AN ASSIGNMENT ON Military, Forced relocation and IDPs in BURMA

Submitted to: Syeda Rozana Rashid Department of International Relations University of Dhaka Course No: 206 Course Title: Refugees, Migrants and the Displaced

Submitted By: Mohammad Abdullah Al Mamun Roll No: BB-202 2nd year, 4th Semester University of Dhaka Submission Date: 9th February 2011

Introduction:

Since the drawn of civilization, millions of people have been driven from homes and displaced within the borders of their own countries for various natural and human made reasons. There are studies which show that over the last two decades, the number of such internally displaced persons(IDPs) has reached to over 25million, displaced in more than 40countries. These are coerced or involuntary movements caused by development projects, armed conflicts, and situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights, and natural or human-made disasters. South Asia figures conspicuously as one of the major IDP producing regions. In recent years, the South Asia region witnessed movements of large number of people within the state boundaries. Some of these people are victims of civil war; others are displaced by ethnic, nationalistic and religious conflicts and fear of persecutions. A large number of people are displaced by development projects activities and by natural disasters such as floods, cyclones, droughts and desertification. In case of IDP triggered by the development projects, they lose their livelihood as they are uprooted from their own land. Their cultural practices are affected as their social cohesiveness is disturbed and their family structures may get disjointed. Forced relocation has been practiced in Burma under a variety of forms. The most brutal methods, strategic hamleting and removal of people by terror or economic sabotage are carried out by the Burmese army on the civilian population as part of their counter-insurgency programme.

What is IDP (Internal Displaced Person)?

An internally displaced person (IDP) is someone who is forced to flee their home but who, unlike a refugee, remains within their country's borders. The region with the largest IDP population is Africa with some 11.8 million in 21 countries. There is no legal definition as there is for a refugee. However, a United Nations report, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement uses the definition: internally displaced persons are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border. While the above stresses two important elements of internal displacement (coercion and the domestic/internal movement) it is important to note that rather than a strict definition, the Guiding Principles offer a descriptive identification of the category of persons whose needs are the concern of the Guiding Principles. In this way, the document intentionally steers toward flexibility rather than legal precision as the words in particular indicate that the list of reasons for displacement is not exhaustive. However, as Erin Mooney has pointed out, global statistics on internal displacement generally count only IDPs uprooted by conflict and human rights violations. Moreover, a recent study has recommended that the IDP concept should be defined even more narrowly, to be limited to persons displaced by violence. Thus, despite the non-exhaustive reasons of internal displacement, many consider IDPs as those who would be defined as refugees if they were to cross an international border hence the term refugees in all but name is often applied to IDPs. Some IDPs may be returning home while others are fleeing, others may periodically return to IDP camps to take advantage of humanitarian aid. It is very difficult to assess those IDPs who flee to larger towns and cities. It is necessary in many instances to supplement official figures

with additional information obtained from operational humanitarian organizations on the ground. Thus, the 24.5 million figures must be treated as an estimate. Additionally, most official figures only include those displaced by conflict or natural disasters. Development-induced IDPs often are not included in assessments. The largest IDP populations can be found in Colombia, the DRC, Iraq, Sudan and Turkey each with IDP populations of over one million. An updated country by country breakdown can be found at: IDMC Global Statistics It has been estimated that between 70 and 80% of all IDPs are women and children. The problem of protecting and assisting IDPs is not a new issue. In international law it is the responsibility of the government concerned to provide assistance and protection for the IDPs in their country. However, as many of the displaced are a result of civil conflict and violence or where the authority of the central state is in doubt, there is no local authority willing to provide assistance and protection. It has been estimated that some 5 million IDPs in 11 countries are "without any significant humanitarian assistance from their governments. Unlike the case of refugees, there is no international humanitarian institution which has the overall responsibility of protecting and assisting the refugees as well as the internally displaced. A number of organizations have stepped into the breach in specific circumstances. Internally displaced people, or IDPs, are often wrongly called refugees. Unlike refugees, IDPs have not crossed an international border to find sanctuary but have remained inside their home countries. Even if they have fled for similar reasons as refugees (armed conflict, generalized violence, human rights violations), IDPs legally remain under the protection of their own government - even though that government might be the cause of their flight. As citizens, they retain all of their rights and protection under both human rights and international humanitarian law. UNHCRs original mandate does not specifically cover IDPs, but because of the agencys expertise on displacement, it has for many years been assisting millions of them, more recently through the "cluster approach." Under this approach, UNHCR has the lead role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of IDPs as well as coordination and management of camps. At the end of 2009, there were an estimated 27 million IDPs around the world and UNHCR was helping about 15.6 million of them in 22 countries, including the three with the largest IDP populations - Sudan, Colombia and Iraq. Millions of other civilians who have been made homeless by natural disasters are also classified as IDPs. UNHCR is only involved with this group in exceptional circumstances, such as the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, the earthquake in 2005 and floods in 2010 in Pakistan and 2008's Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar.

