Religion law in uk There are two main international documents relating to freedom of Religion Article 18 of the United Nations

Universal Declaration of Human Rights which is repeated almost word for word in Article 9(1) European Convention on Human Rights Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. The UN General Assembly has also adopted A Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief On the 12th April 2005 the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted a Resolution on the Defamation of Religion. which made specific reference to Islam and "expressed deep concern that Islam was frequently and wrongly associated with human rights violations and terrorism" Several countries (including Britain) voted against the Resolution because they objected to Defamation of Islam being specifically singled out for mention. The resolution however has no legal significance. There are other UN Documents relating to Religion In English Law it is Article 9 of the European Convention which is legally significant since the Convention is incorporated into English law by The Human Rights Act 1998. Article 9 has also been reinforced by Section 13 of that Act which says

If a court's determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the
exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the importance of that right. Several other Jurisdictions have various types of Blasphemy or Religious Vilification laws. The one that has aroused the most comment in Britain being the Religious Vilification Laws in Australia. The Blasphemy Law of Pakistan is also regarded as unusually draconian

Freedom of religion in uk - wiki The right to Freedom of religion in the United Kingdom is provided for in all three constituent legal systems, by devolved, national, European, and international law and treaty. Four constituent nations compose the United Kingdom, resulting in an inconsistent religious character, and there is no state church for the whole kingdom. The United Kingdom is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which provides in Article 9 a right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; and the policy of the British government is to support religious freedom. However, the issue of absolute religious freedom has become contentious with the onset of [1] the War on Terror.
Contents
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1 Legal provision

o o o

1.1 European Convention on Human Rights 1.2 Human Rights Act 1.3 United Nations General Assembly

2 History

o o o o o o

2.1 State churches 2.2 Monarchy 2.3 Blasphemy law 2.4 Adoption agencies 2.5 Education 2.6 Service provision

3 Footnotes

[edit]Legal

provision
Convention on Human Rights

[edit]European

The ECHR guarantees in Article 9 that subjects will have:

The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance[] The freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

[edit]Human

Rights Act

The ECHR is given binding weight in the United Kingdom by s. 1 ss. (1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), within which Article 9 (for the right to freedom of religion, etc.) of the ECHR is adopted as a "right and fundamental [2] freedom". The HRA gives further effect in UK law tothe rights for religious freedom afforded by the ECHR, and to make available in UK courts a remedy for breach of those Convention rights without the need to go to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. [edit]United

Nations General Assembly

In Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 2200A (XXI) on 16 December 1966, the UN resolved that:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee, a sub-body of the General Assembly, also resolved in General comment 22 on 30 July 1993 that the right to freedom of religion applies to unconventional or extra-institutional religions, as well as atheist or anti-clerical beliefs:
Article 18 [of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights] protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms belief and religion are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions.

[edit]History Due to the United Kingdom having been formed by the union of previously independent states from [3][4][5] 1707, most of the largest religious groups do not have UK-wide organisational structures. [edit]State

churches

The established (or state) church is not consistent between the territories of the United Kingdom. In England, the state church is the Church of England, and the Supreme Governor of the church is the British Monarch. In Scotland, the role of the Church of Scotland is formalised in law, primarily by the Church of Scotland Act 1921. [6] However, the law provides for the church as the national church, but not the state church. In Wales (with the exception of a few border parishes excepted from the Welsh Church Act 1914) or in Northern Ireland (under the Irish Church Act 1869). Establishment of the Church of England, however, does extends to the Isle of Man and to the Channel Islands. In the Church of England bishops and some clergy are appointed by processes involving the Monarchy and certain historic government departments (e.g. the Lord Chancellor's office) but the state plays no formal role in the appointment of other religious leaders. [edit]Monarchy The Act of Settlement 1701 decrees that the monarch of the United Kingdom "shall join in communion with the Church of England". This act was specifically designed to prevent a Catholic monarch from ascending to the throne, but in effect discriminates against all religions other than Protestantism. Members of the Royal family in line of succession who marry a Roman Catholic (though not adherents of other denominations or faiths) are excluded from the succession. [edit]Blasphemy

law

Main article: Blasphemy law in the United Kingdom The common law offence of blasphemy was repealed in 2008. The last person to be imprisoned for blasphemy in [7] the UK was John William Gott in 1922, for comparing Jesus Christ to aclown. The next blasphemy case was in 1976, when Mary Whitehouse brought a private prosecution (Whitehouse v. Lemon) against the editor of Gay News for blasphemous libel after he published a poem by James Kirkup called The Love That Dares Speak Its Name. Denis Lemon was given a nine month suspended sentence and a 500 fine for publishing the "most scurrilous profanity" which portrayed the sexual love of a Roman centurion for the body of Christ on the [8] cross. The sentence was upheld on appeal. In this appeal case, Lord Scarman held that the modern law of blasphemy was correctly formulated in Article 214 of Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, 9th edition (1950). This states as follows:

Every publication is said to be blasphemous which contains any contemptuous, reviling, scurrilous or ludicrous matter relating to God, Jesus Christ or the Bible, or the formularies of the Church of England as by law established. It is not blasphemous to speak or publish opinions hostile to the Christian religion, or to deny the existence of God, if the publication is couched in decent and temperate language. The test to be applied is as to the manner in which the doctrines are advocated and not to the substance of the doctrines themselves.

In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (case #19/1995/525/611) upheld a ban on Visions of Ecstasy, an [8] erotic video about a 16th century nun, based on the video infringing on the blasphemy law. The Court estimated that a limited ban on vulgar or obscene publications that would be offensive to believers, while keeping legal the criticism of religion, was compatible with the principles of a democratic society. On May 8, 2008 the offence of blasphemy was abolished. However, some acts that were once viewed as blasphemous may now be prosecutable under other legislation, such as thePublic Order Act 1986 as amended by [10] the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006. [edit]Adoption
[9]

agencies
[11]

The Equality Act 2006 is applied equally to religious-based and secular adoption agencies. The Catholic adoption agencies unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate a compromise that would include an exemption for religious-based agencies, which would have allowed them to continue to facilitate adoption for opposite-sex parents only. [edit]Education Several university student associations have implemented rules that require affiliated groups to allow "anybody, regardless of faith, ethnicity or sexuality, to sit on their ruling committees and to address their [12] meetings." However some Christian Unions say they should be allowed to require that their ruling committees share their beliefs. [edit]Service

provision

In May 2008, Lillian Ladele, a registrar from Islington, London, took her employer, Islington London Borough [13] Council, to the London Central Employment Tribunal, with the financial backing of the Christian Institute. Ladele had refused to conduct civil partnerships on religious grounds, and following complaints from other staff she was disciplined under the Council's Fairness for All policy. Ladele claimed she had been subject to direct and indirect [14] discrimination, and harassment in the workplace, on grounds of her religion. In July 2008, the tribunal found in [15] [16] Ladele's favour, however this ruling was overturned by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in December, 2008. In 2011 a judge ruling on a bed and breakfast refusing to accommodate unmarried couples found in favor of a gay couple under the Equality Act 2010 but allowed an appeal, commenting that the ruling: 'does affect the human rights of the defendants to manifest their religion'.

