1NC: A. Interpretation: the aff must specify which branch of the USFG implements plan B.

Violation: they dont specify a branch C. Voting issue 1. It's unpredictable: a) The plan is the focus of the debate and the negs only guide for preround prep b) It is the only predictable and stable indication of who does the planliterature cant guarantee us links c) Makes the neg susceptible to unpredictable 2ac plan clarifications 2. Specifying is key to give us textual competition for agent counterplans this is the only non arbitrary standard for competition 3. the USFG isnt a real agent meaning that the plan cannot be implemented and you vote neg on presumption 4. Theyre not topical: the word resolved means to make a firm decision aboutplan cant be firm or definite without specifying their agent so you vote neg on jurisdiction [American Heritage Dictionary at dictionary.com] 5. Aff conditionality is a voting issue a) Its infinitely regressive, they can keep clarifying their plan throughout the debate b) Structural advantages like infinite prep time, choice of advantage ground, first and last speech make it easier for the aff to prepare against agent CPs than the neg to prepare against vague plans evaluate their plan in a vacuum- its the only thing we can hold them to throughout the round
A. Link - The affirmative resembles the Socratic Will to Order positioning itself as the arbiter of stability and control over the world. It continuously searches to eliminate all suffering in the world to create perfection. This search for the Real World abandons the present reality creating ressentiment for life as they constantly act to heal the wound of existence.

Saurette, 96 PhD in Political Theory at John Hopkins University 1996(Paul, I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crsiis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, Page 1-28)
According to Nietzsche, the philosophical foundation of a society is the set of ideas which give meaning to the phenomenon of human existence within a given cultural framework. As one manifestation of the Will to Power, this will to meaning fundamentally influences the social and political organisation of a particular community.5 Anything less than a profound historical interrogation of the most basic philosophical foundations of our civilization, then, misconceives the origins of values which we

to understand the development of our modern conception of society and politics, we must reconsider the crucial influence of the Platonic formulation of Socratic though. Nietzsche claims that pre-Socratic Greece based its philosophical justification of life on heroic myths which honoured tragedy and competition. Life was understood as a contest in which both the joyful and ordered (Apollonian) and chaotic and suffering (Dionysian) aspects of life were accepted and affirmed as inescapable aspects of human existence.6 However, this incarnation of
take to be intrinsic and natural. Nietzsche suggests, therefore, that

the will to power as tragedy weakened, Greek myths no longer instilled the self-respect and self-control that had upheld the pre-Socratic social order. Everywhere the instincts were in anarchy; everywhere people were but five steps

and became unable to sustain meaning in Greek life.

No longer willing to accept the tragic hardness and self-mastery of pre-Socratic myth, Greek thought yielded to decadence, a search for a new social foundation which could soften the tragedy of life, while still giving meaning to existence. In this context, Socrates thought became paramount. In words of
from excess: the monstrum in animo was a universal danger.7 Nietzsche, Socrates saw behind his aristocratic Athenians; he grasped that his case, the idiosyncrasy of his case, was not longer exceptional. The same kind of degeneration was everywhere silently preparing itself: the old Athens was coming to an end and Socrates understood that the world had need of him his expedient, his cure and his personal art of self-preservation.8

Socrates realized that his search for an ultimate and eternal intellectual standard paralleled the widespread yearning for assurance and stability within society. His expedient, his cure? An Alternative will to power. An alternative foundation that promised mastery and control, not through acceptance of the tragic life, but through the disavowal of the instinctual, the contingent, and the problematic. In respond to the failing power of its foundational myths, Greece tried to renounce the very experience that had given rise to tragedy by
retreating/escaping into the Apollonian world promised by Socratic reason. In Nietzsches words, [r]ationality was divined as a saviour it was their last expedient. The fanaticism with which the whole of Greek though throws itself at rationality betrays a state of emergency; one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or be absurdly rational.9 Thus,

