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domains in three spaces of strategy
Communication at the
WORKSHOP ON ARCHITECTURE AND SOCIAL ARCHITECTURE:
DISTURBING NOTIONS OF STRUCTURE IN ORGANIZATIONS
by
Albert Lejeune, Professor, ESG‐UQAM, Montréal (QC), Canada
Ira Sack, Professor, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken (NJ), USA
ERASMO – Exploration and Research group
in the Architecture, Simulation and Modeling of Organizations
EIASM, THE EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR
ADVANCED STUDIES IN MANAGEMENT
BRUSSELS, MAY 15‐16, 2008
Introduction
Business and enterprises architects tend to ignore the fact that at the end of a
modeling exercise, people will have to inhabit the designed organization. Borrowing
from the sociology of art and from the sociology of architecture, we want to show that
the architect is deeply dependant on a society that produces a particular space of
representation where the legitimacy, the tools and the theories are predefined. But
sociology of IT‐ enterprise‐ and business modeling are still lacking. The IT‐business
modelers are not space conscious in the sense that they doesn’t know in what social
space of representation they are building theirs models. If we simplify: some modelers
are eager to empty the organization from any kind of human burden, while others,
taking too an abstract and engineering stance, architect a subjects independent
organization.
We propose in this paper to revise certain contributions in the strategic management
literature around three configurations of the space of the strategy: the empty space, the
programming space and the inhabited space. Along the journey, we will discuss some
aspects of the OM approachi (Organization Modeling), a modeling approach concerned
with both the hard and soft dimensions of the organization.
Designing in a space of representation
In 1693, in the Kingdom of Sicily, the Prince of Butera, who designed a plan for his
Occhiola city destroyed by an earthquake ‘was respected like a scholar for being able to
draw a hexagon on paper and give the necessary instructions to a capomaestro to
postpone all on the ground’ii. In this case, the ground was “emptied” by an earthquake
and hexagonal trajectory.
The concept of a space of representation is proper to individuals engaged in a creative
work or in a design work. Herbert Simon, in his book The Sciences of the Artificial,
defines the design activity in these terms: ‘Everyone designs who devises courses of
action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones’ (1969: 129). This design
activity defining the work of engineers, doctors, painters, architects, managers and
strategists, carries a single logic: the discovery of different options in order to meet the
design criteria. This process of seeking solutions, choice and implementation is an
ongoing process, because if this process starts in a particular context (the idea of a
starting point for Simon), every step in its implementation creates a new situation, itself
2 Introduction | UQAM
a new context which renews the design activity. For Simon, to reach the construction of
an artifact while respecting the design criteria is first an issue of representation ‘Solving
a problem simply means representing it so as to make the solution transparent’ (Simon
1969: 153). The design activity quickly leads us therefore to consider the concept of a
cognitive space of representation that is at the same time the internal representation of
the environment of the task used by the subject and the representation, by the subject
of change and transformation that are possible in the environment of the task.
Below we put fourth and develop the notion of a social space of representation and
discuss the organization modeling activity in three different spaces of representation:
empty, programming and inhabited.
The space of the architect
Raymond, an architecture sociologistiii puts at the center of his argument, the society
as a producer of a social representation space, which has been the source, throughout
history, of the architectural space of representation. But what is the space of
representation of the architect? It is simultaneously a social legitimacy codified by a
power (the legitimacy to represent), a set of technical processes and practices, and a
complex of tools and forms suitable for the mental representation. According to
Raymond, the architect who best illustrates a gap in the space of representation is Le
Corbusier. He wanted to give the modern era white cathedrals. The reading of his works
is indicative of that empty space, which allows all trajectories: ‘Culture is an orthogonal
mindset. This leads to the right when you're strong enough, enough armed and quite
lucid and want to draw perfect lines’ (1925).
A detour through some books on the architect, art and architectureiv has enabled us
to extend this notion of space representation. Like the painter, the strategist has, before
acting, a mental map which contains a blueprint, powerful and blunt, of what he wants
to achieve. For the Prince of Butera it is a hexagon, for Le Corbusierv, the obsession of
the right angle, and for Andrew Fastow, the former Enron Corp. executive who
masterminded the intricate financial deals, it is the magic of a 57 % annual growthvi.
