Peter Warburton

United Kingdom Metals & Mining
Sector report
January 2006
Remonetisation of gold:
Start hoarding
We are raising our mid-cycle gold price estimate to
USD900/oz from USD750/oz and see the possibility of a spike
to USD2,000, or higher. Covert selling (via central bank lending)
has artificially depressed the price for a decade.
Central banks have 10–15k tonnes of gold less than their
officially reported reserves of 31k. This gold has been lent to
bullion banks and their counterparties and has already been sold
for jewellery, etc. Non-gold producers account for most and may
be unable to cover shorts without causing a spike in the gold price.
There is a supply deficit in the gold market of around 1,300
tonnes p.a. before any central bank selling and perhaps 700
tonnes p.a. after "official" sales, but before covert selling. This
compares with world gold mine output of only 2,500 tonnes p.a..
Some central banks, notably Russia, are starting to buy gold.
Gold acts as an early warning of potential crisis such as rising
inflationary/deflationary pressures and general confidence in
paper currency, especially the USD. A strongly rising gold price
could have severe consequences for US monetary policy and the
USD. History suggests that gold always wins against an inflating
paper currency (i.e. one subject to excessive supply growth).
Gold and gold mining stocks are poised for an unprecedented
rise in prices and profile. Investors in UK/European equities need
to assess the implications for their portfolios. Global/hedge funds
may be better placed to respond. Anglo American is the only large
cap gold/precious metals play domiciled in Europe.
Paul Mylchreest
Investment Analyst
+44 20 7621 5257
pmylchreest@cheuvreux.com
www.cheuvreux.com
CHEUVREUX UNITED KINGDOM
CONTENTS
Investment recommendation .......................................................................................... Page 03
I— Introduction and gold price forecast .............................................................. Page 06
II— Anglo American & gold mining stocks........................................................... Page 09
III— Gold: central banks and derivatives ............................................................... Page 12

Introduction .............................................................................................................................................................................................. P.12
IV— Analysis of the gold market .................................................................................. Page 16

Exposing gold price suppression................................................................................................................................................ P.16
How big is the gold short position? ........................................................................................................................................... P.21
"Official" statistics on the gold market .................................................................................................................................... P.26
Gold mining industry ........................................................................................................................................................................... P.30
V— Gold versus the US dollar: only one winner ............................................... Page 33

History tells us gold, not paper, is "real money" ............................................................................................................... P.33
What drives the gold price?............................................................................................................................................................ P.36
VI— Gold and the US economy ................................................................................... Page 40

Gold and Bernanke .............................................................................................................................................................................. P.43
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................................. Page 46

End of Bretton Woods & last remnants of Gold Standard........................................................................................... P.46
Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................................. Page 47

The covert war on inflation indicators ...................................................................................................................................... P.47
CHEUVREUX'S METALS & MINING TEAM

Alfred Glaser France +33 1 41 89 74 42 aglaser@cheuvreux.com
Mikael Jafs Nordic +46 8 723 51 71 mjafs@cheuvreux.com
Paul Mylchreest Author UK +44.20 7621.52.57 pmylchreest@cheuvreux.com
Francisco Riquel Spain +34 91 432 75 51 friquel@cheuvreux.com
Metals & Mining Sector 2

INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION
Strategically, gold is one of the two most important commodities (with crude oil) on the planet, but its role as the
ultimate store of value and method of payment has been forgotten by many investors. The perception of gold has
been affected by the last remnants of a Gold Standard being as long ago as 1971, a 20-year bear market and persistent
central bank selling. In a scenario of financial stability and fiscal prudence, gold's monetary role retreats into the
background, but even then it never goes away. In today's world of massive deficit spending, inflating currencies (i.e.
excessive growth in the money supply) and financial imbalances, gold's monetary role is reasserting itself.
Investment demand for gold is increasing and the remonetisation of gold has begun.
We are raising our mid-cycle gold price estimate from USD750/oz to USD900/oz. Covert selling (via central bank
lending) of gold has artificially depressed the price for about a decade, but Bank for International Settlements' data
on gold derivatives suggests its impact is on the wane. Our USD900/oz mid-cycle estimate takes into account the
long-term average ratios between the gold price and the prices of oil and the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We also see
the possibility of a spike to USD2,000, or higher, if the story on diminished central bank gold reserves becomes widely
accepted, if central banks in countries with large US dollar holdings compete to buy gold and diversify forex reserves away
from dollars and if the US economy slides into either high rates of inflation or deflation.
Central banks have loaned out 10,000–15,000 tonnes of their gold reserves, between a third and a half of the
reported total. Gold loaned by central banks to bullion banks or their counterparties is immediately sold into the physical
market for conversion into jewellery, etc. This creates a short position between the central bank and the bullion bank/its
counterparty. This short position is the foundation for the gold derivatives market which grew rapidly in the 1990s and
currently has a notional value of c.USD300bn. Non-gold producers account for the majority of the short position and may
not be able to cover their shorts without causing a spike in the gold price.
Since the mid-1990s, much of this gold lending has been aimed at suppressing the gold price. A low gold price has served
to:
− calm financial markets during several periods of financial crisis in the last decade (e.g. Japan, Asian currency
crisis, Russia and LTCM);
− improve the perception of US monetary policy; a low gold price suggests a benign inflation outlook, keeps US
interest rates low and is supportive of a stronger US dollar;
− prevent substantial losses in the gold derivatives market (notably from the gold "carry trade").
The leader in the fight to expose the suppression of the gold price is the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee (GATA).
GATA was established in 1999 in the US, but is little known outside the world of "gold bugs". Despite official denials, there
is much evidence to back the gold price suppression claims. Support for GATA has come from senior Russian officials.
Our analysis confirms the view that central banks have loaned out 10,000-15,000 tonnes of gold, although the settlement
of some of these lease contracts may be being made in cash rather than physical gold.
We estimate that there is a substantial supply deficit in the gold market of around 1,300 tonnes p.a. before any central
bank selling and perhaps 700 tonnes p.a. after the publicly announced sales, but before covert selling. This compares with
world gold mine output of only 2,500 p.a. Unlike their unlimited ability to create paper money, central banks' gold reserves
are finite and the 7-10 year lead time on new mining projects rules out any quick fix. In addition, there is no way that the
market can accommodate renewed buying by central banks like Russia.
The gold price acts as an early warning of potential crisis, such as rising inflationary/deflationary pressures and
general confidence in paper currency, especially the US dollar:
− Historically low real yields and accelerating growth in the money supply (currently 8%) suggest that the Fed's
monetary tightening is largely illusory. Indeed, while the Fed Funds has been hiked 325bp, the 10-year bond
yield has declined by 7bp.

− The result of the accommodative policy has been asset and commodity price inflation almost across the board.
As new money supply enters the system the transmission mechanism is not uniform. Originating in the bond
market, new money chases price inflation as it moves from one asset class to another while remaining largely
contained in the financial and commodity sectors. Purchasing power of paper currency is falling sharply in relation
to a wide range of asset classes.
− The impact of rapid money supply growth on the prices of consumer goods is masked by cheap Asian imports
and distortions in the calculation of the CPI.
− While asset inflation rages, the debt-laden US economy remains vulnerable to recession (possibly even a
deflationary slump) if credit expansion and consumer expenditure slow. The yield curve is close to inverting and
consumer credit is growing at its slowest rate for more than a decade. It is worth remembering the economist,
Ludwig von Mises's (Austrian school), warning: "There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought
about by credit expansion".
− The Fed Chairman-elect, Ben Bernanke, has given many speeches on the means to stave off deflation, even if it
requires highly inflationary measures. Our suspicion is that Bernanke will try to keep the US credit expansion going
as long as possible, with the inevitable consequences.
− The US economy will walk a fine line between inflation (possibly hyperinflation) and a deflationary slump in the
next few years. In the short term, we see further reinflation with continuing asset inflation as slightly more
likely. Even if the US economy somehow muddles through, the short position in gold, central bank buying and low
real yields will support the gold price.
Gold and precious metals are the only asset class that should perform well in either an inflationary or deflationary
scenario.
The only European-domiciled "large cap" play on gold and precious metals is Anglo American, which controls the
third largest gold producer (51% stake in AngloGold Ashanti) and the largest platinum producer (75% holding in Anglo
Platinum). AngloGold Ashanti (AGA) is not perfect play on the gold price, given the unfavourable position of its hedge book.
That said, it should still be a major beneficiary of a strong gold price. Developing its gold and platinum group metals
positions would seem to make more sense than reducing its AGA stake as recently outlined. We are concerned that Anglo
may give up control of the third largest gold producer without even extracting a premium. To us, it does not make sense
for Anglo to be a "poor man's Rio Tinto or BHP Billiton". Instead, we believe it should focus on its strong positions in gold,
platinum group metals and diamonds, while also maintaining a solid portfolio of other mining activities.
Gold and gold mining stocks are poised for an unprecedented rise in prices and profile. Investors in European and
UK equities need to assess the implications for their portfolios. Global and hedge funds may be better placed to
respond since they can purchase overseas-listed gold and precious metal stocks, exchange-traded funds (ETFs) based on
gold, or gold bullion itself. The largest "pure play" gold company in Europe, Peter Hambro, has a market capitalisation of
just USD1.5bn. Even investors who are able to invest in overseas stocks may be surprised to find that the market
capitalisation of the 10 largest gold stocks on world stock markets is equivalent to only 30% and 40% of the market
capitalisations of GE and BP respectively.

Gold price 1998-2006 (USD) Gold/oil ratio

GOLD B LN /OILB RE N
40 FROM 1/1/82 T O 24/1/06 MONT HLY
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 20042006
DowJones Industrials/gold ratio US M3 money supply diverges from CPI

D J IN D U S /GOLDB LN ~U $ U S M3 ....B 24/1/06
45 FROM 1/1/72 T O 24/1/06 MONT HLY 300
40
35 250
30
200
25
20
150
15
10
100
5
80
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
US MONE Y SUP P LY M3 CURA
0 US CPI - A LL URBA N: ALL IT E MS SA DJ
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 S ourc e: DA T A S T RE A M
Gibson's Paradox: real yield (US 10 year bond – CPI) is inversely correlated to the gold price
FR TC M1 0 -U S E B MC P I % 3 1/1/06
10 1 00
8 2 00
6 3 00
4 4 00
2 5 00
0 6 00
-2 7 00
-4 8 00
-6 9 00
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
FRT CM1 0-US E B MCP I%
Go l d B u l l i o n $ /T ro y Oun c e(R.H.S CA L E )
S DA T A S T RE A M
Source: Datastream

I— INTRODUCTION AND GOLD PRICE FORECAST
Gold prices: bullish Since we first published a mid-cycle gold price forecast of USD750/oz in October
trend now looks well 2005, the gold price has risen from USD467/oz to USD557/oz, a rise of 19%. To some
established… extent, the rapidity of this move has taken us by surprise as we expected the bull
market in gold to progress at a more measured pace. It is also interesting that during
this period the US dollar has remained very stable, weakening by less than 50bp
versus the euro. The following chart shows how the bullish trend in the gold price is
now well-established.
Gold price since 1998 (USD)
Gold Bullion $ /Tr oy Ounce

550 FROM 1/1/98 T O 10/1/06 WEEKLY
500
450
400
350
300
250
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
HIGH 527.50 5/ 1/06 LOW 253.25 26/ 8/99 LAST 527.50

Sourc e: DAT A ST REAM
Source: Datastream
… with several Several reasons for the strength in the gold price have been put forward. These have
explanations included:
advanced for this…
− rising inflation concerns;
− the change of Fed Chairman;
− rising geopolitical risk;
− rising commodity prices in general; and
− fears over dollar weakness (as yet unfounded).
… all of which miss While all these issues have contributed at various times, we believe they are missing a
the real story, in our key issue driving the gold market. The central banks have sold up to half their gold
view reserves and seem increasingly reluctant to part with more. "Official" demand
estimates for the gold market understate the true position, in our view. At the same
time, major holders of US Treasuries, such as Russia and China, are beginning to
diversify their forex reserves out of US dollars and are buying gold as part of this
process.

In updating our mid-cycle forecast for the gold price we have considered the following:
− The recent price strength reflects a "catch-up" as strong jewellery demand and
growing investment demand (especially from central banks like Russia) overwhelms
efforts to suppress the price.
− The long-term average in the Gold/Oil (Brent) ratio has been around 16x, but is
currently only 8.6x. The argument that oil has experienced a structural price
increase due to the difficulty in finding new reserves could equally apply to gold as
production flattens off and reserve lives deteriorate. In addition, empirical evidence
shows that gold maintains its purchasing power versus other commodities over
time. Looking at the forward curve for oil, the market is assuming a Brent crude
price in excess of USD60/bbl three years out. A 16x multiple on a Brent crude price
of USD60/bbl would give a gold price of USD960/bbl.
Gold/Oil ratio (Brent crude)

GOLDBLN/OILBRE N
40 FROM 1/1/82 T O 10/1/06 MONT HLY
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 20042006
Source: Datastream
− The Dow Jones Industrial Average/gold ratio compares the performance of paper
financial assets, in this case equities, with gold (the ultimate store of value).
Equities outperformed gold for 20 years until 2000, but this has been moving
sharply in reverse. At its peak in 2000, the Dow Jones traded at more than 40x
the gold price. At the bottom of the two major credit cycles in the last 100 years,
in 1933 and 1980, the Dow/Gold ratio fell to only 1–2x. Since the collapse of
Bretton Woods in late 1971, the Dow/Gold ratio has averaged c.12.5x. Applying
this ratio to the Dow's current level of 10,688 would suggest a gold price of about
USD850.

Dow Jones Industrials/Gold ratio
DJ INDUS /GOLDBLN~U$
45 FROM 1/1/71 T O 10/1/06 MONT HLY
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
0
71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05
Source: Datastream
We have taken the average of the prices suggested by the long-term Gold/Oil ratio
and Dow/Gold ratio to give an estimate for the mid-cycle price of gold of USD900/oz.
At this point, we are assuming that this price is reached by 2008 in fairly steady
increments, although the reality may be very different. Our price deck for 2006 through
to 2010 (mid-cycle) is as follows.
Gold price forecast
(USD/oz) 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E 2010E

mid-cyc
Gold 445.3 625 700 800 900 900
Source: Cheuvreux
We also believe that there is a reasonable chance that we could see the gold price
spike up much further, possibly to USD2,000/oz or even higher. This could occur if the
following scenarios materialise:
− The consensus in the gold market starts to believe, as we do, that central banks
have far less gold in their vaults than they say and traders start to trade against
the short position in the gold market.
− The central banks with large holding of US dollar reserves, like Russia and China,
compete to buy gold as they diversify their foreign exchange reserves away from
the US dollar.
− The US economy enters a phase of either deflation or rapidly rising inflation

(hyperinflation?) and confidence in paper currencies in general declines.

