Crisis prevention and the Austrian State Treaty Deborah Welch Larson

Much has been written about how the United States and the Soviet Union have managed crises since World War II, avoiding dangerous escalation and war; little on how the two superpowers have avoided confrontations. In part scholarly neglect of the question of crisis avoidance reflects the acute suspicion and hostility of the cold war. When U.S.-Soviet rivalry was perceived as a struggle between incompatible ideologies and ways of life, it was unthinkable that the superpowers might have any common interests, much less that they could collaborate, even tacitly, to control the conflict in their relationship. Yet even during the most acute cold war tensions, the United States and the Soviet Union successfully improvised conventions or "rules of the game" to avoid dangerous confrontations when one or the other superpower became involved in a regional civil war or interstate conflict. In addition they negotiated agreements to remove particular geographic or functional areas from competition. These crisis prevention agreements include the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, the neutralization of Laos in 1962, and the 1963 agreement not to orbit nuclear weapons in space.' Neutralization is a classic diplomatic technique for crisis avoidance. In the 19th century the great powers avoided confrontations by withdrawing strategic states, cities, or territories from the arena of competition. A neutralized state is not allowed to use force except in self-defense, permit other states to
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1985 meeting of the American Political Science Association. For comments and suggestions on successive drafts, I would like to thank Friedrich Kratochwil, Noel Kaplowitz, Richard Herrmann, and Jack Snyder. I am also grateful to the Columbia University Council for Research in the Social Sciences and the Columbia MacArthur Faculty Research Program on Conflict, Peace, and Security for financing my archival research. 1. Alexander L. George, "Political Crises," in Joseph S. Nye, ed.. The Making of America's Soviet Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 138-39; George, Managing U.S.Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder: Westview, 1983). International Organization 41, 1, Winter 1987 1987 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the World Peace Foundation

28 International Organization use its territory for military purposes, or enter alliances. Neutralization must be brought about either through international agreement or recognition of a unilateral declaration by the great powers or smaller regional powers. The outside powers guaranteeing the state's neutrality legally relinquish the option of incorporating the state into their alliance; in addition they must resist the temptation to meddle in its internal affairs. By recognizing a state's neutral status, great powers restrained themselves from engaging in costly interventions that could escalate into a major conflagration.' Neutralization requires great-power cooperation as well as mutual selfrestraint. Each guarantor state must have some minimal trust that the other great powers will refrain from attempting to move into the power vacuum created when a state is neutralized. In theoretical terms, crisis prevention resembles a Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game in which the rational response for an individual player is to defect, but if both players do so, they are worse off than if they had cooperated. Even though the great powers concerned benefit from neutralizing an area by avoiding confrontation, there is always a temptation to achieve even higher payoffs by violating the agreementas Germany did by invading Belgium in World War I. For example, although the United States and the Soviet Union would benefit from unification and neutralization of Germany, neither can afford to trust the other not to try to absorb a united Germany into its alliance; nor can either state rely on Germany to maintain permanent neutrality. Though the risks were less in the case of Austria, neutralization also posed problems of trust and mutual restraint. The Defense Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff consistently opposed the Austrian State Treaty and withdrawal of U.S. troops because they believed that the Soviets would take advantage of the weak Austrian security forces to gain control of the country through invasion or political subversion. Austria was strategically located. As National Security Council (NSC) policy paper 38/5 stated, "Soviet domination of Austria . . . would result in penetration of the East-West frontier by a salient extending westward to the Swiss border and permit Soviet control of the principal North-South lines of communication in Central Europe." The official policy statement on Austria, NSC 164/1, approved in October 1953, noted that Austria "lies in the path of important military approaches from the USSR to Yugoslavia, Trieste, Italy, Switzerland, and Germany, as well as across a main route between Germany and Italy." Except for the Danube gateway into Germany, "the mountainous terrain covering these approaches provides strong defensive positions." From the Soviet perspective a Western-oriented Austria would extend United States influence eastwird to the Hungarian border and deny the Soviets the communications center in Vienna.
2. Cyril B. Black, Richard A. Falk, Klaus Knorr, and Oran R. Young, Neutralization and World Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), pp. xi-xiii.

Austrian State Treaty 29

The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 is the most successful neutralization agreement negotiated during the postwar period. It prevented a dangerous confrontation between Western and Soviet troops over control of this strategic territory in the heart of Europe. Had they wished to exploit their coercive capabilities, the Soviets had ample means with which to provoke a crisis. The Soviets had 55,000 troops stationed in Austria, administered oil and industrial properties worth $100 million per year, and exercised occupation controls over the eastern zone. Moreover, Austria was dependent on trade with the Soviet bloc for critical imports such as coal and for an export outlet. According to NSC 164/1, "by full-scale application of these powers, the USSR could at any time paralyze eastern Austria and Vienna, or even cause the collapse of the Federal Government."^ Instead of confronting each other in a series of crises as in Berlin, both superpowers withdrew their troops from a forward military base in Europe. The Austrian State Treaty also contributed to crisis prevention by making possible a relaxation of tensions, represented by the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. Had the Soviets not proved their good intentions by signing the Austrian State Treaty, it is doubtful that Eisenhower or Dulles would have agreed to a summit meeting. Why did the United States and the Soviet Union cooperate in neutralizing Austria? What strategy for promoting cooperation best explains the signing of the Austrian State Treaty? I shall first contrast two theories of cooperation, tit for tat, and graduated reciprocation in tension reduction, or GRIT. In the second part of the article, I shall apply both theories to the Austrian State Treaty to determine which best explains U.S.-Soviet cooperation. I shall argue that GRIT better explains the Austrian State Treaty because departure from a strict tit-for-tat strategy of contingent concessions was required to elicit U.S. reciprocal cooperation in signing the treaty and agreeing to a summit meeting. Finally, I shall discuss the implications of the Austrian State Treaty case for theory development in the area of U.S-Soviet cooperation in crisis prevention. The case study that follows does not attempt to revise standard historical accounts of the Austrian State Treaty although I have used recently declassified documentsbut to demonstrate why GRIT is a superior theoretical framework by which to explain the dynamics of U.S.-Soviet interactions after Stalin's death and to provide a

3. "Report to the National Security Council on Future Courses of U.S. Action with Respect to Austria," NSC 38/5, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950 4 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1980), pp. 388-94 (hereafter cited as FR, followed by appropriate year, volume, part, and page numbers); FR: 1951 4, 2, pp. 1097-1100, 1105, 1124n; minutes. National Security CouncU (NSC), 30 April 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Ann C. Whitman FUe, NSC Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (DDEL), Abilene, Kans.; NSC Staff Study, "U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to Austria, October 14, 1953," NSC 164/1, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (SANSA): Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, DDEL.

30 International Organization basis for further empirical research on the conditions for the efficacy of each strategy.

1. Strategies of Cooperation
A. Tit for tat In The Evolution of Cooperation, Robert Axelrod persuasively argues that a strategy of reciprocity or tit for tat is most likely to promote cooperation among egoists in a state of anarchy. In a PD game, the tit-for-tat strategy begins by cooperating, then does whatever the opponent did on the previous move. Axelrod bases his recommendation of tit for tat on the findings of computer tournaments of 200 plays of PD in which the tit-for-tat strategy achieved the highest average score. In a different domain, Robert Keohane posits that a strategy of reciprocity is most effective in maintaining policy coordination among states in the world political economy.'' Axelrod hypothesizes that tit for tat is successful because it is "nice" in never being the first to defect, retaliatory, forgiving, and easy for the opponent to understand. But an important precondition for tit for tat is that the two players anticipate future interactionsin other words, the "shadow of the future" must hang heavily over the present. If the relationship between the parties is enduring, then trust is not even required for cooperation between them to evolve over time. Instead the players learn to collaborate through a process of behavior modificationa trial-and-error sequence of learning through reinforcement or by modeling their actions after other successful cooperators. Axelrod's theory is elegantly posed and engagingly defended. But there are several potential problems attached to applying tit for tat as a strategy for promoting greater cooperation in international politics, largely because the theory as presently formulated does not account for the, psychological obstacles to reciprocity. Many social psychologists would argue that in a situation such as PD, where strong situational forces encourage exploitation, mutual trust is required for cooperation to emerge."^ Otherwise, neither player will cooperate first for fear of being betrayed, and each will compete in selfdefense. In this type of situation cooperation is risky and will not occur unless one side believes that the other will reciprocate. In order to reward or punish particular actions, tit for tat requires that states be able to determine whether the other state has cooperated or defected. But in international politics states label actions carried out by an
4. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 214. 5. Morton Deutsch, The Resolution of Conflict (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). pp. 179-81.

Austrian State Treaty 31 adversary differently than similar actions they carry out. When the other state makes a conciliatory gesture, policy makers conclude that the other side is attempting to deceive or lull them into lowering their guard; when they themselves make a concession, it is a response to international tensions and the need to prevent war.* Whether another state's past sequence of actions are labeled as cooperative or competitive often differs as much among individuals within the same government, as between antagonistic cultures and domestic systems. For example, in April 1953, Paul Nitze, George F. Kennan, Charles Bohlen, and President Eisenhower were encouraged by various Soviet conciliatory acts to believe that the Soviets might be willing to negotiate on outstanding conflicts of interest in order to relax tensions; Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that the Soviets were only engaging in a tactical shift to lull the West into relaxing its vigilance. A player following tit for tat begins the game with a cooperative act to show that it is nice. But if the target of this concession has an inherent "bad faith" image of the initiator, a single cooperative action may be ignored, reinterpreted to conform to preexisting beliefs, or discounted as a ploy to trick the target into letting down its guard. Securing the cooperation of the other state in relaxing tensions may require a dramatic, unilateral concession to shake rigid images and undermine mistrust, such as Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Even if the cooperative act is correctly perceived and taken into account, the target may not wish to reciprocate because to do so would relinquish the initiative to the adversary or legitimize the other state's policies. As Axelrod admits, use of the tit-for-tat strategy may produce conflict spirals, or "echo effects." Once one of the players behaves aggressively, the sequence of mutual retaliation cannot be halted without departing from a policy of strict reciprocity. B. GRIT Charles Osgood's program for graduated reciprocation in tension reduction is a social-psychological theory of cooperation which takes into consideration the cognitive impediments to reciprocity mentioned above.' GRIT is designed to facilitate negotiation between bitter, long-term adversaries. The purpose of the GRIT strategy is to alter the target state's image and percep6. Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 37-38. 7. Charles E. Osgood, Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 85-134; Osgood, "Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism," Journal of'Conflict Resolution 3 (1959), pp. 295-325; Svenn Lindskold, "Trust Development, the GRIT Proposal, and the Effects of Conciliatory Acts on Conflict and Cooperation," Psychological Bulletin 85 (1978), pp. 772-93.

