The Role of the State in Peasant-Nomad Mutualism Author(s): Daniel G. Bates Source: Anthropological Quarterly, Vol. 44, No.

3, Comparative Studies of Nomadism and Pastoralism (Special Issue) (Jul., 1971), pp. 109-131 Published by: The George Washington University Institute for Ethnographic Research Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3316933 Accessed: 23/06/2009 11:04
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THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN PEASANT-NOMAD

MUTUALISAM
DANIEL G. BATES

HunterCollege,City University New York of

Patterns of mutual land use between ethnically distinct nomadic pastoral and sedentary agricultural populations occur in some areas of the Near East. The niches occupied by such groups may appear to be non-competitive in that different seasonalschedules of land use and different modes of production permit the joint exploitation of common territory. However, such land use relationships are inherently unstablebecause the limits of the political economy of either ethnically defined mode of production are rarely coterminouswith the distributionof the resourcesa population could exploit if it had access to them. Therefore, it is contended that peasant-nomad expressions of land-use mutualism and symbiotic exchange are best viewed as a function of a balance of power, and not as the result of the exploitation of intrinsically non-competitive niches. In the Near East, the state, by interfering in these power relations even beyond the limits of its full sovereignty, is often a more critical factor in determining land use relations than the local ecology.

This paper will examine peasant-nomadinteractionwith respect to joint land-use and exchange, and will attempt to make explicit the primary conditions which a valid, comprehensive must fulfill. Specifically,this paper model of these relationships to show that the relationshipof a nomadic pastoral proposes
society to a sedentary population, where these are ethnically distinct, does not depend solely nor even predominantly upon factors of the local ecology. Rather, the interaction of societies pursuing
1 This paper has substantially profited from the critical comments and advice of many readers. An earlier draft was extensively revised in the light of detailed and valuable suggestions made by W. Gary Clevidence, William D. Schorger and Eric R. Wolf. In particular. I would like to thank Raymond C. Kelly who has painstakingly gone over the present text and who has offered numerous helpful criticisms both regarding the style and arguments presented. 109

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specialized modes of production represents the resolution of external forces which engender local competition and cooperation. Any accurate representation of inter-ethnic exchange, quite apart from how it handles local social and economic processes, will have explicitly to account for external political relations-since the interaction of local social entities in the Near East is often a function of how each articulates with such extra-local sources of political power as the state. Processes which affect the distribution of populations over resources, such as inter-group exchange and the common use of a territory by nomadic pastoral and farming communities, are often best analytically framed as ecological systems (cf. Barth 1956: 1079). In instances of interspecific exchange the concept of symbiosis can be usefully employed as a generic designator for all continued effects on population growth and survival arising from the interaction of two or more populations (cf. Odum 1959:226). Mutualism focuses on the beneficiality of these effects on both populations. This focus is appropriate to the analysis of exchanges between peasant and nomadic populations in systems of joint land-use where our concern is to evaluate the degree of reciprocity and value-equivalence. Available studies reveal a great diversity in the degree of mutualism characteristic of interpopulation exchanges where groups, specialized in nomadic animal husbandry, acquire goods and services outside the limits of their own political economies (e.g. Barth 1960:341-355). Anthropological models of ecologic relationships usually focus on the material transfers (and concomitant social parameters) among one ethnically defined human population, animal populations and other biotic resources occurring within a circumscribed locality. However, many ethnographically interesting situations involve more than one culturally defined population. Often several communities are closely integrated in regional systems of land-use with ethnicity of other cultural markers distinguishing modes of production and delineating the resources to which social units will have access in a shared territory. Analytic models of land-use which are directed to spatially discrete human populations will not benefit investigations of ecological relations in areas dominated by state political structures. Furthermore, models which focus on exchanges arising from one population's interaction with its immediate environment may well obscure the dy-

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namics of overall resource allocation among specialized communities.

The approach suggested here argues that the relationship established in situations of peasant-nomad shared land-use is best analyzed as though it were predicated upon two distinct but closely related levels of interaction. The level immediate to the contact groups is the local ecological system, which indudes the populations in question and their cultural adaptations together with the physical environment which they exploit. In this connection such factors as land tenure practices, local social and political organization, relative military strength, population size and density, modes of production and redistribution are relevant. The second level of interaction concerns how the local system relates to a wider economic and political milieu. Ecological studies of nomadic pastoralism are not all narrowly cast. Barth (1956), using an ecological idiom, analyzes the distribution of specialized ethnic groups and patterns of shared landuse involving nomads in Swat, West Pakistan. Treating Swat as an ecological system, he demonstrates that ethnic specializations in concentrating on selected portions of the "total environment," leave open other contiguous or even politically incorporated areas (niches) for other populations (including nomads) to exploit (Barth 1956: 1079, passim.)2 In another study, perhaps the most comprehensive discussion of mountain nomadism available, Barth shows that throughout Southwest Asia ".. . nomads become tied
2 Barth summarizesthis for the distributionof three ethnic groups in Swat were in direct (1956). He notes that Pathan and Kohistani agriculturalists competition for resources,and that the latter were militarily forced to retreat to beyond the altitudinal limits of double cropping on which the Pathan political economy depends. The Kohistanis could readily adapt to this restriction in their territory as their economy combines agriculture and transhumant herding. The third population, the Gujars, occupy a niche which territoriallytraversesboth Pathan and Kohistani spheres of political control. Although the Gujars are by no means uniform in their economic adaptation, they, in many instances are able to pursue long-range nomadic pastoralismby utilizing Pathan territory for valley-bottom winter pastures and Kohistani mariginal summer pastures. which the latter are unable to make use of as transhumants.Access to winter grazing in Pathan dominated regions is attained without conflict as the Gujars are exploiting what Barth terms a non-competitive niche; one which complements certain Pathan requirementsfor Gujar goods and services. In summer Gujar herds attain high pastures which are left vacant by the restrictionson Kohistani transhumant pastoralism set by the availability of winter forage, thus keeping herd sizes well below the amounts that could be carried during the summer monthson nearbygrasslands.