II— ANGLO AMERICAN & GOLD MINING STOCKS
Anglo American (2157p) Mining - 30 January 2006
Rating: 2/Outperform/Buy - Target price: +15.9% 2500p Paul Mylchreest
To 31/12 (USD) 2004 2005E 2006E 2007E

Sales (m) 31795.0 36246.0 39145.0 40320.0
Net att. profit, rest. (m) 2689.0 3979.0 4381.0 4460.0 2225.0
Free cash flow (m) 1683.0 3217.0 2686.0 3335.0 2025.0
EBITDA margin (%) 20.8 24.4 25.4 25.2
1825.0
Clean EPS 188.0 255..0 290.0 295.0
Reported EPS 203.0 259.0 290.0 290.0 1625.0
P/E (x) 20.3 15.0 13.2 12.9 1425.0
Attrib. FCF yield (%) 2.9 5.6 4.7 5.8
1225.0
EV/EBITDA (x) 9.8 7.3 6.5 6.4
EV/EBIT (x) 14.5 10.1 8.7 8.5 1025.0
ROCE (%) 16.0 17.1 17.4 16.4 825.0
ROE (%) 15.6 13.2 12.6 11.3
625.0
P/BV (x) 1.6 2.2 2.3 2.3
01/01 08/01 04/02 11/02 07/03 02/04 10/04 06/05 01/06
Net debt/EBITDA (x) 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.4
Net dividend 70.0 92.0 98.0 98.0 mêáÅÉ mêáÅÉLcqpbJ^=^ii=pe^ob
Yield (%) 1.8 2.4 2.6 2.6
Market capitalisation USD54375m FTSE ALL-SHARE 2936.58 1 month 3 months 12 months

No. of shares, adjusted 14.2m Reuters AAL.L Absolute perf. 9.4% 32.6% 76.3%
Daily volume USD30104.21m Bloomberg AAL LN Relative perf. 6.1% 17.8% 45.9%
Large cap play on gold and precious metals

We are positive on Anglo American for four reasons:
− Anglo American has a unique exposure to the precious metals and diamonds
sector among the large European-based miners. Significant price strength in
gold, platinum and diamonds provides potential for earnings upgrades and will
enhance the disposal value of AngloGold Ashanti should management pursue its
intention to reduce its stake.
− The restructuring programme announced in late 2005 will begin in earnest

during 2006. Mondi and Highveld Steel have been targeted for divestment, the
51% holding in AngloGold Ashanti may be reduced and the underperforming
parts of Tarmac will either be "fixed" or sold.
− A more aggressive policy on returning surplus capital to shareholders also

augurs well for value creation. The USD1bn by the end of 2006 is just the tip of
the iceberg, in our view.
− Anglo American is vulnerable to takeover with its financial performance lagging

that of its peers and management reversing the diversification strategy of recent
years.
Anglo American's strategic direction

Only European large Anglo American is the only European domiciled, "large cap play" on gold and precious
cap play on gold and metals. Anglo controls 51% of AngloGold Ashanti (AGA), the world's third largest
precious metals producer, following the Barrick/Placer Dome deal. Besides AGA, Anglo American also
owns 74.9% of the world's leading platinum producer, Anglo Platinum (AP). The stakes
in AGA and AP are currently valued at USD8.2bn and USD12.7bn, respectively. This
amounts to 14% and 22% of Anglo American's overall market capitalisation of
USD57.8bn.

Restructuring In October 2005, Anglo American announced some preliminary details of its
plans… restructuring programme. This puts an end to the diversification strategy that Anglo
has pursued for many years that led it to purchasing the Tarmac aggregates business
and investing heavily in the Mondi paper and packaging business.
… include proposed As well as selling Mondi and some underperfoming parts of Tarmac, Anglo has
disposal of AGA announced that it will reduce its 51% holding in AGA. The extent and timing of this
reduction is uncertain although Anglo has indicated that it will retain a shareholding.
According to Anglo American's management, the rationale for the sale of AGA is that
its value is not fully reflected in the Anglo American valuation.
AGA: not a perfect We should note here that while we are very bullish on the prospects for gold mining
gold mining play due shares, we would caution that AGA is not the perfect gold mining play as a result of its
to hedging… hedging programme. AGA has hedged about 10.5m oz of gold production at an
average price of USD330–340/oz. This is equivalent to 1.7 years of annual production.
AGA is, therefore, not in a position to fully benefit from the coming rise in the price of
gold.
… but should still While the mark-to-market on AGA's hedge book is substantial (we estimate about
benefit from rising USD2.2bn at a gold price of USD550/oz), AGA should still be a major beneficiary of a
gold prices rising gold price although the hedge book will act as a drag on earnings over the next
decade. That said, much of this has already been discounted in the share price and
this is obvious from its roughly USD9.0bn (35%) lower enterprise value compared with
non-hedger, Newmont Mining. In terms of financial metrics, AGA is an inferior
company to Newmont Mining but much of the difference in enterprise value does
reflect AGA's hedge book. By way of comparison, Newmont had gold production of
about 6.5m oz in 2005 versus 6.0m for AGA. Newmont's cash costs are also around
USD30/oz below AGA's, although they had similar reserve lives at end-2004.
We think retaining AGA We believe that if Anglo's management was patient, the value of AGA would be an
would ultimately boost important driver for its share price in the context of a surging gold price. From our
Anglo's share price… conversations with the company, we are concerned that in deciding to reduce its
holding in AGA, Anglo American's board of directors may be to be responding to ill-
informed shareholder pressure. Gold is one of the two most strategically important
commodities on the planet and Anglo American has a controlling interest in the third
largest producer. Not only is it planning to cut its holding, but it seems prepared to
give up its control of AGA for no premium. This is not sound financial thinking.
… and selling it In our opinion, the new strategy being pursued by Anglo is flawed with regard to AGA.
would be a mistake In comparison with two its major peers, Anglo lacks the substantial iron ore presence
of both Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton. Iron ore is a highly profitable commodity, especially
after the 71.5% price increase negotiated with steel producers from April 2005.
Kumba, Anglo's iron ore business, only has about 30m tonnes of iron ore production
compared with 126m tonnes for Rio Tinto and 100m tonnes for BHP Billiton. There is
little that the company can do to reverse this portfolio weakness given that Brazilian
company CVRD, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton together control 70% of the seaborne iron
ore market. That said, profitability in the iron ore industry will sharply deteriorate when
the global economic cycle finally turns down.
In our view, Anglo should develop both its gold and platinum group metals businesses,
rather than disposing of its AGA stake. This could involve raising its shareholdings in
both AngloGold Ashanti and Anglo Platinum and acquiring junior gold and platinum
companies with good exploration prospects. In essence, Anglo should not try to be a
"poor man's Rio Tinto or BHP Billiton". Instead, it should focus on its strong positions
in gold, platinum group metals and diamonds, while also maintaining a solid portfolio
of other mining activities such as copper, iron ore, coal and nickel.

Gold mining stocks: overview

Gold mining coming After many years in the shadows of the investment world, the gold mining industry is
in from the cold poised for a stellar rise in profitability and profile. Unwittingly, the industry is about to
find itself increasingly pushed into the spotlight at the centre of the global financial
system and US monetary policy. Gold acts as the early warning system for detecting
financial crises, inflationary pressures and declining confidence in fiat currency,
especially the US dollar.
On a worldwide basis, the quoted gold mining sector is tiny in the context of world
stock markets. For example, the largest quoted mining stock by far is Newmont
Mining Corporation with a market capitalisation of USD26.7bn although the pending
takeover of Placer Dome by Barrick will create a similar-sized company. Newmont is
also the only gold mining company in the S&P500 Index. The ten largest pure gold
plays in the XAU Index (Philadelphia Stock Exchange Gold and Silver Index) and their
respective market capitalisations are shown in the table below:
Top 10 gold mining stocks: market capitalisation (USD bn)
Company Market cap

Newmont 25.561
AngloGold Ashanti 15.198
Barrick 16.147
Placer Dome 10.550
Gold Fields Ltd. 10.271
Goldcorp 8.857
Harmony 6.372
Glamis Gold 3.713
Kinross Gold 3.712
Meridian Gold 2.537
Total 102.918
Source: Reuters
Top 10 gold plays The total market capitalisation of the world's ten largest gold plays is just USD103bn.
have market cap of This is equivalent to only 30% of the market capitalisation of General Electric, or 42%
just USD103bn of the market capitalisation of the British oil major BP.
UK and European focused portfolio managers seem poorly placed since there are no
large cap "pure plays" on gold domiciled in Europe. The largest, with a market
capitalisation above the USD1.7bn, is Peter Hambro. There is a string of small and
AIM-listed UK gold stocks, but the liquidity of these shares is minimal. One UK-
focused portfolio manager we spoke to is able to purchase Newmont Mining for his
fund, but he seems to be the exception.
Global funds and hedge funds may be better placed to respond to a strongly rising
gold price since they can purchase non-European listed gold and precious metal
stocks, exchange traded funds (ETFs) based on gold and, in some cases, gold bullion
itself.

III— GOLD: CENTRAL BANKS AND DERIVATIVES
Introduction
What is the truth The starting point for the real story on gold is the quantity of gold held by central
about central bank banks and the financial derivatives related to part of this gold. According to the IMF,
reserves and related the official figure for gold held by central banks in their vaults is 31,000 tonnes, but the
derivatives? reality is much lower, as we will explain.
The table below shows the top twenty official holders of gold reserves and the
percentage of their reserves held in gold in September 2005. Unsurprisingly, most of
the largest holders are the major industrialised nations such as the US, Germany and
France, etc, as well as the IMF and ECB. The UK has slipped well down the list, but its
role in the gold price suppression has been important, as we will show.
Central banks: officially reported gold holdings
Rank Country/entity tonnes at Sep-05 Gold as % of reserves

1 US 8 134 68%
2 Germany 3 428 52%
3 IMF 3 217 n/a
4 France 2 857 59%
5 Italy 2 452 59%
6 Switzerland 1 290 35%
7 Japan 765 1%
8 ECB 720 n/a
9 Netherlands 717 52%
10 China 600 1%
11 Spain 473 43%
12 Taiwan 423 3%
13 Portugal 408 58%
14 Russia 387 4%
15 India 358 4%
16 Venezuela 357 18%
17 UK 311 10%
18 Austria 308 37%
19 Lebanon 287 29%
20 Belgium 228 27%
35 Australia 80 3%
79 Canada 3 0%
Source: World Gold Council
Trouble started in The origin of today's problems in the gold market date back to the 1980s when central
1980s, when central banks began to lend or deposit part of their gold holdings with leading bullion banks
banks started to (such as JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, Citibank, etc) in return for a fee, the gold
lend and sell… lease rate, typically about 1-2% p.a then (currently about 0.2%). This was seen as a
sensible use for an asset that otherwise earned no income for central banks. The gold
lent by central banks was additional to the well publicised "official" selling by many of
them, including the UK, Switzerland, Netherlands, Australia, Canada, etc.
… leading to price From the mid 1990s onwards, however, the nature of much of the central bank gold
suppression in the lending and sales changed. By lending and selling gold, central banks were able to
mid 1990s depress the gold price. The suppression of the gold price served three main purposes:

− It helped to calm financial markets at times of actual or feared

economic/political crisis. For example, the Japanese economic crisis in the mid-
1990s, the Asian financial crisis, Russian debt default and the collapse of LTCM in
1998 and the 9/11 attack.
− It is positive for the perception of US monetary policy. A low gold price

suggests that US inflation is under control and is therefore supportive of a
stronger USD and lower nominal interest rates.
− It prevented major commercial and investment banks incurring substantial

losses from the "gold carry trade" in the face of a rising gold price.
Bullion banks borrow Central bank lending dramatically increased liquidity in the gold market which is
from central banks, created when the bullion banks, which act as intermediaries and have no direct use for
sell into physical the metal, sell the gold borrowed from the central bank into the physical market. The
market… gold itself is then most likely to be turned into jewellery. This gold sale is the starting
point for a number of transactions, generally involving derivatives, at the centre of
which are the bullion banks.
… leading to a host of Having sold the gold borrowed from the central bank, the bullion bank can reinvest the
further transactions proceeds from the spot gold sale in other markets, e.g. the bond market in a "carry
(mostly derivatives) trade". A "carry trade" is where an asset carrying a low yield is sold short and the
proceeds reinvested in a higher-yielding asset. This can be very profitable, but only as
long as the price of the lower-yielding asset doesn't rise. Given the very low cost of
leasing gold, it is a very cheap source of finance. With low lease rates and the gold
price expected to remain weak, hedge funds and the proprietary trading desks of
banks saw huge profit potential in the 1990s. The gold carry trade gathered pace
through this period, but when the price started to rise, the bullion banks and their
counterparties had built up substantial short positions and were "caught".
If the bullion bank chooses not to hedge the gold price risk, there will be no associated
derivative other than a simple swap with the central bank. Gold derivatives arise if the
bullion bank hedges the gold price risk by buying, for example, a long position in the
forward market. On the other side of the bullion banks forward purchase could be a
gold producer hedging future production or a speculator (hedge fund, bank, etc) that
wants to short the gold market. All market participants are also able to adjust their risk
positions through buying and selling gold options.
When bullion banks enter into derivatives transactions with non-producers, or if the
bullion bank itself is unhedged on a gold carry trade, the ultimate source of gold for
repayment to the central bank has to be the physical gold market. The parties short of
gold are then exposed to upside in the gold price.
Central banks' gold The gold-lending policies of central banks distort the supply and demand picture for the
lending practices gold market. Gold borrowed from central banks and sold into the spot market has the
distort gold market effect of increasing supply in the short term and depressing the gold price. Many
commentators seem relaxed, believing that almost all the gold lent by the central banks
is used to cover the forward selling of production by gold producers. This is the
assumption made by the World Gold Council in its "official" estimates of gold supply and
demand. Even if this were true, which it isn't, we are less sanguine. Since forward selling
by producers accelerates supply, the delivery of the gold back to central banks will
therefore restrict supply in the future. If gold demand is rising and producers are
reducing forward selling at the same time, as is currently the case, the deficit in the gold
market will become more exaggerated (we analyse the deficit in gold supply below).

