After Neoliberalism: The Politics of Reregulation in Mexico Author(s): Richard Snyder Source: World Politics, Vol. 51, No.

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AFTER NEOLIBERALISM Mexico The Politics of Reregulation in

By RICHARD SNYDER*

1989 theMexican government launched amassive deregulation of IN

who de technocrats For the mostly foreign-trained agriculture.1 economic the coffee these neoliberal reforms, industry posed signed an entrenched for deregulation. the easiest target Although perhaps state-owned dominated fee reformers Yet Institute Mexican Coffee (iNMECAFE)? enterprise?the movement of small cof the industry, a powerful grassroots it.2 Thus, neoliberal had already mobilized against producers had strong societal allies, making sector an easy task. government retrenchment

in the coffee

Rather than had surprising consequences. this easy retrenchment as the neoliberal to reformers had antici markets, leading unregulated

resulted in the formation of new pated, the dismantling of INMECAFE

institutions tervened state-owned coffee-producing sentially
*

for market in coffee

in Actors who had not previously governance. areas vacated to control by the old sought policy Most notably, new established federal of Mexico's the governments frameworks and es regulatory As a result, by

enterprise. states

"reregulated"

what

law had deregulated.3

I appreciate helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions from Robert Bates, David Col Peter Evans, Jonathan Fox, Ernst Haas, Frances lier, Ruth Berins Collier, Jorge Dom?nguez, Peter Houtzager, Pauline Jones-Luong, Robert Kaufman, Thomas Lewis, Juan Linz, Hagopian, Richard Locke, James Mahoney, Elizabeth Perry, Paul Pierson, Daniel Joel Migdal, Gerardo Munck, Shadlen, Theda Skocpol, Judith Tendier, Steven Vogel, and two anony Posner, Paul Quirk, Kenneth mous reviewers. For their support of my field research inMexico, I gratefully acknowledge the Na World the Institute for International the Institute for the Study of Foundation, Education, Studies at the Politics, and the Ejido Reform Research Project of the Center for U.S.-Mexican for International and Area Stud of California, I thank the Harvard Academy San Diego. University ies for a postdoctoral that supported the writing of this article. fellowship 1 New Peasant Economy," inMaria Lorena Cook et inMexico's Jonathan Fox, "Political Change Mexico (La al., eds., The Politics ofEconomic Restructuring: State-Society Relations and Regime Change in and David Myhre, eds., Studies, 1994); andWayne A. Cornelius Jolla, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican tional for U.S.-Mex The Transformation ofRural Mexico: Reforming the Ejido Sector (La Jolla, Calif: Center ican Studies, 1998). 2 construcci?n de la autonom?a (Mexico City: Gabriela Ejea and Luis Hern?ndez, eds., Cafetaleros:La Nacional de Organizaciones Coordinadora Cafetaleras, 1991); and Horacio Santoyo Cort?s et al., Sis en tema alternativas (Chapingo, Mexico: Universi agroindustrial caf? M?xico: diagn?stico, problem?tica y dad Aut?noma 1994). Chapingo, 3 states. Mexico is a federal system with thirty-one Science

WorldPolitics 51 (January1999), 173-204

174
1994 Mexico's coffee

WORLD POLITICS
found themselves producers confronting environment and not the free markets coffee sector a new that had rooted in

and complex regulatory been anticipated. The case of Mexico's

challenges

expectations

neoliberal economic theory. Instead of paving the way for triumph by

free-market institutions important velopment. dressed the construction of new forces, neoliberal triggered policies outcome for market governance. This exposes an surprising in the of existing work of de limitation economy political Although many scholars issues have explored why countries

choose neoliberal policies or how they implement them, few have ad

the effects of these poli concerning a framework for explaining the without after neoliberal for market governance It argues that by vacating in

posttmplementation us, consequently, cies?leaving reconstruction of institutions

reforms.

This litical

article provides incumbents

such a framework. to

stitutionalized policy domains, neoliberal policy shocks in fact give po

and their their authority expand sectors of the economy. soci support bases by reregulating Organized and can mobilize etal groups have a stake in how sectors are reregulated opportunities to or support reregulation challenge politicians' free-market than unleashing forces, neoliberal processes: reregulation to build support coalitions first, political by reregulating projects. Hence, reforms may entrepreneurs rather trigger launch

two-step

projects cietal actors terms cians

respond of reregulation. and societal groups, for market

second, so markets; to influence to these the by mobilizing projects of politi and strategies The varying strengths in turn, determine that will governance reforms raises create the various result from new types of these reregula

institutions tion processes.

that neoliberal Recognizing tives for institution building The case of Mexico offers

a further

and incen opportunities issue: what kinds of new

institutions replace those destroyed or displaced by neoliberal policies?

to address this opportunity simi and socioeconomic cultural, striking historical, question. Despite re larities among Mexico's states, neoliberal policies coffee-producing at the subnational sulted in a diverse array of institutional amalgams level. In some states the new institutions long-standing reproduced an outcome that of top-down, patterns exclusionary policy-making, an excellent

In other states, by contrast, the the interests of rural oligarchs. protected new channels INMECAFE for small institutions that replaced opened institu in the policy process. These farmers to participate participatory between tions fostered developmental agen government partnerships

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
cies and grassroots producer in the international compete the politics outcomes. section organizations marketplace. of reregulation existing The

175

small farmers that helped framework developed helps explain these diver of

here for analyzing gent institutional The following

reviews

perspectives countries.

on the politics The next

neoliberal reform and shows why they offer only limited insight about
the dynamics of reregulation a new framework introduces The market quent framework is then in developing for analyzing to section the politics of reregulation. of varied the construction states. A subse

applied institutions governance section sets these findings The conclusion research.

explain across four Mexican in comparative

perspective

by explor di

ing how the politics of reregulation might unfold in other developing

countries. rections synthesizes the argument and proposes for future

From Reform The

to Reregulation

study of neoliberal reform has dominated work on the political

of development market-oriented during the last decade. as a Because most studies few variable, however, policies dependent to ex scholars seek effects of these policies. Many this focus on Within choose neoliberal policies.4

economy analyze explore

the political plain why countries some try to account for cross-national variations in the choice, policy in the composition of of reforms.5 Others differences timing analyze to attempting explain, for example, why countries pur policy packages, on is or heterodox sue orthodox Scholars have also focused policies.6

sues of policy

implementation,
or hinder

identifying

political

and social

conditions Such

that help of neoliberal reforms.7 implementation to neoliberal reforms pos studies mainly what makes try explain sible, rather than explain their political consequences. Previous work offers important insights about the factors that induce to support or oppose neoliberal policies and about how po
4

politicians

ed., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics ofAdjustment See, for example, Joan M. Nelson, in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Political and Economic Interactions inEconomic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Coun tries (Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1993). 5 in Nelson See Joan M. Nelson, (fn. 4). "Conclusions," 6 to Stabilization and Ad Miles Kahler "Orthodoxy and Its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches (fn. 4). justment," in Nelson 7 in Thomas M. Callaghy, "Lost between State and Market: The Politics of Economic Adjustment Market: Politi and Nigeria," in Nelson (fn. 4); Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Ghana, Zambia, cal and Economic Reforms inEastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, and Robert R. Kaufman, 1991); and Stephan Haggard eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment Press, 1992). (Princeton: Princeton University

176

WORLD POLITICS insights help ex

success

litical institutions affect their implementation. These

have had varied plain why countries stabilization and structural adjustment. new institutions for market

achieving macroeconomic However, existing analyses shed

little light on important postimplementation issues, such as the kinds of

that replace those destroyed governance by are to have decisive these institutions reforms. Because neoliberal likely it is imperative in the global economy, effects on how countries perform their origins and dynamics. that we understand The mentation ingly countries that address postimple of developing analyses issues have been curiously Scholars have increas apolitical. new in the course of that states acquire noted capabilities few

implementing neoliberal reforms. However, they have focused mainly on capabilities linked either to technical requirements of neoliberal
con state for sale and improving such as preparing enterprises policies, or to market such as pro of trol pressures, global public expenditures, to domestic about export markets information viding sophisticated producers to help boost the their underemphasize possibility competitiveness that neoliberal abroad.8 These reforms can analyses trigger po

or liticallymotivatedinstitution building, driven not by technical market areas exigencies but by ambitious incumbents looking to control policy
by downsizing. advanced because most earlier of those than their countries issues. Most state industrial countries embraced ne

vacated

Perhaps reforms oliberal students

world,9 to postimplementation reforms ket-oriented States sectors, actually

in the counterparts developing attention considerable have devoted

especially in advanced industrial reform studies of regulatory though for conceptualizing offer important postimplementation insights

mar notably, they have shown that and the United in countries such as England of high-technology increased government regulation and financial services.10 Al telecommunications countries issues, led by tech

they deemphasize
stead portray
8 Kahler

the distributive effects of regulatory policy and in

as a relatively
Problem Kaufman

reregulation

apolitical
and Solution:

process

(fn. 6); Peter Evans, "The State as in Haggard and omy, and Structural Change," and the Adjustment Public Enterprise Matter? and Robert R. Kaufman, The Stephan Haggard Princeton University Press, 1995), 310-14. 9 Chile is a notable exception. See Alejandro

