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PADMANABH S.

JAINI

UMASVATI ON THE QUALITY OF SUKHA

Um sv ti begins and ends his Tattv rth dhigama-Bh s ya (also called a a a a a. a a. Svopaja-Bh s ya by Svet mbaras1 ) henceforth called Bh sya on the a. Tattv rtha S tra with several verses, which emphasize the goal of moksa a u . as the absence of karmas and kleas, which can be described as the end s of suffering (duhkha-ksaya). In his concluding verses, called Samksepa. . . . slokas, there are as many as eleven verses that talk about sukha, or spiritual bliss (that is, complete happiness), that is present in the state of a Liberated Soul (Siddha). There, he asserts that this sukha is called avy b dha by the a a sages. This seems to be a technical term, which is not found in MonierWilliams Dictionary. But the word vy b dha does appear and it means to a a hurt or to injure, so avy b dha could be translated as a state free from a a injury [produced by karmic matter]. When asked by a questioner as to how a being who has no body whatsoever and who has destroyed all eight karmas can have sukha at all, Um sv ti explains, In the world, the word a a sukha is employed in four different meanings. When someone says, Fire is happiness or wind is happiness, he is talking about the quality of the objects (visaya). When a person in the absence of a particular pain thinks . he is happy, then he is using it in the sense of freedom from pain. When a person enjoys pleasures as a result of meritorious actions of the past, then that is called the fruit (vip ka), to which the name sukha is given. But a the best and the foremost of these is in the state of emancipation, where
Paper presented at the International Seminar on Um sv ti and His Works, Bhogilal L. a a Institute of Indology, Delhi, January 47, 1999. 1 For a critical study on the identity of authorship of the Tattv rtha S tra and Bh sya, a u a. see Ohira 1982. Ohira dates Um sv ti to the end of the 5th century, while Bronkhorst a a 1985, Zydenbos 1985, and Johnson 1995 favour an earlier date of 4th century. Johnson sums up the debate in the following words: The Tattv rtha S tra . . . is the earliest extant a u Jaina work in Sanskrit, written between 150 C.E. and 350 C.E. . . . There is in fact considerable doubt whether the [Tattv rth dhigama Bh sya] autocommentary was written by a a a. Um sv ti himself; indeed Bronkhorst 1985 has presented a convincing case for attributa a a ing it to a Svet mbara of the fourth century C.E. (at the earliest). . . . Furthermore, the Sarv rthasiddhi, although composed perhaps a century later than the Tattv rth dhigama a a a Bh sya, may be using a version of the Tattv rtha S tra which is at times closer to the a. a u original than that used in the Bh sya. There is also some evidence (see Williams, 1963, a. pp. 23) that the Tattv rtha S tra itself was composed in the Digambara milieu, while a u a Bh sya marked the Svet mbara features (Johnson 1995, pp. 4547). a. Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 643664, 2003. 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

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there is that sukha associated with the emancipation from all karmas and all passions. This sukha is incomparable as there is no object in this entire world with which it can be compared. Therefore, in the absence of ordinary perception and a viable inference that can be drawn from such perception, the presence of such sukha has to be taken on the authority of the words of the Arhats, who indeed have direct perception of such sukha. It cannot be known merely through examination by those who are less than omnia a scient.2 Um sv ti unfortunately does not cite even a single passage from the Agamas but concludes his Bh sya with the benediction that moksa a. . can be attained by a person who follows the path laid down in his work and will undoubtedly attain that sukha which is avy b dha. However, this a a word indeed does occur several times in the Agamas. The most informative discussion related to avy b dha is found in a conversation between a a Mah vra and the Brahmin Somila at Viy hapannatti (Bhagavat) 18.10.4.3 a a He approaches Mah vra, having greeted him in the appropriate way by a formally inquiring about whether he is making spiritual progress (jatt te a
2 samksepa- lok h s a. . .

t d tmy d upayukt s te, kevalaj nadiranaih / a a a a a s . samyaktvasiddhat vasth h , hetvabh v c ca niskriy h//21// a a. a a a. . sams ravisay ttam mukt n m avyayam sukham/ a a . a . . a . avy b dham iti proktam paramam paramarsibhih//23// a a . . . . sy d etad aarrasya jantor nastastakarmanah/ a s . .. .. . katham bhavati muktasya, sukham ity atra me srunu//24// . loke catursv ih rthesu, sukhaabdah prayujyate/ a s . . . visaye vedan bh ve, vip ke moksa eva ca//25// a a a . . sukho vahnih sukho v yur visayesv iha kathyate/ a . . . duhkh bh ve ca purusah, sukhito smti manyate//26// . a a . . punyakarmavip k c ca, sukham istendriy tmajam/ a a a . .. karmakleavimoksac ca, mokse sukham anuttamam//27// . . . s . . loke tatsadrso hy arthah krtsne py anyo na vidyate/ . . . upagyeta tad yena, tasm n nirupamam sukham//30// a . li gaprasiddheh pr m ny d anum nopam nayoh / n a a. a a a . . atyantam c prasiddham tad yat ten nupamam smrtam//31// a . a . . . pratyaksam tad bhagavat m arhat m tai ca bh sitam/ a a. s a. . . grhyate stty atah pr j ir na cchadmasthaparks ay //32// iti// . a . . a a Bh syam idam Uccairn garav cakena sattv nukampay drbdham/ a. a a a a . Tattv rth dhigam khyam spastam Um sv tin sastram//5/ a a a a a a . .. yas tattv dhigam khyam j syati ca karisyate ca tatroktam/ a a . a . so vy b dhasukh khyam pr psyaty acirena param rtham//6// a a a a . a . 3 Somile n mam m hane . . . samanam bhagavam Mah vram evam vay s jatt a . a . a . a a . . . . te bhamte! j vanijjam te bhamte! ph suyavih ram te bhamte! Somil ! jatt vi me, a . a a . a a . . . . javanijjam pi me, ph suyavih ram pi me/ kim te bhamte jatt ? . . . se kim te bhamte a a . a . . . . . . avv b ham! Somil ! jam me v iyapittiyasimbhiyasanniv iy vivih rog yamk sarragay a a . a a a a a a . a a . . dos uvasamt no udremti settam avv b ham/ Viy hapan natti, xviii, uddea 10. a . a a . a s . a . ..

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bhamte) and whether he is unperturbed by his sense organs (javanijjam), . . . he makes a further query, whether there is avv b ha for him. Mah vra a a a assents to all of them (jatt vi me, javanijjam pi me, avv b ham pi me). a a a . . . But Somila inquires further about the sense in which there is avv b ham a a . for him, to which Mah vra replies, O Somila, . . . in the sense of the a suppressing of corporeal deciencies, viz. of various kinds of diseases caused by a complication in winds, bile, and phlegm.4 This episode emphasizes the fact that at least here in the Agama the term avy b dha was a a not used for spiritual bliss of the siddha but for the (temporary) freedom from corporeal afictions. Um sv tis use of the term avy b dha to describe sukha in the state a a a a of the siddha leaves many questions unanswered. Avy b dha is a negative a a term signifying merely the end of afictions that the soul was subject to during the state of karmic bondage in sams ra. The title of another work . a of his called Praamarati-prakaran a (A Treatise on Delight in Spiritual s . Calm) might lead one to anticipate a more positive meaning for the word sukha. Even so, in his concluding verses on that treatise, he repeats the adjectives found in the Bh sya, namely anupama and avy b dha, and adds a. a a that such a soul is characterized by kevala-samyaktva and innite j na and a darana, three qualities that are ksayika bh vas, which were attained while s a . the soul was still in the state of embodiment (i.e., a kevalin). The quality of sukha thus seems to manifest only when corporal bondage has ended, as he says, Physical and mental suffering happens because of activities of the body. In the absence of the body, etc., there is also the absence of such suffering and thus is established the bliss of siddha.5 Here again, sukha is
4 Deleus translation: He assents avv b ha in the sense of the suppressing of corporeal a a

deciencies caused by complications in winds, bile and phlegm (p. 246). It is obvious that in this passage the term avv b ha refers only to a temporary state of health of Mah vra, a a a a a a as conrmed by Abhayadeva S ris comment: avv b ham ti sarrab dh n m abh vah u a a . a . (p. 757). It may also be noted that the term avv b ha appears in this passage in Bhagava a a along jatt and javanijjam, the two words that appear regularly in the vandanaka formula a . . used by a layman in greeting a monk. See Wiliams, 1963, p. 200. 5 pra amitavedakasayasya h syaratyaratiokanibhr tasya/ s a s . . bhayaskuts nirabhibhavasya yat sukham tat kuto nyesam//126// . . . a . . svargasukh ni paroksany atyantaparoksam eva moksasukham/ a .. . . ratyaksam praamasukham na paravaam na vyayapr ptam//237/ . . . s s . a . . mastakas civin sat t lasya yath dhruvo bhavati n sah/ u a a a a . tadvat karmavin so hi mohanyaksaye nityam//266// . . . a . s dikam anantam anupamam avy b dhasukham uttamam pr ptah/ a a a . a . kevalasamyaktvaj nadiran tm bhavati muktah//289// . . . a s a a . dehamanovr ttibhy m bhavatah sarram nase duhkhe/ a. a . . . tadabh vas tadabh ve siddham siddhasya siddhisukham//295// a a . Praamaratiprakaranam s .

