LAW 100 PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Professor E. A.

Pangalangan AY 2008-2009

v.1.0 FINAL

I. INTRODUCTION A. Intersection of Modern Constitutional Developments and Traditional Family Law 1. Provisions of the 1987 Constitution Art. III, Sec. 1: DUE PROCESS and EQUAL PROTECTION clauses - persons similarly situated are similarly treated, rationality test between statutes and their purposes. Art. II, Sec. 12: State recognition of the FAMILY as the fundamental autonomous social unit, that needs protection and support. Same, Sec. 13: State recognition of the YOUTH and their role in nation-building. Same, Sec. 14: State recognition of the EQUALITY OF THE SEXES, the importance of WOMEN in society. 2. Overview of Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses Griswold v. Connecticut: in prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples, the State unjustifiably impinges on their INDIVIDUAL RIGHT to privacy. Eisenstadt v. Baird: in prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons, the state IRRATIONALLY and unwittingly imposes unwanted pregnancies from unsafe sex as a form of punishment. II. CIVIL PERSONALITY A. Concept and Classes of Persons Civil Code, Art. 37: definition of JURIDICAL CAPACITY and CAPACITY TO ACT - juridical or legal capacity is the capability to be the SUBJECT OF laws and rights, while capacity to act is the capability to do actions WITH LEGAL EFFECT. Same, Art. 40: birth determines juridical capacity. FETUSES are considered born for all purposes FAVORABLE to it, provided that it is later BORN ALIVE. Same, Art. 41: fetuses for civil purposes, it is CONSIDERED BORN if it is alive AT THE TIME it is delivered from the mother's womb. Except if the fetus is LESS THAN SEVEN MONTHS at that time, then it should survive for at least 24 hours. Same, Art. 42: death juridical capacity ENDS at death, but obligations PASSES ON to the estate, which is the extension of juridical capacity. Same, Art. 43: indeterminate succession - when there is TOTAL LACK OF EVIDENCE regarding the order of death of two or more persons, and they are called to succeed each other, then they are presumed to have died at the same time, thus THERE IS NO TRANSFER OF RIGHTS. Same, Art. 44: juridical persons - (1) the STATE and its subdivisions; (2) corporate entities created by the State for PUBLIC purposes; (3) PRIVATE corporations and other entities. Same, Art. 45: which laws APPLY to juridical persons - for (1) and (2), the charter or law that created them; for (3), general and special laws governing corporations or partnerships. Same, Art. 46: CAPACITY of juridical persons - they may acquire and possess property, incur obligations, to sue and be sued. Same, Art. 47: DISSOLUTION of juridical persons - specifically for (2), their properties are disposed of in accordance with the charter that created them. Otherwise, then the properties are transferred to the State. Geluz v. CA: an unborn fetus has NO JURIDICAL CAPACITY, and thus it cannot be the subject of suits. People v. Tirol: death extinguishes juridical capacity, but indemnities from criminal liability passes to the ESTATE OF THE DECEASED. Joaquin v. Navarro: in the PRESENCE OF COMPETENT EVIDENCE regarding indeterminate succession, legal presumptions DO NOT APPLY. B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions Thereon 1. Presumption of Capacity Standard Oil v. Arenas: for INSANITY to be a valid restriction on the capacity to act, it should meet the ff. requirements: (1) that the insanity is HABITUAL; (2) that the person was insane AT THE TIME THE ACT WAS DONE; (3) that the act done DIRECTLY AROSE from the person's insanity. Otherwise, the person is PRESUMED TO BE CAPACITATED. 2. Restrictions on the Capacity to Act Civil Code, Art. 6: WAIVER of rights - rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law or prejudicial to a third party.

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Same, Art. 38: RESTRICTIONS on the capacity to act - minority, insanity, or imbecility are mere restrictions, and persons afflicted with them are still subject to obligations. Same, Art. 39: LIMITATIONS on the capacity to act - age, gender, religion, insanity, imbecility, deafmutism, civil interdiction, prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence, insolvency, trusteeship, among others, only modify or limit capacity to act. a. Minority RA 6809: AGE OF MAJORITY is lowered to 18. i. Effect on Contracts Civil Code, Art. 1327(1): the ff. CANNOT GIVE CONSENT to contracts: (1) unemancipated MINORS. Same, Art. 1390(1): if ONE of the parties giving consent to a contract is incapacitated - the contract is VOIDABLE. Same, Art. 1403(3): if BOTH of the parties giving consent to a contract is incapacitated - the contract is UNENFORCEABLE. Same, Art. 1397: Action for annulment of contracts - may be done by all who are principally or subsidiarily obliged to the contract, but capacitated persons CANNOT ALLEGE THE INCAPACITY OF THE OTHER PARTY. Same, Art. 1399: Restitution of incapacitated parties - they are NOT OBLIGED to make restitutions as concerning the defect of the contract, except if they have been BENEFITED by the thing or price received. Same, Art. 1489: Necessaries sold to incapacitated persons - they must pay a REASONABLE PRICE for them. Same, Art. 1426: Annulment of contracts entered into by minors - if they VOLUNTARILY RETURN the whole thing received, there is NO RIGHT to demand the thing or price thus returned. Same, Art. 1427: Minors entering into contracts without parental consent - if they VOLUNTARILY PAY money or a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there is NO RIGHT to recover the Same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith. Mercado v. Espiritu: when the minority of one party is MISREPRESENTED, the contract is VALID. Bambalan v. Maramba: when the minority of one party is KNOWN TO THE OTHER, the contract is VOIDABLE. Braganza v. Villa Abrille: when the minority of one party is NOT DISCLOSED, the contract is VALID. ii. Effect on Marriage Family Code, Art. 5: Any person 18 YEARS OLD OR ABOVE can contract marriage, provided that there are no impediments. Same, Art. 35(1): The ff. marriages are VOID AB INITIO: any of the parties are BELOW 18. iii. Effect on Crimes Revised Penal Code, Art. 12, as amended by the Juvenile Welfare and Protection Act of 2006: Exemptions from criminal liability - (2) BELOW 15 years of age; (3) ABOVE 15 BUT BELOW 18, unless the person acted with discernment. Same, Art. 68, as amended by the Juvenile Welfare and Protection Act of 2006: Penalties for juvenile offenders - (1) ABOVE 9 BUT BELOW 15, exempted from penalty and transferred to the custody of the DSWD; (2) ABOVE 15 BUT BELOW 18, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed and it is lower by two degrees. b. Insanity i. Effect on Contracts Civil Code, Art. 1327(2): the ff. CANNOT GIVE CONSENT to contracts: (2) the INSANE and ILLITERATE DEAF-MUTES Same, Art. 1326: Insane persons entering into contracts - if entered during a LUCID INTERVAL, the contract is VALID. Same, Art. 1399: Restitution of incapacitated parties - they are NOT OBLIGED to make restitutions as concerning the defect of the contract, except if they have been BENEFITED by the thing or price received. ii. Effect on Crimes Revised Penal Code, Art. 12(4): the ff. are EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY: (4) insane persons or imbeciles, unless they are acting during a lucid interval. iii. Effect on Marriage

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Family Code, Art. 45(2): grounds for VOIDABILITY (2) if either party to the marriage is of unsound mind at the time of its celebration, unless ratified by free cohabitation. Same, Art. 47(2): action for VOIDABILITY (2) by the sane spouse, by any relative or guardian of the insane spouse, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval. c. Deaf-mutism Civil Code, Art. 1327(2): the ff. CANNOT GIVE CONSENT to contracts: (2) the insane or ILLITERATE deaf-mutes. Same, Art. 807: deaf-mutes entering into WILLS the deaf-mute person must be ABLE TO READ the will, otherwise, he assigns two persons to communicate its contents to him. Same, Art. 820: deaf-mutes becoming WITNESSES TO A WILL any person of sound mind, above 18 years old, NOT DEAF, NOT BLIND, and able to read and write may be a witness to the execution of a will. e. Civil Interdiction Revised Penal Code, Art. 34: DEPRIVATION of rights of an imprisoned person during the length of the sentence, the civilly interdicted loses parental authority, guardianship, marital authority, etc. f. Family Relations Revised Penal Code, Art. 11(2): JUSTIFYING circumstances the ff. DO NOT INCUR any criminal liability: (2) any person who acts in DEFENSE of the person or the rights of a spouse or any relative within the fourth civil degree, provided there is unlawful aggression on the part of the attacker, and the means employed to do so is reasonable. Same, Art. 13(5): MITIGATING circumstances (5) that the act committed was in the IMMEDIATE VINDICATION of a wrong done against the perpetrator's spouse or relative within the fourth civil degree. Family Code, Art. 37: MARRIAGES between family relatives the ff. marriages are VOID AB INITIO: (1) between ascendants or descendants of any civil degree; (2) between siblings of either the full- or half-blood. Same, Art. 87: DONATIONS between spouses or anything other than moderate gifts are VOID. Civil Code, Art. 1109: PRESCRIPTION between spouses does not run even with the existence of an agreement of separation of properties between them. Same, Art. 1490: SELLING of property between spouses prohibited, unless: (1) there is an agreement of separation of properties; (2) or a judicial decree ordering the same. g. Absence Civil Code, Art. 390: PRESUMPTION OF DEATH of an absentee 7 YEARS for all purposes except succession, which requires 10 YEARS of absence. If the absentee is over 75 years of age, then 5 YEARS of absence is sufficient for all purposes. Same, Art. 391: FOUR-YEAR RULES: the absentee is presumed dead if: (1) in a shipwreck or a plane crash; (2) in the armed forces during times of war; (3) in danger of death under other circumstances and not seen since. Family Code, Art. 124: ADMINISTRATION of conjugal properties in the case of absence, then the present spouse may administer the conjugal properties.

III. PRE-MARITAL CONTROVERSY A. Breach of Promise to Marry Table 1: Actionable wrongs in breach of promise to marry (class notes) Reason For Marriage Property Feelings, expectations, social perceptions Love

Basis for Action for Breach of Promise to Marry Contract for return or reimbursement of spent property Tort for moral or exemplary damages No basis for lost love :(

Civil Code, Art. 19: in the EXERCISE of rights and PERFORMANCE of duties, all persons must ACT WITH JUSTICE, give everyone his or her due, and observe HONESTY and GOOD FAITH. Same, Art. 20: any person who WILLFULLY OR NEGLIGENTLY causes damage to another or to another's property, indemnifies the latter for the same. Same, Art. 21: any person who causes damage to another, CONTRARY TO MORALS, CUSTOM, OR PUBLIC POLICY, shall compensate the latter.

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Same, Art. 2176: quasi-delicts any person who causes damage to another by an act or omission, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Wassmer v. Velez: a breach of contract to marry is NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG, applied to all the cases below. One can only sue for damages for EXPENSES or other incidents that directly arose from the contract to marry. In this case, the costs of the wedding preparations. Tanjanco v. CA: LOST WAGES arising from voluntary dismissal in anticipation of a marriage can be sued for. De Jesus v. Syquia: CHILD SUPPORT is separate from the breach of contract to marry, and can therefore be claimed. Piccininni v. Hajus: EXPENSES made for the renovation of an anticipated conjugal home can be sued for.

IV. Definition and Nature of Marriage Family Code, Art. 1: Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family, and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits set by this Code. 1987 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 1: State recognition of the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation, and its strengthening and promotion of total development. Same, Same, Sec. 2: State recognition of marriage as an inviolable social institution, as the foundation of the family, and its protection. Same, Same, Sec. 3: State defends: (1) the rights of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood; (2) the right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, etc.; (3) the right of families to a living wage; (4) the right of families or family organizations to participate in the planning of programs that directly affect them. Loving v. Virginia: landmark US case affirming the INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO MARRY regardless of race or other natural factors. Zablocki v. Redhail: IRRATIONAL FIT between the prevention of public wards from extra-marital pregnancies and the prohibition of marriage to those persons who have wards. A. Marriage Models 1. Traditional Marriage Graham v. Graham: in affirming the traditional marital roles of husband and wife, the couple was prevented from making NON-TRADITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. In this case, where the husband was stipulated not to work because of the wife's great wealth. Bradwell v. Illinois: the WIFE'S PRIMARY ROLE is the provider of household and child-care services, thus preventing a married woman's entry into the Bar. Also, the inherent legal incapacities of a wife makes the entering of contracts difficult, thus making the legal profession also difficult. 2. Challenges to the Traditional Marriage Model a. The Changing Status of Women Dunn v. Palermo: a wife is still entitled to use her MAIDEN NAME, as the law only provides the usage of the husband's name out of custom. b. By Private Contract: When Valid? When Void? In re: Santiago: married couples CANNOT LIVE SEPARATELY from each other according to their own will and without judicial declaration. Selanova v. Mendoza: agreement on the SEPARATION OF PROPERTIES is only allowed before the contraction of marriage, and nowhere else, not even in extrajudicial declarations. B. Requisites of Marriage Family Code, Art. 2: ESSENTIAL requisites of marriage (1) legal capacity of both parties who must be male and female; (2) consent freely given. Same, Art. 3: FORMAL requisites of marriage (1) a marriage license; (2) an authorized solemnizing officer; and (3) a marriage ceremony by the solemnizing officer and in the presence of at least two witnesses. 1. Essential Requisites a. Legal Capacity, Male and Female Jones v. Hallahan: marriage between persons of the same sex is denied because of the traditional definition of marriage as BETWEEN MAN AND A WOMAN. Goodridge v. Department of Public Health: no rational fit between the State's interest to provide welfare to children and denying the INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO MARRY. Silverio v. Republic: change of gender entry in one's birth certificate to allow marriage between a man and another transgendered man is denied, as marriage is a union BETWEEN A MAN AND A WOMAN. b. Consent Freely Given

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Family Code, Art. 4: a DEFECT in an essential requisite of marriage renders it void. Same, Art. 45(3): grounds for ANNULMENT (3) when the marriage was entered into by FRAUD. People v. Santiago: the influence of FORCE OF THREAT as after the commission of a rape renders a marriage void due to lack of consent. Buccat v. Buccat: there was NO FRAUD as it was impossible for the husband to have not known the late pregnancy of the wife, thus their marriage was valid. Eigenmann v. Guerra: parental consent can be of ANY FORM, like the mere presence of the groom's mother in the ceremony in this case. 2. Formal Requisites Family Code, Art. 26: validity of foreign marriages in the Philippines as regards to FORMAL REQUISITES ONLY. Civil Code, Art. 17: foreign contracts they are governed by the laws of the PLACE WHERE THEY ARE MADE. a. Authority of Solemnizing Officer

Table 2: Conditions for exercise of authority by religious ministers (class notes) Ministers of Religion Duly authorized by the religion or sect to solemnize marriages Conditions Registered in the Civil Registry Acts within the limits of his or her religious authority One or both parties are member of the religion

Effect on Marriage No authority voids the marriage No registration voids the marriage Failure to do so has no effect on the validity of the marriage Neither party is a member voids the marriage

Family Code, Art. 4: an IRREGULARITY in one of the formal requisites DOES NOT AFFECT the validity of the marriage, but the parties responsible for it may be held civilly or criminally liable. Same, Art. 7: solemnizing officers (1) an INCUMBENT JUDGE within his court's jurisdiction; (2) any RELIGIOUS MINISTER authorized by his church to solemnize marriages, and registered as such; (3) a ship CAPTAIN or airplane CHIEF, but only in marriages AT THE POINT OF DEATH; (4) a MILITARY COMMANDER, also only in marriages at the point of death; and (5) a CONSULAR officer. Same, Art. 10: Filipino marriages abroad may be solemnized by a CONSULAR OFFICER (consul, vice-consul, or consul-general) and consequent duties are performed by the same officer. Same, Art. 31: ship captains and airplane chiefs can ONLY solemnize marriages at the point of death within their vessel, or at stopovers or ports of call. Same, Art. 32: military commanders who must also be commissioned officers, can ONLY solemnize marriages at the point of death within their area of command. Same, Art. 35(2): the ff. marriages are VOID AB INITIO: (2) those solemnized by an UNAUTHORIZED solemnizing officer, unless the married parties believed otherwise in good faith. Civil Code, Art 3: IGNORANCE OF THE LAW EXCUSES NO ONE. Navarro v. Domagtoy: marriages solemnized by a judge acting OUTSIDE his jurisdiction were held to be VALID, lack of valid notification of both parties desiring a ceremony in a remote place was held to be only a mere IRREGULARITY. Araes v. Occiano: marriages solemnized BEFORE the acquisition of a marriage license are INVALID. b. Marriage License Family Code, Art. 9: marriage licenses must be obtained in the LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY where any of the parties live. Same, Art. 10: however, when abroad, these same duties are provided by the CONSULAR OFFICER. Same, Art. 11: LICENSE APPLICATION DATA: (1) full name of the contracting party; (2) place of birth; (3) age and date of birth; (4) civil status; (5) nature of the dissolution of any previous marriages; (6) present residence and citizenship; (7) degree of relationship of the contracting parties; (8) full name, residence, and citizenship of the father; (9) and the mother; (10) or of the guardian in case the contracting party has no parents and is under 21 years of age.

