1171128

Social Science History Association
Periodization Schemes and "Party Systems": The "System of 1896" as a Case in Point Author(s): Walter Dean Burnham Source: Social Science History, Vol. 10, No. 3, Walter Dean Burnham and the Dynamics of American Politics (Autumn, 1986), pp. 263-314 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of the Social Science History Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1171128 Accessed: 25/07/2009 21:16
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PeriodizationSchemes and "Party Systems":The "Systemof I896" as a Case in Point

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
I. WASTHERE such thing as the "System of I896"-or ANY
indeed
any other "system"in Americanpoliticalhistory,for that matter? Professor McCormick'spaper suggests that he would clearlyanswer this questionin the affirmative.For essentiallyhe arguesnot that no such system existed, but that much too heavy an interpretative burdenin my analyses has been placed on I896 itself. I am sure that, so far as this is concerned, Professor McCormick is in right. Yet there do seem undercurrents this friendlycritiqueof the broaderdoubt as to whether there is any substantialityat all to the model which I first attempted to sketch out quite a few yearsago. On any one of a varietyof specificdetails, I would have to plead, if not guilty, then at least nolo contendere. Yes, I undoubtedly placed too great a burden on I896 itself, which inevitably should and does create scholarlydoubts. Yes, the original sketch which attemptedto link elite motivation with underlying power structureand those with electoral politics in and after the I890s was painted in very vivid colors indeed. This may tell a intendramaticstory, but it may assume a greaterconspiratorial on and future-prediction the part of elites than was actutionality ally there. But once we deal with issues such as these, is there anything left? Professor McCormick, a friendly critic, seems to of think there is, but undercurrents doubt remain. In truth, the position he takes is quite moderatecomparedto many that have developed over the past decade or so. Criticism varies, but a great deal of it sums up to the argumentthat there is
WalterDean Burnhamis Ruth & ArthurSloan Professorof Political Science at Instituteof Technology,Cambridge,MA02I39. Massachusetts Social Science History IO:3 (Fall I986). Copyrighto 1986by the Social Science
History Association. ccc 0145-5532 / 86 / $I.50.
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essentially nothing to it at all, especially at the level of changes and continuitiesin voting behavior.For examplea recentissue of the Journal of Interdisciplinary Historycontainsan articlewhich demonstrates,using presidentialpluralitiesin the context of runs outcomes over the past century tests, that the flow of presidential could very plausiblybe attributedto chance (Gans, I985). This of course precludesthe existence of any statisticallycredible"eras" of any kind, assuming that the specificshape of the data and the use of the runs test is all that is requiredto passjudgment on this significantissue. Utilizing variance-componentsprocedures, Clubb, Flanigan, and Zingale find both "too many" and "too few" realignments; moreover, there seems a distressing frequency with which the timings of "realignment surges"cannot be fittedwithinthe model of "party systems" bounded at end by critical realignments.' Things that once seemed so clear to me dissolve in the mists of Allan Lichtman(1976) has been only one of many indeterminacy. critics who likewise reject the model. Among other things, he points to the fact that the realignmentit was to "predict," falling in the 1968-I970 period, failed to materialize.2 his part, Lee For Benson (I984) argues, though without a shred of empiricalevidence, that I and others "mistransferred" economic-cycle theory to the political arena.3It is easy enough for me to swear under oath that this was not my problematic,and that my ideas in no way derived from any economic-cycle school, whether those of Hansen, Schumpeter,Kondratiev,Mandel, or anyone else. One findsit strangethat, since this authoris still alive and functioning, Professor Benson never thought it empiricallynecessary to put the question directlybefore making the assumption.But then he appears most recently to have abandoned quantitative-analytic work altogether,and I will thereforehave nothing furtherto say on this point. 2. This essay attemptsto deal with certainfeaturesof Professor McCormick's a critiquebut is more fundamentally meditationon the deeperissues that lurk in his paperand that are morefrontally raisedby (amongothers)the authorsmentionedabove. The meditation cannot escape being somberor even gloomy in places, for, almost without exception, we deal with extremely able people. The volume and diversity of their criticisms are so large, and so cumulativelydestructive,that something seems very seriously
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 265
the mattersomewhere.The question arises as to what this something is. This paper is a brief, inadequateattemptto addressthis question. a. The ultimate possibility is that I have been a significant figurein leading scholarshipastrayover the past generation.This would be an important,but entirelynegative, role-except in the sense that the model suggested has proven an admirablefocus for detailedcriticismsand refutations,essentialingredientsof the scholarlytask. Naturally,one does not like to believe that he has been instrumental in perpetuating"a generation of error"and misleading the professional world into a series of blind alleys. And if it were so, I would be much struck with such evidently vast personal, if nefarious,powers to deceive myself and others. This in itself would be a matter of some wondermentand a fit subjectfor auditin its own right:When, how and why would such powersbe given to men? b. Professor McCormick himself is clearly reluctantto abandon the suggested model altogether. Periodizationschemes are researchcommunity(thoughof course importantto the historians' not to all individual historians by any means). There are good reasons for this, since any periodization scheme, whatever its characteror subject, is or implies a scheduleof priorities.It is or implies a set of generalizationswhich order the infinite mass of availabledata, and providesome clues as to their relativesignificance. Ultimately,the periodizationscheme permitsthe telling of a causal story about collective human affairswhich could not be told withoutit. But thereare many possiblestoriesone might tell. The key issues about any given causalstoryare, first,whetherit is inherentlycredibleat all; and second, assuming that it has some credibility, whether it is to be preferredto another story with legitimatetruth claims of its own. There are really two alternativeshere, assuming that a causal story which purportsto prioritize,explain, and therefore,suggest useful research programsis already before the court of professional opinion. The firstof these is to proposean alternativestory as or (or, if one will, "model" "paradigm") an ordering,integrating under review. The second is device superiorto the one currently to assert with full radicalnessDemocritus'basic argument,panta rhei-everything flows, everythingis change, or in short, history is one damnedthing afteranother.Many historianshave believed
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precisely this. This belief has come forth most vividly in the acrimonious debates which were waged a generation ago between Arnold Toynbee, who proposed a far more grandiose ordering scheme than that under review here, and his critics. The view that there are no large-scale patterns in history is certainly a respectable one. It therefore could hardly be rejected out of hand. The burden of proof for that or any other view, however, rests squarely on how well it does in fact explain phenomena. For my own point of view, at any rate, the ultimate test is empirical, and in two related senses. First, granted the state of our knowledge and methodologies, are the claims made for this view empirically grounded and where possible, testable as such? Second, is it of genuine empirical use to scholars who have puzzles to solve? From my own perspective, there is nothing which requires or ought to require recourse to transcendental premises or to metaphysics in the cyclical model I have proposed. Either it works, and withstands the tests to which it is subjected, or it does not. And if we conclude that it really does not, we all ought to move on to some other frame of reference that will do an adequate job for the world of scholarship, c. And yet, as has been noted, Professor McCormick seems loath to abandon the whole model altogether. There may be reason to suppose that the continuation of debate on it reflects a kind of aggregate professional reaction with two prongs of judgment. First, it is seriously flawed-largely through underspecification, and also through misspecifications of various sorts. But second, there may be "something to it" anyway, if only we could figure out what that something is. Can the model be "saved?" Is it worth saving? These are questions which, as always, will finally be settled (if ever they are finally settled) by the ongoing work of scholarship. I would certainly say at this stage that if I am correct about the "aggregate professional reaction" so far, I would also be very comfortable with it, since it is my judgment as well: Flaws there are aplenty, and some not so small either, but there remains "something to it." d. The basic purpose of this discussion will be to see how, and in what respects, the "System of I896" can be shown to have had a real-world, empirical existence, as a case in point. Necessarily, this will require making comparisons between the structure of the
electoralmarketand the policy system and those which preceded and followed it, but only in the courseof settingboundsaroundit. But in thinkingabout the huge puzzle which is embeddedin these controversies,I am also impelledto suggest anotherset of general professionalissues which they raise. It should go without saying that if these are "systems" all, then like all other largestructures at of collective action spanning long periods of time, covering millions of people and vast economic and social territory,they are vastly complex. Even if one can specifythe underlyingstructures, functionsand processesinvolved-and I think that over time this is possible-the number of details in the fully "true"picture is scarcelyless than the numberof sand grains in a desert. It is hard to imagine that any single individualcould ever exist whose command over both the large-scalestructureof these universesand a crediblenumberof these details was ever "enough"so that he or she alone could give us this fully "true"picture. Yet it is also the case that anyone seeking to produceas much as possibleof such a and picturemust workto the limit on both conceptualization data. This of course is true of all science. We find nearly infinite complexities, but also better and better approximationsover the years to effectiveconceptualorderingsof these complexities.Voting behavior and even party identificationare full of an enormous variety of formerly unsuspectedmovementsin all sorts of directions, as Morris Fiorina (I98I) has recently and forcefully remindedus.4Clearlymuch the same can be said for the probably simpler world of molecular, atomic, and subatomic activity in physics. That world has long known of Brownianmovementsof particles. The field of statistical mechanicswhich LudwigBoltzmann helped to create is squarelybased on the ultimate premise that one cannot know where any given particleis or is moving at any given time; but also that it is not necessaryto know this in order to develop generalizationsabout aggregatebehaviorwhich are so powerfulthat our modern world becomes practicallyand materiallybased on them. But all this creativeactivitytakes place withingenuinescientific researchcommunities,for there,as here, no one individualknows or can know enough to "do it all."For such a communityto exist at all, there must not only be a common problematic shared among those workers who are part of it, but agreed-uponstan-
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dards not only as to what is to be researchedbut how.5In the social sciences, on the other hand, more or less acute heteronomy prevails, both as to what is worth studying and how to go about it. The result has been that we tend very much to function as a in kind of "cottageindustry" whichindividualsmay identifythemselves and others as having common generalinterestsbut do not teams." reallyform "research There are of course some important exceptions to this rule. One, surely,is to be found withinthe communitiesat work within the mainstreamfields and subfieldsof economics. Another is the by magnificentexercise in academicentrepreneurship which Imhas manuelWallerstein builtand continuesto presideactivelyover the researchcommunityat work exploringthe "world-economy," with its presidingsaint, FernandBraudel,looking benignlydown over the whole enterprise.So far as voting behavioris concerned, to the classicand extremelyinstructivecounter-example this "cottage industry"has been given us by the Michiganteam of survey led researchers by Angus Campbell,Philip E. Converse,Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. Comment from me about the researchteam creativityand professionalimpactof this particular would surely be supererogatory. The contrast when one turns from these examples of what is possible to the professionalscene of American political-history researchis, to say the least, bleak. Evidently,the very establishment and flourishingof SSHA over the past decade has been in response to this scene, and it forms a possible vehicle for modifying it. By the same token, the rediscovery(at long last!) of the significanceof historicaldata by the burgeoningschools of political economy and the state in Americanistpoliticalscience strikes me as a harbingerof many possible goods to come in the years and decades ahead. But the basic picture still remains. Such and of "greats" the past in our field as E. E. Schattschneider V. O. Jr. were not members or leaders of research teams, but Key, worked-however creatively-very much in isolation. As things have turned out, so have I. It is of course very easy for the incompetent workman to blame his tools or somethingelse in his environment.Still, it would seem reasonableto suppose that, at the least, the factor we have been discussinglends itself readilyto and insufficienciesthat-at least hypothetimisunderstandings cally-might otherwisehave been clearedup long ago.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON PROFESSOR McCORMICK'S CRITIQUE
I. The best way to give some concretenessto the former discussion is by evaluatingsome of the criticism which Professor McCormick has given us in his paper. At the outset we can examine the issue raised by the authorthat my writings leave uncertainty about the "revolutionary" qualityof this "Systemof I896."This is a rather peripheralissue but does make a convenient point of entry. The short answer is that I have no doubts that in general the system establishedin the I89os was in fact a politicalmatrix which insulated industrialand financecapital from adversemass pressuresfor a generationafterward.This matrix has a number of primary,analyticallydecomposablecomponents,rangingfrom the post-I896 shape of electoral turnout and partisanshipat the base, throughmajorchangesin the rulesof accessand representation in the electoral system at the middle, up to the nature,identity, and policies producedby key nationaldecision makersat the top. Yet the controlsit establishedwere certainlynot unlimited. That For one thing, this system was clearlynot "revolutionary." it representeda drasticand dynamicallyevolving deepeningof is, dominance which was alreadynotably dea corporate-capitalist in the later stages of the preceding("civil-war")system. veloped
Unlike the turnovers of I828, I860, or 1932, the realignment of
I894-1896 did not result in a major reversalof dominant public policy or in a drasticchange in the "historicblocs" which lay at the power core of Americanpolitics in this period. This of course has long been recognized and is one chief reason why Gerald Pomper proposed his (to me, structurallysuperfluous)typology of "convertingelection" to describe this particularelection sequence. Moreover,even a glance at the historyof Americanpolitics from I896 through 1932 duly reveals not only that the hegemonic party split and Democrats regained key leverage at the of Congress-notably the Senate-was frequentlynarrowto the phaseof this sysvanishingpoint duringthe secondor "normalcy" tem. Republicanregularssuch as Senator George Moses of New Hampshire were certainly justified in venting their frustration against insurgentliberalRepublicansfrom the westernperiphery, "the sons of the wild jackass."And to be sure, in any case there