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explained in negative terms, as freedom from suffering, a paraphrase for the word avy b dha. a a It should be noted that the Samksepa-lokas attributed to Um sv ti s a a . . seem to have been accepted by the Digambara author Akala ka in his n Tattv rtha-V rttika (known as R jav rttika) as he quotes some of the a a a a above verses pertaining to sukha with the words uktam ca without refer. ring to his source.6 This is of great signicance since it demonstrates that there was no dispute among Jains on the nature of the siddha and the quality of sukha in that state. Um sv tis admonition that the presence a a of such an indescribable quality in the siddha should be accepted on the authority of the scriptures ( gama-pram na) cannot be lightly set aside. a a. It might, therefore, be considered somewhat presumptuous for anyone to probe into the nature of this quality called sukha and to determine if it is present in any form in the embodied kevalin (i.e., an Arhat) and if it were to exist in the kevalin, to ascertain which karma would be the adversary of that particular quality of the soul. Given Um sv tis emphasis on avy b dha-sukha in the Bh sya as the a a a a a. goal of spiritual life, it is rather surprising that the word sukha is not used in this sense even once in the Tattv rtha S tra. The rst is at IV.21, where a u certain gods are said to be more endowed with sukha (happiness) and dyuti (luster), than other gods. The second is at V.20, where the word sukha is mentioned together with duhkha, jvita, and marana, as functions of matter . . relative to the jva. The third appears in VII.32, where it is one of the atic ras of a person who takes sallekhan . In the Bh sya, the word is used a a a. in connection with the statement on s tra II.45 (nirupabhogam antyam) u that sukha and duhkha are not experienced in the k rmana sarra.7 As for a . . the word avy b dha, it too does not appear anywhere in the S tra in this a a u context but is the name of a heaven, as in IV.26. The other major Digambara commentary on the Tattv rtha S tra, a u namely the Sarv rthasiddhi of P jyap da, which predates Akala kas a u a n work, does not have any preliminary or concluding verses. But in the commentary on the very rst s tra, P jyap da denes moksa as a state u u a . in which a soul is free from all embodiment and in which it has attained perfection of its innate qualities (namely, knowledge, etc.) and the highest form of sukha, which he also describes as avy b dha in almost the a a
6 In Amrtacandras Tattv rthas ra (pp. viii, 4554) these slokas appear without even a a .

the words uktam ca. . 7 (1) sthitiprabh vasukhadyuti . . ./IV, 21; a (2) s rasv t ditya . . . tusit vy b dhamarutah/IV, 26; a aa . . a a a (3) sukhaduh khajvitamaranopagrah s ca/V, 20; a . . (4) jvitamaranasams . . . sukh nubandhanid nak ran ani/ VII, 32. a a a . . . a

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same words as found in the Bh sya.8 Yet there are several passages in a. P jyap das commentary as well as in Akala kas V rttika that suggest u a n a that this particular sukha can be more positively characterized and can also be attributed to the kevalin (i.e., Arhat), who has destroyed the four main gh tiy karmas and has thus become an omniscient being. He is a a still subject to the effects of the four remaining karmas, namely, n ma, a gotra, and ayu, which together are responsible for his continued state of embodiment and longevity, as well as the effects of vedanya karma, which would account for pleasant (s t ) and painful (as t ) feelings (vedan ), aa aa a respectively. Discussing the ksayika-bh vas, or the innate qualities of the soul reala . ized by the kevalin through the destruction of the four gh tiy karmas, a a P jyap da in his commentary on s tra II.4, enumerates the following u a u nine gunas: kevala-j na and kevala-darana with the destruction of the a s . j n varan a and daran varan a karmas, ksayika-samyaktva and ksayikaa a s a . . . . c ritra through the destruction of darana-mohanya and c ritra-mohanya a s a karmas (the two varieties of mohanya karma). Then there are the ve qualities of the soul that are attained by the destruction of the ve varieties of the antar ya karmas.9 The latter are of some relevance to our a discussion of the sukha of the kevalin and hence may be described in some detail. The rst is called ksayika-d na, which gives innite ability to give a . protection (abhaya) against the sorrows of sams ra to beings through his . a preaching. Through the destruction of l bh ntar ya karma (which occurs a a a along with the attainment of kevala-j na) the kevalin gains (l bha) the a a ability of not depending on food by morsel for his sustenance. Instead, his body is nourished by extremely auspicious, subtle, and innite matter a variety of nokarma-vargan a that cannot be absorbed by any human . being prior to this state. This matter is automatically absorbed by the kevalins entire body for the duration of that life. He is said to attain innite satisfaction (bhoga) and comfort (upabhoga) by the destruction of the corresponding antar ya karmas, as witnessed by the heavenly shower a of owers as well as the royal majesty of the assembly hall (samavasaran a), . and so forth. And nally, with the destruction of vry ntar ya karma, a a

8 Cf. nirva esa-nir krtakarmamalakala kasy sarrasy tmano acintya-sv bh vika-j s . a . n a a a a a n digunam avy b dhasukham atyantikam avasth ntaram moksa iti/ a a a a . . . Sarv rthasiddhi, I.1. a 9 j nadir anad nal bhabhogopabhogavry n i ca/ ca sabdah samyaktvac ritr nukar a s a a a. a a . sanarthah/ Ibid., II, 4. . . .

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he attains innite energy (vrya), which is inseparable from omniscience (sarvajatva).10 Given the general rule that the ksayika bh vas, when once realized, are a . never lost, the question arises as to how to interpret the rst four bh vas, a namely d na, l bha, bhoga, and upabhoga in the state of the siddha, who a a does not have a body. P jyap das response to this problem is illustrative u a of the Digambara way of interpreting the term avy b dha. To quote, In a a the siddhas, these [d na, l bha, bhoga, and upabhoga] abide in the form a a of avy b dha, literally, freedom from afiction, which is characterized [in a a this context] by extreme spiritual bliss (param nanda).11 a As if he were anticipating a question as to how this quality of sukha functions there, P jyap da states that it functions in the same way u a as the quality of innite energy (ananta-vrya) functions for the souls omniscience, that is, it energizes the other qualities of the soul such as innite knowledge.12 The quality of energy that the Jainas talk about is not to be confused with the sort of innite power (ananta-akti) attribs uted to an omnipotent god in theistic schools. Rather, as I have observed elsewhere,13 this functions as a sort of metaquality (i.e., situated behind or above), an abstract force that energizes, as it were, the very operation of the knowledge and perception qualities. In the worldly state, the kevalin had benecence, gain, satisfaction, and comfort in their most exalted form as a result of the destruction of the adversary antar ya karmas. Since a these four things are seen as conducive to happiness in an embodied state, P jyap da seems to suggest that there is a metaquality similar to vrya that u a can be called sukha, that is happiness or spiritual bliss, which should not be confused with worldly happiness. What is understood in the worldly state as happiness and unhappiness (s t and as t ) are not actually expressive of the true nature of the aa aa soul. Worldly happiness is past deeds realized as the fruition (udaya) of
10 . . . d n ntar yasy tyantaks ay d anantapr nigananugrahakaram ksayikam abhayaa a a a a. . . a . . d nam/ l bh ntar yasy ses asya nir s t parityaktakaval h rakriy n am kevalin m yatah a a a a a . aa a a a. . a. . sarrabal dh nahetavo nyamanuj s dh ran ah paramaubh h s ksm h anant h pratisaa a a a a .. s a. u . a. a. mayam pudgal h sambandham upay nti sa ksayiko l bhah/ . . . vry ntar yasya karmano a. a a a a . . . . . tyantaksay d avirbh tam anantavryam ksayikam/ p rvokt n m sapt n m prakrtn m a u u a a. a a. . . . a . atyantaksay t ksayikam samyaktvam/ c ritram api tath / Ibid., II. 4. a a . . a . 11 yadi ksayikad n dibh vakr tam abhayad n di, siddhesv api prasa gah/ naisa dosah, a a a . a a n . . . . . . a sarran matrthakaran makarmoday dy apeksatv t/ tesam tadabh ve tadaprasa gah / a a a n . . a . . katham tarhi tesam siddhesu vrttih? param nand vy b dha-r pen aiva tesam tatra vrttih/ a a a a u . . . . . . . . . . . Ibid., II.4. This seems to be the only place where avy b dha is called param nanda in the a a a Sarv rthasiddhi, but the Hindi translator does not expound on the last section. a 12 kevalaj nar pen anantavryavrttivat/ Ibid., II.4. a u . . 13 See Jaini, 1979, p. 105.

