Categorical proposition

Definition: A categorical proposition is a proposition which relates two classes to each other (through a direct assertion of agreement or disagreement between them), both of which are delineated with a categorical term. There are only four forms of a categorical proposition: All S are P. No S are P. Some S are P. Some S are not P. The first, All S are P, is a universal affirmative. The second, No S are P, is a universal negative. The third, Some S are P, is a particular affirmative. The fourth, Some S are not P, is a particular negative. The classes are represented by the letters, S and P. The categorical terms are the quantifiers: All, No, Some. Categorical propositions are usually divided up into four groups: A, E, I and O: A: All S are P (One category is a subset of another) E: No S are P (The two categories do not intersect) I: Some S is/are P (The two categories intersect) O: Some S is/are not P (One category is not a subset of another) A key issue is the nature of distribution. A category is said to be distributed if the proposition refers to every member of the category. The first term is distributed in A propositions; the second is distributed in O propositions; both are distributed in E propositions; and none are distributed in I propositions. One distinguishing feature of categorical propositions is quantity: Universal propositions (A, E) refer to all members of the class designated by its subject term. Particular propositions (I, O) refer just to some members of the class designated by its subject term. Another distinguishing feature of categorical propositions is quality: Affirmative propositions (A, I) express a relationship of inclusion between members of the classes designated by its terms. Negative propositions (E, O) express a relationship of exclusion between members of the classes designated by its terms.

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A categorical proposition contain two categorical terms, the subject and the predicate and affirms or denies the latter of the former [1] Categorical propositions occur in categoricalsyllogisms and both are discussed in Aristotle's Prior Analytics. Categorical propositions are part of deductive reasoning. Examples: Midshipman Davis serves on H.M.S. Invincible. (subject: Midshipman Davis; predicate: serves on H.M.S. Invincible) Some politicians are corrupt. (subject: politicians; predicate: corruptness) Nobody ever got fired for buying IBM. (subject: people; predicate: getting fired for buying IBM) The subject and predicate are called the terms of the proposition. The subject is what the proposition is about. The predicate is what the proposition affirms or denies about the subject. A categorical proposition thus claims something about things or ways of being: it affirms or denies something about something else. Categorical propositions are distinguished from hypothetical propositions (if-then statements that connect propositions rather than terms) and disjunctive propositions (either-or statements, claiming exclusivity between propositions). Classes There are only four classes (or categories) of categorical propositions: Universal affirmative propositions Universal negative propositions Particular affirmative propositions Particular negative propositions The systematic development of these four classes is credited to Aristotle. Quality, quantity and distribution Categorical propositions can be categorized on the basis of their quality, quantity, and distribution qualities. Quality refers to whether the proposition affirms or denies the inclusion of a subject to the class of the predicate. The two qualities are affirmative and negative. On the other hand, quantity refers to the amount of subjects in one class which are included in the other class. The first quantifier is the universal, "all". This means that every subject of one class has membership in the predicated class. The other quantifier is called a particular. It is an indefinite number, which could mean five, twenty or,

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perhaps, all, but always at least one. From quality and quantity are four types of categorical propositions designated alphabetically: A proposition is a universal affirmative: All S is P E proposition is a universal negative: No S is P I proposition is a particular affirmative: Some S is P O proposition is a particular negative: Some S is not P All four types have different distribution properties. Distribution refers to what can be inferred from the proposition. An A proposition distributes the subject to the predicate, but not the reverse. Consider the following categorical proposition: all dogs are mammals. All dogs are indeed mammals but it would be false to say all mammals are dogs. E propositions do distribute bidirectionally between the subject and predicate. From the categorical proposition, no beetles are mammals, we can infer that no mammals are beetles. Both terms in an I proposition are undistributed. For example, some Americans are conservatives. Neither term in the proposition can be entirely distributed to the other term. From this proposition it is not possible to say that all Americans are conservatives or that all conservatives are Americans. In an O proposition only the predicate term is distributed. Consider the following: some hardware are not nails. Knowing that screws are considered hardware, it can be stated that there exist some members outside the class of nails that are members of the class of hardware. However, it cannot be inferred that all hardware are nails. Thus, only the predicate term is distributed in an O proposition.

