreducible objections to religious faith:

1
Christopher Hitchens, god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (New York: Twelve, 2007), 13.
2 nd
Karl Marx, “The Opium of the Masses” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (2
ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 263.
3
Friedrich Nietzsche, “Religion as Resentment” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion
nd
(2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 267.

1
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1) It wholly misrepresents the origins of man and the cosmos

2) Because of this original error it manages to combine the maximum of servility with
the maximum of solipsism
3) It is both the result and the cause of dangerous sexual repression
4) It is ultimately grounded on wishful thinking4

As can likely be deduced from these four objections, Hitchens’ argument is based almost solely

in personal opinion. This opinion, though, is supported by a collection of negative examples

from various religions. This is an area where Hitchens does not come up short in the least.

Hitchens also makes the point that secular humanists believe that humans do not need

religion to be moral or ethical. Of secular humanists, Hitchens says, “We speculate that it is at

least possible that, once people accepted the fact of their short and struggling lives, they might

behave better toward each other and not worse. We believe with certainty that an ethical life

can be lived without religion.”5 In addition, Hitchens makes the point that religion “must seek to

interfere” in the lives of those who are not believers.6 As support for this point, Hitchens offers

an example from the life of Mother Teresa. He recounts her flying from Calcutta to protest a

change in the state constitution of the Irish Republic that would permit divorce. Hitchens’

thoughts on this are clear: “In other words, an Irish woman married to a wife-beating and

incestuous drunk should never expect anything better, and might endanger her soul if she

begged for a fresh start.”7

4
Hitchens, 4.
5
Ibid., 6.
6
Ibid., 17.
7
Ibid.
 3

While Christopher Hitchens does a terrific job of collecting examples where religion has

been in the wrong, there are many flaws in his argument. Though the most odious of these

flaws will be expounded upon later, it is worth noting now that the flaws in Hitchens’ argument

essentially all fall under a single umbrella: Hitchens is wholly unwilling to see anything positive

in religion. This blindness directs his argument.

To begin with, I will respond to Hitchens’ view that “an ethical life can be lived without

religion.”8 Once again, Hitchens is not alone in this view, being in the company of Karl Marx and

others. However, those who disagree with Hitchens are not alone either. For they have Plato’s

Euthyphro9 in their history as well as many others who have made arguments for the existence

of God from morality. Robert Merrihew Adams says what many would agree with, “we believe

quite firmly that certain things are morally right and others are morally wrong (for example,

that it is wrong to torture another person to death just for fun).”10 In addition, it must be noted

that underlying Hitchens’ statement that “an ethical life can be lived without religion” 11 is the

belief that religion does not improve people or society.12 This statement cannot be supported,

though. For, many have received their moral bearings from their religion and while maybe not

being completely immoral previously, went on to live more morally and ethically acceptable

lives; something about which the secular humanist should be happy.

8
Ibid., 6.
9 nd
Plato, “Euthyphro” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario:
Broadview Press, 2008), 97-9.
10
Robert Merrihew Adams, “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief” in Kelly James Clark, Readings in the
nd
Philosophy of Religion (2 ed.; Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008), 100.
11
Ibid., 6.
12
See Hitchens, god is not Great, 184-5.
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While steeped in his work of showing how repugnant religion is, Hitchens does manage

to comment that “other nonreligious organizations have committed similar crimes, or even

worse ones.”13 This is nothing more than lip service, though, as Hitchens gives countless

examples of horrible crimes committed by religious organizations and gives not a single

example of a crime committed by a nonreligious organization. What is more, Hitchens attempts

to claim certain religious people for the cause of humanism. “I can think of a handful of priests

and bishops and rabbis and imams who have put humanity ahead of their own sect or creed.

History gives us many other such examples, which I am going to discuss later on. But this is a

compliment to humanism, not to religion.”14 Hitchens is unable to admit that religion might

have offered something positive to the world, even if that is not its strong suit. How does

Hitchens have the right to claim certain religions folk for the side of humanism simply because

they actually did positive things and did not inflict pain and suffering? When non-religious

people do evil, does that not offer a negative blow to humanism? Is one really to believe that

the majority, if not all, of evil in the world comes from religion?