Gold derivatives can In a report entitled Gold Derivatives: The Market View by Jessica Cross (August 2000)
be swaps, forwards and commissioned by the World Gold Council, the author divides the gold derivatives
or options market into swaps, forwards and options. She identifies seven types of derivatives in
the "forwards" category: fixed, floating gold rate, floating, spot deferred, participating,
Seven types of advance premium and short-term averaging. For each of these forward contracts, she
forwards estimates the negative impact on the gold price of setting up the respective derivative.
identified… For every one of the forwards, she classes the impact as:
"100% – the executing bank borrows the equivalent amount of gold and sells it
immediately into the market".
This confirms that forward derivatives contracts create short positions relating to
central bank gold and that these sales fully impact the spot gold price in a negative
manner.
… and six types of In the "options" category, Ms Cross identifies six types: put, call, cap and collar, up
options and in, down and out and convertible forward. When an option contract is set up, the
initial impact on the gold price is less clear so we have summarised Ms Cross's
findings for each category:
− Call: widely used by the miners and "some central banks" to earn premium. Calls
written by hedger are left naked. Ms Cross states that "the hedger (especially the
central banks) may be willing to deliver against the calls should they be
exercised". The buyer (bullion bank) is initially a seller depending on the delta.
− Put/cap and collar/convertible forward: widely used by the mining industry for
downside protection to the gold price. The buyers will tend not to delta hedge.
The writer (bullion bank) will delta hedge and is initially a seller.
− Up and in/down and out: these are of little use to the mining industry and are
more for speculation. The options (puts or calls) are triggered if a price level is
broken at any stage of the contract term. The bullion bank is initially a delta hedge
seller.
Central banks believed It is not obvious from the above that central bank gold is initially required to provide
to be writing calls liquidity in order to generate these options although delta hedging by the bullion banks
against their gold does involve buying and selling gold. It is interesting, however, that Ms Cross believes
that central banks do write calls against their gold. While having no impact when the
option is created, if it is subsequently exercised, the central bank will have to deliver
physical gold. This suggests that central banks are at risk of losing gold over and
above the level implied solely by the forwards/swaps (we incorporate this into our
analysis of the short position in the gold market below).
Gold derivatives It is clear from the above that the foundation of liquidity in the gold derivatives
liquidity based on market is the short position created by central bank lending. The net position of all
short position the longs and shorts in the derivative market, including all forwards, swaps and
created by central options, must balance out. Between the bullion banks/their counterparties and the
bank lending central banks, however, there is a short position which is the basis for the liquidity.
This short position is held by the bullion banks and/or their counterparties.
The above-mentioned report, Gold Derivatives: The Market View, Ms Cross states
"The growth of the derivatives market has been made possible by the existence of
large stocks of gold, largely in the official sector… The future stability of the derivatives
market depends on the continuing readiness of the official sector to lend its gold."
This suggests a relationship between the size of the derivatives market and the level of
gold lending.

Gold derivatives: total notional value 1998-2005 (USD bn)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
06/98 12/98 06/99 12/99 06/00 12/00 06/01 12/01 06/02 12/02 06/03 12/03 06/04 12/04 06/05
Source: BIS
How big is this short The key question is how big is that short position and we discuss this in detail below.
position? Ms Cross's report then issues a stark warning about the dangers of central banks
calling in their gold loans.
"If a number of central banks decide to withdraw their gold from the market, it would
cause a serious squeeze. Lease rates and spot prices would rise sharply as borrowers
tried to repay their loans….(causing) substantial losses to producers who have sold
gold forward…to fabricators and distributors, and to commercial banks."
In short, this describes a potential gold derivatives banking crisis as outlined by the
Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee, which we describe in the next section.
Short position From a risk perspective, the short position is generally held either by the bullion bank
generally held by or its counterparty, i.e. the gold producer or speculator, which will need to deliver gold
bullion bank or its to the central bank at a later date. In normal circumstances, the short gold position
counterparty held by non-gold producers can only be covered by buying in the physical market. The
vast majority of gold bullion that is sold short is converted into jewellery and is not in
an immediately accessible form for the bullion banks or their counterparties to return
to the central banks. While there is a steady supply of gold scrap, this is about 20–
25% of current gold supply and the propensity of the world's female population to
cash in their gold jewellery in the face of a rising gold price is, to say the least,
questionable. In the mid-late 1990s, however, when almost every central bank seemed
to be a seller of gold, the need to hedge upside risk in the gold price may not always
have been a priority for banks and hedge funds.

IV— ANALYSIS OF THE GOLD MARKET
Exposing gold price suppression

The leader in the fight to expose suppression of the gold price is the Gold Anti-Trust
GATA: fighting
Action Committee (GATA). GATA was created in January 1999 as a non-profit
suppression of the
Delaware-based corporation and consists of a range of gold market participants. The
gold price
GATA website can be found at www.gata.org and the GATA Chairman's gold website is
www.lemetropolecafe.com. While many so-called "gold bugs" are aware of GATA, most
equity and other financial market participants (especially in Europe) are not.
GATA presented a report, Gold Derivative Banking Crisis, to the Speaker of the House
and every member of the House and Senate Banking Committees in 2000. This outlined
the suppression of the gold price and the related risks to the financial system. In
addition, manipulating a free market like gold is illegal under US law and contravenes the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Questions on gold price suppression were asked of Alan
Greenspan and US Treasury officials and received denials of any wrongdoing. Two
lawsuits have been filed. One was dismissed on a legal technicality and the other has
gone to discovery and continues.
High profile support for GATA has come from Russia. One source, although his
comments were carefully worded, was Oleg Mozhaiskov, Deputy Chairman of the
Bank of Russia, in a speech to the LBMA in June 2004. He said:
"Many have heard of the group of economists who came together in the society known
as the Gold Anti-Trust Action Committee… They believe that with the assistance of a
number of major financial institutions…some senior officials have been manipulating
the market since 1994… As a result, the price dropped below USD300 an ounce at a
time when it should, if it had kept up with inflation, have reached USD740-760. I prefer
not to comment on this information but dare assume that the specific facts included in
the lawsuits might have given ground to suspicion that the real forces acting on the
gold market are far from those of classic textbook that explain to students how prices
are born in a free market."
Russian interest in GATA views was confirmed with the attendance of Andrey Bykov at
the GATA conference, "Gold Rush 21", on 8-9 August 2005 in the Yukon, Canada.
Andrey Bykov is President of the Academic Center for Strategic Partnership and
Energy Security in Moscow and is an economic adviser to Vladamir Putin.
Suppression may have GATA argues that the suppression of the gold price may have begun with the
been triggered by Japanese deflation crisis which pushed the gold price over the USD400/oz level in
Japanese deflation early 1996.
crisis in 1996

Gold price and Japanese crisis 1995-96 (USD/oz)

420 FROM 30/6/95 T O 28/6/96 DA ILY
415
410
405
400
395
390
385
380
375
J UN J UL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC J AN FEB MAR APR MAY J UN
HIGH 415.40 2/ 2/96 LOW 379.25 5/ 9/95 LAST 382.25

Source: Datastream
Major bullion banks which had put on the gold carry trade (perhaps 5,000 tonnes at
the time) had no way of covering their short positions without causing the gold price to
spike, exacerbating their losses. If true, the "powers that be" presumably saw the
operation as a success, having saved various banks and prevented the meltdown of
the Japanese financial system (with the potential liquidation of its huge portfolio of US
bonds).
Gold price movements Gold market followers became suspicious when movements in the gold price seemed
"at odds with events" at odds with events. James Turk (founder of the GoldMoney newsletter), explained:
"By early 1997, I sensed that we faced something that could not be explained by
normal market forces… after a much higher than expected inflation number was
released… prices reversed sharply in an unusual and abrupt change of trend. I said: "It
appeared that some powerful force had entered the market".
GATA saw two The major catalysts which sparked GATA's belief that the gold price was being were
major catalysts:… twofold:
… LTCM… − The bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), whose collapse in
September 1998, following the Russian debt default, threatened the global
banking system. There were strong rumours that LTCM was short of 300 tonnes
of gold when it crashed at the end of 1998 (equivalent to USD2.9bn then). This
short position is thought to have been assumed by the banks involved in the
bailout operation.

… and BoE's gold − The handling of the Bank of England's announcement in May 1999 that it
sale announcement would sell 415 tonnes of gold. In GATA's view this was a political decision to
keep the gold price below USD300oz at the time. The public announcement of
the sale seemed to ensure the UK would achieve the lowest possible price rather
than the highest. In fact, the price subsequently collapsed to USD252/oz and the
first sale of 25 tonnes was made at a price of USD261.20/oz, or USD26/oz below
the price at the time of the announcement. Unlike the case of major European
central banks, the UK's gold reserves are ultimately controlled by HM Treasury,
i.e. politicians not the Bank of England. The Bank of England's action followed the
failure of the US (in a high profile campaign by Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin
and supported by the UK Government) to achieve IMF gold sales (officially to fund
debt-relief for developing countries and actually opposed by many of them).
We believe the BoE's From the UK's standpoint, the handling of the sale was a fiasco. We believe the
move was disastrous current loss to UK taxpayers of about USD2.0bn makes a mockery of Tony Blair's
for the UK… comment to the House of Commons:
"It was carried through perfectly sensibly and we actually got the best deal for the
country".
… but who made the In their public comments, neither the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, HM Treasury nor
decision? the Bank of England could agree on who was ultimately responsible for the decision to
sell. Unusually, the former head of foreign exchange and gold at the Bank of England,
Terry Smeeton, even released a statement in which he said:
"It's clearly a Treasury decision in which the Bank has had to acquiesce".
Would not be first There are precedents for the UK coming to the rescue of the US (and vice versa) and
time UK has the banking system in the past. For example, the UK tried in vain to support the
stepped in to help doomed Bretton Woods system in the late-1960s to early-1970s. Between 1958 and
1965, the amount of gold in the UK's reserves varied between 2,000 and 2,500 tonnes,
but during 1966 and 1972, the UK Treasury sold 1,356 tonnes in a futile attempt to
support the value of the US dollar versus gold. Once again, the cost of this ill-fated
scheme was borne by the British public.
Further evidence of As events unfolded, others probed further into activities in the gold market and more
price suppression: evidence – some clear-cut (such as comments by Alan Greenspan) and some
Greenspan's circumstantial – of gold price suppression emerged.
comments…
Officially, the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury do not trade in the gold market.
Indeed, suppressing the free market price of gold contravenes US anti-trust legislation.
Publicly available evidence may suggest otherwise, however. A comment by Alan
Greenspan in his testimony to the House Banking Committee in July 1998 confirmed
both intervention and its aim of restraining strength in the gold price:
"…central banks stand ready to lease gold in increasing quantities should the price
rise".
He later elaborated on this comment in a letter to Senator Joseph Lieberman.
"This observation simply describes the limited capacity of private parties to influence
the gold market by restricting the supply of gold, given the observed willingness of
some foreign reserves – not the Federal Reserve – to lease gold in response to price
increases."
This appears to be clear evidence from Greenspan that central banks do intervene in
the gold market, even if he denies the involvement of the Federal Reserve.

… and suggestions Besides the Fed, the US Treasury operates in the financial markets through the
that ESF may have Exchange Stabilisation Fund (ESF). The ESF has assets of about USD38.0bn and
intervened operates in the forex markets. It is under the exclusive control of the Treasury
Secretary and the President and, therefore, largely escapes Congressional oversight.
Ironically, the ESF was created from the paper profits made following the confiscation
of gold from US citizens in 1933 at USD20.67/oz and the subsequent devaluation of
the US dollar to USD35.0/oz. Lower level Treasury officials have denied that the ESF
operates in the gold market. Despite this, the following comment was found in a 1995
FOMC (Federal Open Markets Committee) transcript attributed to the general counsel
of the Federal Reserve and FOMC:
"The (ESF) statute is very broadly worded in terms of words like 'credit' – it has
covered things like gold swaps".
Discrepancies in the Further work by James Turk in his publication Freemarket Gold & Money Report ("The
Fed's gold stock? Smoking Gun", December 2000) has shown discrepancies between the Federal
Reserve's "Gold Stock" on its balance sheet and the "Gold Stock including the
Exchange Stabilisation Fund" in its statement on US Reserve Assets. This is shown in
the table below (note that the Fed accounts for gold at an historic price of
USD42.22/oz).
Discrepancies in gold holdings: Federal Reserve and ESF
USD m 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999

FRB Year-End Audit 11050 11048 11047 11046 11048
US Reserve Assets incl. ESF 11050 11049 11050 11041 11089
Difference in USD 0 -1 -3 5 -41
Difference in oz (,000s) -24 -71 118 -971
Source: Federal Reserve
The key points from this table are:
− At the end of 1995, US gold reserves are identical in the two sources. Differences
began to emerge in 1996, consistent with GATA's claim that the suppression of
the gold price began in the mid-1990s.
− The differences between US gold reserves and US gold reserves including the
ESF are likely to represent either long or short positions in gold taken by the ESF
and, therefore, may suggest intervention in the gold market.
James Turk concludes that there was a disconnect within the Fed/US Government; i.e.
that:
"…one arm of the government at a very low level was reporting events that other
people at higher levels in another arm of the government were denying ever
happened".
First Washington On 26 September 1999 the first Washington Agreement was signed by the ECB and
Agreement: limiting 14 European central banks (including the Bank of England) to limit their gold sales and
gold sales leasing to 400 tonnes per year and 2,000 tonnes over the next five years. Within the
agreement was provision for the UK to sell the remaining 365 tonnes gold from the 415
tonne sale announced earlier that year.

Gold price during 1999-2000 (USD)

340 FROM 1/1/99 T O 29/12/00 DA ILY
330
320
310
300
290
280
270
260
250
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
HIGH 330.00 5/10/99 LOW 252.85 20/ 7/99 LAS T 272.95

Sourc e: DAT AST REAM
Source: Datastream
What is interesting about this agreement is that some commentators believe the US
and UK may not have been informed about it until just before the announcement. The
Continental European nations seem to have decided to stabilise the gold price in the
run-up to the launch of the euro at the end of that year (The countries introducing the
euro deposited 15% of their gold reserves with the ECB). In the wake of the
agreement, the gold price surged from about USD270/oz to USD325/oz. While being
unhappy with the volatility of the gold price at the time, it is difficult to imagine that the
European central banks' intention was to cause a USD55/oz spike in the gold price
and (potentially) precipitate a gold derivative crisis. The price subsequently fell back
due to concerted action by other central banks.
In a lawsuit filed in December 2001 by Reginald H. Howe versus Bank for International
Settlements, Alan Greenspan et al, it was alleged that "according to reliable reports
received by the plaintiffs…", Sir Edward George, Governor of the Bank of England,
made the following comment to Nicholas J. Morrell, Chief Executive of Lonmin plc in
the aftermath of the Washington Agreement:
"We looked into the abyss if the gold price rose further. A further rise would have taken
down one or several trading houses, which might have taken down all the rest in their
wake. Therefore at any price, at any cost, the central banks had to quell the gold price,
manage it. It was very difficult to get the gold price under control but we have now
succeeded. The US Fed was very active in getting the gold price down. So was the UK."
Unexpected sources of new gold supply also suddenly emerged. For example, in
October 1999, the Central Bank of Kuwait publicly announced that it would lend its
entire holding of 79 tonnes to the Bank of England to improve liquidity in the gold
market! Additional US military spending for Kuwait was announced shortly after. The
Kuwait news was soon followed by Jordan selling roughly half its official gold reserves
of 26 tonnes. Chile sold 34 tonnes in June 2000 and Uruguay transferred all 57 tonnes
of its gold reserves to London for lending the following month.

How big is the gold short position?