Categorical Syllogisms
The Structure of Syllogism Now, to the next level, at which we combine more than one categorical proposition to fashion logical arguments. A categorical syllogism is an argument consisting of exactly three categorical propositions (two premises and a conclusion) in which there appear a total of exactly three categorical terms, each of which is used exactly twice. One of those terms must be used as the subject term of the conclusion of the syllogism, and we call it the minor term of the syllogism as a whole. The major term of the syllogism is whatever is employed as the predicate term of its conclusion. The third term in the syllogism doesn't occur in the conclusion at all, but must be employed in somewhere in each of its premises; hence, we call it the middle term. Since one of the premises of the syllogism must be a categorical proposition that affirms some relation between its middle and major terms, we call that the major premise of the syllogism. The other premise, which links the middle and minor terms, we call the minor premise. Consider, for example, the categorical syllogism: Page | 3

No geese are felines. Some birds are geese. Therefore, Some birds are not felines.

Clearly, "Some birds are not felines" is the conclusion of this syllogism. The major term of the syllogism is "felines" (the predicate term of its conclusion), so "No geese are felines" (the premise in which "felines" appears) is its major premise. Simlarly, the minor term of the syllogism is "birds," and "Some birds are geese" is its minor premise. "geese" is the middle term of the syllogism.
Standard Form In order to make obvious the similarities of structure shared by different syllogisms, we will always present each of them in the same fashion. A categorical syllogism in standard form always begins with the premises, major first and then minor, and then finishes with the conclusion. Thus, the example above is already in standard form. Although arguments in ordinary language may be offered in a different arrangement, it is never difficult to restate them in standard form. Once we've identified the conclusion which is to be placed in the final position, whichever premise contains its predicate term must be the major premise that should be stated first. Medieval logicians devised a simple way of labeling the various forms in which a categorical syllogism may occur by stating its mood and figure. The mood of a syllogism is simply a statement of which categorical propositions (A, E, I, or O) it comprises, listed in the order in which they appear in standard form. Thus, a syllogism with a mood of OAO has an O proposition as its major premise, an A proposition as its minor premise, and another O proposition as its conclusion; and EIO syllogism has an E major premise, and I minor premise, and an O conclusion; etc. Since there are four distinct versions of each syllogistic mood, however, we need to supplement this labelling system with a statement of the figure of each, which is solely determined by the position in which its middle term appears in the two premises: in a first-figure syllogism, the middle term is the subject term of the major premise and the predicate term of the minor premise; in second figure, the middle term is the predicate term of both premises; in third, the subject term of both premises; and in fourth figure, the middle term appears as the predicate term of the major premise and the subject term of the minor premise. (The four figures may be easier to remember as a simple chart showing the position of the terms in each of the premises: M P 1 \ S M 2 P M | 3 | S M M P 4 / M S M S P M

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All told, there are exactly 256 distinct forms of categorical syllogism: four kinds of major premise multiplied by four kinds of minor premise multiplied by four kinds of conclusion multiplied by four relative positions of the middle term. Used together, mood and figure provide a unique way of describing the logical structure of each of them. Thus, for example, the argument "Some merchants are
pirates, and All merchants are swimmers, so Some swimmers are pirates " is an IAI-3 syllogism, and

any AEE-4 syllogism must exhibit the form "All P are M, and No M are S, so No S are P." Form and Validity This method of differentiating syllogisms is significant because the validity of a categorical syllogism depends solely upon its logical form. Remember our earlier definition: an argument is valid when, if its premises were true, then its conclusion would also have to be true. The application of this definition in no way depends upon the content of a specific categorical syllogism; it makes no difference whether the categorical terms it employs are "mammals," "terriers," and "dogs" or "sheep," "commuters," and "sandwiches." If a syllogism is valid, it is impossible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false, and that can be the case only if there is something faulty in its general form. Thus, the specific syllogisms that share any one of the 256 distinct syllogistic forms must either all be valid or all be invalid, no matter what their content happens to be. Every syllogism of the form AAA-