Fco.gov.uk

Freedom of religion
Freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief is guaranteed by many human rights treaties. Under the UNs International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), this freedom set out in Article 18 must be guaranteed even in times of public emergency. Freedom of religion or belief is far-reaching and profound. It encompasses not just the freedom to hold personal thoughts and convictions, but also being able to manifest them individually or with others, publicly or in private. It also includes the freedom to subscribe to different schools of thought within a religion, and to change ones religion or beliefs. It forbids discrimination against individuals who have, or wish to have, different beliefs. It prohibits the use of coercion to make someone hold or change their religion or belief. Promoting the right to freedom of religion or belief is important to achieving the UK's strategic objectives, especially in preventing and resolving conflict. The UK takes every opportunity to reaffirm its position and is committed to the elimination of all forms of discrimination, including those based on religion and belief. We are concerned about all individuals who are denied the right to freedom of religion or belief who face discrimination and persecution. We condemn all instances of violence and discrimination against individuals and groups because of their faith or belief, wherever they happen and whatever the religion of the individual or group concerned.

Law on freedom of 'religion or belief'

The Human Rights Act 1998 incorporates the Council of Europes Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law, including its guarantee of freedom of religion or belief: Article 9: Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion. 1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2. Freedom to manifest ones religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Article 9 of the ECHR has been tested in a number of court cases in Europe with the result that European law has moved in the direction of recognising a category of religion or belief, treated almost as a single category with 'belief' having a wide, but not vacuous, interpretation: As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, sceptics and the unconcerned. - Kokkinakis v Greece: (1994) 17 EHRR 397, para 31. The right to freedom of religion as guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such beliefs are legitimate. - Manoussakis v Greece: (1996), EHRR 387, para 47 'Belief' means more than just mere opinions or deeply held feelings; there must be a holding of spiritual or philosophical convictions which have an identifiable formal content. - McFeely v UK: (1981), 3 EHRR 161. beliefs . . . denotes a certain level of cogency seriousness cohesion and importance. - Campbell and Cosans v. UK: (1982), 4 EHRR 293 para 36. Humanism is a lifestance or worldview which meets the requirements set out in the above quotations: it is more than just mere opinions or deeply held feelings; it involves the holding of spiritual or philosophical convictions which have an identifiable formal content, and its tenets are cogent, serious, coherent and important. It is clear therefore that Humanism is a belief in terms of Article 9. Indeed this was taken for granted in one UK case: re Crawley Green Road Cemetery, Luton St Albans Consistory Court: December 2000.

These cases, then, have shown beyond doubt that Article 9 embraces not only religious beliefs but also non-religious beliefs such as Humanism. Thus we are able to base much of campaigning on firm human rights grounds, as shown by many items in this part of the website. Our approach is reinforced by Article 14 of the ECHR which requires that Convention rights and freedoms be secured without discrimination on any ground including religion etc, and section 6 of the Human Rights Act makes it unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. Moreover, section 3 of the Human Rights Act declares: So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way that is compatible with the Convention rights. The phrase religion or belief is also used in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice or teaching. This was glossed by the UN Human Rights Committee in General comment 22 (30/07/93): Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms belief and religion are to be broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The phrase has also been adopted in the European Union directive on religious and other discrimination in employment, for example in the Council directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000: The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment. This directive was given effect in the UK through the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.

Neutral Citation Number: [2010] EWCA Civ 59

Case No: C1/2009/1261

COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEENS BENCH DIVISION (ADMINISTRATIVE COURT) MR JUSTICE CRANSTON [2009]EWHC 978 (Admin)
Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL 10/02/2010

Before: MASTER OF THE ROLLS LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK and LORD JUSTICE ETHERTON ____________________ Between: THE QUEEN ON THE APPLICATION OF GHAI Appellant - and NEWCASTLE CITY COUNCIL & OTHERS -andSECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE Respondent -and-

Interested Party

(1) RAMGHARIA GURDWARA, HITCHIN First Intervener -and(2) ALICE BARKER WELFARE AND WILDLIFE TRUST -andSecond Intervener

Third (3) THE EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS Intervener

COMMISSION -and(4) THE HINDU MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION ____________________

Fourth Intervener

(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of WordWave International Limited A Merrill Communications Company 165 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2DY Tel No: 020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7404 1424 Official Shorthand Writers to the Court) ____________________ Mr Ramby de Mello and Mr Tony Muman (instructed by J M Wilson Solicitors) for the Appellant Mr John McGuinness QC (instructed by Newcastle City Council Legal Services) for the Respondent Mr Jonathan Swift and Ms Joanne Clement (instructed by Treasury Solicitors) for the Interested Party Mr Satvinder Juss (Pro Bono) for the First Intervener Mr Richard Drabble QC, Mr Eric Fripp and Mr Ellis Wilford (instructed by Simons Muirhead & Burton) for the Second Intervener Ms Helen Mountfield (instructed by The Equality & Human Rights Commission) for the Third Intervener Mr Adrian Berry (instructed by Wilson Barca Solicitors) (Pro Bono) for the Fourth Intervener (by written submissions only) Hearing date: 18 January 2009 ____________________ HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT

____________________ Crown Copyright The Master of the Rolls: 1. After he dies, Mr Davender Ghai wishes his body to be cremated in accordance with his religious beliefs as a Hindu. On 30 January 2006, he wrote to Councillor Arnold, the leader of Newcastle City Council ("the Council"), asking for "out-of-town land, some 10-12 miles from the city" to be "dedicated for traditional open air funeral pyres". Some two weeks later, Councillor Arnold replied, explaining that it was impossible for the Council to accede to the request in the light of the provisions of regulation 3 of the Cremation Regulations 1930 SR & O 1930/1016 ("the 1930 Regulations"), a view he reinforced with counsel's opinion which he subsequently sent to Mr Ghai. Mr Ghai then issued the instant proceedings for judicial review of the Council's refusal to give effect to his request. 2. The hearing before the Judge, Cranston J, proceeded (unsurprisingly in the light of the correspondence referred to above) on the assumption that the cremation desired by Mr Ghai would be in the open air, i.e. not within any structure. Subject to one argument (which was, realistically, not pursued on this appeal), it was accepted by Mr Ghai that such an open air cremation would have been precluded by the legislation relating to cremation, at least if interpreted without reference to section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Mr Ghai's primary case before the Judge was that, if this was the right interpretation of the legislation, there would be an impermissible interference with his right to manifest his religion or belief under Article 9 of the European Convention. Although the Judge accepted that Article 9 was engaged, he went on to hold that the interference was justified [2009] EWHC 978 (Admin). (Mr Ghai also relied on Article 8 and Article 14 of the Convention, but the Judge held that they were not engaged.) 3. That was not only the primary basis upon which the case proceeded below: it was also the primary basis upon which the skeleton arguments for this appeal were prepared. However, examination of the evidence, including further documents put in on behalf of Mr Ghai for the purpose of this appeal, suggested that his religious belief does not in fact require him to be cremated, after his death, on a pyre in the open air. As was confirmed by his counsel on the hearing of this appeal, Mr Ghai's religious belief would be satisfied if the cremation process took place within a structure, provided that the cremation was by traditional fire, rather than by using electricity, and sunlight could shine directly on his body while it was being cremated. An example of the type of structure which would be acceptable to him was