Pr?dation, Embedded Auton "The Heart of the (fn. 7); John Waterbury, in Haggard and Kaufman (fn. 7); and Process," Political Economy ofDemocratic Transitions (Princeton:

in Neoconservative Foxley, Latin American Experiments Economics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 10 On reregulation in advanced industrial countries, seeMichael Moran, The Politics of theFinancial Services Revolution: The U.SA., U.K., and Japan (New York: St. Martins, 1991); and Steven K. Vogel, Freer Markets, More Rules: Regulatory Reform inAdvanced Industrial Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1996). University

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
strive to promote economic their bureaucratic expand prerogatives.11 weak for understanding provide leverage countries. veloping nocrats who performance, Consequently, how reregulation

177
or codify rules, these studies works in de

In developed and developing countries alike, the distributive effects

of regulatory incentives for political action.12 powerful policy generate autonomous In most developing bureaucratic countries, however, agen or actors are nonexistent cies insulated from "capture" by political scarce.13 Hence, the impulse to reregulate often stems from politicians, not from technocrats. of reregulation in To understand the dynamics such contexts to gain requires and keep power. a framework that highlights politicians' efforts

The Politics of Reregulation: A Framework

This section develops framework a framework combines for analyzing the politics of reregu on choices of regu politicians' on between politicians subsequent bargaining a focus together, these

lation. The

latory policies with and societal groups two

a focus

and processes perspectives institutions the divergent for market governance that result from them. 1 summarizes of the framework. the core components Figure

over the terms of reregulation. Taken us account for varied reregulation help

Reregulation
The distributive incentives

Projects:

A Politician-Centered
of market

Perspective

regulation give politicians to purposes. regulatory political policy to distribute it possible "rationed favors, privileged makes Regulation to to access, and individual rules," thereby helping general exceptions to bu the resources by which In contexts where govern."14 "generate control are scarce, we should reaucratic agencies insulated from political strong expect regulatory policy to serve frequently as a tool that incumbent

consequences to harness

politicians deploy to build support and compete for power.

11 to According Vogel (fn. 10), the "core agenda of regulatory reform" consists of efforts by bureau new mechanisms crats to generate revenue and for policy implementation (p. 19). design 12 on the Politics of in Richard Schmalensee Roger G. Noll, "Economic Perspectives Regulation," and Robert D. Willig, vol. 2 (New York: North-Holland, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, Policies in Africa," in Bates, Essays 1989); Robert H. Bates, "The Nature and Origins of Agricultural on the Political Press, 1983). Economy ofRural Africa (New York: Cambridge University 13 Relations and State Capabilities in the Joel S.Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Third World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). 14 Bates (fn. 12), 131.

178
ofImplementation Neoliberal Reforms

WORLD
Politicians Reregulation Factors Launch -

POLITICS
Societal Groups ? Respond Resulting

Projects Institutions Factors explaining

explaining

reregulation strategies 1. societal forces 2. regime institutions 3. policy repertoires

group strategies 1. politicians' reregulation strategies 2. relative group power

The

Politics

1 Figure of Reregulation

Framework

Neoliberal First, such

reforms reforms

organized impose high industrial thus cre (for example, labor, government employees), difficult for politicians.15 Because coalitional ating challenges regulatory divisible benefits and targetable rewards, reregulation generates policy can be a or instrument for maintaining potent support restructuring shocks reforms. neoliberal coalitions strained by neoliberal Second, groups of ambitious and, from the perspective policy domains, politi for increasing cians, these vacant domains may represent opportunities can thus serve not as a means to their authority. Reregulation pre only re serve power in situations crisis caused by neoliberal of coalitional forms but also as away to expand power. evacuate

give often

incumbents

further costs on

reasons

to

regulate. interest

Combined with the distributive consequences of regulatory policy,

and opportunities political challenges posed by neolib to incentives eral reforms give incumbents reregulate. There compelling to serve as a coalition is therefore strong basis for expecting reregulation the characteristic

building tool wielded by politicians in the paradigmatic "soft states" of

countries bureaucracies.16 that lack robust, autonomous developing stems from ambi that the impetus for reregulation The recognition tious politicians, rather than from insulated technocrats, puts incum at the center of the Yet politicians bents' strategic calculations analysis. are not policy tions. their free in their choice of reregulation strategies: completely are constrained institu societal forces and political choices by that pre often have ideas and beliefs Furthermore, politicians

15 Mex Ruth Berins Collier, The Contradictory Alliance: State-Labor Relations and Regime Change in ico (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute for International and Area Studies, 1992); Katrina Burgess, "Alliances inMexico, Venezuela, and Spain" (Ph.D. under Stress: Economic Reform and Party-Labor Relations "Between a Shock and a and Lucan A. Way, 1997); and Steven Levitsky diss., Princeton University, Hard in Poland and Argentina," Place: The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustments Comparative Politics 30, no. 2 (199S). 16 Nations The term "soft state" is from Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), 66.

AFTER scribe a course reregulation stitutional shaping of policy choice requires as well

NEOLIBERALISM An explanation and implementation. a framework that links societal and as politicians' ideas and values

179
of in

strategies constraints

to the

of policy

choice.17

SOCIETAL FORCES The configuration Mapping of societal interests in a policy area constrains politi

cians' reregulation strategies by delimiting the range of feasible policy

the policy preferences of societal actors thus serves strategies. reregulation important first step for explaining ex cannot the distribution of societal preferences However, by itself of collective action have long ob these strategies. As students plain options. as an into group translate do not necessarily served, group preferences even if societal groups do to defend demands. Furthermore, organize not interest groups, it is politicians, that are authorized their interests, as we shall see, the of regulatory policy. And, responsiveness on to institutions. demands interest-group politicians depends political menu on societal forces In sum, focusing of policy helps explain the a focus, while serves more to narrow such options. However, important, the range of the possible than to explain the actual. To account for politi we need to consider additional factors. cians' reregulation strategies, to make REGIME Regimes termine INSTITUTIONS are the formal how authoritative and informal decisions rules of a political and who system that de

may participate in the decision-making institutions have an impor process.18 Regime on to tant because impact reregulation they define who holds authority state and local In federal regimes, make regulatory for example, policy. over in may have authority aspects of regulatory governments policy

are made

can unfold that reregulation their jurisdictions, which means processes across subnational units and may involve intergovernmental differently areas abandoned to control by the federal govern policy competition autonomous ment. In unitary contrast, policy regimes, by potentially not exist at the subnational level, and reregula usually do jurisdictions tion is thus likely to be a territorially more uniform process than in fed a varied eral systems. Nevertheless, system, too, can experience unitary
17 a multilevel are influenced by Peter Gourevitch, analysis of policy choice My efforts to develop Politics inHard Times: Comparative Responses to International Crises (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in theNewly Countries (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). Industrializing 18 in Latin America (Princeton: David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism Press, 1979), 402-3. Princeton University

180

WORLD POLITICS
across economic sec occurring and involving rather interagency,

with variation dynamics, reregulation rather than administrative tors, units, than intergovernmental, bargaining. Regime structure institutions

also shape reregulation the strategies by defining structure This determine the policy-making helps of processP in order to achieve the political tasks incumbents need to accomplish their policy objectives. in which systems

policy in such contexts is likely to be a collective output that reflects the

actors from different of government organizations preferences multiple in regimes with few veto points and agencies. By contrast, (for example, can be made or in which executive fiat), reg systems changed by policy a and political styles of ulatory policy may often reflect the preferences handful of leaders and their advisers.20

veto In regimes with multiple (for exam points a executive is checked and power by ple, legislature in securing consent face complex may challenges judiciary), politicians to overturn from actors empowered initiatives. Regulatory their policy

Finally, regime institutions influence regulatory policy by determin

to societal interests. institutions Regime ing the responsiveness ofpoliticians are career incentives those to whom incumbents' they by defining shape for example, accountable. In competitive democracies, multiparty to represent citizens in their elected officials often face strong incentives districts because their career fortunes hinge are such contexts, and thus highly incumbents downwardly to societal interests. In other types of in regimes, by contrast, responsive to elites and, hence, rel cumbents maybe accountable political upwardly to societal groups. For in nondemocratic example, atively unresponsive or constitu with highly centralized and in democracies systems parties pleasing political to societal pres of politicians shape the responsiveness institutions their reregulation how much sures, regime help explain If regime institutions of societal groups. reflect the preferences projects to societal demands, to incentives give politicians respond compelling interest groups may exert decisive influence over reregulation strategies. to serve so incentives if regime institutions generate weak By contrast, Because they
19 Parlia in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, "Decision Making George Tsebelis, and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science 25, no. 3 (1995). mentarism, Multicameralism 20 are and majoritarian democracies. See Such centralized regimes by delegative exemplified Guillermo O'Donnell, Journal ofDemocracy 5 (January 1994); and Arend "Delegative Democracy," and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (New Majoritarian Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Haven: Yale University Press, 1984). 21 David Mayhew, Press, 1974). Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University

winning accountable

on

reelection.21

In

tional prohibitions service can mean

against

immediate

masters,

reelection, performing constituency not societal interests.