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Same, Art. 12: BIRTH CERTIFICATE required for the license application. If there is none, a certificate of residence (cedula) will suffice, or a sworn testimony by parents, relatives, or acquaintances, as regarding the age, gender, and residence of the contracting party. Same, Art. 13: presence of PREVIOUS MARRIAGES a birth certificate is NO LONGER REQUIRED; instead, the DEATH CERTIFICATE of the previous spouse is required, or a JUDICIAL DECLARATION of the dissolution of the previous marriage. Same, Art. 14: for parties 18 OR BELOW 21 years of age specific parental CONSENT is required, may be in writing or in the presence of the solemnizing officer. Same, Art. 15: for parties 21 OR BELOW 25 years of age parental ADVICE is required, otherwise, there is a delay of 3 MONTHS before the parties can get married. Same, Art. 16: requirement of MARRIAGE COUNSELLING together with parental consent, otherwise, there is a delay 3 MONTHS before the parties can get married. Same, Art. 17: posting of names of applicants in a PUBLIC PLACE done for 10 CONSECUTIVE DAYS within which any interested parties are requested to inform the Registrar of any impediments the applicants may already have. Same, Art. 18: if there are impediments, then the license is STILL ISSUED, unless stopped by a competent court. Same, Art. 19: FEES are required for the license, except for indigents. Same, Art. 20: EXPIRY of license the marriage must be solemnized within 120 DAYS. Otherwise, both parties must re-apply. Same, Art. 21: FOREIGNERS are governed by the LAWS OF THEIR COUNTRY, as certified by their embassy. STATELESS persons are governed by the FAMILY CODE. Same, Art. 22: MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE DATA: (1) full name, age, and sex of each contracting party; (2) also their citizenship, religion, and residence; (3) date and precise time of marriage; (4) presence of valid marriage licenses; (5) presence of parental consent in the appropriate cases; (6) or parental advice; (7) attachment of any marriage settlements. Same, Art. 23: DUTIES of the solemnizing officer concerning DOCUMENTS: present the original copy of the MARRIAGE CERTIFICATE to the parties, submit two copies of it to the Civil Registrar, and keep a fourth copy to himself. He also keeps the original MARRIAGE LICENSE, and the AFFIDAVIT of the contracting parties to their desire to be married in a place other than the prescribed places. Same, Art. 24: DUTIES of the Civil Registrar furnishing all the required documents, and recording all pertinent oaths and affidavits. Same, Art. 25: the Civil Registrar also records all applications for marriage licenses in a RECORD BOOK. Same, Art. 27: marriages of EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER no longer requires a marriage license: those celebrated at the POINT OF DEATH. Same, Art. 28: or those celebrated in REMOTE PLACES. Same, Art. 29: in both cases above, the solemnizing officer must issue an affidavit stating the exact reasons and circumstances of the marriage. Same, Art. 30: also in both cases above, the same affidavit and a copy marriage contract must be submitted by the solemnizing officer to the nearest civil registrar. Same, Art. 31: marriages at the point of death may be solemnized by a ship captain or airplane chief in his vessel or in stopovers or ports of call, Same, Art. 32: or by military commanders in the area of their responsibility. Same, Art. 33: MUSLIM MARRIAGES also do not require a marriage license, but they must be solemnized IN ACCORDANCE with their customs. Same, Art. 34: when both parties have lived together as husband and wife for AT LEAST 5 YEARS, provided that there are no impediments, and they have undergone a marriage ceremony by an authorized solemnizing officer. The same solemnizing officer must also issue an affidavit stating the absence of any impediments. PD 965: the additional requirement of FAMILY PLANNING INSTRUCTIONS to marriage licenses. Republic v. CA: the issuance of the Civil Registrar of a CERTIFICATE DUE SEARCH AND INABILITY TO FIND the application of a marriage license means its absence, thus rendering the marriage VOID. Moreno v. Bernabe: before a marriage can be solemnized, a valid marriage license MUST FIRST BE PRESENTED, otherwise the marriage is VOID. People v. Borromeo: if the married couple had lived together as husband and wife after a properly witnessed ceremony, then there is a PRESUMPTION of the presence of a valid marriage certificate.

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Seguisabal v. Cabrera: FAILURE of the solemnizing officer to transmit copies of the necessary documents makes him civilly as well as administratively liable. Alcantara v. Alcantara: mere IRREGULARITIES in the marriage license, such as a typographical error, do not affect the validity of a marriage. c. Ceremony Family Code, Art. 3(3): FORMAL requisites of marriage (3) a marriage ceremony by the solemnizing officer and in the presence of at least two witnesses. Same, Art. 6: there is NO PRESCRIBED form or religious rite for marriage ceremonies, although in any case, at least two witnesses are always required. In marriages at the POINT OF DEATH, where one parties is unable to sign the marriage contract, it is enough for one of the witnesses to sign for his behalf. Same, Art. 8: prescribed VENUES of ceremonies in the chambers of the judge, or in open court, in a place of worship, in the office of the consular officer, or in a remote place or any other place as requested in writing to the solemnizing officer. Same, Art. 28: marriages of EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER no longer requires a marriage license, BUT would still require a ceremony: those celebrated at the POINT OF DEATH. Same, Art. 29: or those in REMOTE PLACES. Same, Art. 22: the marriage certificate, in which the parties SHALL DECLARE themselves husband and wife, also includes other information such as the EXACT DATE AND TIME of the celebration. Same, Art. 23: attached to the copy of the marriage certificate is the affidavit where the parties have requested a DIFFERENT VENUE for the celebration, like for those in remote places. Same, Art. 24: affidavits and other documents filed in connection with the marriage certificate are EXEMPT from documentary stamp tax. Martinez v. Tan: the couple's written agreement where they declare themselves as husband and wife, signed by them before a judge and two capable witnesses, even though it was INDEPENDENTLY made by them, still counts as a valid ceremony. Madridejo v. De Leon: in marriages at the POINT OF DEATH, it is enough for the solemnizing officer to have performed the ceremony. 3. Presumption of Marriage Civil Code, Art. 220: all presumptions are IN FAVOR of the existence of marriage, filiality, etc. Trinidad v. CA: even with the loss of a marriage certificate, marriage can be proved by the TOTALITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE, such as family photos, testimonies, etc. Viuda de Jacob v. CA: in marriages of exceptional character, the existence of the marriage is presumed, even in the TOTAL ABSENCE of a marriage license. Sevilla v. Cardenas: if a marriage certificate is missing, and all means HAVE NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED to find it, then the marriage is presumed to exist.

V. VOID AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES Table 3: Comparison of void and voidable marriages (Sempio-Diy) Void Marriage Nature Susceptibility of Convalidation Effect on Property Children How Marriage may be Impugned Inexistent from the time of the celebration Cannot be convalidated Co-ownership under Art. 147 Illegitimate under Art. 165 May be attacked directly or collaterally, but for purpose of remarriage, there must be a judicial declaration of nullity under Art. 40 Can still be impugned after the death of parties Voidable Marriage Valid until annulled by a competent court Can be convalidated either by free cohabitation or prescription ACP exists unless other system is agreed upon in marriage settlements Legitimate if conceived before decree of annulment Can only be attacked directly, there must be a decree of annulment Can no longer be impugned after the death of one of the parties

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A. Void Marriages 1. Grounds a. Ordinary Grounds Family Code, Art. 4: the TOTAL LACK or ABSENCE of ANY of the requisites of marriage renders it VOID. Same, Art. 35: the ff. marriages are VOID AB INITIO: (1) those contracted by any party BELOW 18 years of age; (2) those solemnized by an UNAUTHORIZED solemnizing officer; (3) those solemnized WITHOUT a valid marriage license; (4) those bigamous or polygamous marriages, unless one of the spouses is an absentee; (5) those contracted through the MISTAKE OF THE IDENTITY of the other; (6) those subsequent marriages without first obtaining a JUDICIAL DECLARATION of its nullity. Same, Art. 37: incest marriages between ascendants or descendants, or between siblings or halfsiblings are incestuous and VOID AB INITIO. Same, Art. 38: public policy marriages between collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree, step-parents and step-children, a parent-in-law and a child-in-law, adopter and adopted, adopted children of the same adopter, and where one party killed his or her own spouse or the spouse of the other party with whom he or she wishes to marry, are VOID AB INITIO. Same, Art. 39: the action or defense for declaration of nullity DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. Same, Art. 40: for purposes of REMARRIAGE, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked SOLELY by a judicial declaration. Same, Art. 41: BIGAMOUS marriages are VOID, unless the previous spouse has been absent for 4 YEARS, or in the case of dangerous circumstances, 2 YEARS, provided there is a well-founded belief of the death of the absent spouse. If the present spouse wishes to remarry, he or she must initiate a summary proceeding for a DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of the absent spouse. Same, Art. 44: If both spouses acted in BAD FAITH, then their marriage will be deemed VOID AB INITIO. Civil Code, Art. 390: PRESUMPTION OF DEATH of an absentee 7 YEARS for all purposes except succession, which requires 10 YEARS of absence. If the absentee is over 75 years of age, then 5 YEARS of absence is sufficient for all purposes. Same, Art. 391: FOUR-YEAR RULES: the absentee is presumed dead if: (1) in a shipwreck or a plane crash; (2) in the armed forces during times of war; (3) in danger of death under other circumstances and not seen since. People v. Mendoza: void ab initio marriages are treated as if they were never celebrated in the first place, although BEFORE the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is NOT REQUIRED. Tolentino v. Paras: void ab initio marriages do not confer any successional rights, thus the wife from the void marriage cannot declare herself as the deceased husband's surviving spouse. Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy: establishes the present doctrine of requiring a JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY under Art. 40, of the previous marriage in order to contract a subsequent one. Terre v. Terre: INCESTUOUS marriages, even though void ab initio, still require a judicial declaration of nullity before one can marry again from the incestuous marriage. Atienza v. Brillantes: even if the first marriage was contracted before the Family Code, remarriages AFTER the Family Code are covered by Art. 40. Borja-Manzano v. Sanchez: legal separation DOES NOT DISSOLVE marital bonds, and any subsequent marriages contracted are bigamous and thus VOID. Apiag v. Cantero: remarriages BEFORE the Family Code are not covered by Art. 40. b. Psychological Incapacity Family Code, Art. 36: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY of one of the parties at the time of the marriage, even if the incapacity manifests itself during the marriage, renders the marriage VOID. Santos v. CA: first guidelines for the application of Art. 36, as laid down by Canon Law: that for psychological incapacity to be grounds for the annulment of a marriage, it should be accompanied by GRAVITY, JURISPRUDENCE, and INCURABILITY. The wife's unwillingness to return to the conjugal home does not satisfy these requirements. Republic v. Molina: for Art. 36 to apply, aside from the previous criteria of gravity, jurisprudence, and incurability, these additional criteria must also be followed: (1) the BURDEN OF PROOF lies on the party alleging the psychological incapacity of the other; (2) the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be CLINICALLY PROVEN by certified medical experts; (3) the psychological incapacity must be proven EXISTING AT THE TIME when the marriage was contracted; (4) the psychological incapacity must be shown to be clinically incurable, permanent, or otherwise BEYOND THE MEANS of the spouses to cure; (5) the psychological incapacity must be grave enough to IMPAIR the fulfillment of marital obligations; (6) these OBLIGATIONS must be those enumerated by Arts. 68-71 of the Family Code; (7) RULINGS of the Canon courts must be given great respect; (8)

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the Office of the Solicitor General must participate to defend State interests to protect the institution of marriage and to prevent COLLUSION between the spouses. Tsoi v. CA: husband's unexplained REFUSAL TO HAVE SEX with the wife for more than 10 years under otherwise normal circumstances constitutes impairment of marital obligations of cohabitation, thus fulfilling Molina guideline (5). Marcos v. Marcos: Molina guideline (2) for clinical proof of psychological disorder is NO LONGER required, to anticipate cases where the allegedly incapacitated parties might refuse to be examined. The husband's incapacity was NOT EXISTING at the time of the marriage, and according to guideline (3), the marriage is still VALID. Choa v. Choa: mere PERSONALITY CLASHES not grave enough to impair marital obligations under Molina guideline (5) are not covered by Art. 36. Antonio v. Reyes: the marriage was void under Art. 36, and followed each of the guidelines set by the Molina case, except that the psychiatric experts made no assurances about INCURABILITY as required by guideline (4), therefore it is also NO LONGER REQUIRED. Republic v. Melgar: contradictory ruling of not requiring clinical proof of psychological incapacity, but would have been PERSUASIVE in the case. Paras v. Paras: evidence from administrative proceedings cannot be used in the same manner as in civil proceedings for annulment under Art. 36. The alleged psychological incapacity did not exist at the time of the marriage, as required by (3) of the Molina guidelines. Tongol v. Tongol: a psychological disorder was proven as required by (2) of the Molina guidelines, but was not grave enough to impair marital obligations as required by (5). Thus, psychological disorders DO NOT IMPLY psychological incapacity as defined by Art. 36. 2. Period to File Action or to Raise Defense Family Code, Art. 39: the action or defense for declaration of nullity DOES NOT PRESCRIBE. RA 8533: removes the TRANSITORY 10-year prescriptive period left over from the Civil Code before the enactment of the Family Code. 3. Effects of Nullity Family Code, Art. 43: EFFECTS of nullity (1) children born before the termination of the subsequent marriage shall be considered LEGITIMATE; (2) the ACP or CPG is LIQUIDATED, PARTITIONED, and DELIVERED to each of the spouses in equitable shares, bad faith spouses will get NO SHARE, except those earned through his or her own industry and hard work; (3) DONATIONS will still remain valid, except those made to the bad faith spouse, where they can be revoked; (4) the bad faith spouse is removed from the innocent spouse's INSURANCE POLICY; (5) the bad faith spouse is also disqualified from INHERITING from the innocent spouse through testate or intestate succession. Same, Art. 44: If both spouses acted in BAD FAITH, then their marriage will be deemed VOID AB INITIO. Same, Art. 50: aside from liquidation, partition, and delivery of the marital properties, the declaration of nullity also provides for the CUSTODY of common children and the delivery of their legitimes. All CREDITORS of the spouses are also notified of the separation of their property. Same, Art. 51: in the partition, the LEGITIMES of the children shall be delivered in cash, properties or sound securities, unless it is provided in a judicially approved mutual agreement. This does not prejudice their successional rights, and this may be requested by the children's guardian or the administrator of the conjugal properties. Same, Art. 52: the partitioning of the conjugal properties is REGISTERED in the appropriate Civil Registry or Property Registry, otherwise the partition will not apply to third persons. Same, Art. 53: either of the former spouses may REMARRY, after complying with the requirements above. Otherwise, the subsequent marriage will be void. Same, Art. 54: children born before an annulment under Art. 36 are LEGITIMATE. Nial v. Bayadog: void ab initio marriages DO NOT CONFER any successional rights. For 5-year cohabitation to count as a condition for marriage of exceptional character, both parties must have no legal impediments to marry each other. Domingo v. CA: there exists NO ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY OF PROPERTY in void ab initio marriages. Judicial declaration of nullity as provided by Art. 40 may be required for purposes OTHER THAN remarriage. De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro: common children born before the annulment are LEGITIMATE, and therefore entitled to support from each of the spouses.