Burma at a Glance:
The Republic of the Union of Myanmar is the northwestern-most country on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It is also known as Burma. It is strategically located near major Indian Ocean shipping lanes. Tropical monsoon in the lowlands below 2,000 m (6,562 ft); cloudy, rainy, hot, humid summers (southwest monsoon, June to September); less cloudy, scant rainfall, mild

temperatures, lower humidity during winter (northeast monsoon, December to April). Climate varies in the highlands depending on elevation; subtropical temperate climate at around 2,500 m (8,202 ft), temperate at 3,000 m (9,843 ft), cool, alpine at 3,500 m (11,483 ft) and above the alpine zone, cold, harsh tundra and Arctic climate. The higher elevations are subject to heavy snowfall and bad weather. Central lowlands ringed by steep, rugged highlands, with the country's highest point at the 5,881 m (19,295 ft) Hkakabo Razi. The Ayeyarwady River is the main river. Burma has petroleum, timber, tin, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten, lead, coal, marble, limestone, precious stones, natural gas, and hydropower. Deforestation; industrial pollution of air, soil, and water; inadequate sanitation and water treatment contribute to disease. The history of Burma, now officially Myanmar, is long and complicated. Several ethnic groups have lived in the region, the oldest of which are probably the Mon or the Pyu. In the 9th century the Bamar (Burman) people migrated from the then ChinaTibet border region into the valley of the Ayeyarwady, and now form the governing majority. The history of the region comprises complexities not only within the country but also with its neighboring countries, China, India, Bangladesh, Laos and Thailand. The first years of Burmese independence were marked by successive insurgencies by the Red Flag Communists led by Thakin Soe, the White Flag Communists led by Thakin Than Tun, the Ybaw Hpyu (White-band PVO) led by Bo La Yaung, a member of the Thirty Comrades, army rebels calling themselves the Revolutionary Burma Army (RBA) led by Communist officers Bo Zeya, Bo Yan Aung and Bo Y Htut all three of them members of the Thirty Comrades, Arakanese Muslims or the Mujahid, and the Karen National Union (KNU). After the Communist victory in China in 1949 remote areas of Northern Burma were for many years controlled by an army of Kuomintang (KMT) forces under the command of General Li Mi. Burma accepted foreign assistance in rebuilding the country in these early years, but continued American support for the Chinese Nationalist military presence in Burma finally resulted in the country rejecting most foreign aid, refusing to join the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and supporting the Bandung Conference of 1955. Burma generally strove to be impartial in world affairs and was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Israel and the People's Republic of China. By 1958, the country was largely beginning to recover economically, but was beginning to fall apart politically due to a split in the AFPFL into two factions, one led by Thakins Nu and Tin, the other by Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein. And this despite the unexpected success of U Nu's 'Arms for Democracy' offer taken up by U Seinda in the Arakan, the Pa-O, some Mon and Shan groups, but more significantly by the PVO surrendering their arms.[29] The situation however became very unstable in parliament, with U Nu surviving a no-confidence vote only with the support of the opposition National United Front (NUF), believed to have 'crypto-communists' amongst them. Army hardliners now saw the 'threat' of the CPB coming to an agreement with U Nu through the NUF, and in the end U Nu 'invited' Army Chief of Staff General Ne Win to take over the country. Over 400 'communist sympathisers' were arrested, of which 153 were deported to the Coco Island in the Andaman Sea. Among them was the NUF leader Aung Than, older brother of Aung San. The Botahtaung, Kyemon and Rangoon Daily were also closed down.

