RIGHT TO ASSOCIATION Freedom of Association and the right to strike in Public Sector Article III Section 8.

The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. Article IX B Section 2. The right to self organization shall not be denied to government employees. Article XIII Section 3. It shall guarantee the right of all workers to self organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with the law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Deemed embraced in the freedom of expression because a lawful association or organization can be uses as a vehicle to express views that affect the public, which can be more effectively disseminated by an organization. All rights are subject to inherent police power and purposes not contrary to law is a built-in limitation thus, legislature may not arbitrarily declare any purpose unlawful even inimical to public.

Right of Association: Shall not be impaired without due process of law Aspect of o The general right of liberty o Freedom of contract o Freedom of expression and belief Subject to the hierarchy of values recognized by the Constitution Degree of protection an association enjoys depends on the position which the associations objective or activity occupies in the constitutional hierarchy of values. The provision guarantees the right to form association and does not include the right to compel others to form an association, but there may be situations in which, by entering into contract, one may also be agreeing to join an association.

Right of Association in the 1987 text 3 categories of workers: a. Government employees b. Supervisory employee c. Security guards **Civil Servants and Government employees also have the right to unionize and right to self-organization is recognized whether such employees perform governmental or proprietary functions. Right to Strike in accordance with law (Article XIII Section 3) Right to strike may be limited by law and may be narrowly curtailed in the case of certain classes of workers in both the public and private whereas right to organize is broader.

Right of Association in Action: LABOR

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Registration of unions is not a violation of right of association and is a valid exercises of police power; it is merely a condition for the (1) acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations, or unions and (2) the possession of the rights and privileges granted by law. The ROA may be exercise with or without said registration. BERNAS: The right to form associations does not necessarily include the right to be given legal personality, BUT if the law itself makes possession of legal personality a pre-condition for effective associational action then what is involved is not just the right to have legal personality but also the right to be an association. SUBVERSION Can mere membership in communist or similar organizations be made punishable as criminal offense? Knowing membership is punishable. Anti-Subversion Act laid down basic guidelines, the heart of which was the agreement itself and not the action taken pursuant to it. BERNAS: If the demanding standards of freedom of association, coupled with freedom of expression and belief are satisfied, it is not enough for the prosecution to show that the purpose of the organization is to overthrow or harm the government. The government must comply with the heavy burden of showing such purpose or the organization presents a clear and present danger. **inclusion of right to unionize is ill-advised because while the right to unionize is an economic and labor right, the right to association is a civil-political right. SSS Employees Assocn. V. CA, 175 SCRA 686 Held: Employees in the Civil Service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary work stoppages because the terms and conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government owned and controlled corporations with original charters are fixed by law and they cannot use the same weapons employed in the private sector to secure concessions from their employees. Relations between private employees and their employers rest on essentially voluntary basis and the principle behind labor unionism is that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion of law, hence settled by process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature or administrative heads of government, when power is properly delegated, which fix the terms and conditions of employment and therefore may petition the Congress or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the betterment of these T&C. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council. In Re Edilon, 84 SCRA 382 Held: Compelled membership in IBP is not inimical to the freedom of association. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. UPSU v. Laguesma 288 SCRA 15 Held: The right of association guaranteed in the Constitution is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes not contrary to law. Managerial Employees joining, assisting or forming any labor unions is prohibited as per labor code. They may have a separate organization of their own in accordance with R.A. 6715. Sta. Clara Homeowners Association vs. Gaston, 374 SCRA 396 Held: Practices inimical to non-members of homeowners association is in violation of the freedom of association. Freedom of association includes the freedom not to associate. ACCESS TO INFORMATION Article III Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions as well

