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A) The 1AC sees order as something to be created through their feeble willfulness to tame the natural and evil reality of chaos and unintelligibility Der Derian
In these passages we can discern the ontotheological foundations of an epistemic realism, in the sense of an ethico-political imperative embedded in the nature of things. 28 The sovereign state and territoriality become the necessary effects of anarchy, contingency, disorder that are assumed to exist independent of and prior to any rational or linguistic conception of them. In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity. The irony, perhaps even tragedy, is that by constituting the first science of security, Hobbes made a singular contribution to the eventual subversion of the metaphysical foundations of solidarity.

B) Security in modern politics paradoxically breeds insecurity. This securitization destroys civil coexistence, which creates a system which oppresses anything that attempts to rupture modern day conceptions of security. Enns 2004 Bare Life and the Occupied Body 7:3 | 2004 Diane Enns
In 1940 Walter Benjamin wrote: "The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight."1 These words have lost none of their relevancy, according to Giorgio Agamben, who suggests that power no longer has any form of legitimization other than emergency. In fact, not only does power appeal to emergency but labors secretly to produce it. We have only to think here of the U.S. government's post-9/11 warnings of the imminence of terrorist attacks, whether provoked by actual or fabricated threats, for the express purpose of maintaining public support for its foreign policies and goading other nations into a war on terror. Agamben warns that we currently face the most extreme and dangerous developments of the paradigm of security in the name of a state of emergency. Rapidly imposing itself as the basic principle of state activity, security, he argues, is becoming the sole criterion of political legitimization while traditional tasks of the state surrender to a gradual neutralization of politics.2 Ironically, the more security reasoning is promoted, the more vulnerable we become. This is the ultimate risk. Security and terrorism have become a single deadly system in which they legitimate and justify each other's actions. The risk is twofold according to Agamben: not only does the paradigm of security develop a "clandestine complicity of opponents" in which resistance and power are locked together in a mutually reinforcing relationship, but it also leads to "a worldwide civil war which destroys all civil coexistence."3 This is the result of the dependency of security measures on maintaining a state of emergency. Nearly three decades ago, Michel Foucault remarked that the question of power was raised anew around 1955, against the background of what he calls the "two gigantic shadows" created by the "black heritages" of fascism and Stalinism.4 Today, we must revisit the question again, under the new shadows that darken our world: these metamorphosed modalities of power and resistance that are escalating with frightening rapidity on a global scale. In the desperate cycle of state terror and insurrectionary terrorism that has gripped the world we need more than ever to understand power both in its repressive and resistant forms. In the following reflections I wish to revisit Foucault's ideas on power to highlight what I argue is a failure to adequately account for the power of resistance. I address this via an excursion into Agamben, who takes up Foucault's question concerning power over natural life: a biopolitics in which living itself is at stake. Despite Foucault's argument that resistance and power are inseparable -- since one can never escape power relations -- dominating power proves to be an intriguing exception. Collective revolutionary struggles appear to remain an enigma for him. The implications of this problematic will be drawn out with reference to the occupied body: the individual stripped of political and human rights, reduced to a bare existence, who sometimes turns to self-sacrifice in the name of revolt against the occupiers. In what sense can this body be said to be resisting power? In what sense complicit? What hope is there for resisting repressive regimes if the contemporary paradigms of security and terror recuperate into their violent vortex all modes of struggle?

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C) The alternative is to refuse the feeble attempt of controlling hatred, terror, and destruction in favor of an attempt to prevent these realities from surfacing. Every attempt at controlling destruction is a superior starting point at disrupting the dominant ideologies and discourses of modern day politics. Enns 2004 Bare Life
and the Occupied Body 7:3 | 2004 Diane Enns