Ne Win's caretaker government successfully established the situation and paved the way for new general elections in 1960 that returned U Nu's Union Party with a large majority.[29] The situation did not remain stable for long, when the Shan Federal Movement, started by Nyaung Shwe Sawbwa Sao Shwe Thaik (the first President of independent Burma 1948-52) and aspiring to a 'loose' federation, was seen as a separatist movement insisting on the government honouring the right to secession in 10 years provided for by the 1947 Constitution. Ne Win had already succeeded in stripping the Shan Sawbwas of their feudal powers in exchange for comfortable pensions for life in 1959. On 2 March 1962, Ne Win, with sixteen other senior military officers, staged a coup d'tat, arrested U Nu, Sao Shwe Thaik and several others, and declared a socialist state to be run by their Revolutionary Council. Sao Shwe Thaik's son, Sao Mye Thaik, was shot dead in what was generally described as a 'bloodless' coup. Thibaw Sawbwa Sao Kya Seng also disappeared mysteriously after being stopped at a checkpoint near Taunggyi. A number of protests followed the coup, and initially the military's response was mild. However, on 7 July 1962, a peaceful student protest on Rangoon University campus was suppressed by the military, killing over 100 students. The next day, the army blew up the Students Union building. Peace talks were convened between the RC and various armed insurgent groups in 1963, but without any breakthrough, and during the talks as well as in the aftermath of their failure, hundreds were arrested in Rangoon and elsewhere from both the right and the left of the political spectrum. All opposition parties were banned on March 28, 1964. The Kachin insurgency by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) had begun earlier in 1961 triggered by U Nu's declaration of Buddhism as the state religion, and the Shan State Army (SSA), led by Sao Shwe Thaik's wife Mahadevi and son Chao Tzang Yaunghwe, launched a rebellion in 1964 as a direct consequence of the 1962 military coup. Ne Win quickly took steps to transform Burma into his vision of a 'socialist state' and to isolate the country from contact with the rest of the world. A one-party system was established with his newly formed Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in complete control.[29] Commerce and industry were nationalized across the board, but the economy did not grow at first if at all as the government put too much emphasis on industrial development at the expense of agriculture. In April 1972, General Ne Win and the rest of the Revolutionary Council retired from the military, but now as U Ne Win, he continued to run the country through the BSPP. A new constitution was promulgated in January 1974 that resulted in the creation of a People's Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw) that held supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority, and local People's Councils. Ne Win became the president of the new government. Beginning in May 1974, a wave of strikes hit Rangoon and elsewhere in the country against a backdrop of corruption, inflation and food shortages, especially rice. In Rangoon workers were arrested at the Insein railway yard, and troops opened fire on workers at the Thamaing textile mill and Simmalaik dockyard. In December 1974, the biggest anti-government demonstrations to date broke out over the funeral of former UN Secretary-General U Thant.[29] U Thant had been former prime minister U Nu's closest advisor in the 1950s and was seen as a symbol of opposition to the military regime. The Burmese people felt that U Thant was denied a state funeral that he deserved as a statesman of international stature because of his association with U Nu.

On March 23, 1976, over 100 students were arrested for holding a peaceful ceremony (Hmaing yabyei) to mark the centenary of the birth of Thakin Kodaw Hmaing who was the greatest Burmese poet and writer and nationalist leader of the 20th.Century history of Burma. He had inspired a whole generation of Burmese nationalists and writers by his work mainly written in verse, fostering immense pride in their history, language and culture, and urging them to take direct action such as strikes by students and workers. It was Hmaing as leader of the mainstream Dobama who sent the Thirty Comrades abroad for military training, and after independence devoted his life to internal peace and national reconciliation until he died at the age of 88 in 1964. Hmaing lies buried in a mausoleum at the foot of the Shwedagon Pagoda. A young staff officer called Capt Ohn Kyaw Myint conspired with a few fellow officers in 1976 to assassinate Ne Win and San Yu, but the plot was uncovered and the officer tried and hanged. In 1978, a military operation was conducted against the Rohingya Muslims in Arakan, called the King Dragon operation, causing 250,000 refugees to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. U Nu, after his release from prison in October 1966, had left Burma in April 1969, and formed the Parliamentary Democracy Party (PDP) the following August in Bangkok, Thailand with the former Thirty Comrades, Bo Let Ya, co-founder of the CPB and former Minister of Defense and deputy prime minister, Bo Yan Naing, and U Thwin, ex-BIA and former Minister of Trade. Another member of the Thirty Comrades, Bohmu Aung, former Minister of Defence, joined later. The fourth, Bo Setkya, who had gone underground after the 1962 coup, died in Bangkok shortly before U Nu arrived.[29] The PDP launched an armed rebellion across the Thai border from 1972 till 1978 when Bo Let Ya was killed in an attack by the Karen National Union (KNU). U Nu, Bohmu Aung and Bo Yan Naing returned to Rangoon after the 1980 amnesty.[29] Ne Win also secretly held peace talks later in 1980 with the KIO and the CPB, again ending in a deadlock as before. Ne Win retired as president in 1981, but remained in power as Chairman of the BSPP until his sudden unexpected announcement to step down on July 23, 1988.[29] In the 1980s, the economy began to grow as the government relaxed restrictions on foreign aid, but by the late 1980s falling commodity prices and rising debt led to an economic crisis. This led to economic reforms in 1987-88 that relaxed socialist controls and encouraged foreign investment. This was not enough, however, to stop growing turmoil in the country, compounded by periodic 'demonetization' of certain bank notes in the currency, the last of which was decreed in September 1987 wiping out the savings of the vast majority of people. In September 1987, Burma's de facto ruler U Ne Win suddenly canceled certain currency notes which caused a great down-turn in the economy. The main reason for the cancellation of these notes was superstition on U Ne Win's part, as he considered the number nine his lucky numberhe only allowed 45 and 90 kyat notes, because these were divisible by nine. (Bilal Arif) Burma's admittance to Least Developed Country status by the UN the following December highlighted its economic bankruptcy. Triggered by brutal police repression of student-led protests causing the death of over a hundred students and civilians in March and June 1988, widespread protests and demonstrations broke out on August 8 throughout the country. The military responded by firing into the crowds, alleging Communist infiltration. Violence, chaos and anarchy reigned. Civil administration had ceased to exist, and by September of that year, the country was on the verge of a revolution. The armed forces, under the nominal command of General Saw Maung staged a coup on August 8 to restore order. During the 8888 Uprising, as it became known, the military killed thousands. The military

