UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE F O

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
?JoseRanion R. Pusciial I V

INTRODUCTION
Upon t h e promulgation of t h e Family Code of t h e Philippines.' a nen. ground for considering marriages void a b iiiitio was added to t h e existing grounds contained in the Civil Code. This ground is commonly referred t o as psychological incapacity a n d is embodied in Article 36 of rlie Family Code which, as amended. reads:
A marriage contracted by a n y party who a t t h e time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential niarital obligations of marriage shall 1 i k P ~ i i ebe \ o l d even if such incapacity becomes manifest onlv aftei its solemnization

A great deal of controversy surrounded t.his cause for t h e declaration of nullity of inarriage.3 The root of t h e controversy ~ v a t h e s lack of a straightforward definit,ion of psychological incapacity LI rider t h e law,4 compounded by t h e omission of t h e Civil Code Revision Committee to give examples thereofq5which made t h e term susceptiblc to varying interpretations.

Exec. Order No. 209 (1987).

Member. Editorial Board. Philippine Law J o u r n a l .

Article 36 w a s amended by Exec. Order No. 227 dated 1 7 J u l y 1987 which ctcletctl t.he sentence The action for declaration of nullity of t h e marriage under this Article shall prescribe in t e n years after its celebration. T h e 10-year prescriptirrr. periucl i v a s incorporated i n Article 39. S a n t o s v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019. J a n u a r y 4. 1995. 240 SCILA 2 0 (1995). Id. a t 26. :. SEAIPIO-DIY, H:IKnEOOI< OS THE F x m Y C O D E OF THE ~ I ~ l I ~ l I ~ P I37 f (~1~ S I S 988,. Snlita v. hlagtolis, G.R. 106429, J u n e 13. 1994, 233 SCR4 100. 107: I d . a t 31.

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hIuch of the controversy was resolved by the Supreme Court i n tlrc. I-ase of I?epirblic u. Coirl-t of Appeals arid Molina (hereafter referred t 1 % 6 1 s f!Io/tnuIwhcre guidelines for the interpretation a n d application o f lLi i d e X were laid down. However, in this case, the Court still did not t :I\ e an Pxplicit definition of psychological incapacity.

I n this note, the origin a n d development of this novel ground are traced in a n attempt to provide the reader with a better grasp of what c:nnstitu.tes psychological incapacity. Included is a recapitulation o f t h e deliberations of the Civil Code Revision Committee on what is presently Article 36 as well as a review of the Supreme Court rulings as r~t~gards psychological incapacity. Special attention is devoted to the Llfooiiiiuguidelines, of which a brief critique is made.

THEGENESIS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

I n 1979, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines constituted t h e

F I n d i Lam Revision Committee (hereafter Family Law Committee) cr hicL ~ T R S tasked with preparing a draft of a revision of Book I of the
il Code of the Philippines The said committee held meetings a t the U n n ~ ~ s i t y the Philippines Law Center from September. 1979 to of hlareh, 1984. Thereafter, the draft was turned over to the Civil Code TsIon Co?nmiflee (hereafter referred to as Code Committee) of the [AV, Center, which went over and revised the draft up until hlay, 1987
I 11

The Family Law Committee initially thought of including a ,rr.ipter on absolute divorce in the draft.8 Justice Jose B.L. Reyes lvas r ~ t i \ i c s t todprepare a proposal o n this matter. Subsequently, however, ~ tl\c> Code Committee defined marriage a s n special contract of permanent partnership between a m a n n n d n woman entered into i n accordance with law for t h e Pqtablishment of conjugal a n d family life I t is a n inviolable social

(8

K ~ p u b l i c Court of Appeals and Molina, G R No. 108763, February 13, 1997 (erk T

hyl/r)

1)ri op crt note 5 snpru at yyviii Couit of Appeals supra a t 39 (Romero J , concurring) (quoting a lettei it. 1 ;11-1111 15 1985 from J u d g e Alicia Y Sempio-Diy written on behalf of t h e ini!! L,I R arid Civil Code Rexision Committees to Assemblywoman hlercedes d c ,111 a11e c o Te odoi 0 )

Si-\IPiil

II~IOS x

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NATURE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF

I4 1

institution whose nature. consequences, a n d incidents arcgoverned by law a n d not subject to stipulation, except t h a t marriage settlements m a y fix t h e property relations during $ 1 1 ~ marriage within t h e limits provided by law.9