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B. Voidable Marriages Table 4: Grounds and actions for annulment (Sempio-Diy) Ground for Annulment Lack of parental consent for party under 21 Insanity of one party Who Can File Action Party under 21 Parent of party under 21 Sane party The guardian of the insane party / insane party while in a lucid interval Fraud Injured party Prescriptive Period Within 5 years after attaining 21 Before party reaches 21 Before the death of the insane party Does not prescribe Insane party Free cohabitation after insane regains sanity or during a lucid interval Who Ratifies Party under 21 How Ratified Free cohabitation after reaching 21

Within 5 years after the discovery of the fraud Within 5 years after the threat has passed Within 5 years after the marriage Within 5 years after the marriage

Injured party

Free cohabitation after discovery of the fraud Free cohabitation after the threat has passed Cannot be ratified Cannot be ratified

Force, Intimidation, or Undue influence Impotence of one party Serious STD of one party

Injured party

Injured party

Potent party Healthy party

n/a n/a

1. Grounds Family Code, Art. 45: grounds for the VOIDABILITY of marriages: (1) either party was BELOW 21 YEARS of age and has not obtained PARENTAL CONSENT at the time of the marriage, unless freely cohabiting until reaching 21 years of age; (2) either party was INSANE at the time of the marriage, unless freely cohabiting after coming to reason; (3) a marriage obtained through FRAUD, unless the defrauded party continues to cohabit with the other after learning of the fraud; (4) a marriage obtained through FORCE, INTIMIDATION or UNDUE INFLUENCE, unless the injured party continues to cohabit after the threat has passed; (5) IMPOTENCY of one of the parties; (6) the presence of a SERIOUS or INCURABLE sexually-transmitted disease in one of the parties. Same, Art. 46: the ff. constitutes FRAUD as grounds for annulment: (1) concealment of CONVICTION of a crime involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment of PREGNANCY from a man other than the husband; (3) concealment of an STD existing at the time of the contraction; (4) concealment of HOMOSEXUALITY, DRUG ADDICTION, or ALCOHOLISM existing at the time of the contraction. NO OTHER misrepresentation as to chastity, rank, wealth, etc. will be allowed. Same, Art. 47: ACTION for annulment may be instituted by: (1) the party WHO DID NOT OBTAIN PARENTAL CONSENT, within 5 years; or by his or her PARENTS OR GUARDIAN, before he or she reaches 21 years of age; (2) the SANE SPOUSE who must have had no knowledge of the insanity before the marriage, or by the INSANE SPOUSE during a lucid interval; (3) by the DEFRAUDED PARTY within 5 years of learning of the fraud; (4) by the THREATENED PARTY within 5 years after the threat has passed; (5) by the POTENT or HEALTHY party within 5 years after the marriage. Same, Art. 48: OSG must take steps to PREVENT COLLUSION between parties seeking annulment. Revised Penal Code, Art. 344: Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, and other sexual crimes the crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the OFFENDED SPOUSE. Moe v. Dinkins: the denial of marriage to minors without first obtaining parental consent is justified by the State's interest to protect: (1) children's peculiar VULNERABLITY; (2) their INABILITY to make decisions in a mature and informed manner; and (3) to uphold the ROLE OF PARENTS in child-rearing.

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Katipunan v. Tenorio: insanity appearing only AFTER the contraction of marriage is not a ground for annulment. Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay: insanity that developed years BEFORE and still existing at the contraction of a marriage is a valid ground for annulment. Buccat v. Buccat: 7 MONTHS' PREGNANCY cannot be possibly concealed, thus it cannot constitute fraud as a ground for annulment. Aquino v. Delizo: 4 MONTHS' PREGNANCY however, can be concealed, thus constituting fraud as a ground for annulment. Anaya v. Palaroan: non-disclosure of previous EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONSHIPS cannot constitute fraud as a ground for annulment. Ruiz v. Atienza: for force or intimidation to be considered as a ground for annulment, it must be proven to be SUFFICIENTLY GRAVE as to leave the injured party with no other alternatives. Jimenez v. Canizares: in the absence of proof, or in the unwillingness of one of the parties to be medically examined, the presumption is in favor of POTENCY. Sarao v. Guevara: IMPOTENCY is defined as the INABILITY TO COPULATE as opposed to the inability to procreate. People v. Santiago: right after the commission of a rape there still exists an element of DURESS, thus any marriage arising from it is VOIDABLE. 2. Marriage When One Spouse is Absent

Table 5: Comparison of old and new rules on marriage when one spouse is absent (class notes) Rules Waiting Period Effect of Good Faith Cause Judicial Decree Civil Code 7 years 4 years if in danger Good faith can shorten the waiting period Absent spouse is generally reputed to be dead Judicial decree of absence is not required Family Code 4 years 2 years if in danger Good faith has no bearing on the waiting period Present spouse has well-founded belief of the absent spouse's death Judicial decree of absence is required Recording of the reapperance in the local civil registry by any person By the absent spouse and any interested person (subsequent spouse, heirs, children, etc.) Automatically terminated upon recording

Appearance of Only the actual reapperance of the absent spouse is Absent Spouse required Action for Annulment Termination

Only by the absent spouse and both of the subsequent spouses Court proceeding is required

Family Code, Art. 41: BIGAMOUS marriages are VOID, unless the previous spouse has been absent for 4 YEARS, or in the case of dangerous circumstances, 2 YEARS, provided there is a well-founded belief of the death of the absent spouse. If the present spouse wishes to remarry, he or she must initiate a summary proceeding for a DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH of the absent spouse. Same, Art. 42: (1) subsequent marriages contracted in Art. 41 is TERMINATED by the recording of an affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse; (2) the affidavit may be recorded by the returning spouse, or any interested person; (3) due notice of the recording must be sent to the subsequent spouses; (4) the fact of reappearance may be referred to the courts if it is disputed; (5) the automatic termination will not apply if the previous marriage has been declared void. Same, Art. 43: EFFECTS of nullity (1) children born before the termination of the subsequent marriage shall be considered LEGITIMATE; (2) the ACP or CPG is LIQUIDATED, PARTITIONED, and DELIVERED to each of the spouses in equitable shares, bad faith spouses will get NO SHARE, except those earned through his or her own industry and hard work; (3) DONATIONS will still remain valid, except those made to the bad faith spouse, where they can be revoked; (4) the bad faith spouse is removed from the innocent spouse's INSURANCE POLICY; (5) the bad faith spouse is also disqualified from INHERITING from the innocent spouse through testate or intestate succession. Same, Art. 44: If both spouses acted in BAD FAITH, then their marriage will be deemed VOID AB INITIO. Civil Code, Art. 83(2): SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGES are void ab initio, unless: (2) The first spouse had been absent for 7 CONSECUTIVE YEARS at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present

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having news of the absentee being alive; or if the absentee, though he has been absent for LESS THAN 7 YEARS, is GENERALLY CONSIDERED as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage; or if the absentee is PRESUMED dead. The marriage so contracted shall be VALID in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a competent court. Same, Art. 85(2): the ff. are grounds for ANNULMENT: (2) in a subsequent marriage under Art. 83(2), that the former spouse believed to be dead WAS IN FACT LIVING and the marriage with such former spouse was then in force. Same, Art. 87(2): action for ANNULMENT: (2) for causes mentioned in Art. 85(2), by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime; or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other. Revised Penal Code, Art. 349: Bigamy is committed by any person who contracts a subsequent marriage before the dissolution of the prior subsisting marriage. Punishable by prision mayor. Jones v. Hortigela: the duration of the absence of the spouse is computed from the time he or she was LAST SEEN or HEARD OF, and not from the time the judicial declaration of presumptive death was issued. 3. Effects of Pending Action or Decree Family Code, Art. 49: while the action for annulment is pending, and there is NO WRITTEN AGREEMENT between the spouses, the court shall provide for the moral and material welfare of their common children. The choice of the children as to which parent to stay with shall be given consideration. Same, Art. 50: aside from liquidation, partition, and delivery of the marital properties, the declaration of nullity also provides for the CUSTODY of common children and the delivery of their legitimes. All CREDITORS of the spouses are also notified of the separation of their property. Same, Art. 51: in the partition, the LEGITIMES of the children shall be delivered in cash, properties or sound securities, unless it is provided in a judicially approved mutual agreement. This does not prejudice their successional rights, and this may be requested by the children's guardian or the administrator of the conjugal properties. Same, Art. 52: the partitioning of the conjugal properties is REGISTERED in the appropriate Civil Registry or Property Registry, otherwise the partition will not apply to third persons. Same, Art. 53: either of the former spouses may REMARRY, after complying with the requirements above. Otherwise, the subsequent marriage will be void. Same, Art. 54: children born before an annulment under Art. 53 are LEGITIMATE. Civil Code, Art. 369: children conceived before the decree of annulment shall principally use the SURNAME OF THE FATHER. Same, Art. 371: in the case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the GUILTY party, she SHALL resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the INNOCENT party, she MAY resume her maiden name and surname. She may choose to continue using her husband's name unless: (1) the court declares otherwise; (2) she or the former husband remarries. 4. Jurisdiction Tamano v. Ortiz: both civil and Muslim marriages can be tried at a Regional Trial Court. Civil marriages are covered by the Family Code regardless of the contracting parties' religions. VI. LEGAL SEPARATION A. Grounds Family Code, Art. 55: GROUNDS for legal separation: (1) repeated VIOLENCE or ABUSE to a spouse or their common children; (2) the use of force or coercion in order to change the RELIGIOUS or POLITICAL affiliation of a spouse or common children; (3) an attempt to induce the wife or children to PROSTITUTION; (4) IMPRISONMENT for more than 6 years; (5) habitual ALCOHOLISM or DRUG ADDICTION; (6) HOMOSEXUALITY; (7) the contracting of a BIGAMOUS marriage; (8) sexual INFIDELITY or PERVERSION; (9) an ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE of the spouse by the other; (10) ABANDONMENT without cause for more than a year. Civil Code, Art. 97: GROUNDS for legal separation: (1) adultery on the part of the wife, or concubinage on the part of the husband, as defined in the Revised Penal Code; (2) an attempt by one spouse on the life of the other. People v. Zapata and Bondoc: each act of infidelity by the wife counts as a SEPARATE OFFENSE of adultery, as defined by the Revised Penal Code. Muoz v. Del Barrio: physical violence is not a ground for legal separation BEFORE the enactment of the Family Code. Gandionco v. Pearanda: conviction for concubinage is NOT NECESSARY for the filing of the petition for legal separation. Lapuz-Sy v. Eufemio: death of the petitioner TERMINATES the proceedings for legal separation.

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Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz: ABANDONMENT is defined as the LACK OF INTENTION to return to the conjugal home, without justifiable cause. Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong: REPEATED PHYSICAL VIOLENCE as well as verbal abuse are valid grounds for legal separation under the Family Code. B. Defenses Family Code, Art. 56: DEFENSES against legal separation: (1) CONDONEMENT of the act complained of, after its commission; (2) CONSENT prior to the act complained of; (3) CONNIVANCE in the commission of the act; (5) COLLUSION in trying to obtain a decree; (4) RECRIMINATION of the innocent spouse; (6) PRESCRIPTION. People v. Sansano: telling the guilty spouse "You can see whoever you want," amounts to the CONDONEMENT of the act. Ocampo v. Florenciano: admission of the guilty spouse of their acts, by itself, does not amount to COLLUSION. Sargent v. Sargent: active participation of the husband in trying to induce the wife to commit adultery constitutes CONNIVANCE. Brown v. Yambao: inaction of the wife despite the petitioner husband's infidelity constitutes COLLUSION Willan v. Willan: lack of resistance by the husband from the wife's physical abuse and forcible sexual intercourse constitutes CONDONEMENT. Ginez v. Bugayong: sexual intercourse by the couple after the husband's knowledge of the wife's infidelity constitutes CONDONEMENT. Matubis v. Praxedes: a written agreement signed by the couple before a de facto separation attesting to their non-interference in each other's affairs counts as CONSENT to each other's extra-marital affairs. C. When to File or Try Actions Family Code, Art. 57: the action for legal separation PRESCRIBES within 5 YEARS of the occurrence of the ground. Same, Art. 58: SIX-MONTH "COOL-OFF" period from filing the petition of legal separation to the actual start of the proceedings. Same, Art. 59: no decree of legal separation shall be issued unless the court has taken steps to RECONCILE the spouses, despite its impossibility. Same, Art. 60: legal separation cannot be granted on STIPULATION OF FACTS or CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT. OSG must take steps to ensure that COLLUSION between the spouses does not take place. Ocampo v. Florenciano: admission of the guilty spouse of their acts, by itself, does not amount to COLLUSION. Contreras v. Macaraig: prescriptive period for filing action of legal separation is computed from the time of the DEFINITIVE cognizance of the other party's guilty act. Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta: the six-month cool-off period DOES NOT BAR legal actions outside of legal separation. D. Effects of Filing of Petition Family Code, Art. 61: effects of FILING OF PETITION husband and wife are entitled to live separately from each other, and in the absence of a prior agreement, the court appoints either of the spouses or a third party to be the administrator of the marital properties. Same, Art. 62: Art. 49 will apply concerning the SUPPORT and CUSTODY of children during the pendency of the action. De La Via v. Villareal: spouses are entitled to his or her own DOMICILE separate from each other during the pendency of the action. Reyes v. Ines-Luciano: the unemployed spouse is entitled to an alimony during the pendency of the action, regardless of allegations of bad faith. E. Effects of Decree Family Code, Art. 63: EFFECTS of LEGAL SEPARATION: (1) husband and wife are entitled to live apart from each other, although marital bonds still SUBSIST; (2) ACP or CPG is DISSOLVED and LIQUIDATED, and the offending spouse is not entitled to his or her share in the net profits of the properties; (3) CUSTODY of minor children passes to the innocent spouse, subject to Art. 213 of the Family Code; (4) the offending spouse CANNOT INHERIT from the innocent spouse from intestate succession, and any wills created before the decree are revoked by operation of the law. Same, Art. 64: DONATIONS to the offending spouse may be revoked within 5 years of the decree, and INSURANCE POLICIES where the offending spouse is listed as a beneficiary may be revoked even if the policy is stipulated as irrevocable. Insurance Code, Sec. 11: the insured shall have the right to change the beneficiary he designated in the policy, unless he has expressly waived this right in said policy.

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Baez v. Baez: partitioning of the marital properties and custody of the common children are INCIDENTS of the decree of legal separation and MULTIPLE APPEALS assailing each of the decisions is not allowed. 1. Dissolution and Liquidation of ACP or CPG La Rue v. La Rue: theory of equitable distribution homemaker services are valid contributions to the conjugal properties, subject to the following conditions: (1) that it is NOT LIMITED to the possessory interest of a real estate; (2) that it depends on the QUALITY of the services rendered, whether the wife has been frugal or excessive in her expenses; (3) the age and health of the wife, as well as the LENGTH of the marriage. 2. Custody Family Code, Art. 213: PARENTAL AUTHORITY is exercised by the spouse designated by the court; children OVER 7 YEARS of age choose which parent to stay with, unless the court finds that parent unfit; and no child BELOW 7 YEARS of age will be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to decide otherwise. 3. Other Effects Civil Code, Art. 372: when legal separation has been granted, the wife SHALL continue using her name and surname employed BEFORE the legal separation. Matute v. Macadalo: the children's choice of parent is overruled because the parent is UNABLE TO SUPPORT HERSELF. Laperal v. Republic: legal separation does not dissolve marital bonds, thus the wife must still use her MARRIED NAME and surname. F. Reconciliation 1. How Done Family Code, Art. 65: reconciliation is effected by a JOINT MANIFESTATION filed in the same court where the decree of legal separation was issued or is still pending. 2. Effects Family Code, Art. 66: EFFECTS of reconciliation: (1) terminates the proceedings of legal separation, if unfinished, or sets aside the decree of legal separation, if issued; (2) separation of properties as set by the decree of legal separation still subsists, as well as any forfeiture of donations, unless both parties agree to return to the previous regime of separation of properties. Same, Art. 67: PREVIOUS property regime shall be executed under oath, and shall specify: (1) the NEW CONTRIBUTIONS to the restored regime; (2) those RETAINED as separate properties; (3) the names of all their known CREDITORS and the respective amounts due them.

