Islamic Revival in Turkey Author(s): Bernard Lewis Reviewed work(s): Source: International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs

1944-), Vol. 28, No. 1 (Jan., 1952), pp. 38-48 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2604969 . Accessed: 01/04/2012 23:21
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publishedin Egypt a littlepamphlet called US Tarzi Siyaset (Three Kinds of Policy). In this pamphlet,which was later to have great influencein Turkey, he formulatedand examined three possible bases of unity in the Ottoman State. The firstwas Islam, the traditionalbasis of in the Ottoman Empire and its Muslim predecessors,since refurbished the pan-Islamic policies of Sultan 'Abd-iil-Hamid. The second was Ottofor liberal reformers a manism,the aspiration of the nineteenth-century commonOttomancitizenshipand loyaltyirrespectiveof religionor origin. YusufAk?ura discussedboth of these at some lengthand dismissedthemas failures. As a thirdpossibilityhe suggestedTurkism,a unitybased on the Turkishnation. His own Tartar originno doubt had somethingto do with this. The Tartar exiles in Turkey were among the firstpioneers of the Turkish national idea. It was in some measure a reaction of the Russian by Turks to pan-Slavism, and it was certainlyinfluenced the Turcological discoveries of the time in Russia and Western Europe, which made the Turkishpast as well as ofthe Turkishpeoples conscious oftheirspecifically commonMuslim heritage. the Turkishrevolutionof I908, all these tendenciescame out into After the open and found expression in a number of vigorous journals, newspapers, and books. Ottomanism was for a time the dominant creed, but both pan-Islamism and pan-Turkismcommanded an importantfollowing. A study of the Islamic journals that appeared duringthe years of Young reveals a livelymovementofideas. Alongsidethe simple Turk government clericalistreactionariestherewere importantgroups of religiousreformers, gropingtheir way towards a compromisebetween Islam and modernism, Turkishnationalism. Many of the betweenIslam and the new and growing of show the influence Muhammad 'Abduh and of these reformers writings others that of Amir 'Ali and the Indian the Egyptian Mandirmovement, Muslim modernists. The TurkishRepublic, while rejectingthe widerclaims ofpan-Turkism, adopted the Turkish nation as the basis of identityof the Turkish State. provinces Their choice was certainlyhelped by the loss of the non-Turkish of and by the defection the Sultan and the leaders ofthe religioushierarchy to the enemy,that is, to the Allied occupation forcesand the regimewhich of theyprotectedin Constantinople. The resultwas the establishment a lay not actually suppressed,was made a strictly in whichreligion, though State, private affair. If one may stretchwords a little,Islam was disestablished
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a of T the beginning this century TartarexilecalledYusufAk?ura

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and the Sleri'at repealed. The secularist reforms Kemal Atatuirkare of well known-the abolition of the fez and disappearance of the veil, the change ofthe alphabet, the adoption of the Gregoriancalendar and of Sunday as the official day of rest,the takingover ofthe evkaf(religiousendowments) by the State, the restriction and then prohibitionof religiouseducation, the adoption of European civil and penal codes in place of the reformed Islamic law of the precedingperiod,the reduction and eventual eliminationof the power of the religioushierarchyof the ulema. Nor was this all. Turkish Islam had always functionedon two levels: the formal, dogmatic religion of the State, the schools, and the hierarchy; and the popular mysticalfaithofthe masses, whichfoundits chiefexpressionin the or greatdervishbrotherhoods, tarikas. These were dissolved and banned in I925, theirassets impounded,and the holdingoftheirprayer-meetings prohibited by law. The evidence is that the secularization of Turkey was never quite as of completeas was sometimesbelieved, and as the TurkishGovernment the have liked us to believe. In the firstplace, there were many time would indicationsofthe persistence, beneath the surface,ofpopular religionin the form the cult of dervishsheikhs,especially in Anatolia. As late as I930 a of strikingincident occurred in Menemen, near Izmir. A young Kemalist officer called Kubilay heard a local dervishleader addressingthe populace and attacking the regime. When he remonstrated,he was seized by the mob, held down and slowly beheaded, amid the acclamation of the sheikh and his supporters. The guiltywerepunished,and a monumentwas erected to the memoryof Kubilay, at which a ceremonyof commemorationwas held everyyear. and policies of the State, there Even on the official side, in the structure weresignsthat, despite secularism,the older idea that Muslimequals Turk and non-Muslim equals non-Turkpersisted. In some respectsthe participain tion ofthe non-Muslims the public lifeofTurkey actually