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vedanya karma in the present. Being an audayika-bh va, it would not a be seen as desirable, even when it is s t -vedanya (pleasurable feelings) aa that are generated.14 Benecence, gain, satisfaction, and comfort, however, are not audayika bh vas, that is, they are not the result of the maturing a of any karma, as is s t and as t vedanya. Rather, they manifest as a aa aa quality of the soul by virtue of ksyopaama (partial destruction and partial s . suppression) of the various antar ya karmas in the pre-kevalin state. But a at the time of attaining omniscience, these antar ya karmas are totally a annihilated (ksaya), yielding thereby the kind of happiness that we would . ordinarily associate with benecence, gain, satisfaction, and comfort. In the absence of a body, that is, in the state of the siddha, these worldly forms of happiness are no longer applicable. Instead they seem to be transformed into a single quality of innite spiritual bliss (param nanda). a P jyap das statements on the sukha of the siddha, terse as they are, u a shed a different light on the quality of sukha in the state of moksa. The . innite energy of the soul is here associated with not only the qualities of innite knowledge and intuition (as is agreed by all Jaina schools) but also with innite spiritual bliss or sukha. That this is a Digambara view is evident from the repetition of this very sentence in Akala kas n V rttika on this s tra.15 It is even doubtful if such a connection between the a u destruction of the rst four varieties of antar ya karma and the emergence a of sukha is a commonly held view among the Digambaras. Kundakunda, who may be considered to have some authoritative opinion on this matter, does not explicitly make such a connection in his discourse on a kevalins attainment of spiritual bliss. Raising a question as to how there could be knowledge and bliss in the absence of the mediation of senses for a kevalin, he says, By virtue of the fact that he has destroyed the four gh tiy karmas, he has obtained innite energy as well as innite purity a a (tejas). The soul, no longer having use of the sense organs, transforms
14 sukhaduhkhajvitamaranopagrah s ca/ V, 20. sadasadvedyodaye ntara gahetau a n . . sati b hyadravy diparip kanimittavaad utpadyam nah prtiparit khyah parinamah a a a s a . a . . . sukhaduh kham ity akhy yate/ . . . et ni sukh dni jvasya pudgalakrta upak rah/ a a a a . . . m rtimaddhetusamnidh ne sati tadutpatteh/ Sarv rthasiddhi, V, 20. u a a . . cf. Siddhasena: b hyadravyasambandh peks asadvedyoday t sams ry tmanah pras a a . a a . a a . daparinamah sukham/ . . . asadvedyoday d atmaparinamo b hyadravy peks ah samkleaa a a . . . . . . s pr yo duhkham. Bh sya-tk , V, 20. a a. . a . 15 Cf. asesal bh ntar yanir s t paramaubhapudgal n m ad nam (parityaktakava a . a aa s a a . . a a l h rakriy nam) . . . yad anantad nalabdhy dayah ukt h abhayad n dihetavo d n ntar a a a. . a a a. a a a a a . y disamksay d bhavanti, siddhesv api tatprasa gah? naisa dosah/ sarran matrthaa n . . . a . . . . a karan makarmoday dyapeks atv t tesam tad abh ve tad aprasa gah, param nand vy b da a a n . a a a a . a . . har penaiva tesam (abhayad n dn m ) tatra vrttih/ kevalaj nar pen a anantavryavrttivat/ u . a a a. a u . . . . . . Tattv rthav rttika, II, 4. (I, p. 106). a a

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itself as knowledge and spiritual bliss (nanam sokkham ca parinamadi).16 .. . . . Commenting on this, Amrtacandra in his Tattvapradpik -vr tti says, Such a . . a soul, which has destroyed the gh ti karmas by the strength of its pure a transformation brought about by the total destruction of the antar ya a karmas, j na and darana- varan a karmas and the host of the mohanyas, a s a . becomes itself pure consciousness, freed from all delements and thus is transformed by itself into knowledge that reects both itself and all other knowables as well as bliss (saukhyam), which is characterized by an kulat (freedom from doubt, perplexity, anguish and so forth). And a a therefore these two, viz., knowledge and spiritual bliss ( nanda) are the a souls own nature.17 It is interesting that the word ananda employed here is related to the purity of the soul primarily resulting from the destruction of all forms of moha, which can be a synonym for akulat . These two charactera istics, namely, knowledge and bliss, are so interrelated that Kundakunda is even able to apply the method of suddha nicaya-naya, or the pure s non-conventional view, and proclaim further that the innite knowledge of the kevalin is itself perfect bliss (nanam . . . vimalam . . . suham iti .. . . . egamtiyam bhaniyam).18 Commenting on this, Amrtacandra elaborates . . . . . further that an ordinary persons knowledge suffers from the limited ability to know each and every object only partially and only in a sequential order, conned as it is to the limited scope of the senses and the mind. This itself produces curiosity which is not free from perplexity and other such forms of suffering ( kulat ). For this reason, Amrtacandra asserts a a . that kevalaj na itself, having gone beyond all curiosity, may be said to a be identical with innite bliss. (atah sarvath kevalam sukham aik ntikam a a . . anumodanyam).19 However, Jayasena, in keeping with his more moderate
16 pakkhnagh dikammo anamtavaravrio adhikatejo/ . a . .

j do animdio so nanam sokkham ca parinamadi// a . . .. . . . Pravacanas ra, 1, 19. a 17 Amrtacandra: ayam khalv atm suddhopayogas marthy t praksnagh tikarm . . . a a a a a . . . . a a samastamohany bh v d atyantanirvik rauddhacaitanyasvabh vam atm nam as dayan a a a a s a svayam eva svaparaprak sakalaks anam j nam an kulatvalaks anam saukhyam ca bh tv a a u a . . . a . . . . parinamate/ evam atmano j n nandau svabh va eva/ svabh vasya tu par napeksatv d a a a a a . . a indriyair vin py atmano j n nandau sambhavatah/ Ibid., I, 19. a a a . 18 athaitad eva pratyaksam p ram rthikasaukhyatvenopadi ati a s . . a . j dam sayam samattam nanamanamtatthavitthadam vimalam/ a . . . . . . . . . rahiyam tu oggah dihim suham ti egamtiyam bhaniyam// a . . . . . . . Pravacanas ra, I, 59. a 19 Amrtacandra: svayam j tatv t, samastatv t, anant rthavistrtatv t, avagrah diraa a a a a a . . . hitatv c ca pratyaksam j nam sukham aik ntikam iti nicyate/ an kulatvaikalaksanatv t a a . a s a . . . . a saukhyasya, . . . kramakrt rthagrahanakhedena paroksam j nam atyantam akulam a .a . . . . bhavati, tato na tat param rthatah saukhyam/ I, 59 . . . yato hi keval vasth y m a a a a .