AFTER cietal choosing interests, incumbents

NEOLIBERALISM can have significant degrees

181 of freedom

reregulation

strategies.

POLICY REPERTOIRES Although are motivated mainly by the goals of politicians are not and retaining office, regulatory op gaining necessarily policies timal career-boosting Politicians often have distinct strategies. policy their policy decisions and may lead them to repertoires that condition that do not enhance their career fortunes. support regulatory policies I assume

are coherent frameworks of beliefs, values, and ideas repertoires Policy a course of These that prescribe choice and implementation. policy about the proper role for government include conceptions repertoires and the appropriate and the methods ical dividends.22 trans consist of more than just expert knowledge Policy repertoires to economists. In addition mitted and professional by policy analysts are an such pure policy knowledge, repertoires embodying politicians' ex in practical, based on their accumulated applied knowledge, in government and potentially distorted of interpretations perience a may develop expert prescriptions. Policy through repertoires path in which of policy options process understandings dependent cognitive chored formative and enduring ways by a politician's shaped in profound career current expert rather than mirroring experiences. Consequently, consensus, past prescriptions. policy repertoires may reflect outdated, are Data cohorts about or incumbents' career help incumbents paths generations For example, should in and memberships political the content of their policy explain with extensive admin experience means of government for manipulating intervention. these tools They shape in

cumbents' perceptions of both the types of policy tools at their disposal

available to create polit

repertoires. istering statist policies liberal reforms should them to

of how neo may have distorted understandings can lead be implemented. These understandings

core neoliberal such as achieving macro imperatives, interpret economic stabilization and increasing compara exports in sectors with not as mandates tive advantages, but rather as tasks for state shrinking, that require the state's role. expanding can and beliefs how ideas, values, By recognizing shape policy a need not reduce incumbents choices, perspective politician-centered
22 see Peter A. Hall, "The Role of Interests, Institutions, and Ideas in On ideas and policy-making, in Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan the Comparative Political Economy of the Industrialized Nations," S. Zuckerman, Culture, and Structure (New York: Cambridge eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Press, 1997). University

182

WORLD POLITICS it is a helpful and

to max

to faceless calculators of costs and benefits. Although

powerful simplification imize their career fortunes, structed, consequences how minates to assume these that incumbents efforts are framed

seek mainly

understandings idiosyncratic potentially of policy options. A focus on policy incumbents survival and helps explain pursue political for example, support from similar constituen seeking why, politicians cies may have quite different policy agendas. on increase with should The influence of repertoires policy choice

con by historically about the range and thus illu repertoires

the degree of autonomy incumbents have from societal forces. In sev au states had significant eral of the Mexican analyzed below, governors as we shall see, their beliefs and from societal pressures, and, tonomy a decisive orientations role in their choice of reregu ideological played lation strategies.

Institutional
Scholars

Outcomes:

An Interactive

Perspective

effects of neolib the disorganizing have correctly emphasized crisis on societal groups, and economic eral policies especially organized incentives neoliberal reforms give the powerful with labor.23 Coupled as a to these ef incumbents political weapon, policy deploy regulatory are a that reregulation basis for inferring fects provide strong projects a focus on not interest groups.24 While launched by by politicians, should politicians ulation initiatives, into the analysis these initiatives. thus offer to account the best vantage it is nonetheless rereg point for explaining to societal groups necessary bring that result from for the new institutions

in reregula the first move societal groups may not make Although on the institutional out can have a decisive tion processes, impact they are comes of such processes. Societal groups have stakes in how markets can and politicians' supply incentives reregulation projects reregulated, action barriers to collective that help them surmount and focal points

and mobilize

to defend

their interests. Hence,

depending

on the

for mar of societal groups, the new institutions strengths and strategies can that result from politicians' ket governance strategies reregulation
in Larry Diamond the Conventional Wisdom," See, for example, Barbara Geddes, "Challenging and Marc F. Plattner, eds., Economic Reform and Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University in Joe Foweraker and Ann L. and Disorder," "Crisis, Neoliberalism, Press, 1995); and Sergio Zerme?o, Mexico and Political Change in (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990). Craig, eds., Popular Movements 24 often try to anticipate how societal actors will respond to their policy Of course, politicians if regime institutions give them incentives to attend to societal interests. Hence, choices, especially even in the absence of organized societal pressures, political incumbents may try to incorporate societal into their policy decisions. preferences 23

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
inMexico often had the unintended reregulation projects societal opposition of galvanizing that forced politicians consequence shall see,

183

deviate significantly from what these politicians had intended. As we

to modify their projects.

To explain the institutional interactions alyze strategic as cumbents they negotiate connects launched from above by in perspective reregulation projects to responses to these cumbents projects from below by societal groups. is a crucial step toward this connection the institu Making explaining tions
reforms.

we should an of reregulation, in between societal groups and political the terms of reregulation. This interactive outcomes

for market

governance choose

that replace

those

destroyed

by neoliberal

to in any of several strategies responding can initiatives. They these initiatives. reregulatory support politicians' can to defeat them, perhaps oppose and seek Alternatively, they by a in Or they can engage and try to modify launching counterproject. so that the corre initiatives cumbents' scheme resulting regulatory more can to their own interests. And closely finally, they sponds ignore initiatives. Politicians' should have a strategies reregulation reregulation on how societal groups choose these options. among strong influence Societal groups may The relative power of societal to groups should tor in how they respond reregulation also be an important efforts. fac

Applying
Neoliberal reforms

the Framework:
inMexico's coffee

The Case of Mexico

sector did not have the effects

than unleashing architects. Rather by their technocratic anticipated free-market the deregulation of coffee forces, reregulation triggered to control state-level incumbents who sought by policy do projects INMECAFE. Producer mains vacated by the federal government agency, groups The tions nance to responded interactions resulted to these between in a diverse reregulation projects in different ways. Some

mobilized tomodify or defeat the projects, others chose to ignore them.

state governments and producer organiza of new institutions for market array gover states.

the politics of reregulation led of small pro that gave organizations participatory policy frameworks to In addition ducers central roles in policy-making. meeting producer a voice in the policy process, demand for these participatory frame works fostered organizations sector the public between partnerships the welfare and market that helped improve and producer competitive

coffee-producing In the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas

across Mexico's

184
ness of small coffee

WORLD POLITICS
farmers. In the states resulted of Guerrero in and Puebla, by

contrast, the politics of reregulation works that denied small producers frameworks exclusionary generated elites, undermining the efficiency the welfare of

exclusionary policy frame access to the policy process. These and economic spoils for political of coffee production. farmers and offered elite them new

Why

did reregulation inOaxaca and Chiapas result in institutions

small

that promoted Guerrero produced

channels for participating in policy decisions?Why

and Puebla long-standing yield institutions patterns that served of exclusionary,

did reregulation in
interests and re policy top-down

making? The

following

sections deploy

the analytic framework

outcomes. The analysis fo above to explain these divergent developed on the different cuses state initially reregulation projects by pursued and between It then shows how bargaining governments. politicians over the terms of in dis resulted reregulation organizations producer tinct policy frameworks.