32 International Organization tions of the initiator and to foster greater trust that will make cooperation more feasible. To do this, the initiator of GRIT makes an incremental cooperative move, of moderate risk, as proof of benevolent intentions. Osgood's strategy for tension reduction may be summarized as follows; 1. The series of actions should be publicly announced in advance and described as part of a deliberate policy of reducing tensions. 2. Each action must be carried out on schedule, regardless of whether the other state reciprocates. 3. Along with the announcement of each unilateral action, the initiator should include an explicit invitation for the other party to reciprocate in some way, but no quid pro quo should be demanded in advance. 4. The series of actions should be carried out over a period of time, even without reciprocation. 5. The unilateral initiatives should be unambiguous in intent and capable of being verified. 6. The strategist should not make unilateral initiatives that would reduce the state's capacity to retaliate, either with conventional or nuclear forces, should the target state view unconditional concessions as a sign of weakness that could be exploited. 7. The strategist should retaliate immediately against any aggressive or exploitative actions by the target, but only enough to restore the status quo. The punishment should be commensurate with the crime to prevent the conflict from escalating. 8. Any act of reciprocation by the adversary should be rewarded with an incremental increase in cooperation. GRIT is designed to reverse the arms race and lead to spiraling tension reduction instead of conflict. 9. The initiatives should be diversified in sphere of action and geographical location. Like tit for tat, GRIT cooperates on the first move. In addition, GRIT retaliates against exploitation, but is forgiving and will reciprocate if the other side returns to cooperation. On the other hand, GRIT differs from tit for tat in several ways. First, unlike tit for tat, GRIT does not assume that the other side will immediately reciprocate. Thus the GRIT strategist is willing to continue incremental concessions over a period of time, even though the other side does not respond. Persisting in conciliatory acts despite ridicule or dismissal from the recipient helps to convince the other side of one's good faith.*
8. Harold H. Kelley, "Attribution in Social Interaction," in Edward E. Jones et al., eds.. Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning, 1971).

Austrian State Treaty 33 Second, GRIT requires the decision maker to state publicly that the series of moves is intended to reduce tension, whereas tit for tat communicates mainly through the pattern of rewards and punishments. By incorporating a public statement, GRIT diminishes uncertainty and puts additional pressure on the other side to reciprocate by making salient the norm of reciprocity; public opinion generally favors returning "good for good and evil for evil."' Third, GRIT spreads concessions over different issue-areas or geographic areas, whereas tit for tat makes no provision for increasing the level or locus of cooperation. Diversification protects the GRIT initiator from dangerously weakening the state and laying it open to exploitation. In addition, consistent conciliatory behavior over different modalities creates the impression of sincerity and fosters trust. Fourth, GRIT concessions must be moderately risky to engender trust. Osgood specifies that a unilateral act should "in terms of military aggression, be clearly disadvantageous to the side making it, yet not cripplingly so." If the concessions involve some cost, they are less likely to be dismissed as having ulterior motives and more likely to elicit reciprocal cooperation.'" There are two alternative explanations for the effectiveness of GRIT. It may be that unilateral concessions undermine "bad faith" images and elicit greater trust in the target. Unfortunately, the beneficiary of unilateral concessions may discount, ignore, or dismiss their significance in order to preserve a preexisting image of the opponent as malevolent, devious, and Machiavellian. In this case policy makers of the target state may still feel the pressure of social norms to reciprocate. Regardless of whether the response is motivated by internal conviction or by domestic political pressures, the result is the same; the target state reciprocates with another cooperative act. Applied to the Austrian State Treaty, tit for tat suggests that after Stalin's death, Soviet leaders made several concessions to improve relations with the United States. Because the Soviets continued to make concessions despite the lack of response from the United States, the Eisenhower administration inferred that the Soviets were "suckers," acting from a position of weakness. When the United States refused to reciprocate, however, the Soviets retaliated by employing threats and stiffening their policy toward both Germany and Austria. American officials "learned" that failure to reciprocate Soviet overtures heightened tensions and decreased chances for a negotiated settlement in Europe. When the Soviets next made a concilia9. Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement," American Sociological Review 25 (April 1960), pp. 161-78. 10. Osgood, "Winning the Real War with Communism," p. 316; Dean G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic, 1981), pp. 124-25; S. S. Komorita, "Concession-making and Conflict Resolution," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17 (1973), pp. 745-62; Robert L. Swinth, "The Establishment of the Trust Relationship," Journal of Conflict Resolution 11 (1967), pp. 335-44.

34 International Organization tory gesture in 1955, by signing the Austrian State Treaty, President Eisenhower reciprocated by granting the Soviets' request for a summit conference, and tensions relaxed. Both GRIT and tit for tat predict that the United States would ignore or seek to exploit initial unilateral concessions by the Soviets. But GRIT posits that a series of moderately risky concessions, not easily dismissed as the product of self-interest or hostility, would finally succeed in persuading the United States to reciprocate. GRIT suggests that Soviet public statements explaining the purpose of the policy would also be important in stimulating domestic and allied pressures to meet their concessions halfway. In addition, by dispersing concessions over different geographic areas and issueareas and creating a consistent impression, the Soviets successfully disarmed many people's suspicions about their motives. In sum tit for tat predicts that leaders learn through rewards and punishments that their long-term interests lie in cooperation. GRIT suggests that leaders infer that their adversary might sincerely wish to reduce tensions as a result of several moderately costly unilateral concessions and decide to take a calculated risk by reciprocating. Both tit for tat and GRIT assume that the players are unitary actors. But in U.S.-Soviet strategic interaction, the two sides are often composed of shifting coalitions of factions. Failure of one side to reciprocate the other's conciliatory gesture may reflect the influence of a hard-line faction, domestic political factors, or alliance constraints rather than a calculated attempt to gain an advantage. From 1953 to 1955, both the U.S. and Soviet governments were divided into hard-line and soft-line factions on the prospects for reducing East-West tensions. The United States' unwillingness to reciprocate Soviet overtures immediately after Stalin's death may be attributed to Dulles's influence. On the other hand, the Soviet government's first attempt to apply GRIT to U.S.-Soviet relations in March-June 1953 was temporarily checked by the alliance between Khrushchev, Molotov, and the military. Therefore, this article uses the decision-making level of analysis, recognizing that for the Soviet side, some of the explanation must necessarily be speculative.

2. The Austrian State Treaty A. The post-Stalin peace offensive Under Stalin, over 250 sessions were held to negotiate an Austrian State Treaty, with Sisyphean progress. The Soviets invariably found a way to delay signing the treaty, mainly by attaching extraneous issues. For example, the Soviets upheld Yugoslavia's territorial claims in Austria; they wanted "German" assets in Austria as reparations; they demanded compensation for the immediate postwar occupation costs and relief efforts ("dried

Austrian State Treaty 35 peas" debt); or they objected that the country was insufficiently "denazified."" Soviet Premier Georgi Malenkov launched the Soviet GRIT initiative on 15 March 1953, when he announced that there was no dispute between the United States and the Soviet Union which "cannot be decided by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual understanding" (see Appendix). Beginning on 27 March the Soviets made numerous incremental conciliatory gestures, as called for by GRIT. For exEimple, on 12 March Soviet and British aircraft had become involved in a fatal collision over the Soviet zone of Germany. On 27 March, the Soviet government issued a note of apology to the British government and proposed three-power talks on air safety over Germany. The Soviets also loosened traffic blocks around Berlin. A day later, after visiting Moscow, Communist Chinese leaders accepted an American proposal to exchange sick and wounded prisoners from the Korean War, an act U.S. officials regarded as an important gesture. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told press secretary James Hagerty that "the exchange of sick and wounded would be the first test of the Communists' sincerity." Another major step forward in the Korean armistice negotiations occurred on 30 March, when the Chinese government accepted the principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. On 31 March, after having rejected four previous candidates, the Soviet Union said that it would not object to the nomination of Dag Hammarskjold to be secretary general of the United Nations. On 8 April, Vyshinsky adopted a more conciliatory tone in the UN disarmament debates. Urging the West to match Soviet overtures, . Vyshinsky said that they should "begin to dig the tunnel of friendship from both ends."'2 B. The U.S. response: "The Chance for Peace" speech The official U.S. response to Soviet concessions was Eisenhower's 16 April 1953 "Chance for Peace" speech. The speech was originally intended not as a reply to the Soviet "peace offensive" but, instead, as an attempt to exploit Stalin's death through psychological warfare. Presidential aide Emmet Hughes was assigned to write a speech appealing to the Soviet people for peace.''
11. David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1962), p. 249. 12. Hughes diary, 17 and 27 March, 2 April 1953, Emmet J. Hughes Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton, N.J.; telephone conversation with James Hagerty, 2 April 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Memoranda Series, White House Subseries, "January 21, 1953-April 1953," DDEL; J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 74-75; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 125-28; Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1956), p. 123. 13. Hughes diary, 6, 10, and 11 March 1953, Hughes Papers; minutes, NSC Meeting, 11