shown to us in the form of photographs of premises in Ceuta in Spanish Morocco ("the Ceuta premises"). That example was proffered by the Fourth Intervener for the first time on this appeal, but there were photographs of other examples in the evidence below. 4. In these circumstance, it appeared that there was an issue, which was logically anterior to those which have been debated and decided at first instance, namely whether, as had apparently been assumed on all sides until the hearing before us, the accommodation of Mr Ghai's wishes would in fact necessarily infringe the legislation relating to cremation. Accordingly, we decided to hear argument on that issue, on the basis that its resolution might render irrelevant all the other issues, interesting and important as they may be, which had been raised, and indeed decided, below. 5. Having heard oral submissions, we decided to rule on that issue, as it raised a relatively short point, whose resolution might avoid the need for any further argument. The burden of the submissions on the issue was taken on by Mr de Mello on behalf of Mr Ghai (supported by two of the interveners, the Equality and Human Rights Commission, through Ms Mountfield, and the Ramgharia Gurdwara Hitchin, through Mr Juss), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Mr Swift, on behalf of the Secretary of State, who joins the proceedings as an interested party (supported by Mr McGuinness QC for the Council). Mr Drabble QC, who is instructed by another intervener, understandably took no part in the argument. 6. Cremations in England and Wales are governed by the Cremation Act 1902 ("the Act"). The long title to the Act states that it is "[a]n Act for the regulation of the burning of Human Remains and to enable Burial authorities to establish crematoria". 7. Section 2 of the Act provides that in that Act: "The expression "crematorium" shall mean any building fitted with appliances for the purpose of burning human remains, and shall include everything incidental or ancillary thereto". Section 4 extends the powers of a burial authority to provide and maintain burial grounds or cemeteries to "the provision and maintenance of crematoria". Section 5 prohibits "the construction of a crematorium" within 200 yards of a dwelling house "except with the consent, in writing, of the owner", and within 50 yards of any public highway. Section 6 enables burial authorities to accept land "for the purpose of a crematorium", or "a donation for enabling them to acquire, construct or maintain a crematorium". 8. Section 7 of the Act provides that:

"The Secretary of State shall make regulations as to the maintenance and inspection of crematoria, and prescribing in what cases and in what conditions the burning of any human remains may take place, and directing the disposition or interment of the ashes, and prescribing the forms of the notices, certificates to be given or made before any such burning is permitted to take place". Section 8 renders it an offence to "contravene any such regulation" or "knowingly [to] carry out or procure or take part in the burning of any human remains except in accordance with such regulations and the provisions of this Act". Section 14 provided that "any provisions of any local and personal Act for the like purposes as this Act" should "cease to have effect" from the date on which regulations made under section 7 came into force. 9. The 1930 Regulations were the regulations made under section 7 of the Act in force until they were replaced with effect from 1 January 2009 by the current regulations, the Cremation (England and Wales) Regulations 2008, SI 2008/2841 ("the Regulations"). As the note to the Regulations records, there is little difference between the two sets of regulations, and there is no relevant difference, I think, for present purposes. Regulation 2(1) of the Regulations contains definitions including that of cremation, which is defined as "the burning of human remains". The centrally important provision for present purposes is regulation 13 which is headed "Place where cremation may take place", and is in these terms: "No cremation may take place except in a crematorium the opening of which has been notified to the Secretary of State". 10. The combined effect of the Act and the Regulations is, therefore, that a cremation can only lawfully take place in a structure (i) which is a "building", reading regulation 13 together with section 2, (ii) which has been constructed in a location which satisfies section 5, (iii) which is "fitted with appliances for the purpose of burning human remains", pursuant to section 2, and (iv) whose "opening has been notified to the Secretary of State", under regulation 13. (Whether the Act, on its own, excludes cremation outside a "crematorium" does not call for decision in this case, at any rate at this stage: on a strictly literal reading, there may be a case for saying that it does not, but a more purposive reading could well justify a different result). 11. Difficulties which may be thrown up by planning and public health legislation do not fall for consideration at this stage. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider whether any of the four requirements which I have extracted from the Act and the Regulations, construed in accordance with

normal principles of interpretation, would prevent Mr Ghai's wishes as to the cremation of his remains after his death being in due course accommodated. 12. As already indicated, whatever may have been assumed or stated to be the position below, Mr Ghai's beliefs would not require his body to be cremated in the open air, in the sense of requiring his remains not to be enclosed within a structure when they are burnt. There is no suggestion that he would have any difficulty in finding a site for his cremation which is more than 200 yards from any dwelling house and more than 50 yards from any highway. Further, Mr de Mello's answers to questions from Moore-Bick LJ established that Mr Ghai's beliefs would not prevent his remains being cremated on a grate, with a tray underneath to collect the ashes. There would obviously be no difficulty in notifying the Secretary of State once an appropriately located and fitted out building was constructed. Accordingly, it seems clear that giving effect to Mr Ghai's beliefs would not infringe three of the four requirements identified above. The only outstanding question on this issue is, therefore, whether a cremation which accords with Mr Ghai's beliefs could reasonably be achieved in a structure which is a "building" within the meaning of the Act. 13. The evidence before the Judge, as supplemented before us, enables one to identify the sort of structure within which Mr Ghai would be prepared to have his body cremated after his death. As already explained, any structure within which his cremation occurs will need to have a substantial aperture, or substantial apertures, which enable sunlight to fall directly on his body while it is being cremated by fire. It does not matter whether the sunlight shines more or less vertically (e.g. as in the case of a structure which, while wholly enclosed by walls, has no roof) or more laterally (e.g. as would apply to structure with a roof, which is supported by columns, rather than walls). 14. Hindu cremations are performed in the Ceuta premises, which are shown in seven photographs, which were produced by way of further evidence a few weeks before this appeal was due to start. The structure is rectangular, nearly square, and is wholly enclosed (apart from some solid gates) by four perimeter walls, which are some 2 metres high. Within this enclosure, there are a number of rectangular covered areas (some of which abut a perimeter wall), and some uncovered space. Each of the covered areas has a floor raised slightly above the adjoining uncovered areas, and a roof supported by columns on two opposite sides; the columns, and hence the roofs, of the covered areas extend somewhat higher than the perimeter walls. With the exception of two areas, the roof of each of the covered areas is a simple solid flat roof slab, which rests on the top of the columns. 15. Apart from having more sophisticated roofs, the two different areas both appear to be almost square, and both have columns, and hence roof slabs,