Difficult to assess An analysis of central bank activity in the gold market is further complicated by the
central banks' gold opaque methods used by most central banks to account for their gold reserves. Under
reserves… IMF guidelines for central bank accounting of gold reserves, almost all of them do not
discriminate between the amount of gold remaining in their vaults and the amount that
has been leased or swapped out.
… when they make In their annual reports, most central banks report "Gold and gold receivables" or "Gold
no distinction and gold deposits" as one item. This "accounting sleight of hand" appears to have
between gold and originated from an IMF meeting in Santiago, Chile, in October 1999 (just at the time of
gold receivables huge upward pressure on the gold price after the first Washington Agreement).
One GATA supporter, Andrew Hepburn asked the IMF "why does the IMF insist that
members record swapped gold as an asset when a legal change of ownership has
occurred?". The IMF's reply was:
"This is not correct: the IMF in fact recommends that swapped gold be excluded from
reserve assets (see Data Template on International Reserves and Foreign Currency
Liquidity, Operational Guidelines, para. 72,)."
Despite this, public filings from a number of central banks contradict the IMF's
statement. Italy's central bank describes Gold and Gold Receivables in its balance
sheet as follows:
"Comprises the gold owned by the Bank of Italy and receivables in respect of deposits
denominated in gold and swaps".
The central bank of the Philippines stated:
"Beginning January 2000, in compliance with the requirements of the IMF's reserves
and foreign currency liquidity template under the Special Data Dissemination Standard
(SDDS), gold swaps undertaken by the BSP with non-central banks shall be treated as
collateralized loan. Thus, gold under swap arrangement remains to be part of reserves
and a liability is deemed incurred corresponding to the proceeds of the swap."
The IMF has even contradicted itself in a December 2004 paper for a meeting of the
Advisory Expert Group (AEG) on National Accounts entitled "Repurchase agreements,
securities lending, gold swaps and gold loans". On the subject of gold swaps and gold
loans/deposits, it acknowledged that these transactions:
"…are complex and have not been fully worked through. Work is still being undertaken
by the Committee to address the implications."
Most interestingly, however, it highlights the problem of double-counting of gold

loaned by central banks that has subsequently been sold into the physical market:
"In particular, gold may be double-counted with either a gold swap or gold
loan/deposit if the party acquiring the gold were to on-sell it outright, because both the
original owner and the outright purchaser would report ownership of the gold".
GATA estimates GATA generally cites a figure for the short position of 10,000–15,000 tonnes. This
short position at estimate is supported by the analysis of three GATA supporters in work done during
10–15k tonnes… 2001-03. Below we have summarised the three different methodologies:

1. Gold lending analysis

… supported by In Gold derivatives, gold lending, official management of the gold price and the current
three different state of the gold market by Frank Veneroso of Veneroso Associates, 2002.
sources
The starting point for Frank Veneroso's analysis was two speeches given by a Bank of
England official in 1994-95 (Mr Terry Smeeton – head of its gold operations at the time)
at conferences in Australia and London. Mr Smeeton said that gold lending had
doubled to about 3,700 tonnes during the last year and a half. On further research,
Veneroso learnt that the BoE's data was based on a survey of the 14 principal market
makers in the City of London. Some of these firms had not provided any data on their
gold lending outside London, which they acknowledged was even larger. Veneroso ,
therefore, added a further 900 or so tonnes to his original 3,700 tonne lending
estimate. More importantly, the BoE's survey excluded a further 23 bullion banks that
take gold deposits from central banks, including the important Swiss banks.
Questioning 10 bullion bankers about which of the two groups of bullion banks, the 14
or the 23, was the most important in terms of gold lending, 9 out of 10 said the latter.
This suggested that the overall figure for gold loaned by central banks by the mid-
1990s was already over 9,000 tonnes, well above the "official" figure of 2,200 tonnes
at the time (according to Gold Fields Mineral Services). This, together with informal
contacts with current and former employees of bullion banks, led Veneroso to
conclude that aggregate gold lending was in the region of 10–15,000 tonnes.
Summary of Veneros's Research
Bullion Banks Tonnes of gold lending

14 London Market Makers (London books) 3,700
" " " " (ex-London) 900
- Sub-total 4,600
23 Other Bullion Banks >4,600
Total >9,200
Source: Cheuvreux interpretation
2. Gold derivatives reported by BIS

In "Gold derivatives: moving towards checkmate" by Reg Howe with Mike Bolser, 2002.
Howe's assumption is that the short position in physical gold at the central banks is
roughly equivalent to the aggregate of the notional value (converted into tonnes) of
forwards and swaps in the BIS's data on OTC gold derivatives (noting that the BIS tries
to avoid double-counting on derivatives contracts where possible, e.g. where a bank is
on both sides of an options trade). He then uses the prevailing gold price to convert
notional derivative values into tonnes of physical gold. Forwards and swaps involve a
sale of borrowed gold, while swaps also involve a simultaneous purchase in the forward
market. Howe conservatively excludes all gold options from this estimate as these do
not always require leased or swapped gold to earn a return and may reflect much of the
leased gold captured in the forwards and swaps data. As highlighted above, call options
written by the central bank, if exercised, will lead to the delivery of physical gold. By the
end of 2002, Howe estimated that the short position implied by the BIS data on forwards
and swaps alone amounted to almost 13,000 tonnes.

3. Gold dishoarding and imports/exports

In More Proof by James Turk, April 2003.
Turk uses the publicly available data on dishoarding provided by the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York (FRBNY) and import/export data on gold entering and leaving the
UK. He calculates that from 1991-2002, over 7,000 tonnes of gold were dishoarded
from the UK and FRBNY. The rest of his argument is less quantitative, requiring a
major assumptions on the activities of other central banks. While London and New
York are the centres for pricing gold, they are only secondary centres for the physical
gold market along with Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Perth and others. The physical market in
gold, and consequently gold lending activity, is dominated by Zurich. Turk believes
that if around 7,000 tonnes of gold were dishoarded from the UK/FRBNY, it is not
unreasonable to assume that an equal amount was mobilised from Zurich (given its
dominant position) and other centres although there is no evidence for this. Once
again, this would give an overall figure in the region of 15,000 tonnes. One startling
statistic is that in 1997, exports of gold from the UK amounted to 2,473 tonnes, i.e.
roughly equivalent to all the gold production on the planet that year. This makes the
415 tonne sale announced by the Bank of England in 1999 seem small by comparison.
The three analytical pieces summarised above were published during 2001-03. The
question is what is likely to have happened to the short position in physical gold since
then. Unfortunately, the Bank of England has not given any update on its estimates of
gold lending so updating Frank Veneroso's analysis is difficult. We have also been
unable to find recent data on UK gold exports. However, the BIS continues to publish
information on OTC gold derivatives so Reg Howe's work can be updated and we
have used it as the basis for making our own estimate for the size of the short position
in the gold market.
The BIS publishes semi-annual data for commercial banks in the G-10 and triennial
data from a broader survey covering banks in about 50 countries. The most recent
semi-annual data was for end-June 2005 and the most recent triennial survey was for
end-June 2004. The following chart shows the trend in tonnes of gold relating to
forwards/swaps, options and the total gold derivatives market.
OTC gold derivatives 1998-2005 (tonnes of gold)
35 000
30 000
25 000
20 000
15 000
10 000
5 000
0
12/98 06/99 12/99 06/00 12/00 06/01 12/01 06/02 12/02 06/03 12/03 06/04 12/04 06/05
Triennial Semi - Total Semi - Options Semi - Fwds/Swaps
Source: BISTriennial and Semi-annual OTC derivatives surveys

Using Howe's methodology of equating the short in gold to the estimated tonnage of
forwards/swaps gives a figure of slightly under 8,000 tonnes. The latest data for June
2005 continued the downward trend that began in the first half of 2003. We have then
made two adjustments to this number:
− From the latest triennial data, we estimate the gold short in June 2004 was just
over 20% higher than the figure from the smaller semi-annual survey. We have
adjusted the latest semi-annual data to reflect this.
− We know from Jessica Cross's analysis on the gold derivatives market that
central banks write call options on their gold which lead to physical delivery if
exercised. To account for these, we have added a further 5%. The table below
summarises these calculations.
Central bank short position in gold (using Howe methodology)
12/98 06/99 12/99 06/00 12/00 06/01 12/01 06/02 12/02 06/03 12/03 06/04 12/04 06/05
Gold price (end period) 287.8 261.2 291.0 289.0 273.0 271.2 276.8 317.8 343.3 347.7 417.3 395.0 438.1 438.7
Semi-annual (USD bn)
Forwards & swaps 76 87 119 120 101 88 101 118 136 134 154 129 132 109
Options 99 102 124 141 116 116 130 161 180 169 190 189 237 178
Total 175 189 243 261 217 204 231 279 316 303 344 318 369 287
Est. fwds/swaps (tonnes) 8 214 10 360 12 719 12 915 11 507 10 092 11 349 11 549 12 322 11 987 11 478 10 158 9 371 7 728
Est. options (tonnes) 10 699 12 146 13 254 15 175 13 216 13 304 14 608 15 757 16 308 15 118 14 162 14 882 16 826 12 620
Total semi-annual 18 913 22 506 25 973 28 090 24 723 23 396 25 957 27 306 28 630 27 105 25 640 25 040 26 197 20 348
Triennial (USD bn):

Forwards & swaps 116 142 156
Options 112 136 203
Total 228 278 359
Est. fwds/swaps (tonnes) 12 536 16 260 12 316 9 370
Triennial/semi-annual ratio 153% 161% 121% 121%
Cheuvreux est. (tonnes)* 13 163 17 073 12 932 9 839
Source: BIS, Cheuvreux
Cheuvreux estimate of Using this methodology, the central banks' short position in the gold market currently
current short position: amounts to slightly less than 10,000 tonnes. Let's call it the "Cheuvreux estimate".
10k tonnes… This is well down from the level in mid-2001 but is still a massive number.
… of this we estimate Within this figure of 10,000 tonnes we can then estimate the proportion relating to the
the gold miners' gold mining industry's hedge book and how this has changed in recent years. This
hedge book… element of the short position should be repaid from mine production, rather than
buying in the physical market.
The chart below shows the movements in the global hedge book since the fourth
quarter of 2001 in terms of forwards/loans, options and the total
Gold producers: global hedge book 2001-05
m oz 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

. Q4-01 Q4-02 Q4-03 Q1-04 Q2-04 Q3-04 Q4-04 Q1-05 Q2-05 Q3-05
Forwards/loans 73 60 51.8 51.2 51.6 48.77 46.67 45.11 44.15 42.53
Options 21 20 18.5 16.4 13.4 11.99 11.28 12.16 10.88 11.51
Total 94.00 80.00 70.30 67.60 65.00 60.76 57.95 57.27 55.03 54.04
Net change -4.81 -1.20 -2.70 -2.60 -4.24 -2.81 -0.68 -2.24 -0.99
Forwards/loans (tonnes) 2 271 1 866 1 611 1 592 1 605 1 517 1 452 1 403 1 373 1 323
% Forwards/loans 77.7% 75.0% 73.7% 75.7% 79.4% 80.3% 80.5% 78.8% 80.2% 78.7%
% options 22.3% 25.0% 26.3% 24.3% 20.6% 19.7% 19.5% 21.2% 19.8% 21.3%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

The total notional interest in tonnes has declined by 43% since the end of 2001.
Focusing on the forwards/loans category (like Reg Howe), we estimate that the hedge
book has fallen from 2,271 tonnes to 1,323 tonnes, a 42% decline.
… relates to 1.3–1.4k Our conclusion is that, based solely on the BIS data, the central banks' short position
tonnes in gold is around 10,000 tonnes, of which only 1,300-1,400 tonnes relates to producer
hedge books. This 10,000 tonne short position equates to nearly one third of reported
central bank holdings.
However, there is a further and very important complication. This is easily illustrated by
looking at the period from end-June 2004 to end-June 2005. Using the more
conservative semi-annual BIS data on forwards/swaps, the central banks' short
position declined by 2,430 tonnes during mid-2004 to mid-2005. During the same
period, the global hedge book, based on forwards/loans, declined by 232 tonnes.
Difference between The magnitude of the reduction in the producers' hedge book should lead to mined
decline in short position gold being delivered back to the bullion banks and, hence, to the central banks. The
and decline in producers' difference between the decline in the overall short position and the decline in the
hedgebook… producers' hedge book should represent actual purchases in the physical gold market
to reduce the overall short. Using the BIS's semi-annual data on forwards/swaps, the
reduction in the central banks' short position through covering in the physical market
… represents actual was 2,198 tonnes (the difference between 2,430 and 232 tonnes). Let's further assume
purchases of gold… that all of the "official" central bank sales under the current Washington Agreement, a
maximum of 500 tonnes per annum, were just swapped between central banks rather
than hitting the market, this still leaves about 1,700 tonnes.
… and some transactions This is an enormous number, representing about 50% of the World Gold Council
must be going through estimate of the global supply and demand balance. Now the World Gold Council's
without physical gold statistics understate the true level of supply and demand but this just doesn't make
changing hands… any sense. The conclusion is that the unwinding of some of these transactions is being
done without the delivery of physical bullion. As Reg Howe commented when asked
for help in clarifying our calculations on this issue:
"Although the terms of the original transactions almost certainly contemplated

repayment in (physical gold), my guess is that under the prevailing circumstances most
of the reductions reflect cash settlements, thus converting the original loan, deposit or
swap into a sale and obviating the need for the short to go long in the physical market
to close the transaction".
… distorting the Does this matter? The answer is yes. It means further distortion of the gold market and
market further that, in some cases, the central banks are giving up any hope of getting the gold back.
While it may somewhat reduce the amount of short covering driving the gold price, this
should be overwhelmed by investment demand for gold and the structural supply
deficit (both discussed below). Furthermore, while paper currencies are no longer
directly linked to gold, the amount of gold (being the ultimate store of value) backing
paper currencies is further reduced.
Short position must Given the evidence that reductions in the central banks' short position apparent from
be greater than BIS the derivatives market is not being reduced by physical delivery, the true level of the
suggests… short position (or gold that central banks say they have but don't) is obviously higher
than suggested by the analysis of the BIS data above. The "Cheuvreux estimate" of
almost 10,000 tonnes based on the BIS data is, therefore, likely to be too low. Given
the analysis of the changes between end-June 2004 and end-June 2005 above, the
real position is likely to be some thousands of tonnes higher.
… 10–15k estimate Our conclusion is, therefore, that the estimate of 10,000-15,000 tonnes is broadly
looks about right correct.