Socrates codified the wider fear of instability into an intellectual framework. The Socratic Will to Truth is characterized by the attempt to understand and order life rationally be renouncing the Dionysian elements of existence and privileging an idealized Apollonian order. As life is inescapably comprised of both order and disorder, however, the promise of control through Socratic reason is only possible by creating a Real World of eternal an d meaningful forms, in opposition to an Apparent World of transitory physical existence. Suffering and contingency is contained within the Apparent World, disparaged, devalued, and ignored in relation to the ideal order of the Real World. Essential to the Socratic Will to Truth, then, is the fundamental contradiction between the experience of Dionysian suffering in the Apparent World and the idealized order of the Real World. According to Nietzsche, this dichotomised model led to the emergence of a uniquely modern10 understanding of life which could only view suffering as the result of the imperfection of the Apparent World. This outlook created a modern notion of responsibility in which the Dionysian elements of life could be understood only as a phenomenon for which someone, or something, is to blame. Nietzsche terms this philosophically - induced condition ressentiment, and argues that is signaled a potential crisis of the Will to Truth by exposing the central contradiction of the Socratic resolution. This contradiction, however, was resolved
historically through the aggressive universalization of the Socratic ideal by Christianity. According to Nietzsche, ascetic Christianity exacerbated the Socratic dichotomisation by employing the Apparent World as the responsible agent against which the ressentiment of life could be turned. Blame for suffering fell on individuals within the Apparent World, precisely because they did not live up to God, the Truth, and the Real World. As Nietzsche wrote, I suffer: someone must be to blame for it thinks every sickly sheep. But his Shepard, the ascetic priest tell him: Quite so my sheep! Someone must be to blame for it: but you yourself are this someone, you alone are to blame for yourself, - you alone are to blame for yourself This is brazen and false enough: but one thing is achieved by it, the direction of ressentiment is altered.11 Faced with the collapse of the Socratic resolution and the prospect of meaninglessness, one again, one was in peril, one had only one choice: either to perish, or to be absurdly rational.12 The genius of the ascetic ideal was that it preserved the meaning of the Socratic Will to Power as Will to Truth by extrapolating ad absurdium the

the Real World was transformed from a transcendental world of philosophical escape into a model towards which the Apparent World actively aspired, always blaming its contradictory experiences on its own imperfect knowledge and action. This subtle transformation of the relationship between the dichotomized worlds creates the Will to order as the defining characteristic of the modern Will to Truth. Unable to accept the Dionysian suffering inherent in the Apparent World, the ascetic ressentiment desperately searches for the hypnotic sense of nothingness, the repose of deepest sleep, in short absence of suffering.13 According to the ascetic model however, this escape is possible only when the Apparent World perfectly duplicates the Real World. The Will to Order, then, is the aggressive need increasingly to order the Apparent World in line with the precepts of moral Truth of the Real World. The ressentiment of the Will to Order, therefore, generates two interrelated reactions. First, ressentiment engenders a need actively to mould the Apparent World in accordance with the dictates of the ideal,
Socratic division through the redirection of ressentiment against the Apparent World! Through this redirection,

Apollonian Real World. In order to achieve this, however the ascetic ideal also asserts that a truer, more complete knowledge of the Real World
must be established, creating an ever-increasing will to truth. This self perpetuating movement creates an interpretative structure within which everything must be understood and ordered in relation to the ascetic Truth of the Real World. As Nietzsche suggests, [t]he ascetic ideal has a goal this goal is so universal that all other interests of human existence seem, when compared with it, pretty and narrow; it interprets epochs, nations, and men inexorably with a view to this one goal; it permits no other interpretation, not other goal: it rejects, denies, affirms and sanctions solely from the point of view of its interpretation.14 The very structure of the Will to Truth ensure that theoretical investigation must be increasingly ordered, comprehensive, more True, and closer to the perfection of the ideal. At the same time,

this understanding of intellectual theory ensures that is creates practices which attempt to impose increasing order in the Apparent Order becomes the fundamental Philosophical principle of modernity.

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B. Impacts 1. The desire for mastery and control the affirmative replicates only creates ressentiment for our current existence. Such hatred and search for a new life makes life laughable and makes extinction desirable.