36 International Organization The day after Malenkov's 15 March statement that U.S.-Soviet differences could be settled peacefully, Eisenhower read Emmet Hughes's draft of the speech, then began pacing the room as he spoke fluently and forcefully. "I'm tired, and I think everyone is tired, of indictments of the Soviet regime." "What matters is thiswhat have WE got to offer the world? What are WE ready to do? If we cannot say thatA, B, C, D, E, E, just like that these are things we proposethen we really have nothing to say. Malenkov isn't going to be impressed by speeches." In the speech Eisenhower wanted to make concrete proposals for reducing tensions between the superpowers. "Let us come out, straight, no double-talk, no slick sophisticated propaganda devicesand say: this is what we'll dowe'll withdraw our armies from there if you'll withdraw yours. . . . We want to talk to the Russian peopleif their government will give us so much unjammed time, we would do our best to give them facilities to state their side of the case." "There are new governments in two great countries. The slate is clean now let's begin." Hughes replied, " I couldn't agree more with the spirit of this, Mr. President, but . . . it was difficult in this draft even to refer to Soviet troop withdrawalbecause we don't according to State [Department] dare withdraw our own troops." Eisenhower exploded. "If these very sophisticated gentlemen in the State Department, Mr. Dulles and all his advisers, really don't mean they can talk about peace seriously, then I'm in the wrong pew. I surely don't know why I'm wasting my time with them. Because if it's war we should be talking aboutI know the people to discuss that with, and it's not the State Department. Now we either cut out all this fooling around and make a serious bid for peaceor we forget the whole thing." In a telephone conversation ten minutes later Hughes told Dulles that the president wanted substantive proposals, as specific as cutting armaments to 5 percent, getting armies out of this country or that country. "Well, you know the first problem you hit with any concrete proposals is that you have to consult with our allies," Dulles replied. "In Germany, you talk about withdrawing and you scare everyone in Erance and Germanythey want us to stay for 50 years. You talk about quitting Austriabut you can't order the Erench and British armies out of Austria."'''
March 1953, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman File, NSC Series, DDEL; minutes, NSC Meeting, 30 April 1953, ibid; memorandum by Under Secretary of State Walter B. Smith, 10 March 1953, "Comments by Department of State on the Draft Outline of Plan for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death," C. D. Jackson Records, "PSB Plans for Psychological Exploitation of Stalin's Death," DDEL. 14. Hughes diary, 16 March 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton; telephone conversation with Emmet Hughes, 16 March 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Memoranda Series, White House Subseries, "January 21, 1953-April 1953," DDEL.

Austrian State Treaty 37 Although President Eisenhower was willing to give the new regime the benefit of the doubt, Dulles was not. President Eisenhower delegated substantial responsibility for foreign policy to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. And Dulles had a "bad faith" image of the Soviets. There was virtually nothing they could do to change his mind about the dangers of dealing with Communists. In his influential study of Secretary Dulles's belief system, Ole R. Holsti showed that he attributed the Soviets' conciliatory gestures to economic weakness and the bankruptcy of their foreign policy as a way to preserve his image of the Soviet Union as an implacable enemy, hostile, immoral, and calculating.'^ At a 17 March speech-writing conference with various State Department officials and White House staff, Eisenhower declared passionately: "If you only could trust that bastard Malenkov." Nevertheless, the president said, "I'd like us to prepare a speech just ASSUMING that Malenkov was a reasonable man with whom we had some serious differences to iron outwe may know he isn'tbut let's start with that assumption and talk accordingly." Privately, C. D. Jackson complained about Eisenhower's "Boy Scout, PTA approach to the Russians."'^ At the end of March, as discussed previously, the Soviets began making major concessions in the Korean armistice negotiations and the UN talks to elect a new secretary general as well as offering to engage in air safety talks. Contrary to the reciprocity norm, these unilateral Soviet concessions made Dulles less willing to make a conciliatory overture to Stalin's successors through a presidential speech. As Hughes commented, "One fact clouds speech prospect: possibility that big Soviet peace offensive may be under way."'^ Secretary Dulles regarded the Soviet government's overtures as a sign of weakness and attributed Soviet conciliation to firm U.S. policies. In addition he did not want to legitimize the new Soviet regime by reciprocating their conciliatory gestures. On 29 March Dulles told Hughes that he was even less "keen" on the idea of a speech than a week ago. "I think there's some real danger," he said, "with all these Soviet overtures, of our seeming to simply fall in with their program." "It's obvious that what they're doing is because of outside pressure, and I don't know anything better we can do than keep up those pressures right now." At a 31 March National Security Council meeting Dulles explained that "the current peace offensive is designed by the Soviets to relieve the ever-increasing pressure upon their regime." "Accordingly," he said, "we must not relax this pressure until the Soviets give promise of ending the struggle."'^
15. Ole R. Holsti, "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia," in David J. Finlay et al., eds.. Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1%7), pp. 25-96. 16. Hughes diary, 17 March 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 17. Hughes diary, 27 March 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 18. Minutes, special meeting of the NSC, 31 March 1953, FR: 1952-54 2, 1, p. 268; Hughes diary, 29 March, 3 April 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton.

38 International Organization Other officials interpreted the Soviet "peace offensive" differently. Paul Nitze told Dulles that it was just "possible that the present Soviet actions are inspired by a desire to testpossibly once and for allthe feasibility of dealing with some of the outstanding issues without disastrous consequences to their objectives." On 2 April Eisenhower told a press conference that he believed that we should take at face value every offer that was made to us until it was proved unworthy of confidence. On 8 April at an NSC meeting, when several officials tried to persuade Eisenhower that there was no evidence that the Russians had changed their intentions, Eisenhower retorted, "Well, just as a matter of debate anyway, I'd say there also isn't the slightest evidence that they HAVEN'T."''' Eisenhower read over several drafts of Hughes's speech and penciled in suggestions. Eisenhower's principal contribution was to remove language that could be offensive to the Soviets, such as references to their taking over Eastern Europe. The president also made suggestions for reciprocal concessions, but Dulles succeeded in having them removed. Eor example, the president inserted a paragraph saying that we would meet "halfway" any tangible proposals in "any Congress or conference or meeting" with the Soviets. After a quick phone call to Dulles, Hughes deliberately omitted the president's additions as a "needless" invitation to talks. Hughes also chose to ignore Eisenhower's suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union swap unjammed radio time so that each side could present its own case, and his offer to travel to meet Malenkov. " State would kill them anyway," Hughes rationalized. As so often happened, Eisenhower did not give sufficient personal attention or energy to fight for diplomatic initiatives that Secretary of State Dulles opposed. The result of Dulles's dogged opposition was that Eisenhower's speech asked the Soviets to make a series of major concessions to "prove" their good faith but offered nothing in return.^" Yet Eisenhower did not wish the Soviets to perceive the speech as imposing conditions for cooperation. "We don't have to be so damn specific about Korea as if we were setting a lot of conditions," he said. "All we want is sincerity, sincere acts, not talk, sinceritywhatever they want to dothe Austrian treatythe POWsthey don't need any damn conferences to do these thingsall they got to do is DO themand we'll welcome that and we'll meet them half way." Eisenhower wanted the Soviets to carry out several small, unilateral concessions, as in GRIT, in order to build trust and demonstrate their sincerity; then he would be in a position to reciprocate.^'
19. Nitze to Dulles, 2 April 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Presidential Speech Series. "Drafts: 'Chance for Peace' Speech(l)," DDEL; Stebbins, The United States in WorldAffairs: 1953, p. 125; Hughes diary, 9 April 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 20. Hughes diary, 6 April 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 21. Hughes diary, 11, 12, 13 April 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton.

Austrian State Treaty 39 Like Eisenhower, Dulles regarded Soviet signature of the Austrian State Treaty as a test of the sincerity of the Soviet peace offensive. Dulles suggested that Austria be mentioned twice, because it was, "next to Korea, the clearest test of Soviet intentions which we should welcome."^^ On 16 April 1953, in the "Chance for Peace" speech, Eisenhower declared that he would believe the sincerity of Soviet professions of their desire for peace when words were backed by deeds. There were many opportunities for deeds which required only the simple will to carry them out. "Even a few such clear and specific actssuch as the Soviet Union's signature upon an Austrian treaty or its release of thousands of prisoners still held from World War IIwould be impressive signs of sincere intent." Eisenhower stressed that the first great step along the way to peace must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea. Then the United States would be prepared to negotiate a political settlement on such outstanding issues as the unification of Germany through free elections and disarmament. The major problem with Soviet concessions in 1953 from the standpoint of reducing tensions was that they did not involve any significant costs or risks to the new regime. Consequently, Malenkov's peace offensive did not fully conform to the GRIT model. As the Council of Foreign Relations annual review pointed out, many of the Soviet "concessions" represented no more than the correction of gross breaches of normal international usage. Such gestures as the permission accorded several Russian women who had married Americans to leave the Soviet Union cost practically nothing and could hardly be interpreted as indicating a major policy reversal.^^ C. The Soviets continue GRIT On 25 April the Soviet government reciprocated by publishing the full text of Eisenhower's speech, including its criticism of Soviet policies, in both Pravda and Izvestia, an event that ambassador to Moscow Chip Bohlen called "unparalleled" under Stalin. Although the Soviet government pointed out that the Eisenhower initiative was one-sided in its attempt to "link his proposals for peace with a whole series of preliminary conditions" imposed on the Soviet Union, overall Soviet criticism of Eisenhower's speech was restrained. Bohlen inferred that the article was designed to "avoid the appearance of throwing cold water on any prospects of peaceful solution and improved relations." George F. Kennan commented that the Pravda article "reveals clearly that the present Soviet leaders are definitely interested in
22. Dulles to Hughes, 10 April 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Presidential Speech Series, "Drafts: 'Chance for Peace' Speech (1)," DDEL; Hughes diary, 11 April 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 23. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953, p. 124.