1 is valid, for example, while all syllogisms of the form OEE-3 are invalid.
This suggests a fairly straightforward method of demonstrating the invalidity of any syllogism by "logical analogy." If we can think of another syllogism which has the same mood and figure but whose terms obviously make both premises true and the conclusion false, then it is evident that all syllogisms of this form, including the one with which we began, must be invalid. Thus, for example, it may be difficult at first glance to assess the validity of the argument: All philosophers are professors. All philosophers are logicians. Therefore, All logicians are professors.

But since this is a categorical syllogism whose mood and figure are AAA-3, and since all syllogisms of the same form are equally valid or invalid, its reliability must be the same as that of the AAA-3 syllogism:
All terriers are dogs. All terriers are mammals. Therefore, All mammals are dogs.

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Both premises of this syllogism are true, while its conclusion is false, so it is clearly invalid. But then all syllogisms of the AAA-3 form, including the one about logicians and professors, must also be invalid. This method of demonstrating the invalidity of categorical syllogisms is useful in many contexts; even those who have not had the benefit of specialized training in formal logic will often acknowledge the force of a logical analogy. The only problem is that the success of the method depends upon our ability to invent appropriate cases, syllogisms of the same form that obviously have true premises and a false conclusion. If I have tried for an hour to discover such a case, then either there can be no such case because the syllogism is valid or I simply haven't looked hard enough yet. Diagramming Syllogisms The modern interpretation offers a more efficient method of evaluating the validity of categorical syllogisms. By combining the drawings of individual propositions, we can use Venn diagrams to assess the validity of categorical syllogisms by following a simple three-step procedure: First draw three overlapping circles and label them to represent the major, minor, and middle terms of the syllogism. Next, on this framework, draw the diagrams of both of the syllogism's premises. Always begin with a universal proposition, no matter whether it is the major or the minor premise. Remember that in each case you will be using only two of the circles in each case; ignore the third circle by making sure that your drawing (shading or ) straddles it.

Finally, without drawing anything else, look for the drawing of the conclusion. If the syllogism is valid, then that drawing will already be done. Since it perfectly models the relationships between classes that are at work in categorical logic, this procedure always provides a demonstration of the validity or invalidity of any categorical syllogism. Consider, for example, how it could be applied, step by step, to an evaluation of a syllogism of the EIO-3mood and figure, No M are P. Some M are S. Therefore, Some S are not P.

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First, we draw and label the three overlapping circles needed to represent all three terms included in the categorical syllogism:

Second, we diagram each of the premises:

Since the major premise is a universal proposition, we may begin with it. The diagram for "No M are P" must shade in the entire area in which the M and P circles overlap. (Notice that we ignore the S circle by shading on both sides of it.)

Now we add the minor premise to our drawing. The diagram for "Some M are S" puts an inside the area where the M and S circles overlap. But part of that area (the portion also inside the P circle) has already been shaded, so our must be placed in the remaining portion.

Third, we stop drawing and merely look at our result. Ignoring the M circle entirely, we need only ask whether the drawing of the conclusion "Some S are
not P" has already been drawn.

Remember, that drawing would be like the one at left, in which there is an in the area inside the S circle but outside the P circle. Does that already appear in the diagram on the right above? Yes, if the premises have been drawn, then the conclusion is already drawn. But this models a significant logical feature of the syllogism itself: if its premises are true, then its conclusion must also be true. Any categorical syllogism of this form is valid.

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Here are the diagrams of several other syllogistic forms. In each case, both of the premises have already been drawn in the appropriate way, so if the drawing of the conclusion is already drawn, the syllogism must be valid, and if it is not, the syllogism must be invalid.

AAA-1 (valid)
All M are P. All S are M. Therefore, All S are P.