decreased after of the establishment the Republic, althoughtheirlegal status on paper was higherthan ever before. Certain formsof discriminationcontinued-for were called up formilitaryservice but did not bear example, non-Muslims while the numberof non-Muslimsin the arms and were not commissioned, civil service dwindled rapidly. All this can be largely but not wholly exfrom social the plained by theirignoranceofTurkishand theirself-isolation of the Turks. While the cosmopolitan Islamic Empire and culturalworld to had assigneda definite the place and function the non-Muslim minorities, nationalist Republic could offerlittle to those who either would not or could not join the dominantgroup. While on the one hand Turkish-speaking orthodox Christianpeasants in Anatolia were classed as Greeks and to transferred Greece, the childrenof Muslim Kurds or Arabs settled in Istanbul were classed as Turks. Significantly, religion still appeared on documents. identitycards and other official therewererumoursofa religiousrestoration, the After death ofAtatuirk

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but apart fromthe returnof Muslim chaplains to the army in May I940 nothingverymuch happened. The first open sign of religiousoppositionto the secularistpolicyofthe State appeared in I940. In the previousyear the of TurkishMinistry Education decided to publish a Turkish edition of the of Islam, the great co-operative enterprise published in Encyclo.pwdia Leiden by an internationalteam of European Orientalistsand containing in the best that European scholarship had to offer Islamic studies. The be a meretranslation. Many articleswhichwere Turkisheditionwas not to out of date were to be revised or rewritten Turkishscholars,and many by new articlesadded, but the whole was intendedto be in the same spiritof scientific the Leiden publication. A group of scholarshipas had informed religious-minded Turks, led by Esref Edib, who had been editor of the in Muslim periodical Sebil-ibr-Resad the Young Turk era, protested energeticallyagainst this project. They said that the so-called Enicyclofiodia of Islam was not really an encyclopaediaof Islam but against Islam, and that it was the workof Christianmissionaries, aimed partlyat assistingmissionaries in theirendeavoursand partlyat undermining basis ofthe Muslim the faith. They criticized the Ministry of Education for sponsoring this in allegedly anti-Islamic project, first lettersand articles in the press and then in a periodical which they published themselves. In I94I they began the publication of a rival encyclopaediaof their own, entitled Tirk Islam Ansiklopedisi(TurkishEncyclopaediaof Islam), on the same patternas the official writtenfroma strictlyMuslim one, but with all the contributions point of view. Each fasciculeof theirencyclopaedia was accompanied by a magazine supplementcontainingviolent and oftenscurrilouscriticismsof the currentfascicules of the other encyclopaediawhich were meanwhile issuingfromthe Ministry. The new post-war democracy of Turkey gave a very much greater of degreeof freedom expressionto all trendsof opinion,includingof course the religious leaders, who now proclaimed more and more openly theii hostilityto secularismand theirdemands foran Islamic restoration issue that was publiclydebated was that ofreligiouseducation. The first The debate began with private discussionsand moderatelyphrased articles in the press, and then, on 24 December I946, a full-dress debate was held on the subject in the Meclis in Ankara. Several membersof the Government Party spoke in favourof restoring religiouseducation, and although refusedto accede to theirrequest, the mere fact the Prime Ministerfirmly that the debate was held at all was widely regarded,in the rather more authoritarianTurkey of that time, as portending a coming change of policy. A long controversyfollowed in the press, parliament, and elsewhere. Should religiouseducation be tolerated? Should it be compulsory or optionalin schools? Should it be controlled the Ministry Education of by or by the Department of Religious Affairs?This last, a shrunkenremnant and of of of the office the Sheikh-uil-Islam the Ministries Sheri'atand Evkaf, into new life. These questions were eventuallysettled was now burgeoning