Hitchens is playing the same card that Karl Rahner played with his “anonymous

Christians.” Rahner tried to claim for Christianity people who were not Christians but who

exhibited values which many label as “Christian.” These non-Christians would be “regarded in

certain respects as anonymous Christians,” Rahner says.15 I cannot imagine that Hitchens would

accept as valid Rahner’s theory of anonymous Christians and thus, I cannot accept as valid

13
Hitchens, god is not Great, 4.
14
Ibid.
15
Karl Rahner, Grace in Freedom (London: Burns & Oates, 1969), 85.
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Hitchens’ attempt to claim religious people for the cause of secular humanism simply because

he believes that nothing positive can come from religion.

The next aspect of Hitchens’ argument that causes his case to be fundamentally flawed

is the excessive use of over-generalizations. One such example of this is when Hitchens says of

religion as a whole, “It must seek to interfere with the lives of nonbelievers, or heretics, or

adherents of other faiths. It may speak about the bliss of the next world, but it wants power in

this one.”16 This is certainly true of some religious adherents, but not of all. One need only to

look at the vast ecumenical movement and the increase in recent years in interfaith dialogue.

Moreover, does Hitchens think that there is no secular humanist anywhere who expects all

religious people to abandon their beliefs? There are just as many secular humanists that are

intolerant of religious people as there are religious people that are intolerant of secular

humanists. I do not, by any means, intend to paint all secular humanists the same, as Hitchens

has done to religion and religious people.

In the same vein, Hitchens says, “The true believer cannot rest until the whole world

bows the knee.”17 Once again this is not true. Hitchens clearly has not witnessed the privacy

that many religious people live with and which many sects or branches of various religions

advocate. How does Hitchens, who is not a believer, presume to determine what makes one a

“true believer”? Should this not be left up to the religion itself, or even more specifically, to

each particular adherent? I recognize the necessity of generalizations and have certainly

16
Hitchens, god is not Great, 17.
17
Ibid., 31.
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already used some in this paper. However, generalizations must be used with great caution and

any philosopher trying to argue a point must work to not paint with such broad strokes.

It is appropriate now to return to the question of who should get credit when a religious

person does something virtuous, because it helps to highlight Hitchens’ assumption that if he

simply supplies enough examples, then his opponent will retreat in defeat. To defend his

position that religious belief does not improve people or society, Hitchens offers this statement:

“The first thing to be said is that virtuous behavior by a believer is no proof at all of – indeed is

not even an argument for – the truth of his belief.”18 The first flaw in this aspect of Hitchens’

argument is that it portrays Hitchens’ apparent belief that just because he says it is not a proof,

or even an argument, that it actually cannot be a proof or an argument for the truth of the

believer’s belief.

It is certainly not true that something becomes inadmissible as a proof or an argument

just because Hitchens says so. However, Hitchens is right that “virtuous behavior by a believer”

cannot act as a proof of his belief. What Hitchens does not seem to recognize is that if this is

true, then the converse should also be true, that non-virtuous behavior cannot act as proof

against his belief. Hitchens would likely respond to this critique by saying that he is merely

attempting to show that religion poisons everything and that he is not supplying examples so as

to argue against the veracity of religion and religious belief. This would not be true, though. For,

Hitchens does use the examples he furnishes to argue against the truth of religion. He says that

“there are, indeed, several ways in which religion is not just amoral, but positively immoral.” 19

18
Ibid., 184-5.
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Religions immorality, Hitchens holds, is built into its original precepts. These include, according

to Hitchens: “presenting a false picture of the world to the innocent and the credulous, the

doctrine of blood sacrifice, the doctrine of atonement, the doctrine of eternal reward and/or

punishment, the imposition of impossible tasks and rules.”20 Thus, it becomes clear that

Hitchens is not intending to remain neutral when the veracity of religion is questioned, but

rather he is purporting that not only does religion poison everything, but it does so because it is

so fundamentally in error.

Coupled with Hitchens’ over use of generalizations is his ability to dodge direct critiques.