Further confirmation is provided by the Bank for International Settlements. Despite the
"sleight of hand" advocated by the IMF for central bank accounting, the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS - the central bank for central banks) does separately
identify gold in the vaults from "gold deposits" that have been loaned out.
The BIS has its own gold reserves and also holds gold on behalf of other central
banks. The separate identification of gold and gold deposits relates to the aggregate
of these gold reserves. Roughly speaking, the BIS's own gold accounts for 20%
(about 190 tonnes) of the total. The table below shows the percentage of BIS gold on
deposit since 1996 (the BIS has a March year-end).
Bank for International Settlements: Gold lending 1996-2005
March year-end 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Gold bars % 87.3% 78.8% 73.0% 72.2% 64.6% 62.3% 59.5% 60.1% 60.2% 60.0%
Gold deposits % 12.7% 21.2% 27.0% 27.8% 35.4% 37.7% 40.5% 39.9% 39.8% 40.0%
Source: BIS annual reports
Support for GATA The percentage of BIS gold on "deposit" is exactly in line with the GATA claim that
claim that 33–50% between one third and one half of central bank hold has been loaned out. There are
of central bank hold only two other central banks which separately identify gold in their vaults and gold out
has been loaned out on loan, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of Portugal. The prudent Swiss had
approximately 10% of its gold on loan at the end of 2004 while the Portuguese had
30%.
"Official" statistics on the gold market

At this point, it is worth examining the World Gold Council's (WGC) "official" estimates
for supply and demand in the gold market. These are summarised in the table below
with supply shown both before and after the publicly announced sales by central
banks.
World gold supply and demand: 2002- September 2005
(tonnes) 2002 2003 2004 9M05

Supply:
Mine production 2 589 2 593 2 461 1 842
Net producer hedging -412 -270 -427 -123
Total mine supply 2 177 2 323 2 035 1 719
Gold scrap 835 939 829 608
Supply before official sales 3 012 3 262 2 864 2 327
Total demand 3 365 3 191 3 498 2 874
-5.2% 9.6% 14.9%
Supply shortfall -353 71 -634 -547
Official sector sales 545 617 475 489
Balance 192 688 -159 -58
There are a number of points arising from this table:
− Even using the WGC's estimate of official sales, there is a substantial deficit
between "supply before central bank sales" and demand in most years, e.g. 353
tonnes and 634 tonnes in 2002 and 2004, respectively. In the first nine months of
2005, the shortfall is running at 547 tonnes, or an annualised rate of 729 tonnes
(despite a sharp reduction in producer dehedging last year).

Central bank sales − While central bank gold sales are ongoing, they are ultimately finite. The existing
continue, but not Washington Agreement between European Central Banks for 500 tonnes per year
indefinitely ends in 2009. It is possible that the higher the gold price rises, the more public
opinion could turn against further sales in European countries. This would only
exaggerate the supply deficit.
Estimate of "unofficial" − Central bank sales in the WGC statistics are confined to those under the
sales could point to Washington Agreements and other publicly announced sales by central banks.
level of supply deficit… They do not contain the non-publicised, or covert, gold sales from central bank
leasing activity outside of that related to producer hedging. If we can estimate the
level of "unofficial" selling by central banks, we may be able to get a better picture
of the "true" supply deficit.
… which we believe In 1995, when the suppression of the gold price may have begun, the global producer
could be around hedgebook was approximately 2,000 tonnes. It may be possible to add another (say)
1.3k tonnes/year 1,000 tonnes for gold borrowed by the world jewellery industry to help manage its
inventory, making a total of 3,000 tonnes of gold borrowed from central banks for
"legitimate" reasons by the end of 1995. If we conservatively assume that the central
banks' short position was 10,000 tonnes by the end of 2005, the WGC statistics have
underestimated demand by an average of 700 tonnes per annum during the last 10
years. This means that before any "official" central bank selling (currently about 600
tonnes per annum), the annual shortfall in supply could now be running as high as
1,300 tonnes.
Demand growth Furthermore, this shortfall developed at a time when investment demand for physical
strong gold, especially in the West, has been low. This is now changing. Although WGC
demand estimates understate reality in absolute terms, recent levels of demand
growth for gold are impressive. According to the WGC, global gold demand increased
by 9.5% in 2004 and surged 14.9% in 9M05 due to strong jewellery demand in India
and China and higher levels of gold investment. Jewellery demand in India has risen
37% in 9M05 versus the corresponding period in 2004. India accounted for 20% of the
world market for gold jewellery in 2004. Gold investment has surged in 2005, rising by
62% in 9M05. The following table shows the breakdown of world gold demand since
2002:
Breakdown of world gold demand 2002-September 2005
(tonnes) 2002 2003 2004 9M05

Fabrication:
Jewellery 2 667 2 481 2 613 2 129
Industrial & Dental 356 379 409 316
Subtotal fabrication 3 023 2 860 3 022 2 444
Net retail investment 339 292 342 305
ETFs 3 39 133 125
Total demand 3 365 3 191 3 498 2 874
% Chg -5.2% 9.6% 14.9%
Central banks: The level of investment demand shown above relates to private and institutional
source of near-term money. Ironically, in contrast to the trends of recent years, a much bigger source of
investment demand near-term investment demand for gold could come from central banks themselves,
for gold? especially those outside North America and Western Europe.
We believe several central banks are already beginning to accumulate gold, one of
which is certainly Russia. There is a strong possibility that central banks in Asia and
the Middle East will become net accumulators of gold reserves as they diversify their
growing foreign exchange reserves away from US dollars.

Looking at the official statistics for central bank gold holdings, most of the big creditor
nations to the US, like Japan and several other Asian economies, and the big natural
resource producers, like Russia and Saudi Arabia, have generally maintained their gold
holdings relatively constant in recent years. China is the exception and has
significantly increased its gold reserves since 2000. However, as the last column in the
table below shows, all of these nations (including China) have very limited gold
holdings as a percentage of total foreign exchange reserves.
US creditors & natural resource holders: official gold holdings
Country 1990 1995 2000 2005 Gold as %

reserves
1. Japan 754 754 765 765 1%
2. China 395 395 395 600 1%
3. Taiwan 421 422 422 423 2%
4. Russia n/a 293 384 387 4%
5. India 333 398 358 358 4%
6. Saudi Arabia 143 143 143 143 7%
7. Singapore 0 0 0 127 2%
8. Indonesia 97 97 97 96 4%
9. Thailand 77 77 74 84 2%
10. Kuwait 79 79 79 79 12%
11. Malaysia 73 74 36 36 1%
12. Korea 10 10 14 14 0%
13. Brazil 142 142 59 14 0%
14. Chile 58 58 2 0 0%
To put the situation in context, the seven leading Asian nations held USD2,300bn of
reserves at the end of 2004, equivalent to 10 times those of the G7 nations. China's
foreign exchange reserves increased by nearly USD200bn to almost USD800bn in
2005.
Gold reserves As shown on page 12, Western countries like the US, Germany, France, Netherlands,
average 9% globally etc, have at least 50% of their reserves in gold according to the official figures anyway.
Spain has over 40% and Switzerland over 30%. The UK has only 9%, but still far more
than the major US creditors and natural resource holders. Indeed, the global average
is 9%. Any sudden readjustment of even a small part of these reserves away from the
US dollar and into gold by these nations could have a major impact on the gold price.
It is also worth remembering that as central banks battled unsuccessfully to support
the US dollar in 1968, the London Gold Pool lost 400 tonnes of gold in just one day.
In November 2005, the Russian central bank announced its intention to double its gold
reserves and this plan was subsequently endorsed by President Putin. Interfax
reported him saying:
"I support the proposal that the Central Bank pay greater attention to precious metals
in forming our gold and foreign exchange reserves".
The Russian News and Information Agency reported that first deputy chairman of the
Central Bank of Russia, Alexei Ulyukayev, said that the bank would be:
"…buying gold on all markets on which it is available…"
We also believe that there is a strong possibility that China is increasing its gold
reserves. A statement by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) outlined
its objective:
"…to improve the currency structure and asset structure of our foreign exchange
reserves, and to continue to expand the investment area of our reserves".

This is a clear indication that China intends to diversify its foreign exchange holding
and gold is certainly underrepresented at this point. The People's Bank of China
followed up the SAFE comment by saying that China had no intention of reducing its
US dollar reserves. However, this may indicate a flattening off in the rate at which they
are accumulated.
According to the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), the size of the US
bond market, i.e. the value of outstanding bonds, was USD23.6tn in 2004, of which the
public debt was USD8.2tn. The overall figure for the bond market was estimated by
the NASD at roughly twice the value of all the US stock markets. The total value of the
US stock and bond markets is, therefore, in the region of USD35tn. Using the World
Gold Council's estimate that total above-ground gold stock is 153,000 tonnes, the
value of all the gold on the planet is USD2.7tn at USD550/oz. If investors even
attempted to divert 1% of the value of the US stock and bond markets into gold, this
would be equivalent to USD350bn, or 19,800 tonnes of gold. This amounts to 13% of
all the gold in existence and is nearly 8 times the annual production of mined gold (in
the region of 2,500 tonnes).
The US Treasury publishes the level of foreign holding in US Treasury Securities on a

monthly basis. The next table shows the top 10 holders in January, June and October
2005. There has certainly been a slowdown in the rate at which China has been buying
US Treasuries in the second half of 2005 and Japanese holdings have been flat
throughout 2005. These trends for the two largest holders of US Treasury securities
are a potential worry for the US Treasury and the Fed.
Major foreign holders of US Treasury securities
USD bn Jan 05 Jun 05 Oct 05

Japan 679.3 681.2 681.6
China 223.5 243.7 247.6
UK 101.1 145.5 187.1
Caribbean Banking Centres 94.2 106.8 113.5
Taiwan 68.3 71.3 71.6
Germany 53.8 61.1 64.4
OPEC 67.0 57.0 63.8
Korea 53.6 59.6 61.4
Canada 35.4 43.8 51.7
Hong Kong 45.3 48.2 47.5
Others 487.6 494.4 511.8
Total 1 909.1 2 012.6 2 102.0
Source: Federal Reserve
The biggest purchasers of US Treasuries so far in 2005 have been based in the UK
and the Caribbean banking centres. Holders of US Treasuries registered in the
Caribbean are generally assumed to be hedge funds. It hardly seems prudent for the
US to rely heavily on hedge funds to finance its deficits as these investors are most
likely to sell on signs of a deteriorating outlook for the US dollar.
Will central banks Paul Volcker, who preceded Alan Greenspan at the Fed made the following comment:
lose their appetite
for dollars? "At some point, both central banks and private institutions will have their fill of dollars…
I don't know whether change will come with a bang or a whimper, whether sooner or
later… it is more likely that it will be financial crises rather than policy foresight that will
force the change". (Washington Post, April 2005)
There is a precedent for central banks breaking ranks and refusing to take any more
inflating dollars. It was the French leader, President Charles de Gaulle, who started
converting US dollars into gold in the late 1960s and forced the US to abandon the
Gold Standard. France was a major US creditor at the time.

Gold mining industry

Miners cannot boost If, as we predict, there is a sustained wave of gold investment buying, the upward
production to meet any pressure on the gold price will be exacerbated by the inability of the gold mining
upswing in demand industry to respond with higher production. The WGC estimates that mine production
has been essentially flat since the end of the 1990s and fell by 5% in 2004 as shown in
the following chart.
Gold: world production 1992-2005E (m oz)
90
80
70
60
millions oz.
50
40
30
20
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005E
Source: World Gold Council, Cheuvreux
Gold production For the foreseeable future, there seems little chance that this situation will change very
"flat to declining" much. Newmont sees gold production "slightly down in 2005" and, in a recent
presentation, Barrick recently noted "mine production flat to declining" as one of the
key industry challenges in the years ahead. Overall, the consensus is for a generally
flat production profile for several years.
The following chart shows the production trend for the five largest gold producers
during 1999-2004. Gold mined by these five producers amounted to just over 800
tonnes in 2004, almost one-third of the world total. These are the "elite" in the gold
mining industry, yet for most of them the recent production record is unimpressive.
Two of these miners, AngloGold Ashanti and Barrick, have suffered production
declines in the period 2000-04 and Newmont has suffered a decline during 2002-04.
Only Placer Dome and Gold Fields Ltd. have seen a meaningful increase during the
period, and even they have seen temporary declines in some years.

Top 5 gold miners: production trend 1999-2004 (m oz)
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
AGA Barrick Newmont Placer D. Gold Fields
Source: Company accounts
Gold reserves are coming under pressure as existing gold mines mature, ore grades
decline and gold miners find it increasingly difficult to replace production with new
discoveries. Looking at published reserve lives of the gold miners can be misleading.
In Barrick's case, for example, its reserve life has increased due to production falling
more rapidly than reserves have risen. In the period 2001-04, Barrick's production fell
by 19%, easily outstripping growth in proved and probable reserves of 8%. As a
consequence the reported reserve life rose from 13.4 years to 18.0 years during these
three years. To get a clearer idea of the trend in reserve lives for leading gold miners
during 1999-04, we have compared reported 2004 proved and probable reserves with
the highest level of gold production since 1999.
Top 5 gold miners: reserve life in 1999 and 2004
Reserve life in years 1999 2004

Newmont 11.4 12.1
AngloGold Ashanti 15.4 10.9
Barrick 10.2 14.5
Placer Dome 20.9 15.5
Gold Fields Ltd. 23.0 17.4
Source: Company accounts
Production held In an interview, President of Newmont Mining, Pierre Lassonde, explained that new
back by recent lack technologies developed in the 1980s (especially heap leaching) made previously
of technological uneconomic gold deposits viable, leading to a period of higher production. In the last
development… twenty years, however, there has been no such new technological development.
Lassonde argues that for most of the 1990s, there were between 3-5 greenfield
discoveries with over 5m oz of gold each year. In the last seven years, however, he
could only name two.
… and low Besides the lack of technological development, the other issue holding back world
exploration spend gold production has been the low level of exploration spend since the late-1990s. The
weakness in the gold price during the late 1990s/early 2000s led to a sharp cutback on
exploration budgets. The trend in AngloGold Ashanti's spend on exploration since
1999 is typical for the industry:

AngloGold Ashanti exploration spend 1999-2005E (USD m)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005E
Source: AngloGold Ashanti
Long mining lead Ironically, those parties who sought to suppress the gold price sowed the seeds of the
times… industry's current inability to respond to increased demand. Pierre Lassonde
highlighted this:
"…when exploration has been sharply cut it takes at least 7-8 years for a rise in price to
generate not just exploration but the subsequent exploitation of the results, let alone
sufficient new output to compensate in addition for the exhaustion of existing mines."
… mean no quick fix The long lead times in gold mining mean that as long as demand for gold remains firm,
there is no quick fix to the supply deficit apart from a higher price.

