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The U.S. must use its diplomatic capital to prevent conflict between India and Pakistan. Zarate 2/20/11 (Juan C. a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009. An alarming South Asia powder keg, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html) <In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration between nuclear-armed historic rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches' brew of terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001 and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader, more devastating conflict. The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. >

Diplomatic capital and pressure on the Pakistani government is key to calming tensions and solving the the terrorist threat in the region. Zarate 2/20/11 (Juan C. a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was deputy assistant to the president and
deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009. An alarming South Asia powder keg, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html)

<So what can the United States do to ratchet down tensions? We need to build trust, confidence and consistent lines of communications between India and Pakistan. This begins by helping both parties pave the way for a constructive dialogue on the status of Kashmir. Steps toward progress would include pushing for real accountability of figures responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks and the handing over of wanted Lashkar-i-Taiba facilitators such as Indian crime lord Dawood Ibrahim. The United States also needs to disrupt the terrorist group's fundraising and planning. The focus should be on unearthing names and disrupting cells outside Pakistan that are tied to Lashkar-i-Taiba, which involves pressuring Islamabad for the names of Westerners who may have trained at Lashkar-i-Taiba camps. This is among the thorniest U.S. national security and counterterrorism problems. It requires officials to focus on imagining the "aftershocks" of a terrorist attack and act before the threat manifests - even as other national security issues such as unrest in the Middle East boil over. Yet without political attention, diplomatic capital and sustained preventative actions, a critical region could descend into chaos. History shows that the actions of a small group of committed terrorists, such as the Black Hand in 1914 or al-Qaeda in 2001 - can spark broader wars. History could repeat itself with Lashkar-i-Taiba. Asymmetric threats that serve as flash points for broader geopolitical crises may be the greatest threat we face from terrorism.

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Now is the key time, another attack by Lashkar-i-Taiba would cause India to retaliate against Pakistan, destroying Pakistani stability, hurt efforts to solve terrorism in western Pakistan and Afghanistan, and lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. Zarate 2/20/11 (Juan C. a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was deputy assistant to the president and deputy
national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005 to 2009. An alarming South Asia powder keg, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html)

Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraint in the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants. Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a nuclear war between India and Pakistan. India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are set to surpass those of India. >

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A Reality Check on India, Pakistan

February 17, 2011

By Ahmad Majidyar & Apoorva Shah http://the-diplomat.com/2011/02/17/areality-check-on-india-pakistan/

On February 10, India and Pakistan announced that they would resume peace talks that were suspended after Pakistan-based terrorists attacked multiple sites in Mumbai in November 2008, killing 170 people. Washington welcomed the announcement, no doubt hoping that dtente between the two nuclear neighbours might lead them to end their proxy war in Afghanistan, and leave Pakistan better able to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda on its own soil. But its much too early to get carried away. After all, diplomacy conducted under terrorisms shadow can backfire, and should there be another attack on Indian soil, Indian policymakers even those in favour of reconciliationmay well conclude they have no partner in Pakistan, bringing the prospect of conflict closer. Its also not at all clear that Pakistan really is sincere in its desire for rapprochement. The country has reportedly doubled its nuclear arsenal over the last four years, and is believed to be building its fourth plutonium reactor. Western nations should be troubled that a country that professes to be committed to fighting Islamic militants at home has decided to focus so much attention on developing its nuclear prowess instead. Indians should also be concerned. On July 15, 2010,India and Pakistans foreign ministers met in Islamabad supposedly in order to restore trust. But the talks collapsed in acrimony, with the Indian side claiming that Pakistan had failed to move to resolve differences over the prosecution of anti-India terrorist groups operating from its territory. Just ahead of these talks, Indian Home Secretary G. K. Pillai had claimed that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had played a much more significant role in the Mumbai attacks than was initially thought, adding that he believed Pakistan was coordinating it from the beginning till the end. Testimony by captured alleged Pakistani-American terrorist David Headley appeared to support Pillais claims, with Headley reportedly telling FBI interrogators that the ISI went so far as choosing the weapons to be used in the attack. If all this is true, then there can be no serious diplomacy until Pakistan stops seeking to leverage Islamist militancy as a weapon in Kashmir and against India. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and similar groups continue to operate freely in Pakistan. Last February, for example, LeTs leader Hafiz Saeed led a 10,000-strong procession in Lahore to mark Kashmir Solidarity Day and warned India to liberate Kashmir or face jihad. Indeed, he also signalled a possible expansion of conflict, suggesting that the group might broaden its operations to the southern Indianand largely Muslimdistrict of Hyderabad.

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'US should encourage India to be more flexible on Kashmir'

2/26/11 http://www.rediff.com/news/column/us-must-encourage-india-to-be-more-flexible-onkashmir/20110226.htm The other critical issue for American diplomacy to address is the underlying problem that drives Pakistan's relationship with terror: India [ Images ] and Kashmir [ Images ]. The Pakistani state and its army have been obsessed with India since its creation in 1947. The ISI built much of the modern jihadist infrastructure in South Asia precisely to fight India asymmetrically, either directly in Kashmir or to defend Pakistan's strategic depth in Afghanistan. From the Pakistani perspective, an optimal resolution of Kashmir would be a union of the province, or at least the Muslim-dominated valley of Kashmir and the capital of Srinagar [ Images ], with Pakistan. Once Kashmir was 'reunited' with Pakistan, there would be no need for nuclear weapons or for a jihadist option to compel Indian withdrawal from the valley. This is precisely the outcome that Pakistani leaders have in mind when they urge American leaders to devote diplomatic and political energy to the Kashmir issue. Of course, it is a completely unrealistic scenario. India has made it clear that it will not withdraw from Kashmir. On the contrary, India argues it has already made a major concession by de facto accepting the partition of the state between itself, Pakistan, and China. India is probably prepared to accept the Line of Control [ Images ], in effect the cease-fire line of 1948, as the ultimate border with Pakistan, but not a fundamental redrawing of borders to put the valley under Pakistan's sovereignty. There is a way to resolve the Kashmir problem more realistically. The basis for such an approach would be to use the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue. That dialogue has already produced a series of confidencebuilding measures between the two countries, reopening transportation links, setting up hot lines between military commands, and holding periodic discussions at the foreign secretary level on all the issues that divide the two. Unfortunately, the dialogue has not seriously addressed the Kashmir issue because of the significant gulf between the two parties and India's refusal to negotiate while still a target of terrorist attacks planned and organised in Pakistan. But the two have gone far in the back-channel talks on how to resolve Kashmir. The United States has long been reluctant to engage more actively in the Kashmir dispute in light of the Indian posture that outside intervention is unwarranted and that Kashmir is a purely bilateral issue. Faced with the likelihood of Indian rejection of outside intervention, American diplomacy has put the Kashmir problem in the 'too hard' category and left it to simmer. The results are all too predictable. The Kashmir issue periodically boils over, and the United States and the international community have to step in to try to prevent a full-scale war. This was the case during the Kargil [ Images ] crisis in 1999, after the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, and again in 2002 when India mobilised its army for war on the Pakistani border. A unique opportunity for quiet American diplomacy to help advance the Kashmir issue to a better, more stable solution may exist now. The US-India nuclear deal has created a more stable and enduring basis for relations between the two countries than at any time in their history. The deal removes the central obstacle to closer strategic ties between Washington and New Delhi [ Images ] the nuclear proliferation problem, which held back the development of their relationship for two decades.

