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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.

2, 2012

Study of Various Routing Protocol and Related Attacks in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Review Survey
Sumit A. Khandelwal
Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, DESs College of Engineering and Technology, Dhamangaon Rly. (MS), India sumit3khandelwal@gmail.com

A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a dynamic wireless network that can be formed without any pre-existing infrastructure in which each node can act as a router. MANET has no clear line of defense, so, it is accessible to both legitimate network users and malicious attackers. In the presence of malicious nodes, one of the main challenges in MANET is to design the robust security solution that can protect MANET from various routing attacks. Different mechanisms have been proposed using various cryptographic techniques to countermeasure the routing attacks against MANET. However, these mechanisms are not suitable for MANET resource constraints, i.e., limited bandwidth and battery power, because they introduce heavy traffic load to exchange and verifying keys. In this paper, the current security issues in MANET are investigated. Particularly, we have examined different routing attacks, such as blackhole; Routing Attacks wormhole, Resource consumption attack and IP Spooling Attack. Keywords: MANET security, routing protocols, Survey, Security attacks.

1. Introduction
Ad-hoc wireless network protocols are becoming increasingly important for deployment scenarios with limited wired infrastructure. Examples of these are sensor networks, home networks and rapid deployment emergency networks, MANET can be applied to different applications including battlefield communications, mergence relief scenarios, law enforcement, public meeting, virtual class room and other security-sensitive computing environments. There are 15 major issues and sub-issues involving in MANET such as routing, multicasting/broadcasting, location service, clustering, mobility management, TCP/UDP, IP addressing, multiple access, radio interface, bandwidth management, power management, security, fault tolerance, QoS/multimedia, and standards/products. Currently, the routing, power management, bandwidth management, radio interface, and security are hot topics in MANET research. Although in this paper we only focus on the routing protocols and security issues in MANET. The issue of routing packets between any pair of nodes is a challenging task because the nodes can move randomly within the network. Path that was considered optimal at a given point in time might not work a few moments later. There are two main types of the routing protocols. The proactive/ Table driven protocols maintain routes to all nodes, including nodes to which no packets are being sent, and Second approach is Demand Driven/ Source-Initiated Protocols, involves establishing reactive routes, which dictates that routes between nodes are determined solely when they are explicitly needed to route packets. In proactive routing protocols, such as the optimized link state routing (OLSR) [4, 5], nodes obtain routes by periodic exchange of topology information. In reactive routing protocols, such as the ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) protocol [3, 5], nodes find routes only when required. The overall goal of the security solutions for MANET is to provide security services including authentication, confidentiality, integrity, anonymity, and availability to the mobile users. In order to achieve to this goal, the security solution should provide complete protection spanning the entire protocol stack. In this paper we focus on the network layer, which is related to security issues to protect the ad hoc routing and forwarding protocols. From the security design perspective, the MANETs have no clear line of defense. Unlike wired networks that have dedicated routers, each mobile node in an ad hoc network may function as a router and forward packets for other peer nodes. The wireless channel is accessible to both legitimate network users and malicious attackers.

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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012 Recently, several research efforts [8, 9, 13] introduced to counter against these malicious attacks. Most of the previous work has focused mainly on providing preventive schemes to protect the routing protocol in a MANET. Most of these schemes are based on key management or encryption techniques to prevent unauthorized nodes from joining the network. In general, the main drawback of these approaches is that they introduce a heavy traffic load to exchange and verify keys, which is very expensive in terms of the bandwidth-constraint for MANET nodes with limited battery and limited computational capabilities. The MANET protocols are facing different routing attacks in network layer of protocol stack, such as blackhole; Routing Attacks wormhole, Resource consumption attack, IP Spooling Attack.

2. Routing protocols in MANET

MANET routing protocols can be categorized into two classes as: table-driven/proactive and source-initiated (demand-driven)/reactive. In the following sections, we present the overview of these protocols.