swept aside the Constitution of 1974 in favor of martial law under the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) with Saw Maung as chairman and prime minister.[29] At a special six-hour press conference on August 5, 1989, Brig. Gen. Khin Nyunt, the SLORC Secretary 1 and chief of Military Intelligence Service (MIS), claimed that the uprising had been orchestrated by the Communist Party of Burma through its underground organisation.[36] Although there had inevitably been some underground CPB presence as well as that of ethnic insurgent groups, there was no evidence of their being in charge to any extent.[29] In fact, in March 1989, the CPB leadership was overthrown by a rebellion by the Kokang and Wa troops that it had come to depend on after losing its former strongholds in central Burma and re-establishing bases in the northeast in the late 1960s; the Communist leaders were soon forced into exile across the Chinese border. The military government announced a change of name for the country in English from Burma to Myanmar in 1989. It also continued the economic reforms started by the old regime and called for a Constituent Assembly to revise the 1974 Constitution. This led to multiparty elections in May 1990 in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory over the National Unity Party (NUP, the successor to the BSPP) and about a dozen smaller parties. The military, however, would not let the assembly convene, and continued to hold the two leaders of the NLD, U Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, under house arrest imposed on them the previous year. Burma came under increasing international pressure to convene the elected assembly, particularly after Aung San Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991, and also faced economic sanctions. In April 1992 the military replaced Saw Maung with General Than Shwe. Than Shwe released U Nu from prison and relaxed some of the restrictions on Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest, finally releasing her in 1995, although she was forbidden to leave Rangoon. Than Shwe also finally allowed a National Convention to meet in January 1993, but insisted that the assembly preserve a major role for the military in any future government, and suspended the convention from time to time. The NLD, fed up with the interference, walked out in late 1995, and the assembly was finally dismissed in March 1996 without producing a constitution. During the 1990s, the military regime had also had to deal with several insurgencies by tribal minorities along its borders. General Khin Nyunt was able to negotiate cease-fire agreements that ended the fighting with the Kokang, hill tribes such as the Wa, and the Kachin, but the Karen would not negotiate. The military finally captured the main Karen base at Manerplaw in spring 1995, but there has still been no final peace settlement. Khun Sa, a major opium warlord who nominally controlled parts of Shan State, made a deal with the government in December 1995 after U.S. pressure. After the failure of the National Convention to create a new constitution, tensions between the government and the NLD mounted, resulting in two major crackdowns on the NLD in 1996 and 1997. The SLORC was abolished in November 1997 and replaced by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), but it was merely a cosmetic change. Continuing reports of human rights violations in Burma led the United States to intensify sanctions in 1997, and the European Union followed suit in 2000. The military placed Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest again in September 2000 until May 2002, when her travel restrictions outside of Rangoon were also lifted. Reconciliation talks were held with the government, but these came to a stalemate and Suu Kyi