V— GOLD VERSUS THE US DOLLAR: ONLY ONE WINNER
History tells us gold, not paper, is "real money"

Gold: ultimate store Strategically, gold is one of the two most important commodities on the planet along
of value and method with crude oil. Money is vital to society since without it, commerce and trade on a large
of payment… scale are almost impossible. Gold, rather than paper currency, is the ultimate store of
value and method of payment. Without delving too deeply into this subject, gold is
unique in being able to perform this role for the following reasons:
− It is durable, homogenous and divisible.
− Gold's rarity gives it intrinsic value and that value is high per unit of volume.
− Its value is recognised across the globe and is traded in a continuous market.
− Gold plays little role in economic growth and is produced for accumulation not
consumption.
− Annual gold production only adds about 2% per annum on average to theoretical
supply, amounting to all that remains above ground. With other commodities, short-
term volatility in supply or demand cannot be easily accommodated.
− Gold is the only form of money that cannot be debased (unless the gold market is
rigged) by the same authorities who print paper currency. Indeed, at times a rising
gold price acts as a measure of currency debasement.
− Gold is the only financial medium of exchange that is not someone else's liability.
… a role that appears Most participants in the financial markets and the general public seem to have forgotten
to have been gold's role as the ultimate form of money. To them, it is probably just the "barbarous
forgotten by some relic" to use the words of Keynes. There are perhaps four reasons for this:
− The Gold Standard, in its latter manifestation as the Bretton Woods system, ended
in 1971. While it was in operation, major world currencies were linked to the USD
which, in turn, was guaranteed by the US Government to be convertible into gold at
USD35/oz.
− The prolonged bear market in gold that lasted 20 years after the price hit an all-
time high of USD850/oz in 1980.
− Persistent disinvestment by central banks in recent years mainly in the form of

publicly announced sales by European central banks.
− The suppression of the gold price since the mid-1990s by the US monetary
authorities and others.
Most people in finance For someone who started work aged 21 to remember the 1980 peak in the gold price
too young to remember during their professional career, they need to be at least 46 years old. To remember the
gold standard, or even Gold Standard, they need to be at least 55 years old. The vast majority of people
last gold price peak… currently working in the financial sector, even in senior positions, are younger than this.
… and tend to view The issues cited above led to the a general perception that gold has become "just
gold as "another another commodity" during the last 20-30 years and its traditional role as a store of
commodity" financial value has diminished.
History shows that Most people do not even stop to think that today's fully-floating fiat currency system
fiat currencies only arose from the US Government's default on its guarantee to convert its currency
eventually fail into gold because the market devalued the US dollar. History shows that fiat currencies
fail.

In times of financial It is true that in today's system, central banks do not guarantee convertibility of fiat
stability, gold's currency into gold and almost no economic transactions are settled in gold. In a world of
monetary role is financial stability and fiscal prudence, gold's monetary role retreats into the background,
obscured… but even then it never goes away. Of course, the world's monetary authorities would
rather you believe it had, so you remain happy with their inflating paper (i.e. subject to
excessive supply growth).
… yet gold has its Just like conventional paper money, gold has its own exchange rate versus other
own exchange rate currencies, i.e. its price in US dollars. It also has its own interest rate, i.e. the "gold lease
and interest rate rate". The latter is the rate of interest charged (usually by central banks) for lending gold
to third parties. Typically the gold lease rate is very low, e.g. 1-2%, or even much less as
it is currently. In times of financial crisis, gold is the soundest money and cannot be
debased, so it makes sense that it (almost always) has a lower interest rate than any
other currency.
WGC estimates Currencies with lower interest rates are always in contango (i.e. future prices are higher
above-ground gold than the spot price) against those with higher interest rates. Since gold has the lowest
stocks at 153k tonnes interest rate and (as with currencies) there is basically no immediate concern regarding
at end-2004 future supply, the gold market is almost always in contango. With regard to available
gold supply, most of the gold ever produced is still in existence today and is, therefore,
still theoretically available as supply. This is obviously a simplification because, unlike
paper currencies, the supply of gold is finite. The World Gold Council estimates that the
quantity of above-ground gold stocks at the end of 2004 was approximately 153,000
tonnes. If the gold price was in backwardation and there were no liquidity concerns, any
trader could sell gold on the spot market, put the proceeds on deposit, and be sure of
buying it back at a lower price in the future. With other commodities like copper and oil,
uncertainty about future supply means that the price is generally in backwardation.
It is worth highlighting some quotes from well-respected people on the subject of gold
as money:
The French President, Charles de Gaulle described gold as
"…the unalterable fiduciary value par excellence."
De Gaulle was instrumental in breaking the Bretton Woods system by betting that gold
was sounder money than an inflating US dollar during the Vietnam War and he was
proved right. In fact the French seem to have a particular affinity for gold and were
hoarding it in the run-up to the Great Depression of the 1930s.
J.P Morgan was quoted as saying about gold
"Gold is money. That's it".
Alan Greenspan, in justifying the US's decision to continue holding gold reserves, said in
1999:
"Gold still represents the ultimate form of payment in the world. Germany in 1944 could
buy materials during the war only with gold. Fiat money in extremis is accepted by
nobody. Gold is always accepted."
The monetary history of the twentieth century contains several attempts by major
industrialised nations to adopt and then adhere to a Gold Standard, i.e. guaranteeing
that their currencies are convertible into gold and that money supply growth is backed
by gold. The period of the "Classical Gold Standard" is considered to be 1815-1914. The
massive cost of the First World War eventually forced all nations to come off the Gold
Standard as deficit spending inflated their currencies. Readoption for many nations took
place in the years following the Versailles Treaty, but once again it was short-lived as the
UK abandoned it in 1931 and the US in 1933.

Gold Standard: A search on the internet will reveal an intriguing essay by Alan Greenspan titled "Gold
championed by and Economic Freedom" published in Ayn Rand's 1967 book, Capitalism, the Unknown
Greenspan… Ideal. In it he argues in favour of the Gold Standard and against today's fiat currency
system:
"As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in
the economy, prices must eventually rise… In the absence of a gold standard, there is no
way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation…"
And:
"Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the
way of this insidious process. It stands as the protector of property rights."
With the Gold Standard, when the banks became fully loaned on the basis of a country's
gold reserves, interest rates would rise until new loan demand would be chocked off.
In the essay Greenspan dwells on the "hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard
which unites statists", i.e. the political and financial authorities. Greenspan characterises
the gold standard and a banking system limited by the level of gold reserves as acting
as:
"..the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth."
.. and the Bank of Oleg V. Mozhaiskov, Deputy Chairman, Bank of Russia, extolled the benefits of the Gold
Russia Standard in a speech to the LBMA in June 2004.
"The obligations on debtor countries to pay off the trade deficits with gold (upon demand
of the creditor countries) severely limited the exporter countries' opportunities for trade
expansion. The importer countries were made to live within their means, predicated by
their gold reserves. Gold was therefore considered… as an instrument guaranteeing
order and justice in international economic relations…"
Bretton Woods: last The last attempt to establish at least a "quasi" gold standard was the Bretton Woods
attempt at "quasi" system negotiated in 1944. This involved other countries pegging their currencies to the
gold standard US dollar, which became the world's reserve currency, and maintaining them within +/-
1% of parity. Par values could be renegotiated in circumstances of "fundamental
disequilibrium" in their balance of payments. To maintain "confidence" in the US dollar,
the US agreed to guarantee convertibility of the USD in to gold at USD35/oz to foreign
governments. With hindsight, the flaw in Bretton Woods was that it didn't ultimately
prevent the US, at the centre of this system, from engaging in deficit spending and
creating a huge oversupply of dollars. The demise of the Bretton Woods system is
summarised in Appendix 1.
Doubts over future The lesson of history is that, time and time again, fiat currency systems have failed
of USD as world's because governments have been unable to sustain the purchasing power of their paper
reserve currency currencies in relation to gold. This does not augur well for the current fiat currency based
on the USD as the world's reserve currency with no link to gold whatsoever. The
advantages of using a Gold Standard were summarised by Greenspan in a speech on
"Issues for Monetary Policy" to the Economic Club of New York.
"Although the gold standard could hardly be portrayed as having produced a period of
price tranquillity, it was the case that the price level in 1929 was not much different, on
net, from what it had been in 1800. But, in the two decades following the abandonment
of the gold standard in 1933, the consumer price index in the United States nearly
doubled. And, in the four decades after that, prices quintupled. Monetary policy,
unleashed from the constraint of domestic gold convertibility, had allowed a persistent
overissuance of money. As recently as a decade ago, central bankers, having witnessed
more than a half-century of chronic inflation, appeared to confirm that a fiat currency was
inherently subject to excess".

Greenspan now says That was in 2002. Less than three years later in July 2005 we hear a very different
we've learned to Greenspan as he tells Congress:
beware of fiat money…
"Would there be any advantage, at this particular stage, in going back to the gold
standard? And the answer is: I don't think so, because we are acting as though we were
there… So I think central banking, I believe, has learned the dangers of fiat money, and I
think, as a consequence of that, we've behaved as though there are, indeed, real
reserves underneath the system".
… though this is not This is ironic given that during Greenspan's 18 years as Chairman of the Federal
necessarily borne Reserve, he has presided over the biggest deficit spending and monetary expansion by
out by recent history any government in world history. For example, during Greenspan's tenure, the money
supply (M3) has risen from USD3.6tn to USD10.3tn. The four year bull market in the
dollar gold price suggests that the market does not believe the Fed has acted as though
it is still on the gold standard either. Which Greenspan do you agree with? We prefer the
one who favours gold, sound money and the lesson of history on its side. In this vein,
George Bernard Shaw said:
"You have to choose between trusting to the natural stability of gold and the natural
stability of the honesty and intelligence of members of the government. And with due
respect to these gentlemen, I advise you, as long as the capitalist system lasts, to vote for
gold".
When shrewd investors and, ultimately, the general populace, identify rampant
debasement of a currency, Gresham's Law kicks in: "bad money drives good money out
of circulation" and "true" money is hoarded.
What drives the gold price?

The value of gold has been subject to intense debate for centuries. Baron von Rothschild
commented:
"I only know of two men who really understand the true value of gold – an obscure clerk
in the basement vault of the Banque de Paris and one of the directors of the Bank of
England. Unfortunately, they disagree".
The research and commentary on the gold price over many years has been filled with the
debate about gold's ability to act as a hedge in periods of inflation and deflation. While
deflations (outside Japan) are confined to history books as far as most people are
concerned, there currently appear to be two main schools thought:
1. Gold is a hedge against inflation

In the minds of many people today, this view is probably based on the simultaneous rise
of both the gold price and inflation during the 1970s. Much longer time periods also
confirm that gold holds its purchasing power. Since the creation of the Federal Reserve
in 1913, the Fed's own inflation calculator (which underestimates the true level of
inflation in recent years) shows that the purchasing power of the USD has fallen to one
twentieth (5%) of its 1913 level. Over the same period, the gold price has risen by a
factor of 26.6 from USD20.67 to USD550.

Gold price matches CPI 1970-79
GOLDBLN 31/1/06
80 550
500
75
450
70
400
65
350
60 300
55 250
200
50
150
45
100
40
50
35 0
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Gol d Bul li on $/T roy Ounc e(R.H.SCALE)
US CPI - A LL URBAN: ALL IT EMS SADJ
Source: Datastream
During the last century, the most extreme example of gold acting as a hedge against
inflation was the German hyperinflation in 1923. Germany came off the Gold Standard at
the outbreak of the First World War and the costs of the conflict led to a huge debt
burden. The Reichsbank subsequently monetised this debt by printing money. As
confidence in the mark weakened, the populace hurried to spend the rapidly increasing
number of marks in circulation. For a short period, there was an illusion of prosperity.
However, inflation became so gargantuan and the purchasing power of the mark so
small that the economy collapsed and deflation set in. Only those people who had
converted their marks to gold and foreign currencies protected their capital (In
November 1923, one ounce of gold was worth USD20 and twenty trillion marks).
2. Gold is a hedge against deflation and a poor short-term hedge

against inflation
Supporters of this view often cite the a study entitled The Golden Constant by R.W.
Jastram published in 1977. Jastram looked at the experience of England during 1560-
1976 and the US from 1800-1976. Over these very long periods, Jastram found that
gold prices soared during deflations (deflations and inflations were measured in terms
of commodity prices) but lost purchasing power during inflations. However, even
Jastram noted that gold maintains its purchasing power over long periods.
Furthermore, he observed that in the period 1951-76 in the US, both gold and
commodity prices rose by roughly similar amounts.
The discussion above suggests that there have been periods in history when both view
points have been correct. What about recent history? Outside Japan, there have been
no experiences of deflation in the major industrialised world. Looking at the
performance of the gold price from its peak in 1980 until 1995 (before central banks
are believed to have suppressed the price) seems to show that gold has not been a
good hedge against inflation.

Gold price fails to match CPI 1980-2000
GOLDBLN 31/1/06
180 700
170 650
160
600
150
550
140
500
130
450
120
400
110
350
100
300
90
80 250
70 200
80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00
Gol d Bul l i on $/T roy Ounc e(R.H.SCALE)
Sourc e: DAT A ST RE AM
Source: Datastream
There is also another school of thought that is little known these days outside the
world of gold bugs and academic economists:
Gibson's paradox
Keynes saw direct This is the observation by the economist, J.M. Keynes, that during the period of the
correlation between Gold Standard, there was a direct correlation between the long-term interest rate
LT interest rates and (Keynes used the yield on British "Consols") and the general price level. The paradox
general price levels stemmed from the way it differed from the consensus view that the long-term interest
was correlated with the rate of change in prices, i.e. inflation. Under Gibson's Paradox,
with a gold standard, a falling price level corresponded with falling real interest rates.
With the gold price fixed, the purchasing power of gold is obviously increasing.
The thinking behind Gibson's Paradox can be transferred into today's world of floating
gold prices and fiat money. A rising gold price equates to a falling price level (in terms
of gold purchasing power) and lower real interest rates. This makes sense as falling
real yields make holding financial assets less attractive, while rising real interest rates
increase the opportunity cost of holding gold (which has zero or a minimal yield). In
simple terms and outside of a Gold Standard, Gibson's Paradox suggests that the
gold price rises as the attraction and confidence in financial/paper assets declines.
This was neatly outlined by former Fed Governor, Wayne Angell, in the minutes of an
FOMC meeting in July 1993 (before price suppression began).
"The price of gold is pretty well determined by us… But the major impact on the price
of gold is the opportunity cost of holding the US dollar… We can hold the price of gold
very easily; all we have to do is to cause the opportunity cost in terms of interest rates
and US Treasury bills to make it unprofitable to own gold".
The following chart shows the relationship between real US interest rates (10-year
Treasury yield minus CPI) and the gold price (inverted on the right-hand axis) since the
end of Bretton Woods:

Gibson's Paradox post-Bretton Woods
FRTCM1 0-US E BMCP I% 31/1/06

10 100
8 200
6 300
4 400
2 500
0 600
-2 700
-4 800
-6 900
72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
FRT CM10-USEBMCPI%
Gol d Bul lion $/T roy Ounc e(R.H.SCALE)
Source: Datastream
We would make several points relating to this chart:
− There is a clear correlation between the general trend of real interest rates and the
inverse movement in the gold price (NB after gold ownership became legal again
in the US in 1974, sales by the US Treasury initially restrained the price).
− The end of the bull market in gold in 1980, clearly shown in the chart, was
triggered by Paul Volcker's (then Fed Chairman) unwavering desire to squeeze
inflation out of the system using higher interest rates (echoing Fed Governor
Angell's comment).
− The chart shows a clear divergence in the trends for several years beginning in
the mid-1990s at the time that GATA alleges the recent suppression of the gold
price began.
− Gibson's Paradox is a free market phenomenon. Studies have shown that it was
disrupted by government intervention in the gold market after World War 1 and
the London Gold Pool in the run-up to the collapse of Bretton Woods. In both of
these instances, when government intervention was relaxed, the gold price rose
strongly and found its correct market level. Given renewed intervention by
governments in the gold market from around 1995, it seems reasonable to expect
the same to occur this time.
Our conclusion on what drives the gold market is that the gold price "comes out
of hiding" as real yields on financial assets decline and especially as the risk of a
financial crisis in terms inflation or deflation rises. As the risk rises, the role of
gold as "true" money and a store of value reasserts itself. In essence, gold acts
as a barometer of the financial attraction and confidence level of paper money.