2.1 Table-driven routing protocols

Table-driven routing protocols attempt to maintain consistent, up-to-date routing information from each node to every other node in the network. These protocols require each node to maintain one or more tables to store routing information, and they respond to changes in network topology by propagating updates throughout the network in order to maintain a consistent network view. The areas in which they differ are the number of necessary routing-related tables and the methods by which changes in network structure are broadcast. The following sections discuss some of the existing table-driven ad hoc routing protocols. 2.1.1 Destination-sequenced distance-vector (DSDV)

The Destination-Sequenced Distance-Vector (DSDV) routing protocol [18] is a table-driven algorithm based on Bellman-Ford routing mechanism [2]. The improvements made by [18] to the Bellman-Ford algorithm include freedom from loops in routing tables. In DSDV every node in the network maintains a routing table in which all of the possible destinations within the network and the number of hops to each destination are recorded. Each entry is marked with a sequence number assigned by the destination node. The sequence numbers enable the mobile nodes to distinguish stale routes from new ones, thereby avoiding the formation of routing loops. Routing table updates are periodically transmitted throughout the network in order to maintain table consistency. To help alleviate the potentially large amount of network traffic that such updates can generate, route updates can employ two possible types of packets: full dump and smaller incremental packets. Each of these broadcasts should fit into a standard-size of network protocol data unit (NPDU), thereby decreasing the amount of traffic generated. The mobile nodes maintain an additional table where they store the data sent in the incremental routing information packets. New route broadcasts contain the address of the destination, the number of hops to reach the destination, the sequence number of the information received regarding the destination, as well as a new sequence number unique to the broadcast. By delaying the broadcast of a routing update by the length of the settling time, mobiles can reduce network traffic and optimize routes by eliminating those broadcasts that would occur if a better route was discovered in the very near future. 2.1.2 Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol

Optimized link state routing (OLSR) protocol [4] is a proactive routing protocol and based on periodic exchange of topology information. The key concept of OLSR is the use of multipoint relay (MPR) to provide an efficient flooding mechanism by reducing the number of transmissions required. In OLSR, each node selects its own MPR from its neighbors. Each MPR node maintains the list of nodes that were selected as an MPR; this list is called an MPR selector list. Only nodes selected as MPR nodes are responsible for advertising, as well as forwarding an MPR selector list advertised by other MPRs. Generally, two types of routing messages are used in the OLSR protocol, namely, a HELLO message and a topology control (TC) message. A HELLO message is the message that is used for neighbor sensing and MPR selection. In OLSR, each node generates a HELLO message periodically. A nodes HELLO message contains its own address and the list of its one-hop neighbors. By exchanging HELLO messages, each node can learn a complete topology

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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012 up to two hops. HELLO messages are exchanged locally by neighbor nodes and are not forwarded further to other nodes. A TC message is the message that is used for route calculation. In OLSR, each MPR node advertises TC messages periodically. A TC message contains the list of the senders MPR selector. In OLSR, only MPR nodes are responsible for forwarding TC messages. Upon receiving TC messages from all of the MPR nodes, each node can learn the partial network topology and can build a route to every node in the network. For MPR selection, each node selects a set of its MPR nodes that can forward its routing messages. In OLSR, a node selects its MPR set that can reach all its two-hop neighbors. In case there are multiple choices, the minimum set is selected as an MPR set. 2.1.3 Cluster head gateway switch routing (CGSR) protocol

Cluster head gateway switch routing (CGSR) protocol is based on a cluster multi hop mobile wireless network with several heuristic routing schemes. In CGSR, a stable least cluster change (LCC) clustering algorithm is preferred over the widely used lowest (highest) ID and the highest connectivity algorithms. According to the LCC algorithm, cluster heads change only when two cluster heads come into contact, or a node moves out of the range of all cluster heads. At each mobile node, a cluster member- table is maintained where in information about the destination cluster head of each mobile node in the network is stored. In addition, a routing table that stores information about the next hop to reach the destination is stored at each node. On receiving a packet, a node uses the cluster member table to determine the nearest cluster head along the route to the destination; then uses the routing table to determine the next hop node used to reach the selected cluster head. Using DSDV, the cluster member table is periodically exchanged among all nodes in the network and the routing table is periodically exchanged within a cluster. CGSR uses DSDV as the underlying routing scheme, and hence has much of the same overhead as DSDV. However, it modifies DSDV by using a hierarchical cluster-head-to-gate-way routing approach to route traffic from source to destination. Gateway nodes are nodes that are within communication range of two or more cluster heads. A packet sent by a node is first routed to its cluster head, and then the packet is routed from the cluster head to a gateway to another cluster head, and so on until the cluster head of the destination node is reached. The packet is then transmitted to the destination.