VII. DIVORCES A. Foreign Divorces Civil Code, Art. 15: NATIONALITY THEORY of applicability of laws laws relating to FAMILY RIGHTS AND DUTIES, or to STATUS, CONDITION and LEGAL CAPACITY of persons are binding upon all citizens of the Philippines, EVEN THOUGH LIVING ABROAD. Family Code, Art. 26: LEX LOCI CELEBRATIONIS all marriages celebrated outside of the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they are solemnized and valid there, as such SHALL ALSO BE VALID in this country, except those marriages under Arts. 35(1), (4), (5), (6), 36, 37, and 38. Van Dorn v. Romillo: in marriages between a Filipino and an American, American divorces dissolving those marriages are valid with respect to American citizens, and although the case was decided before the Family Code, the court decreed its validity ALSO with respect to the Filipino, to prevent an UNJUST situation of one spouse being able to remarry while the other cannot. Quita v. Dandan: a Filipino expatriate, upon obtaining a foreign citizenship AT THE TIME OF THE FOREIGN DIVORCE, is no longer bound by the laws of the Philippines, thus making the divorce VALID, provided that the divorce is also valid where they obtained it. Llorente v. CA: Filipinos acquiring foreign citizenship through naturalization can obtain a valid foreign divorce. Garcia v. Recio: the nature of foreign laws and decrees MUST FIRST BE PROVEN, for instance, whether a foreign divorce is limited or absolute, before they can be declared valid in this jurisdiction. B. Muslim Divorces Code of Muslim Personal Laws, Art. 45: divorce is the DISSOLUTION OF THE MARRIAGE BOND in accordance with this Code, to be granted only after exhaustion of all possible means of reconciliation between the spouses. Yasin v. Shari'a District Court: divorce HAS THE EFFECT OF DISSOLVING MARITAL BONDS, and consequently, a wife can use her maiden name and surname without any special proceeding from the court. VIII. DE FACTO SEPARATION

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Family Code, Art. 100: separation in fact WILL NOT AFFECT the ACP, except that: (1) the spouse who abandons does NOT have the right to be supported; (2) when the consent of the other spouse is required for transactions, judicial AUTHORIZATION must be obtained; (3) if the ACP is INSUFFICIENT, the separate properties of the spouses will be used for support, and the present spouse will administer those separate properties upon judicial declaration. Same, Art. 127: separation in fact WILL NOT AFFECT the CPG, except that: (1) the spouse who abandons does NOT have the right to be supported; (2) when the consent of the other spouse is required for transactions, judicial AUTHORIZATION must be obtained; (3) if the CPG is INSUFFICIENT, the separate properties of the spouses will be used for support, and the present spouse will administer those separate properties upon judicial declaration. Same, Art. 239: judicial authorization for consent to transactions a verified PETITION must first be filed alleging the foregoing facts. Attached with the petition is a PROPOSED DEED embodying the transaction, otherwise, a statement of reasons and the details of the transaction will suffice. Same, Art. 242: upon filing of the petition, the other spouse will be notified TO SHOW CAUSE why petition should not be granted, and to set a venue for the parties' INITIAL CONFERENCE. This notice is accomplished by a copy of the petition, and to be sent at the last known address of the other spouse. Same, Art. 246: if there is no agreement at the initial conference, then the petition will be decided at a SUMMARY HEARING on the basis of affidavits, testimonies, and other pertinent evidence in favor or against the proposed deed. Same, Art. 247: judgment of the court shall be immediately executory and final. Perez v. CA: de facto separation does not provide for the CUSTODY of common children. Estrada v. Escritor: despite the presence of a Jehovah Witness "pledge of faithfulness" amounting to marriage, each of the spouses are PRESUMED to be separated in fact without a decree of legal separation stating otherwise.

IX. RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and Respect Revised Penal Code, Art. 247: DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES any married person, who having surprised his spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person not her spouse, shall kill any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If inflicted lesser physical injuries instead, then he shall be exempt from criminal liability. This article shall also apply to daughters with respect to their fathers, provided that he himself has not induced the daughter into prostitution. Same, Art. 266-A: RAPE: WHEN AND HOW COMMITTED rape is committed: (1) by A MAN who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (a) through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (d) when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (2) by ANY PERSON who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Same, Art. 266-C: EFFECT OF PARDON the subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. [2] In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. Family Code, Art. 68: OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES (1) COHABITATION; (2) mutual LOVE, respect, and fidelity; (3) mutual HELP and support. Civil Code, Art. 34: failure of a police or peace officer in protecting a citizen from danger makes him or her CIVILLY AND ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE. Municipalities or departments in charge shall also be subsidiarily liable. RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Children Act), Sec. 6: ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN the crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; (b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (c) attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm; (d) placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm; (e) attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting

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the woman's or her child's movement or conduct: (1) threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family; (2) depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right; and (4) preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties. (f) inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions; (g) causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family; (h) engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;(2) peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) engaging in any form of harassment or violence. (i) causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children. Same, Sec. 26: BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code. Narag v. Narag: obligation to cohabit is NOT PUNISHABLE, but failure to do so constitutes immorality. Goitia v. Campos Rueda: the spouse who has justifiably abandoned the conjugal home is still obliged to be supported by the remaining spouse. Warren v. State: marital rape is a violation of the wife's INDIVIDUAL DIGNITY and cannot be justified based on the status of marriage. Thurman v. City of Torrington: POLICE PROTECTION is a right afforded to all persons under the Equal Protection Clause. People v. Liberta: statutes with MARITAL EXEMPTIONS are irrationally underinclusive as there is no fundamental difference between married and unmarried victims of rape. B. Fixing the Family Domicile Family Code, Art. 69: BOTH SPOUSES FIX THE FAMILY DOMICILE. In case of disagreement, the court will decide. Except: (1) if one spouse is living abroad; (2) for other valid and compelling reasons. Tenchavez v. Escano: a spouse's refusal to stay with the other does not give rise to moral damages. Cohabitation/consortium should be from the SPONTANEOUS ACT of the spouses, and not from compulsion. Dadivas v. Villanueva: if the wife leaves the domicile through the INFIDELITY of the husband, then she is still entitled to support from the latter. Garcia v. Santiago: same as the above, except if the cause is THREATS from the husband. Atilano v. Chua Eng Beng: if the cause of abandonment is mere FAMILY MISUNDERSTANDING, then the wife forfeits the right to be supported. Del Rosario v. Del Rosario: FAMILY MISUNDERSTANDING is held to be a valid cause, as long as it is attributable to one spouse, and not just from other relatives. C. Mutual Help and Support Family Code, Art. 68: OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES (1) COHABITATION; (2) mutual LOVE, respect, and fidelity; (3) mutual HELP and support. Same, Art. 70: both spouses JOINTLY SUPPORTS the family from: (1) ACP/CPG; (2) the fruits of their separate properties; (3) their separate properties. Same, Art. 199: MULTIPLE PROVIDERS OF SUPPORT ORDER OF PRIORITY (1) spouse; (2) descendants in the nearest degree; (3) ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) siblings. Same, Art. 200: MULTIPLE RECEPIENTS OF SUPPORT ORDER OF PRIORITY (1) children, or spouse in the absence of children; (2) other descendants; (3) ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) siblings. Civil Code, Art. 111: the HUSBAND is responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, from: (1) CPG; (2) husband's capital; (3) wife's paraphernal property. [2] In case of separation of property, both spouses are to contribute proportionally. McGuire v. McGuire: husband is the sole authority in matters concerning support and family maintenance. Pelayo v. Lauron: husband has priority over ascendants for the wife's medical expenses during childbirth. D. Management of the Household Family Code, Art. 71: BOTH SPOUSES have the right and duty to the management of the household.

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Civil Code, Art. 115: WIFE manages the affairs of the household. The purchase of jewelry and other precious objects is voidable, unless approved by the husband, or paid from the wife's paraphernal properties. Young v. Hector: both or either spouse may manage the affairs of the household, but it should be out of MUTUAL AGREEMENT rather than unilateral action by one spouse whenever it is convenient for him or her. E. Exercise of Profession Family Code, Art. 73: either spouse may exercise ANY PROFESSION without the need of consent from the other. [2] If one spouse objects, the objection must be based on valid, serious, and moral grounds. [2] In case of disagreement, the court can only decide whether or not: (1) the objection is proper; (2) the benefit prior to the objection shall be charged to the ACP/CPG, and benefit after the objection shall be charged to exclusive properties. Civil Code, Art. 117: the wife may exercise any profession or occupation, or engage in business. However, the HUSBAND MAY OBJECT, provided: (1) his income is sufficient for the family according to its social standing; (2) his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. [2] In case of disagreement, the family council will be consulted. RA 7192 (Women in Development and Nation-Building Act), Sec. 5: EQUALITY IN CAPACITY TO ACT women of legal age, regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men under similar circumstances. [2] In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to act, married women shall have equal rights. To this end: (1) women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangement under the same conditions as men; (2) women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non-material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs; (3) women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and (4) married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses. [3] In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect be equal to those of men under similar circumstances. Same, Sec. 6: EQUAL MEMBERSHIP IN CLUBS women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization. Same, Sec. 7: ADMISSION TO MILITARY SCHOOLS any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the standards required for men except for those minimum essential adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes. F. Use of Surname Civil Code, Art. 370: a MARRIED WOMAN may use: (1) her maiden first name and surname + husband's surname; (2) her maiden first name + husband's surname; (3) her husband's full name, prefixed by "Mrs." Same, Art. 373: a WIDOW may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living. Same, Art. 377: USURPATION of a name or surname may be the subject of an action for damages. Same, Art. 378: the UNAUTHORIZED or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action. Silva v. Peralta: a woman not validly married to another man CANNOT USE HIS SURNAME, and doing so will give rise to damages, even if good faith is alleged. Tolentino v. CA: divorced wives CAN STILL USE THEIR FORMER HUSBANDS' SURNAMES under the Civil Code. Yasin v. Shari'a District Court: divorce has the effect of dissolving marital bonds, and consequently, a wife can use her MAIDEN NAME AND SURNAME without any special proceeding from the court. G. Relief from Courts Family Code, Art. 72: when one of the spouses NEGLECTS A DUTY to the conjugal union or COMMITS ACTS which tend to bring danger, dishonor, or injury to the other spouse or to the rest of the family, the injured party may apply to the proper court for RELIEF. Perez v. Perez: courts have NO JURISDICTION over matters of refusal or overt acts of a spouse causing moral damages to the family. Claim for material damages must be economic in nature. Arroyo v. Vazquez: courts CANNOT ISSUE AN INJUNCTION to compel a wife who abandons the conjugal home.

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X. PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES A. General Provisions Family Code, Art. 74: property relations between the spouses are GOVERNED by the ff. in this order: (1) marriage settlements executed before the marriage; (2) the Family Code; (3) local customs. Same, Art. 75: the future spouses may agree on ACP, CPG, complete separation of property, or any other regime. Otherwise, ACP WILL APPLY. Same, Art. 76: MODIFICATIONS to marriage settlements must be made BEFORE the marriage, and subject to Arts. 66, 67, 128, 135, and 136. Same, Art. 77: marriage settlements MUST BE IN WRITING, signed by the parties, and executed before the marriage. It will not affect THIRD PERSONS unless recorded in the proper registries. Same, Art. 78: MINORS (18-20 years of age) can also enter into settlements, but it is valid only if their parents or guardians are also made parties to the agreement. Same, Art. 79: for the civilly interdicted and other INCAPACITATED persons, it is indispensable for their court-appointed guardians to be made a party to the agreement. Same, Art. 80: Nationality Theory on Property Relations in the absence of contrary stipulations, these are governed by PHILIPPINE LAWS, regardless of the place of marriage or their residence, except: (1) if both spouses are ALIENS; (2) with respect to extrinsic validity of contracts affecting property NOT SITUATED in the Philippines; and (3) contracts entered into in the Philippines but affecting properties in countries which require different formalities for extrinsic validity. Same, Art. 81: everything stipulated in the settlements, including donations, are rendered VOID IF THE MARRIAGE DOES NOT TAKE PLACE. However, stipulations not related to the marriage are valid. Collector v. Fisher: PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTION: when the applicable foreign law cannot be proven, then they are presumed to be the same with Philippine Law. Thus in the absence of a marriage settlement, the spouses are presumed to have adopted conjugal partnership. B. Donations Table 6: Comparison between ordinary donations and donations propter nuptias (Sempio-Diy) Ordinary Donations Express acceptance is necessary. Cannot be made by minors. Cannot include future property. No limits to donation of present property as long as legitimes are not impaired. Grounds for revocation found in the Civil Code. Donations propter nuptias (DPN) Does not require express acceptance. May be made by minors (Art. 78). May include future property (same rule as wills). If present property is donated, and not ACP, then limited to 1/5 of current property. Grounds for revocation found in Art. 86.

1. Requisites for Donations Family Code, Art. 82: DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS are those which are made [1] before the celebration of the marriage; [2] in consideration of the same; [3] and in favor of one or both of the spouses. Same, Art. 83: these donations are governed by Title III, Book III of the Civil Code in so far as NOT MODIFIED by the Family Code. Domalagan v. Bolifer: Non-celebration of the marriage that is considered by the DPN makes it VOID. Serrano v. Solomon: DPN should be made to the SPOUSES ONLY and not to third persons, such as children or other relatives. Future property can only be donated thru DPN or wills. Solis v. Barroso: DPN of real property should be recorded in a PUBLIC INSTRUMENT, and they DO NOT CREATE ANY OBLIGATION. They are not contracts. Mateo v. Lagua: DPN may be reduced if it prejudices the donor's heirs. 2. Donation propter nuptias of Present or Future Property Family Code, Art. 84: if the spouses are not ACP, then they are limited to donating not more than 1/5 OF PRESENT PROPERTY. Any excess is void. [2] Donations of FUTURE PROPERTY are governed by provisions on testamentary succession. Same, Art. 85: donations propter nuptias of PROPERTIES WITH ENCUMBRANCES are valid. In case of foreclosure and the property is sold for LESS than the amount secured, then the donee is not liable for the deficiency. If MORE, then the excess goes to the donee.

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3. Grounds for Revocation of Donation propter nuptias Family Code, Art. 86: DPN may be revoked when the ff. grounds occur: (1) NON-CELEBRATION or judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage, except if the donation is made in marriage settlements under Art. 81; (2) if the marriage is made by a MINOR WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT; (3) ANNULMENT of the marriage and the donee is held in bad faith; (4) LEGAL SEPARATION, and the donee is the guilty party; (5) if with OTHER RESULTORY CONDITIONS and they are not fulfilled; (6) acts of INGRATITUDE. Same, Art. 87: gifts or donations made INTER VIVOS DURING THE MARRIAGE are void, except moderate gifts. This also applies to live-in partners. 4. Void Donations Nazareno v. Birog: DPN made AFTER the marriage and to other family members are void. Matabuena v. Cervantes: donations inter vivos BETWEEN LIVE-IN PARTNERS are void. Harding v. Commercial Union: actions to DECLARE DONATIONS VOID can only be initiated by the spouses themselves or by interested persons. MODERACY OF GIFTS must be proven by the circumstances and social standing of the spouses. Sumbad v. CA: marriage of the parties at the time of the donation MUST FIRST BE PROVEN before the donation can be declared void. Ching v. Goyanko: sales of property BETWEEN LIVE-IN PARTNERS are void. C. System of Absolute Community 1. General Provisions Family Code, Art. 88: ACP begins on the PRECISE MOMENT of the celebration of the marriage. Any stipulation as to the commencement at any other time is void. Same, Art. 89: NO WAIVER of rights, interests, shares, and effects of the ACP DURING THE MARRIAGE can be made, except in case of judicial separation of property. Same, Art. 90: CO-OWNERSHIP applies to ACP in matters not covered by the FC. 2. What Constitutes Community Property Family Code, Art. 91: ALL PRESENT AND FUTURE PROPERTIES of the spouses belong to the ACP, unless otherwise provided in the marriage settlements. Same, Art. 92: the ff. are EXCLUDED from the ACP: (1) property acquired during the marriage by GRATUITOUS TITLE and its income, by one of the spouses, unless otherwise stated by the donor; (2) property for EXCLUSIVE and PERSONAL USE of one of the spouses, except jewelry; (3) property acquired by either spouse who has LEGITIMATE DESCENDANTS from a previous marriage, and its income. Same, Art. 93: property acquired during the marriage is PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE ACP, unless proven as one of those excluded. 3. Charges Upon the ACP Table 7: Categorization of ACP charges (class notes) Debts & Obligations (2) by the administrator-spouse for the benefit of the family / by both spouses / by one spouse with the consent of the other (3) by one spouse without the consent of the other for the benefit of the family Taxes & Expenses (4) maintenance of ACP properties Support (1) support of spouses and common children

(5) mere preservation of exclusive properties used by the family

(6) education of spouses, absolute

(7) antenuptial debts for the benefit of the (10) litigation expenses, unless the suit (8) education of common children, only for family is groundless value of donation (9) antenuptial debts not beneficial to the family, and exclusive properties of the debtor-spouse is insufficient

Family Code, Art. 94: the ACP is LIABLE for: (1) SUPPORT of the spouses, their common children, and the legitimate of either spouse; (2) all debts and obligations contracted by the administrator-spouse during the marriage for the BENEFIT of the community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other; (3) or those made WITHOUT CONSENT of the other spouse, to the extent that the family may have benefited; (4) TAXES, liens, charges, and repairs of the community property; (5) taxes and expenses for MERE PRESERVATION of the separate property of either spouse that is also used by the