Prior to their publication in the form of a plan, these visions are a sketch for the Prince
of Butera, a mock‐up for Le Corbusier or a spreadsheet for Fastow. Action is the
fundamental link between the strategy and what it takes as an object of reflection and
action in its environment. The Prince of Butera, Le Corbusier or Fastow, as strategists, is
not in a position of perception (trying to understand the context) or projection (eager to
generate consensus). The strategist acts, but doesn’t share his mental map. Guided by a
3 Designing in a space of representation | UQAM
mental map, the strategy progresses according to a path through each of its acts,
dramatically, when the strategist is in a state of absolute power, or incrementally when
his power is relative.
The space of the strategist and the organizational architect
The concept of the space of representation is adapted to the organizational context
by using the term: the space of strategy. In what space does the strategist at the top,
visualizing the organization’s future, structure a situation to reduce it to a small number
of critical problems? To answer this question, we need to consider a range of political
dimensions (the legitimacy of a strategist), instrumental dimensions (the tools of the
strategist) and theoretical dimensions (the theories underlying the action of strategist).
The real thing that holds the attention of the strategist is clearly the organization's
performance. But performance is born of a leverage effect of a work on X ‐ the crucial
problem which becomes the object of the strategy ‐ which can be, depending on the
situation, an amalgam of organization and environment, people and processes, culture
and decision‐making processes, structure, technology and resources, etc.
The work on X may be called a visualization exercise. As emphasized by Morabito,
Sack and Bhate (1999): ‘stepping through the OM design process is an exercise in
visualization. Visualization is somewhat like composing a symphony or painting a
picture. The artist starts with an image the final rendering is visualized even if not fully
formed. As the artist fills in the image, the composition begins to take form, the artist
shapes according to the image, but the form molds the image, too. Planned and
emergent, the molded image is a product of visualization. Visualization applies to
organizational design as well. Visualization is not a vision statement. Rather, it is a
collection of decisions by which the strategic intent of management may be interwoven
into the fabric of an organization's architecture. Typically, strategic intent is defined as
the long‐term ambition of the business. From an organizational design viewpoint,
strategic intent means the desired emergent characteristics of the organization.’
Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the
organizational architect
In the empty space, the strategist has full access to the object of the strategy because
it has the political ability, instrumental and theoretical to create the emptiness around
4 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
him in order to impose its own trajectory. In the programming space, constraints and
opportunities of the environment and the strengths and weaknesses of the organization
are filling up the situation of representation, reducing the role of strategist‐architect to
the projection rather than action. In the inhabited space, the purpose of the strategy is
not only accessible to the top strategist: it is shared by multiple actors who want to
contribute to new strategies and performance.
The empty space
What Raymond called empty space, is a space devoid of any social representation,
leaving room for an architected path: the development of an aesthetic intuition. In
strategic management, it brings us closer to the visionary entrepreneur.
The empty space characterizes this type of architect, who, in order to achieve her
aesthetic intuition, create a vacuum around him: power vacuum; i.e., no legitimacy for
the others, tools vacuum; i.e., no constraints nor accepted way to work, theories
vacuum i.e. no predetermined way to act about the future. Only the empty space will
allow her personal trajectory development, as was the case, with the merchants of San
Gimignano, known around the world for its thirteen medieval towers. In San Gimignano,
every street leads to 15 towers (see fig. 1): the higher the tower, the richer the
merchant.
The empty space is characterized by the strategist search for maneuverability and
self‐realization. He is the only human having access and defining the subject of his
strategy, and to ensure that its implementation is in line with her vision. The example of
Fastow at ENRON or Jobs at Apple Corp. can be seen as an archetype of what we call the
empty space in strategy.
Growth is key to the organizational strategist work or cost‐cutting in a downturn
situation where reengineering, downsizing and radical transformation approaches will
empty the space of representation, privileging the tabula rasa. Growth enables the
building of a stronger and more powerful organization. As recalled by Mintzberg (1973)
writing about entrepreneurs: ‘We're empire builders. The tremendous compulsion and
obsession is not to make money, but to build an empire.’ These strategists of empty
space have understood the need for a vision, an obsession, and a trajectory for pushing
performance. The strategist of empty space must come to represent, for potential
employees, the greatest potential for success.