center from 191o through 1918, but also that Republican control
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was much less policy innovation which took theform of legislation in the immediatewake of I896 than seems to have occurred
after I860 or 1932.
Let us turn to reflectionson the prioritiesand incidences of various types of public policy using, for example, the categories that Theodore Lowi (I966) has given us.6 Recalling the notable pluralismof Americanpoliticsat almost all times in its history,we can readily understandthat distributive(crudely:"pork-barrel") policiescontinuedafter 1896as before. Moreover,we shouldhave little trouble accepting the substantialgrowthof regulatorypolicies duringthis systemitself,one of many governmentalresponses to the mushroomingcomplexityand interdependence civil soof ciety. Most of the time, we can assume that business was divided ratherthan unitedover a multitudeof specificissues. We can even assume that it occasionallylost a roundhere and there,as it probably did when uproarover Upton Sinclair'sJungle producedthe Pure Food and Drug Act of I906, completewith a federalagency to administerits regulatorypurposes.And of course, since this is a business civilization, it would certainly help clarity of analysis to be reasonablysure what specificentities we have in mind when we talk about "business" all. After all, WilliamJennings Bryan at remindedthe Eastern"goldbugs" his Cross of Gold speech at in the 1896Democraticconventionthat the people he spokefor were businessmentoo, a view that some might believe missedthe point. Mattersbecome quite differentwhen we turn to redistributive policies. (It should go without saying, of course, that many such policies also have their distributiveand regulatorycomponents; ideal types should not be empiricallyconfused with typicallyimpure real-world phenomena.) Such policies are the heart of critical-realignment periodsand are among the most importantof their "symptoms." They presupposethe developmentof political conditionswhich generatea far higherdegree of unity at a much broaderaggregate level of sectoral interests than most pluralist analysts have ever imagined. In general, the overwhelmingbulk of corporateand financialcapital in the most developed "metropole" regions of the country acquired such a class unity during the convulsionsof the I89os, and they werejoined by a huge preponderanceof voters-notably in metropolitanareas-in these regions. But, after giving due credit to the Gold StandardAct of I900
or the Dingley Tariffof 1897 and its successors, where was the redistributive policy one looks for? We recall in the firstplace the truth of Schattschneider's observationa generationago that it is the losers in the socioeconomic struggle who (sometimes) gravitate to government,not the winners. Big businesswas sufficiently in controlof its economicenvironmentduringthe laissez-faireera that its basic policies were, with few exceptions, aimed at preventing things from happening througha democraticallyrooted public sector, not at generatingmajorinnovations.Whateverthe many internal conflicts among its major sectors over specific issues, corporatecapitalwas broadlyunitedin its pursuitof defense againstthe mass pressurescontinuouslygeneratedby its activities. In this respect, it was very similar to all other "developmental" elites, whethercapitalistor otherwise,in the modern world. As I long ago pointed out, and on reflection I think correctly, the elites had unique problemwhich these American"developmental" was the priorexistence of so many open and legitimatechannels of democratic(or "mass")influenceon the politicalsystem. From Alexander Hamilton'stime to Calvin Coolidge's(and beyond!), this seemed to make elite insulation peculiarlyproblematic,and therefore made (and makes) the role of political democracy in as Americaproblematic well. For this, far more than possibly fickle (if favorable)electoral support was necessary,and far more than simple legislation,for the latter could always be repealedand replacedwith something disagreeableafter the next turn of the electoralwheel. To be sure, both high tariffs and free trade are economically redistributive policy choices, and the Gold StandardAct would have seemedfar more so than it did in the end, were it not for the fortuitouspostI896 inflation in the world's gold supply. But more was needed than this, and if we ask whereit was provided,the obviousanswer
is that it was provided by the Supreme Court. This institution, of
course the "least democratic"component of the federal government, achieveda position of policy hegemonyin its famous I8941895 term. It thereafterassertedthis hegemony,often very vigorously, from then until its well-known "switchin time that saved I agreevery stronglywith ProfessorMcCormickthat an important researchprogramfor the years ahead is to place the study of policy development on at least as solid a basis as the study
nine" in the spring of I937.
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jamin Ginsberg's (1982: esp. 123-142) massive content analysis of
of voting behavior. As he says, the results produced by policy scholarshave often been inconclusiveor even disappointing.One notes, for example, that effortsto locate majorchangesin judicial policymakingin the context of realignmentshave not won universal acceptance by any means. To be sure, work such as Benfederalstatusesfrom 1789to the presentera do producesome imdatingsof post-realignment portantconvergenceswith traditional Congresses, but also yields data-e.g., the highly significant
values in some domains for the I881-1883 Congress-which do
not "fit"at all. Once again, it seems we appearto end driftingin shallows,cul de sacs. Yet, I cannot shake the feeling that some of this, at least, is due to the limitations of the cottage industry. How does one measure the long-term influence of a limited number of events and decisionson the entire politicallife of the country?Ordinary quantitativemeasuresare probablyinherentlyinadequatefor this
task. Back in I919, Vladimir Lenin (I965: 178-225, orig. 1919)
madehis one and only ventureinto voting-behavior analysiswhen he did a detailed study of Russia'sone and only free election, that for the Constituent Assembly of 1917. His was a respectableif tendentiouseffort. Its most persuasiveargument,from my point of view, is that it is sometimes even more important to weigh votes than to count them, for in revolutionarysituations especially, strategicallyconcentrated minorities like the Bolsheviks, with their 23% of the national vote, can carry the day precisely because of where and among what population groups they are strategicallyconcentrated. If the need to weigh ratherthan merely count votes is significant for the study of Americanelectoraldata, how much more so should this be kept in mind when dealing with those relatively rare but politicallydecisive decisionswhich reallyauthoritatively allocate power! So far as the history of the Supreme Court is concerned,the world of legal scholarshiphas never had any difficulty in accepting the view that the 1894-I937 period forms an
integratedera in that history.It is a period marked,in the words of Justice Robert H. Jackson (I94I), by a "strugglefor judicial constitutional It supremacy." is a period in which "higher-law" doctrines reachedtheir apogee. In the words of the eminent constitutionalscholar EdwardS. Corwin, writtenin I929, "Invested
with statutoryform and implementedby judicial review, higher law, as with renewedyouth, entered into one of the great periods of its history,and juristically,the most fruitfulone since the days
of Justinian" (Corwin, 1955: 89, orig. I928-1929). The number of
these "constituentdecisions"renderedin the pivotal 1894-1895 term (or any other given term) was quite small. The three which, by common repute among the world of legal scholars, were the
most significant of all were Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Company (I895 and Rehearing I895)7 voiding the 1894 federal income tax (reversedby the adoption of the I6th Amendmentin
I913, just in time for World War I); U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co.
(1895) creating a regulatoryvoid for the federal government's powers under the CommerceClause by establishinga sharp distinction between "production" "commerce," on the basis and and of which the Guffey Coal Act of 1935 was declaredunconstituterms the President'spolice powers to send troops to break up a strike in order to keep the mails moving. The "burstof judicial creativity"which began around the epochal turning point unfolded over the decades,and the cumulativeeffect was to createa vast "no man's land" or gray area in which neither federal nor state regulatorypowerscould constitutionallyreachcruciallyimportantareas of corporateenterprise. The storyof judicialhegemonyover the "commanding heights"
of economic regulation between I894 and I937 is far too oft-told tional in I936; and In re Debs (1895) affirming in the strongest
a tale to bear much further discussion here. I should not be thought to imply that there were no detours or diversionsin its course, but it certainlyfollowed a dominant patternof evolution. We can make several summarypoints about it in the context of our general argument. Firstly,the relativeweightinessof any set of decisions handed down in any one year lends itself poorly to ordinarystatistical methodology.Though more may become methodologicallypossible, one needs at least to do what the constitutionalscholarshave done over the generations:assess the network of decisions which cumulateover time, and in their totality the real position of the judiciaryin limiting from the outset what the scope of permissiblelegislationis going to be. Secondly, the in achievementof a factualjudicial supremacyover "metapolicy"
the period 1894-1937, far from being an isolated accomplishment
so far as the "Systemof I896"is concerned,is integrallyrelatedto
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it from beginningto end. The convergenceis not merelya matter of chronologybut a matter of substance. Throughthe Supreme Court, ultimatelyrooted as its membershipand doctrineswere in a normal Republican electoral hegemony, corporate enterprise receivedthe elite insulationit sought. Throughthe SupremeCourt as well, it probablyreceived the lion's share of the redistributive policieswhich it won in this era. Thirdly,grantedthe vast political role of courts in the American political system from the age of John Marshalldown to the present, it is equally not accidental that majorelectoral-political over the Court'sroleand controversy decisions is most likely to erupt during eras of critical realignment, as in the I89os and the I930s. Fourthly and finally, scholars
who seek policy referentsfor realignmentsand electoraleras ignore the policy work of the judiciaryat their peril. In particular whereverredistributive political envipolicy and its "abnormal" ronmentof class or other large-aggregate solidarityis concerned, the variouscomponentsof our complex political system function in a much more integrated way than conventional wisdom has seemed to suppose. And the courts have historicallybeen at the very heart of it.
TOWARD A STRUCTURAL DEFINITION OF "I896"
These considerationsbring us quite immediately to an exceptionallyforcefulelementin ProfessorMcCormick's critique.How could the "deadhand"of the issues and candidatesof 1896 conceivably dominate politics for decadesafter the event? On a very manifest level, they obviously could not and did not: The issues of, say, the Progressiveera have little enough on their face to do with the Battle of the Standards.Yet if there is a clear long-era definition,and more even than the history of judicial review tells me that thereis, how and why could 1896assumesuch constituent importance?This becomes even more interestinga questionif, as I think can be demonstrated,the "Systemof 1896"had a much strongerelement of dynamic evolutionthan its immediatepredecessor, or than the usual static formulationsof the "partysystem era"model could accountfor. Verybriefly,we can say that 1896opened the door to a new era of Americanpolitics, an era with both static and dynamic qualities that can be readily identified,and which significantlydiffer
from those of the periods before and after. This is another way of saying, that, for reasons we shall discuss below, the basic constituent political-electoraldecision made then was not in fact reversed for the next generation. The cumulative effect of the issues and structuralchangesof subsequentyears was reflectedin the curiouspoliticalworldof the I92os, which formedthe apogee, the developmentalend-point, of the system as a wholejust before it perishedin an unimaginablecatastrophe.This of courseimplies that post-I896 stimuli, in the aggregate, continued to favor the "partyof development"which had won ascendancyin, and over the specificissues of, 1896. Such a judgment would seem to requirea furthereffortat conceptualizing system behavior and its origins in the gross with, alas, many even very importantdetails and movementsleft aside. If we begin with I896, attentionshould first be paid to the structure of organizablepoliticalconflictat the nationallevel both then lifetime. Secondly,we need then to and throughoutthe "system's" conditionsaffectingsoexamine a general set of disequilibrating economy, and thereforepolity, conditions which began to ciety, overtake shape long before I896 and which were not "finally" come until long after. One of the most strikingfeaturesof the "Systemof I896"was its extreme sectionalism,which became more extreme-at least at the presidential voting level-as time passed.This extremesectionalism involved a territoriallystructuredorganizationof electoral politics around a "development"axis. As Roscoe Martin (I933) was the firstto show empiricallyas early as I933, this even included a sharp polarizationbetween town and country in faraway Texas counties where the People'sParty was very strong in the mid-I89os. Durable pro-Republicanrealignment was at a maximum in the greater Northeast and, more generally,in the centers.Eachof the three urban/metropolitan greaterMetropole's great "sections"went its own way-as Schattschneider(I956) long ago and correctly observed-with the greater Northeast more or less heavily Republican,the South moving into the regressive one-party regime immortalizedby V. O. Key, Jr., just beforeit began to break up, and the Westengaged increasinglyin radicaland antipartisanprotestsbut generallypivoting arounda Republicanaxis.8 Such analystsof comparative Europeanpoliticsas the late Stein
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Rokkanhave pointed to the greatimportanceof center-periphery conflictsas part of the modernizationprocess (see Rokkan, 1970:
esp. 181-184; also Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 1-64, 307-444).9 To
a significantextent, this is a question of "the town beating the at country" a certainstage of capitalistdevelopment.In the I89os, virtuallyeverythingconspiredto producea dominant alignment based on what I have elsewheretermed "metropole-colony" polarizations.The protest forces which had emerged by that time, "takingover"but also diluted by the national Democratic party, were what might be called "declining-sector," peripheral (and interests.As I demonstratedsome yearsago, even peripheralized) within a core "metropole"state like Pennsylvania, the relative impact of pro-Republicanrealignmentwas at its greatest in the developed regions of the state and along the line of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and was weakest (in one or two cases, actually negative) in more remote mountain "boondocks" (Burnham, step underWilliamJennings Bryan'sleadershiptowardthe "politics of provincialism"-the politicsof peripheral-colonial interests -which David Burner (I968) describesso well as its keynote in the 1920s.?1It was unableto find its way back to a stable relationship with "core"interests or the Metropole'svotes except for a time under Woodrow Wilson. And even at that, Wilson could never have achieved power without the I912 rupturewithin the Republicanparty.The strangedeathand colossal public repudiation of his administrationin I920 more than suggests that in the end, no stable Democratic relationshipwith "core"interests or Metropolevoters was ever achievedeven then. because they were the "ins"when the second-worstdepressionin Americanhistorystruckthe economy.This ousteracquiredlongterm force not only becauseof the party'sfundamentalperipheralization then and later, but because depressionwas virtuallyinstantly replaced both by the fruits of a "splendidlittle war"and then by sustainedprosperity. should be betterknown than it is (It
that the decade 1898-1907 The Democrats had been ousted in I894-I896 in large part I970: 42-45). In 1896, in short, the Democratic party took a giant
entire history of American capitalism in its rate of economic

