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PHIL40760 Lecturer: Richard Kearney

Marions Anamorphic gaze in Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness

Student: Helen Horgan MA Contemporary European Philosophy 05/05/11

In the following paper I would like to explore Marions phenomenological account of the gift in Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness, to explicate his aims and objectives and to situate his philosophy within the domain of contemporary phenomenology, aesthetics and ethical discourse. To further circumscribe a region for analysis I will focus specifically on his account of 'anamorphism, as set out in section thirteen of Being Given. This should help reveal the apparatus of Marions thought. I will then contrast this perspective to Wittgensteins more hermeneutical (dare I say it) phenomenology, observed through the medium of his equally perceptive conception of 'aspect seeing. Finally I will employ the work of Irish artist James Coleman, and his seminal installation "So Different...and Yet" as a useful and grounding case study, in order to better clarify the practical and ideological applications of both thinkers philosophies. First I am required to begin with an outline of Marions bracketing of the structures of the gift and his wish to access it in terms of a particular phenomenology of givenness.

Marion begins in section nine of Being Given with a response to Jacque Derridas work on the gift Given Time. In this Derrida is at pains to demonstrate the impossibility of the phenomenological implications of gift giving as something removed from the structures of economic exchange. Derrida marks the conditions of this impossibility by setting out four basic requirements for the pure gift. I will run through these briefly.

Firstly for the gift to be perfectly given there cannot be reciprocation. An act of reciprocation would negate the gift as purely given as it would become part of an economy of exchange. Also phenomenologically it would falsely appear to the mind as an exemplar of sufficient cause.

Secondly, the giver of the gift must give without imposing any contractual obligation on the recipient. The givee should not be aware that he has received a gift and the giver should not know what he has given. Marion points out how Derrida finds the mistaken gift to be the most perfect since it functions in spite of not being party to any expectant conditions. It is taken as it appears at face value.

Thirdly for the gift to be purely given, it should be absolutely forgotten by both giver and givee. This is to avoid any narcissistic attachment of the individual ego to the act of giving.

And fourthly, most radically, to remove the gifts potential to enter into an economy of exchange as objective commodity the gift itself cannot be present. This is to enable the gift to appear not as object but as the phenomena of givenness itself. This particular aspect of the gift is givenness at its most aporetic. All phenomena are such that they must appear, but for Derrida and Marion the gifts appearance as objective entity obscures the very nature of givenness a priori. Marions aim for his phenomenology is also to reduce the object nature of the gift to that of pure givenness and so liberate it from presence as present. In this way he aims to insure that givenness remains as active potential.

Following Derrida Marion performs a phenomenological reduction in three parts. He does this by characterizing the system of gift giving as maintaining three players; the giver, the givee and the gift itself. Each is isolated by Marion in turn.

Bracketing the givee Marion begins his reduction by bracketing out the givee. This is so that the givee cannot act as an agent of exchange, either by behaving reciprocally or by prompting the act of

giving. Marion posits alternative characterizations for the absent givee. The first is the anonymous, best illustrated by acts of giving to charities where there can be no awareness of a direct recipient, that is, we give to an anonymous face on an envelope, the bearer of which may or may not exist, and who at the very least is without the capacity to engage in direct exchange. The second absent givee, the enemy, is the one who cannot give back, whos only response is to deny the gift or to strike back, to refuse to recognize it. For Marion the gift that is given to the enemy is a gift given purely because of the impossibility of its recognition and its return.Thirdly the ingrate is the one who demands that he alone decides what is given to him, all the while he will naturally and consequentially be the bearer of unacknowledged givenness. This for Marion is the gift at its most pure because it is effective as received and not as expected. All of these example serve to highlight how the gift appears most vividly when we are struck unawares and when the causal economy of rationality associated with our natural understanding has broken down.