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in relations of dependence and reciprocity to sedentary communities in the area-their culture is such as to presuppose the presence of such communities and access to their products (Barth 1960:345)." Going on to describe the relations of a variety of nomadic adaptations to sedentary societies, he notes that the quality of exchange and joint land-use will be the outcome, in part, of the potential for expansion of the militarily dominant population (Barth 1960:346; also 1956:1088). Force alone, however, does not bear the primary burden of determining the degree of mutuality achieved in peasant-nomad exchange systems, nor does it entirely set the distribution of ethnically defined modes of production in a region. In an analysis of Swat (1956), in other discussions of nomadic pastoralism (e.g. 1960) and with reference to the functions of ethnicity (1969: 19-20) Barth proposes that stable patterns of co-residence expressed in niches (in ethnically heterogeneous systems) arise from differing but complementary modes of production. Each of these is delineated by political and social usages which establish the boundaries of the niche. With respect to the nomadic pastoralist niche, he states that ". .. there are no competing and more effective means of utilizing the seasonal pastures on which the nomadic adaptation is based; it remains the only economically viable form (Barth 1960:353)." Further, he stresses that the exchanges themselves generate this stable relationship, if they are phrased as value equivalent ... In areas where pastoral nomadism has been developed as a completely full-time specialization, and all agricultural and industrial goods are obtained in exchange for value equivalents in pastoral produce, a relatively peaceful and close market relationship is established between the two segments of the society, even without effective controlling mechanisms (Barth 1960:354). It is not the purpose here to give a critique of Barth's work. However, Barth rasies a number of questions which are central to an attempt to specify the minimal conditions of peasantnomad land-use mutualism; viz. the importance of relative power of the specialized ethnic groups in contact, the stability of the exchange system, and how the degree of exchange mutuality is related to other socio-economic variables within either political

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economy. Also, without faulting the overall thrust of the analysis quoted from above, it would seem that the logic of power in conjunction with the common need on the part of nomadic populations to secure grazing in potentially arable areas makes it tautological to posit value equivalent exchange as the independent variable and a close market relationship as the dependent one. Rather, as Barth himself suggests, reciprocity or value equivalence in exchange is affected by the relative power of the groups engaging in the different modes of production (Barth 1960:346; 1956:1088). Also, it must not be taken as given that ethnic specialization or even high land-use mutually makes for the most effective or efficient use of resources in a region, as is perhaps the case for Swat. This teleoloical aspect of the model is implicit in the general assumption that as a cultural system (like that of the Pathans) expands to the limits of its political economy, so these limits will coincide with the extremes set by the peak efficiency of that population's major mode of production due to the material requirements of the social organization (cf. Barth 1.956:1081). It is rare, however, in the Near East for any society to be organizationally so committed to one level or one mode of production that it cannot easily accommodate great variations in the basic adaptation without lass of its political coherence. Certainly the segmentary tribal structures, of all types, commonly associated with nomadic pastoral societies and many village communities lack this rigidity, and very often a tribal unit will encompass considerable diversity in modes of production. This will be made clearer when we examine the concept of peasant-nomad mutualism in terms of the minimal conditions which must obtain for value equivalent exchange to be approached. The adjustment described by any set of inter-population relations is necessarily temporary. Each of the contiguous populations, agricultural or nomadic pastoralist, reacts dynamically to selective pressures internal as well as external to its socio-economic structure. Just as each group might react differently to changes in its external environment, so might each handle changes in its own domnesticpolitical economy differently. Demographic pressures, for example, are often treated differently among pastoralists than among their settled agricultural neighbors in the

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same ecosystem, reflecting the different limitations inherent in land and animals as property. Although nomadic pastoralism as a full-time specialization has many requirements for non-pastoral products, and usually can offer products and services needed by sedentary populations in return, any such system of exchange or joint land-use represents the resolution of a number of potentially disruptive forces. These disruptive forces reflect the differences in the adaptations to aninals and land as primary resources, and the nature of ethnicity as a boundary-keeping mechanism. Foremost among processes which reduce the potential for high mutuality is direct competition for access to land. In any ecological setting, the farmer is exploiting land that would be, or could be utilized by nomadic pastoralists as pasture. There is usually a clear limit to the expansion of agriculture in a region, marked by such physical characteristics as soil or rainfall. The converse is rarely true. Rather political boundaries, the barriers erected by force or political convention restrict nomadic incursion into arable lands. In virtually every area of peasant-nomad contact, crop damage due to nomad animals is a matter of local contention and the adjudication, if done at all, is a matter of conflict. Demographic pressure on resources arising within either society, can dictate territorial expansion as an attractive alternative to a redistribution of resources already available in a given political economy. Ethnic distinctions often make the land of neighboring groups prime targets in the relieving of demographic imbalances (cf. Barth 1959:20). Also nomads whose herds fail to meet the minimum requirements for household self-sufficiency are often forced to settle (Barth 1960). Often (as in Turkey) nomads who settle must interject themselves into ethnically different and initially hostile communities (Bates 1971). No ethnic economic specialization is immutable because a society can drastically vary its basic mode of production in an extremely short period. There are many instances where nomadic tribes have settled, displacing ethnically different agricultural populations. Ethnic stereotypes are not sufficient in themselves to reserve a mode of production from possible inroads by other groups. The much discussed nomadic antipathy for peasants is