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In the new era of US-Indian strategic partnership, Washington should quietly but forcefully encourage New Delhi to be more flexible on Kashmir. It is clearly in the American interest to try to defuse a lingering conflict that has generated global terrorism and repeatedly threatened to create a full-scale military confrontation on the subcontinent. It is also in India's interest to find a solution to a conflict that has gone on too long. Since the Kargil war in 1999, the Indians have been more open to an American role in Kashmir because they sense Washington is fundamentally in favor of a resolution to maintain the status quo, which favors India. The key will be whether the United States can make clear to Pakistan that its red lines about terror are real, especially the red line on Lashkar-e-Tayiba [ Images ]. If Prime Minister Singh [ Images ] can see real evidence of LeT being broken up and dismantled in Pakistan, then he can reenter and advance the back channel with the political clout to secure a peace breakthrough. The United States currently has better relations with both India and Pakistan than at any other time in the past several decades. Its rapprochement with India, begun by President Clinton and advanced by President Bush, is now supported by an almost unique bipartisan consensus in the American foreign policy establishment and Congress. President Obama [ Images ] has already hosted Singh at the White House for a state dinner and traveled to New Delhi in November 2010. At the same time, the sanctions that poisoned US-Pakistani ties for decades have been removed by new legislation passed with bipartisan support. Obama has begun a strategic partnership dialogue with Islamabad [ Images ]. It is a unique and propitious moment. A Kashmir solution would have to be structured around a formula for making the Line of Control both a permanent and normal international border (perhaps with some minor modifications) and a permeable frontier between the two parts of Kashmir so that the Kashmiri people could live more normal lives. A special condominium might be created to allow the two constituencies to work together on issues specific to the region, such as transportation, the environment, sports, and tourism. The two currencies of India and Pakistan could become legal tender on both sides of the border, for example, an idea recently floated in India. Given the history of mistrust that pervades both sides, the two states are unlikely to be able to reach such an agreement on their own. A quiet American effort led by the President to promote a solution is probably essential to move the parties toward an agreement. This should not be a formal, public initiative--discretion and privacy are essential. I urged Obama to do just this on Air Force One and in the strategic review. Resolution of the Kashmiri issue would go a long way toward making Pakistan a more normal state and one less preoccupied with India. It would also remove a major rationale for the army's disproportionate role in Pakistan's national security affairs. That in turn would help to ensure the survival of genuine civilian democratic rule in the country. A resolution of the major outstanding issue between Islamabad and New Delhi would reduce the arms race between them and the risk of nuclear conflict. With the desire to fight asymmetric warfare against India eliminated, Pakistan would also be discouraged from making alliances with the Taliban [ Images ], Lashkar-e-Tayiba, and Al Qaeda [ Images ]. Former ambassador Bill Milam, a seasoned South Asia hand, has insightfully stressed that the "India-Centricity of the Pakistani mindset is the most important factor and variable" in the future of the country. Such an agreement would not resolve all the tensions between the two neighbors or end the problem of the Taliban in Afghanistan. But more than anything else, it would set the stage for a different era in the subcontinent and for more productive interaction between the international community and Pakistan. It could set the stage for a genuine rapprochement between India and Pakistan and nurture trade and economic interaction that could transform the subcontinent for the better. This is the big idea America needs to promote in South Asia. Excerpted with the author's permission from Bruce Reidel's book, Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America and the Future of Global Jihad, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC

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The Kashmir-Kabul Connection and US Diplomacy

by Mehlaqa Samdani It remains to be seen whether or not Secretary Clinton succeeded in reducing the trust deficit between the United States and Pakistan during her recent visit to the region. What is clear, however, is that she made significant progress towards a resumption of dialogue between India and Pakistan. According to reports, not only did Clintons visit to the region prompt Indias withdrawal of 15,000 troops from Indian-held Kashmir, but was also the reason behind the Indian prime ministers announcement that India was ready for talks with Pakistan without pre-conditions. This is somewhat surprising given Indias reluctance to allow third parties to interfere on the question of Kashmir. In fact, it had been successful lobbying by the Indian government that had led to Holbrookes responsibilities (being) limited to AfPak and who has allegedly been pressured to avoid using the K-word - Kashmir. Experts believe that apart from US pressure, the Indian government itself is now ready for talks due to growing voices within Indiacalling for a dialogue with Pakistan. Also, Pakistans acceptance of the trouble emanating from its borders is viewed by many in India as a starting point for future negotiations. Prior to the Mumbai attacks, Pakistan and India had made significant progress on a variety of fronts. The countries had completed the fifth round of the composite dialogue, the strategic framework under which India and Pakistan discuss important issues such as Siachen, Tulbul Navigation Project/Wullar Barrage, Sir Creek, economic and commercial cooperation and friendly exchanges, terrorism and drug trafficking, peace and security, and, critically Jammu and Kashmir. In fact, both Musharraf and Singh have recently acknowledged that the two countries had come very close to clinching a deal in 2007 and the basis of the talks had been Musharrafs 4-point formula: make the LoC irrelevant; demilitarize Kashmir; give self-governance to the Kashmiris; and have a joint mechanism comprising Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to oversee the transition and make it work. At that time, both governments had been beset by internal domestic opposition, which in Indias case at least is no longer the case. Pakistan also seems eager to begin dialogue and has already appointed an envoy for this purpose. The United States is likely to play a critical role in facilitating these talks especially since there is growing recognition among US policymakers that stability in Afghanistan will only be achieved if Pakistans concerns regarding its eastern border are addressed.