Marion employs the theological narrative of the return of Christ as the universal and invisible givee, bracketed in advance so that any man can take the place of the recipient. This is giving to no-one and everyone; giving in the sense of the Christian epitaph love thy neighbour. The gift in this instance is given without regard for any particular and without requirement of worthiness on behalf of any receiver. An ethical dimension creeps in to Marions account here which cant at the same time be properly dealt with within his phenomenological account. This mirrors the problematic relation between aesthetics and politics. The primary aim of any phenomenology is to present an objective account of first person experience. For Marion this is to enable us to explore phenomena in themselves void of any preconceived expectations or presuppositions. In this way phenomenology may be ethical in its concern for acknowledging the nature of being but it is not political in

the sense that it does not prescribe how to be or make any judgements as to right or wrong action. But here Marions insistence of moral indifference could itself be seen as paradoxically political. Intuitively it would appear more moral to give to the enemy and to the faceless than to ones friend. The step by step bracketing out of all agency is also suggestive of a dangerous disempowering of free will. Marion seems to be suggesting, and this will become clearer later on, that the gift is something we undergo and not something we are active participants in, but this enforced passivity can easily lead to an expectation of servitude to a higher power, the absent giver.

The absent giver also gives without knowing what he gives or with loss of consciousness that he gives. The givee is therefore infinitely indebted a priori in that he is given to before knowing who or where from, before consciousness itself. Marion suggests that it is in recognizing givenness, in finding oneself originally indebted, that the subject first receives consciousness of self. It could be argued that this move substitutes the possibility of an intersubjective experience with a reified relation to an abstract agent. It appears that the flaw with Marions account could be this drive for ultimate separation, as a focus on pure immanence that verges precariously on ideological transcendence.

To further avoid the transferral of objective intent Marions last measure is to bracket out the gift itself as object. He does this by supplying examples of gifts wherein no specific object appears. Marion is insistent that the gift should not be part of any relation, which would enable it to inhabit an economy of exchange. The givenness of the gift for Marion must be given both absolutely and intrinsically.

the characteristics of its coming forward must always remain immanent to the consciousness that we have of the phenomenon (ie cognition but not

re-cognition) and we must renounce relying on any and all relation, even an intersubjective one, at least as long as its transcendence has not been reduced or rendered incompatible with intentional immanence. 1

At the same time the examples Marion gives are curiously indicative of natural relationships; such as giving friendship, giving power, or giving ones word (giving confidence to another). Either Marion is employing these examples to mark a distinction between essential relationships and incidental ones (which would paradoxically imply a belief in primacy or first causes) or the examples merely highlight what Marion will not attend to, that all givenness is in fact part of a relation, and to bracket this awareness out is to run the risk of naivety, of passive consumerism, where all gifts are given before we have the will to choose to receive. Marion does state that the complex gift gives most, as it holds desire unfulfilled, and this lack of resolution seems to secure it from entering into a cyclic economy of exchange. What is problematic is that Marions gift as pure givenness excludes reciprocity and at the same time incurs a debt. It is given irrevocably and without question.

that givenness characterize entirely, solely on the basis of the lived experiences of giveability and acceptability, the phenomenon as irrevocably given 2

Is the gift as acceptability merely an inherent property hidden and enforced within its phenomenality? Is its delivered invocation a request or a demand? Could the gift in which no thing is transferred merely be an objective ideology or theology slipping past
1

Jean Luc Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) p120
2

Ibid p120

unacknowledged and unnoticed like a trojan horse? Marion seems to suggest that all potential phenomena either are gifts or are indistinguishable from gifts since they appear in the same way. In which case we should not acknowledge the arrival of pure evil as evil but only as given. Marion could be implying that, of course there is evil, evil is a given but there is good to be found even still amongst it. What is more immediately problematic is the a priori removal of relations of exchange, a move which seems to bypass any possibility of things being otherwise, or of phenomena being questionable. Marion may have removed the gift as object but has he replaced it with a hermeneutics in reverse, in which phenomena need to be met as constituted?