Considering this definition and the Christian traditional concept of' marriage as a permanent, inviolable, and indissoluble soc:i:il inst,itution upon which the family and society are founded, and r e a l k i n e the strong opposition t h a t any provision on absolute divorce n ~ o ud I invite from the Catholic Church and the Catholic sect,or of the citizenry. the committee abandoned the idea of absolute divorce. The Code Committee instead opted for a n action for judicial declat,ation of inrTalidity of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Lam . ! ! I Such a n action, it was believed, would not only be a n acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve the problem of c h u r c h annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized under civil hv,. Justice Reyes was again requested to draft the provisions for s u c h a n action for declaration of nullity of marriage. Later, the committ.ee decided to consolidate the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Rej-es in order to avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages." Tile result was the inclusion of "psychological incapacity" in the proposed Article 35 on void marriages, to wit:
Article 35. - The following marriages shall be void from t h e beginning: .... ( 7 ) Those marriages contracted by a n y party who, a t t h e time of t h e celebration, w a s wanting in t h e sufficient use of reason 01. judgment to understand t h e essential n a t u r e of marriage or w a s psychologically incapacitated to discharge t h e essential marit-a1 obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after t h e celebration."

c,

10

Id. a t 39-40.

id at 40.

Id.. CI\?L CODE AND F A J i I L I L W COIlMIYrEES, hfIN1WES OF T H E 1.18'"' ~ E E ~ r I Y i : A ~ ti [hereinafter 148Tr1 MEETING] (held on 26 J u l y 1986) (unpublished, availuble in tlic U.P. College of Law Libraryj.

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This ground was lifted from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which provides:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1.

who lack sufficient use of reason: who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; who, for causes of psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage.14

2.

3.

OF UNEARTHING THE NATURE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY: OF THE CIVIL CODE REVISION COMMITTEE T H E DELIBERATIONS

The Code Committee took up the proposed Article 35 in its 1 4 W meeting. During the deliberations on subparagraph (7), a debate took place on the nature of psychological incapacity. The core of t h e controversy was whether or not psychological incapacity is a vice of consent and, concomitantly, whether it ought to be a ground for voidable, instead of void, marriages.
On subparagraph (7), which was lifted from the Canon Law, Justice Reyes suggested t h a t they say wanting in sufficient use instead of wanting in the sufficient use, b u t Justice mduardo P.] Caguioa preferred to say wanting in the sufficient use. On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed t h a t they say wanting in sufficient reason. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is t h a t one is not lacking in judgment but t h a t he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added t h a t lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge [Alicia V. Sempio-] Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious t h a n insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested t h a t subparagraph (7) be modified to read:

I d . at 8. Santos v. COURT APPEALS supra a t 32; see A. SEMPIO-DIY, czt. note 5 supra OF , op. a t 36.

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That contracted by any party who, a t the time of the celebration, was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest after the celebration. Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase was imrttirtg zit use of reasori or jiidgrnerit to icnderstand the essential uafure of marriage refers to defects in the iuerttal faculties ~ ~ f i a t i r i g consent, uhicli is riot tlie idea i i t subparagraph (7), but lack of appieciatioii of ones marital obligations.
siifficieiit

Justice Caguioa stated t h a t there are two interpretations of the phrase psychologically or mentally incapacitated - in the first one, there is vltiation of consent, while in the second one there is no understanding of the effects of the marriage He added that the first one would fall under insanity. Justice [Ricardo C ] Puno, however, opined t h a t in the second interpretation, there is also mtiation of consent because one does not know all the consequences of the marriage, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage

Prof [Esteban B ] Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psvchological iiicapacity a ground for voidable marriage since otheruise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim t h a t he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand tlie obligations of marriage Dean Fortunato] Gupit [Jr ] added t h a t it is a loose way of provlding for divorce Justice Caguioa explained t h a t his point is t h a t in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, theie is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it would be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appeaiance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there a l e cases wlicii the insanity is curable He emphasized that psychological

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tIicopcicit\' does iiot refer to riiental facitllres aiid has riothirig to do

crlitli ro7iserit,

it

refers to obligatioris attendant to riinrrmge.15

It this point in the meeting, the committee defined the bases for c-formulating the provisions on void and voidable marriages Upon Ju 5 t i ~ e Puno's suggestion, the committee determined the classification b n i e s for the void character of marriage in Article 35. I n so doing ' p%:y cliological incapacity" was classified under inarriages void 015rrritro comprim~g special cases a n d special situations. But the debate was far flicalrl c/T/er
3
( b f

On pwchologicnl incapacitv, Piof F l e i i d a Ruth P ] Roinero niqiiirecl if they do not consider it a s going t o t h e very essence of c o n i e n t S h e asked if they a r e ieally removing it from consent 111 1 eplv, ,Ji/ltstrce Cagirioa e x p l a i ~ e d that, rdtirriatelv, consent $ r i gerreral i s affected biit he stressed tlmt hts porrit cs that i t LS not prriicipalis a ciitrutzori o f coriserit s i i m there I S a valid coiiserit H e objected to the Ininping togethei of the validity of t h e m a celebiatioii arid t h e obligations a t t e n d a n t to marriage, which a r e cornple(e1y different from each other, because they require a tlilfeieiit capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but 111 contiact, it 15 different JiLstrcP Ririo, however, felt / h a t psithological iiicupacztv i s still Q kind of oice o f consent arid that i t i i i o i r l d riot be classified as a rlordable rriarraage iditch is iricapabic of toriiulidatioii, Lt slioirld be coiiralidated but there rrioidd be no
pr C'SCI rpfror1

