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Fines, Imprisonment or Both: Civil vs. Criminal Contempt

by Laura A. Thornton

y client has received a show-cause summons alleging that he owes a substantial amount of child support. He is to appear before the juvenile court judge on a specified date to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court, fined, imprisoned, or both, for failing to pay his child support as previously ordered. My client asks why he can be subject to jail time, if he is not charged with a crime. In that question, he has summed up the perceived quasi-civil, quasi-criminal nature of many contempt charges in the context of family law cases. Unfortunately, there is no single test for distinguishing civil from criminal contempt and no simple answer to my clients question. In this article, I will attempt to provide you with an overview of the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, the elements necessary for proving either case, the defenses thereto, the procedures, and the possible sanctions in each type of contempt case.

Both the juvenile and the circuit courts of the Commonwealth are vested with inherent contempt powers. Additionally, the courts are granted statutory contempt powers.2 Such powers are designed to vindicate the authority of the court and the rights of the parties.3

Types and Forms of Contempt

There are two types of contempt proceedings: civil and criminal. Civil contempt proceedings are utilized to enforce the rights of private parties and to motivate an accused contemnor into doing what he is required to do by court order. Such proceedings are remedial in nature.4 Criminal contempt proceedings, on the other hand, are prosecuted to preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the court.5 Such proceedings are punitive in nature. Oftentimes, however, the same act or failure to act by a party can justify either civil or criminal contempt proceedings. There are also two forms of contempt: direct and indirect. Direct forms of contempt take place in the presence and hearing of the trial judge.6 Such contempt may be punished summarily, without prior notice to the defendant.7 Indirect contempt is contempt at least part of which takes place outside of the hearing and presence of the trial judge.8 Such indirect contempt may be punished only with prior notice to the defendant.

Basis of the Courts Contempt Powers

Blacks Law Dictionary defines contempt of court as: [A]ny act which is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in administration of justice, or which is calculated to lessen its authority or its dignity. Committed by a person who does any act in willful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of justice, or by one who, being under the courts authority as a party to a proceeding therein, willfully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to comply with an undertaking which he has given.1

Distinguishing Civil from Criminal Contempt

The best way to distinguish civil from criminal contempt is to examine the penalty sought or imposed. If the defendant holds

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the keys to the jail and can purge himself from the contempt finding by committing an affirmative act, the contempt is civil in nature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a judges ruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings current his support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearage current, he may be released. In this situation, the defendant has an opportunity to purge himself of the civil contempt. Conversely, if the defendants punishment is unmodifiable by action from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. Examples of such criminal contempt are unconditional fines and fixed unconditional jail sentences.9 In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for distinguishing civil from criminal contempt. In that case, the trial court found the defendant in civil contempt for his willful failure to pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to eleven months in jail without any provision allowing the defendant to purge himself of such contempt by payment of all or a portion of his support arrearages. On appeal, the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil since there was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself of the contempt. The case was reversed and remanded to the trial court to provide the defendant with the procedural protections afforded a criminal defendant.

the proposition that the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence.13 However, such a standard is not plainly articulated in the Leisge case. In fact the necessary standard of proof for civil contempt cases is not addressed at all in the Leisge case. Rather, the case focuses upon the necessity of proving intent for a civil contempt conviction. In Leisge, a mother had been granted custody by the Virginia trial court. The father removed the parties child to New Mexico for a visit, and while there filed a petition for custody. The Virginia court entered an order restraining the father from proceeding with litigation in New Mexico. The father nevertheless continued his New Mexico litigation. The Virginia court found the father to be in contempt, and fined him $500 per day with imprisonment until he purged himself of the contempt. Eventually, the New Mexico Supreme Court granted a writ prohibiting the New Mexico District Court from holding a hearing on the fathers custody petition and the mother regained custody. At trial in Virginia on the contempt charge, the fathers fines were remitted and his jail sentence suspended conditioned upon his good behavior. The father was also ordered to pay a substantial portion of mothers legal fees. The father argued that he should not be held in contempt because the Virginia custody order was void and he did not possess the specific intent to violate the court order. The court of appeals held that the custody order was valid and that because the charge was for civil, not criminal, contempt, specific intent was not necessary for conviction. Since the purpose is remedial, it matters not with what intent the defendant did the prohibited act . . . . An act does not cease to be a violation of a law and of a decree merely because it may have been done innocently. Leisge at 309, quoting, McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 191 (1949).