Agamben argues that nothing is more important today than a revision of the concept of security as the basic principle of state politics and a consideration of the catastrophic consequences of the use of this paradigm. He urges us to consider that Maybe the time has come to work towards the prevention of disorder and catastrophe, and not merely towards their control. Today, there are plans for all kinds of emergencies (ecological, medical, military), but there is no politics to prevent them. . . . It is the task of democratic politics to prevent the development of conditions which lead to hatred, terror, and destruction -- and not to reduce itself to attempts to control them once they occur.61 To this end, we need to listen to those who bear witness to the conditions of life under an occupying force, and to those whose sacrifice, in the end, may not count for anything except momentary empowerment for a people. A resistance that cannot be appropriated or recuperated, one that remains outside of the mutually reinforcing paradigms of power and counter-power, violence and counterviolence, is clearly evident in the resilience of the Palestinian people to their occupation. This force should be our point of departure in an analysis that requires courage as well as rigor in order to refuse the pernicious invitation to participate in a Manichean politics that polarizes the arguments: either one defends the victimized or defends the war on terror. Above all, we must guard against any ideology that promotes a "clandestine complicity of opponents" that will lead to the destruction of civil coexistence. This includes an unexamined defense of despair and the necessity of dignity as reason enough to resort to extreme acts of violence against civilians. Anger at injustice and an understandable desire for revenge have historically been channeled in diverse ways. While we cannot assume that "suicide bombing" is truly unnecessary, it is worse to say that it is the only option.

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The complexity of conflict, ignored by the affirmative, creates a degree of unintelligibility that allows for the sovereign state to declare a state of emergency, in turn allowing the state to pick and choose conflicts to indulge, and these indulgences are validated via modern day media discourse. These complexities have also created commercial possibilities for new securitizing discourses, which have flourished creating a market incentive for the indulgence in conflict. Dillon 2000
Meanwhile, branches of the military became mediators and pacifiers in attempted resolution of conflicts that continue to defy clear military purpose, the geostrategic character of which also remains equally confused and obscure.[ 7] What are increasingly known as Peace Support Operations (PSOs), or Operations Other Than War (OOTWs), increasingly dominate military agendas and concerns. In the United Kingdom, for example, this form of global liberal policing has taxed the armed forces to the limits of their operational strength. As much attention is paid to civil-military communication and coordination and practices of political negotiation in the development of the novel operational concepts and doctrines that such complex interventions require--quite literally, their very discursive formation at an operational level--as it is to traditional military requirements. Moreover, liberalization has applied to military security in some areas and in some respects as much as it has applied to economics and social welfare. The

complexification of conflict has also opened new commercial possibilities for the provision of "security," and new security discourses, practices, and agencies have flourished as a consequence. Private armies have emerged and transnational security corporations now offer their services. States have contracted alliances with commercial security organizations that offer assistance where formal state intervention, for whatever reason, is eschewed. Even international organizations avail themselves of the security advice and services
that commercial security companies offer, for example with respect to protecting food warehouses so that "spontaneous distribution" of food supplies does not occur.[ 8] Emerging political complexes in Africa and Eurasia have therefore become the "strange attractors" around which novel security-development alliances of states, international organizations, international nongovernmental organizations, and local nongovernmental organizations have formed within the domain of liberal peace and at the interface of its turbulent border terrain.[ 9] Global liberal governance thus responds to the turbulence of emerging political complexes by forming its

own emerging strategic complexes as a means of dealing with the instances of violence that the densely mediated polities of the West periodically find unacceptable there, or in response to the security threats that they are generally said to pose. The resultant assemblages are often coalitions of the willing, the accidental, and the ready to hand. Their formation and intervention are selective, influenced by media attention, and by economic and geostrategic interests at least as much as by the calculation or anticipation of need. Such diverse multiple international/interagency networks pose novel strategic and political questions not only for their own contingent formations but also to the order of liberal peace as such. Their accounts of the sources of disorder are varied and conflicting, yet they also offer new rationales for Western armed forces and their allied arms economies. The outcome can be quite contradictory: military attaches can be committed both to selling arms and to selling "security reform" measures designed to introduce Westernstyle policing, the rule of law, and demilitarization. Through the advent of such emerging strategic complexes, development analysts have become as
interested in conflict, war, and security as security specialists have become interested in development economics, civil society, and conflict resolution.[ 10] In the process, the liberal peace of global governance exposes its allied face of humanitarian war. An additional feature of these strategic complexes is, however, also a

deep and profound confusion about military purpose and military strategy. That in turn promotes a new liberal bull market for strategic ideas in the aftermath of the dissolution of Cold War discourse.[ 11] Already, then, discourses concerned to elucidate the practices and
dynamics of interagency cooperation have emerged, operational concepts and doctrines are formulated and disseminated, and manuals of good practice are officially adopted. Accounts of the bureaucratic politics that characterize the intense interagency competition and rivalry that accompany the formation and operation of such strategic complexes are also emerging. These relish the failure and confusion that abounds in such circumstances, but simultaneously also appeal to it in order to fuel demands for yet better governance, early warning of incipient conflicts, and more adaptive military might to deal with them. No political formulation is therefore innocent. None

