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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident
Virginie ELBAZ
Institute of Radioprotection and [N]uclear Safety Fontenay aux Roses - France Vienna March 19 22, 2012
Contents
1. Introduction
7. Conclusion
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
1. Introduction
After the Fukushima accident in March 11th in 2011, a review of the safety of the facilities has been undertaken at the European level based on European specification produced by WENRA and approved by ENSREG
The
complementary safety assessment CSA called stress test consists in reassessing the safety margins of the nuclear installations for extreme natural events (earthquake, flood) and total loss of the safety system (loss of power supply, loss of cooling)
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
Avoid discrepancy between the facilitys state and new safety approaches, practices and regulations,
Assess the robustness in the actual safety requirement Facilitate the on-going improvement of the facilities' safety and their operations
Safety reassessment
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
design)
of safety guide (definition of earthquake, seismic account the future operation context:
facilities:
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
Stress Test
Specific examination of the conformity with the design requirements Extreme natural events taken into account in the safety requirement
Identification of a list of Systems Structures and Components (SSC) need to be qualified for hazard levels higher than those considered in the existing safety framework For extreme situations, this Hardened Safety Core allows to bring back the plants in a safe state
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Earthquake Flood
Beyond the design basis usually taken in French assessment + Combination of scenarios
Pool
In
France, NPP fuels are stored in pools located in the nuclear power plants of EDF and before treatment in pools of the reprocessing plants of AREVA La Hague
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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
AREVA EDF
Superphenix pool
Dry storage
CASCAD,
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
nuclear fuel used in PWR is manufactured with uranium, slightly enriched (4.5 %) with fissile 235U isotope and MOX between 380 and 630 of fuel elements according to PWR plants
Locations
Time
of decay before going to AREVA La Hague 2-3 years for UOX fuel
steel liner with reinforced concrete walls pool is situated in a specific building (BK), near the reactor building
Stainless
The
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Cooling system
capacity between 1150 and 1900 m3 pool cooling system is provided by an external system to the pool (PTR) and earthquake proof cooling system has 2 redundant loops (each one consists of pump and heat exchanger) water is drawn from the pipe located about 4 m below the surface of the pool
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The
The
The
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
Pools
1988
500
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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of water is between 10 000 and 15 000 m3 (10 times more than NPP pools) of the water: 9 m (twice the height of a basket) Thermal Power authorized is between 8 to 16 MW per pool (similarly to NPP pools)
water
Height
Maximal
C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA
PWR
design basket with initial 235U fuel enrichment of 4,5% and MOX assemblies come from EDF power plants
Main
fuel cladding
basket
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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The
reinforced concrete basin rests on a slab, independent of any adjacent structure, on neoprene bearings pads, and permits free thermal expansion.
water is permanently cooled and purified with cooling exchanger
Pool
C. Cieutat Copyright AREVA
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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POOL
Water temperature 35C
Thermal exchanger
Fuel Assembly
slab
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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4. Safety assessment on spent fuel storage pools Safety of spent fuel pools
Keeping water level Pool water must be continuously cooled to remove the heat produced by spent fuel assemblies SAFETY REQUIREMENT Robustness of the civil engineering and of the cooling system Monitoring system Redundancy of equipment Backup generators/supply ACCIDENT Leak in the pool Loss of the water evaporation draining Damage the fuel cladding integrity Release of radioactive materials to environment
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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
Lots of questions involved the spent fuels storage pools during Fukushima accident
Monitor the situations of pools (water level, temperature of water) in case of a severe accident (degraded site)
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Defence in depth
D E S I G N
Current water supply - make-up means - Fire network - Demineralized water - Safety tanks
H A R D C O R E
IRSN approach
TO BE DEFINED
- Strengthten make-up water (pre-assembly pipe) in any condition (earthquake, high level of radiation) -Study more accident scenarios -Identification of operational and accessible devices set up in any conditions even for extreme situations
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Means of actions based on hardware and operations -Isolating or minimizing of leaks or breaks consequences (anti-siphon devices, new isolating devices) -Water supplies (strengthen the design of water supplies in any condition) -Instrumentation (monitor the water level on the full range of the pool height) -Possibility of restarting a cooling train
Means of crisis to be investigated - Accessibility to actions means in case of a high level of radioactivity due to sky effect -Hydrogen production ?
Sources: I. MIRAMON and L. GILLOTEAU IRSN
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Development of calculation code Some studies and exploratory calculations have been done with the ICARE/CATHARE code (ASTEC Module), for very specific air undercooling scenarios, mainly focused on the thermo-mechanical behaviour of fuel assemblies.
The MOZART experimental program was launched (2005-2009) to address the phenomenology of zircaloy nitriding and oxidation in air.
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Devoted to the study of ignition conditions and thermal runaway propagation in Air on BWR and PWR fuel assembly mock-ups in pool storage conditions
Rupture of cladding
7. Conclusion
Conclusion
Recommendations leaded by IRSN Complementary attempt must be provided by the operators in order to ensure the spent fuel pools (hard core) in a safe state for scenarios beyond the safety requirements Capacity to restore water in any conditions (i.e degraded situation, after an earthquake) in order to increase the robustness of the facility
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Overheating of the storage pool of spent fuel until boiling Decay of water inventory of the pool by steaming (or due to a leak or a piping break in case of an accidental draining) Risk of degradation of the radiological conditions (1 meter above a fuel assembly is necessary to guaranty good radiological conditions) Dewatering of fuel assembly being handled leading to a racing of zirconium oxidation reaction Boiling of the stored fuel assemblies leading to : a risk of restarting the chain reaction (criticality), and then a risk of important radiolysis of water leading to a hydrogen accumulation Dewatering of the stored fuel assembly in the bottom of the pool
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Safety assessment performed during PSRs No dewatering of fuel assembly, even partially (in order to prevent from damaging the fuel cladding which causes a severe accident) : Assemblies in stored position
Safety assessment performed during CSAs (to be investigated) No localized boiling in the storage area of spent fuel assemblies (in order to prevent criticality risk leading to a risk of radiolysis of water and then, a risk of hydrogen accumulation)
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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Definition of functional criteria in order to obtain safety assessments outcomes leading to the implementation of hardware modifications fundamental design principles
A leak or break in any system connected to the pools should not cause direct dewatering of stored spent fuel assemblies, even if no isolating action is launched. If a drainage occurs via a piping connected to the pools, it must be possible either to isolate the drainage process before direct dewatering of an assembly being handled or to put the spent fuel assembly in safe position before its dewatering. When drainage causes loss of pool cooling, an emergency water supply should prevent stored fuel assemblies from being dewatered later
IRSN approach of the safety of the spent nuclear fuel storage pools after Fukushima accident IAEA Meeting - Vienna 21st March 2012 Virginie ELBAZ
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