Nietzsche, 86 German Philosopher 1886(Friedrich, Beyond Good and Evil, Page 342)
225. Whether it be hedonism, pessimism, utilitarianism, or eudaemonism, all those modes of thinking which measure the worth of things according to PLEASURE and PAIN, that is, according to accompanying circumstances and secondary considerations, are plausible modes of thought and naivetes, which every one conscious of CREATIVE powers and an artist's

not sympathy as you understand it: it is not sympathy for social distress, for society with its sick and misfortuned, for the hereditarily vicious and defective who lie on the ground around us; still less is it sympathy for the grumbling, vexed, revolutionary slaveclasses who strive after powerthey call it freedom. OUR sympathy is a loftier and furthersighted sympathy:we see how MAN dwarfs himself, how YOU dwarf him! and there are moments when we view YOUR sympathy with an indescribable anguish, when we resist it,when we regard your seriousness as more dangerous than any kind of levity. You want, if possibleand there is not a more foolish if possible" TO DO AWAY WITH SUFFERING; and we?it really seems that WE would rather have it increased and made worse than it has ever been! Wellbeing, as you understand itis certainly not a goal; it seems to us an END; a condition which at once renders man ludicrous and contemptibleand makes his destruction DESIRABLE! The discipline of suffering, of GREAT sufferingknow ye not that it is only THIS discipline that has produced all the elevations of humanity hitherto?
conscience will look down upon with scorn, though not without sympathy. Sympathy for you!to be sure, that is

2. The Socratic delusion creates mastery, control, and violence as a justification for achieving the end goal of the Real World

Saurette, 96 PhD in Political Theory at John Hopkins University 1996(Paul, I Mistrust all Systematizers and Avoid them: Nietzsche, Arendt and the Crisis of the Will to Order in International Relations Theory, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1, Page 1-28)
The dichotomisation of the ideal and apparent worlds results in a second inversion .

The notion of politician as craftsman undermines the possibility of action in the political sphere by attempting to deny the very condition of plurality and natality. The prerequisite qualities of equality and persuasion are replaced by the precepts of fabrication: mastery and violence. Plural political action is renounced in favour of the unquestioned order of rulership and mastery (which destroys the potential for natality and plurality), or by the coercion of violence (which simply overwhelms any possibility of action through sheer strength.) This consequence is then circularly justified by the belief that the end of action can be noting more than the realization of the Real World in the Apparent World. The conception of community through equality
and difference is inexorably replaced by the understanding of political community constructed through mastery, control, and rule.

The dual inversion of politics-as-making explicitly reveals the profound impact of the philosophical foundation of the Will to Order/Truth on the modern

conception of politics. Within this philosophical order, politics must be understood as a process of fabrication in which the end utopian goal justifies and underpins rulership, control, and domination. From this perspective, the development of a variety of Real World ideals (Platonic justice, Christian salvation, or vulgar Marxist Utopianism) which guide political action have disguised the entrenched consistency of the understanding of politics-as-making. It is precisely this definition of politics that must be exposed and problematised. For politics-asmaking is neither a natural nor realistic conception of politics, but rather a historical consequence of a specific philosophical foundation. As such, it is neither factual nor beyond critique.

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3. Attempts to secure our experience of existence produces paranoiac fear. This produces life as a project where we struggle to perfect it through security. This fuels a ressentiment that negates life.

Der Derian, 95 - Political Science Professor at the University of Massachusetts 1995(James, On Security Page 29) The will to power, the, should not be confused with a Hobbesian perpetual desire for power, it can, in its negative form, produce[s] a reactive a resentful longing only power, leading, in Nietzsches View, to a triumph of nihilism. But Nietzsche refers to a positive will to power, an active and affective force of becoming, from which values and meanings are produced which affirm life. Conventions of security act to suppress rather than confront the fears endemic to life, for life itself is essentially appropriation, injury, overpowing of what is
alien and weaker; suppression, hardness, imposition of ones own forms, incorporation and at least, at its mildest, exploitationbut why should one always use those words in which slanderous intent has been imprinted for ages.? 35 Elsewhere Nietzsche establishes the pervasiveness of agonism in life:

life is a consequence of war, society itself means to war,36 But the denial of this permanent condition, the effort to disguise it with a consensual rationality or to hide from it with a fictional sovereignty, are all effects of this suppression of fear. The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of differencethat which is not us, not certain, not predictable. Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power, which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable, to the causally sustainable, In The Gay Science, Nietzsche
asks of the reader: Look, isnt our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security? 37 The

fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true, reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces, and is sustained by, the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the
nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: The casual instinct is this conditional upon, and excited by, the feeling of rear. The why? shall, if at all possible, not give the cause of its own sake so much as for a particular kind of cause a cause that is comforting, liberating and relieving.That experienced before,

which is new and strange and has not been is excluded as a cause. Thus one not only searches for some kind of explanation, to serve as a cause, but for a particularly selected and preferred kind of explanationthat which most quickly and frequently abolished the feeling of the strange, new and hitherto unexperienced: the most habitual explanations. 38 A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unkown become identified as evil, and evil provokes hostility recycling the desire for security. The influence of timidity, as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the necessities mistrust and evil experiences.39 The unknowable which cannot be contained by force or explained by reason is relegated to the off-world. Trust, the good, and other common values to rely upon an artificial strength: the feeling of security such

as Christian possesses; he feels strong in being able to trust, to be patient and composed: he owes this artificial strength to the illusion of being protected by a god. 40

1NC (4/4)
C. Alternative Take the risk of exposing yourself to violent impacts and abandon the desire for control. Refuse to engage the 1AC as way of embracing the unknowable aspects of life. This risks danger but your mortality is a certainty. The alternative is the only way to bring meaning to life by living life eventfully through a rolling of the dice.

Deleuze. 83 French Philosopher 1983(Gilles, Nietzsche and Philosophy, Page 25-27) The game has two moments which are those of a dicethrow the dice that is thrown and the dice that fall back, Nietzsche presents the dicethrow as taking place on two distinct tables, the earth and the sky. The earth where the dice are thrown and the sky where the dice fall back: if ever I have played dice with the gods at their table, the earth, so that the earth
trembled and broke open and streams of fire snorted forth; for the earth is a table of the gods, and trembling with creative new words and the dice throws of the gods (Z III The Seven Seals 3 p.245) O sky above me, you pure and lofty sky! This is now your purity to me, that there is no eternal reason-spider and spiders web in you; that you are to me a dance floor for divine

But these two tables are not two worlds. They are the two hours of a single world, the two moments of a single world, midnight and midday 3 the hour when the dice are thrown, the hour when the dice fall back. Nietzsche insists on the two tables of life which are also the two moments of the player of the artist; We temporarily abandon life, in order to them temporarily fix our gaze upon it. The dicethrow affirms becoming and it affirms the being of becoming. It is not a matter of several dicethrows which, because of their number, finally reproduce the same combination. On the contrary, it is a matter of a single dicethrow which, due to the number of the repetition of a combination but rather the number of t he combination which produces the repetition of the dicethrows. The dice which are thrown one are the affirmation of chance, the combination which they form on falling is the affirmation of necessity. Necessity is affirmed of chance in that being is affirmed of becoming and unity is affirmed of multiplicity. It will be replied, in
chances, that you are to me a gods table for divine dice and dicers (Z III Before Sunrise p.186). vain, that thrown to chance, the dice do not necessarily produce the winning combination, the double six which brings back the dicethrow. This is true, but only insofar as the player did not know how to affirm chance from the outset. For, just

as unity does not suppress or deny multiplicity, necessity does not suppress or abolish chance. Nietzsche identifies chance with multiplicity, with fragments, with parts, with chaos: the chaos of the dice that are shaken then thrown. Nietzsche turns chance into an affirmation. They sky itself is called chance-sky, innocence-sky (Z III
Before Sunrise); the reign of Zarathrustra is called great chance (Z IV The Honey Offering and III Of Old and New Law Tables;