5 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
Figure 1
Medieval towers in San Gimignano, Italy: empty space
Why this primacy of the action? As stated by Jobs, the entrepreneur, even if he is
managing a very big company, is in business for himself. What therefore should be done
with all that bureaucracy around him? Leaders who have a firm path towards improved
performance will try to break, through their actions, programming organizations to
encourage initiative, responsibility and entrepreneurship within their corporation. The
strategist of empty space must be strong and have an exceptional savoir‐faire. As also
highlighted by Mintzberg about Sam Steinberg, the entrepreneur must both be really in
a position of control over his organization to ensure the legitimacy of its vision, its
trajectory. And she must have an intimate knowledge of his profession and the work of
this organization.
However, ‘The important thing is the vacuum!’ This expression is attributed to the
renowned British sculptor Henry Moore (who died in 1986). The sculptor least saw his
work on material, that the beauty of emptiness created.
6 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
The programming space
Programming space is unique to the architect who eventually abandons any a priori
aesthetic vision for putting together a program resulting from a budget, data on costs
and regulatory burdens (of land, materials, aesthetics rules and the construction
industry).
He leads us to the mechanical and objective manager functioning according to the
costs / benefits, opportunities / constraints and strengths / weaknesses. Programming
space is full and dense, charged with standards and constraints, tools for representation
and practices rooted in ideologies and theories in place. The architect who works in this
kind of space of representation can no longer develop its own trajectory. He makes only
the formatting of various and multiple constraints: ground plan of land use, standards of
urban planning, construction standards, specifications (see fig. 2 for an illustration).
This is the kind of space of representation described by experts in problem solvingvii :
a space filled with operators where a solution or an artifact (the product of a conscious
design) only develops and crystallizes after multiple iterations. The strategy designed in
this space is the result of a series of iterations between nodes of knowledge about the
opportunities and threats in the environment, as well as the strengths and weaknesses
of the company or organizationviii. The dominant dimension in this programming space,
in its concrete and visible aspects, is certainly the formal tools i.e. mental forms,
standards, routines, procedures, books of knowledge, software, databases etc. enabling
the analysis of the environment, modeling, strategic planning, and management by
objective, zero‐based budgeting, project management, concurrent engineering, etc.
The configuration of power is transformed; the specialists for strategic planning, the
project management office and the finance people form a larger team around the top
strategist. The formal plan becomes the preferred tool for the strategy; access to the
purpose of the strategy is difficult. In the configuration of the programming space, the
strategist is linked to a planning system that acts on him and on which it acts.
7 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
Figure 2
North American suburbs, Duluth: programming space
Through this process of planning, the purpose of the strategy becomes a compound
object increasingly encompassing the whole organization and increasingly opening on
the environment to build mutual adjustment: the fit. What is the relationship between
the strategist and the programming space? The planning system will produce a strategy
to the extent that the system treats the three basic components of a strategy: goals,
resources and environmental constraints.
The dominant relationship, in the configuration of empty space, was the action of the
strategist on the performance of his organization. In the configuration of the
programming space, the key relationship is the projection of a plan on the purpose of
the strategy. The trained strategist and planning experts at the summit will develop a
model for the purpose of the strategy (the publication of a plan requires a prior
consensus on the different perspectives of experts and the manager at the top), and will
publish this model in the form of the plan.
We briefly discuss the dimensions of legitimacy, tools and theories of representation
of the strategy in a programming space. As soon as the strategist, by a sense of duty,
choice or natural inclination, is required to consider "objectively" both his organization
8 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
and the environment thereof, he is committed to sharing its legitimacy to formulate
strategies (representing on paper, in the plan and by his actions, the future of his
organization) with experts in planning and the planning system in place. The balance will
be fragile in a powerful and effective planning service in the formulation and strategist
powerful and effective in the implementation. The legitimacy of the technocracy is likely
to produce a weakening of the strategist and management at the top; and a failure to
implement the best strategies on paperix.