Reregulating
In 1989, marketing after of

Coffee
two decades one of extensive of Mexico's to withdraw, intervention major a move sources in production of foreign and ex pro

began change,25 duction supports, price controls, for more channels than 200,000 small producers, the dismantling network The gave them few options

coffee, INMECAFE

that eliminated

and government-managed small coffee producers.26 of INMECAFE's massive but to sell their harvests

marketing For most purchasing at exploita

tively low prices to localmiddlemen.

states to of the major coffee-producing governments responded two types of INMECAFE's exit by launching reregulation projects: one, and Guerrero and the other, crony capitalism. In Oaxaca neocorporatismy as an state government officials took INMECAFE's departure opportunity to resurrect weakened coffee tended sector. to They institutions corporatist launched neocorporatist control of of political reregulation control in the in projects to official representation affiliated with the ruling Institu sought to incorporate the

give monopoly

interest

coffee-producer interruption

organizations?those for six decades. These

which had governed Mexico without tional Revolutionary Party (PRl),

projects

25 1970 and 1989 coffee averaged 5.1 percent of the total value ofMexico's Between exports and 34 on in three million Mexicans depend percent of the total value of agricultural exports. Approximately come from coffee See Santoyo Cort?s et al. (fn. 2). production. 26 Small producers have less than twenty hectares of land (or approximately fifty acres).

AFTER

NEOLIBERALISM

185
institutions of interest

thousands of small producers who had previously been tied to the PRI
through INMECAFE into new, authoritarian representation. involved INMECAFE's re (1) transferring projects Neocorporatist sources (for to government-spon example, agroindustrial machinery) new sored small and (2) constructing organizations producer mechanisms for regulating of credit that excluded inde distribution not affiliated with the PRI. The neocorporatist organizations in Guerrero of included outright orga project repression independent nizations coercive measures and efforts to co-opt their leaders. These pendent were status In These the coffee on intended and to force with affiliate to renounce the organizations their independent the PRl's National Peasants' Confederation state governments

(CNC).
Chiapas projects intervention and Puebla, by contrast, pursued crony

capitalist reregulation projects designed to benefit the coffee oligarchy.

to turn the clock back to the sought period preceding of INMECAFE, when local elites had dominated the

to In contrast focused economy. neocorporatist projects, which new institutions of interest representation for small pro building on focused the monopoly ducers, crony capitalist resurrecting projects control by local elites over coffee processing and marketing. involved efforts to create marketing boards capitalist projects of Chiapas, for ex managed by the coffee oligarchy. The government to of the oligarchy members control over give prominent ample, sought a source of rents to licenses to export coffee. In addition creating major and income for these private elites, this new regulatory power promised Crony out of export markets and help keep small producer cooperatives firms. thus force them to sell at low prices to elite-owned exporting to the withdrawal of IN What these different responses explains MECAFE? Why did the governors of Oaxaca and Guerrero pursue neo on smallholders, the governors of focused while strategies and Puebla chose crony capitalist policies oriented toward oli Chiapas federal regime institu garchs? The analysis below shows how Mexico's areas to incentives tions gave state governors reregulate policy powerful vacated by neoliberal reforms. Although institutional factors help ex such factors do not explain how they plain why governors reregulated, we for their different To account reregulation strategies, reregulated. In states where need to focus on societal forces and policy repertoires. corporatist or dominated the coffee sector (for example, small producers oligarchs the Guerrero and Puebla), societal forces explain governors' strategies: was to benefit in states with no the dominant contrast, group. By goal to

186 dominant producer

WORLD POLITICS
policy that fit

and (for example, Oaxaca group Chiapas), the decisive role: governors chose strategies repertoires played their ideological orientations.

FEDERALISM AND UPWARD ACCOUNTABILITY

systems subnational Mexico's federal jurisdictions. the subnational level, especially reregulation core Other in the coffee sector In federal units are potentially autonomous institutions incumbents empowered state governors, to reregulate what fed as an policy at

eral law had deregulated.27 Federalism

institutions

thus defined the politics of

subnational process. essentially inways that structured accountability regime Mexican from societal interests. A gave governors autonomy significant to the same of constitutional reelection immediate against prohibition to incentives fice weakened for elected officials constituency perform service. Furthermore, all governors were directly appointed virtually by could also dismiss them.28 Because could the president, who governors and typically hoped to move on to high-level fed on eral posts after completing their terms, their career futures depended or to a national to actors at the center (that is, to the loyalty president to level political faction). Hence, governors were upwardly accountable not to voters and in accountable national elites, political downwardly terest groups. But if such had auton accountable governors upwardly not run for reelection to inside their states, why would omy from interest groups they seek so to such groups and deliver targeted benefits and de respond eagerly to markets? for reregulating To answer these cisively opportunities questions requires more knowledge about governors' motivations than

can be deduced from the formal rule prohibiting reelection. Until the late 1990sMexico had a hegemonic party system inwhich virtually all governors were affiliated with the PRI.29 Ruling party elites
to maintain stability and deliver quotas expected governors political votes to the PRI in local and federal elections. Governors who failed accomplish these where tasks since saw their 1917 career fortunes plummet, of to

and many a full,

were dismissed by the president, as illustrated vividly by the case of

Guerrero,
27

only

six governors

have

completed

and Subnational Authoritarian See Richard Snyder, "After the State Withdraws: Neoliberalism et al., eds., Subnational Politics and Democratization in in inMexico," Regimes Wayne A. Cornelius forth of California, San Diego, Mexico Studies, University (La Jolla, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican coming). 28 in Soledad and Alvaro Arre?la Ayala, "El poder de los gobernadores," Assad Carlos Martinez de Loaeza and Rafael Segovia, eds., La vida pol?tica mexicana en la crisis (Mexico City: El Colegio M?xico, 1987). 29 a Politics in Transition: The Breakdown A. Cornelius, Mexican of One-Party Dominant Wayne Studies, 1996). Regime (La Jolla, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
Institutional Context 1 Table of Gubernatorial _(1940-95)_
Rules Formal of rule no reelection upward masters; Informal rules by the president upward masters; future career prospects elites depend (e.g., the upward masters; accountability ignore societal accountability ignore societal to political accountability ignore societal to political Office* Incentives for Governors

187

Decision

Making

inMexico

groups

appointed

groups to political

on national-level president maintain

groups

and PRI leaders) political stability downward interests; responsiveness seek alliances with responsiveness seek alliances with to societal societal to societal societal groups groups

secure

quotas

of votes

for PRI

downward interests;

aWith the exception of no reelection, these rules of office did not apply to the handful of governors states after 1988 who were affiliated with the center-right in several northern opposition National Action Party (PAN). None of those states produce significant amounts of coffee.

out the vote and maintain six-year term.30 To get stability, gov political ernors faced pressures to with local groups such as traditional elites ally and political bosses from the PRl's who controlled networks patronage in the absence of a direct electoral confederations. Even corporatist connection, then, the unwritten incentives to rules of Mexico's forge political governors strong to maintain extent necessary ruling support coalitions, and deliver sufficient system gave at least to the votes for the

stability

on election to party accountability day.31 Paradoxically, upward for downward elites at the center created pressures responsive political ness to local interest groups. by governors as summarized in Table entered 1, although most governors Hence, was their autonomy from societal office with interests, autonomy votes for the PRI and of securing imperatives neo the federal government maintaining stability. When implemented to liberal reforms, reregulation offered a potent, new tool for governors bounded by the dual
Gonzalez La intervenci?n federal en la desaparici?n de poderes, 2d ed. (Mexico Oropeza, Guer de M?xico, Nacional Aut?noma 1987); and Alba Teresa Estrada Casta??n, City: Universidad rero: sociedad, econom?a, de M?xico, Nacional Aut?noma pol?tica, cultura (Mexico City: Universidad 1994), 75. 31 The term "electoral connection" is from Mayhew (fn. 21). 30 Manuel

188
build the selective

WORLD POLITICS
alliances with societal groups they needed career fortunes. The to man

fact that their and protect age these imperatives reforms coincided with a period of growing the timing of the economic across for democratization and escalating pressures political instability an at Mexico made reregulation especially important political weapon the subnational level. us un and upward Taken federalism accountability help together, was a process inMexico led by state gover derstand why reregulation nors. However, cannot institutions by themselves explain regime labored under governors reregulation strategies: governors' although strate different similar institutional constraints, they chose strikingly account for this variation, we need to turn from institu regime gies. To available to governors. tions to societal forces and the policy repertoires A POLARIZED Like fee SECTOR

in many developing cof industries countries, Mexico's agroexport sector has a 71 per At one extreme, profile. polarized production two hectares cent of coffee of land each and farmers have under

less output. At the other extreme, only 25 percent of national produce out of national of coffee farmers produce 22 percent than .5 percent own and many processing equipment, large farmers usually put.32 These earn a and marketing of their income from processing major portion in the socioeconomic grown by small farmers. The main cleavage sector thus divides peasant who have little or no smallholders, that from an agrarian-industrial infrastructure, oligarchy agroindustrial most and marketing?the controls stages of profitable processing coffee coffee production. In an effort crease to strengthen control political earnings, Mexico's in the countryside federal government and in began princi enter

foreign-exchange to intervene in the coffee sector in the early 1970s. The heavily was the state-owned intervention instrument of government pal prise INMECAFE, which, in addition to controlling

and dramatically expanded organized producers,33 elite by opening tion. INMECAFE competed with the agrarian-industrial and marketing channels alternative, government-managed processing a set minimum that guaranteed small producers price. In the late 1970s

export quotas for all smallholder produc

32 et al. (fn. 2), 25-30. This group comprises farmers with more than twenty Santoyo Cort?s hectares. 33 were part of the International Coffee (ICO) regulatory regime. See Organizations Export quotas Robert H. Bates, Open-Economy Politics: The Political Economy of the World Coffee Trade (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