AAA-3 (invalid)
All M are P. All M are S. Therefore, All S are P.

OAO-3 (valid)
Some M are not P. All M are S. Therefore, Some S are not P. Page | 8

EOO-2 (invalid)
No P are M. Some S are not M. Therefore, Some S are not P.

IOO-1 (invalid)
Some M are P. Some S are not M. Therefore, Some S are not P.

Fallacy
The ability to identify logical fallacies in the arguments of others, and to avoid them in ones own arguments, is both valuable and increasingly rare. Fallacious reasoning keeps us from knowing the truth, and the inability to think critically makes us vulnerable to manipulation by those skilled in the art of rhetoric.

What is a Logical Fallacy?

A logical fallacy is, roughly speaking, an error of reasoning. When someone adopts a position, or tries to persuade someone else to adopt a position, based on a bad piece of reasoning, they commit a fallacy. I say roughly speaking because this definition has a few problems, the most important of which are outlined below. Some logical fallacies are more common than others, and so have been named and Page | 9

defined. When people speak of logical fallacies they often mean to refer to this collection of well-known errors of reasoning, rather than to fallacies in the broader, more technical sense given above.

Formal and Informal Fallacies

There are several different ways in which fallacies may be categorised. Its possible, for instance, to distinguish between formal fallacies and informal fallacies.

Formal Fallacies (Deductive Fallacies)

Philosophers distinguish between two types of argument: deductive and inductive. For each type of argument, there is a different understanding of what counts as a fallacy. Deductive arguments are supposed to be water-tight. For a deductive argument to be a good one (to be valid) it must be absolutely impossible for both its premises to be true and its conclusion to be false. With a good deductive argument, that simply cannot happen; the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion. The classic example of a deductively valid argument is: (1) All men are mortal. (2) Socrates is a man. Therefore: (3) Socrates is mortal. It is simply not possible that both (1) and (2) are true and (3) is false, so this argument is deductively valid. Any deductive argument that fails to meet this (very high) standard commits a logical error, and so, technically, is fallacious. This includes many arguments that we would usually accept as good arguments, arguments that make their conclusions highly probable, but not certain. Arguments of this kind, arguments that arent deductively valid, are said to commit a formal fallacy.

Informal Fallacies
Inductive arguments neednt be as rigorous as deductive arguments in order to be good arguments. Good inductive arguments lend support to their conclusions, but even if their premises are true then that doesnt establish with 100% certainty that their conclusions are true. Even a good inductive argument with true premises might have a false conclusion; that the argument is a good one and that its premises are true only establishes that its conclusion is probably true.

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All inductive arguments, even good ones, are therefore deductively invalid, and so fallacious in the strictest sense. The premises of an inductive argument do not, and are not intended to, entail the truth of the arguments conclusion, and so even the best inductive argument falls short of deductive validity. Because all inductive arguments are technically invalid, different terminology is needed to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments than is used to distinguish good and bad deductive arguments (else every inductive argument would be given the bad label: invalid). The terms most often used to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments are strong and weak. An example of a strong inductive argument would be: (1) Every day to date the law of gravity has held. Therefore: (2) The law of gravity will hold tomorrow. Arguments that fail to meet the standards required of inductive arguments commit fallacies in addition to formal fallacies. It is these informal fallacies that are most often described by guides to good thinking, and that are the primary concern of most critical thinking courses and of this site.

Missing the point

Definition: The premises of an argument do support a particular conclusionbut not the conclusion that the arguer actually draws. Example: "The seriousness of a punishment should match the seriousness of the crime. Right now, the punishment for drunk driving may simply be a fine. But drunk driving is a very serious crime that can kill innocent people. So the death penalty should be the punishment for drunk driving." The argument actually supports several conclusions"The punishment for drunk driving should be very serious," in particularbut it doesn't support the claim that the death penalty, specifically, is warranted.