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of At educationwas reby a compromise. the beginning 1949 religious of schools. It consisted two hours'instruction on introduced Turkish to and whoseparents Saturday afternoons, was onlyto be takenby children asked forit. The overwhelming majority did. The text-book specifically of of of was prepared a joint committee representatives the Ministry by of and and a Affairs, presents modernEducation theDepartment Religious have some difficulty of in ized version Islam whichtheywouldprobably in recognizing Meccaor evenDamascus. The next step came in OctoberI950, whenit was decidedto make whenparents wererequired to education rather, religious compulsory-or This appliedonlyto the4thand 5th opt out insteadofin,as previously. schools. For the restof the schoolyearsreligious classesof the primary remained instruction optional. withthe growing interest religious in matters Thesechanges, together raisedthe question religious of in higher and the increase publicworship, in countries, education.The medreses which, Turkeyas in otherMuslim of had had beenthemaincentres higher by religious studies, beenreformed abolished Kemal in I924 alongwith and werefinally theYoungTurks, by and the restofthepanoplyofofficial Islam. In their the Caliphate place a of Kemal established Facultyof Theologyin the University Istanbul, of and to form intended serveas the centre a new,modernized, 'scientific' to more ofreligious westward-orientated instruction, appropriate a secular, was success.The teachers, The themselves republic. experiment nota great to did to ofthemedrese tradition, nottake kindly thetaskassigned them, to of and theatmosphere the timewas not conducive its realization.The from secondary the of schools I929 in abolition Arabicand Persian teaching and of boththenumbers thecompetence thestudents.After some reduced was finally the at in abortive suppressed 1933, attempts reform, Faculty of in Studiesattachedto and replaced due courseby an Institute Oriental of theFacultyofArts. Duringthe nineyearsof existence theFacultyof of from to twenty.In the the dropped 284 Theology, numbers itsstudents same periodtherewas a paralleldeclinein the schoolsforImams and wereclosedin I932. Exceptfor and the preachers, thelasttwosuchschools for schools Koran-readers, a smallamount and comparatively unimportant at education higher levelsdisappeared. ofprivate instruction, religious therefore revivalofrecent an revealed acuteshortThe religious years even and to teachreligion, inschools, to undertake age ofpeoplecompetent in functions mosques. Thislack ofmenwitha serious thevarious religious and illiterates the religious in education religious gave scope to fanatics results.It was no doubtfor thisreason, withunfortunate often at revival, decided to restorethe Faculty of least in part, that the government in whichopenedits gates to students OctoberI949. Several Theology, of features the new Facultystrikethe outsideobserver.Unlikeits prewith its great it decessor, is not in Istanbul,the old religious centre, but and traditions, inAnkara, newcity, heartof the the libraries, mosques,

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republican Turkey and the seat of the government. Unlike the old ultimatelyunder the it medreses, is a part of the University,and therefore control of the Ministryof Education. The firstChairs to be established include Islamic Art and History of Religions. In recentyears therehave been a numberof signsofincreasingreligious of activity,and one of the most strikingis the growingself-assertiveness religiousfunctionaries.For a long time they had been very quiet and did not dare to raise theirvoices, certainlynot in the towns,and hardlyeven in countryplaces. Nowadays they are much more in evidence. The wearing of religiousgarb outside mosques is still forbidden,but the beret, which presents obvious advantages for Muslim worship, has become the social turban of the religioushierarchy. For a time even equivalent ofthe former the beret was banned in Turkey, precisely because it had assumed that withbeards and beretsare to be seen in but today old gentlemen character, many places, voicing their views and demands with growingvigour. The survivors of the ulema have become more ambitious. They are openly demandingcontrolof religiouseducation, and theyhave begun, in a tentative way, to intervenein politics. Recently they started a demand forthe and if that is returnof the evkafto the Department of Religious Affairs, granted-it has not been yet-it willof coursegive thema greatincreasein power and influence. Mosque attendance has risen considerably. Many of the mosques are and one can followthe service fromquite a now equipped with amplifiers, distance around them. Inscribed Arabic texts hang on the walls in cafes, for shops, taxis, and in the markets,and vast numbersof them are offered sale in the streets. Religious books and pamphlets are being writtenand scale. In I939, out of several thousand published on an ever-increasing books printedin Turkey, there were only a dozen on religioussubjects. I do not know the currentstatistics,but judging by window and stall displays, it must be a very much larger percentage today. Besides a great number of pamphlets of popular piety, there are books on Islam, bioworks on Islamic history,theographiesof the Prophet and other figures, translationsof and commentarieson the Koran. logy and mysticism, Quite a considerable numberof Turks have gone on the pilgrimageto Mecca duringthe last two or threeyears. Last year therewere nearlynine thousand, in spite of the fact that the governmentgave no allocation of for foreign currency the purpose. Three of the major Istanbul dailies sent and the popular presshas in to special correspondents cover the pilgrimage, general given increased attentionto religiousmatters. are Far moresignificant the many signsof a revival ofthe tarikas,which continuedto exist secretlyrightthroughthe Republican era. It is natural should be encouragedby the growing enoughthat the dervishbrotherhoods tolerance of Islam to reassert themselves, but apparently the official governmentare not prepared to extend the same indulgenceto popular, mysticalIslam as to orthodoxy. This governmentmistrustof the tarikas