which are a little higher than those of the other covered areas. One of those two areas is over the main entrance to the structure: on top of the roof slab, it has a cupola, which has a base which is four-coloured on top and white above. The other area ("the cremation area") is where the cremations occur. Its roof slab is thicker because it has a superstructure, which is four-coloured at its base, and white above; in the centre of this roof slab is a substantial rectangular hole, which accounts for about half the area of the slab; the columns and floor of this area are somewhat more ornate than those of the other areas. All walls, columns, and roofs of the Ceuta premises appear to have been constructed of concrete, cement or bricks, with the walls and columns being rendered with plaster or the like. 16. The evidence before Cranston J included photographs or drawings of other structures in India within which Hindu cremations are performed. These were Devikund Sagar (Bikaner), Gaitor (Jaipur), Kota, Jaswant Thara, Jodhpur, Thiruvananthapuram (Kerala), Kancheepuram (Amritsar), and Patan. This evidence was far less detailed, as there was only one, relatively small, photograph of each structure. (There were also three other structures in evidence, each of which was shown in one tiny photograph.) 17. Almost all these structures in India appeared to be constructed of substantial material (stone, brick, rubble, breeze blocks or the like) and, in some cases, rendered. At least judging by their appearance, all these structures seem to be substantial in size, capable of holding twenty people or more, and very likely to have foundations of some sort. Most of these structures are sophisticated in their design, and impressive, even imposing, in style. Many of them are works of art, with much of the structure being expertly and intricately carved, while others are more workmanlike in their design. 18. While it could be dangerous to draw any conclusions for present purposes from any one of these photographs, I consider that, taken together, they provide a pretty clear indication of the sort of structure within which Hindu cremations can and do take place in India. They demonstrate that such cremations occur within a structure which is substantial in its extent, solid in its structure, and relatively permanent in nature. The structures all have a solid roof, supported on columns and without walls, although in many of the structures shown in the photographs the columns rest on plinths or low walls, and are connected by a low surrounding balustrade. 19. Before turning to the central question, it is right to mention that the reference to Hindu cremations in the above discussion may involve something of an over-simplification. As is clear from Cranston J's judgment, there may well be several different beliefs among Hindus as to what their religion requires when it comes to bodily cremation. What we are concerned with in this case is, of course, what Mr Ghai's belief involves when it comes to cremation,

and it matters not for present purposes whether it is a universal, orthodox or unusual belief for a Hindu. It would accord with his belief if, after his death, he was cremated in any of the structures shown in the photographs to which I have referred, including the cremation area in the Ceuta premises. 20. The reason I have referred in some detail to the structures shown in the photographs is that, as Mr Swift pointed out, Mr Ghai has not provided a drawing, plan, or model of a structure which he would wish to erect in which his remains can be cremated after he dies. Accordingly, in order to resolve the issue of whether his belief could be accommodated by a structure which is a "building" within the meaning of the Act, one has to refer to structures, such as the crematorium area in the Ceuta premises and the structures in India shown in the other photographs which I have mentioned, any of which he says would accommodate his beliefs. I now turn to consider that issue. 21. On behalf of the Secretary of State, Mr Swift contended that a structure could only be a "building" within the Act if it was "an inclosure of brick or stonework, covered in by a roof". This contention was supported by three arguments, namely (i) the view of Lord Esher MR in Moir v Williams [1892] 1 QB 264, 270 that this was "what is ordinarily called a building", (ii) the desirability of having a clear and simple meaning for the word, as breach of the Act would be a criminal offence, and (iii) the need to ensure that cremations could not be seen by the general public. I turn to consider those three arguments in turn. 22. The first argument is based on the normal meaning of the word "building". The meaning of the word "building", or, to put the point another way, determining whether a particular structure is a "building", must depend on the context in which the word is used. Interpreting a word in a statute or a contract, or indeed in any other document, can, of course, only be sensibly done by considering the context in which it is being used. However, where, as is the case here, the word is one which is used in ordinary language and has no established special legal or technical meaning, and is not defined in the document in question (in this case, the Act), one can usefully take as a starting point the word's ordinary meaning. In Moir [1892] 1 QB 264, 270, 271, and 273, Lord Esher MR, Fry LJ, and Lopes LJ approached the question of the interpretation of the word "building" in the Metropolitan Building Act 1855 by starting with its "ordinar[y]" meaning, its meaning in its "ordinary sense" and "popular usage", or its "ordinary and usual sense", and then considering its context. 23. In my view, Lord Esher's obiter statement in Moir [1892] 1 QB 264,270 that the "ordinar[y]" meaning of the noun "building" is "an inclosure of brick or stonework, covered in by a roof" can only be justified if it was intended to refer to the ordinary meaning of the word "building" in the context of the

statute in which it fell to be construed in the case before him. It is not without significance that there is nothing in the reasoned judgments of Fry LJ or Lopes LJ in Moir [1892] 1 QB 264 to support Lord Esher's statement. 24. Particularly as it appears that Lord Esher's statement as to the "ordinar[y]" meaning of the word "building" may be treated as some sort of authoritative guidance as to the normal meaning of the word, I take this opportunity to say that it would be wrong to see it as having any such effect. In my opinion, the word "building" in normal parlance is naturally used to describe a significantly wider range of structures than would be included within Lord Esher's "inclosure of brick or stonework, covered in by a roof". 25. There are many wooden or other structures not made of "brick or stonework", such as chalets, stables, or industrial sheds, and there are many structures which are not "inclosures", such as wood-drying stores, bandstands, or Dutch barns, all of which, on the basis of the normal use of the word, are "buildings". Other structures come easily to mind, such the Pyramids or the Colosseum, which are buildings in normal parlance, but do not fall within Lord Esher's "ordinar[y]" meaning. So, too, at least some prefabricated structures, particularly if attached to a concrete, or similar, base, are naturally described as buildings. 26. Deciding what a word means in a particular context can often be an iterative process, and the ultimate decision should not be affected by whether one starts with a prima facie assumption as to the meaning of the word and then looks at the context, or one starts by looking at the context and then turns to the word. However, if one approaches the issue by making a preliminary assumption as to the meaning of a word such as "building", then, in agreement with what Etherton LJ said in argument, I do not think that it would be right to take a somewhat artificially narrow meaning of the word, and then see whether the context justifies a more expansive meaning. It is more appropriate to take its more natural, wider, meaning, and then consider whether, and if so to what extent, that meaning is cut down by the context in which the word is used. 27. As to Mr Swift's second argument, the fact that breach of the Act can lead to prosecution, if relevant at all for present purposes, would seem to me to support a wide, rather than a narrow, meaning for the word "building". After all, the traditional approach is that, where a statute creates an offence, the court should lean in favour of an interpretation which absolves the alleged offender. Having said that, I do not think that this is a case where any assistance is to be derived from the fact that breach of the Act is an offence: the definition of "crematorium" is scarcely central to the nature of the offence, and the offence itself is relatively minor.

28. I turn to Mr Swift's third argument, namely that the purpose of the Act was to prevent the public seeing the cremation. I accept that the passing of that Act may well have been triggered by the direction given by Stephen J to the jury in R v Price (1884) 12 QBD 247. In that case, a jury was directed to acquit the defendant, who was accused of burning the body of his son (who had died of natural causes) in a field, on the ground that burning a body did not constitute an offence, unless it amounted to a public nuisance in common law. In the course of his learned and interesting discussion, at (1884) 12 QBD 247, 254, Stephen J, referring impliedly to cremations, said that not "every practice which startles and jars upon the religious sentiments of the majority of the population is for that reason a misdemeanour at common law". This appears to have led to the Disposal of the Dead (Regulations) Bill 1884, which, although it received a second reading in the House of Commons, was never enacted. One of the 1884 Bill's two purposes was to prohibit public cremations, on the ground that they were contrary to "public decorum and decency"; (the other purpose was to prevent the concealment of crimes of violence). After further attempts to introduce such a Bill, the Act was successfully passed into law. 29. I do not consider that the decision in Price (1884) 12 QBD 247 and the purpose of the 1884 Bill are enough to establish that one of the purposes of the Act was to ensure that cremations were performed so as to be invisible to the public. If prohibiting publicly visible cremations was intended by the legislature, one would have expected to find some statement or provision to that effect, and it would have been only too easy to say so, either in the long title to the Act or by so providing in one of its provisions, especially as that aspect, or a point close to it, had been raised by the 1884 Bill. Section 5 directly addresses the issue of the proximity of cremations to dwellings and highways, and, if it was intended to address the issue of the privacy of a cremation (rather than public health or privacy of residents and risk of congestion), it represents the limit of the protection the legislature thought it right to provide. 30. The only material produced to the court which directly demonstrates the purpose of the Act is in the speech of Lord Monkswell when introducing the Bill, which in due course became the Act, in the House of Lords in 1902 (HL Deb 27 January 1902, v 101, c 904). Assuming that that speech can be referred to for the purpose of identifying the purpose of the Act, or "the mischief" which it was directed to curing, it does not contain anything to support Mr Swift's third point. On the second reading of the Bill, having said that its purpose was as set out in its long title, Lord Monkswell explained that "there ha[d] been many private Acts passed for this purpose", and that "the time ha[d] now come when the question of cremation ought to be under the general law and under uniform rules". He then summarised briefly the various clauses of the Bill, and explained that it was similar to one