Appeal to authority
Definition: Often we add strength to our arguments by referring to respected sources or authorities and explaining their positions on the issues we're discussing. If, however, we try to get readers to agree with us simply by impressing them with a famous name or by appealing to a supposed authority who really isn't much of an expert, we commit the fallacy of appeal to authority. Example: "We should abolish the death penalty. Many respected people, such as actor Guy Handsome, have publicly stated their opposition to it." While Guy Handsome may be an authority on matters having to do with acting, there's no particular reason why anyone should be moved by his political opinionshe is probably no more of an authority on the death penalty than the person writing the paper.

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Appeal to pity
Definition: The appeal to pity takes place when an arguer tries to get people to accept a conclusion by making them feel sorry for someone. Examples: "I know the exam is graded based on performance, but you should give me an A. My cat has been sick, my car broke down, and I've had a cold, so it was really hard for me to study!" The conclusion here is "You should give me an A." But the criteria for getting an A have to do with learning and applying the material from the course; the principle the arguer wants us to accept (people who have a hard week deserve A's) is clearly unacceptable. The information the arguer has given might feel relevant and might even get the audience to consider the conclusionbut the information isn't logically relevant, and so the argument is fallacious. Here's another example: "It's wrong to tax corporationsthink of all the money they give to charity, and of the costs they already pay to run their businesses!"

Appeal to ignorance
Definition: In the appeal to ignorance, the arguer basically says, "Look, there's no conclusive evidence on the issue at hand. Therefore, you should accept my conclusion on this issue." Example: "People have been trying for centuries to prove that God exists. But no one has yet been able to prove it. Therefore, God does not exist." Here's an opposing argument that commits the same fallacy: "People have been trying for years to prove that God does not exist. But no one has yet been able to prove it. Therefore, God exists." In each case, the arguer tries to use the lack of evidence as support for a positive claim about the truth of a conclusion. There is one situation in which doing this is not fallacious: If qualified researchers have used well-thought-out methods to search for something for a long time, they haven't found it, and it's the kind of thing people ought to be able to find, then the fact that they haven't found it constitutes some evidence that it doesn't exist.

Straw man
Definition: One way of making our own arguments stronger is to anticipate and respond in advance to the arguments that an opponent might make. In the straw man fallacy, the arguer sets up a wimpy version of the opponent's position and tries to score points by knocking it down. But just as being able to knock down a straw man, or a scarecrow, isn't very impressive, defeating a watered-down version of your opponents' argument isn't very impressive either. Example: "Feminists want to ban all pornography and punish everyone who reads it! But such harsh measures are surely inappropriate, so the feminists are wrong: porn and its readers should be left in peace." The feminist argument is made weak by being overstatedin fact, most feminists do not propose an outright "ban" on porn or any punishment for those who merely read it; often, they propose some restrictions on things like child porn, or propose to allow people who are hurt by porn to sue publishers and producers, not readers, for damages. So the arguer hasn't really scored any points; he or she has just committed a fallacy. Page | 12

Ad populum
Definition: The Latin name of this fallacy means "to the people." There are several versions of the ad populum fallacy, but what they all have in common is that in them, the arguer takes advantage of the desire most people have to be liked and to fit in with others and uses that desire to try to get the audience to accept his or her argument. One of the most common versions is the bandwagon fallacy, in which the arguer tries to convince the audience to do or believe something because everyone else (supposedly) does. Example: "Gay marriages are just immoral. 70% of Americans think so!" While the opinion of most Americans might be relevant in determining what laws we should have, it certainly doesn't determine what is moral or immoral: There was a time where a substantial number of Americans were in favor of segregation, but their opinion was not evidence that segregation was moral. The arguer is trying to get us to agree with the conclusion by appealing to our desire to fit in with other Americans.

Fallacies of Ambiguity With these fallacies some sort of ambiguity is introduced either in the premises or in the conclusion itself. This way, an apparently false idea can be made to appear true so long as the reader does not notice the problematic definitions.