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family; (6) expenses made to enable either spouse to obtain a professional or vocational degree or any other activity for self-improvement; (7) ante-nuptial debts in so far as they have redounded for the benefit of the family; (8) the value of what is donated by both spouses in favor of the education of their common children, or legitimate children of either spouse; (9) ante-nuptial debts not covered by (7), the support of illegitimate children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouses by reason of a crime or quasi-delict, when in case the separate properties are not sufficient to cover the above items, the payment of which are considered as advances from the share of the debtor-spouse upon dissolution of the community; (10) expenses for LITIGATION between the spouses, unless the suit is found to be groundless. If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing liabilities, except (9), the spouses are SOLIDARILY liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties. Same, Art. 95: whatever is lost through legal or illegal GAMBLING is borne by the loser and is not deducted from the ACP. Any winnings are added to the ACP. 4. Ownership and Disposition of the ACP Family Code, Art. 96: ADMINISTRATION of the ACP belongs to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision prevails, subject to recourse by the wife to the courts for proper remedy, within 5 years from the date of the decision. [2] In case of INCAPACITY of one spouse, the capacitated spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF THE COURT, or written authority of the other spouse. Otherwise, the disposition is void. However, the transaction is considered as a CONTINUING OFFER until perfected by the acceptance of the court or the other spouse, or until the offer is withdrawn. Same, Art. 97: either spouse may dispose of his interest in the ACP through a will. Same, Art. 98: DONATIONS FROM THE ACP are not allowed without the consent of the other spouse, except moderate donations for charity, family rejoicing, and emergency purposes. 5. Dissolution Family Code, Art. 99: the ACP TERMINATES: (1) upon DEATH of either spouse; (2) LEGAL SEPARATION of the spouses; (3) JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY under Arts. 134-138. Same, Art. 100: SEPARATION IN FACT will not affect the ACP, except that: (1) the spouse who abandons does NOT have the right to be supported; (2) when the consent of the other spouse is required for transactions, judicial AUTHORIZATION must be obtained; (3) if the ACP is INSUFFICIENT, the separate properties of the spouses will be used for support, and the present spouse will administer those separate properties upon judicial declaration. Same, Art. 101: if a spouse ABANDONS without just cause or FAILS to comply with family obligations, the aggrieved spouse may ask for receivership, judicial separation of property, or for sole administratorship of the ACP, subject to precautionary measures. [2] The obligations refer to marital, parental, or property obligations. [3] A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or she leaves the conjugal home without intention of returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for 3 MONTHS or failed to give information as to whereabouts during the same period is prima facie presumed to have no intention of returning. 6. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities Family Code, Art. 102: PROCEDURE for the dissolution of ACP: (1) an INVENTORY listing separately all exclusive and community property of the spouses is prepared; (2) DEBTS and obligations of the ACP are paid out of its assets, and in the case of insufficiency, the spouses are solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties; (3) the REMAINDER OF EXCLUSIVE properties are delivered to them; (4) REMAINDER OF ACP constitutes its assets, and is DIVIDED EQUALLY between husband and wife, unless there is a different division agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or there has been a voluntary waiver. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to FORFEITURE subject to Arts. 43(2) and 63(2), the said profits shall be the increase in the market value between the time of celebration and dissolution of the ACP; (5) presumptive LEGITIMES of common children are delivered upon partition under Art. 51; (6) unless otherwise agreed upon, the conjugal dwelling and its lot is adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children chose to stay with. Children below 7 are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court rules otherwise. If there is no majority of children, then the court will decide. Same, Art. 103: dissolution of the ACP by death of one spouse is effected by: [1] judicial settlement of the ESTATE of the deceased; [2] ORDINARY ACTION for partition; [3] or EXTRAJUDICIAL partition, all within ONE YEAR of the death of the deceased spouse. If the surviving spouse remarries without complying with these requirements, a MANDATORY regime of complete separation is imposed on the subsequent marriage. Same, Art. 104: SIMULTANEOUS DISSOLUTION the respective capital, fruits, and income of each community are determined upon such proof as may be considered by the rules of evidence. In case of

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doubt, the ACP is divided between the different communities in proportion to their respective capital and duration. Oas v. Javillo: ACP terminates upon the death of a spouse, and all properties acquired by the surviving spouse afterwards BECOMES EXCLUSIVE, or becomes part of the ACP of the subsequent marriage. Viuda de Delizo v. Delizo: when the respective capitals of the marriages cannot be determined with mathematical certainty due to lack of sufficient evidence, then the DURATION of the marriages are taken into account. D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains Table 8: Comparison between ordinary partnership and conjugal partnership (Tolentino) Ordinary Partnership Nature of Existence Rules, Duration, and Purposes Division of Fruits Management According to the will of the parties, and upon agreement in an ordinary contract Determined by the will of the parties Proportional to the capital of the parties Partners have equal rights Conjugal Partnership Independent of the will of the parties, and from the mere fact of marriage Determined by law Equal between spouses Husband has slight predominance

1. General Provisions Family Code, Art. 105: if CPG, then the provisions of this Chapter are of SUPPLEMENTARY APPLICATION. Same, Art. 106: under CPG, the spouses place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits, and INCOME from their separate properties and those acquired thru their efforts or by chance, and upon dissolution of the marriage or of the CPG, the NET GAINS obtained shall be DIVIDED EQUALLY between them, unless otherwise provided in their marriage settlements. Same, Art. 107: Arts. 88 and 89 also apply to CPG. Same, Art. 108: CPG is governed by the rules on CONTRACT and PARTNERSHIP in all that is not in conflict with the Family Code or marriage settlements. 2. Exclusive Property Family Code, Art. 109: the ff. are EXCLUSIVE property, those which are: (1) brought to the marriage as HIS OR HER OWN; (2) acquired by either spouse through GRATUITOUS title, unless otherwise stated; (3) acquired by either spouse by redemption, barter, or EXCHANGE with property belonging to only one of the spouses; (4) purchased with the EXCLUSIVE MONEY of either spouse. Same, Art. 110: the spouses RETAIN ownership, possession, administration and enjoyment of their exclusive properties. Same, Art. 111: a spouse may DISPOSE of his or her exclusive property without the consent of the other spouse, and may appear alone in court to litigate with regard to the same. Same, Art. 112: the ALIENATION without the consent of the owner-spouse of his or her exclusive property that is administered by the other spouse automatically terminates that administration, and the proceeds are turned over to the owner-spouse. Same, Art. 113: property DONATED or left by will to the spouses, jointly and with designation of shares, pertains to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive property. Otherwise this is shared. Same, Art. 114: if donations are ONEROUS, charges are borne by the exclusive property of the donee-spouse, whenever advanced by the CPG. Same, Art. 115: RETIREMENT BENEFITS, pensions, annuities, gratuities, usufructs, etc. are governed by rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be proper in each case. Lim v. Garcia: property acquired through exchange with exclusive property are also exclusive, even if made during the marriage. Rodriguez v. De la Cruz: administrator-spouse of the other spouse's exclusive property cannot dispose of them by donation. People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Register of Deeds: administratorship of one spouse's exclusive property can be DELEGATED TO A THIRD PARTY without need of consent from the other spouse. Philippine Sugar Estates v. Poizat: power-of-attorney cannot substitute the other spouse's consent in disposing of his or her exclusive property. Castro v. Miat: properties purchased on INSTALLMENT, even if completed after the death of a spouse, are not part of the surviving spouse's exclusive property.

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3. CPG a. Presumption that Property is Conjugal Family Code, Art. 116: all property acquired DURING THE MARRIAGE, whether made, contracted, or registered in the name of one spouse, are PRESUMED CONJUGAL unless the contrary is proven. Jocson v. CA: "x married to y" as it appears in land titles is not conclusive of the conjugal status of the property. Francisco v. CA: exclusive property brought into a second marriage remain exclusive property under CPG regime. ACP is not retroactive for marriages celebrated under the Civil Code. b. Properties that Compose the CPG Family Code, Art. 117: those acquired by: (1) onerous title AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CPG; (2) LABOR, industry, work, or profession of either spouse; (3) FRUITS, whether natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during the marriage from the COMMUNITY PROPERTY, as well as NET FRUITS from EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY; (4) share of either spouse in HIDDEN TREASURE; (5) occupations such as FISHING or hunting; (6) LIVESTOCK existing upon the dissolution of the CPG in excess of the number of each kind either spouse brings into the marriage; (7) CHANCE or gambling, however losses are borne exclusively by the loser-spouse. Zulueta v. Pan Am: MORAL DAMAGES arising from a contract paid from CPG, are also awarded to the CPG. Mendoza v. Reyes: loans contracted during the marriage are conjugal, and so is any property acquired therefrom. Villanueva v. IAC: property acquired through lucrative/gratuitous title during the marriage is exclusive if no proof as to its conjugality is presented. c. Property Purchased by Installment Family Code, Art. 118: if partly paid with conjugal funds, CONJUGAL if completed after the marriage, EXCLUSIVE if completed before the marriage. Any amount advanced is reimbursed by the owner-spouse to the conjugal partnership at the dissolution of the CPG. Castillo v. Pasco: ownership of property made through installment is vested in both spouses, but actual ownership is proportional to each spouse's contribution. Lorenzo v. Nicolas: even if the installment is completed after the marriage, the property is exclusive if ownership was vested in one spouse before the marriage. d. Rules on Improvement Family Code, Art. 120: IMPROVEMENTS MADE ON EXCLUSIVE LAND if ORIGINALVALUE > NEW VALUE (value of land + value of improvements + net change in value), then land remains exclusive. If ORIGINAL VALUE < NEW VALUE, then land becomes conjugal. This amount is reimbursed to the owner-spouse at the dissolution of the CPG. Civil Code, Art. 158: conjugal non-building improvements remain conjugal. REVERSE ACCESSION if the value of the conjugal improvement is greater than the value of the exclusive land on which it is built upon, then the land becomes conjugal. Subject to reimbursement. Calimlim-Canullas v. Fortun: change of ownership takes place at the time when the improvements are made. e. Charges upon the CPG Table 9: Categorization of CPG charges (class notes) Debts & Obligations (2) by the administrator-spouse for the benefit of the family / by both spouses / by one spouse with the consent of the other (3) by one spouse without the consent of the other for the benefit of the family Taxes & Expenses (4) maintenance of CPG properties Support (1) support of spouses and common children

(5) mere preservation of all exclusive properties

(6) education of spouses, absolute (8) education of common children, only for value of donation

(7) antenuptial debts for the benefit of the (9) litigation expenses, unless the suit family is groundless

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Family Code, Art. 121: Same as ACP rules, except: (5) expenses for MERE PRESERVATION can be made on ALL exclusive property, not just the ones used by the family; (9) covered by Art. 122. Same, Art. 122: PERSONAL DEBTS, fines, and indemnities of either spouse made before or during the marriage are NOT CHARGED on the CPG, except if the debtor-spouse has insufficient or no exclusive properties. Subject to reimbursement. Javier v. Osmena: debts incurred in the EXERCISE OF A SPOUSE'S PROFESSION are charged on the CPG. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin: debts incurred during the marriage are presumed to be conjugal and thus are charged on the CPG. DBP v. Adil: loan contracts signed by both spouses are conjugal, and they are jointly liable for payment, even if only one spouse signs a subsequent promissory note. Luzon Surety Co. v. De Garcia: debts incurred for the benefit of third persons are not charged on the CPG. Ayala Investment Co. v. Ching: benefit derived from a debt must be specifically and directly in favor of the family before charged on the CPG. Benefits such as increased prestige within the company, do not directly benefit the family. Carlos v. Abelardo: debts used for the purchase of the family home are CPG. Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman: debts incurred for the increase of capital investment for a family-owned business is charged on CPG. f. Administration of the CPG Family Code, Art. 124: ADMINISTRATION of CPG see Family Code, Art. 96. Same, Art. 125: DONATIONS from CPG see Family Code, Art. 98. Felipe v. Heirs of Aldon: disposal by the wife of CPG property without the husband's consent is void, and action for redemption does not prescribe. Tinitigan v. Tinitigan: under the Civil Code, the husband may still exercise administrative powers on the CPG even if the wife refuses. Wife may not lease out CPG property without husband's consent. Guiang v. CA: consent of both spouses is necessary, otherwise the disposal is void. Relucio v. Lopez: administratorship of CPG property cannot be given to third persons by one spouse without the other spouse's consent. Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa: offer for sale of CPG property must be agreed upon by vendee and both the vendor-spouses. g. Dissolution of the CPG Family Code, Art. 126: TERMINATION of the CPG see Family Code, Art. 99. Same, Art. 127: DE FACTO SEPARATION see Family Code, Art. 100. Same, Art. 128: ABANDONMENT and ABSENCE see Family Code, Art. 101. h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities Family Code, Art. 129: PROCEDURE for liquidation of CPG (1) INVENTORY; (2) payment of PERSONAL DEBTS are credited to CPG; (3) REIMBURSEMENT for acquisition of exclusive property through improvement by the CPG; (4) DEBTS OF CPG are paid out of its assets, otherwise both spouses are solidarily liable with their exclusive property; (5) REMAINDER of exclusive properties are delivered to respective owner-spouses; (6) LOSS or deterioration of exclusive property used for the benefit of the family due to fortuitous events is paid to ownerspouse by the CPG; (7) net remainder of CPG is DELIVERED EQUALLY to both spouses, unless otherwise stated in marriage settlements or if there has been a waiver; (8) presumptive LEGITIMES are delivered to common children in accordance with Art. 51; (9) CONJUGAL DWELLING goes to spouse with whom the majority of children are staying with. Same, Art. 130: LIQUIDATION UPON DEATH OF A SPOUSE see Family Code, Art. 103. Same, Art. 131: SIMULTANEOUS DISSOLUTION OF MULTIPLE CPGs see Family Code, Art. 104 Same, Art. 132: Rules of Court on administration of the estate of deceased persons are observed in the APPRAISAL and sale of CPG in matters not covered by the Family Code. Same, Art. 133: SUPPORT OF SURVIVING SPOUSE AND CHILDREN taken from their share in the CPG until the delivery is finished. Excess is deducted from that share. Santero v. CFI: support of illegitimate children are also covered, but not their mothers.

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E. Separation of Property and Administration of Common Property by One Spouse Table 10: Conditions for separate property regime (class notes) Separate Property Regime / Complete Separation of Property Marriage settlements When applicable Judicial decree: (1) Voluntary (2) Sufficient Cause Mandatory when previous marriage was not liquidated Legal separation 1. Judicial Separation of Property for Sufficient Cause Family Code, Art. 134: without marriage settlements, there can be NO SEPARATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT JUDICIAL ORDER. May either be voluntary or for sufficient cause. Same, Art. 135: GROUNDS FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY (1) civil interdiction; (2) declaration of absenteeism; (3) declaration of loss of parental authority; (4) abandonment or failure to comply with marital obligations in accordance with Art. 101; (5) abuse of administratorship; (6) de facto separation for more than 1 year, and reconciliation is highly improbable. Garcia v. Manzano: under the Civil Code, the husband can terminate administratorship of the wife anytime. Sufficient causes are intended for the wife's remedies in case of husband's abuse. Partosa-Jo v. CA: refusal of a spouse to the conjugal home constitutes abandonment by the refuser-spouse. Family Code rules on judicial separation of property are retroactive. Dela Cruz v. Dela Cruz: ABANDONMENT is defined as the LACK OF INTENTION to return to the conjugal home, without justifiable cause. 2. Voluntary Separation of Property Family Code, Art. 136: all creditors of the ACP/CPG are listed and notified. Court takes measures to protect creditors and other persons with pecuniary interests. In re: Voluntary Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of the Spouses Bermas: children from the previous undissolved CPG are interested parties to the dissolution of the subsequent CPG, therefore they should also be notified. Lacson v. San Jose: approval of the voluntary separation of property does not legalize a de facto separation between spouses. Maquilan v. Maquilan: voluntary separation of property may take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings for the same do not require the intervention of the Solicitor General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial separation of property. 3. Liquidation and Dissolution of Property Family Code, Art. 137: once separation of property has been declared, liquidation should be in conformity with the Family Code. Support during the pendency of the action is taken from ACP/CPG. Same, Art. 138: provisions on complete separation of property applies after dissolution of ACP/CPG. Same, Art. 139: petition and final judgment of separation of property must be filed in the appropriate registries. Same, Art. 140: separation of property must not prejudice the rights of creditors. Same, Art. 141: GROUNDS FOR RETURN TO PREVIOUS REGIME (1) CIVIL INTERDICTION terminates; (2) absentee REAPPEARS; (3) court is satisfied that ABUSE OF ADMINISTRATORSHIP WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN; (4) abandoning spouse RETURNS; (5) parental authority is REINSTATED; (6) de facto separation RECONCILES. Once the return to the previous regime has been granted after a voluntary separation, NO FURTHER VOLUNTARY SEPARATION may be allowed afterwards. 4. Sole Administratorship of Other Spouse's Property Family Code, Art. 142: TRANSFER OF ADMINISTRATORSHIP (1) GUARDIANSHIP of one spouse by the other; (2) declaration of ABSENTEEISM; (3) CIVIL INTERDICTION; (4) one