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In fact, according to an Asia Times report, the withdrawal of Abdullah Abdullah from the planned runoff election took place due to US pressure. In exchange for Abdullahs withdrawal, who was considered pro-India by IslamabadPakistan's militaryagreed to actively mediate between Washington and the Taliban over a reconciliation plan that will allow the US to exit from Afghanistan
http://csis.org/blog/kashmir-kabul-connection-and-us-diplomacy Mar 12, 2011

China-US diplomacy and AfPak: Brig Samson Sharaf http://www.insaf.pk/Media/InsafBlog/tabid/168/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/5572/China-US-diplomacy-andAfPak-Brig-Samson-Sharaf.aspx published in Nation 1/23/11 The visit of the Chinese President Hu Jintao to the US will not live in memory for the declarations that were made in the joint press conferences and the press releases. They are more significant in what has not been said. In the backdrop are diplomatic flurry, pre-visit co-ordinations and concessions from either side. In this calculus of mutual diplomatic conceding, inasmuch as China did not mention Kashmir, AfPak and India, the US in quid pro quo refrained from mentioning Pakistans growing nuclear cooperation with China, WOT and the much-trumpeted Long War. Though irritants, suspicions and differences were not highlighted publicly, they nonetheless formed the perspective in which this diplomacy was framed. Cognisant of the upcoming elections in USA and the support that Barack Obama needs from the right, State Department Spokesman Philip J. Crowley was quick to assert that theres no change in the US policy. On a question, that references to irritants and suspicions were dropped as a policy to appease India, he evaded the issue and responded: I think its a manifestation of the nature of our discussions herethat we have ongoing with China. But, no, I wouldnt read anything else into it. This sums up the exploratory and confidence building nature of this high profile visit to the US. In the light of the constraints faced by President Obama and the State Department in addressing issues that in fact destabilise South Asia, Afghanistan and the surrounding regions, rhetoric was low key. Following the Democrat traditions of resolving issues diplomatically, this establishment is handicapped by a somewhat lame duck President, Pentagon that calls all the shots on strategic and security issues and the desire to coopt India for its long-term objectives in Central and South Asia. In contrast, though the Chinese President too faces his elections, he appears to be fully backed in his diplomacy and can go back and claim that he has made significant economic and diplomatic success. He also spared America the diplomatic spar by not mentioning that China had already begun reducing its exports to the US, that the US was causing international financial destabilisation by printing out dollars and its human rights record in Guantanamo Bay and rendition centres. More so, at the heels of the aggressive diplomatic visit by Vice President Biden and Mullens mantra to do more, it was also for the first time that Pakistan was not in the headlines as a punching bag for the US failures in Afghanistan. Though India feels happy at its diplomatic clout and staying on the right side of State Department diplomacy, no mention of Pakistan caused much dismay in its thinking circles. Economically, in the face of a $275 billion trade deficit, conceding export deals to a tune of $45 billion is not significant. In addition, China also agreed to give the US contractors proximately $88 billion contracts and an order for 200 Boeing aircrafts worth $19 billion creating jobs for a starved US workforce. In return, China will get access to the lucrative US locomotive market and joint manufacturing facilities with General Electric (GE) that in a few years will help the Chinese locomotive industries to elbow out GE just as it has done with the German, French and Japanese locomotive manufacturers in the past. But the irritants remain. China is the direct recipient of the US Long Arm-Long War Strategy. Both eastward expansion of NATO and the bases in Afghanistan affect it directly. China realises that the US is unhappy about

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Chinese presence in Pakistan and Balochistan. It also knows that the Baloch separatist movements that are particularly anti-Chinese have sponsors with US blessings. Then there are issues of US arms sales to Taiwan, Dalai Lama, Kashmir, India and support to Pakistan. The fact that this visit avoided such real issues reflects multiple connotations. First, the Chinese have displayed remarkable cognisance and insight of the constraints faced by the Democrat administration. They have provided the US administration with enough economic concessions to carry to their vote banks in the next presidential elections and return with the peoples verdict. Then the road to economic engagements will be more promising and may lead to a matrix whence economic compulsions will overshadow military concerns. Second, the Chinese see the Democrats far better diplomatic partners than the Republicans, who represent the right, are militarily adventurous and more aligned to the Pentagon. Hence, the Chinese have decided to bet on them for peace in the region. Third, this also raises a question whether China has managed to avert an extraordinary escalation in AfPak at the heels of the Bidens visit and Petraeus Plan. If it has, then roads to a diplomatic and negotiated settlement of the Afghan issue will be wide open. Fourth, it brings back North Korea to the negotiating table. This also impacts Chinese bilateralism with Japan and South Korea, crucial to Chinas economic progress. In case the Chinese achieve these objectives, then the regions around Pakistan are likely to see a graduated deescalation, return of diplomacy as an instrument to negotiate peace and improved Pak-Afghan relations. This would also open doors to India and Pakistan to resume peace diplomacy, and boost trust and confidence building measures across the entire spectrum of irritants, particularly along the Line of Control. Peace along the divided frontier of Kashmir will give a much-needed respite to the people of the region, permit them to interact, carry out mutual trade and reduce force levels pending the resolution of the question under UN auspices. The success will also provide room for Pakistan to concentrate more on its domestic issues, challenge the forces of intolerance, and give breathing space to the armed forces to play a pro-active role in national development in the post-conflict, post-earthquake and post-flood scenario. Readers may be surprised at my assertion, but it is a fact that the Pakistani system lacks the wherewithal to absorb and deliver on the significant aid flowing into Pakistan. It is time that as in the 50s and 60s, the armed forces play their role in national development, as the most viable and constitutional instrument to absorb and deliver these projects, rather than the shady NGO mafias aligned with the corrupt officials and politicians of the government. There are prospects of peoples revolution for Pakistan following the recent Tunisian example. If that happens, then the forces of intolerance will unleash themselves against the entire system. The government must realise that far too much time has been lost to political tantrums and it is time they deliver honestly. The only democratic options are to either perform or call for immediate elections. The slide and rot must be stopped and arrested.