growth.) From the I89os through I928, Republicans campaigned
was second only to the I960s in the
on two interrelatedthemes. First, the Republican party alone understoodhow to shape public policies that favoredthe growth
of "progress," affluence,and economic development.Second, the Democrats (the then "partyof depression")had equally demonstratedthat they were backward-looking, mossbackhayseeds,and Such appeals, of incompetentand disorganizedwhen in office."1 course, were quintessentiallywhat one would expect of a party vehicle for an ascendant which was the political "development" corporatecapitalism. As events were repeatedlyto demonstrate, there was no seriously organizedalternativegame to this "capitalist road"in town. Until the roof caved in, and no matter how popularindividualDemocraticcandidatesfor Governoror Senator became in the meantime,the Democraticpartywas unableto make itself nationally credible as such an alternative. All very reminiscent,one might say, of the I98os too; but that's another story for anotheroccasion! So much, however briefly,for the vital and enduring centerperipherypolaritythat dominatedorganizableAmericanpolitics
from the I89os to 1932. We turn now to an almost equally impor-
which I896 tant point, the underlyingpressuresfor disequilibrium did not terminate. The processes of economic transformation associated with the creation of a concentratedindustrial-finance capitalist nation were attended by upheavalin society on a scale wholly revolutionaryin its scope. It may well be that, as many have claimed, the industrialrevolutionfinds its equal as a comof prehensivetransformation the foundationsof humanexistence only in the neolithic revolutionwhich began ten millenia earlier. Far more aware of the immensityof this change today than our social-scienceforebearsof two generationsago were, we perhaps fail even today to graspit, for we live well on this side of the great divide between then and now. As Robert Wiebe (I969) has pointed out, the whole period from the mid-I870s to the early I920S was thereforemarked by an intense and protracted"searchfor order."Politically, a very was surely set in place by the reimportantpart of this "order" alignment of the I89os and its aftermath. Equally surely, much else was to happen as the process of political reorganizationunfolded. It was from this matrix of change that the I896 "system" drew its peculiardynamism. I. We all know by now that turnout rates persistentlyfell from
the late I89os down through the eve of the
I928
election. In the
South, the decline was largely concentratedin a short period at
278
the very beginning. As Kousser (1974) and others have shown, this was largelythe artifactof a vast purgeof the regionalelectoral system.'2This letter-dayturnoutdeclineoccursas earlyas I890 in Mississippiand Florida,and extends case by case througheach of the other ex-Confederatestates down throughabout I908. This declinein participation intimatelyassociatedwith the destrucwas tion of politicalpartiesand partycompetitionin generalelections, across vast reachesof territory. 2. But non-southernturnout fell as well, persistently if not quite so dramatically.Here there is equally little doubt as to the empiricalreality of this secular decay, or the causal importance of changes in rules governing access to the ballot box. All this by now has attracteda very substantialliterature,including the analysis of motivations behind the imposition of personal registrationand other requisitesfor voting.13 3. The progressiveperiod-in some respects one of the most complex sets of events in our political history-was noteworthy for fundamental transformationin the articulationof political instances. One could suggest the existence of at least "threefaces of progressivism" this period,at least two of which were in tacit in alliancewith each other. cena. In the Metropole,especiallyin its urban/metropolitan most fully assimilatedthe "corporate ters, Progressivesperhaps ideal"as a principleof politicalorganization supersedethe older to The "searchfor order" and political "machines." political parties here appearedto take the form of a structuralrevolutionstressing bureaucracy, expertise,politicalinsulationfrom partisanand electoralinfluences,and the dissolutionof the "nefarious" top-bottom alliances of political bosses and ethnic proletarianswhich had hithertodominatedso much of the region'spolitics. For such proeffects gressivism,channelingand curbingthe more "pernicious" of democracy was at least as important as making the system "moredemocratic" throughsuch reformsas directelectionof U.S. the directprimary, initiative,referendum, recall. the and Senators, but not accidentally,ways of channeling and curbing Ironically often were found through this very latter-daydemocratization; though as always, the end results seem far clearer in hindsight than they did to the contendingpoliticalactivistsof the time. But one of the key featuresof rules changes in this period was state regulationof partiesthemselves,a regulationas detailedas it was
destructive. In this respect, as Key showed a generationago, the developmentof the direct primarywas crucial. The primarywas in itself a reflectionof a generalelection now often voided of the element of genuine choice among genuine competitors;and it reinforcedthe void.'4 b. Southern progressivismemerged somewhat earlier. It was clearlyassociatedwith regionalelite interestin economicdevelopment. A crucial motivation was the cleaning up of the morass of corruption and violence that marked southern politics prior to the Great Purge. The association between the establishment of "businesslike" "up-to-date" and governmentand disfranchisement of the "lowerorders"in the region'spoliticalsociety is thus exceptionallyclose and apparent.The careerof JosephusDaniels of North Carolina-prime instigatorof the Wilmingtonrace riot of I898 and subsequently Woodrow Wilson's Secretary of the Navy-may not be entirelytypical, but it is certainlyillustrative. Much of the impetusfor the Democratic"New Freedom"variant of progressivism came from these southernProgressives, since the South was the core base of the partywhich came to powerin I913 on the ruins of a divided GOP. There was plenty of reason for an alliance of interest between major sectors of Metropole and southernprogressivism, both before and during WorldWar I. c. WesternProgressivessuch as Robert M. LaFollette, George Norris, Hiram Johnson, William Borah, and others were leaders of that "face"which was most oriented towardachievinga more radicaldemocracy,followingthe formulathat "thecure for the ills of democracy is more democracy."Anti-partisanshiphere was pervasive.It was rootedin the region'sspecializedroleas a colony in the American imperial economy-but a colony which, overwhelmingly white and far more "developed"than its southern counterpart,operated accordingto a very differentpolitical rhythm. For many Metropoleand southern Progressives,the traditional partyorganizations involved"dangerous" alliancesbetween and "masses"which they feared on both political entrepreneurs racist and class grounds. For western Progressives,on the other hand-very much as for the Prairie Province Canadianswhose revolts C. B. Macpherson(I953) has described-the traditional majorpartieswere rejectedfor a quite differentreason:They were perceived to be the agents of an alien, pervasive,and oppressive The most fully developed legislative monument to this capital.15
280
attitude, without question, was the network of "party-busting" statutes enacted under Hiram Johnson's reform aegis in California (I911).
4. Progressive-erastructuralchange, as is well known, permathe of nentlytransformed articulations Americanelectoralpolitics and the linkage structuresbetween rulers and ruled. Personalregistrationstatutes, initially applied as a rule against the ethnic polyglotpopulationsof cities, themselvesmade significantinroads into turnouts.16 the South, of course, they were a relatively In aroundthe minorpartof a dense networkof legislativebarricades ballot box throughwhich a wholesalepurgeof the electoratewas achieved. But for many purposes, it is better analyticallyto considerthe South not as a unique subsystembut as an extremecase pointing toward more general (i.e., nationallyfocused) propositions about the evolution of Americanpolitics in this period. The direct primary,first developed in one-party Democratic Mississippi and hegemonicallyRepublican Wisconsin in I903, was to carry most of the countryby storm over the next dozen years. Its pernicious effects on the integrity of party organizationand its tendencies to entrench one-party supremacywhere this was alreadycoming into being were classicallydescribedby V. O. Key, Jr., in 1956.They need no furtherdiscussionhere. In many urban areasand some state legislatures(Minnesotain 1913,Nebraskaas late as 1937), the nonpartisanideal was fully realized:at the electoral level, candidatesnow ran withoutpartylabels at all (see e.g.,
Hays, 1967).17The direct election of U.S. Senators certainly pro-
vided democraticchoice for a key policy institutionwhere it had hitherto been lacking. On the other hand, it did so in a context where the body is constitutionallyunapportionedand unapportionable (in I980, one vote for U.S. Senator in Alaska was worth 57 votes in California). And, as always where democratization is superimposedon a divided-powersconstitutionalstructure,it servedto reinforcepowerfragmentation, this case by preserving in the legitimacyof this unapportioned body as the world'sstrongest Second Chamber. 5. Underthe impactof these changes-not to mentionthe huge domestic impact of World War I and especially the Bolshevik Revolutionof 1917 the dynamismof the "system" towardits led fulfillmentin, say, the congressionalelection of I926. Nationwide
participation had fallen from about 75% in the 1894 realignment
election to slightly underone-thirdof the potentialelectorate(less than io% in the South as a whole!). The numberof uncontested congressional elections had vastly multiplied, not only in the South where Democrats were returned unopposed, but in the Northand Westas well, where Republicanswerethe beneficiaries. And the 1924 election-with the lowest national presidential turnout ever achieved from 1828 to the present day-revealed "the system" at its apogee as well. The Democrats, nominating John W. Davis on the Io3rd ballot, ratifiedtheir "politicsof provincialism" its most pitiful. Progressives, at liberals,and laborites, revolted by the proferred major-partychoice between Calvin Coolidge and Davis, flocked to Senator LaFollette'sinsurgent Progressivecandidacy. The result was a brilliantlyetched trisectionalelectoralpattern.The "plate-tectonic" boundariesoriginally forged in the I896 realignmentwere at their most visible. Only a relativehandfulof countiesremainedcompetitivebetween the Republicanand Democratic candidates.Most of these were to be found within a hundredmiles either side of a line slanting west-southwest from Dover, Delaware, to Phoenix, Arizona. South of that line one rapidlyenteredthe Solid South, markedby abysmalturnoutand overwhelmingDemocraticmajorities.North of it but east of the MississippiRiver lay the heartlandof Republican supremacy over both Democrats and Progressivestaken home together.Westof the Mississippi,and includingLaFollette's state of Wisconsinjust east of that river, Davis tended virtually to disappearfrom view and LaFollette was Coolidge'schief rival. In short, the profileof 1924 is clearly organized in terms of the Metropoleand the two chief peripheries,South and West. With few if importantexceptions, major-party competitionin this election survived only along the "plate" boundaries between the greaterSouth and the rest of the country. 6. Naturally, partisanship as a whole dramatically decayed across this period, as various quantitativemeasuresduly reveal. This had policy consequences.PresidentWarrenG. Harding,ordinarilynot regardedas a politicaltheorist,delivereda passionate threnody on the vanished partisan world of yesteryear in his World Court speech of April 24, I923 (CDNA, I924).18 He explained, quite accurately,that partypoliticshad increasinglybeen supplantedby "bloc"politics in Congress;that partyloyalty,once regardedas a primevirtue,was now widely held in contempt;that
282
as a result, it was much harderto carryout coherentprogramsin Congress than it used to be, and that presidentialinfluence on legislative outcomes had markedlydeclined; and that the emergence of direct primarieshad had a great deal to do with these changedthe deplorabledevelopments,since it had fundamentally electoral motivations of legislators. All in all, Harding'sspeech "modern" has a remarkably ring, anticipatingas it does not only of Key's complaintsin the I95Os,but for example, Morris many
Fiorina's (1981) concerns of the I98os.19 The modern American
politicaluniversehad truly arrived. 7. But while presidentsand other politiciansmay have suffered frustrationas the "Systemof I896"deepened over time, the conversion of democracy into a relatively broad-based oligarchy generally well served the interests of laissez-faireand the commanding heights of Americancapitalism. When the "searchfor order"had been largely completed, a society whose norms and values were largely shaped by the imperativesof this corporate Very soon after 1896 the concapitalism had come into being.20 demandsfor politicalresponseto complexity,interdepentinuing dence, and disruptionhad generatednoteworthychangesin public attitudesand institutionalstructure.As Stephen Skowroneck (I982) has recently demonstratedin great detail, "the state of courtsand parties" which had been inheritedfromthe nineteenthuniversewas progressively supplantedby a state centurypolitical in which bureaucratic organization,expertise,politicalneutrality, values and structuresassumedfirstplace. and other managerialist needs only to add that, as we have said, courts retain their (One functions-indeed vigorouslyexpand decisive boundary-limiting them-down until the I930S.) The New Deal was to build, if vastly, on this changedstate structure;it did not create it. 8. We have attempted to make the case that the "System of I896" does have an underlyingunity and characteristicswhich distinguish it clearly from its predecessorsand successors. This is so in the firstplace on the crucialplane of publicpolicies, agendas, and dominant "publicphilosophy." Basically,we have suggested, the cleavagestructureof the time pivoted on two themes: modernization" "capitalist-road definingwhat the role of the state was to be in general (with the SupremeCourt playing a particularly decisive role); and political-structureand political-norm