introduced the previous year, with the addition of new provisions (including what is now section 9). Lord Monkswell said much the same thing on the second reading of that earlier Bill (HL Deb 7 March 1901, v 90, c 768). 31. Even if one of the Act's purposes was to ensure that cremations were performed away from public view, I do not consider that that would be enough to justify giving the word "building" the narrow meaning for which Mr Swift contends. It would be perfectly possible to carry out a cremation away from public gaze in a building with substantial openings in the walls. Further, rather than intending to give the word "building" an artificially narrow meaning, it seems to me that it is much more likely that the legislature would have anticipated the visibility of a cremation being dealt with in regulations made pursuant to section 7 of the Act. In any event, I am very doubtful about the legal propriety of the court implying a specific requirement, such as precluding public visibility, into the Act, when it is not expressed, and Parliament could easily have spelt it out if it had thought it right to do so. In some cases, such a course may be appropriate, but only when the implication is obvious or (which may be a subset of obviousness) when the statute concerned cannot achieve its stated aim, or will not work effectively, without the implication. This is plainly not such a case. 32. I turn now to what appears to me to be the proper approach to the issue of whether the sort of structure, in which Mr Ghai wishes his remains to be cremated in due course, would be a "building" within the meaning of section 2 of the Act. 33. In that connection, I consider that the proper characterisation of the issue is not so much the somewhat abstract question as to what is meant by a "building" in the section; rather it is the more specific question whether a structure acceptable to Mr Ghai would be a "building" within the section. At least in general, it appears to me that, both in principle and in practice, it is inappropriate for the court to seek to define a word or expression used in a statute, where the legislature has not done so. It would virtually be a judicial encroachment onto the legislative function. Judicial guidance on such an issue, through the court's reasoning in a case where the meaning of a word is in issue, is inevitable, and, it is to be hoped, helpful. But a conscious and unneccessary definition of the word by the court is another matter. Judicial observations are made in the context of the facts of the particular case, and any attempt by the judge to provide a general definition of such a word in a statute will often lead to problems, as cases may well arise in the future with facts which are very different or unanticipated in nature, where the earlier definition would lead to difficulties. 34. In order to answer the issue to be determined on this appeal, it is right to consider what assistance can be got from the Act. At least for present

purposes, the relevant aims of the Act, which can be gathered from its provisions, were to ensure that cremations were subject to uniform rules throughout the country, to enable the Secretary of State to regulate the manner and places in which cremations were carried out, to require a crematorium to be a building which was appropriately equipped, and to ensure that a crematorium was not located near homes or roads. The Act also envisaged that crematoria would be "constructed". These facets of the Act suggest to me that, provided it is relatively permanent and substantial, so that it can properly be said to have been "constructed", and provided it could normally be so described, a structure will be a "building" within the Act. 35. In the light of these factors, I consider that there is no reason not to give the word "building" its natural and relatively wide meaning in section 2 of the Act, as discussed in paragraphs 21 to 26 above. The fact that the noun which one might primarily use, in ordinary conversation, to describe some of the structures mentioned in paragraph 25 above would not be a "building" is nothing to the point. The primary way most people would describe the structure in which they live would be a house or a block of flats, but that does not mean that a house or a block of flats is not, in ordinary language, a building. 36. There have, predictably, been many cases which have required the courts to consider the meaning of the noun "building", but the outcome has inevitably been governed by the context. Nonetheless, it is not without interest to note that in this court a reasonably substantial barbeque has been held to be a "building" in the context of a restrictive covenant: see Windsor Hotel (Newquay) Ltd v Allan (The Times, 2 July 1980). It is also perhaps worth mentioning that the contention that the noun "building" in section 10 of the Open Spaces Act 1906 should be restricted in the way that Mr Swift suggests was rejected in In re St Luke's Chelsea [1976] Fam 295, 312D. 37. Accordingly, the wording of the Act does not detract from adopting the natural and relatively broad meaning of "building" in section 2. The references to crematoria being "constructed" in sections 5 and 6, and the reference to a donation of land in section 6, tend to suggest that to be a "building" within section 2, a structure must be (at the risk of an oxymoron) relatively permanent and substantial. This may remove some structures from the ambit of the word as used in the Act, but I doubt those aspects take the matter any further: if a structure is not relatively permanent and cannot be described as "constructed", it would not, I think, ordinarily be described as a "building". 38. This conclusion is supported by other factors. Thus, in the light of the wide regulatory powers given to the Secretary of State by section 7, there is no need to give a restricted meaning to the word "building" in the Act: if it was

considered that, for one reason or another, the type of structure in which cremations could occur should be restricted, that could be achieved by regulations made pursuant to section 7. Further, where Parliament wanted to impose restrictions on crematoria (as it did in sections 2 and 5, with regard to fitting out and location), it spelt them out. Additionally, given that cremating bodies was known to be lawful as at 1902, it appears to me that one should lean in favour of a construction which gives a statute, introduced primarily to regularise, and ensure uniformity in, cremations, a generous, rather than a restricted, effect. (Quite apart from this, if, as I prefer to leave open, the Act does not preclude open air cremations, there would be a further reason for adopting a natural and wide definition of "building" for present purposes.) 39. In these circumstances, I have come to the conclusion that Mr Ghai's wishes as to how, after his death, his remains are to be cremated can be accommodated under the Act and the Regulations. This is because the various structures I have described in paragraphs 14 to 18 above, namely the cremation area in the Ceuta premises and the various structures in India, are "building[s]" within section 2 of the Act. They are buildings in the ordinary sense of the word, and they are substantial and effectively permanent structures. There is nothing in the Act, or in any external material which can be taken into account when construing the Act, to support the notion that the word is not to be given its ordinary meaning in section 2. 40. The consequences of this conclusion may well be that it is unnecessary to consider any further substantive issues in this case, including any of the issues decided by Cranston J. However, as indicated at the end of the hearing, the parties should now have an opportunity to agree as to the future conduct of this appeal, or, if they cannot agree, to make submissions on that matter, initially, at any rate, in writing. Lord Justice Moore-Bick: 41. I agree. Lord Justice Etherton: 42. I also agree.