Elements of Civil Contempt

Under Virginia case law, to establish a case for civil contempt a plaintiff must prove: the existence of a court order either prohibiting or mandating an act by the defendant10; the defendants actual knowledge of such an order11; and violation of such order by the defendant12. In the case of Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411, 499 S.E.2d 560 (1998), the Court of Appeals reversed a finding of contempt on the ground that there was no violation of the express terms of the court order by the defendant. In that case, the parties property agreement had been incorporated into their final decree of divorce. It provided that the husband would obtain a life insurance policy, as approved by the wife, naming the wife and children as beneficiaries at such time as the youngest child reached the age of 23. The husband obtained such a policy six months after he should have done so, and did not provide wife with a copy of the policy. The trial court found husband to be in contempt for not providing wife with a copy of the policy. The court of appeals reversed, stating that there was no express requirement that the husband provide the wife with a copy of the policy: such a requirement was only implied. The court said, [b]efore a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be express rather than implied. Id. Quoting Taliaferro v. Hordes Admr, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 242, 247 (1822). There is no Virginia case directly related to the standard of proof in civil contempt cases. The Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judges and Lawyers 1999 Edition cites the Leisge child custody case for

There is no Virginia case directly related to the standard of proof in civil contempt cases.
In Virginia federal case law, there are additional elements and a clearly articulated standard of proof. Under controlling federal case law, the elements necessary to prove civil contempt include: the existence of a valid decree of which the alleged contemnor had actual or constructive knowledge; a showing that the decree was in the movants favor; a showing that the alleged contemnor by its conduct violated the terms of the decree, and had knowledge (at least constructive knowledge) of such violations; and a showing that the movant suffered harm as a result.14 Each of these elements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.15

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Elements of Criminal Contempt

To establish a case for criminal contempt, the Commonwealth must prove an intentional or willful act by the defendant.16 Such act may be a violation of a court order or be conduct that undermines the integrity of the court, including those instances set forth in Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 (i.e., misbehavior in the presence of the court, violence or threats to a judge or court officer, vile language, misbehavior of a court officer, disobedience or resistance to court process or orders). The standard of proof, as with any criminal case, is beyond a reasonable doubt.17 In a recent case, Michaels v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 601, 529 S.E.2d 822 (2000), the court of appeals reversed a trial court finding of contempt on the ground that the court order upon which the contempt show cause was predicated did not expressly impose a duty upon the defendant, which the defendant failed to fulfill. In that case, the trial court, by order dated January 21, 1999 continued an inmates trial pending a psychological evaluation at Central State Hospital. The order was received by the jail, but the inmate was not transferred. No separate order was entered directing transport or scheduling the psychological evaluation. Upon learning that the inmate had never been transferred, the trial court issued a rule to show cause against the supervisor of the records for the city jail, and subsequently found him in contempt for failing to transport the inmate. The court of appeals reversed, stating that [b]efore a person may be held in contempt for violating a court order, the order must be in definite terms as to the duties thereby imposed upon him and the command must be expressed rather than implied. Id. at 609.

rule are then served on the defendant. Personal service of the rule on the defendant is required.20 Service upon counsel of record is insufficient.21 In the circuit court, a similar procedure is used to initiate a civil contempt proceeding. If the contempt proceedings are ancillary to the pending action, the petitioner shall proceed in the pending action. If, however, there is no matter pending on the active docket, it is necessary to reinstate the underlying case. Virginia Code Section 20-112 (1950, as amended) requires service of process of the motion to reinstate where the purpose of reinstatement is to request additional orders to effectuate previous orders entered pursuant to Virginia Code Section 20-107.3 (1950, as amended). Once the matter is on the courts pending docket, the petitioner files a motion requesting that the court enter a rule (order) directing that the defendant appear at a certain date and time and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to obey the previous order. While it is not required by statute or case law, many courts prefer that such motions be supported by the affidavit of the petitioner or be verified by the petitioner under oath. If a rule is issued without an affidavit, but the defendant appears and participates in the proceeding, he is deemed to have waived objection to the rule.22 Once the court enters the rule, the defendant must be personally served therewith.23 Service upon counsel of record is insufficient.24 At the hearing, the burden of proof rests with the petitioner to prove his prima facia case. Thereafter, the burden shifts to the defendant to show justification for his actions or inactions allegedly violative of the prior order.25 This principle of shifting burdens was applied in the Alexander case. (See, Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691, 406 S.E.2d 666 (1991)). In that case, the mother sought to have the father held in contempt for failure to pay child support in a timely manner. Upon hearing the testimony of the mother that the father had not paid his child support on time, the burden then shifted to the father to justify his failure to pay support. The court then heard from the father who testified that from the time the mother filed her show-cause motion he had paid all of his child support payments. Based upon the husbands evidence, the court declined to hold him in contempt. The defendant has the right to present evidence in his defense, to call witnesses, and to examine the opposing party.26 Examples of a valid defense include the inability to obey the order due to no fault of the defendant, the defendants lack of notice of the order, and lack of jurisdiction of the court to enter the underlying order (making the order void). (See Street v. Street, 24 Va. App. 14, 480 S.E.2d 118 (1997), where the court of appeals reversed the trial court for refusing to allow the defendant to present evidence of his inability to pay support as a defense to a contempt finding for failure to pay child support). In support cases, should the defendant fail to appear, the court may proceed with trial in his absence or continue the matter.27 Should trial proceed in the defendants absence in a support matter and judgment of conviction be entered against him, the defendant may within thirty days make application to have the