Square of Opposition
The square of opposition is a chart that was introduced within classical (categorical) logic to represent the logical relationships holding between certain propositions in virtue of their form. The square, traditionally conceived, looks like this:

The four corners of this chart represent the four basic forms of propositions recognized in classical logic:
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A propositions, or universal affirmatives take the form: All S are P. E propositions, or universal negations take the form: No S are P. I propositions, or particular affirmatives take the form: Some S are P. O propositions, or particular negations take the form: Some S are not P. Given the assumption made within classical (Aristotelian) categorical logic, that every category contains at least one member, the following relationships, depicted on the square, hold: Firstly, A and O propositions are contradictory, as are E and I propositions. Propositions are contradictory when the truth of one implies the falsity of the other, and conversely. Here we see that the truth of a proposition of the form All S are P implies the falsity of the corresponding proposition of the form Some S are not P. For example, if the proposition all industrialists are capitalists (A) is true, then the proposition some industrialists are not capitalists (O) must be false. Similarly, if no mammals are aquatic (E) is false, then the proposition some mammals are aquatic must be true. Secondly, A and E propositions are contrary. Propositions are contrary when they cannot both be true. An A proposition, e.g., all giraffes have long necks cannot be true at the same time as the corresponding E proposition: no giraffes have long necks. Note, however, that corresponding A and E propositions, while contrary, are not contradictory. While they cannot both be true, they can both be false, as with the examples of all planets are gas giants and no planets are gas giants. Next, I and O propositions are subcontrary. Propositions are subcontrary when it is impossible for both to be false. Because some lunches are free is false, some lunches are not free must be true. Note, however, that it is possible for corresponding I and O propositions both to be true, as with some nations are democracies, and some nations are not democracies. Again, I and O propositions are subcontrary, but not contrary or contradictory. Lastly, two propositions are said to stand in the relation of subalternation when the truth of the first (the superaltern) implies the truth of the second (the subaltern), but not conversely. A propositions stand in the subalternation relation with the corresponding I propositions. The truth of the A proposition all plastics are synthetic, implies the truth of the proposition some plastics are synthetic. However, the truth of the O proposition some cars are not American-made products does not imply the truth of the E proposition no cars are American-made products. In traditional logic, the truth of an A or E proposition implies the truth of the corresponding I or O proposition, respectively. Consequently, the falsity of an I or O proposition implies the falsity of the corresponding A or E proposition, respectively. However, the truth of a particular proposition does not imply the truth of the corresponding

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universal proposition, nor does the falsity of an universal proposition carry downwards to the respective particular propositions. The presupposition, mentioned above, that all categories contain at least one thing, has been abandoned by most later logicians. Modern logic deals with instantiated terms such as unicorn and ether flow the same as it does other terms such as apple and orangutan. When dealing with empty categories, the relations of being contrary, being sub contrary and of sub alternation no longer hold. Consider, e.g., all unicorns have horns and no unicorns have horns. Within contemporary logic, these are both regarded as true, so strictly speaking, they cannot be contrary, despite the formers status as an A proposition and the latters status as an E proposition. Similarly, some unicorns have horns (I) and some unicorns do not have horns (O) are both regarded as false, and so they are not sub contrary. Obviously then, the truth of all unicorns have horns does not imply the truth of some unicorns have horns, and the sub alternation relation fails to hold as well. Without the traditional presuppositions of existential import, i.e., the supposition that all categories have at least one member, then only the contradictory relation holds. On what is sometimes called the modern square of opposition (as opposed to the traditional square of opposition sketched above) the lines for contraries, sub contraries and sub alternation are erased, leaving only the diagonal lines for the contradictory relation.