Freedom of religion is a principle that supports the freedom of an individual or community, in public or private, to manifest religion or beliefin teaching, practice, worship, and observance; the concept is generally recognized also [1] to include the freedom to change religion or not to follow any religion. The freedom to leave or discontinue membership in a religion or religious group in religious terms called "apostasy" is also a fundamental part of [2] religious freedom, covered by Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Freedom of religion is considered by many people and nations to be a fundamental human right.
[3][4]

In a country with a state religion, freedom of religion is generally considered to mean that the government permits religious practices of other sects besides the state religion, and does not persecute believers in other faiths

History
Historically freedom of religion has been used to refer to the tolerance of different theological systems of belief, while freedom of worship has been defined as freedom of individual action. Each of these have existed to varying degrees. While many countries have accepted some form of religious freedom, this has also often been limited in practice through punitive taxation, repressive social legislation, and political disenfranchisement. Compare examples of individual freedom in Italy or the Muslim tradition of dhimmis, literally "protected individuals" professing an officially tolerated non-Muslim religion. In Antiquity a syncretic point-of-view often allowed communities of traders to operate under their own customs. When street mobs of separate quarters clashed in a Hellenistic or Roman city, the issue was generally perceived to be an infringement of community rights. Cyrus the Great established the Achaemenid Empire ca. 550 BC, and initiated a general policy of permitting [5][6] religious freedom throughout the empire, documenting this on the Cyrus Cylinder. Some of the historical exceptions have been in regions where one of the revealed religions has been in a position of power: Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity and Islam. Others have been where the established order has felt threatened, as shown in the trial of Socrates in 399 BC or where the ruler has been deified, as in Rome, and refusal to offer token sacrifice was similar to refusing to take an oath of allegiance. This was the core for resentment and thepersecution of early Christian communities. Freedom of religious worship was established in the Buddhist Maurya Empire of ancient India by Asoka the Great in the 3rd century BC, which was encapsulated in the Edicts of Ashoka. Greek-Jewish clashes at Cyrene in 73 AD and 117 AD and in Alexandria in 115 AD provide examples of cosmopolitan cities as scenes of tumult.

Middle East Following a period of fighting lasting around a hundred years before 620 AD which mainly involved Arab and Jewish inhabitants of Medina (then known as Yathrib), religious freedom for Muslims, Jews and pagans was declared by Muhammad in the Constitution of Medina. The Islamic Caliphate later guaranteed religious freedom under the conditions that nonMuslim communities accept dhimmi (protected) status and their adult males pay the jizyatax as a substitute for the zakat paid by Muslim citizens. Jews and Christians were alternately toleratedand persecuted, the most notable examples of the latter being the conquest of Islamic Spain by fundamentalist groups from north Africa (the Almoravids, followed by the Almohads from the mid-12th century). Persecution of non-Muslims caused the emigration of many Jews (and Christians) into the northern, Christian states.[7]

Religious pluralism existed in classical Islamic ethics and Sharia law, as the religious laws and courts of other religions, including Christianity, Judaismand Hinduism, were usually accommodated within the Islamic legal framework, as seen in the early Caliphate, AlAndalus, Indian subcontinent, and the Ottoman Millet system.[8][9] In medieval Islamic societies, the qadi (Islamic judges) usually could not interfere in the matters of non-Muslims unless the parties voluntarily choose to be judged according to Islamic law, thus the dhimmi communities living in Islamic states usually had their own laws independent from the Sharia law, such as the Jews who would have their own Halakha courts.[10] Dhimmis were allowed to operate their own courts following their own legal systems in cases that did not involve other religious groups, or capital offences or threats to public order.[11]Non-Muslims were allowed to engage in religious practices that was usually forbidden by Islamic law, such as the consumption of alcohol and pork, as well as religious practices which Muslims found repugnant, such as the Zoroastrian practice of incestuous "self-marriage" where a man could marry his mother, sister or daughter. According to the famous Islamic legal scholar Ibn Qayyim (12921350), non-Muslims had the right to engage in such religious practices even if it offended Muslims, under the conditions that such cases not be presented to Islamic Sharia courts and that these religious minorities believed that the practice in question is permissible according to their religion.[12][verification needed]
[edit]

India
Religious freedom and the right to worship freely were practices that had been appreciated and promoted by most ancient Indian dynasties. As a result, people fleeing religious persecution in other parts of the world including [13][14][15] Christians, Jews, Bah'i and Zoroastrians fled to India as a place of refuge to enjoy religious freedom. This had been the underlying attitude of most rulers of India from time immemorial. Ancient Jews fleeing from persecution in their homeland 2,500 years ago settled in India and never faced anti[16] Semitism. Freedom of religion edicts have been found written duringAshoka the Great's reign in the 3rd century BC. Freedom to practise, preach and propagate any religion is a constitutional right in Modern India. Most major religious festivals of the main communities are included in the list of national holidays. India is an 80% Hindu country, yet its prime minister is a Sikh (Manmohan Singh), the chairperson of the ruling alliance is a Catholic woman of Italian birth (Sonia Gandhi), and three out of the twelve presidents of India have been Muslims. Further, the current Chief Election Commissioner of India is a Muslim,as are many successful Indians including film stars,artists,religious scholars,industrialists etc. Still, though some argue that India's [17] predominant religion, Hinduism, has long been among the most tolerant of religions, others assert that tolerance only appeared in India with the emergence of the modern Republic of India as a secular nation in [18] 1947. The Dalai Lama, the Tibetan leader in exile said that religious tolerance of Aryabhoomi, a reference to India found in Mahabharata, has been in existence in this country from thousands of years. Not only Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism which are the native religions but also Christianity and Islam have flourished here. [19] Religious tolerance is inherent in Indian tradition, Dalai Lama said.

Freedom of religion in the Indian subcontinent is exemplified by the reign of King Piyadasi (304 BC to 232 BC) (Asoka). One of King Asoka's main concerns was to reform governmental institutes and exercise moral principles in his attempt to create a just and humane society. Later he promoted the principles of Buddhism, and the creation of a just, understanding and fair society was held as an important principle for many ancient rulers of this time in the East. The importance of freedom of worship in India was encapsulated in an inscription of Asoka:
King Piyadasi (Ashok) dear to the Gods, honours all sects, the ascetics (hermits) or those who dwell at home, he honours them with charity and in other ways. But the King, dear to the Gods, attributes less importance to this charity and these honours than to the vow of seeing the reign of virtues, which constitutes the essential part of them. For all these virtues there is a common source, modesty of speech. That is to say, one must not exalt ones creed discrediting all others, nor must one degrade these others without legitimate reasons. One must, on the contrary, render to other creeds the honour befitting them.