Pak-US and Afghan strategic dialogue?

Sajjad Shaukat http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=78757 High-level strategic dialogue among the United States, Pakistan and Afghanistan set for scheduled for February 23-24 this year in Washington have been postponed. In this regard, US postponed the talks amid a growing crisis sparked by the arrest of an American, Raymond Davis

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who was accused of murdering two Pakistani nationals. On February 15, 2011, like other US high officials, even President Barack Obama urged Pakistan to free Raymond as he has diplomatic immunity under the Geneva Convention. Meanwhile, recently, the visiting Chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee, John Kerry in Lahore remarked that issue of Davis has nothing to do with local courts as diplomats enjoy immunitywe cannot allow that one incident can break the strong relationship between the two countries. Notably, legal experts in Pakistan are of the opinion that Raymond Davis is a murderer who has no diplomatic immunity. Many Pakistanis are suspicious about Davis, who was arrested with loaded weapons, a GPS satellite tracking device, photographs of Pakistans defence installations and tribal areas, while American authorities are still silent about his role in Pakistan. In this connection, even western media and renowned newspapers such as The New York Times, Washington Post and the Guardian have also revealed that Davis Raymond is agent of American CIA. This fact shows a greater contradiction between the Obama Administration and their media. As regards the strategic dialogue, State Department spokesman Philip Crowley said in a statement, In light of the political changes in Pakistan and after discussions with Afghan and Pakistani officials in Washington, it was agreed to postpone the Trilateral Meetingwe look forward to convening a very productive Trilateral Meeting at the earliest opportunity. He further explained that Washington remains committed to robust engagement between Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States, as we share many issues of mutual concern and benefit from being at the same table. Meanwhile in the recent days the US and Pakistani military chiefs had a day-long meeting in Oman, and Pakistans Ambassador Husain Haqqani was invited to the State Department for a formal meeting with Marc Grossman, the new US Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite all of this, the suspension of talks with no new date announced marked the latest blow to strained US ties with Pakistan, where Pakistans police has rejected the Americans self-defense claim and accused him of cold-blooded murder as a court extended his remand. There is no doubt that a diplomatic crisis has boiled up between Washington and Islamabad over the detention of Raymond Davis, and the US has stepped up pressure on Pakistan to free him. And the Pakistani government is in a tough situation. The public wants Davis tried and convicted. On the other hand, the United States continues its efforts to free its imprisoned citizen and is now reportedly issuing veiled threats. Besides the crisis over Raymond Davis, previous history of Pak-US ties proves that Washington has always pressurised Pakistan on a number of occasions. In this respect, it is mentionable that in the aftermath of the November 26 catastrophe of Mumbai, America, while tilting towards India had put diplomatic duress on Islamabad. Setting aside the ground realties that Pakistan, itself, has been the major victim of terrorism, which has been bearing multiple losses in combating this menace since 9/11, with the support of the US, Indian blame game against Islamabad, continued during exchange of information between the two neighbouring countries regarding Mumbai mayhem. While, rejecting Pakistans stand that its government or any official

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agency was not involved in the Mumbai attacks, presenting one after another list of bogus evidence, New Delhi wanted to make Islamabad accept all other Indian demands since our rulers admitted on February 12, 2009 that Ajmal Kasab is Pakistani national and Mumbai terror-attacks were partially planned in Pakistan. In that context, India wanted to avail the Mumbai tragedy in increasing further pressure on Pakistan with the help of America in order to force Islamabad to confess that all the terrorists responsible for Mumbai attacks came from Pakistan. In that scenario, US former Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice and British Foreign Secretary Milliband who had visited India and Pakistan stressed upon Islamabad to take actions against the banned Jamaatud Dawa and the already banned Lashkar-i-Tayba. Speaking in Indian tune, they had also said that the terrorists involved in the Mumbai events came from Pakistan. In the recent past, IMF decided to sanction loan to Pakistan after American green signal. Past experience proves that economic dependence on foreign countries always brings political dependence in its wake. While, at that critical juncture, our country had been facing precarious financial problem, US-led some western allies compelled Pakistan to accept some Indian false demands. Another instance of American pressure is that the US is emphasising Islamabad to take action against the militants of North Waziristan. It also continuous drone attacks on Pakistans soil without bothering for the sovereignty of our country. As a matter of fact, we are living in an unequal world order. The prevalent global system tends to give a greater political and economic leverage to the affluent developed countries which could protect their interests at the cost of the weaker countries. Whenever, any controversy arises on the controversial issues, the UN Security Council enforces the doctrine of collective security against the small states, while the five big powers protect their interests by using veto. This shows discrimination between the powerful and the weaker. In this context, it is notable that in 2001, UN had permitted the United States to attack Afghanistan under the cover of right of selfdefence. In case of the Indian occupied Kashmir, the issue still remains unresolved as UN resolutions regarding the plebiscite were never implemented because Washington and some western powers support the illegitimate stand of India due to their collective interests. While elaborating shrewd diplomacy, renowned political philosophers, Hobbes, Machiavelli and Morgenthau agree that the powerful states can safeguard their interest by exerting psychological pressure on the less powerful states. In these terms, a renowned strategic thinker, Thomas Schelling remarks about the US, coercion to be an effective tool of foreign policy. Kissinger also endorses politics of bargaining and pressure through threats, coercion and even violence as essential elements of the American diplomacy. Nevertheless, suspension of strategic talks among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan are though part of American pressure on Islamabad, but the same will produce negative impact on both the countries, giving a greater setback to the US war on terror. In this regard, Americans should know that Pakistan is still a frontline country and a key state actor for American different war in Afghanistan, while the US-led NATO forces cannot win over the Taliban militants without Islamabads support. Non-cooperation or any misunderstanding among the US, Pakistan and Afghanistan will encourage India which is already manipulating US war in Afghanistan. In fact, since the US-led NATO forces occupied Afghanistan after 9/11, stiff resistance of the Taliban militants which created unending lawlessness in the country has made it a most conducive place for India to prepare conspiracies to fulfill its secret strategic designs against Pakistan, Iran and China.