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is not new. Even the sultans,in earliertimes,looked askance at some ofthe ordersbecause of the suspicion of heterodoxyand dissidence attached to them. During the war years there were occasional arrests of dervish sheikhs. A major episode began in April I950 when a sheikh of the Tijani order,called Kemal Pilavoglu, was arrestedand broughtto trialin Ankara. The trial awoke very great interest; thousands of the sheikh's followers the came into the court-room thronged streetsoutside the court-house, and interrupted trial by shoutingand demonstrating.Eventually, forthe the remainderof the proceedings,the court-househad to be guarded by a cordon of two hundred policemen. The sheikh claimed to have 40,000 followers. Since then there have been a number of similar proceedings against otherorders-Nakshbendis in May I950, Mevlevis in June,Kadiris in March I95I. During the past year it is the Tijanis that have been most active, and it is theythat have become associated, in the public mind,with the most extremeand thoroughgoing formof religiousreaction. Unlike the Mevlevis, Kadiris, and others, the Tijani order is not old-established in Anatolia but is a comparativelyrecentimportation. It was foundedat the end ofthe eighteenth centuryin NorthAfrica,and became prominent with a fanatical campaign of proselytizationin Tropical Africa. In Turkey it seemsto have spread at the expense ofthe relatedbut morepacificKhalveti and Kadiri orders. Its present role invites comparisonwith those of the in Ikhwan al-Muslimuin Egypt and of the Fida'iyan-i Islam in Persia. In FebruaryI95I an outbreakofvandalism,ofundoubted dervishinspiration, aroused widespread indignation,and provoked against statues of Atatuirk in counter-measures the form of a new law to protect the memory of Atattirk frominsult. There was some criticismof this law. Some Democrat deputies protested against 'the cult of the leader'-the opposition argued that it was the achievements,ratherthan the memory, Atatuirk of that needed protection. The accession to power of the Democrats in the elections of May I950 broughta few immediate changes. Many of the religious elements supNational Party,whichwas moreopenlyfavourable portedthe unsuccessful to theiraspirations,but the majority seem to have voted for the Democrats, who had a greater chance of success and who, in this as in other things,provided the occasion fora plebiscite against Republican policies. In the eventthe Democrats appeared to favourthe religiousrevival. Their was to continueand perhaps accelerate the process of piecepolicy at first meal concessions begun by their predecessors. In the early months of Democrat rulethreesuch concessionsweremade. One ofthem,compulsory religious educationin primaryschools,has already been discussed. In June I950 the recitationof the call to prayerin Arabic was permitted. The call to prayerin Turkish,which had previouslyalone been tolerated,was not abolished, but the use of Arabic was made optional. As far as I could ascertain,the call is now read almost exclusivelyin Arabic. In July I950 were introducedinto the programmeof the Turkish State Koran-readings
D

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Radio three times weekly. More recently the government have been tendencyto placate and even encouragereligioussentishowinga growing ments. Membersof Parliamentand moreespecially candidates forelection bid openly for religioussupport, secularist attempts to halt the tide are frowned upon, and some membersof the Democrat Party, though not the demands fora complete have lent theirsupportto far-reaching Party itself, reversalof the Kemalist reforms. A word or two may be said about the religiouspress that has grownup in Turkey in recent years. There is now quite a number of periodicals devoted wholly or mainly to religiousmatters and to the propagation of religiousideas. These may be divided into threemain categories. The most widelyread are the popular journals, mainly weeklymagazines, addressed to primarily artisansand peasants, to be read aloud wherenecessary. They the of presenta form simplepietywhichprobablyverywell reflects mind of the people to whom they are addressed. A second group has been well describedas 'Boulevard Fascism withreligiouscolouringmatter'. The outperiodstandingexample is BiiyiikDogu (Great Orient),a ratherscurrilous ical, appearing at irregularintervals and edited by the poet Necib Fazil nationalist,and