40 International Organization pursuing with us the effort to solve some of the present international difficulties. "24 Again, the Soviets responded with a series of unilateral concessions, diversified over geographic areas and issue-areas, as in GRIT. In a 30 May note the Soviet government renounced previous claims to territory and bases from Turkey. On 27 July the Korean armistice was signed.^^ The Soviets also extended their unilateral concessions to Austria. On 27 April the Soviet foreign minister informed the Austrian ambassador that there would be an amnesty for Austrian prisoners of war and civilian internees in the Soviet Union. On 8 June the Soviet government told Austrian Chancellor Julius Raab that there would only be "spot checks" of travelers between East and West zones. The Soviets also agreed to allow free shipment of goods between Soviet and Western zones. On 10 June the Soviets derequisitioned various government buildings, schools, and other dwellings for Austrian use. On 30 July the Soviets announced that they were assuming the financial costs of occupation. On 11 August the Soviets abolished censorship in their zone. Einally, on 9 November the Soviets ended radio, theater, and concert censorship.^^ D. Power struggle in the Kremlin The Soviet's GRIT initiative was interrupted by the 17 June 1953 uprising in East Germany and the ensuing power struggle in the Kremlin. On 10 June the Politburo announced a program of liberalization for East Germany, the New Course, halting forced collectivization of agriculture, raising living standards, releasing some political prisoners, and decreasing governmental repression. East German leader Walter Ulbricht, however, chose to raise work norms for building workers, which amounted to a de facto decrease in wages. In reaction, on 17 June East Berlin workers marched on the capital, demanded free elections, burned pictures of Stalin and Ulbricht, converged
24. Bohlen to Washington, 25 April 1953, White House Central Files, Confidential Series, "Russia: Stalin's Death and Reaction," DDEL, reprinted in W. W. Rostow, Europe after Stalin: Eisenhower's Three Decisions of March 11. 1953 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), pp. 161-63; George F. Kennan to Allen Dulles, 25 April 1953, Jackson Records, "Kennan, George," DDEL; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 75. 25. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953, p. 137; Philip E. Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy since Stalin," Foreign Affairs 32 (October 1953), pp. 21-22. 26. William Lloyd Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria (Bonn: Siegler, 1961), pp. 131-34; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 250-51. 27. Mosely, "The Kremlin's Foreign Policy Since Stalin," pp. 24-25; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 172-75; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 77, 172-73; Victor Baras, "Beria's Fall and Ulbricht's Survival," Soviet Studies 32 (July 1975), pp. 383-85, 391; Baras, "Stalin's German Policy after Stalin," Slavic Review 37 (June 1978), pp. 265-66; Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin since Stalin (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1962), pp. 70-72; Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953, pp. 146-47; Boris I. Nicolaevsky, Power and the Soviet Elite: "The Letter of an Old Bolshevik" and other Essays by Boris I. Nicolaevsky. ed. Janet D. Zagoria (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 134, 136, 146.

Austrian State Treaty 41 on the local jails to liberate political prisoners, and beat up East German security police. Soviet troops had to be brought in to restore order. Hearing news of the Berlin uprising, workers in sixty East German cities ilso marched in protest and seized control of factories. Malenkov and the head of the Soviet Secret Police Lavrenti Beria were weakened by their previous support for the New Course in East Germany. Both men favored making concessions to the West in order to relax tensions and loosen domestic restrictions. In particular, Beria's prestige suffered when, contrary to his assurances, the East German police proved unable to suppress the uprising and Soviet troops had to be used. Other members of the Kremlin had been alarmed by Beria's obvious ambition and attempts to grab supreme power, and on 26 June they seized the opportunity to have him arrested.^^ After learning of Beria's fall, Dulles informed the Cabinet that "the big thing is how to exploit Soviet weakness," he said. "This is the time to CROWD the enemy and maybe FINISH him once and for all."^* Contrary to Dulles's expectations, the Soviets made no more significant concessions to the West in 1953-54 after signing the Korean Armistice. Indeed, while the Kremlin power struggle continued, the Soviets were in no position to follow a coherent policy toward the United States, whether GRIT or tit for tat. In his August 1953 speech to the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov continued to advocate "peaceful coexistence" with the West and peaceful settlement of issues between the United States and the Soviet Union. But a month later, his rival Nikita S. Khrushchev was designated first secretary and made the leading speech on agriculture at the Central Committee plenum, the very issue on which Malenkov had staked his reputation as a reformer.-^' Adding to the political complexity, while Khrushchev and Malenkov competed for dominance over policy making in agriculture. Presidium members deferred to Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov's leadership in foreign affairs immediately after Stalin's death. Molotov, who had served as Stalin's foreign minister from 1939 to 1949, was the only member of the Presidium who had experience in foreign affairs. A true believer in Stalinist orthodoxy concerning issues such as the inevitability of war and the division of the world into two camps, Molotov was in a position to block any overtures aimed at settling the issues responsible for creating tensions with the Westem democracies. Since the Korean War broke out when he was not foreign
28. Telephone conversation with Allen Dulles, 10 July 1953, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Memoranda Series, "July 1953-October 31, 1953 (5)," DDEL; Hughes diary, 10 July 1953, Hughes Papers, Princeton. 29. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953, pp. 192-93; Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73 (New York: Praeger, 1974), pp. 546-47; Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957-64 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966), pp. 27-28; R. Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R., 1945-60 (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 229.

42 International Organization minister, Molotov was probably agreeable to liquidating Stalin's misadventure. In addition, like other members of the Presidium, the Soviet foreign minister recognized that Stalin's belligerence and unwillingness to adhere to civilized norms of diplomatic conduct had provoked the rearmament and consolidation of the Western alliance. But Molotov was not willing to go beyond abandoning the dysfunctional policies that had led to the Soviet Union's virtual diplomatic isolation. In particular, he was doggedly and reflexively opposed to any suggestion that the Soviet Union withdraw its troops from an area occupied at the end of World War 11.^" In view of the domestic political infighting between Khrushchev and Malenkov, the desperate agricultural situation, and the shock of the East German uprisings, it is not surprising that the Soviets temporized and stalled to avoid negotiations on Germany or Austria. For example, when the Western powers proposed a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss Germany and Austria, the Soviets first insisted that the People's Republic of China be included and that the impermissibility of foreign bases be placed on the agenda. Then they objected that the deputies of the foreign ministers, who had been meeting on and off to discuss Austria for seven years, were not the most "suitable instrument" to discuss the Austrian State Treaty. In response to a U.S. proposal for a meeting of foreign ministers in Lugano, Switzerland, in October, the Soviets proposed a two-tier system of a fivepower conference, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), to discuss elimination of foreign bases and tension reduction, followed by a fourpower conference to discuss Germany. Austria, the Soviets claimed, could be handled through normal diplomatic channels. Then, without warning, in November the Soviets agreed to a meeting of foreign ministers in Berlin, without preconditions, to discuss Germany and Austria.^' E. The Berlin Conference, 1954 Dulles doubted whether anything constructive would come out of the Berlin Conference. "The question," he told Eisenhower, "is how do you get it over with with as little damage as possible."^^ As he predicted, the foreign ministers met from 25 January to 18 February 1954 but achieved little. The problem was Germanythe heart of Europe.
30. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 121-22, 135-37; Leonhard, The Kremlin since Stalin, pp. 52-53; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 543; Paul Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy: A Case Study," Western Political Quarterly 28 (March 1975), p. 132n. 31. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs: 1953, pp. 194-95, 198, 384-87; Gordon Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey (London: Macmillan, 1957), pp. 252-53; Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics of Power (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962), pp. 1056; Documents on American Foreign Relations: 1953, ed. Peter V. Curl (New York: Harper & Bros., 1954), pp. 227-29; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 547-48. 32. 2 December 1953, Whitman File, Ann C. Whitman Diary Series, "ACW Diary Nov.-Dec. 1953 (2)," DDEL.

Austrian State Treaty 43 Molotov made it clear that the Soviets intended to hold the Austrian State Treaty hostage to the goal of a neutralized and demilitarized Germany. At Molotov's insistence, the Austrian State Treaty was placed at the bottom of the agenda, after discussions on recognition of Red China, disarmament, EDC (European Defense Community), European security, and Germany. When Dulles suggested to Molotov that "there was more chance for agreement on the Austrian question because Austria, ifter all, was a little country which could not appreciably affect the balance of power in Europe," Molotov objected that there was a possibility of some success on Germany. Specifically, Molotov wondered whether they might agree on a "small German army, with a German government which would be directed neither against the United States, France, Great Britain, nor the Soviet Union." Secretary Dulles asked Molotov whether he had read the Versailles Treaty recently. Marshal Foch, who was a very good general, had written into the Treaty of Versailles almost every limitation and control you could imagine, including prevention of sporting associations, use of rifles, and so on. Nevertheless, this had not prevented the rebirth of German military forces. Molotov retorted that the trouble had been that the Allied Powers did not keep control over the German government. "If the wrong kind of government got into power, then it was difficult to control what it did," Molotov said. When the foreign ministers finally turned to Austria on 12 February, Molotov linked the Austrian State Treaty to the German question. He agreed to sign the Austrian State Treatywith the important condition that foreign troops would remain until a German peace treaty had been signed. In the meantime. Occupation troops would be withdrawn only from Vienna. Since there was little likelihood that the West and East could agree on reunification of Germany, this would amount to permanent occupation of Austria, vitiating the purpose of a peace treaty. Dulles cabled Eisenhower that Molotov's presentation "turned the clock back on Austria and cut [the] heart out of proposed treaty by providing for indefinite Soviet occupation so that treaty would not be treaty of liberation but of servitude." In addition Molotov wanted provisions written into the treaty which would prevent Austria from joining any alliance or allowing foreign bases on its soil. Dulles and his State Department advisers had foreseen that the Soviets would propose neutralizing Austria. Before the Berlin Conference, President Eisenhower told Dulles that if Austria could achieve a status of armed neutrality analogous to Switzerland, that would be quite satisfactory to him. What Dulles had not anticipated was Molotov's clumsy attempt to use Austria as a hostage for a German settlement.^^
33. Memorandum of conversation, 6 February 1954, Whitman File, John Foster DullesChristian Herter Series, "Dulles, John Foster, Feb. 1954 (1)," DDEL; Livingston Merchant, "The Berlin Conference," off-the-record talk before National War College, Livingston T. Merchant Papers, "Berlin Conference, 1954," Box 2, Princeton; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy

44 Intemational Organization If Molotov's principal motive for agreeing to the Berlin conference had been to delay or prevent German rearmament, then the Soviets must have felt vindicated when the French Parliament rejected the EDC on 30 August 1954. But Great Britain quickly developed an alternative plan for rearming Germany, which was then discussed at a nine-power conference in London. The protocols of the Paris Agreements admitting Germany to NATO were signed in late October. In December 1954 the Soviets threatened that ratification of the Paris Agreements would render impossible further negotiations on Austria.^'' F. Return to GRIT: the surprising Soviet shift on Austria In view of Soviet threats, Molotov's 8 February 1955 speech decoupling Germany from Austria was a startling policy reversal. He said that, contrary to the Soviet government's position at the Berlin Conference, withdrawal of Occupation forces from Austria need not wait until a German peace treaty was signed, if there were guarantees against Anschluss.^^ What made the Soviet shift possible was Khrushchev's victory in the Kremlin power struggle. From March 1954 until December 1954, the Soviet leadership debated the impact of nuclear weapons on strategy and defense, an issue on which Stalin had allowed no dissent. In a March 1954 speech. Premier Malenkov argued that capitalist forces would be deterred by Soviet possession of nuclear weapons from launching an attack against the Soviet Union; therefore, Soviet military expenditures could be reduced, releasing funds for increased production of consumer goods. Malenkov also warned that continuation of "cold war policies" could lead to a new world war which would mean the end of civilization. In contrast, Malenkov's opponents, among them Soviet Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin, objected that laws of history such as Lenin's "inevitability of war" could not be destroyed or paralyzed. Bulganin asserted that the capitalists would not be deterred from launching a nuclear war out of humanitarian considerations. The military objected to Malenkov's efforts to reduce defense expenditures. Khrushchev agreed that Soviet defenses required further strengthening. In June 1954 Khrushchev gave a speech in Prague in which he claimed that only capitalism would be destroyed by a nuclear war and argued that settlement of issues with the West was not possible as long as capitalist encirclement existed.^^
after Stalin, pp. 142-43, 145-46, 251-52; Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 145-46; Berlin to Washington, 13 February 1954, Whitman File, DuUes-Herter Series, "Dulles, John Foster, Feb. 1954 (1)," DDEL; memorandum of conversation with the president, 20 January 1954, John Foster DuUes Papers, White House Memoranda Series, "Meetings with the President 1954 (4)," DDEL. 34. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 147. 35. Ibid., p. 148; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, p. 255. 36. Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy

Austrian State Treaty 45 Still, it was not strategic or defense issues in isolation which proved to be politically decisive in the leadership struggle but, rather, the question of the priority to be given to heavy industry. In August 1953 Malenkov had proclaimed a policy of increasing production of consumer goods, redirecting funds away from the traditional emphasis on heavy industry. Beginning in December 1954 Khrushchev attacked Malenkov's policy as "rightist deviation" from Marxism-Leninism and demgerous to Soviet defenses. Khrushchev's advocacy of renewed emphasis on the priority of heavy industry enabled him to gain the support of Molotov, Bulganin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich, a majority ofthe Presidium. The army, fed by heavy-industry products, also allied with Khrushchev against Malenkov." Thus, the same day that Molotov made his speech announcing the change in policy toward Austria, Malenkov resigned as chairman of the Council of Ministers. Bulganin became premier, while Khrushchev remained first secretary of the Communist Party. Once he had defeated his rival Malenkov, Khrushchev proceeded to adopt the former Soviet premier's policy of relaxation of tensions in order to isolate his erstwhile ally Molotov. By seizing Malenkov's "peaceful coexistence" line, Khrushchev was able to pick up some ofthe former premier's supporters in the PresidiumAnastas Mikoyan, Mikhail Pervukhin, and Mikhail Saburovand to form a broad political coalition as a centrist. Indeed, despite his blustering rhetoric in 1954 about nuclear weapons and the need for increased vigilance against imperialist aggression, Khrushchev did not differ significantly from Malenkov on foreign-policy issues. It was Khrushchev's habit to attack his rivals one at a time, to prevent them from uniting against him. Until Malenkov had resigned, Khrushchev could not afford to offend Molotov by criticizing his Stalinist foreign
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 19-22, 25-27; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 94-96; Leonhard, The Kremlin since Stalin, pp. 88-89, 92-93; Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger, 1958), pp. ll-li; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 220-21; Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 208. 37. Horelick and Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 21; Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945-1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 73, 78-79; Hough and Fainsod, How the Soviet Union Is Governed, p. 208; Roger William Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics: The June Crisis of 1957 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1%2), pp. 55-57, 65; Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R., pp. 248-51; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, p. 221; Garthofif, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, pp. 22-23; Leonhard, The Kremlin since Stalin, p. 88; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 89; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, pp. 555-56; Vojtech Mastny, "Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement," Problems of Communism 31 (July-August 1982), p. 41. 38. Conquest, Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R., pp. 264, 270; Pethybridge, A Key to Soviet Politics, pp. 36, 62-64; Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, and Franklyn Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966), pp. 73-74; Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy," pp. 136-37; Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World: Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), pp. 87-88, 93.

46 International Organization Soon after Malenkov's defeat, however, Molotov came under attack. Reconciliation with Tito and the Austrian State Treaty were the immediate issues in dispute. Molotov was opposed to withdrawal from Austria on principle; it might set a precedent for Eastern Europe. Eurther, he did not trust Austria to remain neutral. Khrushchev pointed out that Austria was not a "people's democracy"; therefore, withdrawal would be no loss, especially since the Austrians promised to pay the Soviets for the privilege. To be sure, the Soviet Union was giving up military bases in eastern Austria, but at the same time it was proving its peaceful orientation without strengthening the military potential of its adversaries.""^ When the West did not immediately respond to Molotov's implied invitation in Eebruary 1955, the Soviet government invited Austrian Chancellor Raab to Moscow."*" In just four daysfrom 12 April to 15 AprilAustrian and Soviet delegates reached agreement on a treaty. As the Nation pointed out, the "treaty terms Chancellor Raab brought home from Moscow are more generous at almost every point than Austria and the West expected and were ready to accepteven including the demand for Austrian neutrality. ' The New York Times reported that "Austria has obtained a treaty much more favorable than the one the West offered at the Berlin conference more than a year ago and again since, and the Soviet Union rejected." Within the next six years, Austria promised it would pay the Soviets $150,000,000 in goods as compensation for former German assets, and $2 million for the Danube Shipping Company. In addition the Austrians agreed to provide the Soviet Union with 10 million tons of oil over ten years in payment for the Soviet share of Austrian oil enterprises. Thus the Soviets relinquished their right under the previous treaty draft to 60 percent of Austrian oil production, 420,000 tons of Austrian refinery capacity, concessions for oil exploration and exploitation for thirty-five years, and title to the Danube Shipping Company. More important the Austrian purchase would eliminate Soviet economic enclaves and managerial personnel that could be used to subvert Austria's independence after the withdrawal of Western troops. By reducing their ability to communize Austria after the treaty went into effect, the Soviets were following the GRIT rule that unilateral initiatives should be clearly disadvantageous from the standpoint of aggression. Had they not done so, the Eisenhower administration might have opposed signing the Austrian State Treaty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had warned that the Soviets might use the armed guards stationed at the Russian-controlled oil facilities and their managerial and economic personnel as a basis to subvert the Aus39. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 228, 230, 232, 254-55; Marantz. "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy," p. 137; Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, pp. 31-32; Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans, and ed. Strobe Talbott (1974; reprint ed.. New York: Bantam Books, 1976), pp. 562-63; Ra'anan, The USSR Arms the Third World, pp. 97-101, 105. 40. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, pp. 148-49.

Austrian State Treaty 47 trian government after U.S. troops were taken out. The official U.S. policy statement on Austria, NSC 164/1, recommended that U.S. negotiators seek to persuade the Soviets to relinquish control of German assets in return for financial compensation. The JCS and Defense Department had also argued that Western troops should not be withdrawn from Austria until Austrian security forces were sufficiently strong to protect the country against Soviet subversion, and Austria was free to coordinate with the West in defense planning. But the JCS recognized that withdrawal of Soviet economic and managerial personnel would accomplish the same end of protecting Austrian sovereignty and independence."*' Though the Austrian-Soviet negotiations had produced a treaty that exceeded his expectations, Dulles insisted on a preliminary conference of ambassadors beginning on 2 May 1955 to iron out any remaining difficulties before the foreign ministers signed the treaty on 15 May 1955. At the last minute several significant "snafus" reflecting Western distrust threatened to delay signing of the treaty. For example, the Western ambassadors objected to voluntary repatriation of displaced persons and refugees for fear that the Soviets might pressure Austria to return anti-Communist refugees to their countries of origin. In addition the West did not want any limitations placed on the size of Austria's army.'*^ Anxious that the Soviet Union might renege once Western troops were withdrawn, the United States wanted the SovietAustrian agreement written into the text of the treaty itself. Eisenhower told Dulles that he "wanted to be sure that we do everything possible to avoid providing opportunities for the Russians to stage another Czechoslovak takeover in Austria." The Western conditions further decreased the Soviets' ability to violate Austrian neutrality through invasion or subversion. The Soviet government conceded on all the disputed issues. DuUes's principal adviser on Austria at the Berlin Conference, C D . Jackson, wrote Henry Luce that "what the Austrians got this time around is considerably better than what they would have gotten a year ago on our explicit instruc-

41. "The 'Deed' We Wanted?" Nation, 23 April 1955, p. 339; John MacCormack, "Austrian Treaty Set for Signing as Soviet Yields," New York Times, 13 May 1955; Thomas O. Schlesinger, Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe: The Domestic Roots of a Foreign Policy (WienStuttgart: Wilhelm BraumuUer, 1972), pp. 23-24; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Statin, pp. 255-57; HoUis W. Barber, ed.. The United States in World Affairs: 1955 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), pp. 47-48; Shepherd, The Austrian Odyssey, p. 210, 247-48; Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 150; "U.S. Objectives and Policies with Respect to Austria, October 14, 1953," NSC 164/1, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs: Records, 1952-61, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, DDEL; L. Mathewson, Director, Joint Staff, Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 22 April 1955, White House Office, SANSA Policy Papers, "NSC 164/1Policy Toward Austria (1)," DDEL. 42. Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, pp. 151-52; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Statin, pp. 258-59; Barber, ed.. The United States in World Affairs: 1955, p. 46. 43. Memorandum of conversation with the president, 6 May 1955, E>ulles Papers, Chronological Series, "May 1955 (3)," DDEL; Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of