Justice p e o n o r Ines-] Luciano suggested t h a t they invite a p s ~ h i a t r i s t who is t h e expert o n this m a t t e r Justice Caguioa, , however. reiterated t h a t psychological incapacity cs rLot a defect L I I t h e iririid brrt i i i the i~iiderstar~dzng the CoiisequeiLces of marriage, of inid t h v e f o r e , a psychiatrist will riot be of help ' 6

i\biie III

After further deliberation, the committee agreed to include the the matters for policy decision a t the next meeting.

li

lo

I IS"' hfT<I?TIN(x see note 12 srrpra, a t 8-10 (emphasis added) 4d a t I 2 (rinphasis added)

I n its 14gth meeting, the Code Committee made a review of Article 35.17 It was agreed in principle t h a t subparagraph (7) should he the subject of a separate article. This came about when t h e committee considered the question of prescription of the action for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Justice Puno raised the question: If it is a void marriage, the declaration of nullity is imprescriptible. Supposing the spouse, who had the psychological incapacity, is already dead, can the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage be bronght even after the death of the psychologically incapacitated spouse for the purposes of determining the legal effects of the marriage? In reply, Justice Caguioa stated that the action is not imprescriptible but should be brought within ten years. After further discussion, Justice Puno remarked t h a t the problems may be solved if they will go back to the bases since they may want to segregate subparagraph ( 7 ) Justice Reyes opined t h a t at the very least, it should be a separate article, with which the other members concurred

The Code Committee took up for policy decision t h e issue of whether or not psychological incapacity is a specie of vice of consent in its 150thmeeting.l9
Justice Pun0 formulated the next article a s follows: Article 3 7 . A marriage contracted by any party who, a t the t,ime of t,he celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest aft,er its solemnization. Justice Caguioa suggested that even if be substituted with although On the other hand, Prof Bautista proposed t h a t the clause although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
CI\711, CODE AND FAMILY LAW COMMITTEES, MINUTESOF THE 149 MEETING3 bereinafter 14gTMEETING] (held on 2 August 1986) (unpublished, available in the U.P. College of Law Library). Is I d a t 5. *) CIVIL CODE AND FAMILY LAWCOMMITTEES, MINUTES THE 1501 OF MEETING (held 4 on 9 August 1986) (unpublished, available in the U.P. College of Law Library).

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manifestation of psychological incapacity. Jiist,ice Cagnioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse. Judge Diy suggested t h a t they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity Justice Cagrrzoa explained that riiei~fal aiid physical iiicapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is riot a specie of vice of consent Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting: On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated t h a t the phrase psychological or mental impotence is a n invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, t h a t is why it is considered a weak phrase He said t h a t the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as psychological or mental incapacity to discharge Justice Caguioa remarked t h a t they deleted the word mental precisely to devoid it of vlce of consent He explaiiied that ~sycliologicaliiicapaczty refers to lack o f uriderstaiidrrig o f the essential obligations of marriage

reminded the rrieinbers that, at the last riieetiiig, Justice p l ~ i i o tliey have decided not to go into the classificatioii of ~sychologicnl incapacity because there was a lot of debate on it arid that this is precisely the reason iuhy they classified zt as a special case
At this point, Justice Pun0 remarked that, since there have been church annulments of marriage arising fkoin psychological incapacity, Civil Law should now reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.2o

After further deliberation, the committee agreed to place R 10year prescriptive period on the action for declaration of nullity due to psychological incapacity. Thus, Article 37 read:
A marriage contracted by any party who, a t the time of the celebration. was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
I d . a t 9-10,

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beginning although such incapacity becomes manifest after i t s solemnization

The action for declaration of nullity of t h e marriage under t h i s Article shall presciibe in 10 years after its celebration 2 1

Thc Code Committee approved t h e provision. T h i s would become what 15 now Article 3 C of t h e Family Code. Based on t h e foregoing, it a p p e a r s t h a t :
(1) Psychological incapacity does not refer to m e n t a l faculties iior is it a defect of t h e mind;

(2) It refers to t h e lack of appreciation of oces m a r i t a l obligations or the luck of understanding of t h e essential obligations of marriage ; a n d
(3) I t is not a specie of vice of consent b u t , r a t h e r , it is classified ;is a special case.
SUPREME COURT