‘The picture (or perhaps, nightmare) of planning as the solution of almost
unimaginable numbers of simultaneous equations can be replaced by a picture of
planning as the construction of a series of unrelated action programs’x. In the
programming space, the strategist does not act directly on people, but he gives himself,
through the planning process, the means for scheduling and rescheduling activities. This
does not mean that innovation is impossible, but once identified, it must be integrated
with routine behaviors of the organization's members. A complex decision will evolve,
within an organization, not only in terms of the premises set by senior management, but
also in terms of the pattern of communications and human relations that transmits to
the members of the organization information, the premises, goals, attitudes and
expectationsxi.
In the configuration of the programming space, conflicts around theories of
representation are common and the most subtle but also most ruthless. If in strategy
and policy, hard science (decision theory, industrial organization and micro‐economics)
and formulation analytics oppose inductive and qualitative approaches and the
resources‐based view of the firm. For some experts, the soft approaches are related to
the art, and art does not progress and therefore does not logically deliver knowledge.
Therefore an attempt must be made to find a language that would objectively test
hypotheses and accumulate verified knowledge.
The corporate models, artifacts of the strategy, are derived from a concept of linear
time (clock‐paced). In the programming space, the concept of territory to build (the
ENRON Empire) is replaced by the concept of a sequence of movements, always to
reprogram. Although the concept of space as territory is unique to the strategist of
empty space, the concept of a sequence of actions scheduled in time to keep a fit
between the company and its environment is unique to the strategist of the
programming space.
9 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
The inhabited space
The inhabited space is proper to the social architect who is listening to the customer,
seeking to capture and reflect only the needs of a family, community or organization
without imposing its aesthetics trajectory. As at Google corp., the inhabited space is
filled with living legitimized subjectsxii. They are, in architecture, the future inhabitants
of an environment built for the community like the Oia village in Greece (see fig. 3); in
organizational life, future users, individuals or sub‐organizational systems making a
project or a strategy happen. But these people, even if they are not aesthetic and
technically competent as the architect, have a voice to express on their habitat.
According to Raymond (1984), these people hold the architectural concept.
The inhabited space is an area where political and cultural power is acting from both
inside and outside the organization. It is less a matter for the manager at the top to
ensure the strategy’s legitimacy than to understand the emerging pattern of the
strategy, which is being built around him. It must develop an adequate theory about the
intentions and strategies of the players in and around the organization.
Neither the vision of the leader or the strategic content will give meaning to an
organization. The concept is already there, waiting to be recognized (Raymond, 1984).
But this recognition will depend on the relationship between the social architect and
users of the strategy. ‘The leader was perhaps the one who chose the image of all those
who were available at that time… But it is rare that he also had that first conceived the
vision’xiii.
The configuration of power is changed, everyone should have access to the
legitimacy of representation to define and access to the object of the strategy. The
strategist summit is less designer of the strategy than the designer of a space ‐ the
inhabited space ‐ allowing the emergence of new strategies, innovations, new processes
and new products. As at Google corp., the top strategists voluntarily define such a
context that allows the strategic autonomy of the greatest number of members and
managers of the organization.
The context defined by the strategist at the top, wanting to build a inhabited space, is
the following: he must lose power to legitimize the actions of other potential strategists,
but must use tools, structural and cultural, to create a context creating and approving
strategic behavior alone, but must retain an a priori vision for the future of his
organization, to be attentive to the emerging situations (to encourage or prohibit). The
definition of a context rather than the publication of a model is critical to the inhabited
10 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
space. There is convergence between researchers interested in the strategy beyond the
concept of solo‐hero (empty space) or programming strategy (programming space) to
say that the key, to create strategic self‐management behavior is the context.