48 International Organization The Soviet initiative in concluding the Austrian State Treaty was a unilateral concession. The payoff structure for the Soviets on Austria remained the same. The West did not offer attractive new terms; indeed the final treaty was much less favorable to the Soviets than the draft that they had refused to sign a year earlier. As Alexander Kendrick pointed out in the New Republic, "One of the peculiar aspects of the Soviet gesture is that the Western Three and Austria have been perfectly willing to sign a treaty without concessions." Further, by agreeing to decouple the Austrian treaty from the German problem, the Soviets gave up a valuable bargaining chip."^ But public statements can be contrived to deceive the adversary as well as to evoke reciprocal cooperation. That is why GRIT concessions should be moderately risky to the initiator. If the initiatives involve potential costs, the target is less able to dismiss the concessions as motivated by self-interest or ulterior motive. In liberating Austria the Soviets risked raising popular expectations in the East European satellites that Soviet troops would be withdrawn and they too would be allowed to pursue a foreign policy of neutrality. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reported to the NSC that the Soviet move in Austria would "entail very considerable risks for the Soviet positions in the European satellites." Secretary of State Dulles agreed that "by virtue of their action in Austria the Soviets may be loosing forces in the satellite states which they would be unable to control." "We were now confronting a real opportunity," Dulles said, "for a rollback of Soviet power" which could leave the satellite states with a status similar to Finland's. In a televised report on the Austrian treaty, Dulles predicted that the treaty would carry new problems into the satellite area because for the first time Red Army forces had moved towards Russia and an area of Europe was "liberated." "The example of what has happened here, I thought as we saw these cheering, waving crowds, is going to be something contagious," Dulles exulted. Dulles's prediction was prescient. Imre Nagy, Hungarian premier during the 1956 uprising, was influenced by the Austrian model and wished to establish a neutral belt composed of Yugoslavia, Austria, and Hungary. It was Nagy's proclamation that Hungary was withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact to pursue a policy of neutrality which provoked the second Soviet military intervention."*^
Austria, pp. 152-53; Shepherd, Austrian Odyssey, p. 262; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 258-59; Dulles to Eisenhower, 12 May 1955, Whitman File, DuUes-Herter Series, "Dulles, John Foster, May 1955," DDEL; C. D. Jackson to Henry Luce, 13 May 1955, Jackson Papers, "Log 1954," DDEL; William B. Bader, Austria between East and West 1945-55 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), p. 185. 44. Alexander Kendrick, "Fishing for Germany with Austrian Bait," New Republic, 2 May 1955, pp. 11-12. 45. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty and the Cold War," p. 660; minutes, NSC Meeting, 22 April, 20 May 1955, Whitman File, NSC Series, DDEL; John Foster Dulles, "An Historic WeekReport to the President," television report to the president, 17 May 1955. Dulles

Austrian State Treaty 49 Consistent with GRIT but not tit for tat, the Soviets explained publicly that their objective in signing the Austrian State Treaty was to reduce tensions. In May Khrushchev cited the Austrian State Treaty as evidence that the Soviets did not want to conquer Europe. "Is there any stronger proof necessary to show that the Soviet Union does not want to seize Europe to carry on any sort of war?" Khrushchev asked. "Who would evacuate troops if he wanted to attack?" Khrushchev emphasized that the main principle of Soviet foreign policy was "the possibility and necessity of peaceful coexistence of different social systems."''* As Osgood recommends, the Soviets invited the United States to reciprocate by agreeing to a summit meeting; but they did not make the Austrian State Treaty contingent on any quid pro quo. During the four-power negotiations on Austria Premier Bulganin told Western diplomats in Moscow that the Soviet government wanted a four-power meeting to discuss the German problem and disarmament.''^ G. The U.S. proposes a summit meeting As the GRIT proposal would predict, Eisenhower and Dulles felt compelled to reciprocate by proposing a summit meeting. Concerning the 15 April Soviet-Austrian agreement, the New York Times reported that "the major upshot . . . is to make an early Big Eour Foreign Ministers' Conference almost inevitable." "By making concessions to Vienna, the Russians have hopes to meet the test of 'deeds not words' posed by President Eisenhower two years ago as a token of Soviet good faith," the Times explained. Dulles said that the Austrian-Soviet agreement improved chances for a Big Four meeting either "at the summit" or at the foreign ministers' level, and that "concrete plans for new discussions" with the Soviet Union could be made at the meeting of NATO foreign ministers in May. On 28 April President Eisenhower told newsmen that he had a "sixth sense" that the outlook for peace had brightened as a result of the Soviet Union's eagerness to conclude an Austrian settlement and Communist China's proposal for direct negotiations with the United States on Taiwan. On 10 May the Westem countries invited the Soviet Union to a summit, and the Soviet government formally accepted on 13 June. When reminded by news reporters that he had said he would require deeds
Papers, Box 96, DDEL; background news conference, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 89, Princeton; Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 50, 76; Imre Nagy, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York; Praeger, 1957), pp. 32-34, Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 373-78. 46. James Reston, "Soviet's New Tactics," New York Times, 21 April 1955; New York Times, 19 May 1955. 47. New York Times, 10 May 1955. See also New York Times, 8 and 24 April 1955.

50 International Organization rather than words from the Communists before agreeing to sit down with them, Eisenhower pointed out that the Soviets' willingness to conclude an Austrian settlement was one of the deeds he had mentioned. Eisenhower later recalled that he felt obliged to reciprocate the Soviets' signing the Austrian State Treaty by agreeing to a summit: Almost simultaneously the Soviets took a step that gave at least a glimmer of hope that they, under their new leadership, might be genuinely seeking mutually acceptable answers. This act involved Austria. . . . Because of the Soviets' action, and not wishing to appear senselessly stubborn in my attitude toward a Summit meetingso hopefully desired by so manyI instructed Secretary Dulles to let it be known through diplomatic channels, that if other powers were genuinely interested in such a meeting we were ready to listen to their reasoning."*^ Had the Soviets not given Austria its freedom, it is doubtful that Eisenhower would have acceded to Prime Minister Anthony Eden's pleas for a summit. As recently as December 1954 Eisenhower had written Churchill: I have always felt, as you know, that it would be a mistake for you and me to participate in a meeting which was either essentially social or exploratory. A social meeting would merely give a false impression of accord which, in our free countries, would probably make it more difficult to get parliamentary support for needed defense appropriations. . . . So, I am bound to say that, while I would like to be more optimistic, I cannot see that a top-level meeting is anything which I can inscribe on my schedule for any predictable date.**^ Did U.S. officials agree to relax tensions because the Soviet decision to sign the Austrian Treaty had altered their image of the Soviet Union? Not Dulles. "The wolf has put on a new set of sheep's clothing," Dulles told news reporters in Vienna, "and while it is better to have a sheep's clothing on than a bear's clothing on, because sheep don't have claws, I think the policy remains the same."^" Nor had Dulles "learned" that the failure of the United States to reciprocate Soviet concessions led Soviet leaders to adopt a tougher policy. To maintain his image of the Soviets as aggressive and hostile, Dulles attributed the Soviet decision to leave Austria to firm U.S. policies. In a televised report to the American people on 17 May 1955 Dulles declared that: "And all of a sudden, a few weeks ago, out of the blue, came this announcement that the Russians were willing to take their troops out of Austria. . . . It is just one of those breaks that come if you keep on steadily, steadily, keeping the
48. New York Times, 17, 18, and 28 April, 12 and 15 May 1955; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change: 1953-1956 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963), pp. 505-6. 49. Eisenhower to Churchill, 1 December 1954, Whitman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diary Series, "December 1954 (1)," DDEL. 50. Background news conference, Vienna, 15 May 1955, Dulles Papers. Princeton.

Austrian State Treaty 51 pressure on."'' Privately, the secretary of state asked his brother Allen Dulles why Walter Lippmann was so antagonistic towards him. "For years his idea was to get the Red Troops going back and now that it has happened there is no recognition from him," Foster Dulles complained.^^ Dulles felt obliged to agree to a summit meeting because the Soviet "deed" had stimulated domestic and allied pressure to reciprocate the Soviet government's initiative in signing the Austrian State Treaty. In the Nation, J. A. del Vayo observed that one result of the Soviet agreement with Austria is that "everywhere in Europe the concept of an East-West highlevel conference has acquired irresistible fascination." The man in the street was impressed that it took only four days to negotiate the Moscow-Vienna agreement; "You see . . . it is possible to talk to the Russians and to arrive at an agreement." Explaining why the administration reversed its opposition to a meeting, Eisenhower said, "Throughout the world there has been clear evidence presented through the press, through correspondence . . . through diplomatic sources that there is a vague feeling that some good might come of the conference." A New York Times editorial observed that the change in American policy was brought about in part by the- "great surge in popular demand that the statesmen of the West seek peace and pursue it unflaggingly."^^ H. The Soviets reciprocate the United States' invitation to a summit Soviet leaders responded with a flurry of conciliatory moves toward the West, throughout the world and in different issue-areas, as GRIT would predict. On 10 May, within a few hours of the West's invitation to a summit meeting, Soviet negotiators at the UN Disarmament Commission Subcommittee tabled a disarmament proposal that moved toward the Western position in a number of important respects. The Soviet demarche accepted the Western position that U.S., Soviet, and PRC conventional forces should be equalized, instead of being cut a fixed amount that would perpetuate Soviet conventional superiority. Similarly, the Soviets no longer insisted that nuclear weapons must be banned before conventional troops could be reduced. The Soviets accepted the establishment of a single international agency for disarmsiment and the principle of on-site inspection. Previously, the Soviets had denied that hidden stockpiles of nuclear weapons could be a problem.
51. John Foster Dulles, "An Historic WeekReport to the President," television report to the president, 17 May 1955, Dulles Papers, Box %, Princeton. 52. Telephone conversation with Allen Dulles, 23 May 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations Memoranda Series, "May 2, t955-August 31, 1955 (7)," DDEL. 53. J. A. del Vayo, "Toward a Big Four Talk; Public Pressure Increases" Nation, 7 May 1955, p. 389; "When the Big Four Meet," New Republic, 23 May 1955, p. 3; New York Times, 12, 15, and 22 May 1955.