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as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Chavez vs. PCGG 299 SCRA 744 Held: Information sought must be matters of public concern and access to which may be limited by law. The state policy of full public disclosure extends only to transactions involving public interest and may also be subject to the reasonable conditions prescribed by law. Public concern like public interest is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matters at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. Official acts of public officers in pursuit of their official functions are public in character; hence the records pertaining to such official acts and decisions are within the ambit of the constitutional right of access to public records. R.A. 6713 public officials and employees are mandated to provide information on their policies and procedures in clear and understandable language and ensure openness of information, public consultations and hearing, whenever appropriate In general, writings coming into the hands of public officers in connection with their official functions must be accessible to the public, consistent with the policy of transparency of government affairs. (aimed to afford people that public officials are honest, faithful and competently performing their functions) Q: What are some of the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? Held: The SC enumerated the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, as follows: (1) National Security matters and intelligence information there is governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic, and other national security matters. (2) Trade or industrial secrets (R.A. 8293 Intellectual Property Code) and other related laws and banking transactions (R.A. 1405 Secrecy of Bank Deposits) (3) Criminal matters, such as those relating to apprehension, the prosecution and the detention of criminals, which courts may not inquire into prior to such arrest, detention and prosecution (4) Other confidential information. (R.A. 6713 The Ethical Standards Act) Q: Is the recovery for the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses a matter of public concern subject to this right? Held: With such pronouncements of our government there is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest. Additionally, ill-gotten wealth refers to assets and properties purportedly acquired, directly or indirectly, by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives and close associates which is supposedly originated from the government and to all intents and purposes, they belong to the people. The right can be limited if the information sought would endanger national interest or security A law will only be effective upon publication in the OG, or alternatively in 2 newspapers of general circulation. (Tanada vs. Tuvera)

NOTES: The right of access to public documents and records is:

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(1) Self Executory (2) A public right Limitations: (1) Limited to information on matters of public concern (2) Subject to regulation government research data findings of government funded research, NOT findings of privately funded research REGULATORY DISCRETION: Access can be reasonably regulated for the convenience of and order in the office that has custody of the documents but regulation should not amount to prohibition of access.

Regulatory discretion includes: (1) Authority to determine what matters are of public concern (2) Authority to determine the manner of access to them Ratio for the regulation of time, manner and place of examination is to: (1) Prevent damage to or loss of records (2) Prevent undue interference with the duties of the custodians (3) Prevent encroachment on equal right of others to examine documents. Right to information must be balance against other genuine interests necessary for the proper functioning of the government. The standards that have been developed for the regulation of speech and press and of assembly and petition and of association are applicable to the right of access to information They are all cognate right; rest on the premise that ultimately, it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone can protect the values of a democratic government.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte 170 SCRA 256 Held: The right to information does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like. Public character of GSIS funds gave private individuals access to the documents.

Baldoza vs. Dimaano 71 SCRA 14 Held: Access of official records (the docket book) for any lawful purpose (to look into the criminal cases for a report on the peace and order situation of the municipality) is guaranteed but is subject to reasonable conditions by the custodian of the records. **Access to judicial records may not be prohibited; however, a judge may regulate examination of such records. Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission 150 SCRA 530 Held: In determining whether or not particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case to case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

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Note that personal interest is not a ground for demanding access to information. There must be a public concern in obtaining access.

Chavez v. PEA 384 SCRA 152 Held: Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the right to information. Once the committee makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the government. From this moment, the public right to information attaches, and any citizen can access all the non proprietary information leading to such definite proposition. The right to information covers three categories of information: (1) Official records refer to any documents that are part of the public records in custody of the government agencies or officials (2) Documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, and decisions refer to documents and papers recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying, or explaining official acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. (3) Government research data used in formulating policies refer to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in formulating government policies. ACADEMIC FREEDOM Garcia v. Faculty of Admission 68 SCRA 277 Held: The Constitution recognizes the enjoyment by institutions of higher learning of the right to academic freedom. The school decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of the students.

The internal conditions for academic freedom in a university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following functions: (a) (b) (c) (d) Admission and examination of students Curricula for courses of study Appointment and tenure of office of academic staff Allocation of income among the different categories of expenditure.

It is an atmosphere in which the four essential freedoms of a university prevail to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. UP vs. Ayson 176 SCRA 647 Held: An institute of higher learning cannot be compelled to provide for secondary education. It is beyond cavil that UP as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities. Failing on such conditions, UP can order its abolition on academic grounds. UP vs. CA 218 SCRA 728 Held: It is beyond the province of the court to make pronouncements on matters beyond its ken and expertise. To be sure, in resolving the complaint for damages, the court may find congruence in what is justiciable and what falls within the field of the sciences. Still, it is best to keep in mind that its proper role and functions is the determination of legal issues.