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usually an expression of ethnic hostility. Should nomadic animal husbandry become economically a poor allocation of household capital, such hostility is rarely a-substantial barrier to settlement and agriculture (cf. Bates 1971). Likewise, it is not at all unknown for sedentary communities to spawn nomadic pastoral households, even in areas where nomadic pastoralism is associated with a different ethnic group (Haaland 1969:59-73). Furthermore, there is in most situations a marked inability to control inter-ethnic conflict. The segmentary political systems most often seen in the Near East tend to ramify external opposition through as wide a political network as possible, thus making conflict, once started, difficult to dampen. Similarly, there may be a tendency to emphasize short-term economic gain in transactions with cross-ethnic or narrow community boundaries which again would mitigate against mutualism in systems without overarching political control directed to this end. Collectively the above are disjunctive factors which tend to lessen reciprocity, to put pressure on respective niche boundaries and thus to erode the economic basis for complementarity in production. Exchange or mutuality is affected not only by divisive conditions mentioned above, but by the potential for complementary exchange between two specializations. Potential for reciprocal peasant-nomad exchange is, largely, inversely proportional to the self-sufficiency of each population with regards to the production or services of the other. Peasant communities vary greatly in the amount of animal husbandry practiced in conjunction with agriculture, but most need not rely on external sources of animal products to meet minimum demands for protein and dairy goods. Probably more important are secondary nomadic services such as transportation of commercial crops to market as was the case in southeastern Turkey prior to World War II (Bates 1971), in providing fertilizer for fallow fields (cf. Kolars 1963) and for protection from the predation of other nomads (cf. Musil 1928). In recent years, payment for grazing rights is a contribution to certain sedentary communities made by nomadic groups in Turkey (cf. Kolars 1963; Bates 1971). However, the point to be stressed in this context is that peasantnomad land-use and exchange systems are often less reciprocal or

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mutual than is potentially feasible. This is to say that actual relations do not represent a simple balance of local processes of economic adjustment, nor do they display a teleologic tendency for maximum efficiency in land-use systems involving ethnically different specializations. Each population, it may be assumed, is interested in increasing its own production and security as evaluated in the short-run. This renders the structure created by a system of peasant-nomad interaction extremely sensitive to shifts of power, whether instigated by forces outside the region or from pressures within either society. There is a potential or, perhaps, even a centrifugal tendency towards degrading the system, to reduce any region of shared co-exploitation to one where a single ethnic specialization dominates to the exclusion or restriction of others. Successful adaptations of one society are taken over by other groups, and security is often given precedence over production and profitable exchange. The reasons for this devolve on the question of coordinating economic processes within the ecosystem, and how power from the outside affects these regulatory processes. In the examples given by Barth for Swat it seems assumed that peasant-nomad exchange and land use tended to produce homeostasis; that regulation is located in the ecosystem itself (Barth 1956). He makes reference to the absence of state authority (until 1917) and attributes the stability of the system to the fact that the fullest expansion of the dominant society had already occurred, and that there was little direct competition (Barth 1956:1079; 1960). At the same tine sedentary agricultural communities could not raise sufficient animals to exploit distant pastures as relatively stationary herds are limited by the amount of grain and stored forage needed to carry them through the winter in the village (Barth 1956: passim). However, although the nature of the terrain and the vegetational cycles establish the outer limits of migration and provide the direct economic impetus for mountain nomadic pastoralism, it is incorrect to view every schedule of migration as a predictable response only to available but marginal grazing land. Furthermore, it might with equal accuracy be interpreted as a political response of a community which is less powerful as it adapts its cycle of movement to the economic round of activities of a

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dominant society. Or, in some areas, the response itself may lie in dominating and restricting a weaker sedentary mode of production. With an ecological approach to peasant-nomad interaction one must consider that high mutualism does not arise from the exploitation of non-competitive niches, but rather from the control of conflict generated by often antithetical social and economic processes associated with the different patterns of land-use. Such controls are often a function of how each society articulates with extra-regional polities, including ethnically similar populations of which each is the local representative. We have mentioned that the power of the state in most of the Middle East is of importance in determining local forms of interpopulation exchange. Somewhat more information is called for at this point. But before continuing it is necessary to note that nothing more than a general outline can be provided, as not only is the ecology of the region complex, but also the forms of state or "national" authority vary greatly from place to place, as they have through history. It is, I think, useful to distinguish as Coon does between sovereignty and suzerainty with regards to the Near Eastern state (Coon 1951:262-268). Since very early historical times no area has fallen outside the claimed political borders of some central government. However, the amount of authority exercised by any state, or feudal kingdom, varies considerably. Often the political claims of erstwhile powerful governments amount to little in the day-to-day governing of distant or geographically inaccessible provinces (e.g. Coon 1951 ). But no matter how tenuous the state's suzerainty, its formal claim to rule makes it amenable to manipulation by local political, often tribal, forces, each eager to tap what sources of power are available. This is somewhat different than the traditional picture of state and local community relations, according to which the village or tribe is held to be the passive subject of the wider political aims of the central government. As often as not, the local power structures at a village or tribal level are concerned with transforming public force in the name of the state to personal or narrow community ends. When the state is able, there is little hesitation for it actively to intervene in the allocation of resources and territories among competing factions.