52 International Organization For the first time by any major power, the Soviets proposed a ban on nuclear tests. Although the 10 May proposal admittedly contained several objectionable features, such as the requirement that foreign bases be eliminated, it was a remarkable improvement over previous Soviet disarmament proposals.^^ On 13 May the Soviet government announced that a high-level mission would be visiting the apostate Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia, a move that Dulles regarded as "without precedent in history" and bound to have 'tremendous repercussions" because it bore with it the risk of splintering the unity of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. According to the New York Times, U.S. officials believed that Moscow was "setting an example that may not sit well with the more obedient Communist leaders of the Eastern satellite countries." Moscow's rapprochement with Tito was extraordinarily risky from the standpoint ofthe unity ofthe East European bloc. Molotov warned Khrushchev that accommodating Tito could lead to demands for greater independence in Poland. Moscow's embrace of Tito and his formula of "national roads to socialism" was one of the factors that provoked the October uprisings in Poland and Hungary. The Yugoslavs, too, were led by the Austrian State Treaty to hope that the Russians might consent to the establishment of a neutral bloc of states in central Europe.^'' /. Soviet motivations for signing the Austrian State Treaty Why did the Soviets sign the Austrian State Treaty? The Austrians had offered to declare their neutrality a year before the treaty was signed, but Molotov had not been interested. The Soviets could not have expected that the Austrian formula of reunification through neutralization could be used as bait to prevent ratification of the Paris Agreements and West German entry into NATO when they initialed the bilaterjJ Vienna-Moscow agreement in April. The Paris Agreements had been ratified by the European parliaments by December 1954. After a bitter debate, the West German Parliament approved the Paris Agreements on 27 February 1955. Final deposit of the ratification instruments of the Paris Agreements on 5 May 1955 had no effect on the fourpower negotiations on Austria then underway.^*
54. New York Times, 15 May 1955; "When the Big Four Meet," New Republic, 23 May 1955, p. 8; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, pp. 97-99; Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait ofthe Hero (Boston; Little, Brown, 1974), p. 650; Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race, pp. 22-24. 55. New York Times, 15 May 1955; remarks of Secretary Dulles at Magazine Editors and Publishers' Meeting, Greenbrier Hotel, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., 23 May 1955, Dulles Papers, Box 98, DDEL; "Toward 'Active Coexistence,' " Nation, 11 June 1955, p. 493; Lowenthal. World Communism, pp. 50, 76; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 229-30, 335. 56. Bader, Austria between East and West, pp. 201-2; Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 162.

Austrian State Treaty 53 West Germany's admission to NATO undermined any hopes that the Soviets would agree to German reunification even in return for guarantees of neutralization. After February 1955 Soviet policy was aimed at obtaining international recognition of "two Germanys" and preventing West Germany from acquiring nuclear weapons. During the April 1955 Austrian-Soviet negotiations Premier Bulganin remarked that Germany would be split for a long time as a result of the decision to arm West Germany. The Soviet shift to a "two Germanys" policy underlay their June decision to establish diplomatic relations with Bonn and to invite Adenauer to visit the Soviet Union. In July Bulganin declared publicly that "the Soviet government does not at this stage suggest renunciation of the Paris Agreements or that Western Germany resign from these alignments, [as] that would be absolutely unrealistic." When Adenauer visited Moscow in December 1955, Khrushchev said he was no longer interested in even discussing the question of West Germany's withdrawal from NATO. Soviet proposals at Geneva and afterwards called for a confederation between the two German governments, supposedly leaving it up to the Germans themselves to work out the details and mechanisms of reunification.^' Still, even if blocking the formal entry of West Germany into the Western alliance were no longer possible, the Soviets may have calculated that the mirage of reunification through neutralization, seemingly embodied in the Austrian State Treaty, might serve as an inducement to delay or reverse German rearmament within NATO. On 18 April Radio Moscow promised that "if Bonn would follow the Austrian example, Germany as a nation and world peace would gain considerably." On 15 May when the treaty was signed in Vienna, Molotov said, "The Soviet Union attaches great significance to the Austrian declaration that the country will not join any military alliance and will not permit foreign military bases on its soil." Unfortunately, solution of the German question was seriously complicated by "new obstacles," in particular the "danger of a reborn German aggressive militarism." A Pravda editorial stated: If little Austria with its 7,000,000 inhabitants not only did not lose its independence but on the contrary strengthened it, why must the German Federal Republic reject such a policy? Why must it contribute vast sums to the arms race and restrict its sovereignty for the benefit of the military bloc of the Western powers?'*
57. James Reston, "Soviet's New Tactics," New York Times, 21 April 1955; Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 262-65, 278-79; Charles E. Planck, The Changing Status of German Reunification in Western Diplomacy. 1955-1966 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), pp. 22-23; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, The Stable Crisis: Two Decades of German Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), pp. 92-95; Michael Balfour, West Germany (New York; Praeger, 1968), p. 217. 58. New York Times, 15 May 1955; M. S. Handler, "Molotov Names Neutrality as Price for German Unity," New York Times, 16 May 1955; Stearman, The Soviet Union and the Occupation of Austria, p. 164-65; Robert L. Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," Western Political Quarterly 21 (December 1968), pp. 657, 665.

54 Intemational Organization Whether West Germany should join NATO was a controversial issue within the Federal Republic; the Social Democratic Party (SPD) argued that entry into the Western bloc and rearmament would end prospects for reunification. On 15 April the official correspondence of the SPD contended that the success that Austria has achieved is essentially a result of the fact that it has not, like the West German Republic, bound itself irrevocably and militarily to the West." "There can be little doubt," the SPD organ continued, that . . . a possible later agreement of all four powers regarding Germany must resemble at least basically the Austrian solution."^** Even after the Paris Agreements were ratified. West German rearmament was far from a forgone conclusion, because implementing legislation approximately 150 actshad yet to be passed. For example, the Bonn Parliament had to approve legislation providing for an officer corps and conscription of the twelve German divisions envisioned for NATO. In late April the SPD announced that it intended to bottle up the enabling legislation in parliamentary committees while pressing for four-power negotiations on German reunification. The Austrian State Treaty raised the question of whether Germany should rearm before one more try was made at negotiations with Moscow. The Social Democrat's argument was "if Raab could bring something back from Russia, why can't Adenauer?" Even some members of the governing coalition suggested that the German army could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the Soviets for reunification. The SPD did not become reconciled to rearmament and membership in NATO until its plan for German reunification through military disengagement and a confederation of the two Germanys was ignored by Khrushchev in 1959.^ But delaying German rearmament was at best a remote possibility. Adenauer's coalition was in firm control of the Bundestag, and his policy of achieving sovereignty, economic recovery, and security through alignment with the West was popular with the German people. On 25 May Adenauer informed the Western alhes that neutralization was out of the question.^' Delaying or reversing West German rearmament could best be furthered through a policy of detente with the West, crowned by a summit meeting. After Malenkov's forced resignation in February 1955 Soviet foreign policy
59. New York Times, 16 April 1955. 60. New York Times, 17, 21, and 24 April 1955; James Reston, "Soviet's New Tactics," New York Times, 21 April 1955; C. L. Sulzberger, "The Compleat Angler Goes Fishing along the Rhine," New York Times, 27 April 1955; James L. Richardson, Germany and the Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 25, 29-32; Barber, The United States in World Affairs: 1955 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957), p. 43; Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," p. 660; J. Emlyn Williams, "An Independent Germany," New Republic, 30 May 1955; del Vayo, "Toward a Big Four Talk: Public Pressure Increases, p. 390; Hanrieder, Stabte Crisis, pp. 136-37. 61. New York Times, 21, 25, and 26 May 1955; Hanreider, Stable Crisis, p. 137.

Austrian State Treaty 55 underwent fundamental and far-reaching changes, of which the Austrian State Treaty was the first sign. At the beginning of the Khnishchev-Bulganin era, the term relaxation of tensions appeared with numbing frequency in Soviet official foreign-policy pronouncements. The Austrian State Treaty was an important component of Khrushchev's detente strategy. In Europe Khrushchev's goal was to obtain Western recognition of the territorial and political status quo. Soviet efforts at acquiring influence and power would henceforth be directed at "neutralist" leaders in the underdeveloped countries. The Soviet government applauded the April 1955 Bandung Conference as the beginning of a coalition between socialist and neutralist nations. As part of this strategy, in November 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin made an unprecedented trip to India, Burma, and Afghanistan. Their trip was carefully prepared for by advance trade agreements, and offers of economic and technical assistance. The new policy of wooing neutralists entailed repudiation of Stalin's rigid "two-camp" view of the world, and the Leninist doctrine that the only path to socialism was through violent revolution. Austria could serve as proof of the Soviet government's benevolent policy toward neutrals. Similarly, in September the Soviet government recognized Finland's neutrality and allowed it to join the Nordic CouncU.*^ In addition to furthering Soviet foreign-policy objectives, relaxation of tensions would allow Khrushchev to divert excess Soviet mUitary manpower to agricultural production and undermine U.S. nuclear superiority by putting funds into developing an intercontinental ballistic missile instead of building more bombers, an area in which the United States held a virtually unsurpassable lead. In 1955 and 1956 Khrushchev reduced Soviet ground forces by over one million. Sending surplus military manpower to work in the fields would allow Khrushchev to improve Soviet standards of living without requiring substantially increased investment in agriculture which would cut into the heavy-industrial and military budget. In addition, as Khrushchev recalled, "even if we couldn't convince [the United States] to disarm themselves and to give up the idea of war as a means of political pressure, at least we could demonstrate our own peaceful intentions and at the same time free some of our resources for the development of our industry, the production of consumer goods, and the improvement of living standards." Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Zhukov favored reducing expensive and bloated ground forces and increasing investment in military modernization.*^
62. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, pp. 222-23,228,273-74,290,294-95,2%-302, 307; Ferring, "The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the Cold War," p. 658; Bloomfleld, Clemens, and Griffiths, Khrushchev and the Arms Race, pp. 61-62. 63. Bader, Austria between East and West, p. 202; New York Times editorial, 24 May 1955; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 104; GarthofF, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, pp. 150-51; Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, pp. 251-52.