Further Immediate Inferences:

These logical relations are not part of the Square of Opposition. They involve changes to the subject and predicate classes. (The logical relations on the Square of Opposition always keep the same subject and predicate terms) A. Conversion: interchanging the subject and predicate terms of a categorical proposition (it is valid, or preserves the truth value) for the E and I propositions only) 1. Notice that the truth value is preserved for those statements with symmetrical distribution status: the E and I. 2. If an A or O proposition is converted, an undetermined truth value results. 3. The complete table for conversion is as follows. Note
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especially that we are not reversing the subject and predicate positions. Only the terms in the subject and predicate are interchanged. For this reason, it might be helpful to invent actual classes for S and P when you first study the relations.
If "All S is P" is given true, then "All P is S" is undetermined. If "All S is P" is given false, then "All P is S" is undetermined. If "No S is P" is given true, then "No P is S" is true. If "No S is P" is given false, then "No P is S" is false. If "Some S is P" is given true, then "Some P is S" is true. If "Some S is P" is given false, then "Some P is S is false. If "Some S is not P" is given true, then "Some P is not S" is undetermined. If "Some S is not P" is given false, then "Some P is not S" is undetermined.

4. Another way to remember that only the E and I statements preserve the truth value in conversion is to note that flipping the E and I Venn Diagrams over results in the same logical geography being displayed. I.e., their diagrams are symmetrical respectively.

B. Obversion: changing the quality and replacing the predicate term with its complementary class (valid, or preserves truth value for all propositions--the A, E, I, and O). 1. The complementary class is the class of everything not in the original class. E.g., the complementary class of "lightbulbs" is
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"non-lightbulbs." Usually, one just tacks on "non-" to obtain a complementary class. But note that the complementary class of "light bulbs" is not "nonlight bulbs." 2. Often, in English, certain prefixes indicate complementary classes. For example, "un-," "in-," "de-," "im-," "dis-" and others are sometimes so used. However, English being what it is, relying on the prefixes is risky. Consider "ravel" and "unravel" or "flammable" and "inflammable" or "imflammable." For this reason, it is usually safer to use the prefix "non-" in a kind of logical pseudo-English. 3. Often common sense requires thinking what the true complement of a class is to be. The complementary class of "objects to be admired" cannot be "non-objects to be admired." Sometimes, only the context of the argument yields a clue as to the complementary class. Be careful not to empty your classes-there are fundamental philosophical implications here. 4. The complete table for obversion is as follows.
If "All S is P" is given true, then "No S is non-P" is true. If "All S is P" is given false, then "No S is non-P" is false. If "No S is P" is given true, then "All S in non-P" is true. If "No S is P" is given false, then "All S is non-P" is false. If "Some S is P" is given true, then "Some S is not non-P" is true. If "Some S is P" is given false, then "Some S is not non-P" is false. If "Some S is not P" is given true, then "Some S is non-P" is true.

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If "Some S is not P" is given false, then "Some S is non-P" is false.

C. Contraposition: replacing the subject term by the complement of its predicate term and replace the predicate term by the complement of its subject term (valid, or preserves truth value only for the A and O propositions). 1. Notice that contraposition is the same thing as successive obversion, conversion, and obversion of a proposition. In effect, contraposition does these operations in one step. Compare the following two inferences. Statement 1. All S are P. 2. All non-P is non-S. Statement 1. All S are P. 2. No S are non-P. 3. No non-P is S. 4. All non-P is non-S. Reason given contraposition Reason given obversion conversion obversion Truth Value true true Truth Value true true true true

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2. It might be helpful to visualize this picture of the general operation of contraposition.

3. Again for contraposition, as for obversion, one has to be careful about describing the class complement for exactness.

4. The table for all the contrapositives is as follows.

If "All S is P" is given true, then "All non-P is non-S" is true.

If "All S is P" is given false, then "All non-P is non-S" is false.

If "No S is P" is given true, then "No non-P is non-S" is undetermined.

If "No S is P" is given false, then "No non-P is non-S" is undetermined.

If "Some S is P" is given true, then "Some non-P is non-S" is undetermined.

If "Some S is P" is given false, then "Some non-P is non-S" is undetermined.

If "Some S is not P" is given true, then "Some non-P is not non-S" is true.

If "Some S is not P" is given false, then "Some non-P is not non-S" is false.

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