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In considering the problem of academic freedom, one must distinguish between autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher.

Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. CA 348 SCRA 265 Q: How should the States power to regulate educational institutions be exercised? Held: Section 4(1), Article XIV of the Constitution recognizes the States power to regulate educational institutions. Such power to regulate is subject to the requirement of reasonableness. Moreover, the Constitution allows merely the regulation and supervision of educational institutions, not the deprivation of their rights. University of San Agustin, Inc. v. CA 230 SCRA 761 Q: Define and discuss the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning. Held: Academic freedom of educational institutions has been defined as the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It is a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpertual Help College of Rizal, Inc., 227 SCRA 595 Q: What are the essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom? Held: (1) It encompasses not only the freedom to determine on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught and how it shall be taught, But likewise who may be admitted to study. (2) The essential freedoms subsumed in the term academic freedom encompass the freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds: (a) Who may teach (b) What may be taught (c) How it shall be taught, and (d) Who may be admitted to study Incidentally, the school not only has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The Constitution no less imposes such duty. All educational institutions shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the historical development of the country, to teach the rights and duties of citizenship, strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline, encourage critical and create thinking, broaden scientific and technological knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency. If a school has the freedom to determine whom to admit, logic dictates that it also has the right to determine whom to exclude or expel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholding of graduation priveleges. UP Board of Regents v. CA 313 SCRA 404 Q: May a university validly revoke a degree or honor it has conferred to a student after the graduation of the latter after finding that such degree or honor was obtained through fraud? Held: Freedom of higher learning is a freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of the students and where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, for it is precisely the graduation of such student that is in question.

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THE IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE Article III, Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. The purpose of the impairment clause is to safeguard the integrity of valid contractual agreements against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, they should be respected by the legislature and not tampered with by subsequent laws that will change the intention of the parties or modify their rights and obligations. The protection of the impairment clause is not absolute.

CONTRACT: Refers to any lawful agreement on property or property rights, whether real or personal, tangible, or intangible. The agreement may be executed or executor. It does not cover: (1) Licenses as these involve grants of privileges only that are essentially revocable (2) Marriage contract which is regarded as a social institution subject at all times to regulation by the legislature and to change of the original conditions (3) Public office because it is not a property right and therefore cannot be the subject of a contract between the incumbent and the government.

Tan vs. Director of Forestry 125 SCRA 302 Held: A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal state, or municipal granting it and person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation. Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. Ruther v. Esteban 93 Phil 68

(1) The impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive right (2) The protective power of the state, the police power, may only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional provision against impairment of contracts; (3) A different situation is presented when extensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow,; (4) The decision in the Bleisdell case is predicated on the ground that the laws altering existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment. Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union NUBE v. PVB 189 SCRA 14 Held : Even of it be conceded that the charter of the Bank constitutes a contract between the Government and the stockholders of the Bank, it would not follow that the relationship cannot be altered without violating the impairment clause. The undeniable fact is that the notion of public interest has made such considerable inroads into the constitutional guaranty that one could validly say now that it has become the exception rather than the rule. The modern understanding is that the contract is protected by the guaranty only if it does not affect public interest, but there is hardly any contract now that does not somehow or other affect public interest as not to come under the powers of the State. Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Congress. Contracts mat create rights of property, but when contracts deal with a subject matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a

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Held: Instances by which the bounds may be transgressed:

congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant constitutional power making contracts about them. The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc. v. POEA 243 SCRA 666 Held: The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness. It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object if value and which confer rights that may be asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. No prevention of proper exercise of the police power. Freedom to contract is not absolute, all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impressed with public interest. Bogo Medellin Sugarcane Planters Assoc. v. NLRC 296 SCRA 108 Held: Jurisprudence holds that the constitutional guarantee of non-impairment of contract is subject to the police power of the state and to reasonable legislative regulations promoting public health, morals, safety and welfare. Not all quit claims are per se invalid or against public policy, except (1) where there is a clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or (2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance 235 SCRA 630 Held: It is enough to say that the parties to a contract cannot, through the exercise of prophetic discernment, fetter the exercise of the taxing power of the State. For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a basic postulate of the legal order. The policy of protection contracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of government which retains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society.