The initial entry of Islam into South Asia came in the first century after the death of the Islamic Prophet Muhammad. When around 1210 AD the Islamic Sultanates invaded India from the north-west, gradually the principle of freedom of religion deteriorated in this part of the world. They were subsequently replaced by another Islamic invader in the form of Babur. The Mughalempire was founded by the Mongol leader Babur in 1526, when he defeated Ibrahim Lodi, the last of the Delhi Sultans at the First Battle of Panipat. The word "Mughal" is the Indo-Iranian version of Mongol. On the main Asian continent, the Mongols were tolerant of religions. People could worship as they wished freely and openly, though the formation of 2 nations i.e. Pakistan and Bangladesh has been on basis of religious intolerance. After arrival of Europeans, Christians in zeal to convert local as per belief in conversion as service of God, have also been seen to fall into frivolous methods since their arrival. Though by and large there are hardly any reports of law and order disturbance from mobs with Christian beliefs except perhaps in the north eastern region of [20] India. The rise of the BJP political party and the emergence of Hindu nationalism have been accompanied by the repression of Christianity and in some cases assaults on Christians and their institutions. The worst of these happened in August 2008 when 4,640 houses and 252 churches were torched in Kandhamal. 54,000 people were made homeless by the violence. Attacks continue and in November 2010 Hindutva extremists atacked Christian homes in Peliguda, Kenduguda and Telarai villages in Orissa state: Christians say they were attacked for refusing [21][18] to contribute to the local Durga Puja celebrations. Freedom of religion in contemporary India is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 25 of the nation's constitution. Accordingly every citizen of India has a [22] right to profess, practice and propagate their religions peacefully. Vishwa Hindu Parishad counters this argument by saying that evangelicalChristians are forcefully (or through money) converting rural, illiterate populations and they are only trying to stop this. In September 2010, Indian state Kerala's State Election Commissioner announced that "Religious heads cannot [23] issue calls to vote for members of a particular community or to defeat the nonbelievers". The Catholic Church comprising Latin, Syro-Malabar and Syro-Malankara rites used to give clear directions to the faithful on exercising their franchise during elections through pastoral letters issued by bishops or council of bishops. The pastoral letter [23] issued by Kerala Catholic Bishops Council (KCBC) on the eve of the poll urged the faithful to shun atheists. Even today, most Indians celebrate all religious festivals with equal enthusiasm and respect. Hindu festivals like Deepavali and Holi, Muslim festivals like Mahanabi Jayanti, Christian festivals like Christmas and other festivals like Buddha Purnima, Mahavir Jayanti, Gur Purab etc. are celebrated and enjoyed by all Indians.

Europe
[edit]Religious intolerance The Roman Catholic Church kept a tight rein on religious expression throughout the Middle Ages, basing its principles on the Bible and on the Gospel. Jews were alternately tolerated and persecuted, the most notable examples of the latter being the expulsion of all Jews from Spain in 1492. Some of those who remained and converted were tried as heretics in theInquisition for allegedly practicing Judaism in secret. Despite the persecution of Jews, they were the most tolerated non-Catholic faith in Europe. However, the latter was in part a reaction to the growing movement that became the Reformation. As early as 1380, John Wycliffe in England denied transubstantiation and began his translation of the Bible into English. He was condemned in a Papal Bull in 1410, and all his books were burned. In 1414 Jan Hus, a Bohemian preacher of reformation, was given a safe conduct by the Holy Roman Emperor to attend the Council of Constance. Not entirely trusting in his safety, he made his will before he left. His forebodings proved accurate, and he was burned at the stake on 6 July 1415. The Council also decreed that Wycliffe's remains be disinterred and cast out. This decree was not carried out until 1429. After the fall of the city of Granada Spain in 1492 the Muslim population was promised religious freedom by the Treaty of Granada, but that promise was short-lived. In 1501 Granada's Muslims were given an ultimatum to either convert to Christianity or to emigrate. The majority converted, but only superficially, continuing to dress and speak as they had before and to secretly practice Islam. The Moriscos (converts to Christianity) were ultimately expelled from Spain between 1609 (Castile) and 1614 (rest of Spain), by Philip III. Martin Luther published his famous 95 Theses in Wittenberg on 31 October 1517. His major aim was theological, summed up in the three basic dogmas of Protestantism: The Bible only is infallible Every Christian can interpret it Human sins are so wrongful that no deed or merit, only God's grace, can lead to salute. In consequence, Luther hoped to stop the sale of indulgences and to reform the Church from within, but this could not succeed, as his doctrine meant the end of the clergy and of the Pope. In 1521 he was given the chance to recant at the Diet of Worms before Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor, then only 19. After he refused to recant he was declared heretic. Partly for his own protection, he was sequestered on theWartburg in the possessions of Frederick III, Elector of Saxony, where he translated the New Testament into German. He was excommunicated by Papal Bull in 1521. The Protestant movement, however, continued to gain ground in his absence and spread to Switzerland. Huldrych Zwingli preached reform in Zrich from 1520 to 1523. He opposed the sale of indulgences, celibacy, pilgrimages, pictures, statues, relics, altars, and organs. This culminated in outright war between the Swiss cantons that accepted Protestantism and the Catholics. The Catholics were victorious, and Zwingli was killed in battle in 1531. The Catholic cantons were magnanimous in victory. Meanwhile, Luther's idea had been interpreted radically by the leaders of the German Peasants' War, and Luther himself assisted the German princes in slaughtering these revolutionaries. The defiance of Papal authority proved contagious, and in 1533, when Henry VIII of England was excommunicated for his divorce and remarriage to Anne Boleyn, he promptly established a state church with bishops appointed by the crown. This was not without internal opposition, and Thomas More, who had been his Lord Chancellor, was executed in 1535 for opposition to Henry. In 1535 the Swiss canton of Geneva became Protestant. In 1536 the Bernese imposed the reformation on the canton of Vaud by conquest. They sacked the cathedral in Lausanne and destroyed all its art and statuary. John Calvin, who had been active in Geneva was expelled in 1538 in a power struggle, but he was invited back in 1540. The same kind of seesaw back and forth between Protestantism and Catholicism was evident in England when Mary I of England returned that country briefly to the Catholic fold in 1553 and persecuted Protestants. However, her half-sister, Elizabeth I of England was to restore the Church of England in 1558, this time permanently, and began to persecute Catholics again. The King James Bible commissioned by King James I of England and published in 1611 proved a landmark for Protestant worship, with official Catholic forms of worship being banned.

In France, although peace was made between Protestants and Catholics at the Treaty of Saint Germain in 1570, persecution continued, most notably in the Massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day on 24 August 1572, in which thousands of Protestants throughout France were killed. A few years before, at the "Michelade" of Nmes in 1567, Protestants had massacred the local Catholic clergy