This being done we observe a decisive point the way in which the gift gives itself coincides exactly with the way in which the phenomenon shows itself. What is accomplished as reduced gift is also described as constituted phenomenon3

My argument is that inline with the problematic relationship between politics and aesthetics, and phenomenology and ethics, what Marions account seems to unravel itself as is an aesthetics with a difficult moral or political dimension. Against the context of the artist who offers up work for perceptual deliberation without the expectation that the viewer accede to their authorial intent, and in this way opens up a space for ethical reflection void of any pre-given presupposition Marions account appears dogmatically hierarchical, in that the viewer is ultimately subservient to the gift, it is the gift which decides and the viewers role to accede to it. At this point Marion enters into his account of

Jean Luc Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) p115

the aesthetic concept of Anamorphism as the giftly axis, the axis on which alone the gift is met, and not one among other means of access to visibility.4

that the phenomenon accedes to its visibility only by way of a givenness; that in order to rise into appearing it must cross a distance (an elsewhere) that separates it and therefore must (sur)render itself there...; that this arising is unfolded according to an immanent axis with which the I must fall into alignment if it is to receive an appearing-all that defines one of the essential characteristics of the given phenomenon, its anamorphosis.5

Marion insists this conception does not refer to pictorial procedures except by analogy but if we look at his twofold description of the mode of appearing we might better understand how he envisions that giftly phenomena appear. What is the distance needed to cross and from where is this elsewhere? Marion wants us to imagine that; ascent to visible detected on account of its arising from an elsewhere need not necessarily indicate

origin, cause or agent of exchange since it can make itself felt without pointing to one of them....It highlights the intrinsic character of what gives itself to us without depending on or referring to us, indeed coming upon us despite us. The elsewhere thus indicates the first radical property of the given phenomenon...weighing on that which it comes upon

This elsewhere is the place of the de-centered I that the phenomenological reduction invokes, in which the usual context of inhabited presuppositions have been bracketed out
4

Jean Luc Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) p115
5

Ibid p123

and what was once familiar we now see in isolated abstraction. Marions description of anamorphism resembles somewhat the experience of looking at a painting, firstly at the micro level where nothing is seen but pure pigment, pure surface;

This procedure involves first presenting to the uncurious gaze of the viewer a surface entirely covered with colored pigments but apparently void of any recognizable form whatsoever, then moving this gaze to a precise (and unique) point from which it will see the de-formed surface trans-form itself in one fell swoop into a magnificent new form.6

This is the first of the twofold process Marion describes. This first apparition is the appearing itself, in that everything visible...by definition appears, and so every appearance takes form, but as first level appearance its form is still vague, it indicates only a momentarily isolatable portion on the indistinct surface and as such is indistinguished as any particular phenomena. This ambiguous appearing is akin to a first coming to sight as sense itself void of any figurative intent. The apportioning of a momentary isolatable aspect seems to indicate a degree of framing is at work here but Marion would have us believe that the phenomena comes to us at this point as if we had been first blind. In the following instant, the form will deform itself and re-form itself into another: in short it will let the phenomenon it supervises dissolve without having ever brought it into appearing.7 What he is describing sounds close to Heideggers differentiation between appearance as indication (the first indirection of the gaze) and appearance as that-which-appears (perceiving the phenomena directly).

Jean Luc Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) 123
7

Ibid p124

The second-level form does not merely make the phenomenon visible; above all, it distinguishes the phenomenon from others by detaching it from them as if from the depths. The second level form refers the first-level forms to the depths of the visible and tears its phenomenon from there as from a mere background. 8

I would suggest that this analogy bears closer resemblance to the technology of imagery than Marion would have us believe, at least by his own account. What is ordinarily suggested by the appearance of phenomena as radical difference and its crossing of the distance from elsewhere would be its emergence on the planes of both temporality and locality. But Marions insistence that ana-morphisis indicates;

that the phenomenon takes form starting from itself. In this way we better understand that the phenomenon can come at once from elsewhere and from itself. It comes from its own depths to its own form, according to a phenomenological distance that remains strictly internal9

The first form offers no identifiable figure it exercises no authority over the gaze. The amorphous form offers no particular view. But with its

form of arrival...not only must a gaze know how to become curious, available and enacted, but above all it must know how to submit to the demands of the figure to be seen: find the unique point of view...admit that it would be necessary to alter ones position (either in space or in
8

Jean Luc Marion, Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) p124
9 Ibid

thought)...in short renounce organizing visibility on the basis of free choice...in favor of letting visibility be dictated by the phenomenon itself, in itself.