refers to a truth about the world that preexists that truth's entry into the world through discourse. Every formula is instead a clue to a truth. Each is crafted in the context of a wider discursive economy of meaning. Tug at the formula, the pull in the fabric begins to disclose the way in which it has been woven. The artefactual design of the truth it proclaims then emerges. We are therefore dealing with something much more than a mere matter of geopolitical fact when encountering the vocabulary of complex emergency in the discourse of global governance and liberal peace. We are not talking about a discrete class of unproblematic actions. Neither are we
discussing certain forms of intractable conflicts. The formula complex emergency does of course address certain kinds of violent disorder. That disorder is not our direct concern. Recall with Foucault and many other thinkers that an economy of meaning is no mere idealist speculation. It is a material political production integral to a specific political economy of power. We do not therefore subscribe to the view championed, for example, by Adam Roberts that the formula complex emergency is merely a way of giving a new name to an old problem.[ 12] We are talking instead about a particular understanding of (inter)national politics that leads to

such disorder being bracketed and addressed in terms of complex emergency. For it is only in the context of a certain political rationality, in this instance the global governance of liberal peace, that the formula occurs at all.[ 13] It is in relation to that political rationality and its hybrid practices of power that the formula not only makes sense but also does certain kinds of work. So-called humanitarian emergencies are always therefore profoundly political events concerned above all with the responses to the advent of violent change induced by the constant interplay between the local and the global.

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This blind acceptance of un-intelligibility structures a system of security that excludes the body through inclusion. The body is only included for the end goal of the state rendering the body completely vulnerable to oppressive technologies. The management of individuals is synonymous to the states international approach to conflict creating a state of constant conflict and emergency, because serial policy failures are approached from an epistemologically flawed lens ensuring constant problemitization of war. Dillon 2000
For our purposes, Agamben's analysis discloses a certain comparability in the operation of sovereign power and the power/ knowledge that Foucault termed governmentality. Not only are they both a strategic form of power, they each operate by effecting a kind of "phenomenological" reduction. Both claim to reduce life to its bare essentials in order to disclose the truth about it, but in so doing actually reduce it to a format that will bear the programming of power to which it must be subject if the power of sovereignty (or, as we shall see, that of governance as well) is to be inscribed, instituted, and operated. Life here is not of course "natural" life, whatever that may be. It is in every sense the life of power. But since we are talking different operations of power, we are also talking different forms of life; modalities formed by the different exercises of reduction through which each operation of power institutes and maintains itself. Each form of life is the "stuff" of power, but in dissimilar ways. That

is what we mean when we say that sovereignty and governmentality reproduce life amenable to their sway. It is not uncommon for a form of life thus reproduced to desire the processes that originate it. Sovereign and governmental powers alike each also therefore work their own
particular powers of seduction on the subjects of power that they summon into being. Seduction, as well as imposition, is thus integral also to their very modus operandi.[ 31] Nationalism might be said to be one form of such seduction, consumerism another. In respect of sovereignty, Agamben calls the life of sovereign power "bare

life." Bare life is thus life without context, meaning, or history--the state of nature--so that sovereignty may be installed as the power that orders it. In being abandoned, that which is excluded is cast into a condition that places it at the mercy of the sovereign power that institutes itself through instituting this relation. The formal structure of sovereign power understood as a strategic principle of formation rather than as a metaphysical point of origin is therefore precisely this: "the excluded included as excluded." By virtue of that inclusion as excluded, bare life is simultaneously both produced by the exercise of sovereign power and subject to it in a particular way. As excluded life, bare life under the strategic ordering of sovereign power is life exposed to death--life available to be killed. Mundanely, it is life that is disposable. In either instance--irrespective of the different rationales advanced for it--the bare life effected by the strategic ordering of life instituted by the operation of sovereign power is a life-form available ultimately to serve the interest of continuously preserving the institution of sovereign power itself. Consider the classical nature of sovereign warfare, the discourse of political realism that articulates it, and the fictions of political subjectivity and interest that are said to fuel it. Bare life is included in the political order "solely through an exclusion"[ 32] and on the basis of the reduction of life that such exclusion effects: "The production of bare life is the originary activity of sovereignty."[ 33] In effect, only by effecting a zone of indistinction between
nomos and physis--inside and outside--does sovereignty come to power as the power of the command that is capable of making the differentiations for which the specific indistinction it has created calls. The same maneuver is in fact repeated in the governance-related vocabulary of networks and its allied science of complex adaptive systems. The problematization of inside and outside--nomos/physis--is repeated there, too, albeit in respect of "systems," "species," and "populations" rather than between peoples, nations, and states. Equally, a form of life is presupposed that is capable of bearing the inscription of a correlate form of power. The same maneuver, then, but one effected by a different principle of formation. Similarly, there is a biopower effect, but the form of life presupposed and reproduced is also different. The Adaptive Life of Governmental Power: Emergency as Emergence As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population

