Kyle Donnelly Prof.

Fti September 25, 2009 Relationships Between Major Existentialist Theories There are many fundamental differences between philosophers such as Kierkegaard and Camus or Sartre, but they hold some themes in common. Recurring ideas like despair and absurdity in Kierkegaard and an eroded moral basis in Nietzsche show why they are some of the main influencers of 20th century existentialism. The most basic of existentialist ideas is that existence precedes essence; that is, everything exists in its purest form first, and then acquires an essence through human actions or perceptions. This is especially applied to us, as we become who we are through our own choices, actions, and appearances. Existentialists affirm that there is virtually nothing about ourselves that we are not personally responsible for. Sartre thoroughly develops the proposal of existence preceding essence as an opposition to traditional metaphysics, where essence precedes existence. This means that existentialists must reject the idea of a common human nature and any eternal truths established by religions or cosmic orders (Sartre 22). From this follows Sartrean freedom and Nietzsche's death of God. A simple example is that since people are not inherently good or bad, our actions and choices transform us into a good or bad person. This identity we assume as our own, and is acknowledged through other people's views of us. When we realize we have no determined essence, we encounter our freedom as individuals and our freedom from traditional ethics. We are also unable to blame or legitimize our actions based on these ethics or morals. This is what Sartre calls being condemned to be free (Sartre 28-29). In Section 109 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche foreshadows this in his description of the universe. He explains that it is improper to blame our circumstances on an unlucky cast or anything that redirects blame from ourselves to the universe or other higher structures, like society. He emphasizes that there is no direction or end to the universe, which is also similar to Sartre's complaint against the Marxists: he does not believe that we are necessarily determined to become a proletariat

world (Sarte 35-36). In Section 57 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche brings up the example of mountains and clouds. He says that we can not truly know them for what they are, because things as basic as their names have become irrevocably integrated into our perception of them. If we could strip away this essence, they would exist only as they are, but Nietzsche says this is impossible. This is similar to how Sartre describes individuals. Our identity is only a compilation of others' perceptions of us, but he adds that it is also our own attitudes that constitute our essence. Things such as purpose also act to create an essence that is dependent on our existence (Sartre 42-43). The main difference here is that Nietzsche is describing objects which acquire an essence because we give it to them, and Sartre is concerned with people who create their own essence. Sartre greatly expands the concept of freedom in existentialist terms. He says that it becomes the most basic part of ourselves once we can acknowledge it. It has no aim in itself, but becomes the foundation for the rest of our lives. Once we realize that there is nothing eternal or deterministic forcing us to do anything, we encounter our freedom, the freedom of others, and finally personal authenticity. Sartre says that anyone trying to find a scapegoat for their actions or circumstances is denying their freedom and is inauthentic (Sartre 48-50). Because we are completely free, we feel anguish knowing that we must assume full responsibility for our choices. Because of the absurdity of the world, no future is certain. This means that when making decisions, we do not know what the results will be; nevertheless, we are still responsible. Sartre uses the example of a military commander sending troops into battle to illustrate his idea of anguish (Sartre 27). Abandonment begins with Nietzsche's declaration: Gott ist tot. This means that people, or at least philosophers, have grown out of the idea of God as a certain truth and ground for morality. Nietzche and later existentialists find this realization deeply troubling (Guignon 101-103). Sartre refutes secular attempts at a definite morality, since he believes that nothing exists a priori without an eternal God. He worries this will lead to nihilism or chaos, referencing Dostoyevsky's If God does not

exist, everything is permissible (Sartre 28-29). This leads to Camus' interpretation of Kirilov's premise: If God does not exist, then I am God. Since God has died, everything we do is internalized and cannot be blamed on anything or anyone else (Camus 108). This all relates to Sartre's idea of condemned to be free, which leads back to the conditions of freedom. Sartre's description of despair in Existentialism is a Humanism seems mostly to be self-reliance. He says that we must rely only upon our wills for what we can do, and on probabilities for everything else. Once we reach a point where we rely on luck, we must abandon this hope because there is no God or design can turn desires into a reliable probability (Sartre 34-35). This is the most practical way to continue living once we have abandoned hope. Kierkegaard's analysis of despair is considerably more pessimistic. He treats it as a sickness that we must live with until we die. It is a form of spiritual death that results from not being in line with God's plan for oneself. He says there are three types of despair: an unconsciousness of self, denying oneself, and longing to be oneself. He reconciles the last two into one more basic form of despair, since desiring to be something else is essentially a denial of who one is presently (Guignon 82-84). When Nietzsche describes in The Gay Science the despair he recovered from, he compares it to a long winter: an oppression endured patiently and resisted, but without hope (Guignon 123). This is a midpoint between Sartre and Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard describes it as an unfortunate condition of life that is necessary to be endured (Guignon 82), but Nietzsche claims that he has been cured of the illness Kierkegaard believed was permanent (Guignon 123). The hopelessness that Nietzsche felt both before and after his healing is what Sartre espouses in abandonment. The idea of despair in Kierkegaard and the subsequent death of God in Nietzsche provide the basis for the existentialist themes of anguish, abandonment, and despair. They derive hopelessness and subjectivism from an uneasiness over the absence of morals. Although each of these philosophers differ, their main themes influence and complement each other to form the basics of existentialist thought.