"modernization" throughthe progressivereplacementof partyby the "corporateideal."Granted what kinds of dominant political cleavageswere empiricallyorganizablein this period,the electoral "modernization axis" of cleavage was overwhelminglydefinedin territorialsocio-economic (or "sectional") terms. Modifications in the rules of access and rules governingcandidatechoices and the electoral process more generally made significant-if, as subseto quent events were to demonstrate -marginal contributions the "deepening"and solidificationof this alignment system at the mass level. Ultimately,such electoral solidificationwas an indispensable requirementfor the functioning of the system "at the top"-again, as subsequentevents were to demonstrate. It is becauseof the center-periphery that "development" polarization laid down in the fierytraumaof the I89os that I896 was to "open a door" to the future. If its specific issues and candidates faded promptlyenough into history,the basic balanceof electoral forces then laid down showed impressive continuity thereafter. In substantialmeasure,one supposes that this was so becauseimportantas majorfigureslike TheodoreRooseveltand Woodrow Wilson were as individuals-the Republicansacquireda durable popular hegemony as "the party of (capitalist-road)modernization,"and the Democrats appearedto be-and were-a collection of peripheral,backward-lookinginterests. The conditions surroundingthe collapse of the Wilson administrationin I919192I (including the coercive "GreatHun and Red Scare"atmosphere to which some of its leading members made spectacular contributions)served to reinforceboth images, and I920s prosperityand isolationismsolidifiedthem. Somehow, I leave this segment of the review with the strong impressionthat nothing at all new has been said here about the "Systemof I896."As we can see in what is beforeus, this vision is clearly and widely open to skepticismand negationsfrom others whose judgment and scholarshipcommand respect. This makes me increasinglywonder whetherit is a private vision which may have distressinglylittle to do with real-worldempiricalevidence. All I can say is that this is the causalstory which, on inspectionof some parts of the evidence, recommendsitself to this observeras providing a sketch for a credible framework within which men and women acted and events happened.
284
SYSTEM BOUNDARIES AND SYSTEM CHANGES: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
coalition.21
I. When we turn to areaswhere statisticalmeasurementscan tell a powerfulstory, we come, I think, to more solid ground. In preof senting some evidence for a substantivetemporal"bounding" the "System of I896;" it is important to be clear about what is measured,what is not, and why. One cannot be concerned here with the fascinatingbut limited set of issues raisedin articleswith such (hypothetical)titles as "WasI928 a criticalelection in Keokuk, Iowa?" By the same token, it is perfectly obvious that the rise of Al Smith in the 1918New Yorkgubernatorial election was associated with a real realignmentof electoraland other forces in that state. This manifestly happened, and its happening was to producesignificantconsequences,not least of which was Smith's nomination.But-until I928 in some placesand I928 presidential as late as 1936 in others-this realignmenthad no very visible counterpartseven in adjacentstates, not to mention the country as a whole. I think this particularstory can in fact be discussedin terms of the "I896 System"model so brieflysketchedabove, but it would distractfrom our main purposeshere to attemptto do so now. Such examples remind us, as they should, that "Brownian movements"and even more structurallyfundamentalaggregate currents abound in the history of twentieth-centuryAmerican electoralpolitics. On the other hand, they do so within the limits of an existing "hegemonic" structureof politics. 2. The latter is probably better revealed at a macro level of aggregation.Naturally,such a strategywill significantlysimplify the underlyingstructureof reality,and many may well argue that the reductionisminvolved reaches heights which are impermissible. All one can do is to attempt to be as conscious as possible about the scope and limits of what it is one is actuallymeasuring, as well as about the effectivenessof the methods employed. Beyond that, no matter how remarkableand diverse movements turn out to be at minute levels of aggregation,the unifyingtheme of the "Systemof I896"is after all that it was a period of normal Republicanascendancyat the nationallevel. There were only two deviating-election exceptions to this--I9I and I916-which were not the directartifactsof splits in the dominant(GOP) voting
3. The evidence for a regionallyconcentratedrealignmentcentered in the years I894-I896 is impressive, and by now has an extensive literature.22 What one seeks with any longitudinalmeain sure is to identify "cutting-points" a series, if any. Underlying this search is the theoreticalposition that during realignments,a net aggregateshift among minoritiesof electoratesoccursand has subsequentdurability(the latterof course discriminatesbetween realignments and "deviating elections" such as I904). Certain types of relativelyeasily accessiblemethods-for examplebiserial correlation-unfortunately seem to requirefor generallycredible resultsa longertotal time span of data points than the 150+ years an organized national electoralmarketgive us. Others, I frankly confess, requireadvanced skills and tools that I do not possess. One assumes, for example, that discriminant-function analysisthough originally developed to deal with spatial partitioningin statistical geography-could be applied longitudinallyas well. The underlyingprinciple of such a method is to draw the best possible boundarywhich simultaneouslyminimizeswithin-group varianceand maximizesbetween-group variance.Spatialrelationships, being evaluatedat any given moment in time, are by definition wholly stable. Longitudinalrelationshipsnecessarilyprovide the element of instabilitywhich the flow of time guarantees. As simple approximationsto the probableresult producedby more powerful techniques, such measures as iterated dummyvariable correlations(rd) or t tests have the attractiveproperty that they tend towarda maximum when substantialand durable change occurs, and toward a minimum where it does not. They are much less useful for analysis in the contemporaryera, since politics today involves very large and volatile vectors of change from election to election, i.e., varianceson both sides of a given "cutting point" will be large enough to depress the statistical of "meaning" any given differencesbetween the means. When t is applied to the flow of electoral and other partisan data (e.g., partisan balance in state legislatures)with five election observationsat four-yearintervals before the cutting point and five afterwards,realignment"surges"in its value occur precisely where chronologicallythey are to be expected. Naturally, the amplitudeand sometimes the timing are modifiedwhen one examines each major party'sshare of the total separately.Since data are rarely self-explanatoryin full, and major decisions re-
286
can gardingtheirclassification and sometimesshould be madeon substantive grounds, it helps to make clear what one's decision rules are. For the case particularlybefore us, this involves only one of consequence:the mergingof the Republicanand Progresleast 95%of the lattervote came from the former'svoting streams for the countryas a whole, and in almost all states. Broadlyspeaking,applicationof iteratedt tests at the statewide level of aggregationrevealsmajordifferencesbetween the "I896"
sequence (I876-1912, midpoint 1894) and the "I932" sequence. sive votes in I912 (and 1914), on the substantive ground that at
Using presidentialdata only, there are very strong regionalconcentrations of high, mediocre, and low t values in I896, and of course along the expected territorialdimensions. The "19281932"sequenceon the other hand duly pinpoints the territorially limited upsurge centered around I928 (midpoint 1926-Massachusetts, Connecticut,etc.) and a quite universalsurge of high t values centeredaroundmidpoint I930. (The latterremindsus, by towardthe Democratsin the way, that the South also "realigned" 1932: however one-partythe region'sstates tended to be during the "Systemof 1896,"they becamefar more so afterwards).There are many, many intriguingdetails in such arrays.For instance, t values in much of the West tend to peak ratherlater than I894 (e.g., midpoint I902), and significantt values sometimes appear elsewhere (e.g., Iowa, midpoint 1918). But the basic pattern is what concerns us here. This typicallyrevealsvery low values between the "knife-edges," reflectingthe fact that-important as the I90o-1916 electoralturmoilwas in its effects-it did not last long It enough by this measureto producelargervalues.23 is also noteworthy that when we apply t to the turnout data, we find a protracted series of high t values in most cases (i.e., midpoints I902, patternsoccur in the context of long-drawnout processeswhich have a unidirectionalmovement tendency: turnout fell election after election, with only a moderate uptick in I916, all the way
from I896 to 1924 (see Appendix Table A).
I906, I9IO) rather than a knife-edged surge and decline. Such
We should again briefly reiteratewhat the underlyingreality seems to be which producesthese resultswith these methods.It is almost banal to make the point, but it should be stressed that realignments involve a sudden net movement among decisive minoritiesof the electorate,with subsequentlong-termstabiliza-
tion. This net movement can sometimes be extremely small in orderto produceelectorallydecisiveconsequencesin a givenjurisdiction and is in any case far, far indeed from extending to the whole or even a majorityof the electorateinvolved. One such case is presented by West Virginia. Before I894, this state had a normal, if constantlydiminishing,Democratic majority;afterwards, a Republicanone. The value of t is maximized in I894 at 4.698 for the Democratic series and 4.390 for the Republican(both significantat the .005 level, df = 8). But the net shift is by no means overwhelming.If the Democratic I876- 1892 mean percentageof lican percentagerose from 45.4 in the earlierperiod (s.d. = 3.15) to 53.1 (s.d. = 1.67) in the later. But this net swing of about 8% was sufficientfor a partisanupheaval,as was an even smallerone elections. A more refined (about 5%) in the state'sgubernatorial would duly reveal that the pro-Republicanrealignment analysis surge was concentrated in the coal-mining counties and in the state's small-city areas, as again could be expected from the "development"model we have been discussing; but that is another story. The key to the extensivenessof the partisanconsequences and the height of the t values based on such small net shifts can be found in two features of the data: the general closeness of aggregatemajor-party competitionbefore and after 1894 (typical or border-stateenvironments)and the extreme longitudinalstabilityof the array,especiallyin the 1896-1912 period,as measured by the quite tiny standarddeviations. 4. Far simpler methods, essentially graphic presentationsof long-termdata flows, can be used to fill in more of the pictureof the system and its dynamic unfoldingacross its lifetime. By now, duringthis aggregatemovementstowardelectoraldemobilization (and the strong reversal of this trend outside the South period in the subsequent New Deal era) have been thoroughlyenough mappedto requireno furtherdiscussionhere. Let us insteadlook at two related features of the "System of I896" that set it apart more or less sharplyfrom its "past"and "future": aggregatelevels of competitiveness in congressionalelections and the growth of "electoraldissociation"or disaggregationin voting coalitions as between presidential and other "high-visibility"(gubernatorial and senatorial)elections.
the total vote was 51.5 (standard deviation = 2.74), the party I896-I912 mean fell to 43.8% (s.d. = 1.82). Similarly, the Repub-
288
5. Levels of competitivenessin congressionalelections can be measuredin many possible ways. Four differentalternativesare presented in Charts 1-4, and-so far as the 1896 "system"is concerned they all tell the same story.All of them requireidentifying the percentageof congressionaldistrictsin the areasspecified in which the districtvote outcomesin each electionfall within specified limits. Chart I, covering the North and West for the period 1880-1984, shows quite dramaticdifferencesbetween this "system"and its adjacent counterparts.It shows as well a very strong seculartrend towarda largerand largershareof (Republican, mostly) seats won by 70% or more of the district vote. Regressionlines are fitted,as in Chart2-the opposite side of the coin. Some may think that the time-partitioningon which the regressionlines are based is tendentious, leading to a foregone conclusion.The shapeof the data in both cases seems quite clearly to place the burdenof proof on such a judgment. Charts3 and 4 give us a much longertime span, essentiallythe
entire file from 1834 through 1984, with the area in question some-
what expandedto includeall non-Southernstates (i.e., the border states are included here, as they are not in Charts I and 2). The little "trick" appliedhere, derivedfrom the work of the statistician John Tukey, is to "smooth" the data by iterating the median values of three adjacentobservations(i.e., the median values for
1892-1896, with midpoint plotted at 1894, then I894-1898, with
pressureon congressional-electioncompetitivenessin American Moreover,whateverprocesseswere at work madethis a history.24 dynamicallyevolving trend towardless and less competitiveness.
from the I89os through about 1930 showed the greatest negative
midpoint plotted at 1896, etc.). Chart 3 presents a somewhat looser definitionof noncompetitiveness than Chart I (definedas startingat 60% ratherthan 70%), while Chart4 presentsa comparativepicturefor closely competitiveand reallysolid one-party districtoutcomes. While the methodsare simple, the compilationsinvolvedare of course most time-consuming: Literally thousands of individual election results must be processed.The results, however,seem to be worth it, since they give us a clear view of majortrendsin this crucial dimension of Americanelectoral history. Again, I must leave to the judgment of others whetherthe suggested boundary of "party-system" points are tendentiousor reasonablygrounded partitionsof the data. It seems certain in any case that the period
PERCENTAGE OF CONGRESSIONAL 188( 1884 1888 1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 -< 1928 m 1: 1932 1936
o
I
DISTRICTS WITHIN LIMIT