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spouse becomes a FUGITIVE. If the other spouse is not qualified, then the court appoints a third person as administrator. 5. Regime of Separate Property Family Code, Art. 143: the Family Code is suppletory. Same, Art. 144: separate property regime may refer to: [1] present or future property. [2] May be total or partial. [3] If partial, then non-separate property will be ACP. Same, Art. 145: each spouse owns his or her separate property WITHOUT NEED OF THE CONSENT of the other. Fruits and earnings from property or profession also belong to the spouses separately. Same, Art. 146: both spouses bear the FAMILY EXPENSES in proportion to their respective incomes, or to the market value of their respective properties if the income is insufficient. Liabilities incurred for family expenses are solidary. G. Property Regimes of Unions Without Marriage Table 11: Comparison between partnerships under Arts. 147 and 148 (Tolentino) 147 148

Status of Partners Capacitated to marry each other, or under void Incapacitated to marry each other, or married to third ab initio marriage persons Rules Followed Co-ownership Co-ownership Properties before the partnership, and fruits of their exclusive properties There must be actual joint contributions Ownership only to the extent of actual and proven joint contributions Bad faith partner has no share Properties Excluded Properties before the partnership, and fruits of their exclusive properties Ownership of Properties and Fruits Presumption of Partnership Status of Properties Partners in Bad Faith

Owned in common in equal shares Joint ownership is presumed

Bad faith partner has no share

Family Code, Art. 147: CAPACITATED PARTNERS or VOID AB INITIO MARRIAGES' property relations are governed by CO-OWNERSHIP. [2] Property acquired during the co-ownership are presumed obtained thru JOINT EFFORT. [3] Neither party can dispose of property owned in common without consent of the other, until after the termination of the co-ownership. [4] Upon termination, the share of the bad faith partner goes to the common children or their descendants, in case of waiver. If there are no descendants, then all shares go to the innocent spouse. Forfeiture takes place only after the termination of the co-ownership. Same, Art. 148: INCAPACITATED PARTNERS' property relations are governed by CO-OWNERSHIP. [2] No presumption of joint effort, in proportion only to their respective CONTRIBUTIONS. In the absence of proof of the extent of contributions, then shares are presumed equal. [3] If one partner is validly married to a third person, his or her share in the co-ownership ACCRUES TO THE VALID MARRIAGE. [4] Bad faith partner who is not married to another has no share in the co-ownership, previous Article applies. If both partners are in bad faith, then previous Article also applies. Yaptinchay v. Torres: original doctrine of Art. 148. Contributions under Art. 148 must be proven adequately. Juaniza v. Jose: property acquired by the married partner during the co-ownership belongs to his CPG, and the other partner cannot be held liable for damages arising from it. Viuda de Consuegra v. GSIS: contradictory doctrine of a partner obtaining a share from the other married partner's death benefits during the co-ownership. Maxey v. CA: homemaker partner has an equal share in the co-ownership in capacitated unions (Art. 147). Valdes v. RTC: co-ownership (Art. 147) applies to void marriages under Art. 36. Cario v. Cario: bigamous partner has no share in the married partner's death benefits. Rivera v. Heirs of Villanueva: Art. 148 applies to adulterous partnerships. Saguid v. CA: in the absence of proof of extent of the partners' respective contributions, their shares are presumed equal. If there is proof, then shares are limited to the proven amount.

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San Luis v. Sagalongos: a partner is capacitated after obtaining a valid foreign divorce, thus Art. 147 applies. But if the validity or the extent of the divorce must be proven, otherwise Art. 148 applies.

XI. THE FAMILY A. Members of a Family 1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations Family Code, Art. 149: FAMILY RELATIONS are governed by law, and no custom, practice or agreement destructive to the family is recognized or given effect. Same, Art. 150: MEMBERS OF A FAMILY: (1) spouses; (2) parents and children; (3) siblings, whether full- or half-blood. Same, Art. 151: SUITS BETWEEN FAMILY MEMBERS no suit prospers unless it appears that earnest efforts towards a COMPROMISE have been made, and that the same have failed. [2] If there is no showing of such, the case is dismissed. [3] Does not apply to non-compromisable cases. 2. Support Family Code, Art. 194: support comprises EVERYTHING indispensable for sustenance, education, transportation, etc., in keeping with the financial condition of the family. Same, Art. 195: PERSONS OBLIGED TO SUPPORT EACH OTHER (1) spouses; (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants; (3) parents and their legitimate children, and their legitimate or illegitimate grandchildren; (4) parents and their illegitimate children, and their legitimate or illegitimate grandchildren; (5) legitimate siblings, whether full- or half-blood. Same, Art. 196: ILLEGITIMATE SIBLINGS are only obliged to support each other, if of age, and due to the claimant's own fault or negligence. Same, Art. 197: PROPERTIES ANSWERABLE FOR SUPPORT [1] spouses: the ACP/CPG; [2] legitimate children from parents: the ACP/CPG; [3] legitimate parents from children: the exclusive property of the child; [4] any descendant from grandparent: exclusive property of the grandparent; [5] illegitimate children from illegitimate parent: exclusive property of the parent; [6] siblings: property of the obligor. Same, Art. 198: support pendente lite comes from ACP/CPG. [2] After final judgment of the nullity of marriage, obligation to support ceases. [3] In case of legal separation, guilty spouse may be obliged to support the innocent spouse. Same, Art. 199: MULTIPLE PROVIDERS OF SUPPORT ORDER OF PRIORITY (1) spouse; (2) descendants in the nearest degree; (3) ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) siblings. Same, Art. 200: MULTIPLE RECEPIENTS OF SUPPORT ORDER OF PRIORITY (1) children, or spouse in the absence of children; (2) other descendants; (3) ascendants in the nearest degree; (4) siblings. Same, Art. 201: amount of support is in proportion to means of the provider and the needs of the receiver. Same, Art. 202: this amount is reduced or increased if circumstances change. Same, Art. 203: obligation to support is redoundable FROM THE TIME RECEPIENT DEMANDS IT, but is not paid except from the date of the court order. Same, Art. 204: HOW SUPPORT IS GIVEN [1] payment of the amount; [2] accepting the recipient in the home of the provider, unless there is a legal or moral obstacle from doing so. Same, Art. 205: support cannot be levied upon on attachment or execution. Same, Art. 206: if support is given by a stranger WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROVIDER, then the stranger has a right to reimbursement, unless it appears that the support was given without intention of being reimbursed. Same, Art. 207: if support is UNJUSTLY REFUSED, any stranger may provide it, and he or she is reimbursed. Same, Art. 208: if contractual or given by will, any excess legal support is subject to levy on attachment or execution. 3. Funerals Civil Code, Art. 305: the duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative is in accordance with the order established for support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of siblings, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal has a better right. Same, Art. 306: every funeral must be in keeping with the social position of the deceased. Same, Art. 307: the funeral is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation determines the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral is decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for the same, after consulting the other members of the family.

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Same, Art. 308: no human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons mentioned in article 305. Same, Art. 309: any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral is liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral. Same, Art. 310: the construction of a tombstone or mausoleum is deemed to be a part of the funeral expenses, and is chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the spouses. Penobscot Area Housing Development Corp. v. City of Brewer: the family has the characteristic of being more permanent and more cohesive than boarders, roommates, etc. Mendoza v. CA: suits against family members cannot prosper unless there has been a showing of efforts towards a compromise, but FUTURE SUPPORT is not compromisable. Mendez v. Bionson: collateral relatives are not family members under Art. 150. Guerrero v. RTC: siblings-in-law are not family members under Art. 150. Hontiveros v. RTC: if one of the parties to a suit is not a family member, then Art. 151 will not apply. Common-law partners are not family members. B. The Family Home Family Code, Art. 152: FAMILY HOME [1] Constituted jointly by both spouses, or by the unmarried head of the family. [2] Consists of both the HOUSE AND THE LAND on which it stands. Same, Art. 153: [1] It is constituted from the time WHEN THE FAMILY RESIDES in it. [2] As long as it has the status of a family home, it is EXEMPT from forced sale, etc. except as provided by law. Same, Art. 154: BENEFICIARIES OF FAMILY HOME (1) both SPOUSES, or the unmarried HEAD OF THE FAMILY; (2) their parents, ascendants, descendants, legitimate or illegitimate siblings, and who are [a] living in the home, and [b] dependent on the head for legal support. Same, Art. 155: EXEMPTIONS ON THE FAMILY HOME (1) EXECUTION; (2) FORCED SALE; (3) ATTACHMENT. Except for: (1) non-payment of taxes; (2) debts incurred before the constitution of the family home; (3) debts secured by mortgages on the land before the constitution; (4) debts due to the builders/repairers of the home. Same, Art. 156: FAMILY HOME IS PART OF [a] If by married couples: ACP/CPG, or exclusive property of one spouse with the consent of the other spouse. [b] If by unmarried head of the family: his or her exclusive property. [2] Family home may only be constituted on conditionally sold/installment property whose ownership is withheld only to guarantee purchase price. Same, Art. 157: LIMITS ON VALUE OF FAMILY HOME [a] URBAN AREAS: 300,000 pesos. [b] 200,000 pesos. [2] In case of currency adjustment, price is that which is most favorable. Same, Art. 158: CONSENTS NECESSARY FOR SALE OF FAMILY HOME [a] Both spouses. [b] Majority of legal age beneficiaries. [2] In case of conflict, the court will decide. Same, Art. 159: DEATH OF FAMILY HEAD [a] family home continues for 10 YEARS after the death, or [b] as long as there is still a MINOR beneficiary. [2] Heirs CANNOT PARTITION the family home. [3] This rule applies regardless of whoever owns or constitutes the family home. Same, Art. 160: NON-PREFERRED CREDITORS once a judgment ordering the sale of the family home, and once it is found that it exceeded the limits set by Art. 157 at the time of its constitution, execution sale may take place. [2] Preferred creditors enumerated in Art. 155 are paid first. If remaining amount is within limits, then non-preferred creditor will not be paid. Same, Art. 161: ONLY ONE FAMILY HOME PER HEAD. Same, Art. 162: the provisions in this Chapter shall also govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are applicable. Siari Valley Estates Development Co. v. Lucasan: money judgments ON THE LAND where the family home is built before its constitution can be executed on the family home. Modequillo v. Breva: constitution of the family home before the Family Code cannot be done by mere residency of the family. All family homes after the Family Code are deemed constituted when the family resides in it, by operation of law. Taneo v. CA: family home cannot be constituted on property that does not belong to any of the spouses. Versola v. Madolaria: the status of family home must be alleged in the proceedings for the judgment of sale, not when the execution of sale is about to take place. Patricio v. Dario: grandchildren cannot be considered as the minor beneficiaries of their grandparent's family home, when they are dependent on their parents themselves. Veneracion v. Mancilla: the status of family home as a defense for exemption from foreclosure must be raised at the pleadings. Arriola v. Arriola: rights of co-ownership cannot subjugate the prohibition from partition of the family home for a period of 10 years from the death of the head of the family.

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XII. PATERNITY AND FILIATION A. Legitimate Children 1. Kinds of Filiation Family Code, Art. 163: FILIATION [1] natural; [2] legal fiction. NATURAL FILIATION [1] legitimate; [2] illegitimate. Same, Art. 164: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN [1] Are those CONCEIVED OR BORN during the marriage. [2] Or thru ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION with the consent of both spouses in a public instrument. a. Biological-Natural Perido v. Perido: presumption in favor of marriage and legitimacy of children can only be overcome with cogent proof. Liyao Jr. v. Liyao: a child conceived or born during a valid marriage is presumed to belong to that marriage, regardless of the existence of extramarital relationships. A child cannot impugn his or her own legitimacy. SSS v. Aguas: verified proof that the child was born within the duration of the marriage is enough to establish legitimacy. b. Biological-Assisted Reproductive Technology In re: Baby M: recognition of the legality of gestational mother arrangements. Johnson v. Calvert: biological parents have legal authority over the child whom the gestational mother is carrying. In re: Adoption of Anonymous: both spouses' consent is required for any kind of assisted reproductive technique that they may employ. 2. Impugned Legitimacy Family Code, Art. 166: GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY: (1) physical impossibility due to: (a) impotence, (b) physical separation, and (c) serious illness; (2) for other biological/scientific reasons; (3) if thru artificial insemination, and consent was lacking or vitiated. Same, Art. 167: the child is still legitimate even if MOTHER denies it, or is convicted of adultery. Same, Art. 168: in the absence of proof to the contrary:
within 300 days within 180 days: belongs to 1st celebration of 2nd marriage more than 180 days: belongs to 2nd birth of child

termination of 1st marriage

Same, Art. 169: the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born within after 300 days of the termination of a marriage is proven by those who allege the same. Same, Art. 170: ACTION FOR IMPUGNING LEGITIMACY: [1] Prescribes in 1 YEAR within registration of the birth if the husband or his heirs live in the same city or municipality as the child. [2] In 2 YEARS if in a different city within the Philippines. [3] In 3 YEARS if abroad. [4] If the birth is CONCEALED, then prescription is computed from either the time of the discovery of the birth or of its registration, whichever comes first. Same, Art. 171: HEIRS OF THE HUSBAND can substitute him in an action to impugn only if: (1) he dies BEFORE PRESCRIPTION; (2) he dies AFTER FILING the action without desisting; (3) the child if BORN AFTER HIS DEATH. Andal v. Macaraig: TUBERCULOSIS is not a serious enough illness to make intercourse a physical impossibility. If the child is born within 300 days of the husband's death, then it is presumed to belong to him. Jao v. CA: BLOOD TYPE-MATCHING is conclusive evidence only of non-paternity. Macadangdang v. CA: only proximate separation between the spouses is not conclusive of physical impossibility. Chua Keng Giap v. IAC: mothers can deny filiation only with respect to herself and the putative child. Cabatbat-Lim v. IAC: absence of record of birth overthrows the presumption of legitimacy. Republic v. Labrador: change of status from legitimate to illegitimate in a birth certificate cannot be done without first establishing legitimacy. Tan v. Trocio: a child conceived or born during a valid marriage is presumed to belong to that marriage. People v. Tumimpad: contradictory ruling: blood type-matching is conclusive of paternity. Benitez-Badua v. CA: proof of filiation cannot be used in a situation where the child does not belong to either spouse in the first place, as marked by the absence of a record of birth.

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Lumain de Aparicio v. Paraguya: a child born 192 days after the celebration of the mother's marriage is still presumed to belong to that marriage. 180-day rule only applies to when there is a previous marriage, and not to premarital relationships. B. Proof of Legitimate Filiation 1. How to Prove Filiation Family Code, Art. 172: (1) RECORD OF BIRTH appearing in a public instrument or a final judgment; (2) OPEN ADMISSION of legitimate filiation in a public document or in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Otherwise, (1) open and CONTINUOUS POSSESSION of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) ANY OTHER MEANS allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Revised Rules of Court, Rule 129, Sec. 4: JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS An admission, verbal or written, made by the party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Same, Rule 130, Sec. 7: EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE WHEN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IS A PUBLIC RECORD when the original of document is in the custody of public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. Same, Same, Sec. 36: TESTIMONY GENERALLY CONFINED TO PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE; HEARSAY EXCLUDED a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules. Same, Same, Sec. 39: EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE ACT OR DECLARATION ABOUT PEDIGREE the act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these fast occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree. Same, Same, Sec. 40: FAMILY REPUTATION OR TRADITION REGARDING PEDIGREE the reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree. Same, Same, Sec. 41: COMMON REPUTATION common reputation existing previous to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of common reputation. Civil Code, Art. 220: in case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts leans toward the LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN. Constantino v. Mendez: proof of filiation must be established by clear and convincing evidence. TESTIMONIAL evidence of low standard cannot replace record of birth as proof of filiation. Mendoza v. Melia: baptismal certificate given probative value for births before 1930. BIRTH CERTIFICATE must be signed by the parents and sworn for it to be admitted as evidence. Lim v. CA: public documents made by private individuals MUST BE NOTARIZED before admitted by the court as evidence. Marriage contracts cannot be used as proof of filiation. Heirs of Rodolfo Baas v. Heirs of Bibiano Baas: "Su padre [Your father]" ending in a letter is only proof of paternal solicitude and not of actual paternity. Signature on a REPORT CARD under the entry of "Parent/Guardian" is likewise inconclusive of open admission. Uyguangco v. CA: using the father's surname without objections, having a share and running the family business, and receiving support from the father, all constitute CONTINUOUS POSSESSION. Mariategui v. CA: filiation CAN BE ATTACKED COLLATERALLY in an action for partition. Acebedo v. Arquero: BAPTISMAL CERTIFICATE is only conclusive of the sacrament administered, and not of the statements contained within. Herrera v. Alba: DNA ANALYSIS is conclusive proof of non-paternity. W = likelihood of paternity of a putative father compared to the probability of a random match of 2 other individuals. If the value of W < 99.9%, then it is only corroborative. If W 99.9%, then there is a refutable presumption of paternity. 2. Action to Claim Legitimacy Family Code, Art. 173: DOES NOT PRESCRIBE as long as the child lives, and is transmitted to his heirs within 5 YEARS if the child dies or becomes insane during minority. [2] Action already commenced will not be terminated by the death of either party.