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stance, points out that the bliss (sukha) of the kevalin, characterized as an kula as well as param nanada, is no doubt distinct from j na since a a a this quality has a different name, a different characteristic, and a different purpose. Even so, from the nicaya viewpoint (in which differences are s disregarded), perfect sukha may be said to be not distinct (abhinna) from innite knowledge.20 It should be noted here that Kundakunda does not relate this innite spiritual bliss with the body of the kevalin as P jyap da does when the u a latter discusses the relationship between ananta-sukha and the destruction of l bha-antar ya, and so forth. Conversely, P jyap da never mentions a a u a the bliss of the soul in the context of the kevalin but only bliss related to a body, for example, the automatic absorption of nourishment and so forth. He reserves the term param nanda for the state of the siddha, albeit a from the destruction of the antar ya karmas, and not necessarily only from a the attainment of ananta-j na and ananta-darana. Kundakunda perhaps a s does not regard this attribution of worldly happiness allowing this to be the case in actuality as of any consequence to the true nature of the sukha experienced by the kevalin even before attaining the siddha state. The perfection of bliss thus attained by the destruction of the gh tiy a a karmas leads Kundakunda to the well-known Digambara position that the kevalin does not suffer from any bodily pain or pleasure.21 Such a conclusion regarding the nature of the kevalin brings us face-to-face with a the celebrated controversy between the Digambaras and the Svet mbaras ambaras, as is well known, argue over the nature of the kevalin. The Svet
sukhapratipattivipaks abh tasya duhkhasya s dhanat m upagatam aj nam akhilam eva u a a a . . pranayati, sukhasya s dhanbh tam tu parip rnam j nam upaj yeta/ tatath kevalam eva a u . u . . a a . s . saukhyam ity alam prapacena/ Pravacanas ra, I, 61. a . Jayasena: svabh vo hi kevalj nadaranadvayam, tayoh pratigh ta avaranadvayam a a s a . . . tasy bh vah kevalin m j nam eva sukham ity abhipr yah/ Ibid., I, 61. a a . a. a a . Kundakunda goes even a step further and declares that those who do not trust in the above statement must be abhavyas: no saddahanti sokkham suhesu paramam ti vigadagh dn am/ a . . . . . sunid na te abhavv bhavv v tam padicchamti// u. a a a . . . . However, Jayasena does not take the term abhavya literally: te hi jv vartam nak le a a a samyaktvar pabhavyatvavyaktyabh v d abhavy bhanyante, na punah sarvath / Ibid., I, u a a a a . . 62. 20 Jayasena: abhedanayena . . . kevalaj nam eva sukham iti pratip dayati . . . a a yad evam ksayikj nam tad an kulatvalaksanaparam nandaikar pa-p ram rthikasukh t a . a a u a a a . . . . samj -laksana-prayojan dibhede pi nicayanayen bhinnatv t p ram rthikasukham a a s a a a a . . . . bhanyate/ Ibid., I, 59. . 21 sokkham v puna dukkham kevalananissa natthi dehagadam/ . a . . .. . . jahm animdiyattam j dam tamh du tam neyam// Ibid., 20. a . . a I, . a . . . .

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that because of the continued embodiment and the inevitable rise of the s t and as t -vedanya karmas in the kevalin, the sukha described by aa aa the Digambaras as innite bliss cannot become manifest until the kevalin becomes eternally free from embodiment and thus becomes a siddha.22 There is one more s tra that species four qualities of the soul that are u not destroyed at the nal destruction of embodiment, i.e., at the attaina a ment of siddhahood.23 One would expect Um sv ti to list all eight gunas, which were respectively brought to perfection by the destruction of their corresponding adversary karmas. But only four are listed, namely kevalasamyaktva, kevala-j na, kevala-darana, and siddhatva. The rst, kevalaa s samyaktva a term which appears only in this s tra is a synonym for u ksayika samyaktva, the samyaktva that is attained when the soul destroys . darana-mohanya karma in the fourth gunasth na. However, this ksayika s a . . samyaktva is still accompanied by the other variety of moha called c ritraa mohanya, which encompasses the varieties of kasayas and no-kasayas. . . Therefore, the samyaktva at this stage is dened by the kinds of qualities that become manifest with it, such as praama (peacefulness) anukamp s a (compassion), and so forth. At the kevalin stage, however, the same samyaktva, being accompanied by the purest conduct (ksayika-c ritra), a . becomes kevala-samyaktva. This is clear from P jyap das explanation of u a the term samyakdarana in s tra I, 2 where it is pointed out that in the s u vtar gas (i.e., the kevalins), this samyaktva is only total purity of the a u soul ( tmaviuddhim tram).24 The fact that s tra X.4 does not mention a s a kevala-c ritra should probably be understood in light of this statement of a P jyap da. In the case of the kevalin, the purity attained by samyaktva u a is indistinguishable from the purity gained by c ritra and hence there a would be no need to mention them separately. Knowledge (j na) and intua ition (darana), are the two aspects of consciousness (caitanya) that were s never totally absent even in the state of bondage; they are now brought to perfection and will remain so forever. As for siddhatva (the state of being
22 For a compilation of Y panya and Svet mbara texts on kevali-bhukti, see a a

Jamb vijaya Muni 1974. For a critical examination of this controversy over the nature u of the kevalin, see Dundas 1985. See also Jaini, 1993. 23 aupa amik dibhavyatv bh v c c nyatra kevalasamyaktva-j na-dar ana-siddhats a a a a a a s vebhyah/ Tattv rtha S tra, X, 4. ete hy asya ksayik nity s tu muktasy pi bhavanti/Bh sya, a u a a a. . . a X, 4. daranasaptakaks ay t ksayikam kevalasamyaktvam , samastajn n varanaksay t s a a a . . . . . . a ksayikam kevalaj nam aesadaran varan aksay t ksayikam kevaladaranam, samaa . s . s a s . . . . a . . . stakarmaksay t siddhatvam ity ete ksayik bh v yasm n nity s tasm n muktasy pi a a a a a a . a . a bhavantti/ Bh sya-tk , X, 4. a. . a 24 tattv rthasya sraddh nam samyagdar anam . . . tad dvividham, sar gavtar ga a a . s a a . visayabhed t praamasamveg nukamp stiky dyabhivyaktilaks anam prathamam/ atmavia s a a a . . . . . suddhim tram itarat/ Sarv rthasiddhi, I. 12. a a

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liberated), it is hard to imagine that it is a separate guna. It is a name . given to a state achieved by the destruction of all eight karmas whereby the soul accomplishes everything that was to be accomplished, a literal meaning of the word siddha. It is probably mentioned here as a separate guna as a device to eliminate any possibility of the pure souls return to . the state of bondage (sams ra). It can thus be compared to the Buddhist . a (Sarv stiv din) concept of an asamskrta (uncompounded) dharma called a a . . apratisam khy -nirodha, which forestalls the regrouping of the dharmas of a . the Arhat once nirv na is attained.25 What is conspicuously absent in this a. s tra are vrya and sukha, the two qualities that we have discussed earlier u in connection with the kevalin. P jyap das comment on their apparent u a exclusion from this s tra is rather brief: If only these four qualities u survive, then would that not result in the exclusion of innite energy and so forth? That is not the case. There exists an invariable concomitance between ananta-j na/darana and ananta-vrya, and so forth. One who is a s decient in energy will also have deciency of knowledge. As for [innite] sukha, it invariably accompanies [innite] knowledge (j namayatv t ca a a 26 sukhasya).
25 utp d tyantavighno nyo nirodho pratisamkhyay / . . . an gat n m utp dasy a a a a a a. a a .

tyantam vighnabh to visamyog d yo nyo nirodho so pratisamkhy nirodhah/ nahy asau u a a . . . . pratisamkhyay labhyate, kim tarhi, pratyayavaikaly t/ Abhidharmakoabh s ya, I, 6. a a s a. . . Cf. Akala ka: siddhatvam api ksayikam agamopadistam asti tasyopasamkhy nam n a . .. . iha kartavyam? Na kartavyam? . . . siddhatvam hi sarvesam ksayik nam bh v n m a a a. . . . . a. . s dh ranam iti/ Tattv rthav rttika, I, p. 106. a a . a a 26 anyatrakevalaj nadar anasiddhatvebhyah / Tattv rtha S tra, X, 4. kevalasamyaktvaa s a u . j na-daranasiddhatvebhyo nyatr nyasminn ayam vidhir iti/ yadi catv ra ev va isyante, a s a a a s. . anantavry dn m nivrttih pr pnoti/ naisa dosah, j na-daran vin bh vatv d ananta a a. a a s a a a a . . . . . vry dn m aviesah, anantas marthyahnasy nant vabodhavr ttyabh v j j namayatv c a a s . . a a a a a a a . ca sukhasyeti/ Sarv rthasiddhi X. 4. a These comments may be contrasted with the following: aupaamik dibhavyatv bh v c c nyatrakevalasamyaktvaj nadarana-siddhatvebhyah / s a a a a a a s . Tattv rtha S tra, X, 4. ete hy asya ksayik nity s tu muktasy pi bhavanti/ Bh sya, X, 4. . . . a u a a a. . a samastakarmaksay t siddhatvam ity ete ksayik bh v yasm n nity s tasm n muktasy pi a a a a . a . a a a bhavantti/ Bh sya-tk , X, 4. a. . a While Um sv ti and Siddhasena are silent on the missing bh vas, namely, sukha and a a a vrya in X, 4, Jinabhadragani in his Viesavayakabh s ya adds sukha to this list in the s . s a. . following verse, an addition which goes unnoticed in Koty ryav diganIs Vivarana: a . . a . tassodaiy ty bhavvattam ca vinivattate samayam/ a a . . . sammattan nadamsanasuhasiddhatt im mott na//3685// a. a . u. . . tassodaiy ty ity di/ tasyed nm caramasamayaksaye . . . muktv sv bh vik ni a a a a . a a a a . . samyaktva-j na-daraan ni y vat siddhatv ni sesabh v n m s peksaparinamatv d a s a a a a a a. a . a . vigama iti sthitam/ 3685//III, p. 734.