LAW: Includes statues enacted by the national legislature, executive orders, and administrative regulations promulgated under a valid delegation of power, and municipal ordinances passed by the local legislative bodies. It does not include judicial decisions or adjudications made by the administrative bodies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial powers. To impair. The law must retroact so as to affect existing contracts concluded before its enactment. No impairment if the law is made to operate prospectively only, to cover contracts entered into after its enactment.

Clemens v. Nolting 42 Phil 702 Held: A law which changes the terms of a legal contract between the parties, either in the time or mode of performance, or impose new conditions, or dispenses with those expressed, or authorizes for its satisfaction something different from that provided in it terms, is a law which impairs the obligation of a contract and is null and void. OBLIGATION: It is the vinculum juris, the tie that binds the parties to each other.

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In truth, the Contract Clause has never been thought as a limitation on the exercise of the States power of taxation save only where a tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.

The obligation of a contract is the law or duty which binds the parties to perform their undertaking or agreement according to its terms and intent. In a contract of loan, the obligation is the duty of the lender to extend the loan and of the borrower to repay it, according to their stipulations.

IMPAIRMENT: Anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract The degree of diminution is immaterial. As long as the original rights of either of the parties are changed to his prejudice, there is an impairment of the obligation of the contract. In case of remedies, there will be impairment only if all of them are withdrawn, with the result that either of the parties will be unable to enforce his rights under the original agreement. No impairment as long as a substantial and efficacious remedy remains.

LIMITATIONS: A contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally modified even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is the proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. A contract suffers a congenital infirmity if: o Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and always, a reservation of the police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare, hence susceptible to change by the legislature o Legislature cannot bargain away the police power through the medium of a contract neither the private parties fetter the legislative authority by contracting on matters that are essentially within the power of the lawmaking body to regulate.

** It is submitted that this reservation is not at all necessary in as much as the subject of the franchise is necessarily connected with the public welfare and so is embraced in the police power of the State. Ilusorio v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 17 SCRA 25 Held: Such provisions are restricted to contracts which respect property or some object of the value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, involving the public right and welfare of the entire community affected by it. The security of the health, safety, moral, comfort, and general welfare of the community are matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the police power if the State to regulate and control them. Ortigas v. Feati Bank, 94 SCRA 533 Held: It should be stressed, that while non impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute since it has been reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e., the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people invariably described as the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. Lozano v. Martinez, Supra Held: Offenses punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but against public order. Hence, it does not impair the freedom of contract. It form part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the State.

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La Insular v. Machuca 39 Phil 567 Held: Act of the Legislature imposes new or additional tax upon goods contracted to be sold and places the burden of paying said tax upon the purchase, the obligation of the contract between the contracting parties in not thereby changed. Manila Trading v. Reyes 62 Phil 68 Held: Legislature may change existing remedies and modes of procedure without impairing the obligation of contracts and parties have no vested rights in particular remedies or modes of procedure provided an efficacious remedy remains for enforcement. ** Like the police power, the other inherent powers of eminent domain and taxation may validly limit the impairment clause. Casanova vs. Hord, Supra Doctrine: Where a law grants a tax exemption in exchange for valuable consideration, such exemption is considered a contract and cannot be repealed because of the impairment clause. All other tax exemptions are not contractual and so may be revoked at will by the legislature. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. 224 SCRA 792 Held: The non impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. EX POST FACTO LAWS Article III, Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. EX POST FACTO LAW: A law that seeks to punish an act which, when committed, was not yet a crime or was not as heavily punished. A law that retroacts to the day of the act so as to cause prejudice to the person performing the act. When a law is more favorable to the accused, it is allowed to retroact. Justinian Code: Nulla poena sine lege. RPC 21 No crime or misdemeanor shall be punished by penalty which was not established by law prior to its commission. Prohibition applies only to criminal legislation which affects the substantial rights of the accused and to criminal procedural law prejudicial to the accused. Does not apply to an executive proclamation suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus

Q: When is a law penal in nature? A: When the law in question has to be enforced through a criminal prosecution. Hence, the deprivation of the right to practice ones profession, although achieved through an administrative proceeding, is criminal nature. Q: When may procedural law be considered retrospective penal law? A: When it alters legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. However, it is well settled that statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence, which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his advantage, are not prohibited. KINDS OF EX POST FACTO LAWS:

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(1) Every law that makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act. (2) Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed. (3) RA Every law that changes punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment that the law annexed to the crime when committed. (4) Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. (5) Every law which, assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or the deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful. (6) Every law which deprives persons accused of crime of some lawful protection to which they have become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or of a proclamation of amnesty. CHARACTERISTICS: To be ex post facto, the law must: (1) Refer to criminal matters (2) Be retroactive in its application (3) To prejudice of the accused Even if the law be penal and retroactive, it will still not be ex post facto if it does not operate to the disadvantage of the accused.

In re Kay Villegas Kami Inc. 35 SCRA 428 Held : (reiteration of the kinds of ex post facto laws). The constitutional prohibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect. Republic v. Fernandez 99 Phil 934

Note however that the rule that ex post facto law does not apply to civil matters is not absolute.

Bayot v. Sandiganbayan 128 SCRA 383 Held: The suspension from office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Documents in the amendatory provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post facto law. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan 111 SCRA 433 Held: (reiteration of the kinds of the ex post facto law) Montenegro v. Castaneda 91 Phil 882 Held: Proclamation is invalid because it partakes of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law, and violates the constitutional precept that no bill of attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed. The prohibition applies only to statutes. U.S. v. Coronel 12 Phil 279 Held: The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission. It is not lawful to attribute retroactive effects to the said Act for the reason that, even though it refers to a matter of procedure, it does not contain any clause making it retroactive in its effects, and furthermore, the provisions thereof if applied now are prejudicial to the accused.

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Held: The constitutional prohibition is only against ex post facto laws which apply only to criminal or penal matters generally not to laws which concern civil matters or proceeding or which affect or regulate civil rights.

Co v. CA (1993) Held: The principle of prospectivity applies to judicial decisions which although in themselves need laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean. Also included are administrative rulings and circulars. Note: SC decisions are binding precedents. CA decisions are not binding and are merely persuasive.

People vs. Vilo 82 Phil 529 Held: The Judiciary Act of 1948 provides that whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be determined by the eight justices of the court, and that when eight justices fail to reach a decision as herein provided, the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed. Majority of the Court are of the opinion that the new law may be given retroactive effect so as to cover the case at bar involving an offense committed prior to the enactment of JA 1948. The writer, on contrary, believes that it should not be ex post facto law with the inclusion of Article 47 of the RPC that no accused could be sentenced to death except when there was unanimity among the Justices as to the propriety of the penalty; and this requisite correspondingly accorded the accused a substantive right. To give effect to the view that the J.A. of 1948, should be given only prospective application, the writer is constrained to switch his vote to the imposition of reclusion perpetua upon the appellant who otherwise should have deserved the penalty of death. Rodriguez vs. Sandiganbayan 120 SCRA 659 Held: Presidential Decree 1606 is not an ex-post facto law legislation, for as petitioner himself pointed out: It is now well-settled statutory changes in the mode of trial or the rules of evidence which do not deprive the accused of a defense and which operate only in a limited and substantial manner to his disadvantage, are not prohibited. Katigbak vs. Sol. Gen. 180 SCRA 540 Held: Penalty of forfeiture prescribed by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions of property made prior to its passages as it will run afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bill of attainders. (reiteration of the first and fifth kind of ex post facto law) Lacson vs. Executive Secretary 301 SCRA 298 Held: Ex post facto law, generally prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. BILL OF ATTAINDER: A legislative act that inflicts punishment without trial, its essence being the substitution of legislative fiat for a judicial determination of guilt. Only when a statute applies to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on the m without a judicial trial that it becomes a bill of attainder.