2.2 On demand-driven reactive protocols

On demand protocols create routes only when desired by source nodes [19, 11, 17 24]. When a node requires a route to destination, it initiates route discovery process within the network. This process is completed once a route is found or all possible route permutations are examined. Once a route is discovered and established, it is maintained by route maintenance procedure until either destination becomes inaccessible along every path from source or route is no longer desired. 2.2.1 Ad hoc on-demand distance vector (AODV)

AODV [4, 5] is an improvement of DSDV algorithm previously described. AODV is a single-path, reactive routing protocol. Route discovery is using a route request (RREQ) route reply (RREP) cycle. When a source node has data to be sent to a destination node and does not know the route to the destination node, floods a route request (RREQ) packet throughout the network. Several RREQ packets, each travelling on a different path, will reach the destination. The destination node replies (RREP packet) only to the first RREQ packet and drops subsequent RREQ packets with the same source sequence number and broadcast ID. The RREQ packet that arrived at the earliest is likely to have traversed a path with low delay and/or hop count. Representing the weight of each link in the network by the delay incurred on the link, AODV reduces to finding a minimum-weight path between the source and the destination. 2.2.2 Dynamic source routing (DSR)

The key feature of DSR [3] is the use of source routing. That is, the sender knows the complete hop-by hop route to the destination. These routes are stored in a route cache. The data packets carry the source route in the packet header. When a node in the ad hoc network attempts to send a data packet to a destination for which it does not already know the route, it uses a route discovery process too dynamically determine such a route. Route discovery works by flooding the network

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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012 with route request (RREQ) packets. Each node receiving a RREQ rebroadcasts it, unless it is the destination or it has a route to the destination in its route cache. Such a node replies to the RREQ with a route reply (RREP) packet that is routed back to the original source. RREQ and RREP packets are also source routed. The RREQ builds up the path traversed so far. The RREP routes itself back to the source by traversing this path backwards. The route carried back by the RREP packet is cached at the source for future use. 2.2.3 Temporary-ordered routing algorithm (TORA)

The Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) is a highly adaptive loop-free distributed routing algorithm based on the concept of link reversal. TORA is proposed to operate in a highly dynamic mobile networking environment. It is source initiated and provides multiple routes for any desired source/destination pair. The key design concept of TORA is the localization of control messages to a very small set of nodes near the occurrence of a topological change. To accomplish this, nodes need to maintain routing information about adjacent (one-hop) nodes. The protocol performs three basic functions: route creation, route maintenance, and route erasure.

3. Security Objectives
The preliminary security goals can be considered as an extension of the objectives for traditional networks. Two mnemonics, CIA (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability) and Triple A (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting) are generally used as the criteria for a secure network. These attributes must be satisfied, as well as some other factors like privacy, physical security etc. must be considered due to the pervasive nature of MANET [3, 7, 8]. Confidentiality - The information must not reach others, who are not entitled to receive the information. Not only data, routing information must also remain secure. Integrity - One shouldnt be able to modify the data during transit. Both malicious attacks and benign failure, such as radio propagation impairment could cause information corruption. Availability - The network can still operate when faced with a DoS attack. These types of attacks can be launched at any layer of the network causing physical jamming, disconnection, and malfunction of key management service and routing protocol. Authentication - The receiver should be able to identify the sender correctly. No other person can disguise as the sender. Non-repudiation - The sender cant falsely deny later that he has sent a message. This is useful for detection and isolation of compromised nodes. Access control - Information is being handled by authorized nodes. Authorization - Rules and regulations that define restriction of responsibilities of network and individual nodes.