royalist,and appears Kisakiirek. BiiyiikDogu is clericalist, to be a Turkish calk on the ActionFranpaise, with the House of Osman in place of the 'fortykings who in a thousand years made France'. Like his French prototypeNecib Fazil has had brusheswiththe law. The thirdand most interestinggroup consists of those journals with some intellectual Selamet, pretensions.The mostimportantare the TurkIslam A nsiklopedisi, and Sebil-iir-Resad.The last purportsto be a revival of the journal of the are same name publishedunderthe Young Turks. Most ofthe contributors survivorsfromthat period, and are incidentallyalso responsibleformany of the religiousbooks which are appearing. These journals appear to enjoy the support of the Department of Religious Affairs. The contentof these journals is somewhat disappointing. The religious journals of the Young Turk period maintained a very high standard, and were writtenby men thoroughlyconversantwith Islam, its literature,its doctrines,its traditions. But most of these men are dead, and the few and survivorsshow all too plainly the scars of thirtyyears of frustration isolation. In the absence of any religioushighereducation, no successors could appear to replace them. The journals are forthe most part clericalist ratherthan religiousin any real sense. They are xenophobe, usually antitreatingmost of what they discuss froma Western,oftenanti-Christian, rathercrude political point of view. Articleson India, forexample, which occasionally appear, consist of communal pamphleteering,and show no religiousproblemsand trendsin modern awareness of the very interesting Indian and Pakistani Islam. Much of theircontentconsistsof apologetics, with the familiardistortionof true Islamic values by restatingthem in in termsofthe dominantWesternconcepts; the historicalromanticism the compresentationof the recent and remoterIslamic past; the inferiority

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plex that induces learned Muslims to seize on chance remarksby one or otherWesternerin praise of Islam and inflatetheirimportancebeyond all reason. This romantic approach to history is found in other Muslim countries, whereMuslimthinkersstriveunnecessarilyto justifytheirown civilizationin Westernterms. It has some novel variantsin Turkey,as, for example, in the parallel attempts to show that the Ottoman ulema were reallygood Kemalists and Republicans and that Kemal himself was a good and faithful Muslim. Only occasionally does one finda serious attempt to face the problems of Islam in the modernworldand the role of Islam in a modernState. Here the ideas derive mainly fromtwo sources-the Indian and Egyptian reformers the nineteenth of century. Ahmed Hamdi Akseki,the late chiefof the Department of Religious Affairs, and Omer Riza Dogrul, one of the most active religious journalists, were both good Arabic and English scholars,and have translatedbooks fromboth sources. It is still not easy to assess the political role of this religiousrevival in modern Turkey. With the restoration of freedom of opinion Islam necessarily became a political issue again, and the fearof givingthe advantage of religioussupport to the other side led both of the major parties to give at least toleration,oftenencouragement,to this movement. At the same timeboth the Republican and Democrat Parties seem anxious to keep it within bounds. No interference has as yet been tolerated in matters which the government regard as vital. The tarikas are still held in check, the evkaf have not been restored,and so farthereis no sign that they will be. Despite the demands of some extremists, such changes as the returnto the Arabic alphabet or the repeal of the social legislationof the Republic are not yet under serious consideration. At the same time it is clear that of the strength the movementis such that in a democraticTurkey no party could dare to ignoreit, perhaps even to oppose it. If the revival continues to growin strength and momentumat the presentrate, it is not impossible that even these reforms may be endangered. In one field that of foreign policy the religiousrevival seems to have had no effect worthspeakingof. Turkeystillfollowsa Westernorientation, and has shown a remarkablelack of interestin-variousmovementsto the south and to the east fora greaterIslamic solidarity. A case in point is the clear preference the Turkish Governmentfora European ratherthan a of MiddleEastern alignment a preference that is only partlydue to political and strategicconsiderations. Another is the Turkish attitude to Israel. The religiouspress and leaders are of course pro-Arab,but official policy to towardsIsrael has been friendly. Turkey gave de jure recognition Israel beforeGreat Britain,opposed the internationalization Jerusalemat the of United Nations, and concluded a trade pact with Israel in July I950. The ratherenergetic pan-Islamic activities of the Pakistan Legation in Turkey seem to have little effect, and have even aroused criticismin the Turkish press.