The emergence of a figure from a deformed ground, the demand for a singular unique perspective on the part of the phenomenon in order that it be perceived in its ideality suggests nothing other than the aesthetic comprehension of a two-dimensional plane, that is an image (or icon) where the complex geometry of its internal perspective is determined by the thing itself forced upon the viewer. It is evident of Marions apparent inversion of intentionality that he goes so far as to suggest that the viewer may need to adjust himself in space to submit to the appearance of the phenomenas gaze.

What Marion is describing seems to bear much resemblance to Wittgensteins account of Aspect Seeing albeit seen from the other side. Wittgenstein describes the functional differences of concepts which refer to modes of seeing, such as looking, intuiting or imagining. He tells us most directly that; while I am looking at an object I cant imagine in it10, since imagining is an act of the will. Wittgensteins account of perception is an attempt to bridge naturalistic explanation and expressive-existential modes of concept formation. Speaking of noticing an aspect he says;

The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before ones eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck

10

Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) p174

himAnd this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.11

For Wittgenstein our natural attitude is one in which the concepts we use impose a blindspot on seeing alternatives. He sees our use of concepts and their specific effect on perception akin to the workings of various technological apparatus. His describes the mechanics of our ordinary applications, not so much as forms of representation as the employment of instruments with certain uses. The problem for Wittgenstein is how to talk about phenomenological objects using a physicalist language.

The notion of seeing aspects is introduced as an illustration of a grammatical distinction between two senses of the word see...and correlatively...between two objects of sight.12

For a realist our intuition would be that our ways of speaking and describing should be responsive to the fact of how things are. On the other hand an interpretive model would serve to support the idea that grammar is, in an important sense, arbitrary.13 But how could we express the experience of being able to see something as something and at the same time what it says, or indicates, that is, what its meaning is. Taking the example of an image of a face, how is it that we distinguish the face from its expression? The intuitive difference between seeing a face and seeing its likeness (seeing it as sad, in pain, bemused etc) is that the likeness isnt there to be seen in the same way the face is, in that we cant point to it. We get a sense that the similarity is somehow more a property of

11 12 13

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1953) p50 Justin Good, Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception (Continuum, London/New York, 2006) p7 Ibid p12

our visual impression than an objective feature. Also similarity is often something which dawns on us. It is something transient that can come and go, like a smile, but we cannot draw a picture of a face without seeing it as a face.14 At the same time noticing a change of aspect is not like a subjective change of local perspective which directly corresponds to our viewing experience. The experience of an aspect dawning is something like the effect of first bracketing out the object or the figurative awareness within our sights. All contexts and presuppositions are removed and we momentarily look but dont see, Slowly our awareness of a revised context fills the frame pushing the figure forward again above ground. Hence what was all the time in our sights appears to us differently. The separation from the ordinary view or natural attitude that occurs during a case of aspect seeing suggests that our ordinary understanding is blocking some more authentic view. In Wittgenstein and the Theory of perception Justin Good says that;

The grammatical differences between the two sense of see...do not call for a clarification of the meaning of see, they illustrate the meaning. Thus there is a sense in which to ask what explains our inclinations to speak of seeing is here to have already passed by the relevant phenomenon.15

As Marion has pointed out, to search for a causal explanation is to block the phenomenal experience and with it its primarily ontological relevance. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein embarks on outlining a description of the two senses of seeing. Speaking about our experience of viewing the necker cube he says;

14

In the Blue and Brown Books Wittgenstein goes to great lengths to describe the difference between transitive and intransitive aspects of sight. This relates by analogy somewhat to immanent and transcendent qualities and properties of phenomena which I have not had the opportunity to define further at this point.
15

Justin Good, Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception (Continuum, London/New York, 2006) p13