4. Routing attacks in MANET

The malicious node(s) can attacks in MANET using different ways, such as sending fake messages several times, fake routing information, and advertising fake links to disrupt routing operations. In the following subsection, current routing attacks and its countermeasures against MANET protocols are discussed in detail. 4.1 Black Hole Attack The black hole problem is one of the security attacks that occur in mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs In a black hole attack, a malicious node sends fake routing information, claiming that it has an optimum route and causes other good nodes to route data packets through the malicious one. Black hole problem in MANETS [2] is a serious security problem to be solved. In this problem, a malicious node uses the routing protocol to advertise itself as having the shortest path to the node whose packets it wants to intercept. In flooding based protocol, if the malicious reply reaches the requesting node before the reply from the actual node, a forged route has been created. This malicious node then can choose whether to drop the packets to perform a denial-of-service attack or to use its place on the route as the first step in a man-in-the-middle attack. For example, in AODV, the attacker can send a fake RREP (including a fake destination sequence number that is

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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012 fabricated to be equal or higher than the one contained in the RREQ) to the source node, claiming that it has a sufficiently fresh route to the destination node. This causes the source node to select the route that passes through the attacker. Therefore, all traffic will be routed through the attacker, and therefore, the attacker can misuse or discard the traffic. Figure 1 shows an example of a black hole attack, where attacker a sends a fake RREP to the source node S, claiming that it has a sufficiently fresher route than other nodes. Since the attackers advertised sequence number is higher than other nodes sequence numbers, the source node S will choose the route that passes through node A.

Figure 1. Blackhole attack on AODV The route confirmation request (CREQ) and route confirmation reply (CREP) is introduced in [15] to avoid the blackhole attack. In this approach, the intermediate node not only sends RREPs to the source node but also sends CREQs to its next-hop node toward the destination node. After receiving a CREQ, the next-hop node looks up its cache for a route to the destination. If it has the route, it sends the CREP to the source. Upon receiving the CREP, the source node can confirm the validity of the path by comparing the path in RREP and the one in CREP. If both are matched, the source node judges that the route is correct. One drawback of this approach is that it cannot avoid the blackhole attack in which two consecutive nodes work in collusion, that is, when the next-hop node is a colluding attacker sending CREPs that support the incorrect path. In [1], the authors proposed a solution that requires a source node to wait until a RREP packet arrives from more than two nodes. Upon receiving multiple RREPs, the source node checks whether there is a shared hop or not. If there is, the source node judges that the route is safe. The main drawback of this solution is that it introduces time delay, because it must wait until multiple RREPs arrive. In another attempt [10], the authors analyzed the blackhole attack and showed that a malicious node must increase the destination sequence number sufficiently to convince the source node that the route provided is sufficiently enough. 4.2 Wormhole attack A particularly severe security attack, called the wormhole attack, has been introduced in the context of ad-hoc networks. During the attack, a malicious node captures packets from one location in the network, and tunnels them to another malicious node at a distant point, which replays them locally. In this paper we survey and classify the solutions that have been proposed in the literature for this attack and propose a decentralized scheme for intrusion detection based on the theory of diffusion of innovations. We argue that the proposed approach is more appropriate to address ad hoc networks dynamic and cooperative nature especially at the application level. In this attack, a pair of colluding attackers record packets at one location and replay them at another location using a private high speed network. The seriousness of this attack is that it can be launched against all communications that provide authenticity and confidentiality. Figure 2 shows an example of the wormhole attack against a reactive routing protocol. In the figure, we assume that nodes A1 and A2 are two colluding attackers and that node Source is the target to be attacked. During the attack, when source node broadcasts an RREQ to find a route to a destination node , its neighbors B and C forward the RREQ as usual. However, node A1, which received the RREQ, forwarded by node B, records and tunnels the RREQ to its colluding partner A2. Then, node A2 rebroadcasts this RREQ to its neighbor I. Since this RREQ passed through a high speed channel,

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International Journal of Advances in Science and Technology, Vol. 4, No.2, 2012 this RREQ will reach node Destination first. Therefore, node Destination will choose route D(Destination)-I-B-S (Source) to uni-cast an RREP to the source node and ignore the same RREQ that arrived later. As a result, Source will select route through H to Destination that indeed passed through A1 and A2 to send its data. In this type of attacks many modes have been suggested to be used in conjunction to benefit from the advantages of each to compensate for other modes disadvantages. Ethically, this type of wormhole analysis is important to account for possible new dangers and variations of this attack. Furthermore, it can help in putting some constraints on the network topology to design a robust network for such attacks, and in the design of new and more powerful attack countermeasure.