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There is no elaboration on this s tra (X.4) in the Bh sya, nor is there u a. any additional point made by Siddhasena in his Bh sya-tk . However, at a. . a the end of his long Bh s|ya on X.7, which deals with twelve varieties of a . approaches for discussing the nature of the siddhas in their previous state (for example, the time and place of their liberation and the gender of their body), Um sv ti describes the attainment of siddhahood. Then by the a a destruction of vedanya, n ma, gotra, and ayu karmas . . . the soul becomes a pacied or at peace (antah) like re that has no more fuel left to burn. s . The word santa (at peace) in the Bh sya is probably a description of the a. siddhatva quality appearing in s tra X.4. This expression is not indicative u of any novel quality realized by the soul at this stage; it merely signies the end of the spiritual journey. This is evident from the concluding line of Um sv ti: Such a soul, having gone beyond the happiness of sams ra a a . a attains the bliss of nirv na (antah), which is total, incomparable, eternal, a . s . and perfect.27 Siddhasena glosses the word santa (at X.7) as param hl dam upagatah, a a . that is has arrived at supreme joy. The two expressions are probably not quite identical and this becomes clearer as one reads seven additional verses, which Siddhasena seems to be quoting from some unknown text. It is laid out in these verses that the soul that was an Arhat (satk r rhah ) now, aa . having shed his nal body, is at peace, established in himself. He has gone beyond birth, death, old age, and disease (virug vigadah). These constitute . vy b dha, or extreme forms of afictions. And due to the absence of them a a as well as because of his omniscience, he becomes now extremely happy (bhavati parama-sukh). And this is indeed the happiness free from afic tions (avy b dham sukham hy etat). And thus, such a soul is endowed with a a . . a s ksayika-samyaktva, j na, darana, vrya, and siddhatva, and also by the . bliss that is beyond all dualities (yuktah . . . nirdvandven pi ca sukhena).28 a .
27 ksetrak lagati . . . Tattv rtha S tra, X, 7 . . . tatah sams rabjabandhanirmuktah a a u . . a . .

phalabandhanamoks apekso yath khy tasamyato jinah keval sarvajah sarvadar suddho a a s . . . . . buddhah krtakrtyah sn tako bhavati/ tato vedanyan magotr yus kaksay t phalabanda a a . . . . . . a hananirmukto nirdagdhp rvop ttendhano nirup d na iv gnih p rvop ttabhavaviyog d u a a a a . u a a hetvabh v c ca uttarasy pr durbh v d samtah/ sams rasukham attya atyantikam a a a a a a . . . a aik ntikam nirupamam niratiayam nityam nirv nasukham av pnotti/ Bh sya, X, 7. a s a. a a. . . . . 28 sams re punar apr durbh v c ch ntah param lh dam upagatah/ . . . a a a a a a . a . . vy b dh bh v c ca sa sarvajatv c ca bhavati paramasukhi/ a a a a a a vy b dh bh vo nu svasthasya j nasya nanu susukham//3// a a a a anupamam ameyam avyayam anagham sivam ajaramarujam abhayatrsam/ . .. ek ntikam atyantikam avy b dham sukham hy etat//4// a a a . . evam ksayikasamyaktvam vryasiddhatvadaranaj naih / s a . . . . atyantikaih sa yukto nirdvandven pi ca sukhena//7// a . Bh sya-tk , X, 7. a. . a

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These verses, which emphasize the presence of roga (disease) in the state of the Arhat and the absence of them in the state of the siddha, a are expressive of the Svet mbara doctrine that total happiness (anantasukha) is not possible in the state of embodiment and hence even the kevalin cannot be equated with the siddha on this particular point. It is rather strange that in the passages quoted above, there is no mention of the destruction of vedanya karma, the presence of which precludes the possibility of freedom from hunger, thirst, and the resulting diseases and so forth even to an omniscient being. But the expression avy b dha-sukha, a a can be construed as pointing to the destruction of vedanya karma. The same concept is probably to be seen in the expression nirdvandva applied to the sukha of the siddha. The sukha of sams ra is truly happiness mixed . a with unhappiness (s t and as t on account of vedanya karma). However, aa aa when this karma is also destroyed together with those karmas (i.e., n ma, a gotra, and ayu) that sustain the body, the soul may be said to have gone beyond all dualities and variations forever, a state described by the term avy b dha.29 a a Yaovijaya in his Adhy tma-mata-parks a initiates a vigorous refutas a . tion of the Digambara position attributed to Kundakunda, specically the three verses quoted above from the Pravacanas ra. There is no dispute, a he says, if it is maintained that with the destruction of the j n varanya a a . karma, there is the destruction of the suffering (duhkha) born of ignorance . (aj na). But would it be proper to claim thereby that there is also the a total destruction of all forms of suffering? The kevalin has surely gained omniscience, but that does not mean the quality of avy b dha has been a a realized as well. And as long as the two varieties of the vedanya karma are coming into fruition (vip kodaya), it cannot be said that the totality of a duhkha has been brought to an end. Yaovijaya presents his arguments in s . a syllogistic formula: It is not possible for the kevalin to have sukha of the ksayika nature because such sukha is attained only by the destruction .
29 It is noteworthy that the most eloquent passage in the Ac ra ga S tra which speaks a n u about the liberated soul makes no mention of any of the positive qualities that may be realized in that state:

acce jmaranassa vattamaggam vikkh yarae, savve sar niyattamti, takk tattha na vijjai, a a a a . . .. .. . ma tattha na g hiy , oe, appaitth nassa kheyanne, se na dhe na hasse . . . na itth na purise a a .. a . a a na annah , parinne sanne uvam na vijjae, ar v satt , apayassa payam natthi/ Ac r nga a a u a . S tra (s tra 170). u u a Nevertheless Sil nka introduces the terms sukha and avy b dha in his comments a a on the above passage: aesakarmaksayam vidhatte, tatksay c ca kim gunah sy d s . a . . . . . . a ity aha vividham aesakarmaksayalaksanavi istak sapradeakhyo va tatra ratah, s . s . . . . . s . . a atyantikaik ntik n b dhasukhaks ayikaj nadaranasampadupeto anantam api k lam a a a a a s a . . samtisthate/ . . . sopam tulyat s mukt tmanas tajj nasukhayor v na vidyate, a a a a a a . .. lok tigatv t tesam/ (p. 154). a a .

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of its adversary, vedanya karma. In the kevalin, vedanya karma, which is incompatible with ksayika sukha, is continuously coming to fruition . (udaya). Therefore, the sukha of the kevalin is not identical with that of the siddha.30 As for the Digambara view that with the destruction of mohanya, the vedanya itself is rendered powerless and hence the kevalin has realized ksayika sukha, Yaovijaya contends that the scriptures enumerate eight s . (and not seven) karmas, which respectively obstruct eight qualities of the soul. He cites the following authority: With the destruction of moha, there is the realization of ksayika samyaktva and c ritra, while with the destruca . tion of vedanya karma and antar ya karma, innite sukha and innite a energy are realized, respectively.31 It is not proper therefore to declare
30 (1) ann najam tu dukkham n navaranakkhayena khayam ei//91// . . . svata eva sakaa. . . a. . .