Figure 3
The village of Oia in Greece: inhabited space
The concept of corporate strategy represents ‘the more or less explicit articulation of
the firm's theory about its past concrete achievements’xiv. Thereafter, new strategies
emerge to the extent that strategists at the summit adopt a meta strategy which turns
them into arithmetic teachers: That means people whose effectiveness is measured by
the ability of their students to solve problems, rather than their own ability to solve these
problemsxv. The inhabited space includes literature, which places the organization (or
structure), in time, before the strategy. The key is that the emergence of a strategic
autonomy, born of cognitive processes, social, organizational and political complexesxvi
raises contents to be transmitted, rearranged and incorporated by management at the
top in their definition of a strategic content for the firm. The inhabited space
configuration is not necessarily limited to the company or organization. As with the
extended Toyota model, this configuration may extend outside the organization. The
close exchanges with suppliers, union participation in decisions of a strategic nature,
working together with governmental bodies or the upcoming joint development of new
technologies with competitors illustrate this point.
11 Three spaces of strategy for the strategist and the organizational architect | UQAM
Without reducing the strategy to a group phenomenon, without denying the role of
leader, the configuration of the inhabited space implies that the formation of the
strategy occurs within a group. It is the group that acts by agreeing on the means of its
action. In the inhabited space, the consensus is crucial and it bears on concrete ways.
The theory that guides the one who works in this space is the ideology and culture of
the group or organization. The inhabited space works for the manager and members of
the organization, in a context of empowerment cultural tools and unwritten theories on
what has been the success the organization. What is radically new in this configuration
is that the direct and exclusive link between the top strategist and its strategy
disappear! New forms of real‐time and late knowledge bindingxvii are appearing, cross‐
linking members to each other, to the information continuum and to the environment.
Information is shared and immediately interpreted by the group. Inside the pure
inhabited space the projection of an artifact (the plan) has disappeared. All the science
and art of the leader are used to define a context of autonomy, initiative and consensus.
In large organizations over the past fifty years, strategic space has been empty as a
result of structural centralization and Taylor’s work organization. It was empty because
decrees from above were sufficient to direct the organization. Over the past twenty or
thirty years, organizations operating in a more open, more complex environment have
made planning experts into their new high priests and have undertaken to program the
strategic space. Programming space is based on the development of a plan through a
systematic representation of the organization and its environment. In the 21st century,
however, innovative and successful organizations are often organizations that rely less
on planning than on the large number of strategists in their workforce. The shift of
structures toward autonomy, legitimacies toward initiative, and guidelines toward local
interpretation leads to the appearance of a new strategic space: inhabited space. While
strategy has been — and for the most part remains — the exclusive domain of senior
managers, strategic space belongs to organizers, i.e., men and women who develop
systems, processes and products at their own level using the knowledge available to
them.
Architecting in a space of strategy
What can be architected?
The organization is not a built artifact: it is one node, a more dense area within a
wider societyxviii. An organization cannot be simplified into its structure. As a built
12 Architecting in a space of strategy | UQAM
artifact, a simple tool, an organization would be submitted as an enclosed space in full
reign of the artifact strategically designed by a few (See Selznickxix on institutionalizing).
Historically, organizational design has meant changing structure. As other constructs
came to the fore, the central position of structure remained essentially unchanged. The
issue had been refined from "structure" to "determinants of structure." Does
technology or strategy determine structure? Is size more important? Or is it a
combination of factors?xx But the game has changed. Structure is too static and
unresponsive… The sources of competitive advantage are shifting to those
organizational constructs that characterize the behavior of an organization: culture,
people, process, information (data and knowledge), and learning (knowledge
creation)xxi.
The behavior not the strategy
The architecture of processes and activities is the expression of a new effort in
business designxxii. As companies reorganize their activities with the help of information
technology, this undertaking recalls the first steps of systematic management at the end
of the nineteenth century, and scientific management at the beginning of the
twentiethxxiii. There is one difference: a century later, emphasis on the company's
activities has been incorporated into the center of reflections on corporate strategy,
chiefly through the contributions of Porterxxiv which have gained wide circulation.
Just as decision‐making at the top has been at the center of the concept of strategy, in
the context of the 21st century, innovation, knowledge creation, the reengineering of
corporate systems, activities, processes and projects must direct our understanding of
the concept of strategy.
Strategy is now more than a series of right decisions taken at the top — it has become
the outcome of multiple reengineering efforts that call for complex knowledge at the
level of activities.