AFTER

NEOLIBERALISM Strength of Oligarchy

189

High
indeterminate

Low

High
J3 "O as

neocorporatism

(Oaxaca)
crony capitalism

neocorporatism (Guerrero)

(Chiapas) " a CO
Low crony capitalism indeterminate (no cases)

(Puebla)

Societal
SOURCE:Measures

Forces

Figure 2 and Reregulation

Strategies

of the strength of small producers and oligarchies are based on "Censo Cafetalero de los predios por estado," INMECAFE (1992); and on author interviews with pro 1992, Estratificaci?n ducers and federal and state government officials.

au the 1980s many also organized small farmers throughout to form that would establish cooperatives tonomously producer-owned new channels free from the control of both the agrarian marketing industrial elite and INMECAFE.34 and The coffee sector's polarized production profile gave national-level

politicians two distinct options for deploying regulatory policy to their

their could help small producers improve political advantage. They to terms of elite by intervening with the agrarian-industrial exchange and market small farmers greater control over coffee processing give elite maintain ing. Alternatively, they could help the agrarian-industrial a na its hegemony. INMECAFE's supervision, Under relatively uniform

tional regulatory scheme privileged small producers during the 1970s

and 1980s. stroyed nities to launch In Guerrero producers the end of the 1980s, this national-level framework, new At however, neoliberal reforms de state governors giving at the subnational initiatives of power opportu level. small

regulatory the distribution and Puebla

between

constrained the and agrarian-industrial strongly oligarchs INMECAFE withdrew. to governors when As reregulation strategies open eliminated of Guerreros illustrated by Figure 2, the weakness oligarchy
34 Ejea and Hern?ndez (fn. 2).

190

WORLD POLITICS

as a feasible the weak crony capitalism strategy. In Puebla, by contrast, ness of small as a viable eliminated strategy. neocorporatism producers in social structure variations these subnational Although help explain was not in Guerrero and, conversely, why why crony capitalism possible a focus on societal forces was not in Puebla, neocorporatism possible to account for is not sufficient initiatives. Reregula reregulation not from tion projects resulted from the actions of governors, lobbying by coffee farmers. Hence, societal pressures do not explain why politicians to in the first instru sought reregulate place: if they had been passive ments the governors of Guerrero and of organized societal interests, to INMECAFEs withdrawal Puebla should have responded by doing noth alone two cases of a "reregulation the strengthens lobby" in the that the impulse to reregulate stemmed not from interest group argument defined career incentives. pressure but from governors' institutionally saw different cases of Oaxaca and Chiapas, which The reregulation ing. The absence of societal forces, further under similar configurations projects despite score a focus on societal demands cannot by itself explain politi why the coexistence of cians' reregulation strategies. As Figure 2 illustrates, in Oax small producer movements and powerful oligarchies powerful aca and Chiapas could have they understand weakly chosen constrained neocorporatist the governor of Oaxaca governors' or crony reregulation capitalist projects. options: To

why cies favoring smallholders, capitalist policies repertoires.

favoring

neocorporatist poli pursued of Chiapas chose crony while the governor we need to analyze their divergent oligarchs,

policy

POPULISTS AND NEOLIBERALS Heladio MECAFE Ram?rez L?pez was withdrew, (1986-92), a relic of the governor of Oaxaca when era. He a bygone populist IN had

launched his political career in the early 1970s with support from close advisers to President Luis Echeverr?a Alvarez (1970-76), and his polit
ical identity and policy policies tist-populist in Oaxaca the vision of the appropriate role for government through of "Social Liberalism" and "Social Rule of Law."36 According concepts to the official document summarizing the "legal framework" for were of the sta forged in the mold preferences at that time.35 Ramirez articulated his dominant

35 of Texas Political Biographies, 1935-1993 See Roderic Ai Camp, Mexican (Austin: University Press, 1995), 575. 36 The concept of "social liberalism" was in vogue at the national level after 1988. See Miguel Angel in 2d ed. (University Park: Penn Mexico, Centeno, Democracy within Reason: Technocratic Revolution State University Press, 1997), 205-10.

AFTER Ramirez's

NEOLIBERALISM

191

the Social Rule of Law sought to "overcome administration, the limitations of classical, individualistic liberalism, which was charac state intervention terized by state abstention, that... through dynamic social justice and welfare." The document criticized promotes perspec tives that saw the government's role as limited to contract enforcement were and protection of individual "imbued with rights, because they a

liberal, individualistic philosophy that paralyzes [the state's] activity and

minimizes economic its role."37 Ramirez codified management by amending that "the state will plan, implement, and orient local eco coordinate, nomic activity and carry out the regulation and promotion of activities to the corresponding public interest."38 Given Ramirez's populist roots and policy orientation, it is not for government responsibility state constitution to the stipulate

sur

prising that he responded to the dismantling of INMECAFE choosing by

over the crony one. The governor option capitalist a former director of INMECAFE, Fausto Cant? Pe?a, to appointed the reregulation of the coffee sector. During the mid-1970s, supervise as a member of President Echeverria's Cant? had government, populist a orchestrated into INMECAFE's transformation giant public enterprise the neocorporatist even with Cant? Council would more than seven a new thousand state employees. Under founded government he envisioned guidance, State Coffee agency?the as a mini-INMECAFE that framework he had Ramirez's

of Oaxaca?which resurrect on a subnational earlier

built fifteen

years In Chiapas, the governor had by contrast, tion of the role for government. appropriate

at the national

scale the regulatory level.39 a

concep starkly different Gonz?lez Jos? Patrocinio

Blanco (1988-93) avidly embraced President Carlos Salinas de Gortari's

"modern reform and economic (1988-94) project of market-oriented economic of gov ization."40 Gonzalez's combined privatization policies investment in ernment-owned with promotion of external enterprises urban consumer and services, and agricultural tourism, goods exports.41 to In the rural sector, Gonzalez's government sought expand large scale commercial agriculture, especially cultivation of tropical fruit. Ex

37 Del Oaxaca m?gico al encuentro con la modernidad: Seis a?os de transformaci?n y desarrollo, marco of Oaxaca, 1986-1992, 1992), 18. legislativo (Oaxaca: Government 38 Ibid., 45-46. 39 en Fausto Cant? Pe?a, "Proyecto de ley para el fomento y desarrollo integral de la cafeticultura el estado de Oaxaca," in Primer encuentro estatal de estudio, an?lisis y capacitaci?n sobre cafeticultura (Oaxaca: Secretar?a de Desarrollo Rural, 1989). 40 see Centeno of modernization On the complex meanings (fn. 36), among Mexican political elites, chap. 7. 41 to and the Limits Neil Harvey, "Rebellion in Chiapas: Rural Reforms, Campesino Radicalism, Salinismo" (La Jolla, Calif: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1994).

government neoliberal implements reforms

federal

Negotiating

2 Table the Terms of Reregulation

Oaxaca Guerrero

I state governments launch reregulation projects Reregulation neocorporatist neocorporatist

project

Response producer organizations producer organizations respond

of

small

engaged productivist strategy (i.e., seek to

strategy partisan (i.e., seek to defeat

project)

modify project) Strength of

small producer organizations

high

high

resulting institutions

Resulting
institutions

policy

participatory framework

policy

exclusionary framework

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
port crops, such

193

as banana, mango, and citrus fruits, received melon, as evidenced to up major project special attention, by the government's state s port facilities.42 export firms bene grade the Large agribusiness in infrastructure, fited most from these improvements which helped lower transportation In contrast to Ramirez of public sought their costs and reduce who shipment pumped in Oaxaca, that the delays. resources into a new

government agency (the State Coffee Council) and launched amassive

campaign Gonz?lez investment to increase targeted export small potential coffee of producers, large-scale

agribusiness, which neoliberal doctrine defined as the most efficient,

its emphasis form of production. And neoliberalism, with competitive on in sectors where of big agribusiness the export potential increasing was Mexico had comparative advantages, by the governor interpreted as of Chiapas To promote crony capitalist legitimating reregulation. a small coffee Gonz?lez created agency exports, regulatory charged mainly owners of export licenses. He appointed major cof to the new agency.43 In the hands of these supervise fee-exporting to block efforts elites, regulatory power served as a tool for attempting to export their coffee instead of by small producer directly cooperatives to elite-controlled it at exploitative firms.44 The prices exporting selling s to the of INMECAFE, which was con governor response dismantling gave agrarian-industrial gruent with his neoliberal policy orientation, with issuing firms oligarchs nopoly an in important Chiapas control over coffee exports. opportunity to reassert their mo