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Under the pretext of Talibinisation of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Indian secret agency, RAW with help of some foreign intelligence agencies has well-established its networks in Afghanistan. Particularly, India has been running secret operations against Pakistan from its consulates in Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandhar and other sensitive parts of the Pak-Afghan border. It has spent millions of dollars in Afghanistan to strengthen its grip on the country. New Delhi has not only increased its military troops in the counry, but has also decided to set up cantonments. In this respect, India is using the Border Roads Organisation in constructing the ring roads by employing Indo-Tibeten police force for security. Moreover, suspension of trilateral talks for a long time is likely to create misunderstanding among these three countries, encouraging the terrorists and especially thwarting American regaional and global interests at this critical juncture when Washington is already facing violent anti-American protests in the Middle East. And wave of resentment against the US is runnning high in Pakistan and other Arab countries. Nonetheless, importance of the Pak-US and Afghan dialogue can be judged from the fact that in these trilateral annual talks, ministers and other top officials of Islamabad, Washington and Kabul outline progress on issues such as the war in Afghanistan and the campaign against extremism. So these trilateral dialogue must continue and a new date must be announced in this regard very soon as coordination among these concerned states is very essential for eliminating militancy, US war against terrorism, and creating regional stability.

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1110309/jsp/opinion/story_13678899.jsp DEEPENING MESS - Pakistan is again exploiting Indias eagerness for dialogue Kanwal Sibal Apropos our decision to resume a comprehensive dialogue with Pakistan, the question needs to be asked why we want to play the same game with our neighbour again and again when we know that it does not want to play by accepted rules, or interprets the rules differently from us, or indeed sets its own rules of play. Pakistan also commits fouls with impunity, but that does not deter us from going into the field with it. We also enter the game under threat of constant violence by our adversary. When we give such latitude to Pakistan and our own play is so defensive and permissive, how can we ever hope to win the game? The reference to the Thimphu spirit suggests that we believe there is a positive spirit that animates Pakistan in playing this game. Why we persist in believing this despite the experience of the past is not easy to explain. We have had before other versions of a similar spirit the Lahore spirit, the Islamabad one, that of Havana, Ekaterinberg and Sharm-el-Sheikh, and New Delhi too, but, despite the rhetoric and expressions of hope, Pakistans game behaviour has continued to be unclean and malevolent.

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We are the ones that make all the effort to create a positive environment before each round of play, despite Pakistans bid to vitiate the atmosphere. We say we have no choice but to play an honest game, however dishonest the other side is. Our bounden duty is to play the neighbourhood team, we say, despite its reputation of being unsporting. We exhibit our great keenness to enter the field, always assuming that the game will be played with positive intent on both sides. We are glad to offer to do the extra running to make the game exciting if the other side were to show some seriousness in playing straight. We are even willing to acknowledge for discussion some imaginary fouls the adversary charges us with, so long as play can be maintained. Our bottom line, of course, is that refusal to play the game, whatever the level of fraud and deception on the other side, is not an option. Pakistan garners many advantages in responding to our overtures to resume play after periodic suspensions because of its misconduct. As the wooed party it makes demands with regard to playing conditions. Because our urge to play gets regenerated time and again, it feeds Pakistans conviction that its misdeeds will always get condoned eventually, and that whatever fouls it commits or rules it transgresses, the game will not be called off for too long. Indeed, the play will then resume from a new threshold of tolerance of its objectionable acts on Indias part. By being invited to play, Pakistan also gets acknowledged as a credible team, and Indias equal. When teams play, the cheerleaders are in the ring to make a noise. When the play stops they are disappointed and push for it to resume. India, as the supposedly stronger team, is then pressed to overlook fouls and violence and make the requisite gesture to the weaker side. And finally, Pakistan sees in every bout of play with an India that seems bereft of a winning playing strategy an improved chance of defeating its adversary by scoring the goal it has long hoped for. This is an elaborate metaphor for our diplomacy with Pakistan. We are once again engaging Pakistan in a dialogue, without learning salutary lessons from past dealings. When Pakistan resists our basic demands we gradually modify them under the cover of platitudinous references to compulsions of neighbourhood, of no dialogue not being an option, of a stable and prosperous Pakistan being in our interest and so on and in this way the climbdown is sought to be concealed. After the Mumbai attack, Pakistan, far from being on the defensive, has been adamant that Indias step-by-step approach, with priority focus on terrorism, is not acceptable because it relegates the Kashmir issue to the background. It has insisted on the revival of the composite dialogue, as that would cover, besides Kashmir, the Siachen issue over which the Pakistanis feel aggrieved and want an Indian withdrawal. We have now yielded to its demand, though we are avoiding calling the renewed full spectrum dialogue composite, as if description defines reality. We will be discussing Kashmir, peace and security, counter-terrorism, Siachen, Sir Creek, the Wullar barrage/Tulbul navigation project, economic cooperation and people to people contacts, an agenda that has an uncanny resemblance to the composite dialogue that we ostensibly reject. Pakistans obstinacy has succeeded in extracting a major concession from us. To top it all, Pakistan has made the visit of its foreign minister to India contingent on meaningful results, implying that the onus is on us to produce results to its satisfaction. Meanwhile, Pakistan has made no progress in bringing to justice those responsible for the Mumbai terror attacks, much less act against the India-directed jihadi groups. Indeed, it seems to