Figure 2.Wormhole attack in MANET 4.3 Routing Attacks There are several types of attacks mounted on the routing protocol which are aimed at disrupting the operation of the network. Various attacks on the routing protocol are described briefly below: 4.3.1 Routing Table Overflow: In this attack, the attacker attempts to create routes to nonexistent nodes. The goal is to create enough routes to prevent new routes from being created or to overwhelm the protocol implementation. Proactive routing algorithms attempt to discover routing information even before it is needed, while a reactive algorithm creates a route only once it is needed. An attacker can simply send excessive route advertisements to the routers in a network. Reactive protocols, on the other hand, do not collect routing data in advance. Routing Table Poisoning: Here, the compromised nodes in the networks send fictitious routing updates or modify genuine route update packets sent to other uncompromised nodes. Routing table poisoning may result in suboptimal routing, congestion in portions of the network, or even make some parts of the network inaccessible. Packet Replication: In this attack, an adversary node replicates stale packets. This consumes additional bandwidth and battery power resources available to the nodes and also causes unnecessary confusion in the routing process Route Cache Poisoning: In the case of on-demand routing protocols (such as the AODV protocol [11]), each node maintains a route cache which holds information regarding routes that have become known to the node in the recent past. Similar to routing table poisoning, an adversary can also poison the route cache to achieve similar objectives. Rushing Attack: On-demand routing protocols that use duplicate suppression during the route discovery process are vulnerable to this attack. An adversary node which receives a Route Request packet from the source node floods the packet quickly throughout the network before other nodes which also receive the same Route Request packet can react. Nodes that receive the legitimate Route Request packets assume those packets to be duplicates of the packet already received through the adversary node and hence discard those packets. Any route discovered by the source node would contain the adversary node as one of the intermediate nodes. Hence, the source node would not be able to find secure routes, that is, routes that do not include the adversary node. It is extremely difficult to detect such attacks in ad hoc wireless networks.





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4.4 Resource consumption attack

This is also known as the sleep deprivation attack. An attacker or a compromised node can attempt to consume battery life by requesting excessive route discovery, or by forwarding unnecessary packets to the victim node.

4.5 IP Spoofing attack

In conflict-detection allocation, the new node chooses a random address (say y) and broadcast a conflict detection packet throughout the MANET. Any veto from a node will prevent it from using this address. If the malicious node always impersonates a member that has occupied the same IP address and keeps replying with vetoes, it is called an IP Spoofing attack as illustrated in below figure.

Figure 3. IP spoofing attack In figure 2, N represents the new node, and M represents a malicious node. Node P is a neighbor of node M. Although node P may be aware that it has no direct neighbor with the address of y by means of neighbor detection mechanism, it still thinks that the veto message is forwarded by node M from another node N.


We presented an exhaustive survey of the routing protocols and various attack in Network layer of protocol stack for mobile ad hoc networks MANET is a new paradigm in wireless revolution in terms of acceptability. The technology is quite matured. Still practical implementation is rather difficult due to security and other problems. In this survey paper, we try to inspect the security threats in the mobile ad hoc networks, which may be a main disturbance to the operation of it. Due to nature of mobility and open media MANET are much more prone to all kind of security risks as covered. As a result, the security needs in the MANET are much higher than those in the traditional wired networks.


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Authors profile
Sumit A. Khandelwal is Assistant Professor in Computer Science and Engineering Department of DESs College of Engineering and Technology. Dhamangaon Rly(MS),India. He received his BE degree in Computer Science from Amravati University / India. He is working towards his Master in Computer Science and Engineering from Amravati University. He completed Sun Certification i.e. SCJP. He also published various papers in International Journal and Conference also. He is member of IACSIT (Singapore), IAENG (Hong Kong), CSTA. His research is focused on MANET, Neural networks and Video Surveillance System

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