The Problem of A Posteriori Morality The most direct and apparent result of godlessness is the loss of absolute morals and a supporting ethics. This is acknowledged by existentialist philosophers (Guignon 142; Sartre 28-29), and even to an extent in Kierkegaard (Guignon 65). This is problematic in that it could lead to chaos, where good or beneficial actions have no reliable justification and detrimental activities are very difficult or impossible to judge and discourage. It is easy to see how this would lead to a dangerous world for interaction and make stable governments nearly unattainable. Sartre offers a plausible way out of this predicament: although we cannot judge others' actions morally, we can judge their actions and the outcomes logically (Sartre 47). This objective and rather utilitarian way of judging removes the moral aspect of decisions, but still retains the act in itself and the consequences. Sartre affirms our responsibility for the product of our choices in the part of his speech on freedom and anguish (Sartre 27). Sartre also says that he intends to judge persons acting in bad faith; namely, those denying the extent of their personal freedom. This can be either believing in fate and determinism, or claiming to be bound by certain moral obligations. Sartre accuses these people of inauthenticity, which he believes to be reprehensible. In Sartre's view, acting in full consciousness of one's freedom is the best way to avoid judgement (Sartre 47-50). Kierkegaard has a view that seems strange for a theist today. He reaches an affirmative conclusion in his question about a teleological suspension of the ethical, mostly based on the story of Abraham (Guignon 65). This means that Abraham's test, although legally and morally reprobate at any point in history, is justified because it was part of God's plan, or end. Today we would question why God would ever demand something immoral from Abraham, but when Kierkegaard was writing more emphasis was placed on God's omnipotence and omniscience, rather than benevolence. In an attempt to clarify how this suspension can be true, Kierkegaard uses relations between the absolute (God), eternal, and particular. He claims that a particular can surpass the eternal to form a relationship with the absolute, which is a result and source of faith. How this happens is a paradox,

thereby making faith paradoxical. Kierkegaard complicates the process by introducing temptation as a similar relation separated from faith by a very thin line. The most direction he offers is personal and subjective (Guignon 56-58, 75). Using ancient myths and stories, Kierkegaard shows that it is great to remain in the ethical when commanded by faith, but it is even greater to pass beyond ethical boundaries to fulfill divine commands (Guignon 58-60). Kierkegaard then introduces an individual's absolute duty to God. This he develops in order to separate the faithful into tragic heros and knights of faith. The tragic hero is the type who resigns himself to follow faith ethically, and the knight of faith steps out of ethics to conform to God's will (Guignon 72-73). By preferring the knight of faith to the tragic hero, Kierkegaard establishes that he believes faith is more binding than ethics. Otherwise, he says, everyone could become a saint without any exceptional effort or sacrifice (Guignon 77). Nietzsche introduces his perspectivism in the first section of The Gay Science. He reasons that due to natural selection, nothing is completely harmful to the human race; behaviors traditionally believed to be bad enabled us to rise above other animals through intelligence and selfishness, and the more morally acceptable traits were desirable by communities that were only possible by their less moral ancestors. He exaggerates the effects of this by instructing us to Indulge your best or worst desires, and even do yourself in! (Guignon 129) Nietzsche then offers his explanation for the emergence of religions. They too assist in the survival of humans by giving reasons to live. While naturally driven to survive, many people feel the need to be reassured that life is actually worth living, or at least has some goal. Religious leaders rise out of the population and come up with absolutist ethics that are necessary to follow in order to fulfill the aim of life, which is life in another, better world. Nietzsche finds fault in every step of this progression: there is no higher reason or individual worth to life, certainly no absolute goals, and no ideal alternate reality. He observes that all of these die out eventually, but are held as extremely important to the people of the time (Guignon 130-131).

The view of morals in these philosophers progresses parallel to the development of existentialism. Kierkegaard, the devout Christian, is programmed to believe in the existence of morals, but sees a considerable amount of subjectivity in their influence over people. He first says that God can change or demand action that contradicts these morals without any logical reason, and that people do not need justification if they trespass ethics on divine command. This replaces ethics with God as our personal support and highest commitment. Nietzsche, of course, believes that God is dead. One repercussion of this is that our ethical support and commitment is gone. While this is troubling, he also finds it very freeing. I refer again to his exclamation, Indulge your best or worst desires... and his establishment of perspectivism. Sartre follows this, basing much of his philosophy off of this release from absolute ethics. He loosely replaces Kierkegaard's faith with freedom. Freedom now becomes the ideal basis of everyone's morality, and the measure we can judge on. Since the role of eternals has been diminished, freedom is the most encompassing part of our lives, and inauthenticity or ignorance of this freedom is comparable to impiety or faithlessness. This progression of subjectivism and eradication of ethical duties was an integral part of the development of existentialism. Freedom and responsibility were introduced by Sartre to be the new guidelines for life in an attempt to dilute the threat of anarchy, chaos, or nihilism. We can see in each of these philosophers that a a priori values are not necessary to human existence. Kierkegaard replaced it with faith, Nietzsche with subjectivism and an evolutionary justification, and Sartre with freedom and responsibility. A synthesis of all is probably the best way to live in a world without absolutes.

Works Cited Camus, Albert. The Myth Of Sisyphus and Other Essays. New York: Vintage International, 1991. Guignon, Charles, and Pereboom Derk, ed. Existentialism: Basic Writings. 2nd Ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Existentialism is a Humanism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.