RULINGS N ARTICLE O F T H E FAMILY O 36 CODE

T h e S u p r e m e Court found t h e occasion to acknowledge t h a t the scope of Article 36 was i n need of circumscription i n t h e case of Strlifa 0 . .llcigtolis (hereafter referred to as Salita). T h e Court however desisted from addressing t h i s need because t h e t,hreshold issue i n t h a t case n-as t h e sufficiency of t h e allegations in t h e petition for a n n u l m e n t of marriage a n d t h e subsequent bill of particulars filed i n amplific a t ion thereof, a n d not, t h e scope nor t h e interpretation of Article 36. I n t h e decision, penned by Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, t h e S u p r e m e Court made t h e following observation:
K e do not see t h e need t o define or limit t h e scope of t h p p r o ~ i s i o n Not i n this case a t least For we a i e not called t o do so t h e actual controversy being t h e sufficiency of t h e bill of particulars To inteipret t h e provision a t t h i s juncture would be to give a n obiter dicti,rii which is ill-timed Besides, it a p p e a r s t h a t

I J at 12
2:

Salita v hlagtolis. sripra a t 107

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petitioner in her memorandum has demonstrated a good grasp of what Art 36 actually covers. Suffice it t say that Mme Justice a Sempio-Diy, formerly of the Court of Appeals and a member of the Ciwl Code Revlsion Committee t h a t drafted the Family Code, explainsThe Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear t h a t the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdern generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.23

The Supreme Court did not descry the need to limit the extent of -Article 36 in Salita. Such need would however arise in the landmark case of Saritos L. Court of Appeals (hereafter referred to a s Saxtos).24 In the latter, the Court gave its first definitive ruling on the scope of psychological incapacity.

In Santos, the Supreme Court made reference to the deliberations of the Code Committee t o shed some light on the import of Article 36. It also resorted to the jurisprudence under Canon Law as a n aid in the construction or interpretation of the coda1 provision.
On the nature of psychological incapacity, Justice Jose C. Vitug, on behalf of the majority, wrote:
Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage Thus correlated, bsycholoscal incapacity should refer to no less than a rnerital (not physical) Lncapacity that causes a party to be truly zncognitiue of the basic rnarital covenants that coricotnztantly must be assurned arid discharged by the parties to the triarrmge which, a s so expressed by

I d at 107-108 Santos v Court of Appeals, supra a t 20

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Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations t o live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.25

And. clarifying the animus underlying Article 36, it was explained that:
p ] h e use of the phrase psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances ... There is hardly any doubt t h a t the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of a n utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.26

In the case, Leouel Santos (Leouel) sought to have his marriage to Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos (Julia) declared a nullity, invoking Article 36. Leouel believed t h a t Julia was psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. His belief was grounded in Julias failure to return to the Philippines from the United States, where she was employed a s a nurse, a s well as her omission to communicate with the former for more t h a n five years. The trial court dismissed Leouels complaint and the respondent court affirmed. Leouel elevated the case to the Supreme Court on a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court denied the petition, holding t h u s The factual settings in the case a t bench, in no measure a t all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of mamage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggneved, even desperate, in his present situation Regrettably neither law nor society itself can always provlde all the specific answers to every indimdual problem.27

25
26

27

Id. at 33 (emphasis added) Id.. I d a t 36.

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The Supreme Court refused a similar petition in Chi Mirig Tsoi Corrrt of ;111-'peals.a8 Unlike in Santos, however, the Court determined that, the marriage in Chi Ming Tsoi was void ab triitio on the ground oh' psychological incapacity.
1'.

I n the latter case, Gina Lao-Tsoi ("Gina") was successful 111 procuring from the trial court a decree of nullity of her marriage to Chi Rling Tsoi based on Article 36. Not wanting the marriage annulled, the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals. The respondent court affirmed the trial court's decision and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration Chi Ming Tsoi elevated the case to the Supreme Court The statement of the case a n d of the facts made by t h e trial court reveal t h a t during a 10-month period beginning from the celebration of the marriage until their de facto separation, there w a s no attempt of sexual intercourse between the spouses. Gina claimed that this was s o because Chi Ming Tsoi was psychologically incapacitat,ed. The latter however alleged t h a t it was the former who avoided him. Both t h e trial court a n d the Court of Appeals gave more weight to the wife's presentation of evidence and found the husband t,o be suffering from psychological incapacity under Article 36. I n his petition for review, Chi Ming Tsoi contended t h a t the respondent court erred in holding t h a t the refusal to have sex constitutes psychological in cap acit y . The Supreme Court sustained the appellate court a n d held thai the marriage was void under Article 36. The Court, through Justice J u s t o P. Torres, Jr., held:
Evidentlv one of t h e essential m a r i t a l obligations under the Family Code is "To procieate children based on t h e univeisal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is t h e basic e n d of marriage " Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy t h e integrity or wholeness of t h e m a i i i a g e I n t h e case a t b a r t h e senseless a n d protracted refusal of one of t h e parties to fulfill t h e above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity 29
" i