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have now threatened that the masterminds of Mumbai like Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi may be released unless a Pakistani judicial commission can come to India to authenticate Ajmal Kasabs confession. We are succumbing to these delaying procedural tactics that enable Pakistan to make the pretence of doing something in accordance with the law while doing practically nothing through legal manipulations. We seem to be buying the argument that even if Pakistan wanted to act on our demands it would not be able to do so in the current conditions of domestic terror and mounting extremist sentiment exemplified by the largely approving public reaction to Salman Taseers killing. As usual, we discover excuses for our adversarys inaction in order to justify resiling from our own position. Suddenly, even Hafiz Saeed, the bogey man of yesterday is no longer worthy of serious notice. The venomous head of the terrorist organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the spiritual architect of Mumbai, who advocated a nuclear strike against India a day before the Thimphu meet, and who has close links with the Pakistani political and military establishment, is now dismissed as inconsequential. Because it is amply clear that the Pakistani government will not act against him, we feel obliged to change tack in order to clear the political decks for resuming the dialogue. Why downgrade the centrality of terrorism by consigning discussions on it to the level of home secretaries? The home secretaries do not handle foreign policy, whereas terrorism is a foreign policy issue not only bilaterally with Pakistan, but also regionally and, indeed, internationally. The dialogue at the home secretaries level can be supplementary to the dialogue between the principals in this case the foreign secretaries with focus on evidence, documents, procedures, modalities of exchange of information, counter-terrorism matters and suchlike technical issues. The degree of integrality of the terrorism issue to the quality and substance of the overall India-Pakistan relationship cannot be in the remit of the home secretaries. The principals will discuss Kashmir though, giving this issue the centrality that Pakistan has been manoeuvring for. Pakistan is exploiting the dialogue game to maul us as much as it can. Show it the yellow card and wait for its initiative to resume play if it wants to extract itself from its deepening mess. The author is former foreign secretary of India

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US-Pakistan Denouement: Strategic Implications For India

By Dr Subhash Kapila (SAAG) http://www.eurasiareview.com/analysis/us-pakistan-denouement-strategic-implications-forindia-03032011/ United States Pakistan denouement in their so-called strategic partnership currently underway was inevitable as this relationship was never founded on the basis of sound long-lasting strategic convergences or shared values. Both the United States and Pakistan over the last five decades enjoyed only spasmodic proximity and that too when tactical expediencies on both sides prompted such a proximity. Afghanistan in two different decades brought about two intense proximities in United StatesPakistan military relationship. The First United States-Pakistan involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s emerged with the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in1979. The United States and Pakistan had a strategic convergence in working together to see the exit of the Soviets from Afghanistan, and they succeeded. The Second United States-Pakistan Involvement in Afghanistan arose from United States ultimatums and coercion applied to Pakistan to combine in US Global War on Terror against the Al Qaeda and the Taliban, both entities having been given facilities and infrastructure in Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan till 2001. Tactical expediency dictated Pakistan succumbing to American dictates, but not without Pakistan Army double-timing the United States all along since 2002.

Pakistan This time around, there was no strategic convergences between the United States and the Pakistan Army. The United States and Pakistan had not only different strategic agenda but one

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could say opposing agenda. The Pakistan Armys end-game in Afghanistan this time was to bide time, induce combat fatigue in United States war effort and thereby prompt a military exit of the United Sates from Afghanistan. Thereafter the Pakistan Army could once again reclaim Afghanistan as its strategic depth against India, once again through the Taliban nurtured in Pakistani safe-havens. The past decade of the 2000s post-2001 in terms of United States-Pakistan relationship ostensibly termed as a strategic partnership witnessed a marked trust-deficit between the United States and its Major Non-NATO Ally. Till 2007 or so this trust-deficit was kept in muted contours by both sides. Post-2007 and especially after General Kayani took over as Pakistan Army Chief, the muted contours of the trust-deficit between the United States and Pakistan started seeping into public domain. This decade of the 2000s also witnessed the tangential impact on India of the United StatesPakistan Army troubled relationship. The United States in a vain bid to keep the Pakistan Army on its right side so that it does not impede the US war effort in Afghanistan and also to keep US logistics routes through Pakistan to Afghanistan open, indulged in unabashed policies of pressurizing the Indian policy establishment to what can be termed as appeasement policies towards Pakistan Armys strategic sensitivities. The Indian policy establishment throughout this decade of 2000s kept succumbing to United States pressures to keep resuming the India-Pakistan Peace Dialogues which India kept calling off after every major terrorist strikes from Pakistan against India, the last notable one being the nationally traumatic 26/11 commando-trained attack on Mumbai. Pointedly asserted in my Papers on this issue repeatedly in the last few years was the fact that the Indian Prime Minister in pursuance of his pro-American policies was succumbing to American pressures on policies designed to appease Pakistan Armys strategic sensitivities. This approach was in a state of severe disconnect with Indian public opinion which wanted no truck with Pakistan until it resiled from terrorism. Currently when the United States itself perceives that United States-Pakistan relations may have headed towards an irretrievable damage, it becomes pertinent to point out to the Indian policy establishment that its Pakistan policy postulations would need serious revision. After all the architecture of Indias policy formulations on Pakistan in the past decade were crafted from Washingtons perspectives than Indias national security interests. United States-Pakistan denouement in their relationship was in the offing since 2007 but was kept in muted contours by both nations and more so by the United States. However in the opening months of 2011 this denouement has spilled out in the public domain over the well publicized case of US diplomat Raymond Davis presently in custody of Pakistan in Lahore. Strategic implications arise for India in whatever outcome and course of action emerges from the ongoing spat between the United States and Pakistan which with each passing day is acquiring highly emotive and political overtones, rather than being confined to an issue to be settled through quiet diplomacy.

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This Paper intends to focus broadly on the issue of overall United States-Pakistan denouement and its strategic implications for India with a discussion under the following heads:

United States-Pakistan Denouement: The Major Issues of Friction Breakdown in Relations Between United States and Pakistan Intelligence Agencies US Secretary of State Recent Observations on Pakistan Analyzed United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options: Perspectives Strategic Implications for India Arising From United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options.

United States-Pakistan Denouement: The Major Issues of Friction Strong trust-deficit has always hovered singularly over United States-Pakistan relationship ever since the early 1950s when both nations embarked on an opportunistic relationship. Long term strategic convergences between United States and Pakistan which could have cemented their military relationship and led to a substantive strategic partnership have failed to emerge. Pakistans tainted reputation as an opportunistic and readily available as a rentier state and a regional spoiler state affected its image as a dependable state and a durable ally of the United States when the Pakistan-China strategic nexus is considered. As reiterated in many of my Papers, if when the chips are down and Pakistan is forced into making a strategic choice between China and the United States, Pakistan would align with China. In the onset of 2011, the major issues of friction between the United States and Pakistan can be said to be existing on three major issues. These are as follows (1) Pakistans Afghanistan policy postures and approaches to United States stabilization of Afghanistan (2) United States fears about Pakistans growing nuclear weapons arsenal and the security and safety of Pakistans nuclear weapons (3) Pakistan Armys continued patronage of Islamic Jihadi outfits like the Lashkar-e-Toiba and others. United States stabilization of Afghanistan and its continued embedment there is a United States strategic imperative of the United States. This is diametrically opposite to Pakistan Armys fixative obsession to reclaim Afghanistan for its strategic depth strategy. Hence Pakistan Armys continued hosting of the Afghan Taliban Shura, keeping the Pakistan-Afghanistan border porous for Taliban operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan Army Chiefs continued refusal to launch military operations in North Waziristan. The United States has had serious concerns on Pakistan Armys nuclear weapons arsenal safety, its record of WMD proliferation to Iran and North Korea and refusal to give access to Dr A Q Khan for questioning in relation to Pakistans WMD proliferation. Topping all these concerns is the undeniable reality of rogue elements of Pakistan Army passing on nuclear materials for use by Islamic Jihadis as a dirty nuclear device against Homeland USA.