People v. Ferrer 48 SCRA 382 Held: The constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation of power by confining legislatures to rule making and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function. The singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent, suffice to stigmatize a statute as a bill of attainder. The law is a bill of attainder if it has expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope to overthrow.

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It is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. Misolas vs. Panga 181 SCRA 648 Held: Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial. The total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict a punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed, specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate the offense. There is no encroachment in the power of the court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal possession of firearms has been committed and that the qualifying circumstances attached to it has been established also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial precedents require. NON IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT Article III, Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non payment of a poll tax. DEBT: Refers to any civil obligations arising from contract, expressed or implied.

Lirag Textile v. SSS 153 SCRA 338 Held: Debt is defined as an obligation to pay money at some fixed future time, or at a time which becomes a definite and fixed by acts of either party and which they expressly implied, agree to perform in the contract.

Held: The constitutional prohibition in effect in the Philippine Islands is in the same category as those States in which imprisonment for debt is absolutely prohibited. The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, unlike some States in the American Union, makes no exception in cases of fraud. The debt intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well defined meaning. Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt were intended to prevent the commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason that the damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into between the parties, but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are considered as a punishment therefor, not to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal proceeding as punishments for crime. Ajeno v. Inserto 71 SCRA 166 Held: The provision refers only to a contractual obligation or an obligation to pay money arising from a contract and not to an obligation arising from a crime. Serafin v. Lindayag 67 SCRA 166 Held: The SC, finding the respondent guilty as charged aggravated by the latters submission of spurious evidence i.e., the alleged complaint and the purported notes on preliminary examination to cover up his liability, dismissed respondent from office and directed the endorsement of the original and amended complaints to the NBI to determine the genuineness of the signatures and to file proper criminal proceedings when warranted. (Affirmation of Ajeno v. Inserto case) Sura v. Martin 26 SCRA 286

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Ganaway v. Quillen 42 SCRA 805

Held: The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of the defendant who was insolvent in an action for support in effect, authorize his imprisonment for debt in violation of the Constitution. (Affirmation of Ajeno v. Inserto case) CRIME: Although the debtor cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay his debt, he can be validly punished in a criminal action if he contracted his debt through fraud. The act which is penalized is the deception he employed in securing the debt. The responsibility of the debtor in this situation arises not from the contract of loan, but ex delicto, i.e., from the commission of a crime.

Lozano v. Martinez, Supra Held: It is not the non payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended to coerce the debtor to pay his debt instead its thrust is to prohibit, under pain of sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. It is punishable as an act against property and not against public order. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only facts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power. Where the debtor was convicted for the fraud he exercised in obtaining the debt and made to refund the money illegally obtained by him, his failure to do so could be so punished with subsidiary imprisonment, which according to SC was part of the penalty imposed upon him for the crime he committed and not for his failure to pay his debt. The suspension of a civil servant for his failure to pay a just and admitted debt is an administrative sanction and does not violate the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

POLL TAX: Since a tax is not a debt but arises from the obligation of the person to contribute his share in the maintenance of the government, failure to pay the same can be validly punished with imprisonment. The only exception is failure to pay poll tax which is defined as a specific fixed sum levied upon every person belonging to a certain class without regard to his property or occupation. This exception, adopted pursuant to the social justice policy, reflects the tender regard of the law for the millions of our impoverished masses who cannot afford even the nominal cost of a poll tax like the basic community tax certificate.

Villanueva v, City of Iloilo 26 SCRA 578 Held: A poll tax is a tax of a fixed amount upon all persons, or upon all persons of a certain class, resident within a specified territory, without regard to their property or the occupation in which they may be engaged. INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE Article III Section 18 (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been convicted. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary peonage, all denote a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another. The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised.

Q: Are judicial return- to work orders in labor disputes involuntary servitude?