."' Id

G R No 119190. J a n u a r y 16, 1997

Rt

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I n ruling in this manner, the Court found persuasive, if not controlling, the opinion of Dr. Gerard0 Ty Veloso, former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal i senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute s the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.3

While in Chi Ming Tsoi, the Court was content in ruling on the given facts a n d the related law a n d jurisprudence, it went beyond t h a t in the leading case of Republic L. Molir~a.~ln the latter, the Supreme I Court found the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpret,ation and application of Article 36, given t h a t , in spite of the Saritos ruling, interpreting the meaning of psychological incapacity. several lawyers a n d judges still had difficulty applying the provision in specific cases.32 I n deference to Justice Artemio V. Panganibans illuminating poriencia. the guidelines are reproduced in full:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the mariiage belongs to the plaintiff Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity This is rooted in the fact that both o m Constitution and our laws cheiish the validity of marriage and unity of the family Thus, our Constitution devotes a n entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the nation It decrees marriage as legally inwolable t h e i e h protecting it horn dissolution a t the whim of the parties Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the qtate

((I

3
i2

I d . a t 8-9. Republic v Court of Appeals, supra Id. a t 2.

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The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marnage arid t h e family and emphasizes their permanence. znc zolabrlztj and soltdurrt>
(2) The root coiise of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficirntly proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court t h a t the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, o r knowing them. could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so a s not to liinit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdern generis. nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists

( 3 ) The incapacity must be proven to be existing a t "the time of the celebration" of the marriage The evidence must show t h a t the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's ' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable a t such time but the illness itself must have attached a t such moment, or pi ior thereto
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse. not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated t o procreate, bear, and raise h i s h e r own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grace enough to bring about the disability of the partv to assume the essential obligations of iiiariiage Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as l o o t causes The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will In

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other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, a n adverse integral element in the personality structure t h a t effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting a n d thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code a s regards the husband and wife a s well a s Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code i n regard to parents and their children Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven b-J evldence and included in the text of the decision
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. I t is clear t h a t Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature. Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of o u r people, it stands to reason t,hat to achieve such harmonization. great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our law on evidence what is decreed a s canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void. This is one instance where, in view of the evident, source a n d purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church - while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family a s the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal arid the Solicitor General to appear a s counsel for the state No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly

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.tating thtlrein his reasons for his agreement 01 opposition as t h e r a > e m a r bc to t h e petition The Solicitor General along with t h e pioqecuting attorney shall i u b m i t to t h e court s u c h certification n i t h i n fiftc.cn (15) ( l a \ < from the date the caqe is deemed - 1 l b i ~ i l T t ~ t ~ resolution of the coui t fox T h e Solicitor ( k n e r a l shall di-chaiee the equivaleiit function of the deferisor L s i i m r i i conteiiiplatrd under Canon 1095 3 3

I n A41001r~icr,t h e Solicitor General filed a petition for review o n i(.rt iorari challenging t h e decision of t h e Court of Appeals affirming 111 ( o t o the decision of t h e trial court which declared the marriage of H o i itlel Olaviano Molina (Roridel) to Reynaldo hlolina (Re1naldo i 1 old iih iiirfro o n t h e ground of psychological incapacity u n d e r L4rticie 30 Petitioner contended t h a t the respondent court erred III i n t e i picting a n d applying ps1chological incapacit! to t h e facts of t h e
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Roridel claimed t h a t Reynaldo was immature, irresponsible tlcpendent, disrespectful, arrogant, a chronic liar, a n d a n infidel. I The appc~llate court agreed with t h e trial court in finding t h a t t h e marriage h t i t 1% m ~ nh e parties broke u p because of their opposing a n d conflicting t 11e 1 i 11a lit ie 5 o

T h e Supreme Court granted t h e petition a n d held t h a t t h e iage of Roridel a n d Reynaldo subsists a n d remains valid. Justice 1:rnganiban explained:
m:in

[Ilhere is no clear showing to u s t h a t t h e psychological defect spoken of is a n incapacity. I t appears to us to be inore of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in t h e performance of some inarital obligations. Mere showing of irrrconciliable differences arid conflicting personalities i n no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. I t is not enough to prove t h a t t h e parties failed t o meet their respoiisibilities and duties as married persons. i t i e,sseiitial t h a t they m u s t be shown to be incapable of doing so. s clue t o some psychological (not physical) illness.G

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NATUREOF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITT

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I n t h e aforementioned cases, particularly Saiitos a n d A l o / i i ) c i , t h e S u p r e m e Court explained t h e n a t u r e of psychological incapacih 111 a m a n n e r different from t h a t of the Code Committee I t is plain froin these decisions t h a t : (1) Psychological incapacity is rooted i n a rnenrql or psychological illness - The evidence m u s t convince t h e court t h a t t h e parties, or one o f t h e m , w a s mentally or psychically ill ; a n d (2) T h e psychologically incapacitated p a r t y is truly incognit,ive of t h e basic m a r i t a l covenants t h a t concomitantly m u s t be assumcd a n d discharged ... or could not, have known t h e obligations lie wiis assuming, or knowing t h e m , could not have given valid aSSumlJtl~JI1 thereof.