Civil Contempt Proceedings

There are two types of civil contempt proceedings: summary and plenary. Summary proceedings are instituted when a direct contempt has occurred. In this situation, the contumacious behavior has occurred in the presence of the trial judge and the trial judge may take evidence and punish the contemnor in the same proceeding. The contemnor, while not entitled to prior notice, is entitled to be advised as to the specific charge of contempt and shall be given an opportunity to be heard in his defense.18 If the trial judge chooses to delay the contempt hearing until after the proceeding in which the contumacious behavior occurred, then, the contemnor will be entitled to notice and the judge shall allow another judge to preside over the contempt proceeding.19 Plenary contempt proceedings are more common in family law cases. Plenary proceedings are conducted in cases of indirect contempt when the contumacious behavior has occurred, at least in part, out of the presence of the trial judge. Plenary proceedings require prior notice and an opportunity to be heard by the defendant. The most common procedure in the juvenile court system is for the petitioner to request the issuance of a show cause summons, or rule to show cause. The petitioner alleges, often by a form petition, that the defendant has violated an order of a certain date and requests that the court issue a rule or summons to the defendant directing that he appear on a date certain and explain to the court why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to obey the order. The petitioner, or someone, must sign the petition under oath. The petition and

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case reopened, and after due notice to the original petitioner, for good cause, the court may reopen the case and enter such judgment or order as is right or proper.28

of the plaintiff, to prosecute the action.29 Summary criminal proceedings are conducted just as summary civil proceedings, except that the Commonwealth must prove its case against the defendant by a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.30 The majority of criminal contempt proceedings require plenary proceedings, including informing defendant that the proceeding is criminal,31 transfer to the law side, and substituting the Commonwealth as a party. The defendant in such case must have prior notice of the proceedings, be personally served, and be advised of the details of his alleged contumacious behavior.32 Such notice must advise whether the defendant is facing the possibility of jail time. In the case of Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 461 S.E.2d 421 (1995) the defendant appealed his criminal contempt conviction for failing to comply with orders regarding child support and visitation on the ground that the court did not follow the proper procedure for criminal contempt proceedings; in particular, that he was not provided notice, nor was he indicted or arraigned. The court of appeals upheld the defendants conviction, pointing out that Mr. Steinberg had been provided with a show cause order specifically setting forth the details of his alleged offense, that he had knowledge prior to the hearing that the case was being tried as a criminal contempt, and that for due process purposes, he did not have to be indicted or arraigned. The court distinguished the facts in Mr. Steinbergs case from the facts in the case of Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553, 425 S.E.2d 539 (1993) where a contempt conviction was reversed because the trial court did not adequately articulate the nature of the proceedings at the commencement of the hearing. The court of appeals pointed out that Mr. Steinberg did not request a continuance and did not show that his defense was compromised by any lack of notice. He was able to prepare his defense and personally appeared and fully presented his defense. Accordingly, his due process challenge was denied. According to Virginia law, the defendant in criminal contempt cases has a right to counsel.33 Likewise under federal law, the defendant has a right to counsel and the appointment of counsel in a criminal proceeding in which he is facing jail time.34 Under federal law, if the defendant faces the possibility of more than six months in jail or a serious contempt fine, then the defendant has a right to a jury trial.35 The Virginia Court of Appeals has ruled similarly.36 (See, Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223 (1994), wherein the Virginia Court of Appeals overturned a defendants contempt conviction and eleven month jail sentence for his failure to pay support on the ground that the defendant was denied a jury trial.) The federal courts have not defined a serious contempt fine. In the Muniz case, $10,000 fine was held insufficient to warrant a jury trial. In the Bagwell case, however, a $52,000 fine was held sufficient to warrant a jury trial.37 The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution can apply in criminal contempt proceedings as in other criminal proceedings. In Courtney v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 561, 478 S.E.2d 336 (1996), the appellate court reversed the conviction of a defendant