management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure--the fate and

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the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is
increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

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Discursive starting point for critique solves Taylor and Hardman 2004 (Auita Taylor and M.J Hardman War, Language, and Gnder
what new can be said?) Whatever might have caused the initial shift from egalitarian to dominator (hierarchical) patterns, most parties do not find the resulting relationships comfortable. Thus, to perpetuate those relationships, the language through which people see and structure their worlds, and the narratives that frame those views and values, must validate the system. Dominator structures must, in essence, cover up the unease, the damage, the disfunctionality of hierarchical relationships. Once we recognize this 'cover story' for what it is; we can turn to un-covering what lies below. Delinking the Concepts: Deconstructing the Cover Story One thing is clear: Violence and masculinity must

be disassociated. Since patriarchies rely on that link, breaking the connection is key. How can such delinking take place? It needs to be fundamental, as basic as the postulates that guide thinking. Powerful dominator cultures must be changed from within. That means we start with language, with how each of us, daily, talks, thinks, writes and interacts. Our everyday talk is how we begin to enact a different paradigm. Of course, larger scale political and social action are badly needed, but without changing the language, without changing how we think using the language and the stories we tell in its comfort, we make social action immeasurably more difficult. W & L readers know that language changes all the time. Some changes occur without our realizing it, as for example metaphorical uses no longer recognized as metaphorical (e.g., "fighting" disease). Other changes result from overt political action. We've seen that happen in the U.S. in the last 30 years: introduction of Ms. into the
language; dropping male so-called generics; making it socially inappropriate to use derogative terms to describe women, people of color, American Indians, gays and lesbians, etc. Here we suggest additional strategies of overt language change (and, therefore, the associated thinking) to begin to deconstruct the story of patriarchy and thus un-cover the damages from the hierarchies it requires. We need alternative narratives, new metaphors, and different discourse structures. And we need

to "see" the connections among them all and between each and the cultural stories upholding patriarchal hierarchies.

Policymaking requires awareness about how these narratives function. Dryzek 2006
(John s., Policy analysis as critique, Professor of Political Science and Australian Research Council Federation Felllow, Research School of social sciences, Austrialian National University. He is a fellow of the Academy of social sciences in Australia, former head of the departments of policital science at the universities of Oregon and Melbourne and the social and political theory program at ANU, and former editor of the australisn journal of political science, Oxford handbook of public policy)

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Solvency extension
The criticism of modern day security ought not to be confused with an attempt to create a utopian vision of security; rather the act of criticism opens the body to alternative methods of confronting difference. Der Derian 1995
What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." 9 Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative . My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. 10 The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference.

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Solvency extensions --Criticism = discussion

The end point of the criticism is to prompt discussion in an attempt to full understand security in modern day politics Der Derian 1995
In traditional realist representations of world politics as the struggle for power among states, the will to security is born out of a primal fear, a natural estrangement and a condition of anarchy which diplomacy, international law and the balance of power seek, yet ultimately fail, to mediate. 11 By considering some historical meanings of security that exceed this prevailing view, I wish to suggest "new" possibilities and intelligibilities for security. Admittedly, this brief genealogy is thin on analysis and thick on description. But my intention is to provoke discussion, and to suggest that there is more than a speculative basis for the acceptance of a concept of security that is less coherent and dogmatic, and more open to the historical complexity and contingent nature of international relations.