VI— GOLD AND THE US ECONOMY
US real interest The historically low levels of real interest rates (even using the understated CPI data)
rates unlikely to rise suggest a supportive outlook for gold prices. At this stage we see little likelihood of a
significantly yet significant rise in real US interest rates given the precarious state of consumer
indebtedness.
Two extreme Within this positive scenario for gold prices we examine the risks that the US economy
scenarios: both would could enter a period of either rapidly rising inflation or, alternatively, move into
boost gold price recession and possibly a deflationary slump, both of which would be likely to put even
more upward pressure on the gold price.
Monetary tightening illusory, we have asset inflation

Since 30 June 2004, the Federal Reserve has been raising US short-term interest rates
in the shape of the Fed Funds. The Fed Funds rate has risen by 325bp from 1.00% to
4.25%. This suggests a tightening of US monetary policy in order to constrain growth
and lending activity and reduce the risk of accelerating inflation.
US monetary tightening is illusory - 10-yr Treasury and M3 growth
FRTCM1 0 25/1/06
5.00 8.00
4.50 7.50
4.00
7.00
3.50
6.50
3.00
6.00
2.50
5.50
2.00
5.00
1.50
4.50
1.00
0.50 4.00
J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
US T RE ASURY CONST ANT MA T URIT IES 10 Y R - MIDDLE RAT E
US FED FUNDS EFFECT RAT E (7 DAY A VG) - MIDDLE RAT E
US MONEY SUPPLY M3 - ANNUAL % CHANGE CURA(R.H.SCALE)
Source: Datastream
The chart above shows that this monetary tightening is illusory. Fed Chairman-elect
Ben Bernanke said in his speech, The Logic of Monetary Policy, in December 2004:
"…the most important economic decisions… depend much more on longer-term

interest rates…"
While the Fed Funds rate has risen 325bp, the 10-year Treasury yield has actually
fallen by 7bp. (This is highly unusual and Greenspan described it as a "conundrum".)
At the same time, the rate of M3 money supply growth is at its highest rate, now 8%,
since the Fed Funds began to rise.

Accommodative The reality is that US monetary policy remains accommodative, in fact, more
policy has boosted accommodative than it has been for 25 years. The main result of this accommodative
consumer spending monetary policy so far has been to support consumer expenditure and cause asset
and asset/commodity and commodity inflation almost across the board. After the NASDAQ bubble burst in
inflation 2000, it has been replaced by a number of other bubbles as the expanding money
supply chases price inflation as it moves from one asset class to another. The table
below shows the performance of several markets since the Bush Administration took
office.
− West Coast real estate was already rising in 2001 and this has continued.
− Hard commodities, like copper bottomed in late-2001, and have since more than
doubled.
− The Dow Jones Industrial Average bottomed in late-2002, although it has lagged
other asset classes significantly.
− Sugar, a soft commodity, saw its price reach a low in early 2004 and has risen
very sharply in recent months.
Asset and commodity inflation during current US administration
S UGCNRW 26/1/06
300
250
200
150
100
50
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Raw Cane Sugar,W orl d FOB Cents /l b US AVERAGE PRICE OF EXIST ING ONE
LME-Copper, Grade A Cas h U$/MT - A.M. OFFICIAL
DOW J ONES INDUST RIALS - PRICE INDEX Sourc e: DAT A ST REAM
Source: Datastream
The naïve quantity theory of money is that all prices move up in the same proportion in
response to a rise in the quantity of money. However, the transmission mechanism
that drives price changes is not uniform. This was identified many years ago by
prominent economists like Ludwig von Mises of the Austrian school.
In his book, Debt and Delusion, Peter Warburton identifies the source of asset inflation
as the ability of large bond buyers (e.g. banks and investment funds) to buy new
money at a fixed price at longer maturities. Essentially, interest rates have not risen to
reflect increasing demand for borrowing by the Government and consumers. Instead,
the Fed merely supplies all the money that borrowers want to borrow. So far, most of
the savings to finance this borrowing have been channelled from abroad, given the US
savings ratio has fallen to zero.

When new money is initially created, it is injected into the bond market. If long-term
rates exceed short-term rates, as is normally the case, these banks and investment
funds benefit from a "carry trade" and the old "borrow short, lend long". While this
money may subsequently move around, it remains largely contained within financial
and commodity markets. This effect can be magnified through derivatives which give
banks and funds increased purchasing power for a given level of capital. If the new
money does have an impact on the prices of consumer goods, this is masked by
distortions in the CPI calculation (as we show below). In turn, this influences public
opinion regarding inflation expectations.
Bond market The conclusion here is that bond market is being distorted by inflation, in terms of the
distorted by inflation high rate of growth in the money supply. Given that the bond market is the foundation
for valuing other financial assets, like equities, the distortion works its way through the
system. Perhaps the best way of looking at commodities is not so much that the
prices of oil, copper, sugar, etc, are going up, but that the value of paper money in
terms of real goods is going down.
The impact of rapid money supply growth on the prices of consumer goods has been
masked by cheap Asian imports and distortions in the calculation of the CPI. The latter
is only part of the war waged by the US authorities on inflation indicators. It has also
included the termination of long bond issues in 2001 and (very importantly) the
announcement that M3 money supply data will no longer be published by the Fed
from March 2006.
US economy While asset inflation rages, the heavily-indebted US economy also remains vulnerable
vulnerable to recession to recession, or even a deflationary slump, if credit expansion and consumer
expenditure slow. The bond market has been a very reliable predictor of US
recessions in the last 30-40 years. In fact, five out of the last six times that the yield
curve has inverted, i.e. short-term rates exceeded long-term rates, the US economy
subsequently contracted. The only exception was in 1966. The chart below shows
how close the yield curve is currently to inverting.
Yield curve close to inverting (10-year – Fed Funds)
FRTCM10 26/1/06
20
18
16
14
12
10
0
64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
US T REASURY CONST ANT MAT URIT IES 10 YR - MIDDLE RAT E
US FED FUNDS EFFECT RAT E (7 DAY AVG) - MIDDLE RAT E
Source: Datastream
The next chart shows the trend in consumer credit outstanding and its year-on-year
change in the US. Consumer credit outstanding, mainly credit card debt and car loans,
is now close to USD2.2tn, or about USD20,000 per household.

US consumer credit outstanding & year-on-year change (%)
US CRDOU TB 26/1/06
2200 18
16
2000
14
1800
12
1600 10
8
1400
6
1200 4
2
1000
0
800
-2
600 -4
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
US CONSUMER CREDIT OUT ST ANDING CURA
(PCH#(USCRDOUT B,1Y))(R.H.SCALE)
Source: Datastream
While the US was in a mild recession during 2001, US consumers continued to take on
more debt, but the rate has been slowing. The year-on-year growth is now at its
slowest for more than a decade and could indicate that US consumers are almost
"tapped out". The words of Ludwig von Mises come to mind:
"There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit
expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as a result of
a voluntary abandonment of further credit expansion, or later as a final and total
catastrophe of the currency system involved".
With those last words of von Mises, it is timely to discuss the new Fed Chairman and
his thinking on monetary policy
Gold and Bernanke

Chairman-elect The Fed Chairman-elect, Ben Bernanke, steps into the shoes of Alan Greenspan at the
Bernanke… end of this month. His approach to monetary policy will be critical to the prospects for
inflation, the US dollar and, hence, gold. While Bernanke has promised to continue
Greenspan's policies, his speeches and published work may should give us a good
sense of his approach to monetary policy. There are several key themes:
… is keen to combat − He seems intensely interested, almost to the point of obsession, with the risk of
deflation… deflation and the need to combat it through inflationary measures. We discuss
this very important issue for the gold price in more detail below.
… expects US − An improvement in the US current account deficit will only be gradual and will
current acct deficit require saving-friendly policies in the US and an improving investment climate in
to improve only the developing world. He disputes the view that the US current account deficit is
gradually… largely of its own making. Instead, he sees it more as the result of a glut of global
saving, especially in the developing world.

… believes in clear − Bernanke is a strong believer in the importance of communication of, and clarity
communication, in, monetary policy. Indeed, he believes that Fed's credibility on inflation would be
perhaps with medium- enhanced by setting a target range for the medium-term.
term inflation target
As mentioned above, a disproportionate number of Bernanke's speeches and
publications deal with the threat of deflation. We found eight on the Federal Reserve
website, although there may be more.
− Deflation (November 2002)
− Speech on Milton Friedman's 90th birthday (November 2002)
− Deflation Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here in (2002)
− Some thoughts on Monetary Policy in Japan (May 2003)
− An Unwelcome Fall in Inflation (July 2003)
− Money, Gold and the Great Depression (March 2004)
− Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment

(September 2004)
− The Logic of Monetary Policy (December 2004)
Many of these speeches and reports examine the mistakes in monetary policy during
the last two major deflationary episodes, the US during the Great Depression and
Japan in the 1990s. His views on these two major events can be summarised as
follows:
1930s depression… − He agrees with Milton Friedman that the Great Depression of the 1930s was
caused by tightening of monetary policy at the wrong time in a misguided attempt
to keep a lid on the stock market bubble. This led to a contraction in the money
supply and deflation.
… and Japanese − When Japan suffered from deflation, Bernanke notes that although the Japanese
deflation… cut short-term nominal interest rates to almost zero, monetary policy remained
too tight. His thinking is that even zero short-term interest rates are consistent
with positive real rates equivalent to the rate of deflation. Secondly, even if short-
term rates are at zero, rates at the longer end of the yield curve tends to remain
higher.
… hold lessons for The lessons for Bernanke from these two events were:
Bernanke
− Do not try to counteract asset bubbles.
"…First, the Fed cannot reliably identify bubbles in asset prices. Second, even if it
could identify bubbles in asset prices, monetary policy is far too blunt a tool for
effective use against them."
− Aggressive monetary inflation is the answer as he expounded in the famous

"printing press" speech, Deflation: Making sure it doesn't happen here given to
the National Economists Club in November 2002:
"The conclusion that deflation is always reversible under a fiat money system follows
from basic economic reasoning... Like gold, US dollars have a value only to the extent
that they are strictly limited in supply. But the US government has a technology called
a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent) that allows it to produce as many
US dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of dollars in
circulation… the US government can reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and
services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and
services."

− If cutting short-term interest rates to zero (the "zero bound" in Bernanke speak) is
ineffective at preventing deflation, he advocates the use of "non-traditional"
means to lower yields across the whole of the yield curve and flood the system
with liquidity. Bernanke lists several ways in these speeches and publications that
a big injection of liquidity could be made:
"…I see the first stages of a non-traditional campaign is focused on lowering long-term
interest rates… Such measures might include... increased purchases of longer-term
government bonds by the Fed, an announced program of oversupplying bank
reserves… and the issuance of options to borrow from the Fed at low rates."
"…the Federal Reserve might be able to influence term premiums, and thus overall
yields, by shifting the composition of its holdings, say from shorter-to longer-dated
securities… Perhaps the most extreme… is an announced ceiling on some longer-term
yield below the prevailing rate. This policy entails (in principle) an unlimited
commitment to purchase the targeted security at the announced price."
"… announce explicit yields on longer-maturity Treasury debt… through unlimited

purchases of securities up to two years from maturity… operate in the markets for
agency debt (for example mortgage-backed securities issued by Ginnie Mae, the
Government National Mortgage Association)."
All of Bernanke's suggestions risk rapid monetary inflation and would be picked up in
M3 data if the latter was available beyond March 2006. He has become increasingly
convinced of the benefits of these non-traditional approaches:
"Should the funds rate approach zero, the question will arise again about so-called
non-traditional monetary policy measures. I first discussed some of these measures in
a speech last November. Thanks in part to a great deal of fine work by the staff, my
understanding of these measures and my confidence in their success has been greatly
enhanced since I gave that speech."
Our suspicion is that Bernanke will try to keep the US credit expansion going as
long as possible (probably with the inevitable consequences). A further leg in the
current credit expansion and inflationary boom in assets (with hyperinflationary
risk) seems most likely outcome at this stage. At the same time, the heavily debt-
laden US economy is also at risk of a deflationary slowdown. .There is only one
asset class that will perform under both of these extreme scenarios: gold (and
precious metals).

APPENDIX 1
End of Bretton Woods & last remnants of Gold Standard

Bretton Woods worked reasonably well until the late 1950s when the US moved from a
current account surplus in 1957 to significant deficits during 1958-60. During this
period, US treasury gold reserves declined by 22%. Concerns about the dollar began
to mount, especially in the run-up to the US election in late 1960. The price suddenly
rose to over USD40/oz and the Bank of England and Federal Reserve were forced to
sell gold reserves to maintain the price at USD35/oz. In early 1961 a formal agreement
was reached between the US and eight European nations (including the UK, Germany
and France) to keep the gold price at USD35/oz, leading to the creation of the London
Gold Pool.
The Vietnam War caused the system to break down again as the US budget deficit
soared and there was a rush to convert US dollars into gold. By 1968, when the Gold
Pool was disbanded, US gold reserves had fallen 52% from their 1957 level. Prior to
this, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve had said that he would defend the US dollar
"down to the last ingot"! France, under the direction of President de Gaulle, withdrew
from the Gold Pool and was particularly aggressive in converting US dollars into gold,
thereby triggering the dollar's devaluation.
After the collapse of the Gold Pool, a two-tier market developed in gold. Central banks
would continue to trade between themselves at a price of USD35/oz but the price
could float freely in the private sector. In August 1971, Nixon imposed a wage freeze in
an attempt to contain inflation and the gold backing of the US dollar was removed.
Many commentators at the time expected a break in the direct link between currencies
and gold to lead to a fall in the gold price. In reality, this just showed the weakness of
paper currency and the gold price quickly rose to over USD200/oz.