The Virginia Court of Appeals has found that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution can apply in criminal contempt proceedings as in other criminal proceedings.
There is no Virginia case on whether defendants in civil contempt proceedings are entitled to court-appointed counsel. However, Virginia Code Section 14.1-183 gives the court discretion to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in civil cases. (See also, Virginia Code Section 16.1-266 (D), which grants juvenile and domestic relations district courts authority to appoint counsel for indigent children, parents or guardians.) In many family law contempt proceedings, the petitioner seeks enforcement of a separation agreement that was previously made part of the parties final decree of divorce. In this years Shoup case, the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that in cases where the petitioner seeks enforcement of a written agreement which has been incorporated into a court decree, such agreements are enforceable even in the absence of a finding of contempt. Shoup v. Shoup, 31 Va. App. 621, 525 S.E.2d 61 (2000). In Shoup, the petitioner, husband, sought enforcement of the parties property settlement and modification agreement, both of which had been affirmed, ratified, and incorporated into a decree of the court. The husband filed a rule to show cause requesting an order compelling wife to comply and a money judgment. Upon interpretation of the agreement, the court declined to find wife in contempt. The court did, however, enter an order requiring wife to comply with the agreement and to pay a sum certain to husband. The wife asserted that when the trial judge ruled she was not in contempt, the court lacked authority to grant any relief to husband. The court of appeals held that the trial judge had the authority to enforce the personal obligations of the parties created by the agreements, which were incorporated into the courts decrees.

Criminal Contempt Proceedings

In all criminal contempt proceedings, whether summary or plenary, the court must advise the defendant of the criminal nature of the proceedings. The court must then transfer the case from the equity side of the court to the law side of the court. Next, the court must substitute the Commonwealth as a party in place

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found in contempt for failure to comply with the trial courts order regarding visitation on this ground. As with all criminal proceedings, the Commonwealth must first establish its prima facia case against the defendant. As part of such case, the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant violated an order or engaged in conduct that undermined the integrity of the court. The Commonwealth must further prove that the defendants actions were willful and intentional.38 The defendant must then justify his behavior. He has an opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf and to cross-examine the Commonwealths witnesses.39 The Commonwealth of course must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

defendant in contempt, but instead ordered the defendant to purchase a life insurance policy or post a bond to ensure performance of the obligation and to pay the plaintiffs attorneys fees. The defendant argued that the fee award was not appropriate because the issues were close, and the trial judge made no specific finding of contempt. The court of appeals upheld the trial court finding that the issue of fees is solely in the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless there has been an abuse of discretion.

Conclusion
Virginia circuit and juvenile courts are vested with inherent and statutory contempt powers for the purpose of vindicating the authority of the court and the rights of litigants. To determine whether civil or criminal, one must examine the penalty sought or imposed. It is up to the court and counsel to clarify the nature of the proceedings at the beginning of the proceedings.

Sanctions
A sanction imposed on a party held to be in civil contempt generally may serve either or both of two purposes: to coerce the contemnor into complying with the Courts order, or to compensate the complainant for losses resulting from the contemnors past noncompliance.40 Moreover, a court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy based on the nature of the harm and the probable effect of alternative sanctions.41 Sanctions in a contempt proceeding are left to the discretion of the trial court, unless specifically mandated by statute. Such sanctions may include fines, imprisonment, or both. Virginia Code Section 18.2-456 sets forth the sanctions for Class 1 misdemeanor contempt and limits such sanctions to up to ten days in jail and/or a fine of up to $50. In Brown v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 758, 497 S.E.2d 147 (1998), the Virginia Court of Appeals reduced the fine imposed upon a defendant for a contempt conviction imposed pursuant to Virginia Code Section 18.2-456. In that case, an attorney was held in civil contempt for interrupting the administration of justice by failing to appear on time at a hearing that he scheduled. The trial court imposed a fine of $400 ($10 for every minute the court found the defendant to be late). The court of appeals found the evidence supporting the contempt conviction to be sufficient, but reduced the fine to $50, the statutory limit. Other statutes set forth the particular sanctions for failure to pay fines, costs, forfeitures, restitution or penalty 42; jurors who fail to appear 43, fiduciaries who fail to timely file their required reports 44, and debtors who fail to appear and answer debtor interrogatories.45 The only limitation for sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding, as in a domestic case, is that the sanction be reasonable.