was once again taken into custody in May 2003 after an ambush on her motorcade reportedly by a pro-military mob. The government also carried out another large-scale crackdown on the NLD, arresting many of its leaders and closing down most of its offices. The situation in Burma remains tense to this day. In August 2003, Kyin Nyunt announced a seven-step "roadmap to democracy", which the government claims it is in the process of implementing. There is no timetable associated with the governments plan, or any conditionality or independent mechanism for verifying that it is moving forward. For these reasons, most Western governments and Burma's neighbors have been skeptical and critical of the roadmap. On February 17, 2005, the government reconvened the National Convention, for the first time since 1993, in an attempt to rewrite the Constitution. However, major pro-democracy organizations and parties, including the National League for Democracy, were barred from participating; the military allowing only selected smaller parties. It was adjourned once again in January 2006. In November 2005, the military junta started moving the government away from Yangon to an unnamed location near Kyatpyay just outside Pyinmana, to a newly designated capital city. This public action follows a long term unofficial policy of moving critical military and government infrastructure away from Yangon to avoid a repetition of the events of 1988. On Armed Forces Day (March 27, 2006), the capital was officially named Naypyidaw Myodaw ( Royal City of the Seat of Kings). In 2005, the capital city was relocated from Yangon to Naypyidaw. In November 2006, the International Labor Organization (ILO) announced it will be seeking - at the International Court of Justice. - "to prosecute members of the ruling Myanmar junta for crimes against humanity" over the continuous forced labor of its citizens by the military. According to the ILO, an estimated 800,000 people are subject to forced labor in Myanmar.[38] The 2007 Burmese anti-government protests were a series of anti-government protests that started in Burma on August 15, 2007. The immediate cause of the protests was mainly the unannounced decision of the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council, to remove fuel subsidies which caused the price of diesel and petrol to suddenly rise as much as 100%, and the price of compressed natural gas for buses to increase fivefold in less than a week. The protest demonstrations were at first dealt with quickly and harshly by the junta, with dozens of protesters arrested and detained. Starting September 18, the protests had been led by thousands of Buddhist monks, and those protests had been allowed to proceed until a renewed government crackdown on September 26. During the crack-down, there were rumors of disagreement within the Burmese military, but none were confirmed. At the time, independent sources reported, through pictures and accounts, 30 to 40 monks and 50 to 70 civilians killed as well as 200 beaten. However, other sources reveal more dramatic figures. Some news reports referred to the protests as the Saffron Revolution. On 7 February 2008, SPDC announced that a referendum for the Constitution would be held, and Elections by 2010. The Burmese constitutional referendum, 2008 was held on May 10 and promised a "discipline-flourishing democracy" for the country in the future.

Internally Displaced People in Burma (Myanmar):

The number of Internally Displaced Persons in Burma continues to grow at an alarming rate. Military operations, development projects and economic hardships all contribute to a situation that is bordering on catastrophic proportions. It is also one of Burma's lesser known problems; international awareness and action remains stagnant while millions of people in Burma face starvation, displacement, and no access to basic fundamental services like education and healthcare. Burma has a population of 50 million people. Recent estimates place 2 million of those people as Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). They live precarious and transient lives in the jungles of Burma's ethnic border areas and in the more urban central plains. They are denied the stability of having a home and a livelihood and are forced into a constant state of movement: never having the opportunity to maintain a home, their farms, access to education and medical facilities and. "We have been moving from one place to another every year. Last year and this year have been the most difficult years for us. In the past year, from seeding time to harvest time, the Burmese army troops arrived to our hiding sites very often and every time they arrived they destroyed our paddies. Burma became independent from the British in 1947. What followed was 15 years of elected parliament and democracy that was hampered by ethnic unrest, lack of unity and economic troubles. In 1962 a coup was staged by General Ne Win which brought the Burmese military into power. Ne Win instigated the Burma Socialist Programme Party and a policy to wipe out the ethnic opposition groups that were struggling to assert their own identities and cultures. In the 1970s Ne Win went even further and introduced the 4 cuts program which was an attempt to cut off food, information, recruits and financial support to these armed ethnic opposition groups. The policy has mostly affected the villagers that live in these ethnic border areas. They are the recipients of Burmese military enacted human rights abuses, forced relocations, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, rape, village destruction, forced labor and pottering. IDPs are denied access to education, especially in their native languages and adequate medical treatment. Only 60% of children in Burma have the opportunity to go to school, 25% of them will actually finish primary school. IDPs have at times set up makeshift schools in the jungles to try and continue their education but the vast majority find this impossible. Healthcare is mostly administered through backpack medi-vacs that specifically enter the IDP areas to try and get medical treatment to them. This is often fraught with danger and the numbers of medi-vacs. IDPs also face many food security issues. The Burmese military will often enter villages and burn down rice barns and crop plantations. They often force villagers to feed their soldiers or just take villagers animals for their own use. Villagers are forced to supply the Burmese military with quotas of rice, never receiving any payment for it and then having to buy back their own produce from the military. IDPs are denied access to their crop plantations and have to map out an existence of foraging for berries and jungle food.