We can also see the illustration now as one thing now as another. So we interpret it, and so see it as we interpret it.16

In this sense seeing as can be interpreted as noticing an equivalence or seeing something in the manner of something, under condition of, or with the result or purpose ( so as), but also at the same time, and while. This temporal aspect reveals that there is an inherent movement of differentiation, as well as an immanently reflective dimension in aspect seeing. Noticing an aspect makes us aware of our own reflecting on what we see. Marions account of anamorphosis as having two-levels confesses this but somehow he does not want to admit any agency being at work, at least he has bracketed out the agent from his analysis. He is no doubt concerned with the movement in two-parts from the abstract and the figurative, in that he prioritizes the figural apparition at the second level as the culmination of form. More specifically the term ana-morphosis translated directly reads as back formation. For Marion ana as back implies a return, as in repetition, but it can also imply an inversion; formation from the back. In aspect seeing it is when our gaze moves from a fixation on the figure that the background is allowed to come to the fore and it is this shift in context that effects a change within the composite image.

That what is seen can change without a physical change in the figure suggests the distinction between the object seen and the visual impression...Concepts referring to properties of the visual impression can thus be understood to have a non-visual reference, in the sense that they only refer indirectly to the actual figure. By contrast purely visual concepts

16

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1953) p193

will be understood to refer to properties of the figure upon which my visual impression supervenes 17

Wittgenstein speaks of our confusion between seeing and looking at as a confusion between the geometrical eye and the physical eye.18 For Wittgenstein There is...absolute position, absolute motion and size in visual space. 19 In an image, strictly speaking there is one dimension, it is a reflection that creates the second. Talk of choosing between one of two choices is a move towards judgement derived from an internal image which is at that moment an inhabitant of the will. It is not by necessity constructed by the will, but it has been reduced by it. That Marion seems to insist on there being an ideal perspective for the appearance of phenomena, accessed by way of the technological apparatus of the giftly axis, suggests that he insists there is one of two ways; a right way and a wrong way. This account furthers the argument that Marions phenomenology is not aesthetically ambivalent but a somewhat dogmatic rational procedure; which insists that the subjective agent be stripped of all agency and admit subservience to the demands of what is given, which in this instance omits from an idealized and somewhat godly gaze. Marions call for aesthetic indifference would be honorable were it to invoke a sensuous appreciation of phenomena whilst they appear, in suspension. His ideological and theological turn is a damaging move which causes his phenomenological account to be more overbearingly political than ethical.

For Irish artist James Coleman;

17 18 19

Justin Good, Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception (Continuum, London/New York, 2006) p23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) p63-64 Ibid p158-159

The aesthetic is not understood as being subordinate to any value other than its ownand this is precisely its dimension of difference, its otherness. If the aesthetic has any need for an ethicwhich I doubtit must surely be a horse of a different colour from the kind that the political ought to possess.20

Working between the spheres of photography, film and television; between still and moving images, Coleman has had long standing engagement with the technology of visual and audio projection. 21 His seminal work So Different...and Yet, an installation or a setting originally conceived in 1980, has enjoyed various re-stagings over the years and tacitly explores the interplay between subjective and cultural perception and agency. In MACBA in 2007 it was presented as a large scale video projection parodying that of the didactic lecture which conflatesor perhaps confuses?arts presentation with its reframing by the connoisseur.22 Does the lecture frame the work, or vice versa; do they symbiotically inhabit each other? 23

As a single-screen video the work features the continuous dialogue between two figures, (or protagonists); a woman in a green dress in the foreground, who perpetually adjusts her composure on a chaise longue, and a man in the far corner in a rabbit suit, seated at a piano, picking away at various familiar but nondescript melodies. In So Different...and Yet Coleman appropriates analogical video and editing techniques such as chromo-keying said by Jean Fisher to be in their day the basic method by which perspectival logic could

20

James Coleman in conversation with Richard Kearney in The Crane Bag (Vol 6, No. 2, Latin-American Issue,1982) p130
21 22 23