Hitchens seems to applaud himself for anticipating a critique against his stance. The critique

would go something like this: “…Is it not true that secular and atheist regimes have committed

crimes and massacres that are, in the scale of things, at least as bad if not worse” than offenses

like the Inquisition, the Crusades, and the Islamic imperial conquests? This question is posed at

the beginning of the chapter “An Objection Anticipated: The Last-Ditch “Case” Against

Secularism.” Hitchens does well to anticipate this response to his work, but he never answers

the “case” against secularism. He merely does historical gymnastics to show that all of the

crimes that seem to have been committed by secular or atheists regimes were actually

perpetrated by religion. An example of this is when he is talking about totalitarianism. He points

out that the word was made famous by the secular Jewish intellectual Hannah Arendt, “who

had fled the hell of the Third Reich and who wrote The Origins of Totalitarianism.”21 This word

19
Ibid., 205.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., 230.
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is useful because “it separates ‘ordinary’ forms of despotism – those which merely exact

obedience from their subjects – from the absolutist systems which demand that citizens

become wholly subject and surrender their private lives and personalities entirely to the state,

or to the supreme leader.”22 Then, conveniently using the latter definition, Hitchens makes the

point that “for most of human history, the idea of the total or absolute state was intimately

bound up with religion.”23

Hitchens then goes on for eleven more pages to supply more negative examples of

religion before he thinks he is at a position to make a pseudo-concluding statement: “Thus,

those who invoke ‘secular’ tyranny in contrast to religion are hoping that we will forget two

things: the connection between the Christian churches and fascism, and the capitulation of the

churches to National Socialism.”24 One cannot be blind to the evil that religion has done in the

world or sat by idly and watched happen, but one also cannot be so naïve as to think that

religion poisons everything, or stated otherwise, that everything poisoned is made that way by

religion. Hitchens presents himself as quite naïve on this point, as he cannot straightly answer a

question about the evil done by secular and atheists regimes. Hitchens’ response to this

question is reminiscent of a child that is caught doing something wrong and responds by telling

all that his sibling has done wrong, vainly thinking this will make his original wrong be forgotten

by the parent or that it will somehow magically disappear.

22
Ibid., 230-1.
23
Ibid., 231.
24
Ibid., 242.
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The final point that I wish to make in this paper has hopefully already become clear, that

Hitchens’ argument is essentially a humanistic fundamentalism. Hitchens does a stellar job of

presenting an abundance of examples of the sins of religion. What he does not do well is

present the other side fairly or justly. In addition to Hitchens’ strict adherence to the set of

basic ideas or principles of secular humanism and his inability to see anything positive in a

movement that is contrary to his own, Hitchens even uses language that is not only reminiscent

of Christian fundamentalists, such as Jerry Falwell, but could easily be placed in the mouth of

such a person and not be out of place at all.25 One such statement is very early in the book. “I

simply knew, almost as if I had privileged access to a higher authority, that my teacher had

managed to get everything wrong in just two sentences.”26 I am confident that if I had

previously labeled this as a statement made by Jerry Falwell, no one would have argued. The

profusion of ad hominem arguments, the narrow-minded style of argument and the language

that Christopher Hitchens employs affords one no other option than to label Hitchens’

argument in god is not Great as humanistic fundamentalism.

This paper argued that religion does not, in fact, poison everything, as Hitchens would

have all believe. Moreover, I showed how Hitchens’ argument is foundationally weak and

fundamentally flawed by identifying examples of his practices of over-generalization and of

avoiding direct critiques. Lastly, I argued that Hitchens’ entire argument is in effect humanistic

fundamentalism. God is not Great was clearly written for a popular audience, as can be seen

25
The abundance of statements made by fundamentalists that sound very much like Hitchens’ make
referencing just one impossible. To see quintessential fundamental language, though, see Jerry Falwell, The
Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1981).
26
Ibid., 3.
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through Hitchens’ witty and humorous style of writing. Likewise, this book was not intended to

be taken into philosophical peer revision. This does not, however, mitigate the carelessness

with which Hitchens fashioned much of his argument nor does it make acceptable the fact that

Hitchens embodies that which he seems to detest so much in his opponents. Christopher

Hitchens’ thesis that religion poisons everything is simply his opinion, complete with biases and

prejudices, and must not be accepted on the grounds of its fundamental flaws and its

fundamentalistic nature.
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Moral Arguments for Theistic Belief.” In Readings in the Philosophy of
Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 100-08. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008.

Falwell, Jerry. The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: The Resurgence of Conservative Christianity. New York:
Doubleday & Co., 1981.

Hitchens, Christopher. god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything. New York: Twelve, 2007.

Marx, Karl. “The Opium of the Masses.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James
Clark, 263-4. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. “Religion as Resentment.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly
James Clark, 265-72. 2nd ed. Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008.

Plato, “Euthyphro.” In Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, edited by Kelly James Clark, 97-9. 2nd ed.
Ontario: Broadview Press, 2008.

Rahner, Karl. Grace in Freedom. London: Burns & Oates, 1969.

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