WPO-2011 Spring Sogang University Sukhyun Kim 20090455 Final Question: While East Asian countries have deepened

economic interdependence since the Asian Financial Crisis, they have been troubled with several conflicting issues such as history, territorial disputes, and North Korean nuclear development in the last decade. Among these conflicting issues, North Korean nuclear development is the most apparent threat to regional security. After North Koreas withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, they have met in the multilateral Six-Party Talks for solving North Korean nuclear development. However, four countries (the ROK, the US, the PRC, and Japan) have different interests and intentions in North Korean nuclear development. Please explain these countries calculations in Six-Party Talks. Six-Party Talks were the continuation of the orchestrated efforts made by China, Japan, US and Korea to engage North Korea to give up its nuclear development program and get back on the NPT agreement track. North Korea in 2002 withdrew from NPT. NK, however, acknowledged that U.S. would not keep its promise to build light water reactors in North Korea and that the U.S. engagement policy was only to capture North Koreas favor at ease. North Korea saw these rounds of talks as the bargaining chips for what it wanted to havefood aid and financial package. At the Six-Party Talks, under the leadership of Roh while ROK was working on its peaceful engagement policy, separating the economic matter from the political matter, Japan and U.S. saw these matters as one to pressure NK. Meanwhile, China played the role of a facilitator in an attempt to bring everyone on the same page. Chinas strategic position in East Asia grew dramatically from focusing on the historical ties with North Korea, to the regional economic integration of East Asia. It became more prominent after the resignation of Koizumi Junichiro in late 2006 who insisted on maintaining strong alliance with the Bush Administration than with the Asian regional community. Koizumis bipartisan foreign policy was a great obstacle to Chinas leadership in Asian regional integration. The differing views between Japan and China even deepened when Japan kept insisting to include New Zealand, India and Australia as part of Asian integration, while China insisted on narrow Asian regional integration. The shift in Chinas foreign policy was led by Premier Wen Jiabao and President Hu Jintao. These leaders demonstrated that Chinas policy and priority will be much clearer than before. During the nuclear crisis in 2003, China invited North Korea to the Six Party Talk with US, ROK and Japan. Although China still kept its alliance with North Korea, the international society praised Chinas successful role in orchestrating the peace talk. The talk was very congruent with President Hu Jintaos foreign policy which was represented by the harmonious world and harmonious Asia concepts. President Hu recognized that Chinas foreign policy will be rather pragmatic, following its interests in political-economic security. President Hu emphasized on the peaceful rise strategy of China in combination with liberalization strategy. This showed that Chinas foreign policy orientation has been largely shaped by its economic pursuits in the East Asian region rather than sticking with its historical and ideological alliance. Though internally

some Chinese officials opposed President Hus moderate strategymaintaining alliance with North Korea, but also assisting the Asia-Pacific community to lay foundations for the place of ChinaChina seemed to be firm in its policy orientation toward peaceful development. Chinas role in the Asia-Pacific community is growing even more than before, considering not only the economic prowess, but also its critical role in bridging North Korea to the rest of the world. Japan on the other hand during the Koizumi administration held conflicting relationships with East Asian countries by visiting Yasukuni Shrine annually between 2001 and 2006. Not only infuriating the neighboring countries, Japan was no active in the making of regional integration by operating joint missile defense with US against the intense opposition of China. Koizumi maintained strong relationship with the West, which was clearly Japans appropriate economic and cultural partner. Japan also sent military forces to Iraq and the Indian Ocean collaborating with the US to dispel terrorism. US and Japan during the Bush and Koizumi administrations truly evolved into a military alliance. After Koizumis resignation, Japans relationship led by Abe Shinzo with East Asian countries alleviated, but Japan still held an ambiguous position in East Asia, perceiving its neighboring countries as an economic network. Japan has been not so much active in instigating the talk with North Korea. It has been supportive of the US foreign policy, since many conservatives who support US have taken the lead of the Japanese government. It seems very likely that Japans role in persuading North Korea is also ambiguous. The U.S. strategy in East Asia has been grand and active; however, it has been making assumptions about NKs patterns of behaviors rather than understanding the underlying motivations. During the Bush administration, by calling North Korea an Evil of Axis, it prolonged the negative relation with NK. U.S. since the Clinton administration lost the track of NK, and only when NK withdrew from NPT and neglected to hold the multilateral talk, U.S. sensed the gravity of the problem and called out for closer examination on NK in the East Asian regional context. Yet, the multilateral talk process was not easy, considering that East Asian countries have been cut off from fluent diplomatic interactions aimed for information, attention and interpersonal networks dimensions, and that ROK particularly has been relying on hub-and-spokes system or San Francisco System designed by U.S. was something to overcome to interact with neighboring countries all around. This was also a transitional period for U.S. to maximize its influence through the multilateral relations. To enhance Koreas capacities as a logistical and financial hub for the Northeast Asian region rather than relying on the pre-existing hub of the U.S., President Roh launched its peace and prosperity policy with the Northeast Asian Initiative and established the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asia Business Hub in 2003. President Roh wanted ROK to play a catalyst role in three respects, but these were very similar to what todays China strives to become. At the Six-Party talks and other forms of Northeast Asian dialogue the Roh government improved ties with China and continued to appeal to NK that ROK is open for talk and support. Despite Rohs efforts to peace-building, NKs response was rather inactive and was interested in either rejecting the multilateral talk or demanding the bilateral talk with U.S. when it feels timely and necessary. In any ways Rohs efforts, supported by chaebols who seek larger economic prosperity through East Asian regional integration, were aimed

to foster pro-Asia shift through the Six-Party Talks and other forms of multilateral dialogue. He prospected that it will bring about a change in ROK position in the Asian community and will alleviate the relation with NK. The Six-Party Talks were, indeed, the cross-overs of many interests.

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