S ? g
3
?o I
g o
O g
? o .
^~.~ 0I
3 o
68z
WITHINLIMIT OF PERCENTAGE CONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS

0 o 0:c,) 0 A 0 C 0
rn :v
o6z
Chart 3
60
2ND (JACKSONIAN) PARTYSYSTEM 3RD (CIVIL WAR) PARTYSYSTEM 4TH ("SYSTEM 1896") OF PARTY SYSTEM Predominantly Republican (%D by Dist.:0-39.9)--
5TH ( PART
c, 0
50
In C3 0 -J 40 z 0
cn
Pred Dem (%D
U, w cr o z 0 O
LL
30 Predominantly Whig (%D by Dist.: 0-39.9)
0 o 20 1z LU w O C: 1 10
r
\
Le.0 0 .4i
Ar*
I \ \
As
11I
I_
/
A.&O
II
/I ?? ce4
n -'
0o ) co CN 0
0
) 0o
c o0
coD
o0
' r-
CoJ cD o
O 0)
oo
cOo 0)
0)
CJ
C
0)
0 Cl) a
YEAR
PERCENTAGE OF CONGRESSIONAL
DISTRICTS
_
1842 1850 1858 1866 1874 1882 1890 1898 m > 1906 1914 1922
o p
:.::
z6z
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 293 Table I Divergence and convergenceof voting coalitions, non-southernstates only, 1896-1948
r2: President with
Year 1896
I900
Governor .963
.94I
U.S. Senator
1904 I908
1912
.726 .794
.891
I916 I920 I924

I928
.606 .546 .877

.678
.835 .798 .549

.295
1932 1936 I940 1944 1948
.685 .598 .613 .758 .884
.606 .700 .763 .879 .813
6. The data dealing with divergences in coalitions can be measured in many ways as well, from surveys where available and utilizing a variety of metrics for the analysis of aggregate information. Some of the latter were first presented by me some twenty years ago, another reason for skepticism on my part as to how much of novelty there is in this discussion. For macro level purposes, states are reasonable units of analysis for what follows, since aggregate outcomes for presidential electors, United States Senators and governors are decided at that level. One may begin by a simple array of r2s ("variance explained") matching presidential percentages Democratic of the two-party vote with similar percentages for U.S. Senator and Governor for the period I896-1948.25 It is noteworthy that the relationship between presidential and gubernatorial outcomes remains very strong indeed in both 1896 and 1900. With 1904, "variance explained" suddenly falls by more than 20% and, while the data array here reveals quite a lot of diversity, the trend of "fit" thereafter is clearly down (even in the I932-I940 period, partly an artifact of major third parties in Minnesota and Wisconsin), finally recovering to rather robust
294
Table 2 Voting coalitions diverge over time: absolute deviationsin presidentialand gubernatorialvote, I876-I984* Year
1876 1880
N
12
Median
I.O
Mean
1.6 I.I 1.4 I.I 2.0 2.2 1.9 8.2 5.2 2.7
Variance Stand.Dev. 3.64

1.I7 1.9I
13
14 16 22
22
1884
1888 1892
0.6 0.8
0.7
1.7 I.I
i.o8 1.08
1.18
1.39 0.74 3.07
0.86
1.75 2.59 2.55
6.22
I896
1900 I904 I908 1912** 1916 I920 1924 I928 1932
24 26 26 26 29 28 29 29 29 28 27 26 26 24 24 23 21
1.4
5.7
4.0
2.3
6.69 6.48 38.74

I9.12
4.37
2.27
5.I4 45.09 57.70

21.63
3.7 3.8 5.3 4.9 3.9

5.1 4.0
5.6 6.8 5.8 5.7 5.I 5.4 4.9 5.4 5.3 4.9 8.7 4.8 9-9 6.9
13.8
6.7I 7.60
36.49
28.12 I7.I8
4.65 6.04
5.30 4.I5 4.11 4.II
5.I2
1936
1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964
16.88
26.16
4.6 6.3
3.2
14.43
23.89
3.80
1968
1972 1976 1980 1984
18 15
I2 II II
9.I 4.3 7.4

5.2
36.14
4.89 6.oi
3.82 10.09
14.62 IOI.88
35.I5
5.93
9.41 5.50 8.30 9.27
II.7
88.49
30.27 68.81 85.95
5.4
10.9 9.1
7.1 II.4 II.O
** 1912: Based on Republicanand Progressive% of total vote.
*Basedon percentage of statesonly. Republican totalvote;non-southern
levels in the later I940s. The senatorial sequence begins in presidential years only in I916. Here the decay of relationship across the period ending in 1932 and substantial recovery in the New Deal period stands out in marked relief. The data in Table I suggest that structurally, and despite the
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 295 Table 3 Voting coalitions diverge over time: absolute deviationsin presidentialand senatorialvote, 1916-I984* Year
I916 1920 I924 I928 1932 I936 I940 1944 1948 1952
N
27 25 22 28 26 22 28 26
21
Median
4.0 4.6 3.8 4.8 2.2 4.4 3.2 2.1 3.9 4.8
Mean
4-4 6.6 6.8 7.7 5.9 5-5 4.3 3.8 3.8 4.6
Variance
I5.08 52.77 59-45 70.05 85.42 45.15 I8.24 24.34
15.22
Stand.Dev.
3.88 7.26 7.7I 8.37 9.24 6.72 4.27 4.93 3.90 3.28
26
10.76
1956
I960
26
24
7-3
5.5
8.I
5.8
30.08
19.12
5.48
4-37
1964 I968
I972
29 26
23
3.4 5.9
II.2
7.1 6.6
II.6
48.47 24.66
54.22
6.96 4.97
7.36
1976 I980 1984
27 27 23
8.7 5.5 IO.I
I0.0 7.6 I3.0
35-75 49.79 90. 2
5.98 7.06 9.49
*Based on percentage Republicanof total vote; non-southernstates only.
impact of realignment, I896 and I900 really were nineteenthcentury elections. The big break occurs in the first "modern" presidential-landslide context of the 1904 election. We may obtain some sense of the situation before 1896 and developments afterwards by reviewing the data presented in Tables 2 and 3. These show medians, means, and dispersion measures of the absolute deviation in the Republican share of the total vote for President and Governor and President and U.S. Senator in the non-southern states from 1876 to the present. The presidential/gubernatorial data in Table 2 reveal, as one might expect, that absolute deviations in the late nineteenth century and again down through I900 were very small; so were their variances and standard deviations. The year 1904 surfaces as a structural"minirevolution" at least, with variances suddenly multiplied to almost six times their I900 levels and the mean absolute deviations reaching a level not again surpassed until 1956! So far as these absolute deviations are con-
296
SOCIAL
SCIENCE
HISTORY
cerned, the system then acquires quite a lot of very long-term

stability: The I904-I928 mean of these means is 5.7%, compared with I.6% for the 1876-1900 period and 5.2% for the 1932-I952 period. What does changeafter 1928 is that the dispersionaround 1904 levels. The I904 mean absolute deviation implies that split-
these means falls sharplyfrom the normal levels achieved in the I920s, though of course comes nowhere near returningto pre-
ticket voting would surge sufficientlyto produceDemocraticgubernatorialvictories in the face of enormous Republicanpresidential majorities,indeed (cf. the situationsin Massachusetts and one of the strikingfeaturesof the election.The failure Minnesota) of the mean deviationsto declinevery much duringthe New Deal period, on the other hand, points towardsome significantlimitations on the usual argumentthat this era sawa majorrejuvenation of partisan linkages, at least as far as relationships between nationaland state electionsare concerned. The senatorialdata in Table 3 cannot of course give information about the transition toward modern times which seems to haveeruptedin 1904. It does, however,reveala notabledeclinein the size of the absolute deviationsand in the measuresof spread around these means as we move from the late "Systemof I896" into the post-1938 consolidationphase of the New Deal realignment. Comparative work on such topics as the "nationalization of effects"might well be called for to move beyondthis very political primitiveand crude stage of analysis. But even at that, two comments can be suggested by way of summary. a. The "modern" markedby increasingdivergenceof coaliera, tions, increasingad-hoc dispersionsaroundany measureof cenpaper,I have tried to suggest some reasonswhy this development is not incompatiblewith a "Systemof I896"model which stresses its dynamicallyevolving character. b. By any standard,the New Deal partisan"recovery" thus as measuredwas anythingbut sharpor knife-edged;nor can it really be said to have acquiredcompleteness,notably so far as partisan ties between presidentialand gubernatorial voting coalitions are concerned. On the other hand, recoverythere certainlywas from the depths plumbedin the 1920s. And this is especiallynotable at the political center, i.e., in the relationshipsbetween presidential and senatorialelection outcomes.26
tral tendency, and increasing personalismo, appears to begin around 1904, not 1896. In the commentary provided earlier in this

