Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia National Law University Lucknow,U.P.

FINAL PROJECT OF Study of Basics of case law.

Topic: RATIO.

Name: Pratibha singh Roll No.: 87 Semester: 1st

Submitted To
MR. SHASHANK SHEKHAR ASST.PROFFESOR

STUDY OF BASICS OF CASE LAW

CONTENT
Meaning Difference between ratio decidendi and obiter dicta Finding the ratio decidendi Ratio in appellate decision Cases without a ratio Theories of ratio decidendi

Elements of a judgment- ratio decidendi

INTRODUCTION
There are cases which involve questions which admit of being answered on principles. Such principles are deduced by way of abstraction of the material facts of the case eliminating the immaterial elements. And the result-the principle that comes out, is not applicable only to that case, but to other cases also which are similar to the decided case in their essential features. This principle is known as ratio decidendi. The issues which need determination of no general principles are answered on the basis of the circumstances of the particular case and lay down no principles of general application..These are called obiter dictum.It is the ratio decidendi or the general principle, and not the obiter dictum which has binding effect as a precedent. Many eminent Jurists have laid down principles and methods to determine the ratio decidendi of a decision. But the task is full of difficulties. Prof. Goodhart has made an elaborate discussion about the structure of a case and has suggested methods for the determination of the ratio decidendi, but he too has failed in laying down an infallible test. The ascertainment of the ratio decidendi of a case depends upon a process of abstraction from the totality of facts that occured in it. The higher the abstraction, the wider the ratio decidendi.

Thus a rule that ''it is a tort to tell a lie that is likely to and does caught fright and consequent physical harm'' is a narrow rule, belonging to a low level of abstraction from the facts of the particular case in which it was laid down; leave out the reference to fright, and it becomes wider; replace ''tell a lie'' by ''do any act with the intent to affect the plaintiff in body or mind'' and it becomes wider still. In India, all High Courts are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and all courts subordinate to the High Court are bound by the High Court's decision. However, the decision of one High Court is not binding on another High Court. It only has a persuasive authority. Having considered the extent to which courts are bound by previous decisions, it becomes necessary to consider what actually constitutes the 'decision' in a case and what is that which is actually binding on the lower courts. It is manifest that the ratio decidendi upon which a previous decision has rested has been superseded and invalidated by subsequent legislation or from other like cause, that ratio decid endi ceases to be binding.

MEANING
A decision generally has two aspects, namely:1) What principle it lays down on the rule of law for which it becomes an

authority. This is generally called the ratio decidendi of the case. 2) What the case decided between the parties. Such matters become res judicata .between the parties and cannot be the subject of future dispute. The term 'ratio decidendi' liberally means reason of the decision. It is the general principle which is deducted in a case. In other words, ratio decidendi is the rule of law upon which the decision is founded. The doctrine of ratio decidendi can be better understood by a concrete illustration. The English case of Bridges v. Hawkenshworth may be cited for this purpose. In this case a customer found some money on the floor of a shop. The court applied the rule of "finders-keepers'' and awarded possession of the money to him rather than to the shop-keeper. The ratio decidendi of this case is that finder of goods is the keeper i.e., has right of possession over it.However, in South Staffordshire Water Company v. Sharman, where the defendant found two gold rings in a mud of pool owned and occupied by the plaintiffs, the court refused to apply the ''finders-keepers'' rule expressed in Bridges' case on the ground that in that case money was found in a public place i.e. on the shop floor but in the instant case,it was found in a pool which was not open to public. The ratio decidendi of Donoghue v. Stevenson case was that it exploded the doctrine of privity of contract and held the manufacturer is liable to consumer for his negligence in manufacturing the goods which is of such a nature that it is incapable of intermediate inspection by retailer. The plaintiff was, therefore, held entitled for damages caused to her due to

decomposed snail inside the ginger-beer which was being sold in opaque bottle. A statement made in an OPINION OF THE COURT is either ratio decidendi or OBITER DICTUM. Ratio decidendi refers to a statement that is a necessary part of the chain of reasoning leading to the decision of the case, while obiter dictum ("said by the way") refers to any other statement in the opinion. The distinction is clear in theory but, in practice, may be difficult to apply to any given case No federal court may properly pass on a legal or constitutional question that is not brought before it in a case or controversy, and a court properly resolves only those questions necessary to decide a case before it. The resolution of a particular question is the court's holding on that question, and the reasoning necessary to the resolution of a question properly before the court is ratio decidendi. The ratio decidendi is thereafter binding as a rule of law when the case is cited as precedent. Although a judge may have a clear idea of what arguments were necessary to reach the decision in a case and may attempt to convey that idea in his opinion, it is the courts that apply the case as precedent in future decisions that finally establish which statements were obiter dicta and which ratio decidendi. According to Keeton ratio decidendi of a decision is the principle of law formulated by the judge for the purpose of deciding the problems before him. In Farasol v. Union of India, it was held that English decisions are not binding on Indian Courts but however they are of persuasive value.