lajey k raparinamar pam kevalaj nalaks anam sukham adadh tu, sakaladuhkhaksaye a a u . a a . . . . . . tu kim pram nam? na hi tasya drsijaptisvabh v pratigh te py avy b dhasvabh v a. a a a a a a a . . pratigh to n ma . . . siddh vasth y m eva tatsambhav t/ Adhy tmamataparksa, p. 246. a a a a a a a . . (2) . . . caramaduhkhadhvamsajanakasya vedanyakarmaksayasyaiva ksayikahetutv t/ a . . . . Ibid., p. 217. 31 Tattv rtha S tra, VIII.5 lists the eight varieties of karma prakrtis but does not specify a u . the eight qualities of the soul that are respectively affected by them. Only the rst two karmas name the gunas (i.e. j na and darana) that are obscured. The oft repeated eight a s . siddha-gunas are conspicuously absent in the group of eights of the sth n nga. It is remarka a . able that neither the Bh sya, the Bh sya-tk nor the Sarv rthasiddhi raise a question a. a. . a a about the manner in which the other gunas might be affected, let alone list them, as in . the following passages quoted in the later texts: atha sa bhagav n sailey m dhy namahimn sakalakarmaprakrth ksayam ntv siddho a s a. a a . . . . a bhavati/ . . . evam c sya labdhasvabh vasya satah sv bh vikam idam gunastakam a a a . a . . . .. avirbhavatty aha anantam kevalaj nam j n varanaksay t/ a . a a . . . a anantam daranam c pi daran varan aksay t//1// s s a . . a . . a ksayike suddhasamyaktvac ritre mohanigrah t/ a a . anante sukha-vrye ca vedya-vighnaks ay t kram t///2// a . a . . . . ayusah ksnabh vatv t siddh n m aksay sthitih/ a a a a . a . n magotraksay d eva am rt nant vag han //3// a u a a a a . a Adhy tmamataparksa, p. 350. a . Although ksayika c ritra is mentioned here Yaovijaya himself does not seem to favour its a s . inclusion (due to the absence of yoga in that state). See Ibid., p. 470. Compare this with a Digambara text where c ritra is missing in a similar list: a moho kh iyasammam kevalananam ca keval loyam / a a . .. . . Hanadi hu avaranadugam anamtaviriyam hanei viggham tu//1// . . . . . . . . suhumam ca nanakammam hanei au hanei avagahanam/ . .. . . . . . agurulahugam ca godam avv b ham veyaniyam//2// a a . . . . . Quoted in Tattv rthalokav rttik lamk ra, I, p. 6. a s a a . a

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the disappearance of one kind of duhkha (of vedanya) on the ground that . the other kind of duhkha (born of mohanya) has been eliminated!32 . Yaovijaya also takes note of those who seem to voice a similar view s s a on the authority of such Svet mbara texts as the Avayaka Niryukti, verses 571 and 572, where it is said that for the Trtha kara, there is the rise n of only the most exalted s t -vedanya karma and extremely slight udaya aa of the painful (as t ) ones, similar to a mere drop of lemon juice in a aa large quantity of milk, and therefore it does not produce suffering.33 He argues that it is not proper on the basis of this scripture to deny altogether any ast to the Jina. And in support of his argument he quotes the wellsa known rule from the Tattv rtha S tra that the Jina is subject to eleven a u hardships (parsahas), which begin with hunger (ksut), thirst (pip s ), cold . aa . (ta), heat (usna), and so forth. He disagrees with P jyap das interpres u a .. tation of this s tra that the presence of the parsahas in the Jina should be u . taken guratively (upac ratah) because of the continued presence of the a . physical karmic matter known as dravya vedanya karma similar to the expression the kevalin meditates (dhy na) even though the function of a stopping all thought, which is the essence of meditation, does not actually exist in an omniscient being. He also rejects P jyap das alternative u a suggestion to amend the s tra by adding the words na santi (i.e., they do u not exist) because of the absence of feelings of hunger and so forth aided by mohanya on the grounds that each karma has its own distinct function and it is not proper to subsume one karma under another.34 He reafrms
32 na khalu kevalin m ksayikam sukham sambhavati, udayapr ptena vedanyaa. a . . . . karmana tadvirodh t, ksayikasukham hi vedanyakarmaks ayajanyam, na ca tadudaye a . . . . . tatksayah sambhavatti bh vah/ Adhy tmamataparksa, p. 216. . . . na ca vedan a . a . . . yodayajanyasukhaduh khayor api mohaksay t tirodh nam yuktam/ Ibid., p. 219. a . . . a 33 Ava yakaniryuktau hi trthakare nuttarah pra astaprakrtyudayab huly bhibh tatay s s a a u a . . mandac praastaprakr tyudayo vy varnitah . . . tad bh vayati s a s a . . a .

Tattatthasuttabhaniy ekk ras jam parsah ya jine/ a a . a . . tenavi chuhatanha khaiassa suhassa padik lam//78// Ibid., p. 227. . . . . u .
34 ek da a jine/ Tattv rtha S tra, IX, 11. nirastagh tikarmacatus taye jine vedanyaa s a u a .. sadbh v t tad sray ek daaparisah h santi/ nanu ca mohanyodaya-sah y bh v t a a a a a s a. a a a a . ksudh divedan bh ve parisahavyapadeo na yuktah/ satyam etat vedan bh ve pi a a a s a a . . . dravyakarmasadbh v peks ay parisahopac rah kriyate, . . . dhy nopac ravat/ athav a a . a a . a a a . ek da a jine na santi iti v kyaesah kalpanyah; sopask ratv t s tr nam/ Sarv rthasiddhi, a s a s . . . a a u a. a IX, 11. Cf. adhy tmik hi svarasato Digambaraastram eva kicit pram natvenopanayanti, a a s a. a Svet mbaraastram tu samvedakatayeti t n praty ubhayopade o pi yujyata iti, t n praty s a s a . . evam upadestavyam nanu ek daa jine ity ubhayesam Tattv rthas tram . . ./ atha a s a u . .. . ek da a ity anantaram na santi ity adhy hartavyam iti cet? na, sv mitvacint vasare a s a a a . etasya vipartavy khy natv t/ etena santi eken dhik da a ity apavy khy nam a a a a a s a a

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his doctrine that vedanya is the true adversary karma of ksayika-sukha. . He even contends that avy b dha, which often has been employed as a a a synonym for sukha, is actually a distinct quality, one that manifests when all eight karmas are destroyed and not any one particular karma.35 This brings us back to the problem raised earlier concerning the nature of sukha (in moksa) described as avy b dha by Um sv ti. Kundakunda a a a a . is convinced that omniscience and innite energy are not compatible with any form of suffering and thus he seems almost to be appropriating the function of vedanya karma for mohanya. He then claims that with the destruction of mohanya invariably followed soon thereafter by the annihilation of the three remaining gh tiy karmas the kevalin attains a a innite sukha. The problems rising from the continued embodiment of the kevalin seem to be solved by recourse to the device of an extraordinary variety of a most auspicious (parama-ubha) and subtle matter (no-karma) s that automatically ows unhindered into the kevalins body and thus sustains it to the end of his life. This operation, however, does not appear to be due to the end of the mohanya. As was noted above, according to P jyap da (who seems to be the earliest to articulate such a view) this u a is the result of the destruction of l bh ntar ya karma. One would expect a a a Kundakundas commentators (Amrtacandra and Jayasena) to raise ques. tions concerning the difference between this sukha of the kevalin and that of the siddha. Presumably they would have denied any difference in the quality of sukha itself but might have maintained that there is avy b dha a a in addition to sukha in a siddha. For them, vy b dha of a kevalin is a a that kind of suffering which is inevitable in the presence of any feelings (vedan ) whatsoever, such as feelings of cold and heat (ta/usna) which a s .. incidentally unlike hunger and thirst are not disputed and other forms of feelings generated by s t /as t , albeit in a conventional or metaphorical aa aa way (upac ra). They seem to separate sukha from the feelings (vy b dha) a a a produced by vedanya and see the latter as the opposite of avy b dha. a a They thus seem to be suggesting that throughout the state of sams ra, . a that is, the state of embodiment, vedanya produces feelings only. Freedom from feelings (i.e., avy b dha) is attained only at the end of the fourteenth a a gunasth na, which culminates in siddhahood, when all embodiment must a . end forever.
aveditam/ ittham ca ek da a jine santi vedanyasattv t, na santi v , moh bh v t ity a s a a a a a . asamarthadur graho pi nirastah/ Adhy tmamataprksa, pp. 22122. a a . . 35 etenaiva ca sukham mohaks ayajanya eva gunah ity api nirastam, evam . . . . . . sapt stasamkhy parigananabha gaprasa g t, vedanyaksayasya nirarthakatva-prasa g c a. . a n n a n a . . . ca/ avy b dhatvam vedanyaksayasya phalam iti na dosa iti cet? na, tadd hi a a . . . duhkh nanuviddhasukham eva na tv anyat, sakalakarmajany kulat -vilayasya tattve tu a a . a tasya krtsnakarmaksayajanyatvam yuktam, na tv ekajanyatvam/ Ibid., p. 353 . . . .