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But in every situation state power is a resource to be exploited by local contenders for supremacy or economic dominance. It is difficult to generalize for an area as large and varied as is the Near East. What follows is only an attempt to suggest directions for possible detailed inquiry. For example, in areas where the state's control is absolute, or nearly so, it is usually interested in maximizing total production and hence the tax base, in any region. This is done usually without regard to which ethnic group, if any, monopolizes the relevant modes of products. The border reaches of Near Eastern states have witnessed virtually every strategem of political control or manipulation. For example, in those border regions which were difficult to control, Ottoman policy was aimed continually at shifting support among ethnic groups, allowing none to achieve supremacy or to establish stable exercise of authority which might jeopardize the claim of sovereignty of the state. If the region controlled or secured lay on critical internal trade routes, such as across Syria in Ottoman times, the state might try to achieve stability at the expense of production by supporting the militarily dominant local political force. For example, agriculture was frequently sacrificed for security of communications as the government (Ottoman) allied itself with powerful Bedouin tribes. Such support was rarely consistent because the ultimate objective was always complete control. At the same time the government strived to prevent any tribe or ethnic group from setting up a reliable power base which could not be destroyed by shifting alliances. The exercise of this power, even if through less than full control of local political apparatuses, has an important effect on the local ecosystem, as will be shown in the following examples. Irrigation Agriculture: Large-scale River Valley Irrigation plays a vital role in the agriculture of the Near East; more so where exotic rivers serve as the source of water. Everywhere such large-scale hydraulic works are associated with rigorous state control, high population density and labor intensive commercial cropping geared to a relatively efficient transportation system. Egypt, Sudan and Iraq supply traditional examples,

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with new developments in Syria and Iran soon to present similar aspects. Large-scale irrigation usually presents clear ecological boundaries between crop land and the desert. There is little fringe area capable of supporting nomadic small animal husbandry as found on the Syrian Steppe or Zagros foothills. The camel pastoralists of the inner desert tend to articulate directly with the central government. The government is concerned always with presenting itself as a buffer between its peasant population and forces from the outside.3 The great disparity in population size makes the effects of nomadic demands for agricultural products negligible on the system.4 The peasant has slight need for pastoral products. His demands for meat are minimal, and he can supply animal traction better by stall feeding on grass grown intensively by irrigation. The nomad formerly did have a secondary impact on the peasantry in that defense against possible predation resulted in increased taxation or military levies. When there is direct peasant-nomad contact it historically has resulted in the destruction or reduction of irrigation works, but not in an institutionalized system of exchange. The potential for complete mutuality is very low through shared use of land, although exchange via trader intermediaries is important for nomadic groups. An economic analysis would show that the peasant community requires little of what the nomad produces; irrigation leaves little of the arable landscape open to pastoralism. Nomadic requirements for urban goods are supplied through intermediaries. However, as I shall point out for other areas, this lack of a close economic fit need not entirely preclude mutuality in land
3 Evans-Pritchard gives a good account of how surplus animal products from Cyrenaica flowed to Egyptian markets via urban-based traders. He notes, too, the pains taken by the Egyptian government to forestall any direct nomadic contact in strength with local sedentary populations (EvansPritchard 1948:29-65). Musil cites a similar situation whereby Rwala camels are sold in Egyptian markets via intermediaries (Musil 1928). Related to this, the pastoral nomadic economy developed in the Sinai and Arabian Peninsula, as well as in Cyrenaica, had certain urban-mercantile requirements. Musil writes that weaponry and articles of apparel must be procured from traders. Also approximately one camel load of grain (150 lbs.) per adult and 50 loads per chief is needed annually (Musil 1928:90). The Rwala supply most of this from tributary villages. 4 While the requirements for agricultural products by pastoral nomads may be insignificant in the total market structure, they may be important for communities in direct contact with nomadic tribes.

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use. The crux of the problem seems to lie in the respective political structures of the two groups. Large-scale irrigation agriculture requires sufficient central control to maintain upstream canal systems. The segmentary tribal organization of the camel pastoralist facilitates the formation of large political groups in response to external threat, but stable groupings with strong leadership are not easily arrived at otherwise. Strong central control, if ever, is exercised only in times of war or raiding, and is of short duration. Although camel pastoralists can incorporate oasis settlements and isolated villages as tributary dependencies, the greater population size and administrative sophistication associated with states controlling large-scale irrigation systems is usually beyond the scope of descent-based segmentary political integration. If they should militarily conquer such a state, they either rapidly acquire the accoutrements of an urban elite, or they maximize the short run benefits by destroying the system altogether (cf. Lattimore 1962). Here peasant-nomad mutualism falls at the negative end of the continuum since direct contact usually results in the destruction of the militarily weaker mode of production rather than its incorporation into a common polity, or the establishment of stable patterns of joint land use. Rainfall Plains Agriculture: North Syrian Steppe Although the Northern Syrian Steppe (ca. 8" rainfall limits) marks the limits of grain agriculture to the peasant farmer, it also represents prime grazing to a variety of nomadic pastoralists. Mountain nomads such as the Kurdish and Tiirkmen tribes of southeastern Turkey and Syria use the steppes as winter grazing, while small-animal herding Arab tribes on the fringes of the Syrian desert approach the best watered foothill regions in times of summer drought and likewise for winter grazing. The much commented upon tell remains of former villages give testimony to the historical ebb and flow of desert and sown land. This variation cannot be attributed to known climatic fluctuations, although periodic drought does make the agricultural economy more precarious. Scholars dealing with the Levant have been careful to note the positive correlation between the strength of the sovereign central government and the expansion of grain agriculture into the desert