Negotiating

the Terms of Reregulation

to control Mexico's moved governors decisively policy do Although mains vacated by INMECAFE, they often failed to achieve their vision of a for example, how reregulation should be carried out. In Chiapas, movement the governor's of small blocked efforts powerful producers to im to in Oaxaca, the oligarchy. And the governor's help despite plan that favored smallholders affili pose an exclusionary policy framework autonomous from the ated with the PRI, small producer organizations a dominant the new framework. As ruling party gained position within summarized
42

inTable

2, three key variables

explain

these different

out

pas,

inMar?a Luisa Armend?riz, ed., Chia Sergio Mota Mar?n, "Estructura econ?mica de Chiapas," una 1994), 338-39. radiograf?a (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Econ?mica, 43 Government of Chiapas, "la. reuni?n del Subcomite Especial de Producci?n y Comercializaci?n del Caf?: Minuta de trabajo" (Tuxtla Gutierrez, March 7,1989). 44 Author interviews with leaders of coffee producer organizations, 1995. Chiapas, November

194 comes:

WORLD POLITICS

the type of reregulation the response of small producer project, and the strength of those organizations. organizations, cases of Oaxaca The and Guerrero how the responses of highlight producer organizations to governors' projects influenced were the results of be In reregulation. Although neocorporatist projects outcomes led to strikingly different institutional states, reregulation cause of the distinct movements. of powerful strategies producer Oaxaca launched in both

an strat the producer movement pursued engaged productivist a focus on economic that combined with efforts egy goals development to the governor's Because this strategy modify project. emphasized that did not pose a political threat to objectives to accom the governor was eventually willing the producer and a participatory frame organizations, policy resulted. In Guerrero, the powerful by contrast, producer joined a broader a struggle for political aimed at democracy inMexico, the governor's between the than in

economic nonpartisan, the state government, modate work

movement thereby

strategy defeating choosing partisan the possibilities for accommodation Consequently, were much weaker and the producer governor organizations and an exclusionary framework resulted. Oaxaca, project. The cases of Chiapas and Puebla show how

variations

in the

of producer affected In processes. strength organizations reregulation both states producer and faced crony capitalist organizations projects chose that ignored the governor's strategies proj disengaged productivist ect and focused instead on autonomous, initia grassroots development tives. Despite these similar producer led to responses, reregulation of the varied of the strengths In Chiapas resulted producer reregulation a was movement in a stalemate because powerful capable of producer the governor's initiative its refusal to crony capitalist stalling through in his scheme. This stalemate was subsequently broken by participate movements in the two cases. between federal government reformists and the producer which led to a participatory framework. be movement, By contrast, cause a weak movement in Puebla lacked the capacity either producer a stalemate or to an alliance with to achieve federal reformists, forge in an exclusionary resulted framework. reregulation sections The following nance were reconstructed dismantled. The discussion and producer governors over the new institutions eral reforms. analyze how institutions in each of the four cases focuses on the as for market after gover INMECAFE was between for state influence an alliance distinct institutional outcomes because

interactions

organizations that replaced

they competed those destroyed

by the neolib

AFTER

NEOLIBERALISM

195

AND CHIAPAS PARTICIPATORY POLICY OAXACA FRAMEWORKS:

The cases of Oaxaca to two distinct and Chiapas from illustrate paths In institutions for market governance. participatory socioeconomic his populist group policy in the coffee agenda when sec IN to pursue

deregulation Oaxaca the lack of a dominant tor enabled a the governor

MECAFE withdrew. He took advantage of this opportunity by launching

to benefit neocorporatist reregulation project designed ers affiliated with the PRl's official peasant confederation, small produc that is, the

CNC. When
of autonomous

the governor launched his project in early 1989, a handful

were small producer organizations outside the operating CNC. A further was to contain of the neocorporatist objective project and weaken these autonomous groups by restricting representation to CNC affiliates. within the new policy framework Ironically, undermining the governor's effect: instead of project had the opposite it helped the independent organizations, producer them. The threat of exclusion from the new institutions for organizations powerful soon formed a statewide in con

strengthen market gave the independent governance to centives forces and mobilize. join They federation Committee keting of autonomous of Coffee

support

sands of small producers who had previously depended on INMECAFE

CEPCO was By late 1989 more in Oaxaca, comprising organization thousand small coffee farmers. for these services. CEPCO focus pursued on economic productivist goals with development state-level framework. policy the governor's neocorporatist in the State Coffee Council, an engaged the most than half producer powerful of the state's fifty

organizations?the Coordinating producer of Oaxaca Producers (CEPCO). By offering mar CEPCO and technical thou assistance, rapidly recruited

the emerging fully challenged

a strategy, which integrated in efforts to gain inclusion success The organization formal project, winning the new state government sector. The council subse

representation in the coffee for policy agency responsible served as an arena in which the government of Oaxaca and the quently collaborative innovative, programs producer organizations designed in global markets.45 that made small coffee farmers more competitive

In Oaxaca the combination of institution building from above (that below (that is, CEPCOs engaged productivist strategy) resulted in new
Institutions for Market Governance: See Richard Snyder, "Reconstructing Participatory Policy in and Innovation in Mexico's Coffee Sector," in Richard Snyder, ed., Institutional Adaptation Regimes Rural Mexico Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexican (La Jolla, Studies, forthcoming). 45

is, the governor's

neocorporatist

project)

with

organized

pressure

from

196

WORLD POLITICS
to

institutions that enhanced the efficiency and quality of smallholder

peasant support for the strengthen the governor of Oaxaca coffee, ruling party by reregulating unwittingly raw materials move that a powerful institutional grassroots supplied ment was able to rework into a framework. participatory policy production. Through In Chiapas, by contrast, reregulation took a a different course. There to construct the governor's reregulation project posed major obstacle a in its reliance on a crony ing participatory policy framework, capital ist strategy. The that crony capitalist project rested on the assumption and mar processing to elite-owned firms. Because the principal keting agroindustrial goal was to of most small producer in organizations Chiapas gain precisely control of these lucrative processing and marketing the crony activities, an to choose incentives capitalist project gave them weak engaged pro small farmers should cede responsibility for coffee ductivist which strategy. encountered In contrast a to Oaxaca's neocorporatist organizations, with their core compatible of cof the processing and marketing project small producer his efforts

economic of managing objective a in Chiapas confronted fee, the small producer organizations reregula on tion project these very aspirations. denying premised Consequently, a strategy, ignoring the governor's they pursued productivist disengaged initiative and directing their energies instead toward crony capitalist autonomous marketing elite-owned consolidate Chiapas The economic

their own development projects.46 By launching the small producer denied the organizations cooperatives, raw coffee to firms sufficient of agroindustrial quantities the crony scheme. capitalist led to a stalemate. in 1994 The politics of reregulation in

initially stalemate ended in eastern

thus

ant rebellion

as a consequence of the Zapatista peas severe threat of The ungovernability Chiapas.47

posed by the Zapatistas induced reformist federal officials to allywith

the small coffee coffee movement state government and against the producer This reformist the crony capitalist alliance defeated oligarchy. for a participatory laying the foundations policy framework.

move and Chiapas grassroots powerful producer ments institutions for played pivotal roles in constructing participatory market governance. But in Chiapas the governor's crony capitalist proj ect incentives and poor institutional for a supplied weak ingredients a from below. To forge Oaxaca-style reworking participatory policy
to defeat the crony capitalist project would have been extremely costly for the small to repress coercive capacities and demonstrated producers, given the state government's willingness see (fh. 41). peasants. On state government Harvey repression in Chiapas, 47 On the Zapatista uprising, see Harvey (fh. 41). 46 Attempting

forces, In both Oaxaca

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM framework, the producer movement

capitalist garchy. External crony coalition of the allies proved state government to achieve necessary and the coffee

197
oli

in Chiapas first had to defeat the

this goal.