Laura A. Thornton is a member of the Franklin R. Blatt Law Firm in Harrisonburg. She is a graduate of the University of Virginia and the University of Richmond Law School, where she served as managing editor of the Richmond Law Review. She also served as a law clerk to Judge Daffron of the Circuit Court of Chesterfield County.

ENDNOTES 1 2 Blacks Law Dictionary 288 (5th ed. 1979). See, Va. Code Section 18.2-456 (Summary Contempt for misbehavior in the presence of the court, violence or threats of violence to a judge, juror, party or officer of the court, vile language, misbehavior of an officer of the court, disobedience or resistance to court order); Va. Code Section 16.1-69.24 (granting district courts the same authority as circuit courts to punish summarily for contempt); Va. Code Section 8.01-271.1 (Bad faith in pleadings and motions); Va. Code Sections 8.01-407, 19.2-267, 19.2-267.1, 8.01-356, 8.01-401, 118.2445, 19.2-215.7 (Failure to obey subpoenas and summonses and failure to testify); Va. Code Section 16.1-278.16 (granting district courts contempt powers over persons failing to comply with orders regarding support obligations); Va. Code Sections 20-71 and 20-115 (granting circuit courts contempt powers for pendente lite and permanent support orders and orders granted pursuant to Va. Code Sections 20-103 or 20-107.3); Va. Code Section 19.2-358 (Failure to pay fines, costs, or restitution in timely manner); and Va. Code Section 20124.2 (Authority to effectuate and enforce custody and visitation orders). Potts v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 855 (1946); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986); and Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992). U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) cited in United Mine Workers v. Covenant Coal Corp., 12 Va. App. 135 (1991); Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303 (1982); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986). Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co. 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986). In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va. 1974); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395 (1978). Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va. 1974); Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838 (1904); Davis v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 395 (1978). Richmond Black Police Officers Assn v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977); Steelworkers v. Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and Mine Workers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994).

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Counsel Fees
Judges presiding over contempt proceedings in divorce suits also have the discretion to award counsel fees.46 The recent court of appeals case of Sullivan v. Sullivan, (Record No. 0027-00-4, Va. Ct. App., November 21, 2000), affirmed prior holdings that it is not necessary for the defendant to be held in contempt for the plaintiff to receive an award of fees. In that case, the plaintiff sought to have the defendant held in contempt for his failure to maintain life insurance pursuant to the parties property settlement that had been incorporated. The trial judge did not find the

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10 French v. Pobst, 203 Va. 704 (1962); Winn v. Winn, 218 Va. 8 (1977). 11 Kidd v. Virginia Safe Deposit & Trust Corp., 113 Va. 612 (1912). 12 Wilson v. Collins, 27 Va. App. 411 (1998). 13 Virginia Civil Benchbook for Judges and Lawyers (1999 ed.), citing, Leisge v. Leisge, 224 Va. 303 (1982). 14 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Va. 1992). 15 Id. 16 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986). 17 Nicholas v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 315 (1947); Salyer v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 662 (1969). 18 Virginia Code Sections 18.2-456 and 18.2-457 (1950, as amended); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) Greene v. Tucker, 375 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Va. 1974). 19 Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 20 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965). 21 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended). 22 Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 4 Va. 408 (1824). 23 Virginia Code Section 19.2-11 (1950, as amended). Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 291 (1965). 24 Virginia Code Section 8.01-314 (1950, as amended). 25 Alexander v. Alexander, 12 Va. App. 691 (1991). 26 Street v. Street, 24 Va. App. 14 (1997). 27 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended). 28 Virginia Code Section 20-66 (1950, as amended). 29 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993). 30 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997). 31 Powell v. Ward, 15 Va. App. 553 (1993). 32 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995). 33 Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42 (1995). 34 Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965); Richmond Black Police Officers Assn v. City of Richmond, 548 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977). 35 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974); Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988); Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). 36 Baugh v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 368 (1992). 37 Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454 (1975); Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994). 38 Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392 (1986). 39 Street v. Street, 24 Va. 14 (1997). 40 Colonial Williamsburg Foundation v. Kittinger, Co., 792 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Va. 1992). 41 Id., quoting, Connolly v. J.T. Ventures, 851 F.2d 930, 934-35 (7th Cir. [F. Supp. 1407] 1988). 42 Virginia Code Section 19.2-358 (1950, as amended). 43 Virginia Code Section 8.01-356 (1950, as amended). 44 Virginia Code Section 26-13, 26-18 (1950, as amended). 45 Virginia Code Section 8.01-508 (1950, as amended). 46 Carswell v. Masterson, 224 Va. 329, 332, 295 S.E.2d 899, 901 (1982).

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