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(cf. Hitti 1960; Sweet 1960; Ashkenazi 1938). This model might be further expanded to encompass the Bedouin of the inner desert. Musil states that during periods of increased governmental control and agricultural expansion, poorer segments of Bedouin camel herding tribes are sloughed off into sheep/goat pastoralism, thus replacing the forner small animal herders absorbed by agriculture (Musil 1929:45). Presumably a reverse trend is possible in times of governmental weakness, although it is little documented in the literature. There is adequate documentation that land under cultivation declined in the period following Ottoman conquest (1517) and that pastoral nomadic groups from elsewhere infiltrated the area (Sweet 1960.43 ).5 Ottoman pashas sent out from Constantinople had a free hand in governing their districts during their short tenures and normally operated through local chieftains to collect tax levies in kind. However, frequently a tribe would be paid by the government to maintain security and trade (Sweet 1960:43). In the nineteenth century the Ottomans began a program of agricultural development and forced settlement of nomadic groups. Apart from Midhat Pasha. such governors as Dervish Pasha and Cevdet Pasha were extremely effective in forcibly settling Kurdish, Arab and Tiirkmen tribes by bringing the full brunt of the military to bear on individual tribes while at the same time offering tribal leaders title to large tracts of land (Siimer 1967). Peasant groups from elsewhere, including Circassians, were settled in the area. The Mandate and sul)sequent regimes continued this policy. The present settlement pattern in northwest Syria and southeastern Turkey is one of interspersedtribal, non-tribal villages, and mixed villages.6
5 "During the first three centuries of Ottoman rule both population and economic conditions steadily declined. In the late 18th century over 400 taxable villages were left in the Aleppo area of the 3200 counted at the beginning of Ottoman rule" (Hitti 1951:674 quoted in Sweet 1960:43). "During this period nomadic shepherd peoples and camel Bedouin began to move into northern Syria" (Sweet 1960:43). 6 "Because it (Tell Toqaan) lies within a zone of recent competition between cultivation and nomadic pastoralism, peoples representing both systems or subcultures have sought control of it and its well-watered lands.". .. "As a result, the most distinctive fact concerning Tell Toqaan, now, is the presence in the village of two subcultures: what remains of nomadic shepherd pastoral tradition in a sedentary community and what remains of agricultural peasant tradition in a culturally heterogeneous community" (Sweet 1960:226).

of periphery,parallelingthe sedentarization former pastoralists

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Tell Toqaan, a village in this area, was established during the late nineteenth century and was non-tribal in political structure (Sweet 1960).7 Following the upheavals of the early Mandate era it was taken over by the elite of the Bu Layle tribe but continued sedentary agriculture as a "mixed" tribal village with non-tribal sections (Sweet 1960). There are still nomadic pastoralists in the Tell Toqaan area and a high degree of mutuality obtained between them and both the tribal and non-tribal peasants at the time of Sweet's study (1954). The peasant makes contractual arrangements whereby nomads herd village flocks. The village allows nomad flocks to graze on fallow fields and to pass through village lands during migration. Some grain and manufactured items are sold to the nomads, but the preferred payment for herding is in sheep. The contracts are considered equitable and are freely entered into. This situation is clearly related to the presence of the national gendarmerie adding to the local power of the sedentary population.8 Formerly this was not the case. During times of pastoral nomadic dominance, such agricultural villages as remained intact either paid tribute to a pastoral tribe or were maintained as segments of a strong tribe (Sweet 1960:191). Village contacts with camel nomads were limited to sporadic raids, and formalized tributary relationships were mainly with sheep pastoralists. In short, the equilibrium established between the two modes of production is a function of the manner in which power enters the system from the outside In Tell Toqaan mutuality is not generated by the complementary nature of the two modes of production. The peasant is virtually self-sufficient and can provide for his own animal requirements. Nomadic demands for the products of agriculture can be supplied better through tribute and urban trade. Although at the time of Sweet's study the peasant-nomad pattern of land-use and exchange was highly mutual, this is a transitory state and can be expected to change
7 The following description is taken from Sweet's. village study in Tell Toqaan, 1960. 8 "Competition for and cooperation in land usage between sedentary agriculture and nomadic pastoralism have developed between the two systems terms of contract or political relations which reflect the relative strength of one or the other in control of the land" (Sweet 1960:4).

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to the furtherdetrimentof the nomad as the presentgovernment extends its control (cf. Awad 1960: passim). The government views tribal power as a threat and normallytakes steps to ensure the extensionof a tax-payingbody of peasantryin areas it can control. However, if it lacks sufficientstrengthto do this, it will treat with tribal leadersfor a minimalconditionof security. The beneficiary village-nomadrelationship largely deterof is
mined by the nature of their articulation with the government, and the policies of the government. Where the government is forced to depend upon tribal force for the maintenance of security, the peasant sector of the area involved will suffer, and even the remaining tribal villages will be likely to become tributary to more powerful groups.9 Unlike inter-tribal warfare, raids

against non-tribal village populations for territory are more sanguinary (Musil 1928:577-632; Irons 1965:400). As the the pastoralists"represent" governmentin such cases, there is
little appeal for protection except to rival tribal groups. The existence of this option would seemingly encourage less stable and more predatory peasant-nomad relations. The upshot is that the limits of effective agriculture recede to the outer periphery of governmental control.