EXCLUSIONARY POLICY FRAMEWORKS: GUERRERO AND PUEBLA

The cases of Guerrero in and Puebla show how frameworks tion can result the politics of reregula to small detrimental

exclusionary policy in Oaxaca, Like his counterpart the governor of Guerrero producers. a to INMECAFEs dis also launched in response neocorporatist project as in Oaxaca, a In Guerrero, small producer move mantling. powerful ment outside the PRl's official confederation. peasant organized However, Guerrero's independent producer movement had consoli

dated at the beginning of the 1980s, significantly earlier than the inde
movement in Oaxaca, which in 1989 in direct response formed pendent to the of Guer governor's reregulation project. The early consolidation movement to the rero's independent its reaction shaped governor's in ways that hindered the construction of a partic reregulation project

ipatory policy framework. After hotly contested presidential elections in July 1988, the coffee
movement in Guerrero producer san The most politics. important became producer increasingly organization members involved threw in parti its sup

port behind the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution

and many rank and file became militant tion party. When the governor launched of this new

(PRD),

opposi his neocorporatist reregulation movement had al year, the independent project the following producer committed itself to the struggle for political In con ready democracy. trast to the statewide in Oaxaca newly formed organization producer

which carefully avoided partisan affiliations and focused in (CEPCO),

stead on engaging Guerrero's tended neocorporatist project, a in strategy organizations independent partisan pursued to advance democratization and defeat the neocorpo political the producers' choice to and polarization politicization for the farmers. In Guerrero of a partisan of the coffee strategy sector, and modifying the governor's

ratist project. contributed economic

which led to an exclusionary policy framework that yielded virtually no

benefits small producers had few options. An engaged by contrast, was not feasible, because Puebla's small producer strategy productivist a crony in Chiapas, like their counterparts faced organizations, capital ist the extreme weakness of Puebla's Furthermore, project. producer In Puebla,

movement due to its small size eliminated the possibility of mobilizing

to defeat the governor's project. Because of these constraints, Puebla's

198
producer organizations

WORLD POLITICS
had little choice but to pursue a disengaged also not re the of a

strategy. productivist to their In contrast chose strong formist such a

in Chiapas, who counterparts powerful were Pueblas small producer strategy, organizations as in a stalemate. to achieve In Puebla, Chiapas, enough to intervene federal officials eventually attempted against forces. These small efforts producer undercut failed, however, The because absence organizations. the potential

crony capitalist of Puebla's weakness

of the

for an alliance be strong producer movement tween grassroots and reformist federal officials. Whereas organizations and forged a par the crony capitalist coalition such an alliance defeated

ticipatory policy framework in Chiapas, the crony capitalist forces in

Puebla resulted faced no significant in an exclusionary thus The politics of reregulation opposition. that served the interests framework policy

of the oligarchy. LESSONSFROM MEXICO PATHWAYS: POSTNEOLIBERAL

These in a single sector in just one processes institution-building a reforms that neoliberal basis for expecting strong country provide across sectors and nations. new institutions a rich have left legacy of varied the Mexican building lines and, alternatively, institution two case, we can distinguish plausible innovation after neoliberalism: along resurgence of traditional elites. patterns corporatist of

From

ALONGCORPORATIST LINES INNOVATION INSTITUTIONAL

Students about of comparative economy political institutions the efficacy of corporatist are at increasingly skeptical of challenges

managing is based largely on the experi This skepticism adjustment.48 ences of and Austria, where cases, such as Sweden pressures European for demands of markets from globalization (for example, increasing eroded social democratic labor flexibility) arrangements corporatist economic

that, until
dynamism. Despite

the 1980s, delivered political

such the case of Oaxaca skepticism, In Oaxaca lines is still feasible. intended supplied to

stability and economic

shows a that innovation rereg modes raw in

along corporatist ulation project, originally instead of policy-making, gredients

48 Cornell

neocorporatist authoritarian strengthen incentives and institutional movement was

with which

grassroots

producer

able to forge
(Ithaca, N.Y.:

See Jonas Pontusson, Press, University

The Limits of Social Democracy: Investment Politics and Kaufman (fn. 8), 340-45. 1992); and Haggard

in Sweden

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
served ernment ducer

199

a participatory policy framework. The State Coffee Council of Oaxaca

in the coffee as an arena for consensus interests among competing mobilizing sector and collaborative between gov launching projects and producers. These social collaborations capital how with creatively combined state pro in government's capital

organizations'

ways that improved the efficiency and quality of coffee production. The
can engaged productivist organizations institutions into participatory exclusionary corporatist policy of competing in the global the challenges frameworks that help manage illustrates transform marketplace. Viewed state this way, corporatist heritages?even offer important the often those of the top-down, imperatives compara of po case of Oaxaca

corporatist tive advantages countries with

variety?may for reconciling

institutional

conflicting

litical stability and economic

growth.49 The

task in developing

for example, such heritages, Brazil, Venezuela, Egypt, work and Ivory Coast, may therefore be to make Ghana, corporatism it inclusive and participatory, rather than to get rid of it. by making us of the difficulties case of Guerrero, of reminds The however, institutions from corporatist crafting participatory policy frameworks in nondemocratic systems. A neocorporatist reregulation proj political sector may often be linked to the mainte ect for a economic particular nance of an authoritarian political regime. Producers are citizens, too,

and if they become embroiled in struggles to democratize the political

to the in parti their opposition regime, framing neocorporatist project san terms, as occurred to in Guerrero, difficult then itmay be extremely

establish a participatory policy framework. Spillover into the sector of

issues related to democratization may lead to politicization, a pro to and refuse to bargain with the government causing rigidify as it perceives Fur of the political ducer movement part opposition. motivated and civic goals may be thermore, by partisan producers to in the policy with for inclusion the government reluctant negotiate is not worth decide that gaining admission because arena, they may contentious

compromising their struggle for political democracy. As illustrated by

work the case of Guerrero, polarization are the likely results. These contrasts between projects between led to distinct political and an exclusionary of Oaxaca policy frame where

the cases

and Guerrero,

neocorporatist erful tensions

suggest pow policy frameworks, on the one hand, and democratization,

49 On "state corporatism," Politics 36 (January 1974).

see

Philippe

C. Schmitter,

"Still the Century

of Corporatism?"

Review

of

200
the construction the other.

WORLD POLITICS
of participatory institutions In the context of an authoritarian for market on governance, neolib undergoing

regime to be a democrat eral reforms, one of the costs of choosing first and a to build economic the opportunity second may be forfeiting producer institutions that could help improve welfare and competitiveness.

Resurgence
Countries across with

of Traditional

Elites
traditions of interest intermediation exist

In such places, neoliberal reforms should to launch strong give politicians neocorporatist reregulation mass to mobilize of mass support. Mobilization support is not projects In cases where societal always the strategy politicians prefer, however. are elites incumbents may face compelling pressures powerful, political incentives them by choosing crony capitalist projects. ally with As illustrated by the cases of Chiapas and Puebla, neoliberal reforms can create to reassert their for traditional elites hege opportunities mony. them control cial Neoliberal to return get the state off these elites' backs, allowing policies as usual, which means to business enjoying monopoly over so If private elites command significant regional markets. to

corporatist the developing world.

networks, may have through politicians patron-client to seek their support incentives crony capitalist strong by launching neo than leading to idyllic, decentralized governance, projects. Rather are to in the context of resilient traditional elites liberal reforms likely revive old-fashioned that is, the uncontested decentralization, hege of local oligarchs. mony control case of shows how alliances between strong grassroots Chiapas officials can offset the power and reformist, national-level organizations the construction of participatory of local elites, allowing policy frame neo even in contexts with works strong oligarchies.50 When polarized The liberal alliances frameworks. transnational may serve as reforms are in such places with powerful oligarchies, a necessary condition for participatory policy probably are absent or weak, officials If reformist government and solidarity networks organizations nongovernmental are launched

resources that by providing help sustain partial substitutes often such external mobilization. However, grassroots organizations cannot support. give durable, long-term is seen in the case of Puebla, which scenario illus The alternative

trates the difficulties of building and sustaining reformist alliances in

50 Politics 1993). In his study of rural food provision, Fox calls this the "sandwich strategy"; see Jonathan Fox, The Mexico: State Power and Social Mobilization Press, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University of Food in

AFTER NEOLIBERALISM
the face of weak grassroots movements. Thus, in Puebla, where