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For Yaovijaya, who goes strictly by the laws of karmic operation, s vedanya karma is the chief adversary of the sukha-gun a. And hence, s t aa . and as t , the two modalities through which vedanya is expressed, do not aa allow the full manifestation of sukha total happiness even in the case of the kevalin. The sight of an omniscient being free from all desires whatsoever, still wishing to obtain food within the constraints of the mendicant rules would appear to be an anomaly indeed. But the laws of karma are a inscrutable, and Yaovijaya, who speaks for the Svet mbaras, rejects the s Digambara solution of a supermundane body (parama-aud rika-arra) of a a s kevalin, freed from the needs of food.36 In his quest for retaining the quality of sukha to be opposed solely by vedanya karma, he is even willing to forego the adjective avy b dha ordinarily applied to that sukha as pointed a a out earlier. For him avy b dha-gun a would simply be a synonym for the a a . state of destruction of all karmas without having any specic content of its own. These two positions although apparently at variance are not truly incompatible. Vedanya indeed could be seen as the presence of feelings, such as we ordinarily associate with worldly pain and pleasure, but the term does not necessarily imply opposition to what Kundakunda calls the bliss attained by the destruction of the gh tiy karmas, if the latter is a a conceived as not yet being free from all feelings. However, this quality of the soul would appear to be radically different from the other innate qualities such as knowledge (j na), intuition (darana), and energy (vrya). It is a s a universally accepted Jaina doctrine that from beginningless times these three qualities have been obstructed in the sense of being covered ( vrta) a . as it were, like a mirror is covered by a cloth or the moon is obscured by clouds. Just as the mirror or the moon has not lost the ability to reect or shine by such obscuration, it is believed that the quality that we understand as knowledge or awareness (j na, and by extension its two concomitants, a viz. darana and vrya), the chief characteristic of a sentient being, has s never been totally obscured by its adversary matter called j n varanya a a . karma. Even the tiniest being such as nigoda-jva which has the least amount of this quality made manifest through only the sense of touch is still believed to have a certain portion (maybe an nth part) of its innite potential of knowledge, which must always remain free, unobscured by any karmic matter whatsoever, a portion aptly called nitya-udgh t itaa.
36 nokammakammah ro uvay rena tassa agame bhanido/ a a . . .

na hu nicchayena so vi hu sa vyar o paro jamh //Bh vasa graha, 113. a a a n . . . tadyaud rikaarrasthiteh paramaud rikaarrasthitir patay asmad dy aud rikaarra a s a s u a a a s . sthitivilakanatv t/ tasy s ca kevalyavasth y m keadivrddhy-abh vavat tadbhuktyabh vo s . a a a a . s . a a viruddha eva/ Quoted in Ny yakumudacandra, II, p. 857, n. 2. a

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j na. It is argued that if even this minimum portion of knowledge were a to be obscured as well, then that soul would be indistinguishable from non-soul, that is, matter.37 This ever-open part may be said to guarantee that the soul has a certain built-in advantage over karmic matter to which it is bound: while the soul is never bound totally, karmic matter can be destroyed in its entirety. It provides a ray of discriminiation (viveka/bhedavij na) for an aspiring soul to dispel the darkness of its obscurations a ( varanas) in the course of its long travail in sams ra. But the soul is not a . . a able to totally destroy karmic matter as long as it remains under the power of the primary karma called mohanya. The term mohanya (lit., delusion-producing) itself is signicant: it is not seen merely as an agent of covering, an avarana, as in the term . j n varanya. Obscuration itself does not produce delusion. Delusion a a . takes place even in the presence of knowledge, as in the case of persons who know from the scriptures the true nature of the soul and may still remain deluded about it. Hence it is argued that there is a distinct variety of karmic matter by which the soul is deluded. What it probably means is that this karma serves as the efcient cause for the (beginningless) transformation (parinama) of a certain innate quality of the soul into delusion . (moha). This delusion takes two forms: one that produces false notions about the soul (darana-mohanya) e.g., soul is body and the other s that produces passions (kasaya), which affect the conduct of such a soul . e.g., attachment towards the body (c ritra-mohanya). Unlike the j na a a guna, which is never totally obscured as seen above, we are told time and . again that the soul has from beginningless times been wholly infected by these two delusions, which manifest as mithy -darana and kasaya and a s . drive the soul into unwholesome behavior patterns. The beginninglessness of mithy -darana and its totality point to the presence of some quality a s of the soul that has suffered not merely a simple and partial obscuration but a transformation so total and profound that it has resulted in a state contrary to its own nature. In the commentaries this is called vibh vaa parinama or deled transformation like a piece of gold rusting in ore . that can be set aright so that the state of purity (the svabh va-parin ama, a . or the souls own true nature) can be realized, a case similar to the same piece of gold puried of its rust. Thus unlike j na and darana, which are a s continually present in greater or lesser degrees in all embodied souls, this purity (which we argue to be the same as sukha) is never experienced prior to the destruction of mohanya karma.
37 savvajv nam pi ya nam akkharassa anamtabh go niccuggh d io citthai/ . . . jai puna a. . a a. . . . . . ..

so vi avarijj , t nam jvo ajvattanam p vijj / Namdi Suttam, p. 68. a a. . . . a a . .

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That this is the core part of the Jaina teaching becomes evident when we look at the spiritual progress delineated by the stages of the gunasth nas, a . a a . .. the ladder of spiritual progress.38 The rst gunasth na, called mithy drstI, . is where all bound souls have been at one time subject to daranas mohanya karma. The progress begins at the fourth gunasth na, where the a . soul is able to transform the deluded view about reality (mithy -darana) a s into the right or enlightened view of reality (samyak-darana). From the s fourth gunasth na to the twelfth gunasth na, there is only a single karma, a a . . namely, c ritra-mohanya karma, that needs to be dealt with, step by step, a by getting rid of passions (kasayas) and gaining thereby total purity of . the soul. Throughout the length of this process, it should be noted that there is no prescribed step, or regime, or discipline called for specic ally to remove the avaranya karmas, which have obscured knowledge . and intuition. Kevalaj na (omniscience) would seem to result almost a without any effort, as soon as mohanya karma has been destroyed in the twelfth gunasth na. As the s tra itself says, mohaksay t . . ., there is the a u . . a invariable destruction of the other three gh tiy karmas and thus the soul a a becomes a kevalin. The spiritual progress at each gunasth na is measured a . by the souls ability to transform its vibh va, or delements, into svabh va, a a or own-nature, described by such exalted terms as viuddha (pure), s praama (peace), or ananda and parama-sukha, for want of a better word. s What were once called krodha, m na, m y , and lobha, and the no-kasayas a a a . including the sex desires, should therefore be seen as perverted forms of their opposite, a quality of the soul, the identity of which remains to be established. The Jaina scriptures do not precisely dene the particular qualities of the soul that might be affected by the operation of the mohanya karma. Samyaktva is the name given to that quality which manifests when its opposite, mithy tva (or mithy -darana) is overcome. This is pure insight a a s and does not depend on any particular physical activity. The word normally employed for the opposite of the passions (kasaya) is of course samyak. c ritra, or pure conduct, i.e., the observance of the mah vratas of a a a mendicant. But such conduct is inseparable from certain activities (yoga) and may not by itself be termed as a guna (quality). . It should be noted in this context that Tattv rtha S tra X.4 mentions a u only four ksayika qualities, namely, samyaktva, j na, darana, and a s . siddhatva, that remain in the soul at the time of becoming a siddha. The two qualities that are conspicuously missing here are c ritra and sukha. Could a
38 For a parallel between the Jaina gunasth nas and the Buddhist process of the destruca .

tion of anuayas (e.g. satk ya-drsti, r ga, pratigha, avidy ) through darana-m rga and s a a s a . .. a bh van -m rga culminating in Arhatship, see Jaini, 1977 and 1992. a a a