APPENDIX 2
The covert war on inflation indicators

For the last decade, the US monetary authorities have been waging war on anything
that could warn markets about rising inflation. Besides the gold price, this has
included the methodology for calculating the Consumer Price Index (CPI), the
elimination of the Long Bond and, most recently, the announcement that M3 will no
longer be reported. Rising inflation, in the sense of the official CPI figure, is considered
so dangerous by the US authorities for a variety of reasons:
− It increases the cost to the US Government of welfare programmes, such as

pensions, social security, veterans and other benefits. These costs are all
adjusted by the CPI annually.
− It means higher interest rates and, therefore, a higher cost of servicing the
massive US debt burden and higher mortgage costs for US consumers.
− It has a negative impact on stock, bond and real estate markets which have
become critical to the confidence, spending patterns and balance sheets of US
consumers. Consumer expenditure accounts for 70% of US GDP.
In more detail, the covert war on the true level of inflation has been waged as follows:
Changes in CPI calculation methodology

John Williams is a consulting economist and has specialised in US Government
economic reporting for more than 20 years. His work (see www.shadowstats.com) has
received coverage in the New York Times and other media and eventually led to a
meeting with representatives of all the US Government's statistical agencies. However,
Williams notes that:
"Despite minor changes to the system, government reporting has deteriorated sharply
in the last decade or so".
In Williams' view the CPI statistics were reasonably good until the early 1990s but
have "succumbed to pressures from miscreant politicians". His report The Consumer
Price Index published in September 2004 highlights the most blatant distortions in the
calculation of the CPI used by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to reduce the published
CPI (CPI-U) numbers:
− Substitution of cheaper alternatives. Williams uses the example that when

steak gets too expensive, the CPI calculation assumes that consumers replace
more expensive steak with cheaper hamburgers, rather than buying more
expensive steak.
− Geometric weightings. Over several years the arithmetic weighting of CPI

components was changed to a geometric weighting. This had the effect of
lowering the weighting of CPI components rising in price and increasing the
weighting of those with falling prices.

− Hedonic regression. This is the strangest change of all and is used to offset
rising costs with increased pleasure experienced by consumers (hence its
derivation from the word "hedonism"). There are numerous studies by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics explaining why actual prices of consumer items are substituted
for "quality adjusted" lower prices based on consumer enjoyment. In his work,
Williams uses the examples of an increase in the cost of gasoline due to the cost
of a federally mandated gasoline additive and the increase in the cost of washing
machines due to more technically advanced washing machine technology. The
full impact of price increases such as these does not show up in the CPI figures
due to the alleged incremental enjoyment consumers gain from cleaner air and
cleaner clothes.
− Intervention analysis. This is used to moderate the seasonal swings in goods

such as food and energy. While price rises never get fully reflected in the CPI,
Williams notes that "declining prices sure do".
CPI thought to The changes in CPI methodology since the Clinton Administration are estimated by
understate true level of Williams to have led to the CPI figures systematically understating the true level of US
US inflation by 2.7% inflation by 2.7% on an ongoing basis.
The Fed's focus on the "core" level of inflation is also misleading. The core CPI is
calculated by excluding the "volatile food and energy" components. At around one
quarter of total consumer expenditure, these categories are very significant, especially
when energy prices are so high.
The Long Bond

On Halloween in 2001, the US Treasury announced that it would no longer issue new
30-year Treasury bonds. This instrument was seen as a bellwether for monitoring
inflation expectations and the most important measure of risk-free nominal returns. It
was also used as the benchmark from which to price mortgages which, for most
consumers, represented their biggest monthly cash outflow.
The announcement came just after the Q3-01 US GDP number had been published,
signalling the first contraction in the US economy for a decade. The information was
on the Treasury's website 15 minutes before the announcement was made and certain
leading banks were active in the market prior to the announcement. At the time, the
Long Bond was trading very close to its all-time low, the US Treasury argued that it
would be cheaper to dispense with it and that expected future budget surpluses
meant that the US did not need to borrow money over such a long period of time.
These surpluses have obviously not materialised.
The end of new Long Bond issuance raised much debate at the time. Adam Hamilton
was particularly vociferous in his report Long Bond Assassinated in November 2001:
"The bottom line is the Long Bond would not participate in the great scam of denying
inflation while at the same time the Federal Reserve was frantically flooding the US
economy with new money… the Fed had brazenly manipulated short-term rates down
by 400bp in 10 short months, the Long Bond had coughed-up 12bp in yield... It had to
go… The Long Bond was assassinated to silence a key warning sign for the impending
inflationary tsunami rapidly approaching American shores!"
We was initially sceptical when we read this, but the chart of the Long Bond, the 10-
year Treasury Bond and the Fed Funds rate in the run-up to the announcement is
revealing. Not only was the Long Bond stubbornly refusing to track the Fed Funds rate
but it was also showing increasing divergence from the 10-year Treasury Bond. With
the demise of the Long Bond, the more "malleable" 10-year Treasury Bond became
the benchmark US interest rate by default.

Long Bond, the 10 year and Fed Funds 2000-01
FR TC M1 0 12/1/06
7.00
6.50
6.00
5.50
5.00
4.50
4.00
3.50
3.00
2.50
2.00
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O
US T RE AS URY CONST ANT MAT URIT IE S 10 Y R - MIDDLE RAT E
US T RE AS URY CONST ANT - 30 YR (D'DEA D' - MIDDLE RA T E
US FED FUNDS E FFE CT RAT E (7 DAY A VG) - MIDDLE RA T E e: DAT A ST RE AM
S ourc
Source: Datastream
The end of M3 reporting

In November 2005, the Fed quietly announced that it would suspend publication of the
M3 monetary aggregate data from 23 March 2006 onwards. M3 is the broadest of the
monetary aggregates and effectively equates to the money supply. When asked why
M3 publication was being discontinued, the Fed's reply was that M3 does not contain
any more relevant economic data than M2 and its role in monetary policy has
diminished. In addition, it will save the mighty Fed all of USD0.5m per annum. These
reasons are spurious.
From this March, currency traders, investors and foreign holders of the massive US
Treasury debt burden will not be able to track the rate at which the US monetary
authorities are debasing the US dollar. The value of the US dollar is essentially a claim
against the assets and future income of the US economy, just as an ordinary share or
corporate bond is a claim against the assets and future income of a company. Imagine
the impact on a company which gave itself the power to issue an undisclosed quantity
of new shares indefinitely without communicating the amounts publicly. If this was
possible, confidence in the company and its board of directors would evaporate, the
market's ability to assess the per share value would disappear and its share price
would collapse. This is effectively what the Federal Reserve will do in respect of the
dollar. A GATA supporter, Chuck Augustin, commented amusingly:
"…it looks like the boys are getting ready to unleash Weimar Republic II on the world.
Perhaps we should all be sure our wheelbarrows are in good working order…"
The exact details of the Fed's announcement are important, but first it is important to
understand the components of M3. M3 includes:
− M2, i.e. notes & coin + demand & other checkable deposits + savings deposits +
small-denomination time deposits + retail money funds; and
− large time deposits + repos (repurchase agreements) + institutional money market

accounts + Eurodollars.

The Fed will continue to report data on institutional money market accounts and large
denomination time deposits will still be seen in the Fed's Flow of Funds Accounts. The
only items investors will no longer be able to see are Repurchase Agreements and
Eurodollars. Is this significant? You bet!
In a Repo, the Fed purchases securities, i.e. US Treasury bonds, from the banking
system and credits the reserve accounts of the banks, thus adding liquidity to the
banking system and expanding the money supply. The fear is that the Fed will covertly
accelerate the monetisation of securities, flood the economy with liquidity and create
monetary inflation. Such action will no longer be observable to the market after 26
March this year.
During Greenspan's 18-year tenure, the money supply in terms of M3 has increased
by USD6.67tn, or 189%. The trend in the growth rate shows how an almost
continuous acceleration took the US out of the recession of the early 1990s and
sustained it through various shocks during the second half of the decade including the
Japanese deflation, Asian currency crisis, the Russian debt default and LTCM.
M3 money supply during the Greenspan era 1987-06
000'S US M3 ....B 18/1/06

11 14
10 12
9 10
8 8
7 6
6 4
5 2
4 0
3 -2
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
US MONEY SUPP LY M3 CURA
US MONEY SUPP LY M3 - ANNUAL % CHANGE CURA(R.H.SCALE)
Source: Datastream
The following chart shows on an indexed basis the trend in US M3 money supply and
the reported CPI during Greenspan's Chairmanship. This chart shows that the sharp
divergence in the gradients of the two lines began in the mid-1990s. This is very
revealing in terms of the covert policies of the US monetary authorities. There is a
close fit with the timing that John Williams' alleges the distortion of the CPI data began
and GATA's view of the beginning of the suppression of the gold price.

US M3 money supply growth diverges from CPI
US M3 ....B 24/1/06
300
250
200
150
100
80
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05
US MONEY SUPP LY M3 CURA
Source: Datastream

Intentionally blank

Intentionally blank

Important disclosures
Applicable disclosure clauses
Company Share price 30.01.06 Rating Disclosures

Anglo American 2157p 2/Outperform E
A. One or more companies in the Crédit Agricole S.A. group own more than 1% of the total issued share capital of the Company.
B. The Company owns more than 5% of the total issued share capital of Crédit Agricole SA.
C. One or more companies in the Crédit Agricole S.A. group held as of the last trading day of the past month, a net sales position
higher than 1% of the total issued share capital of the Company.
D. The trading portfolio of one or more companies in the Crédit Agricole S.A. group contains shares of the Company.
E. Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux and/or a company in the Crédit Agricole S.A. group is a market maker or a liquidity provider for the
financial instruments of the Company.
F. Calyon and/or a company of the Crédit Agricole S.A. group has been involved within the last three years in a publicly disclosed offer
of financial instruments of the Company.
G. Calyon and/or a company in the Crédit Agricole S.A. group has concluded or is party to a non confidential agreement relating to the
provision of investment banking services (except publicly disclosed offers) to the Company during the past 12 months or that has
given rise during the same period to the payment of compensation or to the promise to get a compensation paid.
H. This research has been communicated to the Company and following this communication, its conclusions have been amended
before its dissemination.
I. A director or a board member of the Crédit Agricole S.A. group is an officer, director, or board member of the Company.
Specific disclosure clauses
None.
Cheuvreux's rating and target price system
Ratings are built for a 6 to 12 month time horizon.

1/Selected List Expected to outperform the market and is in our country selected list
2/Outperform Expected to outperform the market
3/Underperform Expected to perform at best in line with the market
4/Sell Expected to underperform the market substantially
No Rating or Suspended The investment rating and target price have been suspended. Such suspension is pursuant to
Cheuvreux's policy in circumstances when Cheuvreux's parent company, Calyon, is acting in an
advisory capacity in a merger or strategic transaction involving this company or when Calyon or
Crédit Agricole has a beneficial interest in this company and in certain other circumstances.
Target price methodology Cheuvreux's target prices are derived from one or more of the following methodologies: DCF,
SOTP, peer comparison and EVA.

Breakdown by rating category (as at 30/09/2005)
350
300
Number of companies
250 in each category
200
150
Number of companies
in each rating having
100 received Calyon
investment banking
50 services within the last
12 months
0
1/Selected List 2/Outperform 3/Underperform 4/Sell
Source: Cheuvreux
Dates of changes in target price and/or rating
N° Date Rating Target price

1 24/09/2003 2/Outperform 1306p
2 25/02/2004 1466p
3 26/01/2006 2500p
Source: Cheuvreux
Local regulatory authorities
Country Cheuvreux legal entity Regulatory authority

France Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux SA Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF)
Germany Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux Niederlassung – Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Bafin)
Frankfurt Branch
Italy Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux Italia SIM SpA Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob)
Netherlands Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux - Amsterdam Branch Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM)
Spain Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux España SV SA Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)
Sweden Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux Nordic AB Finansinspektionen
Switzerland Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux - Zurich Branch Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC)
United Kingdom Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux International Ltd Financial Services Authority (FSA)
This report is issued by Crédit Agricole Cheuvreux International Ltd.

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United Kingdom Metals & Mining

I— Introduction and gold price forecast .............................................................. Page 06

II— Anglo American & gold mining stocks........................................................... Page 09

III— Gold: central banks and derivatives ............................................................... Page 12

IV— Analysis of the gold market .................................................................................. Page 16

V— Gold versus the US dollar: only one winner ............................................... Page 33

VI— Gold and the US economy ................................................................................... Page 40

Appendix 1 ................................................................................................................................. Page 46

Appendix 2 ................................................................................................................................. Page 47

CHEUVREUX'S METALS & MINING TEAM

Metals & Mining Sector 2

Metals & Mining Sector 3

Metals & Mining Sector 4

Gold price 1998-2006 (USD) Gold/oil ratio

DowJones Industrials/gold ratio US M3 money supply diverges from CPI

Metals & Mining Sector 5

I— INTRODUCTION AND GOLD PRICE FORECAST

Gold price since 1998 (USD)

Gold Bullion $ /Tr oy Ounce

HIGH 527.50 5/ 1/06 LOW 253.25 26/ 8/99 LAST 527.50

− the change of Fed Chairman;

− rising geopolitical risk;

− rising commodity prices in general; and

− fears over dollar weakness (as yet unfounded).

Metals & Mining Sector 6

Gold/Oil ratio (Brent crude)

Metals & Mining Sector 7

Dow Jones Industrials/Gold ratio

Sourc e: DAT A ST REAM

Gold price forecast

(USD/oz) 2005 2006E 2007E 2008E 2009E 2010E

− The US economy enters a phase of either deflation or rapidly rising inflation

Metals & Mining Sector 8

II— ANGLO AMERICAN & GOLD MINING STOCKS

Anglo American (2157p) Mining - 30 January 2006

Rating: 2/Outperform/Buy - Target price: +15.9% 2500p Paul Mylchreest

To 31/12 (USD) 2004 2005E 2006E 2007E

Market capitalisation USD54375m FTSE ALL-SHARE 2936.58 1 month 3 months 12 months

Large cap play on gold and precious metals

− The restructuring programme announced in late 2005 will begin in earnest

− A more aggressive policy on returning surplus capital to shareholders also

− Anglo American is vulnerable to takeover with its financial performance lagging

Anglo American's strategic direction

Metals & Mining Sector 9

Metals & Mining Sector 10

Gold mining stocks: overview

Top 10 gold mining stocks: market capitalisation (USD bn)

Company Market cap

Metals & Mining Sector 11

III— GOLD: CENTRAL BANKS AND DERIVATIVES

Central banks: officially reported gold holdings

Rank Country/entity tonnes at Sep-05 Gold as % of reserves

Source: World Gold Council

Metals & Mining Sector 12

− It helped to calm financial markets at times of actual or feared

− It is positive for the perception of US monetary policy. A low gold price

− It prevented major commercial and investment banks incurring substantial

Metals & Mining Sector 13

Metals & Mining Sector 14

Gold derivatives: total notional value 1998-2005 (USD bn)

Metals & Mining Sector 15

IV— ANALYSIS OF THE GOLD MARKET