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There have been signs of resentment some quarters at the growthof in the religiousrevival. One sees occasional articlesin the press on the danger of 'clerical reaction', on 'the threat to the Kemalist heritage'. This is a matter which cuts across party affiliations. There are supporters and opponentsof Islamic revival in both the major parties,but my impression is that the strongestanti-clericalelement is in what one might call the Kemalist wing of the Republican Party that section which seeks, above all else, to preserveand pursue the basic policies of Kemal Atatiirk. The chief group that has taken an active role so far in opposing the revival is the students. The National Union of Students and other student bodies have repeatedly protested against 'the twin dangers of clericalismand Communism', and in March I95I several students were arrestedafter a demonstrationagainst the religious periodicals Sebil-4irResad and BiiyiikDogu. Government policy seems to be to discouragesuch activitiesby the students. At the beginningof I95I the National Union of Studentsdecided to use the annual ceremonyat the Kubilay monumentin Menemen as the occasion for an anti-clericalist demonstration. The governmentreacted by cancelling the proceedingsentirely,and, for the first time,the anniversaryof the murderof Kubilay passed in silence. This may simplyhave been a matter of public security the governmentmay have feltthat therewas a danger of disordersif provocative speeches were made there. But even so the cancellation of the memorialceremonyis an interesting testimonyto the strengthof religioussentimentand the wariness of the governmentof permitting open challenge to it. an What elementssupport the religiousrevival? From I924 religionwas not an open political factorin Turkey, and its real strengthand basis of support are not very well known. As far as I could judge frompersonal contacts,the youngerintellectuals those educated in the schools and universitiesof the Republic are, with some exceptions, very little affected and regardit with feelings rangingfromirritation contempt. The main to oppositionto it is in the universities. But theirdislikeof the presentform and leadershipof clerical reactionshould not mislead us into thinking that theyhave done with Islam itself. Islam is too deeply rooted an elementin the Turkish national identityto be lightlycast aside, and a formof faith more suited to nationalist intellectualsmay yet awake a wide response. as Officials, a class, are extremelysensitiveto changes in the direction ofthe wind. In the civil service,in the army,and even in parliamentpiety is fashionable,and while by no means all favourthe fullprogrammeof the reactionaries, many feelthat both formoral and forpolitical reasons some restoration Islamic beliefand practice is necessaryforthe health of the of Turkish people. The peasantry are still as religiousas they have always is been. For them there is no question of a revival the only difference moreopenly. Perhaps that theycan now expresstheirreligioussentiments one of the strongestelementssupportingthe revival is the class known in Turkey as the esnaf-the artisans and small shopkeepers in the towns.