Southeastern Turkey:YoriikMountainPastoralNomads A final example, analagousto Barth'sdescriptionof Swat, is that of the joint exploitation of the landscapein southeastern The following is Turkey by peasant and nomadic communities. from an area studied by me (see also Hiittroth 1959, Kolars
1963). The area included in and lying between the winter and summer pastures of the Saiikara Yoriik, and related tribes, represents a succession of ecological zones, each related to altitude as one proceeds upward from the inland Amik Plains. This zonal diversity is expressed in a series of village types. These range, roughly, from highly mechanized commercial wheat, cotton and
!"Dickson and Musil mention tributary villages of camel nomads, but do not specify whether oasis or rain-fed agriculture is involved. Musil cites a case where the Rwala raid a village but are forced to return the loot and pay damages as the villagers were lucky enough to capture a number of Rwala camels (Musil 1928:47-60). The Rwala feel that the fellahin are obliged to supply them with grain as tax or huwa (Musil 1928:60).

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rice growing villages in the lowlands which singularly or in aggregate are commonly dominated by large landlords, through foothill and middle slope communities which practice run-off irrigation and dry field grain agriculture and horticulture. At the highest altitudes, both in Maras and in Kayseri Provinces, villages at the upper limits of agriculture exploit a grain and mixed crop subsistence economy with limited irrigation, strongly supplemented by sedentary cattle and small animal pastoralism. Ethnic diversity is notable, but except when taken in the broadest sense does not correspond to differences in the local ecology. The lowlands are predominantly settled by Barakli Turkmen and Sunni Kurds who were forced to sedentarize in the 19th century. Villages through the middle slopes are aga;n often Tiirkmen Avcar, Alevi and Sunni Kurds, Circassian and "Macar" (recent Turkish immigrants from Eastern Europe). No ethnically defined population has a monopoly of any mode of production except for the Yoriik who are nomadic pastoralists. Virtually all access to grazing is negotiated with non-Yoriik, as there are only two Yoriik villages, both of which are in the area of winter pasture and are open to grazing by members of the local lineages only. There is a certain amount of direct peasantnomad exchange of foodstuffs, and nomads often purchase inexpensive manufactured products from village peddlers while in the higher summer pastures. More commonly, Yoriik economic transactions take place in the market places along their migratory route, often with settled Yoriik shopkeepers who extend credit. The Yriik, quite like the mountain nomads discussed by Barth, have a migratory schedule that takes the herds through villages at times complementary to the agricultural cycle. Land for winter pasture (Ki0lak) is rented for cash payment from village landlords in the lowland plain, and the animals are put on fallow grain, cotton or rice following harvest in September and October. The migration north to upland pastures (yayla) starts concurrent with the impetus warm weather gives to nearly dormant winter wheat, and before the results of spring planting become as temptation to the sheep. Yoriik sheep, if unshorn, are driven early April up the route to summer pastures; those which have been shorn follow a few

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weeks later. In moving upward, the animals graze along the roadway, utilizing grass that is not used by the villagers, including fallow fields. The summer pastures are owned by Av?ar, Kurdish and Circassian villages, usually as village commons (mer'a). This land is let for cash payment at public auction supervised by government officials, although in practice direct, illicit, dealings arranged between village headmen (muhtar) and Y6riik are the rule. In fall, after harvest is nearly completed in the upland villages the longer, more leisurely migration to winter quarters in the Amik Plains begins. During this period the flocks graze on fresh stubble and fallow, when the chance of damage to crops is virtually non-existent until the actual winter quarters are reached again in October. It is clear that both the potential for exchange is great and that a high degree of mutuality in land use is evidenced during parts of the migratory schedule. Villages at either end of the migratory route cannot make full use of available grazing due to the necessity to maintain sedentary flocks through all seasons on the same grasslands, thus limiting herd size by the amount of forage available at the worst season. Furthermore, this pasture is rented annually to the nomadic herders for cash payment, which represents an income either for individuals or for village treasuries that would not otherwise accrue. The herds move in a schedule that corresponds with the harvest and planting cycles of the villages so that damage to crops is minimized. If there is damage, it is usually paid for. This high degree of mutuality is not the consequence of strictly economic forces at work. The Y6riik entered the area at the turn of the century and migration into the region continued through World War II. This was a result of pressure on traditional Yoriik grazing lands along the southern Anatolian coast. Prior to the arrival of the Yoriik, the forced sedentarization of Kurdish and Tirkmen tribes starting in 1865, had been largely accomplished, a project which arose from the government's desire to bring politically threatening tribes under control. As in Iraq and elsewhere, the leaders of these tribes were given title to large tracts of formerly tribal land, and many of their descendents are found among the largest landlords of the region today. The Yoriik,