Many IDPs find they can no longer survive in Burma and will flee into neighboring countries. IDPs are always potential refugees and Burma's neighboring countries face an increasing burden of support for refugees who flee into their countries. In Thailand there are approximately 130,000 refugees in camps along the border, this does not include an unidentified number who live illegally in Thai villagers along the border. In India there are an estimated 50,000 refugees and in Bangladesh 20,000 refugees who live in atrocious conditions but prefer it to going back to Burma. For all those who flee though there are many more who stay. They suffer greatly, they live in sub-standard conditions, but they have not yet given up hope. As one IDP said, "We will not be forced from our own land".

Forced relocation in Burmas former capital:

During the period 1958-60, the caretaker government of General Ne Win made Burmas armed forces rather than elected representatives responsible for governing Yangon (Rangoon), Burmas largest city and the countrys capital until the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) moved its seat of power to Naypyidaw in 2005. The government established three new townships near Yangon to which 167,000 people, one sixth of the citys population of one million, were involuntarily relocated.1 The government claimed that resettlement was necessary because the tens of thousands of people fleeing insurgency in the countryside who had become squatters in the city posed a threat both to public health and to law and order. Deeply resentful of having lost their former homes, the residents of the new townships put up strong resistance against the Ne Win regime during 1988s Democracy Summer. In response to the demonstrations in the summer of 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, renamed the SPDC in 1997) seized power. Within a year it had established ten new satellite towns with a population of almost half a million, most of who had been forcibly resettled. Many were squatters but others were owners of substantial housing who were being punished by the SLORC for actively supporting the 1988 demonstrations. Not only did they lose their old homes but they were forced to pay for plots of land and materials to build new houses in the outlying areas, which generally lacked electricity, water and other amenities. There were few employment opportunities in the satellite towns, obliging the relocated people to make long and costly commutes into central Yangon to work in the informal economy.2 Today, resettled people live crowded together in simple houses made of thatch and bamboo, the poorest of Yangons poor. They were hardest hit by the August 2007 increase in fuel prices that sparked nationwide anti-government demonstrations the following month, since the cost of food and public transportation skyrocketed. With its huts to apartments scheme, the SPDC claims to have placed many squatters in new multi-storey housing on the site of or near their former dwellings. However, forced relocation in Yangon, Mandalay and other cities in central Burma continues today; victims of fires, for example, are not allowed to rebuild their old neighborhoods and residential areas are cleared to make way for new roads, apartments and shopping centers. This is an environment where the land rights of ordinary citizens, whatever their ethnicity, remain unrecognized. The exact number of Burmese refugees in other countries bordering Burma is unknown but Bangladesh, India, China and Malaysia have all had to deal with substantial influxes of Burmese citizens. As Thailand receives the bulk of the refugees and is the base for the vocal Burmese opposition, many of the articles in this issue of FMR focus on the Thai