Ibid Ibid p38 Ibid

be disrupted: by recording one image against a black or blue backdrop...[it] renders ambiguous whether the two figures occupy the same pictorial space, or even the same temporality. 24

The work is thus suspended between two forms of image production: the mimetic or indexical capacity of film based media to capture the observable world; and the layered construction of painting to manifest an expressive sense of the pictorial. In IMMA in 2009 the video was projected in the center of the enclosed stone courtyard on a huge digital screen the scale of those often seen at open air concerts. The audio omitted from a number of points around the square so that the viewer was inclined to circumscribe the image, viewing it from an all encompassing distance at one instance and at another close enough to appreciate the surface of the screen as a vast grid of tiny blue, red and green bulbs.25 It is as if Coleman is giving the viewer an experience of seeing oneself seeing. While the shifting plot that ensues in the dialogue between the two figure refuses to build to any denouement, narrative closure is deferred...and the potential for any heroic role...is dissipated in a play of shifting identities.26 The female character filling the bottom two-thirds of the foreground self-consciously attends to the camera in the manner of the female odalisque functioning as an allegorical device of the desire to gure27 (my emphasis)

It is by framing, which, in So Different...and Yet...that which is somewhere off-centre or even off stage in the structure of the background
24 25

Jean Fisher, So Different... and Yet, in James Coleman (Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, 2009) p38

Maeve Connolly, Staging Television: James Colemans So Different...And Yet in Mousse Contemporary Art Magazine (Issue 27, February-March 2011) p161
26 27

Jean Fisher, So Different... and Yet, in James Coleman (Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, 2009) p40

Maeve Connolly, Staging Television: James Colemans So Different...And Yet in Mousse Contemporary Art Magazine (Issue 27, February-March 2011) p161

subtends the illusions of the foreground. In this respect, Colemans image solicits not the mastery of the forensic gaze, but the attentiveness of the oblique glance. Or, better, the works refusal to offer any privileged viewpoint, or transparency of meaning, is articulated around an anamorphic gaze, one that demands from the viewer mobility and sensuous engagement. It is the working of this anamorphic gaze that in So Different...and Yet traps us between anticipating a denouement and feeling that meaning has escaped us....Somehow we are always too early or too late.28

I am forced to conclude that Marions particular appropriation of the anamorphic gaze appears curiously out of place against the above description and in the contexts of aesthetics in general, where we are offered a multiplicity of angles for speculation none of which will ever adequately fill our intentions. Of course it isnt a given that phenomenology should equate to aesthetics, certainly not if its goal is to gain access to the pure and the true, emanating from a privileged cycloptic gaze. Aesthetics always has the material to contend with, the stuff of flesh and of life. Although it promises spiritualization it keeps us from any temptations to accede to indivisible abstract supremacy. As Jean Fisher remarks about work of James Coleman; There is nothing puritanically censorial about his approach. 29

28 29

Jean Fisher, So Different... and Yet, in James Coleman (Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, 2009) p43 Ibid p46

Bibliography Coleman, James in conversation with Richard Kearney in The Crane Bag (Vol 6, No. 2, Latin-American Issue,1982) Connolly, Maeve Staging Television: James Colemans So Different...And Yet in Mousse Contemporary Art Magazine (Issue 27, February-March 2011) Fisher, Jean So Different... and Yet, in James Coleman (Irish Museum of Modern Art, Dublin, 2009) Good, Justin Wittgenstein and the Theory of Perception (Continuum, London/New York, 2006) Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time (Blackwell Publishing, USA/UK/Australia, 2009) Husserl, Edmund, The Idea of Phenomenology (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1973) Marion, Jean Luc Being Given : Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness; translated by Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 2002) Moran, Dermot, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Polity Press, 2005) Moran, Dermot, Immanence and Transcendence in Husserl, Stein and Jaspers in The American Catholic philosophical quarterly (2008,vol.82,no2,pp.265-291) Wittgenstein, Ludwig The Blue and Brown Books (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969) Wittgenstein, Ludwig Philosophical Investigations (Prentice Hall, New Jersey 1953)