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when they came into the region, filled an economic niche of pastoral nomadism which had been vacated for strictly political reasons. The grazing land still remained, as did open routes of access between summer and winter pasture. The present high level of reciprocity in exchange is largely a matter of relative power. The Yoriik were permitted to enter the region and to remain nomadic as they were never the threat to the state that the more powerful Tiirkmen and Kurdish tribes had been. The Yoriik are in many ways representative of the adaptation of a politically weaker entity to the demands of a stronger one. The Yoriik migratory schedule is adapted to the agricultural cycles of the various villages, not because it is the optimum for grazing, or because it coincides with other productive requirements of the Yoriik. It is a political adjustment. The pasture fee is a similar matter, and represents the strength of local law enforcement agencies, together with village interest in making maximum use of lands to which they hold title. No household or group of tents can acquire access to grazing by force even though they might well be able to overpower an individual village or owner should violence occur. Prior to 1949 grazing was, by all accounts, free in most areas, with payment, if any, consisting of inconsequential gifts of cheese or butter. Now grazing fees exacted with government assistance are a major form of capital outlay for the nomads, and the cash requirements of grazing payments have led to elaborate on-going credit transactions within the tribes. It has also raised the minimun herd size needed to support a family unit from ca. 50 in the previous generation to over 100 animals at the present time (average 268 sheep). This has pressured many families to settle. It is also likely that inflation of pasture fees will continue, and that total nomadic herd production might well be impaired, and that fewer animals will be maintained than can be supported by the resources available. Yoriik animals would be often better served by staying longer in the lowlands than is presently possible due to the danger of crop damage. Grazing along the route to summer pastures is often poor, although it would not be if village agriculture were not so extensive. If government control was not as finn as it is now,

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it would be safe to say that much marginal agricultural land would revert to grazing as the risk of animal damage would make it unprofitable. Furthermore, pastures now rented would almost certainly be claimed by force. Formerly, Yoriik tribes if not clearly dominant, were strong enough and mobile enough to avoid paying grazing fees and fines for crop damage. At that time the amount of land under cultivation in the area of both summer and winter pastures was less, by local accounts, and that land which was cultivated was restricted to that of the best quality. Part of the increase in agriculture is due to technological advances and the reclaiming of swamp lands throughout the area. Another reason for pressure on grazing in the winter quarters is the increase in village population concomitant to the clearing of the land, and a rising birth rate due to the eradication of malaria within the last 20 years. But it is nevertheless true that if government control were not as effective as it is, the Yoriik migratory schedule would be different in an attempt to make optimum use of grazing in each of the altitudinal zones through which they pass. Optimal grazing times do not always coincide with harvest and fallow fidd cydes. Conclusion The sketches presented of different pastoral nomadic adjustments to sedentary village populations in shared geographic areas suggest that the degree of land-use mutuality, and the extent to which exchange is phrased in equivalent value depends on a balance of power. It is also the case that sources of power from outside the immediate system are important in determining the local equilibrium which often results in the political dominance of one or the other of ethnically specialized modes of production. This is by way of saying that nomadic pastoralism is often best intelligible as a political response to other communities and the state.?1 The migratory cycle, residental pattern and even aspects of internal organization often become clearer when approached from this perspective.
10 A number of papers given at the Symposium on Nomadic Pastoralism, American Anthropological Association Meeting, November 1969 are concerned with this problem, in particular those Irons and

given

by Bates,

Salzman.

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A more general albeit negativeconclusionis that it is incorrect to equate stable patternsof mutuality and cose equivalent exchange with the non-competitivenature of cultural niches using a shared environment.The type of mutuality achieved locally does not seen to have as much to do with the potential for exchange offeredby differentmodesof production. Although my paper has disculsedthe apparenteffects of external sourcesof power on local patternsof symbiosis,it has not sketched the local channels through which it flows, and other local organizational forms affecting the peasant-nomadstructure. For example, variationsin tribalstructuremight be a function of how different societies relate to the outside; however, of many variationscan also be correlatedwith the requirements of herding and the economy. This organizaspecific problems tion itself affects the manner in which a communityarticulates with the external world thereby determiningthe sorts of culture brokerage which develop, and the individuals, be they chiefs, agas, mayors, saints or others, who serve in this role to relate the local group to the outside (cf. Wolf 1956). The formal demandsof a specificpoliticaland social structure not only shape the responseof that society to new stimulae, but may also determine the limits of its territorialexpansion and ability to maintain monopoliesof production,or to adopt new ones. There are numerousexamplesof such non-economicspecification of niche bordersin the Near East. The Gypsiesreserve a wide variety of tasksfor themselvesby virtue of their low caste status and the cultural definitionsof the servicesin which they specialize. In areas of great ethnic heterogeneityinvolving nomadic pastoralists,even relatively minor distinctions of ritual, religiosity,language, and social usage are seized upon to channel economic cooperation,fix settlement patterns and circumscribe marriage systems. Ethnicity thus narrowlydefines the limits of community. The ecological consequencesof this behavior are dear: the resourcesare divided among social groupingswhich cultural values as well as economic processestend to reinforce (cf. Barth 1969: introduction). The total effects of these, however,extend beyond their purely regulatory function. Quite often the hostilities generated by group-definingcultural usages threaten the exchange networks

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they help to condition. Religion and ritual practices are good examples. On one level they may restrict or portion off certain modes, of production, separating the nomadic pastoralists from the sedentary population by a cultural barrier. On another level, they simultaneously increase the chances of overt conflict which could disrupt the entire system. Unlike those of animal populations, the boundaries of niches defined by cultural behavior are extremely elastic. Even the most specialized population can in whole or part change its adaptation rapidly in response to new conditions or in order to take over a more profitable mode of production. No monopoly on the production of either animal or agricultural goods is completely secure against outside encroachment. In parts of Southeastern Turkey, formerly nomadic populations have within one generation come to dominate certain types of commercial enterprises, as well as to compete successfully with long-established farmers in mechanized market-directed agriculture. Numerous other factors condition on-going adjustment to other communities by any pastoral nomadic society. One is, perhaps, the length and variability of the migratory route. A nomadic mountain tribe normally has relations with a series of villages along its route. The existence of alternative routes, as well as variations in local production and defense, affects potential for symbiosis or conflict. One would suspect that relations with infrequently encountered villages would tend to be more predatory. Among the Saqikara Y6riik more conflict arises between nomads and villagers closer to upper pastures where both the government's control is somewhat less and there is more direct competition for pastures between nomads and villagers. Villagers often try to make use of land which they own or have rented out to the nomadic herders. All this makes it difficult to view mutualism as arising from the exploitation of non-competitive niches. It is often a result of how the groups in question relate to the central government, or otherwise establish a balance of power. Furthermore, where symbiotic relations develop between ethnic groups, the structure is often so ridden with hostility, that should one community attain military dominance it might well