In Ram Jivan v. Smt. Phoola, it was held whatever a Decision Bench decision is given in an appex from original suit or in a wait petition the ratio is binding on the subsequent devision bench.

Difference between Ratio Decidendi and Obiter Dicta.

Obiter dicta is a Latin phrase meaning "things said by the way". Obita dicta are not binding (unlike the ratio), but they may be regarded as persuasive in a future decision. The weight given to dicta usually depends on the seniority of the court and the eminence of the judge in question. Obiter dicta are judicial opinions on points of law which are not directly relevant to the case in question. They are made when a judge chooses to give some indication of how he or she would decide a case similar, but not identical, to case under consideration. These statements are often meant to clarify the legal principle which the judge proposes to apply in his or her judgement. For this reason, obiter dicta often take the form of analogies, illustrations, points of contrast or conclusions based on hypothetical situations. Obiter dicta in one case might be adopted as ratio decidendi in subsequent cases. This occurs when a situation regarded as hypothetical by one judge arises in a subsequent case. Distinguishing between ratio and obita is not always simple. When questioned regarding the difference between ratio and obiter, Lord Asquith once remarked that: "The rule is quite simple: If you agree with the other bloke you say it is part of the ratio; if you don't you say it is obiter dictum, with the implication that he is a congenial idiot". Although intended humorously, this remark has a good measure of truth. 1) A ratio decidendi is not an abstract principle, to be applied in a deductive fashion to a later case. Instead the ratio is a ruling on a point of

law in relation to a specific case. 2) Only the ratio binds an inferior court. Cases themselves do not bind. 3) If the court is not required to make a ruling on a point of law, its decision will not give rise to a ratio. 4) There is no requirement for each judgement to contain a single ratio and no more. Multiple ratios are quite normal. 5) Not every statement of law contained in a decision is necessarily ratio or obiter. A judge may refer to a principle only to express his or her disagreement or for the sake of completeness. For a statement of law to be ratio or obiter, the judge must express his or her explicit agreement with the principle

FINDING THE RATIO DECIDENDI

Since the ratio decidendi of a case has the nature of a propositional function, it is variable and becomes elusive. And jurists have even been in search of it. Any legal system using precedent has to consider the way in which they are relevant. To this end the relevancy is found in the fact that decisions involve some principle of general application. But the question is: how is this to be ascertained? Classical theory has regarded the binding part of a decision as the legal principle formulated.But A.L.

Goodhart raises objections to this. According to him the ratio decidendi is controlled by the relation between "the material facts" of the case and the holding on these facts. While the ratio consists of the very reasoning necessary to explain the holding on "the mateiial facts" found by the precedent judge, he suggests that the better way to approach the problem is to elucidate the ratio of a case from the facts themselves rather than from the principle enunciated by the Court. Julius Stone challenges Goodhart and distinguishes between "descriptive" and "prescriptive" ratio decidendi to conclude that facts may be of many possible "levels of generalisation". Descriptively the phrase imports an explanation of the court's reasoning to its conclusion based on sociological, historical and even psychological inquiry. And the finding from such an inquiry is true or untrue as a matter of fact. This may be sought at various levels. Prescriptively the phrase refers to a normative judgment, requiring us to choose a particular, that is, binding ratio decidendi. In other words, Stone's argument is that Goodhart's theory yields indeterminate results because the "principle" derivable from a case by the Goodhart method of "material facts plus decision" is entirely dependent on the level of generality at which one chooses to describe the facts Identifying the ratio in a judgement is frequently difficult. Judges are under no obligation to label the different parts of their judgement as ratio or obiter. In most cases, you need to read the entire judgement to determine the ratio. Some of the reasons for this include:

1) Length of judgements. Many judgements are extremely lengthy and are written in dense, legal language. The ratio may not be expressed in a single sentence or even a single passage. 2) The lack of an explicit ratio. The extreme example of this is the judgement in Raffles v Wichelhaus [1864] 2 H&C 906. This famously consisted of a single sentence: "There must be judgement for the defendants". 3) The existence of multiple lines of argument. Some arguments will be ratio, others will be obiter and others might be neither. 4) Uncertainty regarding which facts were material to the judgement. Judges sometimes fail to indicate which facts are significant and which are not, making it difficult to determine the appropriate level of generality at which a ratio should be stated. 5)In some instances, a case will establish a legal principle which is refined over time, being broadened or narrowed as the result of successive judgements. Finding the ratio decidendi of a case is an important part of the training of a lawyer. It is not a mechanical process but is an art that one gradually acquires through practice and study. One can, however, give a general description of the technique involved. There are a number of rules of thumb that you can use to determine the ratio decidendi. These include: 1) Distinguish the facts which the court regarded as material from those which appeared unimportant. 2) Discover the precedents applied. These will provide an indication of

the court's approach. in deciding the ratio, restrict your analysis to the opinions of the majority judges. 3) Read subsequent decisions to find how the decision has been interpreted. The ratio that becomes recognised as a rule of law may not be the ratio that apparent in the original judgement.' In finding the ratio, it is often useful to consider the way in which judgements are written. Although there is no standard model, they often follow a broad pattern. In most cases, the judgement is divided into three sections: 1) The facts agreed or proven 2) The range of applicable legal principles 3) The application of the appropriate principle to the facts.