ARTICLE AND THE MOLINA 36 GUIDELINES

Although t h e guidelines for t h e interpretation and applic,tt ion of Article 36 laid down by t h e S u p r e m e Court in Moliiia ant instructive a n d facilitate a better understanding of psycholog~cal incapacity, some points need to be emphasized a n d others clarified
~ t b i y

Incapacity is defined a s t h e lack of capacity, or incapability : h n h i l e to incapacitate is to deprive of capacity or to disable. -lJolirr<i, as earlier s t a t e d , identified t h e root cause of psychological incapacitJ- as a m e n t a l or psychological illness. This recognition is t h e first. if not t h e crucial, step i n t h e quest to determine t h e real n a t u r e of psychological incapacit,y. I t i s proposed however that, a slight modification i n t,he Courts formulatjon he made. T would he c1carc.t~ t if it is said that psychological incapacity i s a n incapacity which is due: to a m e n t a l or psychological illness. I n like m a n n e r , physical incapacit,. is an incapacity which is d u e to a physical illness. Article 36 deals n.irh

Co71tm,I d . a t 27 (Romero. J., separate opinion) (I would add t h a t n e i t h r r ~ 1 i u u l d the incapacity be t h e result of mental illness. For if it were due to 1ns:initT~ or defects 111 the ~neiit;ilfaculties short of insailit>-,there is a resultant defect or ricc. of consent. t h u s rendering t h e marriage annullable under Art. 35 of the Family i o t l r ) 1 WICIISTER COMtW3HENSIVE DICTIONARY 638 (international ecl. 1984).
no I d .

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t h e former - the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.40
As regards the mental or psychological illness adverted to, it is submitted t h a t it should be given a strict a n d technical construction since the Court requires t h a t it must be medically or clinically identified.41 Mental illness, by is broader t h a n , a n d includes, psychological illness. The medical term however is mental disorder. Thus, psychological incapacity is a n incapacity which is due to a mental disorder a n d a person psychologically incapacitated is one who is deprived of capacity because of a mental disorder.

According to t h e fourth edition of the Diagnostic a n d Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV), the latest a n d most up-to-date classification of mental disorders:
w]ach of the mental disorders is conceptualized a s a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a n individual and t h a t is associated with present distress (e.c a painful symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or a n important loss of freedom. In addition, this syndrome or pattern must not be merely a n expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event, for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever it,s original cause, it must be currently considered a manifestation of a behavioral, psychological, or biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political, religious, or sexual), nor conflicts t h a t are primarily between the individual and society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a dysfunction in the individual, a s described above ...4

Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at 14. Id.. 44 HAI~OLD I . KAPLAN, M.D. ET AL.,I-LAN AND SADOCKS SYNOPSIS PSYCHIATRY, OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES, CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY (7th ed. 1994). 304 Mental disorder: clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome associated with distress or disability, not just a n expected response to a particular event or limited to relations between the person and society. 43 Id.a t 324.
41

The majpr diagnostic categories of mental disorders under the

DSM-IV system of psychiatric classification are:44

Disorders usually first diagnosed in infancy, childhood, or adolescence; Delirium, dementia, and amnestic and other cognitive dmorders; Mental disorders due to a general medical condition not elsewhere classified; Substance-related disorders; Schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders; Mood disorders; Anxiety disorders; Somatoform disorders; Factitious disorders; Dissociative disorders; Sexual and gender identity disorders; Eating disorders; Sleep disorders; Impulse-control disorders not elsewhere classified; Adjustment disorders; Personality disorders; Other conditions t h a t may be a focus of clinical attention.

Over 300 specific disorders are organized and classified by DSM-IV generally on the basis of their shared phenomenological features.<15 The implication of giving a strict and technical construction t o the root cause in psychological incapacity is that in a n action under Article 36, the intervention of a psychiatrist would be mandatory and not merely d i r e ~ t 0 r y . l ~ Psychiatry is the branch of medicine. that is concerned with the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of mental d i ~ 0 r d e i - s .The party invoking Article 36 must present the report of a ~~ psychiatrist who made a diagnosis48 of the person alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, showing that the latter is suffering from a mental disorder.
Id. at 315. Id. 46 See Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra at 14 (Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists). 47 9 The New Encylcopedia Britannica Micropaedia 761 (15thed. 1992). 40 See KAPLOI, op. cit. supra note 42 at 267-80 (explaining how to conduct a psychiatric interview, history, and mental status examination).
4d
45