situation and the ethnic Karen. This should not be seen to underplay the plight of Burmese refugees in other countries or IDPs in other areas inside Burma. There is simply less information available on them a gap that needs to be addressed. In terms of durable solutions for this refugee population, the current focus is on resettlement. As a form of responsibility sharing, several Western countries have agreed to accept groups of Burmese refugees. This is resulting in largescale movements from the Thai camps to the West, with some additional cases from Bangladesh and India. Several articles in this issue explain how resettlement, while ensuring protection for the refugees concerned, raises issues for community management of the camps and is causing tensions within the refugee population. Thoughts on other durable solutions, such as repatriation or local integration, are missing, however. Even if repatriation is currently impossible, agencies should at least consider the possibility of unexpected changes in Burma which would lead to massive population movements. Early planning is imperative. At the same time, more thought should be given to the alternative solution of local integration. Although most host countries are against this option, my own research indicates that many Burmese people are already integrating, against the odds, and are an economic asset to their host countries. An open debate on all durable solutions and immediate improvements to the closed camps are urgently needed for the sake of both the Burmese refugees and their host populations. Given that Burmese people are displaced throughout the region, this humanitarian crisis will require regional solutions. UNHCR could be encouraged to set up a consultative committee involving all refugee receiving countries to discuss and coordinate a common approach towards Burmese refugees even if a comprehensive plan of action is currently impossible due to the actions of the Burmese junta. But, as Loescher and Milner state, this is only part of the solution: A humanitarian response to the needs of refugees in the region is not a substitute for engaging in the question of resolving the conditions in the country of origin that continue to force refugees to flee.1 The efforts of the UN Special Representative to push for dialogue between the different stakeholders in Burma are essential if Burmas large-scale displacement is ever to end. But from his latest visit to the country in March 2008 it is clear that the prospects for genuine dialogue remain gloomy. In January 2008 the junta suddenly announced that the National Convention had drafted a Constitution, on which the Burmese population has to vote in a national referendum. Elections will be held in 2010. Opposition to or campaigning against the National Convention and the referendum are regarded as treason, and incur a penalty of several years imprisonment. Additionally, opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize Winner Aung San Suu Kyi is barred from taking part in the elections because of her marriage to a British citizen. When Gambari requested that international monitors be allowed to observe the referendum, this was immediately rejected and he was accused of bias in favor of the opposition. The carving out of both humanitarian and political space thus so far remains extremely difficult.

Forced Relocation in Burma (What is happening in Burma):

Strategic Hamleting involves the forcible relocation of a group of villages and their concentration in a military-controlled area. This strategy has regularly been implemented in ethnic area of Burma since seventies. However this policy has been carried out on a massive scale, first in Shan State then in Karenni State as well as in several area of Karen State. All the villagers in a specific

geography location receive order to move out within 3to 7 days to relocation sites. These sites are usually located in the vicinity of army camps or along roads, where the civilian population can be kept under total military control. The villagers, mostly ethnic people surviving from slash-and-burn civilization, are suddenly uprooted from their houses and fields and no transport is provided and in some cases they have to walk several days to reach the new sites. Elderly people or disabled sick people who are unable to move are left behind and most of the time they die from starvation in the village. After the deadline the village becomes a free-fire zone where anyone seen in the proximity can be shot at sight. In many cases, the troops patrolled the area shortly after the evacuation, burning the vacated houses, destroying rice stores and looting whatever is found. Landmines are often planed and traps set up to prevent villages from returning to their houses. In the relocation sites, nothing has been prepared to receive the hordes of relocated people, and generally no assistance is provided. As soon as the task is completed, the soldiers order the villagers to build a fence around the sites. No one is allowed to enter or leave unless they obtain a pass, which they have to pay for. These passes are valid for one or three days allowing them to return to their village at their own risk and gather some belongings or additional food supply but they are not permitted to work in their lands. These relocation sites are often called as concentration camps. They are overcrowded and people sudsiest in appalling conditions: no clean water to drink, no sanitation and without proper medical care among children and women as a result malnutrition becomes rampant among them. The relocation sites are kept hidden from the outside world as the government denies their existence. Hundreds of people testified their presence. After a few months the military faced severe shortage of food in relocation areas and they allowed villages to return their fields and harvest their paddy for a limited period of time and to ensuring their return from relocation sites their relatives remaining hostages.

Burmas forgotten people:

The Rohingyas have a history which dates back to the beginning of the 7th century when Arab Muslim traders settled in Arakan (Rakhine). They were recognized as an indigenous ethnic group by the U Nu government during the parliamentary era in the 1950s but lost their political and constitutional identity when the military government of General Ne Win promulgated the Citizenship Act of Burma in 1983. This effectively denied the Rohingyas recognition of their status as an ethnic minority group. Harsh discrimination against them soon followed. The military junta maintains a clearly articulated stance on the Rohingya people. In a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Myanmar on 26 February 1992, the government declared: In actual fact, although there are national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people are not one of them. Historically, there has never been a Rohingya race in Myanmar. In response to criticisms from the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child in April 2004, the junta stated that it had granted full and equal treatment to the Rohingyas, as with other races, in matters relating to birth and death registration, education, health and social affairs. Moreover, the junta also mentioned that the Rohingyas are listed as a Bengali racial group and recognized as permanent residents of Myanmar. However, in practice, the rights of the Rohingya population remain greatly restricted. The presence of UNHCR and some other international NGOs in northern Rakhine State

can help ameliorate the current plight of the Rohingyas but without political will from within the Myanmar military government, their plight cannot be resolved.