RATIO IN APPELLATE DECISIONS

The problems associated with identifying the ratio in the case decided by an individual judge are multiplied in the case of appellate decisions. Most applelate courts sit with a an uneven number of judges. To discover the ratio of an appellate decision, you need to determine the ratio in the case of each individual judgement. The rule is that only the rationes contained in the majority judgements need to be considered. If a majority of judges agree on the same reasoning, you have identified a single ratio. Otherwise, there might be multiple rationes, or even none.

CASES WITHOUT A RATIO

In a some cases, there may be no majority support for any particular ratio. In such instances, subsequent courts tend to assume that all that is binding is the judgement itself. This means that subsequent cases will be decided on the basis of the decision only when the material facts are almost identical. This is not a purely theoretical possibility. In Paykel v Commissioner of Taxation (1994) 49 FCR 41, Heerey J applied the judgement of the majority in Hepples v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 173 CLR 492, despite the lack of a discernable ratio in the former decision.

THEORIES ON RATIO DECIDENDI

The two most plausible theories are those of A.L. Goodhart, and of Cross and Harris themselves. Goodhart has famously suggested that the ratio decidendi of a case is constituted by the principle that derives from thematerial facts of the case (Goodhart 1931, 136), or, more precisely, the facts that the judge treats as material facts in relation to the judgment the judge issues. He is careful to note that facts may be treated as materi-

ally either implicitly or explicitly. Goodhart is right to point out that, in the total fact situation of any actual case, some facts will matter from the legal point of view and some will not. That the accused was seen driving away from the bank at high speed moments after the robbery matters; that the accused was driving a Ford does not; unless matter of identification are at issue, in which case it might matter; and so on. Even if one recognizes that there will be some interdependence between the principle for which a case is thought to stand, and the facts of the case thought to be material, the advantage of Goodharts approach to have the concept of `material fact drive the concept of ratio is that it makes easier the preservation of the non-canonical character of the language of a common law legal opinion. One important reason in favour of Goodharts view is that the material facts are usually relatively easy to determine, and they will not change as time goes by. The objection to his view is that the ratio is typically broader in scope than any recitation of material facts. In the famous case of Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 567 (HL), the material facts concerned a decomposed snail in a ginger beer bottle, but unquestionably the ratio decidendi of the case was some broader principle concerning the liability of manufacturers for harm occurring to ultimate consumers. The same case shows even the concept of `fact to have some fuzziness. The case went to the House of Lords on the basis that, if the facts were as the plaintiff alleged, did the defendant have a case in law to answer? The `material facts that produced such a substantial change in the common law of negligence were in reality `al-

leged material facts. It is a matter for further contemplation whether the `material fact view can be emended to deal with these concerns. Cross and Harris propose the following understanding of ratio decidendi: `The ratio decidendi of a case is any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step in reaching his conclusion, having regard to the line of reasoning adopted by him, or a necessary part of his direction to the jury (Cross, et al. 1991, 72). Such an account captures many of the fixed points enumerated above, and is therefore an attractive proposal. The difficulty in the proposal is this. Whatever the ratio decidendi of a case is, it is something that is determinative or dispositive. That is, the ratio is not merely necessary but also in some sense sufficient for the decision in the case. It is not clear how Cross and Harris proposal explains this element of sufficiency.

ELEMENTS OF A JUDGEMENT-RATIO DECIDEDI

1) The dictionary meaning of this latin expression is the 'rule of law on which a judicial decision is made', or 'reason for deciding'. 2) Every decision has three basic postulatesa) Finding of facts both direct and inferential b) Statement of principles both applicable to the legal problems as dis-

closed by the facts. c) Judgement based on the combined effect of the above. 3) To consider the ratio decidendi of a case, the Supreme Court has to ascertain the principle upon which it was decided.This is sometimes difficult in cases where divergent views are expressed by different judges, but eventually the final decision is taken. 4) A decision is binding not because of its conclusion, but in regard to its ratio and the principle laid down therein.General statements made beyond the ratio decidendi have mere persuasive value only.This was held in (1996) 6 SCC 44. 5) A case is only an authority for what it decides, and not from what logically follows from it.- held in AIR 1967 SC 1073. 6) Although the decidendi can be applied to similar cases on the basis of fact and law, the SC has said that: care must be taken to ensure that it is not applied mechanically.

CONCLUSION
Ratio decidendi is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the rationale of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower and later jurisdictionthrough the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a court of co-ordinate jurisdictionhowever out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate rations.

The process of determining the ratio decidendi is a correctly thought analysis of what the court actually decided essentially, based on the legal points about which the parties in the case actually fought. All other statements about the law in the text of a court opinion all pronouncements that do not form a part of the courts rulings on the issues actually decided in that particular case (whether they are correct statements of law or not) -- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for which that particular case stands.

REFERENCES
1.www.legalindia.com 2.www.wikipedia.com 3.www.legisnexis.com 4.www.manupatra.com