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and, likethe peasants,manyofthem veryfanatical, These are generally of withone or another the larikas. Finally,the merchant are connected Communism, against in form insurance of classis interested anyadditional at of and has a tradition piousobservance, leastin theprovinces. the Communism against How far religious revival infactan insurance is is made,in secularist The accusation often is a subjectofsomediscussion. religion, dervish at quarters, therevival, leaston thelevelofpopular, that have in brotherhoods agitators.The Anatolian is inspired Communist by communism to of religious the past been no strangers a form primitive clever for ends. Developments might exploit political which propagandists is show that Communism not averseto colin otherMuslimcountries where theseappearto offer of laborating withmovements massfanaticism order.How farthisis happenthe thebestchanceofundermining existing ing in Turkeyis anyone'sguess-thoughon the wholethe ancientand makesTurkeya Turkishmistrust Russian expansionism of deep-rooted soil barren forCommunist seeds. singularly menoftheoldergeneraof revival mainly are The leaders thereligious from YoungTurkperiod. Theyseemto have recruited the tion, survivors intellectuals and manysecularist veryfewyoungmen to theirnumber, is a claimthatthere no realreligious revivalat all, but simply reassertion whichfora long timetheyhad to keep by certain peopleof sentiments they say, will hiddenbut can now proclaimopenly. The movement, it, die with the generation whichsponsored and is only of transitory
significance.

I to For myself, find thispointofviewdifficult accept. Islam has prountilits fall people. Fromits foundation found rootsamongthe Turkish or to theOttoman Empirewas a Statededicated theadvancement defeilce and faithof Islam. For six centuries Ottomanswere the of the power in West,first the attemptalmostconstantly war withthe Christian at successful to imposeIslamicruleon a largepartofEurope,then mainly action to halt or delay the relentless in the long drawnout rearguard withits origins of counter-attack the West. This centuries-long struggle, the in theveryrootsofTurkish Islam,couldnotfailto affect wholestrucFor his and tureofTurkish society institutions. theOttoman, Empirewas of chronicles territories the Empireare the Islam itself.In the Ottoman of referred as 'thelands ofIslam', its armiesas 'the soldiers Islam', its to of head as 'the SheikhofIslam'. Its peoplethought themselves religious namelikeUmayas was a dynastic first foremost Muslims 'Ottoman' and in yad or Abbasid,whichonlyacquireda nationalsignificance the nineof 'Turk'a term of the under influence Europeanliberalism; teenth century for contempt peasants,whichonlybecamea badge of nationalidentity of The of the after impact Europeannationalism. identificationtheEmpire of all contained theheartlands withIslamwas easyenough;its dominions Caliphates; Islam-Syria, Iraq, and Egypt,theseatsofthegreatmedieval the and Muhammad wherethe ancientProphets, Arabia and Palestine,

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'Seal of the Prophets', had lived and preached. Turkishthought,life,and letterswere permeatedthroughand throughby the inheritedtraditionsof the classical Muslim cultures,which, though transmutedinto something new and distinctive,remainedbasically and unshakably Islamic. After a century of Westernization,Turkey has undergone immense changes greaterthan any outside observerhad thoughtpossible. But the deepest Islamic roots of Turkish life and culture are still alive, and the ultimateidentityof Turk and Muslim in Turkey is still unchallenged. The resurgenceof Islam aftera long interval responds to a profoundnational need. The occasional outbursts of the tarikas, far more than the limited restorationof officialIslam, show how powerful are the forces stirring beneath the surface. The path that the revival will take is still not clear. If simplereactionhas its way, much of the work of the last centurywill be undone, and Turkey will slip back into the darkness fromwhich she so painfullyemerged. But that is not the only way, nor the most probable. In Turkey,as in otherMuslimcountries, thereare those who talk hopefully of achieving 'a synthesisof the best elementsof West and East'. This is a vain hope the clash of civilizationsin historydoes not usually culminate in a marriage of selected best elements rather in a promiscuous cohabitation of good, bad, and indifferent alike. But a true revival of a religiousfaithon the level of modernthoughtand lifeis withinthe bounds of possibility. The Turkish people, by the exercise of their practical commonsense and powers of improvisation, may yet finda workable compromise between Islam and modernismthat will enable them, without conflict,to follow both their fathers' path to freedomand progressand theirgrandfathers' path to God. October 195I