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A: No. An employee entering into a contract of employment after CA 103 went into effect voluntarily accepts the conditions prescribed in the law which among the others includes the return-to-work order condition. US v. Pompeya (1915) Held: Posse comitatus is an ancient obligation of the individual to assist in the protection of the peace and good order of his community. Pollock v. Williams US (1944) Held: Peonage is a status or condition of compulsory service based upon the indebtedness of the peon to the master where the debtor is forced to perform some provision of law. The Anti-Peonage Act intended not merely to end slavery but to maintain a system of completely free and voluntary labor by prohibiting legislative acts making the quitting of or absence from work a component of any crime. THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS Article III Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: HABEAS CORPUS, Concept Latin term which means you have the body is a high prerogative writ of ancient common-law origin, the great object of which is the liberalization of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause. ESSENTIAL PURPOSE: To inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary and to relieved a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

Habeas Corpus extend to: (1) Cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person is deprive of his liberty (2) Cases by which the rightful custody of the person is withheld from the person entitled thereto It is available when one is subject to: (1) (2) (3) (4) Physical or moral restraint Sentenced to a longer penalty than that is subsequently meted out to another for the same offense Questions courts jurisdiction Unlawful denial of bail

NOTE: Restraint must be actual, effective and material. As long as freedom of action is limited. Writ of Habeas Corpus is a writ directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the detainee at a designated time and place, and to show cause why he should continue to be detained. A prerogative writ of liberty employed to test the validity of a persons detention. File a petition if detained to secure his release. Exists a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by decisions of the writ The privilege of the writ is the right to have the immediate determination of the legality of the deprivation of physical liberty. The privilege may be waived but another may file a petition (such as relative).

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What is suspended is the privilege of the writ and not the writ itself. Detaining office should show to court that the detainee is being detained for an offense covered by the suspension, and the court cannot inquire any further to find out if the detention is legal. Only for 3 days. After 3 days, the court can now require the officer to produce the body of the detainees and show cause why he should not be released.

Gumabon v. Director of Prisons 37 SCRA 420 Held: The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person there from if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The only ground on which this court, or any court without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the detention. Ilusorio v. Bildner 332 SCRA 169 Held: Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus. A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. The essential object and purpose of the WHC is to inquire all manner of involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom from such restraint. FUNCTIONS OF THE WRIT: The liberty of an individual may be restored by HC where he is subjected to physical restraint, such as arbitrary detention. Even moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this writ. Restraint means actual and effect restraint and not merely restraint. Habeas Corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose liberty is merely restrained Abduction differs from detention it that it refers to the detention of private persons by other private person. Does voluntary restraint constitute HC? Generally, NO, except when a person restrained minor and the petitioner is the father or mother or guardian or a person having custody of the minor. NOTE: Voluntariness is viewed from the point of view of the person entitled to custody Alleged error does not go to the jurisdiction of the court; the proper remedy would not be the prerogative writ but an ordinary appeal.

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**WHC cannot be collaterally attacked and cannot be used as a substitute remedy for a lost appeal. Where a judgement is already final and executor and a favorable law lessening the penalty of the convict who are considered to have already served his sentence thereunder, WHC is proper. GENERAL RULE: A person out on bail is not entitled to WHC because his detention is merely legal or technical, not actual or physical. EXCEPTION: Immigration Cases An immigrant under bond may contest an adverse decision of the immigration commission by means of HC.

Moncupa v. Enrile 141 SCRA 233 Held: It is not physical restraint alone which can be inquired into by means of the WHC. Celeste v. People 31 SCRA 391 Held: The function of the WHC has been to provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be intolerable restraints. The WHC may still be invoked though if the process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be assailed, hence, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case, HC could be relied upon to regain ones liberty. Conde v. Rivera 45 Phil 650 Held: (Affirmation of the above case that deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust the court or tribunal of its jurisdiction. In such a case, HC could be relied upon to regain ones liberty) Ilagan v. Enrile 139 SCRA 349 Held: The function of the special proceeding of the HC is to inquire into the legality of ones detention. PROCEDURE: When an application for HC is filed and the court finds the petition in proper form, it will issue a writ as a matter of course, ordering the production of the person allegedly detained and requiring the respondent to justify the detention. Only where the return of the respondent shows that the person in custody is being held for a crime covered by the proclamation suspending the privilege of HC and in a place where it is effective will the court dismiss the petition. In all other cases, it will continue the proceedings to determine the validity of the persons detention. PROCEDURE FOR GRANT OF WRIT (1) Verified petition signed by the party whose relief is intended; some other person in his behalf. (2) Allowance of writ (3) Command officer to produce (4) Service of writ by sheriff or other officer (5) Return (6) Hearing on return Suspension of the privilege itself is the exception and not the rule, the rule being affirmation and not the limitation of liberty.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A POST CONVICTION REMEDY HC was the remedy of one whose confinement was the result of a valid judgment of conviction arrived at after the judge violated due process by compelling him to take the stand and testify against himself.