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The Molirm guidelines perhaps may be clarified if a distinction is made bet,ween the mental disorder and the incapacity it effectuates in the individual: giving rise to a psychological incapacity. The guidelines require t h a t [tlhe incapacity must be proven to be existing a t the time of the celebration of the It is belie.ired t h a t here the Court is referring to the mental disorder and not the incapacity it, causes. The incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage is the effect of the disorder and such effect will only come about when there are the obligations to be complied with. Thus. w h a t must be proved is t h a t the person alleged to be psychologically incapacitated was suffering from a mental disorder before or a t the time of the marriage celebration. The psychiatric report must again be presented a n d it must contain a psychiatric history50 n-hich details the onset of the present illness a n d the immediate precipitating factors, events or triggers.

The Court also requires t h a t such incapacity. . . be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or ir~cu.rabZe.~~ Permanent is construed as conveying the same meaning as incurable, i.e., not capable of being cured.52 Besides, it was to the latter t h a t the Court a d d e d emphasis . The matter of curabilit,y was discussed by t h e Code Coin m it t ee :
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity t o copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify t h a t it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked t h a t the term incurable has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that psychological incapacity c a n also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out t h a t psychological incapacity is incurable.

4k RPJ)III)I~c v. 5o

Court of A4ppeals, supra a t 14. Scc I<.iI%iX, op. cit. supra note 42 a t 271-76. i 1 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra a t 15. 52 1 WISIISTER COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY16 (international ed. 1984). 3

Prof [Araceli T I Baviera incurable be added a t the Baustista commented that this they will determine curability he more problematic

suggested that the phrase and is end of subparagraph (7) Prof will give rise to the question of how Justice Caguioa agreed that it will

It is clear therefore t h a t the psychological incapacity must be incurable so a s to render a marriage void a b tnitio. I t is posited however t h a t it is not the incapacity of the individual to carry out the obligations which should be incurable. Treatment, if any, is aimed a t t,he mental disorder a n d not the incapacity it causes. Thus, it should be the mental disorder which must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. But even then, it is believed t h a t it is not a medical or clinical incurability which must be proved. The psychiatrist will rarely, if at all, describe the pat,ients condit,ion in terms of curability. I n the psychiatric report, the psychiatrist gives a prognosis - a n opinion about the probable immediate and future course, extent and outcome of the disorder,j4 and a set of nianagenient recommendations, noting whether t,he patient requires psychiatric treatment at the time, and, if so, which problems and target symptoms the treatment is aimed, what kind of treatment or combination of treatments the patient should receive, a n d what treatment seems most appropriate.55 It is believed t h a t what is required to be proved Is that the mental disorder is juridically incurable or t h a t the treatment required exceeds the ordinary means of t,he lparty], o r involve time a n d expense beyond the reach of the lparty].jG
The diagnosis of a mental disorder is not, in itself, sufficient to warrant a finding of psychological incapacity.57 According to illolirr(i, t h e illness must be graue enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. I n other words, the mental disorder must actually give rise to the individuals lack of capacity to comply with the essential marit.al obligations. But before it
51

1-t9 ~ ~ E E T I N G , note 17. srcpra at 4-5. see

KLPL,IS. cit. supra note 42. a t 280. op.

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Id.. A. SEMPIO-DIY, cit. supra note 5 a t 40 (citing Dr. Gerardo Ty Veloso o n t h e op.

general characterist,ics of psychological incapacity); see Santos v. Court of Appeals. siipra a t 33-34. 6 i Cf. KAIUN, op. cit. supra note 42 a t 1179.

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may he said t h a t a person is incapacitated, it must be knokvn : ~ n d understood what Constitutes the essential marital obligationi of 111R 111n ge The use of the phrase essential obligations of marriage may h c traced to Canon 1095,j8of the New Code of Canon Law, o n which Article 36 ~ v a s based. Unfortunately, neither the Family Law Committee nor the Code Committee specified what these obligations are. Justice Vitug however explained t h a t these obligations, as so expressed by Art,icle 68 of the Family Code, include [the] mutual obligations to live together. observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.59 In i?Io/iria, it was held t h a t [t.]he essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221, and 225 of the same Code as regards to parent,s and their children.6o Although the essential marital obligations of marriage have been identified, it is believed t h a t proving non-compliance with the obligations contained in Article 6tF1 may be problematic. Love, respect, help and support are subjective terms, i.e., they relate to a feeling, attitude, or cognition t h a t is recognized as a construct within the mind of the perceiver, even though it takes the external object a s its point of departure.G2 The use of these terms in the statement of the obligations in the said provision leads to a diversity in the understanding of these obligations from person t o person. And because A understands the obligation to observe mutual love differently from B , each would have a different idea of what constitutes compliance t,herewith. I t is suggested, therefore, t h a t the judge should be very judicious in evaluating the evidence adduced to show non-compliance. Additionally, it must be noted t h a t Article 68 a n d the ot,her cit,ed provisions are contained in Title I11 of the Family Code which is entitled Rights a n d Obligations betrGIeeri Husband and Wife. The obligations expressed in these provisions are thus owed t,o the other
Set? text acconipanying note 13, supra. Santos v. Court of Appeals. supra a t 34. Rcpublic v. Court of Appeals, supra a t 16. Artrcle 68 provides: The husband a n d wife a r e obliged to live together. observe niutxal love, respect a n d fidelity, a n d render m u t u a l help a n d support. c,2 2 WEIISTER COMPREHENSIVE DICTIONARY 1248 (international ed. 1984).
5:

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It must be recalled t h a t psychological incapacity is not a specie of vice of consent. A mental disorder which h a s resulted in the incapacity of the spouse to comply with the marital obligations m a y or may not have also caused a defect in t h a t spouses consent to the marriage depending on whether or not he or she was able to comprehend the nature and effect of the act of giving consent.G8 I n case the spouse was also unable to understand the act of consent, the marriage is, a t the same time, voidable under paragraph ( 2 ) of Article ~ 1 of the Family Code. But in a proper case under Article 36, the 5 ~ ~ spouse understood the nature a n d effect of the act of consent a n d gave a valid consent but is incapacitated to fulfill his or her obligations to the other spouse.
I n sum, psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage should be understood to be the incapacity of a spouse to fulfill or comply with his or h e r marital obligations because of a mental disorder a s comprehended in psychiatry. Thus, a marriage should only be declared void from the beginning provided that: (1) the spouse is suffering from a mental disorder sufficiently proved by a psychiatrist; (2) the mental disorder results in the inability of t h a t spouse to meet his or her obligations under the marriage; (3) the mental disorder existed a t t.he time of the celebration of the marriage and not after; and (4)the t,reatment of the mental disorder exceeds the ordinary means of the party or involves time a n d expense beyond the reach of the party such t h a t it is
See ILU%.W, supra note 42 at 1179-80. The marital contract is subject t o the same standards and, thus, can be voided if either party did not understand the nature. duties, obligations, ...and other characteristics entailed a t the time they were married ...whether the competence is related to wills, contracts, or the making or breaking of marriages, the fundamental concern is the personss state of awareness and capacity to comprehend the significance of t,he particular commitment made. h3 Article 15 provides: A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:
jx

(2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party. after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other a s husband and wife; ....

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spouse, a n d not to third persons.G3 It is proposed t h a t major consideration be given to t h e spouses view of the marital relationship a n d the appurtenant obligations, which, in turn, must be reasonable and justified. The non-compliance with the essential marital obligations should be the result of a n incapacity caused by a mental disorder. It should not be due to a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.f;* I n other words, t h e case must be t h a t the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated did not fulfill the marital obligations because he or she could not have done so, a n d not because he or she did not n.ant t o do so. But when is there a n incapacity? If the distress o r disability(; associated with the mental disorder is such t h a t the spouse \\-as, a n d continues to be, prevented from complying with his or her marital obligations, then there is a n incapacity. The judge should examine the diagnosis a n d prognosis made by the psychiatrist to ascertain the distress or disability of the spouse, a n d relating such to the unfulfilled obligations, determine if a finding of psychological i n c a p a c i t , ~is warranted. Since the incapacity is determined in relation to the unfulfilled marital obligations, the nat,ure and extent of which may v a q from person to person because of subjectivity, it is submitted t h a t the incapacity may be relative. Thus, while the court may determine that =1 is incapacitated to comply with his marital obligation(s) to B due t,o his (;IS) mental disorder, he (A) may not be incapacitated with C. It is believed t,hat this is what Justice Panganiban meant when he wrote that,, (sluch incurability may be absolute or even relative in regard to t h e other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.Gi

CIi-11,CODE .L\D FAMILY L.~VV COhlliITTEES. hf1SI:TES O F THE 160h#lEETIKG2 (held on 26 October 1986) (unpublished, available i n the U.P. College of Law Library). 6 2 Rcpublic v. Court of Appeals, supra a t 15. (See n o t e 42. MI cf. : .SIXPIU-DI\-, I op. cit. supra note 5, at 38 (citing Fr. Gerard Heal\, S.J.) (He s:iys t h a t a person with psychological incapacity may be all right for B but not for C bccaiisc t lie former relationship compensates while the l a t t e r aggravates t h e prohlc111.). (L Hepuhlic v. Court of Appeals, s7cpra a t 15.

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juridically incurable. The foregoing requirements should be met before the marriage is avoided if abuse of the ground under Article 36 is to be minimized.