The Way to Resettlement:

Chuwa ma yeh, ga ma ye is an expression in the Karenni language that translates roughly as between a rock and a hard place or, more accurately, difficult to move forward, difficult to go back. The phrase aptly characterizes the emotions of many grave social, economic and cultural challenges, particularly at the outset. On the other hand, it is not only difficult but virtually impossible to go back. Given the abuses and intransigence of the Burmese military junta, refugees cannot return home at the present time. One might add a third component to the Karenni phrase: difficult to remain. Although refugees in camps in Thailand have been the beneficiaries of assistance from more than twenty humanitarian organizations, living in legal limbo has taken its toll. At present, camp residents are restricted in their movements and few are permitted to leave the camps to pursue livelihoods or continue education. However, as the resettlement programme gains momentum, it is important to remember that not every refugee will resettle. Refugees who will never resettle, or who will resettle in some years time, deserve the attention of practitioners and policy makers, because their protection needs in he short and long term are even greater than those who resettle. For this reason, the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT), the coordinating body for NGOs operating on the Thai-Burmese border, commissioned a report to determine the impact of resettlement on the remaining refugee population. The research indicates that, first, while resettlement has done much to boost the hopes of those who are resettling, many of those who remain have experienced a loss of morale as their friends and colleagues depart. Resettlement has sapped the energy of those refugees who have been working for change in Burma, and has done nothing to improve conditions for those internally displaced in Burma. Second, while resettlement is taking place en masse, a higher proportion of educated, skilled and experienced refugees have resettled first, relative to the rest of the population. This is partly because some resettlement countries have tended to select refugees for resettlement based not on their status as refugees but on their integration potential which other long-serving education staff. Many of these individuals have been trained in key education tools such as curriculum development, classroom management and school supervision. The loss of personnel who can provide educational guidance heightens the problem of losing long-serving teachers, influencing the quality of teaching, monitoring and training. In the health sector, the departure of many highly trained refugee health staff has severely affected the ability of health NGOs to deliver good to resettlement as the most feasible durable solution. Our research indicates that, in the short term, mass resettlement increases the needs of the remaining population as refugee camps require more training input to replace departing skilled workers. The following recommendations were developed specifically for the refugee population on the Thai- Burmese border, and incorporate additional recommendations from UNHCR.3 Many of these suggestions are already being taken up. Encourage donors to fund training and capacity-building programmed and initiatives for inexperience and new staff in the camps. Implement trainings for new replacement workers as early as possible and pursue shadowing with a pool of available individuals. As early as possible, undertake a survey of skills and employment abilities of the refugee camp population in order to identify refugees who could be included in a pool of replacement staff. Recruit camp workers from among new arrivals in the camps and from the local (Thai) population. Promote, as much as possible, an open and predictable resettlement process so that refugees know how long it will take

for resettlement to occur, and agencies involved in delivering assistance in the camps know when their staff will be departing. Streamline service delivery by reassessing the assistance needs of the camps, combining some facilities and simplifying management structures. Encourage skilled refugees to relocate between camps. Consider seeking voluntary commitments from refugees, in cooperation with the resettlement country, that they will delay their resettlement for a certain period of time, or until replacements have been fully trained. Encourage the host country to expedite permission for refugees, expatriate workers and local staff of NGOs and CBOs to work in and travel between camps.

Conclusion:
In conclusion, the issue of internal displacement in Burma requires serious attention and further investigation. The forcible eviction of people from their houses and lands particularly areas has led to an untold saga of terror and misery for these people and to the devastation of countless communities. Moreover they deprived of most relief assistance as access to IDPs has been denied to indigenous organizations and INGOs alike. No genuine improvement can be expected without a meaningful tri-partite dialogue between the military, the opposition group and the ethnic groups. In the meantime, the growing number of IDPs near borders threatens regional stability.

Reference:

Lewa, Chris, Military, Forced relocation and the IDPs in BURMA,DISPLACED WITHIN HOMELESS: The IDPs of Bangladesh and the Region(pg.169-175) Brees, Inge, Forced displacement of Burmese people, FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW:ISSU30,April2008(pg.04)