IN LIEU OF A CONCLUSION
Professor McCormick alludes at one point to my use of "hardwon numbers." is quite right to call attentionto this aspect of He my work. The numberscertainlyhave been hard-won.But apart from that, they have always formed an integral part of my research style and will doubtless continue to do so. This side of my work has the strongestsubstantivemotivationsimpellingit. If we are to place any credence in ideas of "realignment" and "party systems,"with the periodizationsthese ideas imply, the case made for them must rest on a solid empiricalfoundation. Essentially, researchprogramsin this field must concernthemselveswith emWhere the total piricalpattern recognition,i.e., with "decoding." pattern, as here, is one of almost unimaginablecomplexity,any theorizingto be credibleto a tough and criticalprofessionalaudience must rest on the most complete possible masteryof relevant databasesand thereafteron the makingof decisionsabout what it all "means."I cannot say in retrospectthat I have succeeded in achievingthis objectiveas well as I had once wished. One'sreach may well exceed one's grasp, after all. But the numbersare there to providea better basis for telling a causal story than we could hope to have without them. And they remind us-or shouldthat if one causal story is disbelievedthen another which better accountsfor the numbersshould be developedand presentedto a skepticalworld. Nevertheless,as I have been at great pains to point out in this arguessay, not everythingthat is relevantto a "systems-theory" ment can be quantifiedor best analyzedin statisticalterms. Take a single policy issue, for example. The constitutionallaw of the commerce clause was authoritativelydefined in a specialized, and a law called "sugartrust case."This definitionwas reaffirmed permanentlyvanished from the face of the earth. We have very line strongreasonto believe, moreover,that this particular of doctrine was one of quite a few which began at about the same time and also disappearedat about the same time. But the Knight case, like Carter later, was a single event. It can and should be woven into a story which identifies "policy eras"and relatesthem to "realignment theory"and "party-system
struck down some forty years later in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., (I936),27 but within six years of the latter date it had totally and highly powerful way in U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., I895, the so-
298
theory."But this can hardly be done efficiently by attempting quantitativeprocedureswhich, to be formallycrediblein the statistical sense, must rest on the law of large numbers. Here there are no large numbers,but ratherconstituentacts which have tremendous subsequent radiance in determining what gets on a policy agenda at all. And, of course, to take a far more transcendental effort than my own, the influential"world-system" school of Wallersteinand his associatesdeals with materialsof five centuries'duration,in a myriadof settingswhere statisticalmethods can never be employed. It would of course be an exercise in a banal form of scientistic positivism to assert that the Wallersteiniansdo not really"usedata"in their work becausethe statistical apparatusis absent and their conclusionsare not set forth in rigorouslydefinedeconometricmodels. literaturereminds us of what I Instead, the "world-systems" think is a basic truth. The full articulationof any systems theory is almost certainly beyond the ability of any single mortal. The division of labor in contemporaryAcademeand the vast number of phenomenaat all levels that are potentiallyanalyzableplace a heavy premiumon specializationand equallyplace generalcrossspecialtytheorizingat a more or less heavy discount. If we think about something which, compared with the "world economy" can politicalhistory,for example-we still findthe same problem. In the end, to fill out any model of Americanpolitical dynamics will requiretelling more or less the whole story of Americanstate and political history within the cues, guidelines,and prioritiesit suggests. And that is a very tall orderindeed. Thus we have policy researchas an unsolved "puzzle," one among many. Those who work on that front may well not have fully absorbedthe mass of informationneeded by analystsof electoralhistory,and of course vice versa. And one suspects that social scientists in particular still need remindingthat there is probablyno single techniqueor batteryof techniqueswhichcan cover all subfieldbases with equal efficiency. and prioritizing comthe Any suggestedmodel for interpreting plexities of real-worldpuzzles will ultimately succeed or be influentialonly to the extent that it helps the solution of these puzzles within the scholarlycommunity.Otherwise, the model will either not be consideredat all by that communityor, if it is, it will
since 1492, is relatively simple -change and continuity in Ameri-
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 299 eventually be replaced by something that does a better job of sorting out scholarly problematics. In the end, one would feel more sanguine about the prospects that this collective truthapproximation process could do its own job in this particular field if there were a true "community" structure to start with. As it is, I really do not know how much progress can be hoped for within our cottage industry in moving even to the first essential step: the reduction of heteronomy about facts, methods, and models. But be that as it may, our professional world, however structurally imperfect, is hardly beyond redemption. We may be on the threshold of an age of new and more creative syntheses, for important changes in research problematics and perhaps even community building seem to be going on among the younger generation of scholars. God speed the plough. So far as the syntheses are concerned, I just can't wait for them to appear!
APPENDIX
Discussion. As we have repeatedlystressed,there is no single methodological panacea for evaluating change and continuity in past voting behavior.The precedingtripartitetable is oriented toward only one of these methods, which lends itself to a relativelysimple determinationof "cuttingpoints" (if any) in a longitudinalseries of observations.Naturally, any such approachis strictly limited in what it can tell us. For example, it gives us no informationbeyond its limits as to the specific identity of voting coalitions and changes in them. For such purposes, microanalysis employingsuch methodsas ecologicalregressionis clearly indicated. Nor can it give us any informationon the vexed issue of, say, in versus "conversion" creation of the New Deal coali"mobilization" since it deals only with percentagesof the total vote cast, rather tion, than percentagesof the potential electorate. (For a discussionwhich is interesting but in substantial measure conceptually and methodologically misguided,see Kristi Anderson, I979.) In seeking "cuttingpoints" within the context of so-called "criticalelection theory,"we look for evidence of moments at which two groups of longitudinalobservationshave what amountsto maximumbetweenvariance.This is the sort of groupdifferenceand minimumwithin-group issue which the standardt-test is designed to evaluate. (Similarly,and yielding essentiallyidenticalresult, one can obtain coefficientsof variavariableis a dummy in tion basedon regressions whichthe "independent" variableof the form oooooI I I I I.) What one does with such metricsis to select a total time band-here, although this is not strictly necessary,
300
means and t values, Appendix Table A The realigning"moment": stratifiedby region and urbanism,at times of maximum difference
I. 1876-I912 (Midpoint, 1894; for t, df = 8)a
1876-I892 I896-1912
MDem MRep
Region
Rest Mid-Atlantic Metro
MDem
MRep
Dem -4.879**
-4.979**
Rep 3.678*
3.983** 7.405***
New England Metro 47.3 49.3

40.4 56.7 51.4 47.1
37.7 57.8
31.1 64.8
39.0
56.4 -I0.249***
Rest 45.9 50.9 E. N. Central Metro 48.8 49.4

Rest W. N. Central Metro Rest (A) 46.2 49.5 43.4 52.9 39.5 55.3
37.5 57.7 38.0 54.9

40.3 55.0 32.9 59.7 36.2 59.2
-8.078*** -3.569*
-2.907? -2.232 -I.098
7.857*** 2.840
3.642* 1.656 1.372
Metropole
Metro 49.8 48.3

Nonmetro 44.6 51.5 35.2 55.5 27.3 56.9 38.7 53.3 46.8 49.8 45.0 49.0 43.0 51.2 34.2 53.6 54.1 44.4 53.3 42.7 59.1 36.0 50.1 47.9 48.0 47.0
38.4 56.I
38.3 42.4 40.5 49.5 57.1 51.7 54.6 45.4
-7.782***
-4.333** 0.934 1.842
5.678***
4.317**
-I.037
W. N. Central Metro Rest (B)
-0.533
Mountain
Pacific
Metro 35.0 54.5

Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Rest
56.5 40.6
35.3 54.7 37.3 53.9 41.7 41.9 50.4 52.0
1.816
0.997 -2.770 -I.497 -0.251 1.091 -5.009** -2.448
-1.882
-0.783 1.222 1.428
-0.201
West
-0.378 3.818* 3.740*
Border
45.3 51.3 49.1 47.6
South
Metro 67.3 32.7

Metro Nonmetro
80.5 16.3
64.1 32.4
2.748
4.53I** -7.293*** -1.988
-4.289**
-I.I62 5.255*** 2.596
USA
44.I
39.6 54.9 51.3
aBased on mean percentages Democratic and Republican (1912: Republican + Progressive)of total vote for periods indicated. Coding for t values is as follows: with df = 8, values in excess of 2.896 are significantat .02 level (0); in excess of 3.355 at .01 level (*); in excess of 3.832 at .005 level (**); in excess of 5.041 at .001 level (***).

Appendix Table A (cont.) II. I912-I948 (Midpoint, 1930; for t, df = 8)'
I912-1928
1932-1948
MDem MRep
t Dem 3.249? 3.1520

4.175**
Region New England Mid-Atlantic E. N. Central Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest
MDem
MRep
Rep -3.449* -3.362*

-4.092**
43.1 34.6 36.6 32.9
51.6 61.9 56.0 61.2
60.4 47.0
37.0 51.5
57.5 40.7 45.0 53.9 57.2 40.9 48.4 50.1 58.5 38.6 53.1 45.2 57.6 40.4 47.5 50.4 56.6 42.6 47.9 50.7 58.0 4I.0
57.4
41.2
3.185* 4.376** 3.317? 3.406* 3.703* 4.267** 3.567* 3.004? 2.079 2.44I
3.439*
-2.252 -4.323** -I.949 -3.588* -2.847

-4.4II**
34.4 56.4 35.1 57.8 32.2 54.2 30.4 59.2 36.2 55.7 33.8 59.4 40.6 51.7 34.6 56.8 40.4 51.8
38.8
52.1
W. N. Central Metro Rest (A) Metropole Metro Nonmetro
-2.764
-2.033
W. N. Central Metro Rest (B) Mountain Metro

Rest
-0.983
-2.043 -2.234 -3.072?
Pacific
Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Nonmetro
30.3 55.4 31.5 54.5 32.5 54.7 34.9 54.7 44.4 51.1 46.3 49.9 65.I 30.7 63.7 32.9
58.8 39.4 57.0 40.5 58.5 39.8 54.0 44.2 59.9 39.2 57.4 42.2 76.I 22.4 76.9 22.3
4.009** 4.283** 3.780* 3.437*
-2.934?
-2.990?
West
-2.049
Border South
5.681*** -4.373** 4.363** -2.294 1.752 3.606* -1.272 -2.535
USA
4.469** -4.535** 37.2 54.5 58.6 39.5 -2.597 4.I52** 39.8 53.6 54.3 44.4 aFor I876-I912, "Metro" is defined as counties (or "town units" in New
or more in 1920.
the definition includes counties or New England "towns"with central cities of

I00,000
England) with central cities of Ioo,ooo in I9oo; for I912-1948 and 1908-I944,
Based on mean percentagesDemocraticand Republicanof total vote, except that in 1912, "Republican"includes Republican + Progressive, and in I948, "Democratic"includes Democratic + Progressive+ States Rights. regionsare found on the following page.
Coding for t values are to be found on the preceding ("I876-1912") page;
302
Appendix Table A (cont.)

III. 1908-1944 (Midpoint, 1926; for t, df = 8)a
I908-I924 I928-I944 t
Region
Rest Rest Rest W. N. Central Metro Rest (A) Metropole Metro
MDem MRep MDem MRcp
Dem
Rep
-2.8o6 -0.749 -2.544 -0.719 -I.94I
-I.774
New England Metro 38.6 55.0

32.9 62.5 34.9 59.0 36.4 55.6 31.3 53.9 30.2 58.5 34.7 56.2
59.8 37.6
45.6 42.8 46.3 52.9 56.0 52.2
5.949*** -5.390***
3.23?1
Mid-Atlantic Metro 34.8 56.9 E. N. Central Metro 33.8 55.8
56.o 41.9 54.6 43.5

54.5 42.6 50.0 48.3 55.7 42.2
4.464** -3.728*
1.901
3.535*
1.942 2.784 2.995?
4.171**
-3.372*
Nonmetro 34.7 57.7 45.4 52.6 W. N. Central Metro 43.3 48.6

(B) Mountain Pacific Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Rest Metro Nonmetro 36.3 54.3 42.2 49.3 39.8 50.0 29.7 53.9 31.4 52.8 33.3 52.4 35.9 52.5 44.6 50.2 48.1 47.5 73.0 22.7 65.9 30.0 36.2 54.5 41.0 51.6
1.879 1.438
1.298 1.570 2.131 2.859 2.925? 2.500 2.I86 3I.43? 1.422 -0.796 1.246 3.778* 2.150
-1.243 -0.524
-0.217
53.5 45.7
45.7 52.9 55.2 43.6 54.2 44.4 54.8 43.3 53.5 43.9 54.7 43.5 50.9 47.2 57.4 53.8 72.3 72.8 41.7 43.8 26.2 26.5
-0.915 -0.952
-1.501
-I.394 -1.346 -0.866