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3. Rights of Legitimate Children Family Code, Art. 174: (1) SURNAME of the father; (2) SUPPORT; (3) SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS and legitimes. Republic v. Vicencio: a legitimate child' use of the father's surname is MANDATORY. De Asis v. CA: right to support a legitimate child CANNOT BE WAIVED or be compromised. C. Illegitimate Filiation 1. Proof of Illegitimate Filiation Family Code, Art. 175: same as for legitimate children, see Family Code, Art. 171. [2] DOES NOT PRESCRIBE as long as they are alive, except if the evidence used is a parent's written admission, then it prescribes DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PARENT. Leuterio v. CA: the more liberal wording of the Family Code rules on illegitimate filiation with respect to the Civil Code does not do away with the HIGH STANDARDS REQUIRED OF EVIDENCE. Uyguangco v. CA: using the father's surname without objections, having a share and running the family business, and receiving support from the father, all constitute CONTINUOUS POSSESSION. Rodriguez v. CA: testimony by the mother alleging the identity of the putative father is allowed. Aruego v. CA: prescriptive period for claiming filiation under the Family Code is not retroactive. Jison v. CA: filiation based only on testimonial evidence is allowed, only if they are of HIGH STANDARD. Material evidence for filiation must belong to the class of "FAMILY OBJECTS," as in family photos, family bibles, etc. Alberto v. CA: introducing a child as one's own to friends and family constitutes continuous possession. Guy v. CA: prescriptive period for claiming filiation depends on EVIDENCE ADDUCED. Agustin v. CA: DNA TESTING is conclusive proof of filiation. In re: Intestate Estates of Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia: PRINTED OBITUARY made by the parent cannot be used as proof of open admission of filiation. Must be handwritten and signed. Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz: DNA testing can still be used even after the death of the parent. 2. Rights of Illegitimate Children Family Code, Art. 176: [1] SURNAME of the mother, or the father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father in the record of birth or in a handwritten public instrument; [2] SUPPORT; [3] SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS, legitimes only of legitimate children. David v. CA: parental authority and custody of illegitimate children BELONGS TO THE MOTHER. People v. Namayan: illegitimate children are entitled to LEGAL SUPPORT. Mossesgeld v. CA: father cannot force the use of his surname on his illegitimate child without first establishing legitimacy. Republic v. Abadilla: use of the mother's surname by illegitimate children is MANDATORY. Gonzales v. CA: illegitimate children are entitled to successional rights. Republic v. Vicencio: illegitimate children cannot use their FATHER'S SURNAME without first establishing legitimacy through adoption. Gan v. Reyes: SUPPORT to illegitimate children cannot be delayed or be subject to compromise. Tonog v. CA: exception to David doctrine: custody of illegitimate child TEMPORARILY DENIED FROM THE MOTHER for reasons of welfare and well-being. De Guzman v. Perez: not attending to the support of an illegitimate child is a cause of action under RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Act). Zepeda v. Zepeda: illegitimate children cannot claim damages arising from their illegitimate status. Alba v. CA: there must be voluntary acknowledgment of paternity before an illegitimate child can use the FATHER'S SURNAME. Republic v. Capote: otherwise, an illegitimate child must revert to using the MOTHER'S SURNAME. D. Legitimated Children Family Code, Art. 177: [1] those CONCEIVED AND BORN outside of marriage; [2] and parents MUST NOT BE IMPEDED to marry each other at the time of the conception. Same, Art. 178: HOW LEGITIMATION TAKES PLACE by subsequent VALID MARRIAGE of the parents. [2] The annulment of a voidable marriage has NO EFFECT on legitimation. Same, Art. 179: legitimated children = legitimate children. Same, Art. 180: the effects of legitimation RETROACT to the child's birth. Same, Art. 181: legitimation of children WHO DIE BEFORE THE MARRIAGE of the parents benefits the children's descendants. Same, Art. 182: ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMATION by anyone whose RIGHTS ARE PREJUDICED, within 5 YEARS from the time the right accrues. De Los Santos v. Luciano: legitimate children of legitimated children can inherit from ascendants.

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Ramirez v. Gmur: rights of legitimated children retroact to the time of their birth. In re: Julian Wang: legitimate and legitimated children carries both the father's and the mother's name, thus MIDDLE NAMES may not be dropped.

XIII. ADOPTION A. Pre-Adoption and Adoption Procedure RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law) IRR, Secs. 10-32: Table 12: Adoption procedure under RA 8552 IRR (class notes) Adopted Biological parent signs a Deed of Voluntary Commitment. Rescissible within 6 months. Voluntary Commitment: Declaration of Availability for Adoption Involuntary Commitment: (1) Announcement of Missing Child in tri-media, (2) Declaration of Abandonment, (3) Declaration of Availability for Adoption Case Study Report Application for Adoption Case Study Report Matching Placement Supervised Trial Custody Home Study Report Recommendation and Consent Petition for Adoption Adoption Decree

Adopter Inquiry Attendance of Adoption Fora and Seminars

B. Who May Adopt/Be Adopted RA 8552, Sec. 7: WHO MAY ADOPT (a) any FILIPINO [1] of legal age, [2] fully capacitated, [3] of good moral character, [4] not convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude, [5] emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children, [6] at least 16 years older than the adoptee, [7] and who is in a position to support and care for children in keeping with the means of the family; (b) any ALIEN with the same qualifications as above, provided: [1] country of origin has diplomatic relations with the Philippines, [2] living in the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the application and maintains such residence until the decree is entered, [3] certified by his or her consul to be capacitated to adopt, [4] and the adoptee is allowed entry to the country as his or her child. #3 may be waived for aliens, provided: (i) the alien is a former Filipino adopting a relative within the 4th civil degree, (ii) or the alien seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse, (iii) or the relative within the 4th civil degree of his or her Filipino spouse; (c) the GUARDIAN with respect to the ward, after the termination of guardianship and the clearing of financial accountabilities. [2] Spouses MUST JOINTLY ADOPT, except: (i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other; (ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his or her own illegitimate child, provided that the other has consented; (iii) if legally separated. If spouses jointly adopt, parental authority shall be exercised by them jointly. Same, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED (a) any person BELOW 18 who has been judicially declared as available for adoption; (b) the LEGITIMATE CHILD of one spouse by the other spouse; (c) ALL ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN by a qualified adopter to improve his or her status to that of legitimacy; (d) a person of LEGAL AGE, provided that he or she has been treated as if the adopter's own child since minority; (e) a child whose adoption has been PREVIOUSLY RESCINDED; (f) a child whose parents HAVE DIED, provided that no proceedings shall be instituted within 6 months of the death. In re: Adoption of Edwin Villa: adoption statutes should be construed in favor of the best interests and the promotion of the WELFARE OF THE CHILD.

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Republic v. Bobiles: Family Code provisions on adoption are NOT RETROACTIVE in so far as they do not impede on the expediency of the adoption, because the prime consideration is the child's welfare, and should not be delayed. Republic v. Toledano: if the spouses are jointly adopting, then both of them must be QUALIFIED. Aliens cannot adopt under the Civil Code. Republic v. Miller: aliens are now allowed to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code. C. Nature of Adoption Proceedings Lazatin v. Campos: adoption is a JUDICIAL ACT, proceeding in rem. Petitions must be announced in publications. Only those proclaimed by the court are valid, and adoption is never presumed. Santos v. Aranzanso: validity of facts behind a final adoption decree CANNOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED without impinging on that court's jurisdiction. DSWD v. Belen: participation of the appropriate government instrumentality in performing the necessary STUDIES AND PRECAUTIONS is important to assure the child's welfare. D. Consents Necessary for Adoption RA 8552, Sec. 9: (a) the ADOPTED CHILD, if at least 10 years old; (b) the BIOLOGICAL PARENTS of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the government instrumentality or institution that has custody over the child; (c) the adopted or LEGITIMATE CHILDREN of the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (d) the ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN of the adopter, if at least 10 years old; (e) the SPOUSE of the adopter or the adopted. Duncan v. CFI: ABANDONING PARENTS' consents are no longer required. If the child only has a DE FACTO GUARDIAN, then his or her consent is required. Landingan v. Republic: consents for adoption MUST BE WRITTEN and notarized. E. Effects of Adoption RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 33: (1) SEVER ALL LEGAL TIES between the biological parents and the adoptee, except if the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the adoptee as a LEGITIMATE CHILD of the adopter; (3) give the adopter and adoptee RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS arising from the relationship of parent and child, including: (i) the right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known; (ii) the right of the adoptee and the adopter to be the legal and compulsory heirs of each other. Civil Code, Art. 365: adopted children shall bear the SURNAME OF THE ADOPTER. Tamargo v. CA: TRANSFER OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY begins at the time when the decree is issued. Sayson v. CA: adopted children have a right to REPRESENT their adopters in successional interests. Johnston v. Republic: adopted children shall use the REAL NAME of the adopted at the time of the adoption. Republic v. Wong: adopted children may REVERT to their names before the adoption if prejudicial against them. Republic v. Caranto: adopted children's GIVEN NAMES may be changed if it is from a clerical error. Republic v. Hernandez: adoption only changes the SURNAME of the adopted child, and not the given name. F. Rescission RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 35: GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION not subject to rescission by the adopters. The adoption may be rescinded ONLY UPON THE PETITION OF THE ADOPTEE with the assistance of the DSWD, if a minor, or over 18 but incapacitated on any of the ff. grounds committed by the adopters: (1) repeated physical and verbal MALTREATMENT despite having undergone counseling; (2) ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE of the adoptee; (3) SEXUAL assault or violence; (4) ABANDONMENT or failure to comply with parental obligations. Same, Sec 37: EFFECTS OF RESCISSION (1) restoration of PARENTAL AUTHORITY to the adoptee's biological parents if known, or to the DSWD if still a minor or incapacitated; (2) the RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS are extinguished; (3) cancellation of the new BIRTH CERTIFICATE and restoration of the old certificate of the adoptee; (4) SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS revert to its status at the time of the adoption decree; (5) VESTED RIGHTS acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected. G. Rectification of Simulated Birth RA 8552 IRR, Sec. 41: [1] A person who has under his or her care and custody a child whose birth certificate has been falsified to make it appear that the child is his or her own son or daughter shall file in the appropriate court a PETITION FOR CORRECTION of the birth certificate and of adoption of the child. [2] Provided, that the person initiates the said proceedings WITHIN 5 YEARS from the effectivity of this Act, and shall thereafter complete the said proceedings wherein he or she shall prove that the simulation of birth was for THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD, and that the child has been consistently considered and treated as his or her own child. [3] The DSWD shall conduct its own Child and Home

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Study Reports to determine if said conditions exist. [4] In all cases of rectification, the standard procedures for adoption shall be followed. H. Adoption Decree Reyes v. Sotero: mere IRREGULARITIES in the adoption decree do not affect its validity. I. Inter-country Adoption RA 8043 (Inter-country Adoption Act of 1995), Sec. 4: THE INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION BOARD there is hereby created the Inter-Country Adoption Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board to act as the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption. As such, it shall: (a) protect the Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or any other practice in connection with adoption which is harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child; (b) collect, maintain, and preserve confidential information about the child and the adoptive parents; (c) monitor, follow up, and facilitate completion of adoption of the child through authorized and accredited agency; (d) prevent improper financial or other gain in connection with an adoption and deter improper practices contrary to this Act; (e) promote the development of adoption services including post-legal adoption; (f) license and accredit childcaring/placement agencies and collaborate with them in the placement of Filipino children; (g) accredit and authorize foreign adoption agency in the placement of Filipino children in their own country; and (h) cancel the license to operate and blacklist the child-caring and placement agency or adoptive agency involved from the accreditation list of the Board upon a finding of violation of any provision under this Act. Same, Sec. 7: INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION AS THE LAST RESORT the Board shall ensure that all possibilities for adoption of the child under the Family Code have been exhausted and that inter-country adoption is in the best interest of the child. Towards this end, the Board shall set up the guidelines to ensure that steps will be taken to place the child in the Philippines before the child is placed for intercountry adoption: Provided, however, That the maximum number that may be allowed for foreign adoption shall not exceed six hundred (600) a year for the first five (5) years. Same, Sec. 8: WHO MAY BE ADOPTED only a legally free child may be the subject of inter-country adoption. In order that such child may be considered for placement, the following documents must be submitted to the Board: (a) Child study;(b) birth certificate/foundling certificate; (c) deed of voluntary commitment/decree of abandonment/death certificate of parents; (d) medical evaluation/history; (e) psychological evaluation, as necessary; and (f) recent photo of the child. Same, Sec. 9: WHO MAY ADOPT an alien or a Filipino citizen permanently residing abroad may file an application for inter-country adoption of a Filipino child if he/she: (a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of application unless the adopter is the parent by nature of the child to be adopted or the spouse of such parent; (b) if married, his/her spouse must jointly file for the adoption; (c) has the capacity to act and assume all rights and responsibilities of parental authority under his national laws, and has undergone the appropriate counseling from an accredited counselor in his/her country; (d) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (e) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law; (f) is in a position to provide the proper care and support and to give the necessary moral values and example to all his children, including the child to be adopted; (g) agrees to uphold the basic rights of the child as embodied under Philippine laws, the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, and to abide by the rules and regulations issued to implement the provisions of this Act; (h) comes from a country with whom the Philippines has diplomatic relations and whose government maintains a similarly authorized and accredited agency and that adoption is allowed under his/her national laws; and (i) possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided herein and in other applicable Philippine laws. Same, Sec. 10: WHERE TO FILE APPLICATION an application to adopt a Filipino child shall be filed either with the Philippine Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the child, or with the Board, through an intermediate agency, whether governmental or an authorized and accredited agency, in the country of the prospective adoptive parents, which application shall be in accordance with the requirements as set forth in the implementing rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Board. The application shall be supported by the following documents written and officially translated in English: (a) Birth certificate of applicant(s); (b) Marriage contract, if married, and divorce decree, if applicable; (c) Written consent of their biological or adoptive children above ten (10) years of age, in the form of sworn statement; (d) Physical, medical and psychological evaluation by a duly licensed physician and psychologist; (e) Income tax returns or any document showing the financial capability of the applicant(s); (f) Police clearance of applicant(s); (g) Character reference from the local church/minister, the applicant's employer and a member of the immediate community who have known the applicant(s) for at least five (5) years; and (h) Recent postcard-size pictures of the applicant(s) and his immediate family; The Rules of Court shall apply in case of adoption by judicial proceedings. Same, Sec. 11: FAMILY SELECTION/MATCHING no child shall be matched to a foreign adoptive family unless it is satisfactorily shown that the child cannot be adopted locally. [2] The clearance, as

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issued by the Board, with the copy of the minutes of the meetings, shall form part of the records of the child to be adopted. [3] When the Board is ready to transmit the Placement Authority to the authorized and accredited inter-country adoption agency and all the travel documents of the child are ready, the adoptive parents, or any one of them, shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines. Same, Sec. 14: SUPERVISION OF TRIAL CUSTODY the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency in the country of the adoptive parents which filed the application for inter-country adoption shall be responsible for the trial custody and the care of the child. It shall also provide family counseling and other related services. The trial custody shall be for a period of 6 months from the time of placement. Only after the lapse of the period of trial custody shall a decree of adoption be issued in the said country a copy of which shall be sent to the Board to form part of the records of the child. During the trial custody, the adopting parent(s) shall submit to the governmental agency or the authorized and accredited agency, which shall in turn transmit a copy to the Board, a progress report of the child's adjustment. The progress report shall be taken into consideration in deciding whether or not to issue the decree of adoption.