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GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION: To the President is entrusted the power to suspend the privilege of the WHC. Power not within the limitations and may be revoked by the Congress or the SC in proper cases. Article VII Section 18

POWER TO SUSPEND THE WRIT INVOLVES INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE 3 GOVERNMENTAL POWERS: President has the power to suspend the privilege but not exceeding 60 days Congress can revoke and President cannot set aside revocation Congress, upon initiative of the President, may extend the suspension SC may, upon initiative of ANY citizen, review the sufficiency and factual basis for 30 days from its filing. SC can annul the suspension is the not based on the 2 grounds: Invasion or Rebellion, when the public safety requires it.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1) Power to determine executive arbitrariness in the manner arriving at the suspension (2) Power to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of suspension SCOPE OF SUSPENSION OF PRIVILEGE: Applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with invasion Not enough that the crimes covered by the suspension be those coming under the constitutional enumeration For a person to lose the privilege of the writ, he must be judicially charged. Not enough that the complaint is under investigation by a fiscal or that a charge has been filed before the fiscals office. The criminal charge has to be filed in court. Changes in original authority of the President to settle the extent of his military powers: (1) Call out armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion only. (2) Grounds for the suspension of the privilege of the writ and the proclamation of martial law are now limited to (a) invasion or rebellion (b) when the public safety requires it. (3) Duration not exceeding 60 days, following which shall automatically be lifted (4) President shall report personally or in writing his action to the Congress within 48 hours of suspension or proclamation. (5) Congress shall convene within 24 hours if not in session. (6) Congress may revoke by a majority of votes which may not be set aside by the President. (7) By the same vote and the same manner, Congress may extend the suspension or proclamation upon the initiative of the President if the invasion or rebellion shall continue and public safety requires it. (8) Actions of the Pres and Congress shall be subject to review by the SC which shall have the authority to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of such action. No longer political question. Decision within 30 days from the time it is filed. (9) Challenge may be file by any citizen (10) Martial law does not automatically suspend the PWHC or the operation of the Constitution. Civil courts and Legislative bodies remain open. Military courts and agencies are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians. (11) Suspension shall apply only to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses inherent in, or directly connected with invasion. (12) Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially charged therewith within 3 days otherwise shall be released.

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The extension in this case may be indefinite, depending on the discretion of the legislature, which may be dicatated by the president.

Lansang vs. Garcia 42 SCRA 448 Held: The SC has the authority under the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for the issuance of a presidential proclamation suspending the PWHC for the purpose of determining the constitutional sufficiency thereof. The authority to suspend the PWHC is thus circumscribed, confined and not restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but, also as regard the time when and the place where it may be exercised. The power to suspend the privilege of the writ is neither absolute nor unqualified. For a valid suspension of the writ: (1) there must be invasion, insurrection or rebellion, (2) imminent danger thereof, and (3) oublic safety must require the aforementioned suspension. Note: The Lansang decision held that the court may only check and not supplant the decision of the executive. Determination only WON there has been a grave abuse of discretion and may not examine the correctness of the exercise of the presidential power

Garcia Padilla v Enrile (1983) Note: The SC reversed the Lansang decision and revived the Montenegro doctrine, reiteration that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was a political question to be resolved solely by the President. Aquino v. Enrile

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Held: Dioknos motion to withdraw his petition for HC was granted because: (1) such withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive fundamental issues of public interest that demanded to be resolved by virtue of other petitions and (2) as it was his liberty that was at stake, he had the right to renounce the application of HC he initiated.