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use force to reduce mutualism, even to the detriment of its own standard of living. The peasant-nomad relationships where each mode of production is ethnically defined, is normally so highly sensitive to shifts of power within it, that the threat of outside intervention encourages each group to maximize its short-run benefit. This is particularly exacerbated in frontier regions, the characteristic home of most mountain nomadism, where government control is the least consistent. It may also select for what Salzman terms "multi-resource nomadism," the combining of pastoralism with other modes of production within one tribal structure (Salzman 1969).11 The existence of most niches in the rural scene of the Near East is as much a creation by forces exterior to the immediate areas, as the niches themselves are inherent in the landscape, or even in the techniques of the peoples themselves. W'hetherspecific economies are in competition or cooperation in using a shared area, depends as much upon how they relate to the outside world, as upon how much they would be able to supplement each other's diet.
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ASHKENAZI,

T.

1938-Tribus semi-nomades de la Patestine du Nord. Paris: Libraire orientaliste Paul Geuther. ASWAD, B. and ecological aspects in the origin of the Islamic state. 1963-Social Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and the Letters 47:419-422. marriage and lineage organization among sedentarized 1968-Land, pastoralists in the Hatay, Southern Turkey: a diachronic analysis. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. ASWAD,M. in the arid lands of the Near East. In The problems 1960-Nomadism in the arid zone. Paris: UNESCO. BARTH, F. of social organization in southern Kurdistan. Oslo: 1953-Principles Brodrene Jorgensen. 1956-Ecological relationships of ethnic groups in Swat West Pakistan. American Anthropologist 58: 1079-1089. 11 The combining of sedentary agriculture and nomadic pastoralism within a common tribal political structure is quite common in the Near East. In such cases, not only can the requisite labor be easily assigned to the portion of the economy which needs it, but also, the two modes of production can present a common political front to the outside. In Islahiye, southeastern Turkey, the nomadic lineages most likely to continue profitable animal husbandry are those which have lineage members in control of the two villages of settled Yoriik. The nomadic households are registered as village dwellers, and have free use of village commons (mer'a).

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1959-1960-Land use patterns of migratory tribes of south Persia. Norsk Geografisk Tidsskrift 17:1-11. 1960-Nomadism in the mountain and plateau areas of southwest Asia. In The problems of the arid zone. Paris: UNESCO. of South Persia: the Basseri tribe of the Khamseh Con1961-Nomads federacy. New York: Humanities Press. 1969-Ethnic groups and boundaries. F. Barth, ed., Boston: Little, Brown. BATES, D. becomes farmer: a study of nomadic settlement in 1971-Shepherd southeastern Turkey. In Turkish Society. P. Benedict and Tumertekin, eds., Istanbul: University of Istanbul Press. COON, C. 1951-Caravan: the story of the Middle East. New York: Henry Holt. DICKSON, H. 1949-The Arab of the desert. London: Unwin. E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, 1949-The Senusi of Cyrenaica. Oxford: Clarendon Press. HAALAND,G. 1969-Economic determinants in ethnic processes. In Ethnic groups and boundaries. F. Barth, ed., Boston: Little, Brown. HITTI, P. 1951-History of the Arabs. London: St. Martin's Press.
HUTTEROTH, W. D.

und Yaylabauern im mittlern kurdischen Taurus. 1959-Bergnomaden Marburg: Selbstverlag des Geographischen Institutes der Universitlit Marburg. IRONS, W. 1965-Livestock raiding among pastoralists: an adaptive interpretation. Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters 50:393-414. 1969-The Yomut Turkmen: A study of kinship in a pastoral society. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. KOLARS, J. tradition and change in a Turkish village. Chicago. 1963-Season, O. LATTIMORE, 1962-Inner Asian frontiers of China. Boston: Beacon.
MUSIL, A.

1928-Manners and customs of the Rwala Bedouin. New York: American Geographical Association. ODUM, E. 1959-Fundamentals of ecology. Philadelphia: Saunders. DE PLANHOL,X. 1958-De la plaine Pamphylienne aux lacs Pisidiens: nomadisme et vie paysanne. Paris: Bibliotheque Archeologique et Historique de l'Institut Francais d'Archeologie d'Istanbul. SALZMAN,P. resource nomadism in Iranian Baluchistan. Paper read 1969-Mulitple at the American Anthropological Association Meetings, November 1969, New Orleans.
SUMER, F.

1967-Oguzlar (Tiirkmenler): Tarihleri-Boy Teskilati-Destanlari. Ankara: Ankara tniversitesi Basimevi. L. SWEET, 1960-Tell Toqaan: A Syrian village. Anthropological papers 14. Ann Arbor: Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan. WOLF, E. of group relations in a complex society: Mexico. Amer1956-Aspects ican Anthropologist 58:6:1065-1078.