Early steps and attempts in the way of tolerance

The Norman Kingdom of Sicily under Roger II was characterized by its multi-ethnic nature and religious tolerance. [24][25] Normans, Jews, Muslim Arabs, Byzantine Greeks, Lombards and "native" Sicilians lived in harmony. Rather than exterminate the Muslims of Sicily, Roger II's grandson Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen (12151250) allowed them to settle on the mainland and build mosques. Not least, he enlisted them in his Christian army [26] and even into his personal bodyguards. Bohemia (present-day Czech Republic) enjoyed religious freedom between 1436 and 1520, and became one of the most liberal countries of the Christian world during that period of time. The so-called Basel Compacts of 1436 declared the freedom of religion and peace between Catholics and Utraquists. In 1609 Emperor Rudolf II granted Bohemia greater religious liberty with his Letter of Majesty. The privileged position of the Catholic Church in the Czech kingdom was firmly established after the Battle of White Mountain in 1620. Gradually freedom of religion in Bohemian lands came to an end and Protestants fled or were expelled from the country. A devout Catholic, Emperor Ferdinand II forcibly converted Austrian and Bohemian Protestants. In the meantime, in Germany Philip Melanchthon drafted the Augsburg Confession as a common confession for the Lutherans and the free territories. It was presented to Charles V in 1530. In the Holy Roman Empire, Charles V agreed to tolerate Lutheranism in 1555 at the Peace of Augsburg. Each state was to take the religion of its prince, but within those states, there was not necessarily religious tolerance. Citizens of other faiths could relocate to a more hospitable environment. In France, from the 1550s, many attempts to reconcile Catholics and Protestants and to establish tolerance failed because the State was too weak to enforce them. It took the victory of the converted Protestant prince Henry IV of France, and his accession to the throne, to impose religious tolerance formalized in the Edict of Nantes in 1598. It would remain in force for over 80 years until its revocation in 1685 by Louis XIV of France. Intolerance remained the norm until Louis XVI, who signed the Edict of Versailles (1787), then the constitutional text of 24 December 1789, granting civilian rights to Protestants. The French Revolution then abolished state religion and confiscated all Church property, turning intolerance against Catholics. [edit]Early laws and legal guarantees for religious freedom In 1558 the Transylvanian Diet of Turda declared free practice of both the Catholic and Lutheran religions, but prohibited Calvinism. Ten years later, in 1568, the Diet extended the freedom to all religions, declaring that "It is not allowed to anybody to intimidate anybody with captivity or expelling for his religion". However it was more than a religious tolerance, it declared the equality of the religions. The emergence in social hierarchy wasn't depend on the religion of the person thus Transylvania had also Catholic and Protestant monarchs (Princes). The lack of state religion was very unique for centuries in Europe. Therefore the Edict of Turda is considered by mostly Hungarian historians as the first legal guarantee of religious freedom in the Christian Europe. In the Union of Utrecht (20 January 1579) personal freedom of religion was declared in the struggle between the Northern Netherlands and Spain. The Union of Utrecht was an important step in the establishment of the Dutch Republic (from 1581 to 1795). The establishment of a Jewish community in the Netherlands and New Amsterdam (present-day New York) during the Dutch republic is an example of the freedom of religion. When New Amsterdam surrendered to the English in 1664, the freedom of religion was guaranteed in the Articles of Capitulation. Intolerance of dissident forms of Protestantism also continued, as evidenced by the exodus of the Pilgrims who sought refuge, first in the Netherlands, and ultimately in America, founding the Plymouth

Colony in Massachusetts in 1620. William Penn, the founder of Philadelphia, was involved in a case which had a profound effect upon future American law and those of England. In a classic case of jury nullification the jury refused to convict William Penn of preaching a Quaker sermon, which was illegal. Even though the jury was imprisoned for their acquittal, they stood by their decision and helped establish the freedom of religion. Contrary to a common belief, Protestantism did not mean more freedom of religion. Wherever Protestants took power, they persecuted and eliminated Catholics. In early modern Europe, lasting cases of religious tolerance could be found only in parts of the Austrian empire, in France after the Edict of Nantes, and in Poland.

Poland Poland has a long tradition of religious freedom. The right to worship freely was a basic right given to all inhabitants of the Commonwealth throughout the 15th and early 16th century, however, complete freedom of religion was officially recognized in Poland in 1573 during the Warsaw Confederation. Poland kept religious [27] freedom laws during an era when religious persecution was an everyday occurrence in the rest of Europe. The General Charter of Jewish Liberties known as the Statute of Kalisz was issued by the Duke of Greater Poland Boleslaus the Piouson 8 September 1264 in Kalisz. The statute served as the basis for the legal position of Jews in Poland and led to creation of theYiddish-speaking autonomous Jewish nation until 1795. The statute granted exclusive jurisdiction of Jewish courts over Jewish matters and established a separate tribunal for matters involving Christians and Jews. Additionally, it guaranteed personal liberties and safety for Jews including freedom of religion, travel, and trade. The statute was ratified by subsequent Polish Kings: Casimir III of Poland in 1334,Casimir IV of Poland in 1453 and Sigismund I of Poland in 1539. The Commonwealth set a precedent by allowing Jews to become ennobled.

UK Parliamentary seminar examines religious freedom

LONDON Although recognized as a fundamental human right by nearly every nation, the freedom of religion or belief is woefully under-enforced by many governments and deserves more attention, said participants at a recent Parliamentary seminar here. Held 24 July 2006 and sponsored by the All Party Parliamentary Friends of the Bahs and the Bah community of the United Kingdom, the two-hour seminar featured a discussion by three human rights experts on the topic of freedom of religion or belief. The persecution of religious believers is shamefully widespread, said Kevin Boyle, a professor at the Human Rights Centre of Essex University, the first panellist. The problem exists despite a strong international legal framework for the right to freedom of religion or belief, as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, explained Prof. Boyle. There is no dispute in international law as to what rights are recognized, said Prof. Boyle. The problems lie with the failure of states to live by international standards. Nations have a positive duty to protect diversity of belief and to remain neutral regarding diverse beliefs, Prof. Boyle added. If one faith has a privileged position, however, it is hard for that state to promote religious equality, he said. Nevertheless, state neutrality on religion need not equate to secularism. The right to freedom of religion and belief cannot be seen in isolation, Professor Boyle concluded. It has to be seen in tandem with other rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a democratic culture. Panellist Samantha Knights said one of the most difficult areas for states to uphold freedom of religion or belief is when religious practices conflict with the wider culture. A barrister at Matrix Chambers, a London law firm, Ms. Knights has studied and worked on cases of freedom of religion or belief in the United Kingdom and the United States. Ms. Knights said the case of high school student Shabina Begum, who claimed she had the right to wear the jilbab [full Islamic dress for women] at school, illustrates the complexity in this area. Were her rights interfered with or was she just inconvenienced, asked Ms. Knights, noting that such questions are extremely difficult for the courts to decide. When faced with issues of freedom of religion, courts need to ask if practices or beliefs are necessary to a religion or merely incidental, said Ms. Knights, saying that there is a need to balance the rights of individuals and the need to protect others. Nazila Ghanea, the third panellist, said freedom of religion or belief is insufficiently protected in part because it has become divorced from other human rights in mainstream thinking. Dr. Ghanea, a specialist in human rights at the University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies who has recently been appointed to a post at the University of Oxford, said when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, the right

to freedom of religion or belief as spelled out in Article 18 was held to be equal with the other rights in the Declaration. Over time, however, the international system has shifted its focus to questions relating to race, torture, and other rights. There has been a divorce whereby the right to freedom of religion and belief has been separated from protection for minorities defined by race, language, etc., said Dr. Ghanea, who is a Bah. Part of the problem, she suggested, is that upholding religious freedom can be a problem for states that have a patrimonial system that favors one particular religion. Protection for religious freedom needs to be understood as a right that is for everyone, said Dr. Ghanea. This is currently lacking and contrasts with, for example, the provisions against torture, which are recognized as universal. The discussion topic was introduced by Member of Parliament Ian Stewart, who said that the aim of the seminar was to promote freedom of religion or belief as a matter of principle. This event is not about the Bahs, but about the challenges we all share and these are not the property of any one group, said MP Stewart. In attendance were representatives of a wide variety of organizations, including the Minority Rights Group, Forum 18, Three Faiths Forum, the Jain Samaj and the British Humanist Association, as well as the Bah community of the United Kingdom and Members of Parliament. The seminar was followed by an animated discussion involving many members of the audience. The success of this event confirms our belief that the time is ripe for a debate in civil society about this area of human rights, said Barney Leith, Secretary for External Affairs of the Bah community of the UK.