-2.107
West
Border South
-0.408 0.474 -0.624 -2.897? -0.939
USA
56.4 41.7 51.4 47.3
aFordefinitions, criteria codingof t values,see preceding and pages. Regions are census regions except for following: W.N. Central (A): Iowa, Minnesota; W.N. Central(B): rest of W. N. Central;Border:Kentucky,Marythe Confederacyin I860-I86I. (Additionally,Delaware is added to the census Mid-AtlanticRegion [New Jersey,New York, Pennsylvania].)
land, Missouri, Oklahoma, West Virginia; South: II states that seceded to form
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 303 with equal numbersof observationsbefore and after the midpoint. We have selected a total time band of 10 contiguous presidentialelections for (five before and five after the midpoint), the "justification" which is foundin the hypothesisthathistorical-realignment haveoccurred "peaks" on the average some 38 years apart over time. It can be noted that the same considerationscan be applied to, say, congressionalor other biennial data, except that here we take 20 contiguous observations(ten before and ten after the midpoint); and that this will not only produce times but also other high values which cutting-pointsat the "expected" are of considerableempirical-and, one assumes, theoretical-interest. Once one identifiesthese bands and the metricsthat go with them (e.g., here, each party's percentage of the total presidentialvote), one then begins at the earliestpoint which data allow and iteratesforwarda step at a time until the end of the series is reached. The assumptionunderlyingthe operation,statistically,is that of randomness acrosstime (i.e., the "nullhypothesis").That is, over time there will either be no major differencesin means at all, or if there are some such differences,longitudinalvariabilityin each party'sshareof the vote will be so great relative to them that t (or rd2, one chooses to use that if technique) will approximatezero. Presidentialelections over the past generation,at least, have often shown huge levels of volatilityfrom one to the next, a phenomenonwhich is an importantspecificcharacteristic of this era comparedwith any earlierone, and which tends to make use of this techniqueless productivenationally(though in certainstates and regions, this is not the case). In point of fact, granted the theoretical literature,we expect to find that there will be times when very large numbers of states or other units will produce statistically significant levels of t, i.e., that the "null hypothesis"will be plausibly rejected in such cases. But most of the time, they will not: Takingthe entire file of states and the entire time period I828-I984, for example, nearly fourfifthsof all observationsin the matrixfall below even a relativelyrelaxed level of statistical "significance" (the .02 level, or with df = 8, 2.896 or above). The full arraywill as a rule show a strikinglyperiodiccharacter,with knife-edged "peaks"falling nationally at such midpoint dates as I894 (firstsubsequentelection, I896) or I930 (firstsubsequentelection, I932). (See Appendix Chart I for a typical pattern.)The threesegments of the above table are designed to give some internal profile of these two "peaks" plus that of midpoint I926 (first subsequent election, I928), which in certain parts of the country shows the dramaticimpact of the so-called "Al Smith realignment."Inclusion of the latter, moreover, showsfor most partsof the countrymajordifferencesin t values between
two adjacent iterations (i.e., those based on I908-I944 and 1912-1948
VALUEOF Rd2
o 1^ ,
"o
v ui U ow X
>
1846 | 1846
-- -
--
--
&-
1862
-?---
'" ......
OD
--44 -(
1870
7' 19886
...
--_
1910
1660
? C"-
" S~~~~"
"
-..
o.
1902
198826 191850 1934 1942
'
......._
_-'"~-
"_
1942
ou1950 196 1968
"-
T-'~
I^-'~~~~
_
0OA)~~~~
X
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 305 for respectively),as one "searches" the "best"national t value. Indeed, the whole pattern of I924-1940 realignmentwas much more broadly in sequencedthan was its predecessor the I89os, and this is reflectedin a of Part I of the table with Parts II and III. comparison In addition to providingregional informationin each of these three time periods, the underlyingelectoral data were stratifiedalong a dichotomousmetropolitan-area/other-area dimension,in partbecausethe literatureon both realigningeras has repeatedly(and correctly)stressed the salience of the metropolitandimension to these realignments.The criteriafor differentiation along this dimensionare specifiedin the notes to the table. Analyzed in these terms, the realignmentof the I89os stands in noteworthy (if expected) contrast to that of the I930S in the relativelyextreme regionalizationof the alignment pattern, as suggested both by inspectionof the underlyingmeans and by the t values. Put one way, we can say that the regional variance in these values in the segment with midpoint 1930 is reduced by more than nine-tenthsfrom the variances recorded in the I89os realignment-a statement true for both parties and both metro and nonmetroareas. Indeed, in Segment I of the table, we see regionally diverse long-term movements, involving not merely the southern but also the western "colonies"except for the Pacific rein gion (a mini-"metropole" its own right in this period). It is evident that overall, in the Metropoleand especiallynationally,t values in the metropolitanareas and that-of course-the maximum impact of realignment is concentratedin Middle-Atlanticstates, the very "coreof the core,"so to speak. One may also note the very high values of proRepublican(or anti-Democratic)t in the metropolitanareasof the Border states. These areas-chiefly Baltimore, Louisville,and St. Louislay at the edges of the Metropoleand were in fact economicallyincorporated within it, as the rural areas of such states as Kentuckyand Missouri were not. By contrast, the segment with midpoint 1930 shows, if anything, a of near-liquidation this regionaldiversity-not of course in underlying voting behaviorif we includethe South, and so forth,but in termsof the underlyingthrustof realignmentfrom a precedingvoting base. There is a much more broadlyetched national pattern,and here too the metropolitan areas tend to lead the way, as writerssuch as Samuel Lubelland Samuel J. Eldersveld pointed out in the early I950s. Obviously, subof stantive interpretation the essential differences-e.g., the "riseof the ethnics" in I928 and the impact of class polarizationin the New Deal era-is, fortunately,enormous and its quality is generallyhigh; so the above brief mention of these differences and their probable origins involved should sufficefor this discussion.The overall"nationalization"
306
in the New Deal realignmentis underscoredby noting that the South values for t occurringfor the also joined the parade,with "significant" Democrats in the nonmetropolitanareas of this region (these cast an overwhelmingmajorityof the region'stotal vote in this period). There are some quite majordifferences,notably concentratedin nonmetropolitanareas, between the t levels reachedfor the Democratsand the Republicans;this is a phenomenon also found occasionally in the extent, this reflectsan importantreality 1876-1912array.To a significant of the "system"pivoted arounda relativelystable Republicanmajority. That is, oppositional forces (Democrats, socialists, Farmer-laborites, LaFolletteProgressives)were in constantand fluid motion, especiallyat the presidentiallevel. Thus, as inspection of the two sets of means reveals, the gains for the Democrats in the New Deal era were far larger than the losses for the Republicansin most places, and especiallyso in the western "colonial"regions, where third-partyinsurgencies on the Left were most common and electorallypowerful. When we turn to the third segment, concentratingon midpoint I926, of the key loci of the "AlSmith realignment" 1928come into clearview. Peaks even exceeding those of midpoint 1930 are found (as one might expect) in New England metro, Mid-Atlanticmetroand (by a very narrow margin) New England nonmetro areas. Elsewherein the country, we find t values lower (frequently far lower) than are achieved in the I9I2-1948 segment. This should remind us, if reminderis needed, that V. O. Key, Jr., was entirely right to classify I928 as a mixture of permanent realignmentand temporary"deviation.." The point has theoretical bite. Theories proposing large numbers of "potential Democrats"in the I920S electorate, derived from posthoc survey analysis, tend to overlook the fact that in many parts of the country-including many metropolitanareas populated largely by Protestantsratherthan Catholics-there was a verypowerful "Hoover surge"among former nonvoters (cf. Anderson, 1979). But again, this gets us beyond what the data show here. We will simply note the I928 areasof each and 1940 percentagesof the total vote for the metropolitan so doing we underscorethe "nationalization" (outside the region. By South, to be sure) of politics which occurredin the interim. Thus, excluding the South, the I928 mean percentageDemocratic in the metro areas of eight regions was 43.3, with a standarddeviation of 7.22 and variance of 52.07. By I940, on the other hand, the Democratic mean was now 57.3%, with the standard deviation falling to 2.03 and the variance to 4.12. The regionally-defined variance in the non-southern vote, in other words,had declined by more than 92% metropolitan-area
between 1928 and 1940.
Readers can, if they wish, find other morsels for reflection in this table. Universalvirtue is not claimed for this techniqueof analysis, or
PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 307 Appendix Table B Shifts in metropolitan-areapartisansupport: major-partypercentagesof total vote cast, 1928 and 1940 presidentialelections
1928 1940
MetroAreasby Region New England Mid-Atlantic East North Central West North Central (A) West North Central (B) Mountain Pacific Border South USA
Dem. 59.1 47.6 42.1 40.3 38.0 40.8 33.3 45.2 48.2 44.7
Rep. 40.2 50.4 56.8 58.4 61.3 58.4 65.5 54.5 51.4 54.0
Dem. 62.0 55.3 56.6 57.0 54.9 57.3 58.0 57.2 77.5 57.4
Rep. 37.5 44.2 43.0 42.0 44.8 42.3 40.7 42.3 22.3 42.0
indeed any other. All that I would like to affirmhere is that this sort of method producesresults which seem highly convergentin many places with the literaturewhich claims that, ultimately,the period I896-I932 was really systemicallydifferentfrom what preceded it and what followed it. It similarlyreinforces-admittedly, at a very high (or "coarse") level of aggregation-the identificationof I896 as both a sectional realignment with very long-term(if dynamicallyevolving) consequences, and as one in which "the city"very clearlyled "thecountry." Grantedlimitationsof space, we may very brieflynote one other issue that is constantly raised by people who object to the "presidential synthesis", i.e., the concentrationby many analysts in the past on presidential election data to the exclusion of other electoral (and electorally derived) data. This is an objection with which I have a great deal of sympathy. All we can undertaketo mention here is that detailed explorationsof other rangesof electoraland electorallyderiveddata, using time-fixingmethods of the sort suggested above, produceresults which are broadlyconfirmingof patternslike those presentedhere. They also producecertain other results which are arrestingand, I believe, of considerablemodel-buildingimportance.In due course I shalltry to explain to the interestedprofessionalpublic what these are and why they seem analyticallyimportant. Back in I908, Arthur Bentley produced a book, The Process of Government,which was his own personal contributionto the "revolt against formalism"then well underway in the law and a numberof the social sciences. Indeed, he virtuallycreated the frameworkfor modern
308
pluralist analysis in political science. Alas, he wrote too soon and was largely forgotten for more than a generation. Whether for good or ill, this has not been my fate; though I would hasten to add that-as the total record shows-I have not executed an entire framework-creation, at least not one which finds any very impressive consensus. In the epigraph to The Process of Government, Bentley puts his program in his usual blunt, forthright way: "This book is an attempt to fashion a tool." If I had to find a single phrase that sums up my own professional lifetime and labors, I could not do better than borrow this much from Arthur Bentley: "This work is an attempt to fashion a tool."
NOTES I
3 4 5
6 7
This appearsto lead them to conclude that realigningchange was largely confinedto the elite world of publicpolicy at the top. Whatevermay be the situationin the present (where such a view might closely fit the facts), one can only wonder how, in the past, stable "policyeras"could have been so feebly relatedto the voting baseson which they were presumably grounded. I should note my increasingconvictionthat a majorrealigningepisode did occur at just that time, but one fundamentallydifferentfrom all preceding realignments. This is one of the many things which cannot be discussed further here. For some intimations along these lines, see Walter Dean Burnham, 1985. For a detailedcritiqueof the "new"Benson, see J. MorganKousser,"Must HistoriansRegress?An Answerto Lee Benson,"1985. The methodologicalkey to this findingis the survey panel study (i.e., interviewing the same individualsover time). The classic formulationof this social matrix for scholarshipis, of course, Thomas R. Kuhn, 1962. Here too there is great unoriginalityon my part. Much of this discussion amounts to an agreement,albeit on a real-world level, with Kuhn'sdiscussionof some of the reasonswhy the soexperiential cial sciences, unlike most naturalsciences, are still at a "pre-paradigmatic" stage of development. Lowi'soriginaldiscussion was in a book review of Bauer, Pool & Dexter, American Business and Public Policy, 1964. The latter, handed down in May I895, is the decision which one usually findsin the constitutional-law casebooks. For an extensive discussionof the case and its background,see Arnold M. Paul (1960: 159-220). Though he had somewhat more in mind, it was this case from the Court's1894 term which Justice Oliver WendellHolmes, Jr. probablyhad more in mind than most when he delivereda notable critiquein 1913: When twenty years ago a vague terror went over the earth and the word socialism began to be heard, I thought and still think that fear was translatedinto doctrinesthat had no properplace in the Constitution or the common law. Judges are apt to be naif, simple-minded men, and they need somethingof Mephistopheles.We too need edu-
Periodization Schemes and "Party Systems"
309
cation in the obvious-to learnto transcendour own convictionsand to leave room for much that we hold dear to be done away with short of revolution by the orderlychange of law ["Lawand the Court,"reprinted in Max Lerner 1943: 390].
Holmes'critiquewas of course phrasedin polite, even euphuisticlanguage. But the point comes throughanyway. The speech reflectsa vivid concern on Holmes' part not just for what went on in the I89os, but for what was still very much on the agenda in 1913and for more than two decadesafter that. Finally, I would cite this speech, along with very much else, as evidence to support a judgment that a massive upper-class"consolidation" and redistributive policy-makingwere at the core of the realignmentof the I89Os.A classic discussion of the overall backgroundfor this "judicialreremainsthat of one of my greatteachers,RobertG. McCloskey, alignment" 1951. 8 The key reference,of course, is to V. O. Key,Jr.'sopus magnum, Southern Politics in State and Nation, 1949. Needless to say, the subjectof the "need"for the city to beat the countryis 9 literature; repeatedlyand extensively discussed in Marxist "development" nowhere more so than in Lenin'sanalysisof the I9I7 constituent-assembly election in Russia (see page 272). 10 Needless to say, this propensitygoes back far earlier: Not only his great enemy H. L. Menckenwould regardWilliamJennings Bryanas a quintessential "provincial," there is (as Mencken appreciatedin his sardonic and way) something entirely appropriatein Bryan'sarrivalat death and apotheosis in the context of the TennesseeScopes "monkeytrial"of I925. We should recall that Bryan was nominated by his party three times for the presidencyand had an influentialrole to play on at least one other occasion (I912). Unquestionably,Bryan's personal importancein the Democratic elite from 1896 until the onset of WorldWarI helps to account by itself for the "consolidation" the voting system set up in I896. Burnerfills in the of later picture;it strikesthis observer,at least, as almost entirelyisomorphic with the earlierone. One may referto almost any Republicanplatformbetween 1896and I928. Ii Additionally,this set of argumentswas given quasi-canonicalform in that once well-known "bible of progressiveRepublicanism" HerbertCroly, by I909, The Promise of American Life. As he explicitly said in this volume, Croly was a neo-Hamiltonian.If one can say that his work is in some sense a "bible," definitionhe was speakingfor many more people than himself by in his own time. By the way, contemplationof this work, the activitiesand rhetoric of many Progressives, and for that matter the careers of such earlierworthiesas William McKinleyand Mark Hanna, should remindus of the fact that the leadershipelevated to national power in I896 was anyperspective,filtered thing but monolithicallyanti-labor.A "development" throughcontemplationof their lives and works, stressesthat if, in the ultimate analysis"1896"was an "industrial-capitalist" electoral/policysystem, its politicaldirectoratecontinuedto make seriousappealsto the interestsof industriallabor too. To the extent that the dominant organizationof this period involves "the city beating the country,"why not? Among other
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12 13
14 15 16
17
I8
things, fundamentalanti-laborpolicy activitycould be left to the Supreme Court, of course not a "political"body! See Coppage v. Kansas, 1915, invalidating state efforts to outlaw "yellow-dog"contracts (not reversed until Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, I94I). As of now, this is the definitiveaccount. Clearly the best and most extensive account is Paul Kleppner, 1982. Cf. also WalterDean Burnham,I982 (originallypresentedto an AmericanBar Association symposium, 1978). Professor Kleppner'sconclusions and my own are in virtuallycompleteagreement. The classic discussionremains V. O. Key, Jr., I956: 85-I96. Cf. also Seymour Martin Lipset, 1950, dealing with the rise of the C.C.F. in Saskatchewan. The net overall effect seems to be in the range of 9-10%. Cf. Steven J. Rosenstone and Raymond Wolfinger(I980:61-88). Quantitativeanalysis of Ohio countiesfrom 1952through1976yields essentiallyidenticalresults, a gratifyingconvergence.It goes withoutsayingthat the moreturnoutfalls, the largeris the class gap in electoralparticipation.Cf. Burnham, 1982. For a brilliantanalysisof the long-termpathologiesof nonpartisanship that developedin one city (Oakland,California)see JeffreyL. Pressman,,1975. We give a few highlights(CDNA, 1924:339): But a great change has taken place, virtuallyinfluencingthe work of
administrative and legislative fulfillment.... The great change has
come about unawares, and as molders of public opinion, you (the press-WDB) have ignored the fundamentalreason. It is the change in our political system, the rule of the primaries,the drift towardpure democracy,and the growing impotence of political parties.... We achieved under the party system, where parties were committed to policies and party loyalty was a mark of honor. Nowadays,in many states, party adherenceis flouted, loyalty is held to be contemptible and nominations for office are often influenced by voters enrolled under an opposing party banner, and platforms are sometimes the insincereutterances expediency,influencedby nomineesratherthan of by advocatesof principle.
I9
Cf. Fiorina's (or judgmentas to why any meaningful"retrospective" "referendum")voting patternbreaksdown as a vehicle of democraticcontrol in today'spoliticalworld: Whatis the futureof partyidentification a system whereeach officein holder bears responsibilityonly for his individualactions, where the actions themselvesare differentiated office?There is none.... by As the year 2000 approaches, Americanpoliticalsystemappears the doubt that LBJ or even FDR would have looked like effectiveleaders if they had occupied Carter'sshoes. Todaya president's charismawill not get congressmen re-elected, nor will a president'sfailures drag any great numberof them to defeat. 'United we stand'has given way
to 'Every man for himself' [Fiorina, 198I: 21o-2II]. trapped in a series of disturbing, mutually reinforcing trends. ... I
Periodization Schemes and "Party Systems"