56 International Organization J. Did GRIT work? The period of detente following the signing of the Austrian State Treaty in itself contributed to preventing crises. For example, when the Soviets shot down a U.S. plane over the Bering Straits in June 1955, they not only apologized for the first time for that type of incident but offered to pay 50 percent of the damages. On 15 May 1955 the New York Times reported that "the French word 'detente,' meaning a 'slackening of international tensions,' reappeared in the vocabulary of official Washington after a long absence." In July Edward Weintal oi Newsweek noted that "because of this new, relaxed mood, most diplomats now think the summit meeting at Geneva has become largely superfiuous. It was designed to relax tensions and explore Soviet intentions. The tensions are now relaxed."^ The Soviets continued GRIT after the summit conference in Geneva, 1925 July. In August the Soviets unilaterally made cuts in conventional forces. A month later, the Soviet government returned the Porkkala naval base to Finland, and they estabUshed diplomatic relations with West Germany.^^ 3. Conclusions The Austrian State Treaty brought about disengagement of the great powers from a potentially explosive spot and established a buffer zone between Eastern and Western Europe, decreasing the likelihood of crises. The relaxation of tensions precipitated by the Austrian State Treaty helped to defuse crises, for example, in the Bering Straits. Thus, the Austrian State Treaty contributed to crisis avoidance globally as well as regionally. The Austrian case suggests several generalizations about the strategies and conditions most conducive to achievement of cooperation in crisis prevention. First, crisis prevention agreements require trust or substitutes such as unilaterally relinquishing capabilities or providing hostages. By agreeing to sell former German assets back to Austria and to withdraw Soviet management and technical personnel, the Soviets diminished their ability to subvert Austrian independence and relieved Western anxieties. In turn, the Soviets showed trust in the United States by agreeing, for the first time, to give up a forward military base in central Europe.^ Second, because of the distorting prism of rigid images of the enemy, a single conciliatory gesture at the beginning of a tit-for-tat initiative may not be enough to penetrate the target's distrust and elicit reciprocation of coop64. New York Times, 15 May 1955; Edward Weintal, "Russia: Retreat but Not Surrender," Newsweek, 11 July 1955, p. 28; Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, p. 508. 65. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, p. 272; Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. Ill; Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, p. 80. 66. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy, p. 105.

Austrian State Treaty 57 eration. Instead, several unilateral concessions spread over different issueareas and involving moderate risks may be necessary to undermine images of bad faith and bolster the position of conciliators within the other state. Third, when the target government is dominated by hard-liners, the pressure of world public opinion may be useful in inducing reciprocal cooperation. Dulles felt compelled to reciprocate, not out of any sense of obligation to meet the Soviets halfway but because of pressure from Western allies and public opinion. Three components of the GRIT strategy which are not part of tit for tat created this public pressure: Soviet public statements explaining the meaning of the concessions, the diversification of multiple incremental unilateral concessions over different geographic areas and issue-areas, and the costs/risks attached to such concessions as neutralizing Austria and the rapprochement with Tito. Thus, the superiority of GRIT in the early 1950s can be partially attributed to the influence that hard-liner Dulles exercised over American foreign policy. Experiments have shown that a tit-for-tat strategy does not work with competitors, people whose orientation is to obtain higher gains than the other player; given Dulles's professed desire to reduce or better yet eliminate Soviet power, this description certainly fits the secretary of state.*' Of the three variables that point up the differences between tit for tat and GRIT, the costs/risks of concessions are probably most important in creating public pressure for reciprocal cooperation. Khrushchev and Bulganin's public statements about their desire to reduce tensions were important in reducing uncertainty about Soviet motives for signing the treaty as well as making the norm of reciprocity salient to the AmericEin people. But Soviet peaceful pronouncements might not have been regarded as credible had not the Soviets made concessions on the Austrian Treaty and Yugoslavia which involved genuine costs and risks. In contrast the Soviet 1953 peace offensive did not produce public pressure for reciprocity because the Soviet government had merely abandoned Stalin's counterproductive belligerence and returned to standard Western diplomatic practices, provoking Eisenhower's demand for "deeds not words" as proof that the Soviets were sincerely willing to cooperate. Could not a policy of tit for tat also make use of public statements, diversification of concessions, and the requirement that concessions involve costs or risks? In theory, no. Tit for tat is a behavior modification theory that does not concede the need to modify the other player's beliefs or create greater trust.^* Osgood's GRIT is a cognitive theory of trust development and for that reason seeks to alter one player's expectations about the other player's intentions.
67. D. Michael Kuhlman and Alfred F. J. Marshello, "Individual Differences in Game Motivation as Moderators of Preprogrammed Strategy Effects in Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (1975), pp. 922-31. 68. See, for example, Axeh-od, Evolution oj"Cooperation, pp. 12, 18, 123, 173-74, 182.

58 International Organization International and domestic structural variables prompted Khrushchev's decision to seek detente with the West by signing the Austrian State Treaty. Historically, when Soviet leaders have perceived that the balance of power was against them, the government has frequently adopted a rightist foreignpolicy course of peaceful coexistence and encouraging neutralism in Western Europe. After Stalin's death, Soviet leaders recognized that the former dictator's bellicose pohcies had driven the Western countries closer together and provoked West German rearmament. Thus, the Soviets' declining international power led Khrushchev to seek a breathing spell in which to modernize Soviet military forces. On the domestic level Khrushchev needed a relaxation of tensions to implement his reforms in agriculture, improve Soviet standards of living, and carry out de-Stalinization. But a policy of "peaceful coexistence" may vary from mere symbolic gestures aimed at improving the atmosphere to substantive concessions directed toward solving at least some conflicts of interest with the West. By forging a broad coalition including old Stalinists and the military as well as the government and economic elite, Khrushchev was in a political position to make the concessions required for detente with the United States. In contrast, having united the hard-liners and armed forces against him through his consumer goods policy, Malenkov was unable to go beyond symbolic tension-reducing gestures that did not succeed in undermining Western suspicions. Thus, to explain the Austrian State Treaty and other of Khrushchev's major innovations in Soviet foreign policy, one must go to the decision-making level of analysis and examine the dynamics of the process by which Khrushchev formed a domestic coalition.^** When the Austrian State Treaty was signed, the "shadow of the future" did not loom large because at the height of the cold war, from 1948 until Stalin's death, there was little trade and no significant U.S.-Soviet collaboration. In an era in which U.S.-Soviet economic interdependence continues to be low and mutual mistrust is high, GRIT may still offer useful suggestions for conducting diplomacy and managing conflict with the Soviet Union. Appendix: U.S.-Soviet Interactions Malenkov peace offensive
15 March 1953. Malenkov announces that there is no dispute between the United States and Soviet
69. Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (1963; reprint ed.. Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp. 4-5; Marantz, "Internal Politics and Soviet Foreign Policy," pp. 131-32. 143-44; Audrey Kurth Cronin, Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945-1955 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 161; Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence, p. 566.

U.S. response

Austrian State Treaty 59 Malenkov peace offensive

Union which cannot be decided by peaceful means. 27 March 1953. Soviets apologize for accidentally shooting down a British plane over Hamburg Corridor. Soviets lift roadblocks around West Berlin. 28 March 1953. China and North Korea accept U.S. suggestion to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war. 30 March 1953. Chinese accept principle of voluntary repatriation of prisoners of war. 31 March 1953. The Soviets agree to nomination of Dag Hammarskjold as secretary general of UN. 2 April 1953. Chuikov invites the United States and Freince to join in air corridor safety talks already begun with Britain. 8 April 1953. Vyshinsky adopts conciliatory tone in UN disarmament negotiations. 25 April 1953. Soviet government publishes full text of Eisenhower's speech in Izvestia and Pravda. 27 April 1953. Soviets offer amnesty to Austrian prisoners of war Jind civilian internees in the Soviet Union. 30 May 1953. Soviets withdraw claims for territory and bases from Turkey. 8 June 1953. Soviets announce that General Sviridov will be replaced as high commissioner of Austria by Ambassador Ivan Ilychev. 9 June 1953. Soviets lift controls at demarcation line between eastern and western zones of Austria. Soviet government announces that only spot

U.S. response

16 April 1953. In "Chance for Peace" speech, Eisenhower calls for deeds not words.

60 International Organization Malenkov peace offensive

checks of travelers between eastern and western zones will be carried out. Controls on freight between Soviet and western zones also eased. 10-13 June 1953. Soviets free previously requisitioned government buildings, schools, business premises, and houses for Austrian use. 27 July 1953. Korean Armistice signed. 30 July 1953. Soviets announce that they will pay their own occupation costs in Austria. 11 August 1953. Soviets abolish censorship in their zone of Austria.

U.S. response

Khrushchev-Bulganin peace offensive

8 February 1955. Molotov decouples Austrian State Treaty from German question. 15 April 1955. Soviets sign bilateral agreement with Austria for withdrawal of Soviet troops. 10 May 1955. Soviet disarmament proposal adopts Western position on many issues. 13 May 1955. Soviet government announces that a delegation of leaders will be visiting Tito. 26 May-2 June 1955. Soviet delegation visits Tito in Yugoslavia. 7 June 1955. Soviets propose estabhshment of diplomatic relations with West Germany, invite Adenauer to Moscow. 13 August 1955. Soviets make unilateral troop cuts. September 1955. Soviets withdraw from Porkkala base in Finland.

U.S. response

10 May 1955. Western powers invite Soviets to a summit conference.