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it be possible that at the time of becoming a kevalin and subsequently at the time of becoming a siddha the two qualities were considered two aspects of a single quality that became at the same time indistinguishable from ksayika-samyaktva, and thus needed no specic enumeration? At the . kevalin stage, samyaktva sheds its worldly associations (e.g., sraddh in a deva, gura, sastra, and so forth) and remains, in the words of P jyap da u a tma-viuddhi-m tram (i.e., nothing other than purity of the soul). The a s a perfected c ritra of the kevalin is also described as yath khy ta (i.e., as a a a described by the Arhats, i.e., one who remains as the nature of ones self: yath tmasvabh vo vasthitah tathaiv khy tatv t). Siddhasenas Bh syaa a a a a a. . tk on this word agrees with the above: One whose samyama (conduct or a . . restraint) is as laid down by the Lord (yath khy tah samayamo bhagavat a a . . a tathaiva sah). Thus it becomes clear that c ritra in its perfected form is a . the same as atmaviuddhi, the denition of samyaktva in the kevalin, as s observed above. C ritra need not be mentioned separately, as there is no a further need for keeping vows, and so forth, in a formal way, beyond this stage.39 The classical terms used to describe the state of the soul attained a by this freedom from passions are praama, ananda, alh da, viuddhi, and s s so forth, which are synonyms of sukha, spiritual bliss, which reaches its perfection with the destruction of mohanya karma. The purity of the kevalin is now independent of any conduct as such and hence it can be called sukha. And this Bliss being total, integrated as it is with samyaktva and the other three ksayika gunas, namely, j na, darana, and vrya, would a s . . be the same as that experienced when siddhahood is attained. Although the karmas responsible for maintaining the body still remain, they do not affect that bliss (sukha) which is achieved by the destruction of mohanya karma, for it is impervious to the vagaries of feelings, i.e., the results of vedanya karma. When together with the body the latter has also been terminated, the siddha soul may truly be said to have not only perfect bliss (sukha) but freedom forever from all association with feelings (avy b dha). And it a a would not be far fetched to seek canonical support for such a conclusion a as is found in Sl nkas comment on the term vedan : siddh s tu vidanti, a a

39 jam kevalam ti nanam tam sokkham parinamam ca so ceva/ . . .. . . . . .

khedo tassa na bhanido jamh gh d khayam j d //Pravacanas ra, I, 60. a a a . . . a a . . . an kulat m saukhyalaksanabh t m atmanovyatirikt m bibhr nam kevalam eva a a. ua a. a. . . . saukhyam/ tatah kutah kevalasukhayor vyatirekah/ atah sarvath kevalam sukham aik na a . . . . . tikam anumodanyam//60//(Amr tacandra) . samj laksanaprayojan dibhedepi nicayen bhedar pen a parinamam nam kevalaj a s a u . a . a . a . . . nam eva sukham bhanyate/ tatah sthitam etat kevalaj n d bhinnam sukham n sti/ tata eva a a . . . . . a kevalaj ne khedo na sambhavatti//60// (Jayasena) a

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n nubhavanti.40 We may also add here Schubrings concluding words in a The Doctrine of the Jainas:
And it is this boundless realization of the nature of the soul alone and not some sensation or other for which, indeed, all preconditions whatever are wanting, that conveys what we may call eternal bliss. (1962, p. 330)

REFERENCES
Abhidharmakoa-bh s ya of Vasubandhu (1970). D. Shastri (ed.). Varanasi. s a. a a Ac r nga S tra: See S trakrt ngam. u u . a Bhagav Vy khy prajaptih : Abhayadevy Vrttih. a a a . . . Bronkhorst, J. (1985). On the chronology of the Tattv rtha and some early commentaries. a Weiner Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, Band XXIX, 155184 (Vienna). Delue, J. (1996). Viy hapannatti Bhagava, 2nd edn. Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass. a Dundas, P. (1985). Food and freedom. Religion 15, 161198. a . Jamb vijaya, M. (1974). (Sanskrit ed.) Strnirv na-Kevalibhukti-Prakarane of S katayana. u a. . a Jaina Atm nanda Sabh , Bhavanagar. a Jaini, P.S. (1977). Samsk raduhkhat and the Jaina concept of suffering. In H. Coward a . a . and K. Sivaraman (eds), Revelation in Indian Philosophy (in honour of T.R.V. Murti). Emervyille: Dharma Publishing. Jaini, P.S. (1979). The Jaina Path of Purication. University of California Press. Jaini, P.S. (1992). On the ignorance of the Arhat. In eds. Buswell and Gimello (eds), Buddhist Soteriology: The M rga Approaches to Liberation (pp. 135146). University a of Hawaii Press. Jaini, P.S. (1993). Fear of food? Jaina attitudes on eating. In Smet and Watanabe (eds), Jain Studies in Honour of Jozef Delue. Tokyo: Hon-no-Tomosha. Johnson, W.J. (1995). Harmless Souls: Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Um sv ti and Kundakunda. Delhi: Motilal Banarasia a dass. Namdi Suttam (1966). M Punyavijaya (ed.), Prakrit Text Society, Vol. X. Ahmedabad. . . . Ny yakumudacandra of Prabh candra (1941). M.K. Ny y c rya (ed.) (Manikchandra a a a a a Digambara Jaina Grantham l ). Bombay. aa Ohira, S. (1982). A Study of Tattv rthas tra with Bh sya, L.D. Series 86. Ahmedabad. a u a. Praamaratiprakaran am of Um sv ti (1989). Y.S. Shastri (ed.), Ahmedabad. s a a . Pravacanas ra of Kundakunda (with Amrtacandras Tattvapradpik -vrtti and Jayasenas a a . . a T tparya-vrtti) (1964). A. N. Upadhye (ed.). Agas: R jachandra Jain S stram l . a a aa . Sarv rthasiddhi of P jyap da (1971). Skt. text with Hindi tr. by Phoolchand Siddh ntaa u a a sastr. Delhi: Bh rataya J naptha. a a . Schubring, W. (1962). The Doctrine of the Jainas (tr. by W. Beurlen). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
40 S trakrt nga-2, (s tra 16) tahappag r p na vinn veyanam veyamti/ Sl nkas a u u a a a. u . a . . . Vrtti: pr nino vidv mso vedan -j nam tad vedayanti anubhavanti, yadi v s t s a. a. a a . a aa a . tar p m anubhavantti, atra catv ro bha g h tadyath (1) samjino vedan m anubu a. a n a. a a. . havanti vidanti ca (2) siddh s tu vidanti n nubhavanti (3) asamjino anubhavanti na punar a a . vidanti (4) ajv s tu na vidanti n nubhavanti (p. 204). a a

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Siddhasena Gani (1926). Tattv rth dhigamas tram, Svopajabh s ya srSiddhasenagan ia a u a. . . krtatk samala krtam (=Bh sya-tk on Tattv rtha S tra and Bh sya). H.R. Kapadia n . a. . a a u a. . . a (ed.). a a. S trakrt nga (1978). Ac r ngas tram and S trakrt ngas tram with Bhadrab hus u u . u a . a . a u . l nkas Vrtti. M. Jamb vijaya (2nd edn.). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Niryukti and S a u . Tatia, N. (1994). That Which Is. Translation of Tattv rtha S tra. Haper Collins. a u T tparya-vrtti of Jayasena: see Pravacanas ra. a a . Tattvapradpik -vrtti of Amrtacandra: see Pravacanas ra. a . a . Tattv rtha(R ja)v rttika of Akala ka. M.K. Ny y c ra (ed.). Varanasi. a a a n a a a Tattv rthas ra of Amrtacandra (1919) (Hindi tr. by Bamshidhara Sh str). Gandhi a a a . Haribhai Devakaran Jain Grantham l . aa Tattv rtha S tra (=TS) of Um sv ti (1932). (1) The s tra text as found in (2) a u a a u Sabh sya-Tattv rth dhigamas tram (=Bh sya). In K. Siddh ntaastr (ed.). Agas: a. a a u a. a s a Srmad R jachandra Jain S stram l . a aa Tattv rthalokav rttik la k ra of Vidy nandi (1949). Skt. Text (Hindi tr. Manikchandji a s a a n a a a Kaundeya Ny y c rya), Vol. I. Solapur: Ac rya Kunthus gara Grantham l . a a a a aa Viesavayakabh s ya of JinabhadraganI (1968). Koty ryav diganIs Vivarana, Part III, s . s a. a . . a . . Malvania and Doshi (eds). Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. a a a Williams, R. (1963). Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Sr vak c ras. Oxford University Press. Yaovijaya, U. (no date). Adhy tmamataparksa (ed. with Guajarati tr. by Bhuvanabs a . h nus ri). Bombay: Babu Amichand Panalal Jain DerasarTrust. a u Zydenbos, R.J. (1985). Moksa in Jainism, According to Um sv ti. Wiesbaden. a a .

University of California Berkeley

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