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On control of terrorism and restraining Pakistan Armys continued patronage to Islamic Jihadi outfits like the Laskar-e-Toiba, the Pakistan Army establishment is in total defiance of the United States. On all of the above contentious issues of concern to the United States, it is the Pakistan Army and its ISI which is the central actor and controlling authority. Why is then the United States tolerating Pakistan Armys shenanigans? Why is it that the United States instead of disciplining the Pakistan Army continues to pressurize India to yield to Pakistan Armys dictates to the United States that India should yield on Kashmir, India should demilitarize Kashmir by withdrawing troops, and that the United States should not allow India to effect a presence in Afghanistan? Obviously, the United States has allowed itself to be blackmailed by the Pakistan Army establishment which not forgetting continues to exist on heavy doses of United Sates military aid and largesse. The situation in February 2011 has reached a tipping point where as the Washington Post put it that the US policy establishment has finally begun facing the harsh reality that Pakistan and the United States have entirely different narratives about their bilateral relationship and that United States politicians are questioning the continued strategic utility of United States-Pakistan relationship. Break down in Relations between United States and Pakistan Intelligence Agencies The bedrock of the United States-Pakistan relationship, irrespective of the varying intensities had been the close links and close cooperation between the CIA and the ISI, the respective intelligence agencies of the United States and Pakistan. At the beginning of 2011 it is increasingly being said in media reports that there has been a virtual breakdown in the CIA-ISI relationship to the extent that they are not communicating with each other. In fact the recent highest military level meetings between the US Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen and Pakistan Army Chief of Staff, General Kayani, at Oman on February 24, the CIA and the ISI representation were conspicuous by their absence. In fact this meeting though reported as reviewing Afghanistan operations was held basically to arrest the downslide in relations between the intelligence agencies of United States and Pakistan. Revealing in this connection are the reported remarks of former Pakistan Army Chief General Karamat who was also a former Pakistan Ambassador to USA, carried in the media. He is reported to have said:

The United States said that once beyond the tipping point, the situation would be taken over by political forces that cannot be controlled, referring to the reported split between the CIA and the ISI.

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The United States did not want the United States-Pakistan relationship to go into a freefall under media and domestic pressures. This consideration drove it (USA) to ask Pak Generals to step in and do what the Governments were failing to do The militaries will now brief their civilian masters and hopefully bring a change in USPak relations by arresting the downhill slide

Obviously, the breakdown in relations between the American and Pakistani intelligence agencies has reached serious proportions. The Pakistani intelligence agencies are accusing United States CIA of flooding Pakistan with agents under diplomatic cover who are more intent on acquiring intelligence about Pakistans nuclear weapons arsenal and penetrating Islamic Jihadi terrorism affiliates of the Pakistan Army. It seems doubtful that the traditional close relationship between the United States and Pakistani intelligence agencies that existed in earlier years could be substantially retrieved and healed. US Secretary of States Recent Observations on Pakistan Analyzed Reinforcing the emerging trend of US-Pak relations skating on thin ice are the recent public remarks of US Secretary of State Hillary Clintons on Pakistan. She is reported to have observed that Pakistan faces major instabilities at home and that Pakistan should stop fomenting antiAmerican sentiments and that shocking and unjustified anti-Americanism will not resolve Pakistans problems. More pointedly, Secretary of State Clinton stated that US relations with Pakistan have plummeted to their lowest point in recent years. Obviously, these remarks of the US Secretary of State were not careless remarks but made with full deliberation and for effect. Such remarks emanating from the highest level of United States foreign policy establishment indicates that something has seriously gone amiss in United StatesPakistan relations. That this criticality in United States-Pakistan relationship has emerged at a coincident moment when United States Forces in Southern Afghanistan are making headway against Taliban strongholds is ominous. The Davis case seems to be only a pretext for the Pakistan military establishment to a tipping point where the United States yields further to Pakistan Army blackmails or failing which the United States is forced to a military exit from Afghanistan. This is not conspiracy theorizing. It needs to be reiterated that Pakistans foreign policy on United States, Afghanistan and India is under direct control of the Pakistan Army Chief General Kayani. Therefore, deductively it can be stated that the downslide in United States-Pakistan relations currently underway and the lowest point that has been reached as observed by Secretary Clinton, has taken place with the full knowledge of the Pakistan Army Chief.