201 reform

oriented federal officials lacked organized pressure from below, they failed in their efforts to break the grip of local elites on the post
INMECAFE that, reforms rather policy than are framework. leading with This to efficient, reminder sobering neoliberal markets, unregulated or and weak grassroots oligarchies institutions that gen case serves as a

in contexts

ganizations erate monopoly

likely rents for societal

powerful to result in new

regulatory elites.51

Summary and Questions

Most recent work countries

for Future

Research

on the of development seeks to ex economy political or how choose neoliberal plain why policies they implement them. This focuses on postimplementation contrast, issues, study, by how neoliberal reforms can result in new institutions for mar showing Neoliberal incumbents seize shocks policy areas, to reregulate opportunities these opportunities because vacate a situation sectors that of the

ket governance. affords political economy. and keep

Politicians

reregulation

generates divisible benefits and targetable rewards that help them gain
are also have stakes in how markets groups power. Societal can com and politicians' reregulated, reregulation projects give them to mobilize. incentives be a Hence, may reregulation pelling negotiated in which and societal groups bargain over the rules process politicians institutions for market that replace those destroyed governance neoliberal reforms. The relative of politi and strategies by strengths cians and societal groups who in this bargaining will deter participate mine the distinct institutional outcomes. a framework in a systematic To cast this argument form, I propose for analyzing the politics of reregulation. The framework consists of a dual focus?on two steps with of reregulation choices politicians' and on subsequent interactions between projects strategic politicians and societal groups the terms of reregulation. incum First, regarding are a bents' reregulation from strategies explained politician-centered that connects societal forces, regime institutions, and policy perspective repertoires comes are gaining compete
51

of new

out institutional Second, shaping of policy choice. from an interactive perspective that focuses on bar explained as between and societal interest groups politicians they to influence two steps the terms of reregulation. These help

to the

It bears emphasis that neoliberal reforms may result in the hegemony of new, rather than tradi that have recendy emerged in Russia and tional, elites, as illustrated by the nontraditional oligarchies other former communist countries of Europe and Central Asia.

202

WORLD POLITICS
institu institu

inMexico led to exclusionary reforms explain why neoliberal tions for market governance in some states and to participatory tions in others.

This study offers several lessons for shifting the focus from the pol itics of neoliberal reform to the politics of reregulation. To illustrate
a fundamental to underscore it difference between lessons, helps neoliberal reform and reregulation. Neoliberal reform imposes concen trated costs on powerful interest groups and creates mostly nonexclud these able benefits, such as a stable currency, low inflation, and reduced fiscal creates concentrated tar deficits.52 Reregulation, by contrast, gains and excludable benefits. To put it starkly, neoliberal reform is about getable, whereas taking away benefits, fundamental This difference search on the First, we reregulation has important is about them. reintroducing for future re implications on the command

of reregulation. politics should go beyond the narrow characterized work

emphasis

ing heights of the political system?heads

technocrats?that form. Rather, we need to broaden and subnational legislators politicians. attention neoliberal reforms deflected because they were with

of government and top-level

on the re of neoliberal politics our focus to include rank-and-file The from of consequences such midlevel incumbents, to have few incentives to sup distributive

correctly understood costs and nonexcludable, concentrated port policies delayed bene fits. From the perspective of explaining the choice and implementation to of neoliberal pres constituency "regular" politicians policies, exposed sures were seen as to re of the problem, that is, as impediments part

form.Most work on the politics of neoliberal reform thus focused on

of top technocrats and national high-level "change teams" consisting were insulated from constituency executives.53 Because they potentially to inflict to have the these elites were understood pressures, capacity a to costs on role interest groups and, hence, proactive organized play

implementing neoliberal policies. The distributive consequences of regulatory policy (that is, targetable
rewards intent and concentrated on securing it likely that regular politicians benefits) make for constituents, rather than insu divisible benefits was not

lated elite change teams, will be the pivotal players in the politics of
case of Mexico illustrates this point: reregulation. The state governors launched by facing complex political reregulation imperatives,

52 For an argument that this pattern of costs and benefits and Kaufman (fh. 8), 9,156-59. Haggard "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial does not fit the post-Soviet context, see Joel S. Hellman, in Postcommunist Reform Transitions," World Politics 50 (January 1998). 53 The term "change teams" is from Waterbury (fn. 8), 191.

AFTER

NEOLIBERALISM

203 thus
contexts that struc

Work by high-level technocrats insulated from political pressures.

needs to be done to of specify better the institutional ture the incentives

actors. This task affords an important op political to draw of the political of development economy portunity on the of literature on institutions burgeoning regimes.54 That political ex literature offers powerful tools for unpacking regimes and analytic rules that define contexts of incumbent decision mak posing microlevel for students choices about reregulation strategies. ing and, hence, shape politicians' our focus from elite teams to also Shifting change regular politicians on the of neoliberal reform Work poses conceptual challenges. politics

commonly employed highly aggregated regime categories.55Although

such categories facilitate broad, cross-national comparisons, contexts. An fail to illuminate politicians' decision-making for future research thus involves crafting fine-grained priority that pinpoint In addition also explore terizes work national key rules and incentives that constrain they often important

concepts situ incumbents

ated at distinct levels of political systems.

on new actors, students of to should reregulation focusing new units A striking whole-nation bias charac of analysis. on the of neoliberal reform: most studies analyze politics or other rather than sectors, subnational systems, regions, awhole-nation focus may be appropriate for explain

units.56 Although

ingmacroeconomic stabilization, the highly divisible quality of regula tory policy suggests that reregulation dynamics will vary significantly
we units. Hence, administrative bias by employing research de beyond countries lines. By signs that disaggregate along sectoral and territorial it easier to control for cultural, ecological, and socioeconomic making nations should com the study of subnational units within variations, more attention on how institutions efforts to focus determine plement and subnational need to move whole-nation politicians' questions
54

across

economic

sectors

incentives.57

Finally, this study's empirical findings fromMexico

about the kinds of new institutions that

raise intriguing
replace those de

See, for example, Matthew Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Scott Mainwaring Design and Electoral Dynamics and Matthew and Democracy in Latin America (New York: Cambridge Shugart, eds., Presidentialism Press, 1997). University 55 and Kaufman See, for example, Nelson (fn. 4), 23; Haggard (fn. 23). (fn. 8); and Geddes 56 in Arend Lijphart, "The Comparable-Cases "Whole-nation bias" is discussed Strategy in Com parative Research," Comparative Political Studies 8 (July 1975), 166-69. 57 see Juan J. Linz and Amando On subnational comparisons, de Miguel, Differ "Within-Nation ences and The Eight Spains," in Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan, eds., Comparing Comparisons: Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research (New Haven: Yale University Press, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific In 1966); and Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, ference in Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 219-23.

204 stroyed by neoliberal

WORLD POLITICS
reforms. The cases of Chiapas and Puebla, where

neoliberal reforms triggered a resurgence of traditional elites, highlight the potential perils of political decentralization. Rather than leading to
efficient allocation of resources by market forces, decentralizing reforms

in places with powerful oligarchies may instead yield reregulatedmarkets that generate monopoly rents for local elites. This finding challenges
facile equations of decentralization with participatory that are governance common in the literature.58 Future work should specify fur development ther the conditions reforms succeed or fail under which decentralizing

to deliver on their promise of stimulating participatory development. Work on the politics of neoliberal reform has often lamented the
lack of insulated that weak Oaxaca state technocratic capacity in developing countries, agencies arguing economic undermined adjustment by exposing

the policy process to the distortions of political ambition.59The case of

casts in pur in a different ambition light: politicians political raw materials suit of power may unintentionally institutional supply In Oax into participatory policy frameworks. ripe for transformation

aca the incen reregulation governor's neocorporatist project provided tives for a from below by grassroots organizations reworking producer institutions for market Rather that yielded governance. participatory

than insulating policymakers,

countries ambition may induces instead involve incumbents

then, the challenge facing developing

policy participatory state may have a silver lining. ambition for market contributes governance. with

so that institutions reconfiguring political to for institutional ingredients supply this perspective, the soft Viewed from frameworks.

Future research should specify the conditions under which political

to the construction The Mexican case of participatory illustrates one institutions set of condi

tions: politicians with populist policy repertoires and institution-building ble of challenging government policy, yet committed to achieving self
their analyses of their economic activities. management By pushing other scholars could discover the politics of neoliberal reform, beyond to participatory policy frameworks. pathways Studies that address issues such as these will improve our understand ing of politics and the prospects for development after neoliberalism. agendas together powerful, engaged producer organizations capa

58 The Search for Bank, "Fiscal Decentralization: See, for example, Interamerican Development in Economic and Social Progress in Latin America: 1994 Report (Washington, Equity and Efficiency," Interamerican Development D.C: Bank, 1994). 59 (fh. 5). (fh. 7); and Nelson See, for example, Callaghy