In that sense, the future business analyst will be an integrator of organizational
constructs like information, process, people, learning, and culture. She will have to
address many complex interactions: data and knowledge, organizational learning
paradigms, culture change, business process change, integration, and even invention.
Knowledge creation and learning, collaborative problem solving and team structures,
new hardware and communication technologies, and the prevalence of knowledge
workers have made the business analyst key in the design of the organization as a
13 Architecting in a space of strategy | UQAM
whole. The business analyst must be an organizational architect responsible for defining
and building the organization’s new source of advantage – its core architecturexxv.
Designing in an empty space and implementing in an
inhabited space
The analog side of architecture and the organizational strategy has been unwittingly
highlighted by Lebaharxxvi. He contends a problem exists whenever there is a need to
transform the state of a given situation. He describes with great finesse reduction
operations undertaken by the architect, from the data, constraints and demands of the
customer, since its first draft until the final plan. Reduction of uncertainty that
progresses through graphic grammars increasingly closed: topology, then projective
geometry, in order to reach the Euclidean space. It is associated with various definitions
of organizational strategy as proposed by Mintzberg and Watersxxvii: From design to
implementation, strategy is, at various stages, position (topology), perception
(projective geometry) and plan (Euclidean space). The idea of pattern is unique to the
organizer in an inhabited space seeking to recognize a strategic artifact (intentional or
emerging) in the development, over time, of an organization or group of organizations.
Successful companies are characterized by complex patterns. These patterns exhibit
clear properties‐for example, competitive distinctiveness and good strategic fit. These
organizational properties are long‐duration characteristics that are largely responsible
for sustained success. Not surprisingly, the underlying patterns responsible for such
distinctive qualities are complex, not easily imitated, and depend largely on a mix of
hard and soft contractsxxviii.
Design cannot be separated from implementation. There is no such thing as a good
design that is not well implemented. As John Kayxxix states: "Was Napoleon's defeat in
Russia a failure of strategy or implementation? It hardly makes sense to ask the
question, because in the hands of a skilled strategist, formulation and implementation
are inextricable." Designing an organization requires managerial choice at every stage of
development: choice associated with the constructs chosen by management to
represent the organization, choice with respect to the organizational domains which
management is interested in proactively designing, choice of alignment among
organizational domains, and choice of operationalization. Throughout the design
process ‐ establishing an organizational baseline, identifying domains that are in need of
design, specifying an organization's invariant at all levels of abstraction, instantiating
appropriate molecules, and refining molecules into an implementation of one's own
design‐refinement may follow any number of paths. The core organizational constructs
14 Designing in an empty space and implementing in an inhabited space | UQAM
which a decision maker includes in the layers of abstraction represent the first necessary
choice. Concomitant with this is the identification of an organization's invariant. One
important purpose is to establish a baseline that reveals where the organization is and
where it would like to be.
Conclusion
Managers require a new language to design organizations. The first element of a new
language is a vocabulary to prescribe the behavior of organizational domains such as
information, process, people, learning and culture. The second ingredient is a grammar
in which to model the associations among domains. Finally, managers require a new
manner of discourse by which to implement their intentions in a specific space of
strategy.
The OM approach presents a new language for organizational design. The authors
draw on the discipline of information modeling to structure organizational pieces, and
therefore, advance an organizational architecture and modeling approach.
In addition, OM is strongly anchored in a philosophical foundation that supports the
social sciences. It is therefore expected that in the future, not only managers and
business executives, but also social science researchers will find OM to be a convenient
approach that complements many of their modeling requirements.
Managers are becoming architects. Their new roles include designing structure,
engineering processes, developing people, leveraging information technology,
facilitating learning, and changing the whole. The manager‐architect has an arduous
task: He or she must design across organizational boundaries, engineer processes into
strategic capabilities, develop individual competencies into a learning organization, align
information technology with business strategy, and integrate the disparate pieces that
constitute the organization so that the "theory of the business" is practiced every day.
Successful organizations have manager‐architects who practice a disciplined approach
to both analysis and design.
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15 Conclusion | UQAM
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A SEARCH ENGINE THAT'S BECOMING AN INVENTOR:
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17 Conclusion | UQAM