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It is not without purpose that in Pakistan media reports, General Kayani is being attributed as having observed that Pakistan is the most bullied ally of the United States and that the real aim of United States strategy is to de-nuclearize Pakistan. Such assertions by General Kayani can whip up nationalistic fervor and also position General Kayani in Pakistans political space. Such observations at the highest levels of the Pakistan military establishment raise serious policy and strategic dilemmas for the United States in relation to Pakistan and Afghanistan. And its strategic implications for India cannot be far behind especially when Indias Pakistan policy is so much enmeshed in serving Washingtons strategic interests in Pakistan. United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options: Perspectives United States follow-up Pakistan policy options in the wake of the Davis episode would necessarily be based on the consideration of anti-American stances of the Pakistan Army establishment since 2007, the anti-American hysteria whipped up by Pakistans right wing groups affiliated to the Pakistan Army and what the Pakistani establishment proposes to do to resolve the Davis issue. Additionally, the political heat presently in evidence at the top political levels and the CIA-ISI rupture would also be strong determinants. The United States would also have to take into account the impact of strained US-Pak relations on its operations in Afghanistan. In any case Pakistan has been allowing the disruption of US logistics effort through Pakistan quite frequently. The United States would have lately gone through scenario-building exercises and war-gaming of contingencies likely to emerge from the strained relations with Pakistan. It is not possible to discuss all these in this Paper. Suffice it to say, that the United States follow-up options essentially boil down to the Hard Option and the Soft Option. The Hard Option of the United States could initially involve strong use of political, economic and diplomatic coercion, including cut- off of military and financial aid, to make the Pakistani establishment yield on all American demands extending from the Davis episode to launching of Pak Army offensives in North Waziristan and secure logistics to Afghanistan. It is premature to visualize military intervention against Pakistan at this stage. It would be an extreme last resort arising more from another 9/11 against the United States. The Soft Option would be to maintain the status-quo of the frayed US-Pak relationship and perpetuate the myth of a strategic partnership. Pakistan would be cajoled to release Davis from captivity and his exit from Pakistan. United States would continue business as usual with the Pakistan Army, at least till 2014. The contextual regional security and political environment would suggest that the United States is more likely to adopt the Soft Option. However, the Soft Option adoption by the United States may not reduce the friction with Pakistan. The Pakistan Army establishment is likely to read it as American capitulation and persist in its blackmailing tactics.

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As US Forces make headway in stabilization of Afghanistan, the more are the chances of Pakistan Army indulging in retrograde disruptive activities in Afghanistan not only through the Taliban but also through its affiliates like the Lashkar-e-Toiba This could strain US-Pak relations further. Analytically, an inescapable strategic imperative for the United States would be for a radical transformation of its relationship with the Pakistani military establishment and the recasting of priorities in South Asia. Strategic Implications Arising for India from United States Follow-up Pakistan Policy Options Strategic implications for India in terms of Pakistan Army confrontationist stances have been a recurrent reality independent of the state of health of US-Pak relations for over the last half a century. This constancy of strategic implications arise from the hostile and confrontational Pakistan Army attitudinal approaches towards India manifested as follows (1) Proxy war in Kashmir (2) Widened and enlarged terrorist attacks all over India (3) Unprovoked border incidents and clashes along the LOC (4) Pak-China strategic nexus as an anti-Indian strategy (5) Hostile propaganda internationally against India over Kashmir and alleging Indias aggressive instincts. With the US military intervention in Afghanistan vitally dependant on logistics lines through Pakistan, the Pakistan Army was provided a new weapon for use against India. The United States was now susceptible to Pakistan Army blackmail for use of US pressures on India to be accommodative to Pakistan Army stances on the Kashmir issue, demilitarization of Kashmir and prevent Indias political and economic involvement in Afghanistan. The Pakistan Army strategy of blackmailing USA to pressurize India has been successful with the present Government in New Delhi repeatedly succumbing to resume dialogues with Pakistan after every major terrorist attack against India, unmindful of Indias national security interests. Pakistans five manifestations of its hostile stances against India spelt out above did not cease despite Indian Governments succumbing to US dictates favoring Pakistan. In fact Pakistan Army since 2007 has stood further emboldened under General Kayani to be more hostile to India secure in the belief of Pakistans nuclear deterrence and United States keeping India pressurized against any retaliation against Pakistan. In terms of United States follow-up Pakistan policy options, whether the Hard Option or the Soft Option, the crucial deduction that emerges is that in either case Pakistan stands threatened by the prospects of internal strife, Talibanization of Pakistan and possibly civil war and fragmentation.. In such an ensuing scenario where both anti-US and anti-India war hysteria is likely to be whipped up to frenzied levels, the strategic implications for India suggest heightened security vigilance, enhancing Indias war preparedness, and increasing and qualitatively improving Indias strategic weapons inventory.

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If United States adopts the Soft Option as a follow-up strategy then India can expect even much more United States pressures on India to yield on the Kashmir issue, demilitarization of Kashmir and end to Indian involvement in Afghanistans reconstruction, as per Pakistan Army demands. The United Sates in the follow-up phase would be doubly prompted to increase pressures on India to re- rehabilitate itself with the Pakistani military establishment. The Indian policy establishment needs to ask itself the serious question that irrespective of the health of United States-Pakistan relations, in the event of an India-Pakistan military showdown for whatever provocation would the United States standby with India against a Talibanized Pakistan? Also another critical question as to whether the increased Indian military equipment purchases from the United States would become subject to US sanctions in the event of an IndiaPak conflict in the future? Lastly, is it a strategically sound option for the Indian Prime Minister to keep acceding to repeated resumption of Peace Dialogues with Pakistan, when the very existence of Pakistan is in question? Peace Dialogues with Pakistan under US pressures can neither ensure peace for India nor swing the United States strategically in favor of India. It is strange that leading policy advisers of US President Obama should be writing best seller books entitled United States Deadly Embrace of Pakistan and the US Administration in a doublespeak pressurizing India to go in for a Deadly Embrace with the Pakistan Army. Concluding Observations The United States-Pakistan so called strategic partnership has all along been a myth. It has now entered a severe denouement phase where damage control may be able to temporarily retrieve a semblance of normalcy but it will be a relationship that will continue to skate perilously on thin ice. In the 1950s and 1960s when India was strategically infirm, India followed an independent policy on Pakistan. Today when India is strategically powerful and strong, the Indian Prime Minister of seven years standing has remained silent on the crucial issue as to what strategic advantages accrue to India by repeated resumption of Peace Dialogues with Pakistan under United States pressures. India cannot mortgage its national security to the pro-US political inclinations of policy establishment or to US persuasive assessments fed to the Indian Prime Minister that Pakistan Army would be more forthcoming for peace with India if concessions were made on Kashmir. The major strategic implications that arise for India from the falling-out of the United States and Pakistan, and irrespective whether the United States adopts the Hard Approach or the Soft Approach, India would have to enhance its security vigilance, achieve high levels of war preparedness and be politically ready for strong deterrent actions to counter any Pakistan Army adventurism. This is all the more necessary especially when the Pakistan Army is headed by a Pakistan Army Chief who openly flaunts that he is India-Centric and stands rated by US intelligence establishment as the most anti-Indian Pak Army Chief ever in Pakistans history.

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(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email: drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)