20
311
21
22
23 24
25 26
A particularly and is interestingcomparisonof "before" "after" given in the great pioneeringsociologicalstudy by RobertS. and Helen M. Lynd (I929: survived the condi413-427). (And here, we should note, "partisanship" tions imposed by the "system of I896" better than in almost any other locality in the country!) Work I am currently engaged in suggests that the original "critical systems"theoryshould be modifiedto include what one realignment-party might call majorbut "subcritical" episodes falling at about the midpointin the life of one of these "partysystems."This suggests importanttransformations, e.g., centered somewhere around such dates as 1837, 1875 and into a "maintaining" a "deand 1913, with a partitioningof each "system" cay" phase. Further discussion of this by me must await a forthcoming work; but there would be plenty of reason for thinking in any case that featuresof the 91o-1916 sequence.This paralthere were many "special" lels a view which Professor McCormick'scritique forcefully and rightly underscores: any discussionof the so-called "systemof I896"must, sooner or later, develop a credibleexplanationof Progressivismif it is to succeed. Cf. my own discussion(I970) in CriticalElections and the Mainspringsof American Politics;for the testimonyof a leadingpoliticalscientistwho was much more nearly a contemporaryof this "system"than I, see Arthur N. Holcombe, I924. (This remains a little gold mine of informationon the period.) It is moreoverinteresting to note that in the long era of the "behavioral revolution"in political science, the enduring significanceof regional diversities and polarities in American politics was largely lost to view. (Nationallyorientedsurveys,for example,are very likelyto miss a lot of this vital regionalcomponent.) The imbalancethus created has recently been very forcefullycounteredby RichardFranklinBensel, 1984. When, in the text, I refer to new developmentsamong younger scholarsthat seem very promisingfor the future, I have people such as ProfessorsSkowroneck and Bensel very much in mind. Some kinds of series, notably those that deal with biennial congressionalin election data, suggests a distinct "uptick" these values around 1912. See Appendix B and Chart B-i. That is, until we reachcontemporary (i.e., post-I966) times. Among many other interesting features, the 1984 congressional election in the nonsouthern states reveals the most extreme shift toward non-competitive results in more than 150 years. It goes without saying that the electoral bases of this noncompetitivenessin the 1980s arefundamentally different fromthose on which its nearequal in the 192osrested. Fromthe perspective of massive conservativehegemonyat the "commanding heights,"however, the differencemay be perhapsless than the data indicate. This table is a segment of one already published in my essay on the 1984 election, "The 1984 Election and the Future of AmericanPolitics,"(1985: r2s 235). The presidential-congressional are omittedas are post-1948years.. outMuch the same story is told when we aggregatecongressional-election comes up to the state level, though such a method can be objected to. Relationshipsas measuredby r2at this level decline from .941 in I896 and
.970 in 1900 to .239 by I928, and then rebound to a New Deal era high of
312
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.680 in I944. The decline during the period from I900 to I928 may not be
completelymonotonic, but it is very impressivenevertheless.So is the subsequent recovery.In this set of relationshipsas in the other two, I904 surfaces as a significantbreak from precedingpatterns. 27 Comparewith Wickardv. Filburn, I942. REFERENCES Anderson,K. (I979) The Creationof a Democratic Majority.Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bensel, R. F. (I984) Sectionalismand AmericanPolitical Development, I8801980. Madison:Universityof Wisconsin Press. Benson, L. (1984) "The mistransferencefallacy in explanationsof human behavior." Historical Methods 17: I18-I31.
The DemocraticPartyin TranBurner,D. (1968) The Politics of Provincialism:

sition, I918-I932. New York: Knopf.
Burnham, W. D. (1970) Critical Elections and the Mainspringsof American Politics. New York:W. W. Norton. (1982) "The Appearenceand disappearenceof the Americanvoter,"in W. D. Burnham,the CurrentCrisis in AmericanPolitics. New York:Oxford UniversityPress: 121-I65. (I985)"The 1984 election and the future of American Politics,"in E. Sandoz and C. V. Crabb,Jr. (eds.), Election84: LandslideWithouta Mandate? New York:New AmericanLibrary:204-260. Carterv. CarterCoal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (I936). Chicago Daily News Almanac (1924) 336-339. Clubb, J. M., W. H. Flanigan,and N. H. Zingale (1980) PartisanRealignment: Voters,Partiesand Governmentin AmericanHistory.Beverly Hills: Sage. Coppagev. Kansas,236 U.S. I (1915). of Corwin,E. S. (1955) The "Higher-Law"Background AmericanConstitutional Law. Ithaca:Cornell UniversityPress. Croly, H. (1909) The Promiseof AmericanLife. New York:Macmillan. Fiorina, M. (1981) RetrospectiveVoting in AmericanNational Elections. New Haven: Yale UniversityPress. Gans, D. J. (1985) "Persistenceof party success in Americanpresidentialelections."Journalof Interdisciplinary History 16 (Autumn):221-237. Ginsberg, B. (1982) The Consequencesof Consent: Elections, Citizen Control and PopularAcquiescence.Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley. continuum," in Hays, S. P. (1967) "Politicalpartiesand the community-society W. N. Chambersand W. D. Burnham(eds.) The AmericanParty System: Stages of Political Development. New York: Oxford University Press:
152-I8I.
Holcombe, A. N. (1924) The Political Partiesof Today:A Study in Republican and DemocraticPolitics. New York:Harper& Brothers. In Re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). Jackson, R. H. (1941) the Strugglefor JudicialSupremacy.New York:Knopf. Key, V. O., Jr. (1956) AmericanState Politics. New York:Knopf.

(I949) SouthernPolitics in State and Nation. New York:Knopf. Kleppner,P. (1982) Who Voted?New York:Praeger. Kousser, J. M. (1985) "Must historians regress? An answer to Lee Benson." CalTechSocial Science WorkingPaper 580 (August). (I974) The Shaping of Southern Politics: SuffrageRestrictionand the Establishmentof the One-PartySouth, I880-1910. New Haven:Yale University Press. Kuhn, T. J. (I962) The structureof Scientific Revolutions.Chicago University Press. Lenin, V. I. (I965) "The constituent assembly elections and the dictatorship of the proletariat," Collected Works. 30 Moscow: Progress Publishers: in
178-225.
Lerner,M. [ed.] (1943) The Mind and Faith of Justice Holmes. Boston: Little,
Brown: 390.
Lichtman, A. J. (1976) "Criticalelections theory and the reality of American

presidential politics, 1916-40." American Historical Review 81: 317-348.
Lipset, S. M. (I950) Agrarian Socialism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967) "Cleavagestructures,party systems, and voter alignments," S. M. Lipsetand S. Rokkan(eds.) PartySystemsand in Voter Alignments. New York:Free Press: 1-64. Lowi, T. J. (1964) "American business, public policy, case-studiesand political
theory, World Politics 16: 677-7I5.
in (I966) "Distribution,regulation,redistribution," R. B. Ripley (ed.) Public Policies and Their Politics. New York:Norton:27-40. Lynd, R. S. and H. Lynd (I929) Middletown:A Study in AmericanCulture. New York:HarcourtBrace. Martin, R. (1933) The People's Party in Texas. Austin: Universityof Texas Press. Macpherson,C. B. (1953) Democracy in Alberta. Toronto:Universityof Toronto Press. McCloskey, R. G. (1951) American Conservatismin the Age of Enterprise. Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress. Paul, A. M. (1960) ConservativeCrisis and the Rule of Law. Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress.
Phelps Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (I94I).
Pollock v. Farmers'Loan & TrustCompany,157 U.S. 429 (I895). Rehearing,158 U.S. 6oi (1895). Pressman, J. L. (1975) Federal Programsand City Politics: The Dynamics of the Aid Process in Oakland. Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress. Rokkan, S. (I970) Citizens, Elections,Parties. Philadelphia:David McKay. Rosenstone, S. J. and R. Wolfinger(1980) Who Votes?New Haven: Yale University Press. E. Schattschneider, E. (1956) "United States: The functionalapproachto party in government," S. Neuman(ed.) Modern Political Parties:Approachesto ComparativePolitics. Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press: 194-215. (I960) The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America. New York:Holt, Rinehartand Winston.
314
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Skowronek,S. (1982) The Buildingof the ModernAmericanState. New York: CambridgeUniversityPress. U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. III (1942).
Wiebe, R. P. (I969) The Searchfor Order,1877-1920. New York:Hill & Wang.

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Social Science History Association

PeriodizationSchemes and "Party Systems":The "Systemof I896" as a Case in Point

I. WASTHERE such thing as the "System of I896"-or ANY

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 265

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 267

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 269

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PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 271

jamin Ginsberg's (1982: esp. 123-142) massive content analysis of

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 273

so far as the "Systemof I896"is concerned,is integrallyrelatedto

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PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 275

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entire history of American capitalism in its rate of economic

was second only to the I960s in the

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 277

South, the decline was largely concentratedin a short period at

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PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 279

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PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 283

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SYSTEM BOUNDARIES AND SYSTEM CHANGES: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 285

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DISTRICTS WITHIN LIMIT

WITHINLIMIT OF PERCENTAGE CONGRESSIONALDISTRICTS

Pred Dem (%D

30 Predominantly Whig (%D by Dist.: 0-39.9)

I916 I920 I924

.606 .546 .877

.835 .798 .549

1932 1936 I940 1944 1948

.685 .598 .613 .758 .884

.606 .700 .763 .879 .813

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Variance Stand.Dev. 3.64

1.39 0.74 3.07

6.69 6.48 38.74

5.I4 45.09 57.70

3.7 3.8 5.3 4.9 3.9

9.I 4.3 7.4

7.1 II.4 II.O

** 1912: Based on Republicanand Progressive% of total vote.

*Basedon percentage of statesonly. Republican totalvote;non-southern

1976 I980 1984

8.7 5.5 IO.I

I0.0 7.6 I3.0

35-75 49.79 90. 2

5.98 7.06 9.49

*Based on percentage Republicanof total vote; non-southernstates only.

cerned, the system then acquires quite a lot of very long-term

PeriodizationSchemes and "PartySystems" 297

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New England Metro 47.3 49.3

Rest 45.9 50.9 E. N. Central Metro 48.8 49.4

37.5 57.7 38.0 54.9

4.009 4.283 3.780* 3.437*

5.681* -4.373 4.363** -2.294 1.752 3.606* -1.272 -2.535