XIV. PARENTS AND CHILDREN A. Parental Authority, General Provisions Family Code, Art. 209: PARENTAL AUTHORITY includes: [1] CARING FOR and rearing unemancipated children. [2] Development of their moral, mental, and physical WELL-BEING. Same, Art. 210: it MAY NOT BE RENOUNCED or transferred except in the cases authorized by law: [1] ADOPTION; [2] GUARDIANSHIP; [3] COMMITMENT of the child in an institution. Same, Art. 211: spouses must exercise JOINT AUTHORITY over their common children, husband's decision prevails unless court orders otherwise. [2] Children must observe RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE as long as they are under parental authority. Same, Art. 212: ABSENCE OR DEATH OF ONE PARENT the REMAINING PARENT continues to exercise parental authority. His or her remarriage does not affect it, unless the court appoints a guardian. Same, Art. 213: SEPARATION OF THE PARENTS, TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION parental authority is exercised by the COURT-APPOINTED PARENT. [2] The court takes into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of children over 7 years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Same, Art. 214: ABSENCE, DEATH, OR UNSUITABILITY OF BOTH PARENTS the surviving grandparent exercises parental authority. If there are more than one, the court takes into consideration all relevant factors until only one is chosen. Civil Code, Art. 2180: the obligations from QUASI-DELICTS are demandable not only from the offender, but also from the persons exercising authority over the offender. [2] The HUSBAND, or in case of his death/incapacity, the mother is responsible for the damages caused by their minor children living in their company. [8] The responsibility referred to in this article ceases when the persons herein mentioned prove that they OBSERVED ALL THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER of a family in preventing damage. Child and Youth Welfare Code, Art. 58: TORTS parents and guardians are responsible for the damage caused by the child under their parental authority in accordance with the Civil Code. 1. Custody a. Determining the Best Interests of the Child i. Gender and the Tender Years Presumption Ex Parte Devine: tender years presumption is UNCONSTITUTIONAL as it irrationally deprives genuinely concerned fathers of their children, and unfairly imposes on them the burden of proof of the unfitness of the mother. Cervantes v. Fajardo: ADOPTION terminates parental authority, thus a parent cannot demand custody of the child given up for adoption. Espiritu v. CA: AGE REQUIREMENT for child's choice under Art. 213 is considered at the time of final judgment. Celis v. Cafuir: ENTRUSTING a child to a third person does not amount to abandonment, as long as the child is supported. It also does not amount to renouncing parental authority, as it cannot be renounced except when an adoption decree has been made final. Gamboa v. CA: mother is PRESUMED FIT unless conclusively proven otherwise. Sy v. CA: HIGH STANDARD of proof is required to show unfitness. ii. Parental Unfitness Feldman v. Feldman: one parent's SEXUAL DEVIANCE does not constitute unfitness, especially if it does not directly affect the children's welfare.

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Santos v. CA: the PROFESSION of the father, by itself, does not constitute unfitness. Same with previous lack of interest and failure to provide support, as those can be attributed to financial circumstances. b. Role of the Child's Preference Goldstein v. Goldstein: if both parents are equally fit, then the child's choice is GIVEN WEIGHT, especially if the child is emotionally stable and intelligent. Laxamana v. Laxamana: custody cases cannot be decided without a trial where the CHILDREN'S CHOICE MUST BE HEARD. Concern of the child over the father's condition constitutes a slight preference over the father, and must be taken into consideration. c. Presumption for the Primary Caretaker Garska v. McCoy: if both parents are equally fit, and the child is within tender years, then the PRIMARY CARETAKER must be presumed to have custody. 2. Other Rights and Duties in Exercise of Parental Authority Family Code, Art. 220: RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THOSE EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY (1) to keep the children IN THEIR COMPANY, to support, educate and instruct them, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) to give them LOVE, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) to provide them with moral and spiritual GUIDANCE, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry, and thrift, and to stimulate their interest in civic affairs; (4) to furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, to supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, PROTECT THEM FROM BAD COMPANY, and prevent them from acquiring vices; (5) to REPRESENT them in all matters affecting their interests; (6) to DEMAND from them respect and obedience; (7) to IMPOSE DISCIPLINE on them as may be required under the circumstances; (8) to perform OTHER DUTIES as are imposed by law on parents and guardians. Same, Art. 221: persons exercising parental authority are CIVILLY LIABLE for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Same, Art. 222: GUARDIANS ad litem or on the property of the child may be appointed by the court. Same, Art. 223: PETITION FOR DISCIPLINARY MEASURES [1] those exercising parental authority may petition for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child is entitled to the assistance of counsel, and a summary hearing is conducted. [2] If the petitioner is found at fault, the court may also order the termination/suspension of parental authority. Same, Art. 224: NATURE OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES [1] May include commitment to a duly accredited institution for not more than 30 DAYS. [2] The petitioner cannot interfere, but must continue to provide support for the child. [3] This may be terminated upon proper petition or by court order. Same, Art. 225: GUARDIANSHIP OVER THE CHILD'S PROPERTY [1] Parents exercise joint authority over the child's property, father's decision prevails. [2] If the child's property > 50,000 pesos, then the parent is required to furnish a bond not less than 10% of the property's market value in order to guarantee the continued guardianship over the property. [5] Ordinary rules on guardianship are suppletory, unless the guardian is exercising substitute parental authority. Same, Art. 226: PROPERTY OF THE UNEMANCIPATED CHILD whether earned through industry, or onerous or gratuitous title, it belongs SOLELY to the child, and can be used only for his or her support and education unless the title provides otherwise. [2] Parents or guardians, in using the child's property, are limited to spending for: (1) for the child's support, (2) and the collective needs of the family. Salientes v. Abanilla: father has a NATURAL RIGHT to keep the child in his company. Cabanas v. Pilapil: the parent has a PRIORITY over other relatives in the administratorship of the child's property. Libi v. IAC: parents are presumed to be PRIMARILY LIABLE for the damages caused by their child. Lindain v. CA: parents CANNOT DISPOSE of their children's properties regardless of their value. People v. Silvano: imposing punishment on the children is a parental right, but it CANNOT JUSTIFY immoral or cruel punishment. Support of children is an UNCONDITIONAL obligation. Shields v. Gross: there must be a balance between the interest of the child and commercial interests, such that SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL CONSENT made in behalf of the child cannot be rescinded by the child. Silva v. CA: parental rights also extend to parents with respect to their ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN. B. Substitute and Special Parental Authority

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Family Code, Art. 216: SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY (1) GRANDPARENTS; (2) the OLDEST SIBLING over 21 years of age; (3) ACTUAL CUSTODIAN of the child over 21 years of age. Same order is followed for the appointment of a judicial guardian. Same, Art. 217: FOUNDLINGS AND ABANDONED CHILDREN substitute parental authority is exercised by the institution or the government instrumentality that found the child, upon judicial order. Same, Art. 218: SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY exercised by the SCHOOL or institution entrusted with the education or custody of the child during the time he or she is under their supervision, instruction, or custody. Same, Art. 219: QUASI-DELICTS UNDER SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY primarily to the TEACHER and subsidiarily to the parents. [2] Diligence can be used as a defense. [3] Other rules on quasi-delicts also apply. Civil Code, Art. 2180: the obligations from QUASI-DELICTS are demandable not only from the offender, but also from the persons exercising authority over the offender. [3] GUARDIANS are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. [7] TEACHERS or heads of establishments of arts and trades are liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. [8] The responsibility referred to in this article ceases when the persons herein mentioned prove that they OBSERVED ALL THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER of a family in preventing damage. Palisoc v. Brillantes: students NEED NOT BE BOARDERS in the school to be covered by Art. 2180. Amadora v. CA: Art. 2180 also applies to ACADEMIC SCHOOLS, to when the semester is over but the child is within the premises of the school, and only to the actual teacher in charge of the student. St. Mary's Academy v. Carpitanos: also applies to school-sponsored events OUTSIDE THE PREMISES of the school. Vancil v. Belmes: parent has a PRIORITY in the exercise of parental authority over her children. C. Suspension/Termination of Parental Authority Same, Art. 228: PERMANENT TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (1) DEATH of parent; (2) DEATH of child; (3) EMANCIPATION of child. Same, Art. 232: also permanent if the person exercising parental authority SUBJECTS THE CHILD TO SEXUAL ABUSE. Same, Art. 229: TEMPORARY TERMINATION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (1) ADOPTION; (2) appointment of a general GUARDIAN; (3) judicial declaration of ABANDONMENT; (4) final judgment DIVESTING a person of parental authority; (5) judicial declaration of ABSENCE or incapacity. [2] These may be subsquently revived upon final order of a court. Same, Art. 230: CIVIL INTERDICTION automatically and temporarily suspends parental authority. Same, Art. 231: OTHER GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OF PARENTAL AUTHORITY (1) treats the child with EXCESSIVE HARSHNESS or cruelty; (2) gives the child CORRUPTING orders, counsel, or example; (3) compels the child TO BEG; (4) subjects the child or allows the child to be subjected to ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS. [2] The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. [3] If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the circumstances. Same, Art. 233: substitute parental authority = real parents. Special parental authority = real parents, except that they cannot inflict corporal punishment on the children. RA 7610 (Anti-Child Abuse Act), Sec. 5: CHILD PROSTITUTION AND OTHER SEXUAL ABUSE children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following: (a) those who engage in or promote, facilitate or induce child prostitution which include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; (2) inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; (3) taking advantage of influence or relationship to procure a child as prostitute; (4) threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or (5) giving monetary consideration goods or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution. (b) those who commit the act of sexual intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; and (c) those who derive profit

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or advantage therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the establishment where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or establishment serving as a cover or which engages in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the license has been issued to said establishment. Same, Sec. 6: ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CHILD PROSTITUTION there is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse. There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code. Same, Sec. 7: CHILD TRAFFICKING any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. Same, Sec. 8: ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CHILD TRAFFICKING there is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of this Act: (a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's parents or legal guardian; (c) When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or (d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or (e) When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child trafficking. Same, Sec. 9: OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS AND INDECENT SHOWS any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period. If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period. Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such child to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period. Same, Sec. 10: OTHER ACTS OF NEGLECT, ABUSE, CRUELTY OR EXPLOITATION AND OTHER CONDITIONS PREJUDICIAL TO THE CHILD'S DEVELOPMENT (a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period. (b) Any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not less than 50,000 pesos: Provided, That this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral or legal duty. (c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or have in his company a minor as provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than 40,000 pesos; Provided, however, That should the perpetrator be an ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its maximum period, a fine of not less than 50,000 pesos, and the loss of parental authority over the minor. (d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted with the operation of any public or private place of accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including residential places, who allows any person to take along with him to such place or places any minor herein described shall be imposed a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not less than 50,000 pesos, and the loss of the license to operate such a place or establishment. (e) any person who shall use, coerce, force or intimidate a street child or any other child to: (1) beg or use begging as a means of living; (2) act as conduit or middlemen in drug

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trafficking or pushing; or (3) conduct any illegal activities, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be entrusted to the care of the DSWD. Same, Sec. 27: WHO MAY FILE A COMPLAINT complaints on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as enumerated herein may be filed by the following: (a) offended party; (b) parents or guardians; (c) ascendant or collateral relative within the third degree of consanguinity; (d) officer, social worker or representative of a licensed child-caring institution; (e) officer or social worker of the DSWD; (f) barangay chairman; or (g) at least 3 concerned responsible citizens where the violation occurred. Same, Sec. 28: PROTECTIVE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD the offended party shall be immediately placed under the protective custody of the DSWD. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Same, Sec. 31(c): COMMON PENAL PROVISIONS (c) the penalty provided herein shall be imposed in its maximum period when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment which has no license to operate or its license has expired or has been revoked; Chua v. Cabangbang: ABANDONMENT is a grounds for deprivation of parental authority. Abiera v. Orin: parental authority CANNOT BE TRANSFERRED along with administratorship of the parents' estate. Cortes v. Castillo: final judgment of ADULTERY is sufficient grounds for deprivation of parental authority, under the Civil Code. D. Rights and Duties of Children Child and Youth Welfare Code, Art. 3: RIGHTS OF THE CHILD all children shall be entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political antecedents, and other factors. (1) The right to be born well. (2) The right to a wholesome family life. The dependent or abandoned child shall be provided with the nearest substitute for a home. (3) The right to a well-rounded development of his personality. The gifted child shall be given opportunity and encouragement to develop his special talents. The emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted shall be entitled to treatment and competent care. The physically or mentally handicapped child shall be given the treatment, education and care required by his particular condition. (4) The right to all the basic physical requirements of a healthy and vigorous life. (5) The right to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of his character. (6) The right to an education commensurate with his abilities. (7) The right to full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation. (8) The right to protection against exploitation, improper influences, and hazards. (9) The right to live in a community and a society that can offer him an environment free from pernicious influences. (10) The right to the care, assistance, and protection of the State. (11) The right to an efficient and honest government that will deepen his faith in democracy. (12) The right to grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute his share in the building of a better world. Same, Art. 4: RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CHILD every child, regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social status, political antecedents and other factors shall: (1) strive to lead an upright and virtuous life; (2) love, respect and obey his parents; (3) extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness, and helpfulness; (4) exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service, in order that he may become an asset to himself and to society; (5) respect not only his elders but also the customs and traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and the principles and institutions of democracy; (6) participate actively in civic affairs; and (7) help in the observance of individual human rights, the strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the furtherance of world peace. E. Parents vs. Children: When Rights Clash Strunk v. Strunk: "child" includes persons OVER 18 but cannot support themselves due to incapacities. SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT ALLOWED for kidney transplant that will benefit a brother who is indispensable for the development of an incompetent child. Guardian ad litem is appointed for the benefit of the incompetent child's welfare. Conservatorship of Valerie N: SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT DENIED for sterilization procedure that is intrusive and irreversible when other less harmful means might be available. Gillick v. West Norwalk: 16-year-old child is COMPETENT enough to take medical advice and contraceptives without need for parental consent. Medical workers not criminally liable when doing so. Curtis v. School Committee: parents cannot interfere over a public school's FREE CONDOM PROGRAM, which is not compulsory and does not impinge on their right to instruct children.

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Roe v. Doe: a child who abandons the home to seek his or her own fortune or to avoid the reasonable demands of the parents FORFEITS THE RIGHT TO BE SUPPORTED. In re: Edward C: FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION is not a license to treat children with cruelty. Prince v. Massachusetts: parents have a right to provide RELIGIOUS TRAINING to their children. F. Summary Procedure Family Code, Art. 249: PETITIONS filed under Arts. 223 (disciplinary measures) and 225 (guardianship over child's property) involving parental authority shall be verified. Same, Art. 250: such petitions are filed in the proper court of the PLACE WHERE THE CHILD RESIDES. Same, Art. 251: upon filing, the court NOTIFIES the persons exercising parental authority over the child. Same, Art. 252: rules under Chapter 2 applies in so far as applicable. RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997), Sec. 5: JURISDICTION OF FAMILY COURTS the Family Courts shall have EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION to hear and decide the following cases: (a) Criminal cases where one or more of the accused is below eighteen (18) years of age but not less than nine (9) years of age but not less than 9 years of age or where one or more of the victims is a minor at the time of the commission of the offense: Provided, That if the minor is found guilty, the court shall promulgate sentence and ascertain any civil liability which the accused may have incurred, however, shall be suspended without need of application pursuant to PD 603; (b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the latter; (c) Petitions for adoption of children and the revocation thereof; (d) Complaints for annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and those relating to marital status and property relations of husband and wife or those living together under different status and agreements, and petitions for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains; (e) Petitions for support and/or acknowledgment; (f) Summary judicial proceedings brought under the provisions of the Family Code; (g) Petitions for declaration of status of children as abandoned, dependent or neglected children, petitions for voluntary or involuntary commitment of children; the suspension, termination, or restoration of parental authority. (h) Petitions for the constitution of the family home; (i) Cases against minors cognizable under the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended; (j) Violations of RA 7610; and (k) Cases of domestic violence against: (1) Women - which are acts of gender based violence that results, or are likely to result in physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women; and other forms of physical abuse such as battering or threats and coercion which violate a woman's personhood, integrity and freedom movement; and (2) Children - which include the commission of all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, violence, and discrimination and all other conditions prejudicial to their development. [2] If an act constitutes a criminal offense, the accused or batterer shall be subject to criminal proceedings and the corresponding penalties. [2] If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case pending in the regular courts, said incident shall be determined in that court. Reyes v. Tabujara: habeas corpus petitions for the custody of a child FILED IN AN RTC OF A PLACE WHERE THE CHILD DOES NOT LIVE do not circumvent RA 8369. The SC and the CA can exercise concurrent jurisdiction over those cases. Madrian v. Madrian: likewise those FILED DIRECTLY IN THE CA.

END OF COVERAGE BIBLIOGRAPHY Sempio-Diy, Alicia. Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines. Quezon City: Rex Book Store [c2003]. Tolentino, Arturo. Vol. 1, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines. Manila: Central [c1990].

by Giselle. XD A 2012 v.1 FINAL 10/16/08 All Rights Violated.

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