Zarathrustra calls himself the redeemer of chance). By chance, he is the worlds oldest nobility, which I have given back to all things; I have released them from their servitude under purposeI have found this happy certainty in all things: that they prefer to dance on the feet of chance (Z III Before Sunrise p. 186); My doctrine is Let chance come to me: it is as innocent as a little child! (Z III On the Mount of Olives p. 194). What Nietzsche calls necessity (destiny) is thus never the abolition but rather the combination of chance itself. Necessity is affirmed of chance in as much as chance itself affirmed. For there is only a single combination of chance as such, a single way of combining all the parts of chance, a way which is like the unity of multiplicity, that is to say number or necessity. There are many number with increasing or decreasing
probabilities but only one number of chance as such, one fatal number which reunites all the fragments of chance, like midday gathers together the scattered parts of midnight. This is why it is sufficient for the player to affirm chance once in order to produce the number which brings back the dice-throw. 22 To know how to affirm chance is to know how to play. But we do not know how to play, Timid, ashamed, awkward, like a tiger whose leap has failed. But what of what you dicethrowers! You

The bad player counts on several throws of the dice, on a great number of throws. In this way he makes use of causality and probability to produce a combination that he sees as desirable. He posits this combination itself to be obtained, hidden behind causality. This is what Nietzsche means when
have not learned to play and mock as a man ought to play and mock! (Z IV Of the Higher Man 14 p. 303). he speaks of the eternal spider, of the spiders web of reason, A kind of spider of imperative and formality hidden behind the great web, the great net of causality we could say, with Charles the Bold when he opposed Louis XI, I fight the universal spider (GM III 9).

To abolish chance by holding it in the grip of causality and finality, to count on repetition fo throws rather than affirming chance, to anticipate a result instead of affirming necessity these are all the operations of a bad player. They have their root in reason, but what is the root of reason? The spirit of revenge, nothing but the spirit of revenge, the spider (Z II Of the Tarantulas). Ressentiment in the repetition of throws; bad conscience in the belief in a purpose. But, in this way, all that will ever be obtained are more or less probable relative numbers. That the universe has no purpose, that is ahs no end to hope for any more than it has causes to be known this is the certainty necessary to play well (VP III 465). The dicethrow fails because chance ahs not been affirmed enough in one throw, it has not been affirmed enough in order to produce the fatal number which necessarily reunites all the fragments and brings back the dicethrow. We must therefore attach the greatest importance to the following conclusion: for the couple causality-finality, probability-finality, for the opposition and the synthesis of these terms, for the web of these terms, Nietzsche substitutes the Dionysian correlation of chance-necessity, the Dionysian couple chance-destiny. Not a probability distributed over several throws but all chance at one not a final, willed combination, but the fatal combination, fatal and loved, amor fati; not the return of a combination by the number of throws, but the repetition of a dicethrow by the nature of the fatally obtained number. CP TEXT: The United States federal Government should consult the Joint Chiefs of Staff on whether or not to withdraw from all topically designated areas Obamas approach to military decision-making solidifies good civil-military relations CNAS 10 Center for a New American Security, May 17, 2010, Civil-Military Relations in the Obama Era, online: http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2010/05/civilmilitary-relations-obama-era.html
This article by Jonathan Alter in Newsweek on how Obama tamed his generals is great and worth reading -- although not necessarily for the reasons the author intended. I'm going to offer up my bottom line conclusion up front and then use the article as a starting point to consider some other issues. BLUF: President Obama has brought civil-military relations back into line in a way that would have made Samuel Huntington proud. There are problems with this, as I will note later on in this post, but overall, this is a really good thing. Alter: Deputy national-security adviser Tom Donilon had commissioned research that backed up an astonishing historical truth: neither the Vietnam War nor the Iraq War featured any key meetings where all the issues and assumptions were discussed by policymakers. In both cases the United States was sucked into war inch by inch. I have spent a little time recently with Paul Pillar, a man whose intellect and record of service I really respect. Paul has made a point similar to Tom Donilon's regarding the Iraq war -- that there never really was a coherent governmental decision-making process. Obama's decision-making process on Afghanistan, by contrast, is to be applauded for the way in which it differed from the "decisionmaking process" (if you can even call it that) of 2002 and 2003. Why?

First, do what Dick Betts does when writing about Huntington's so-called "normal theory" for civilmilitary relations and draw a big triangle on a sheet of paper. Now draw three horizontal lines on the triangle, dividing it into four levels -- political, strategic, operational and tactical. In the normal model, civilians have responsibility for the top section. They decide the policy aims. Then civilians and the military decide on strategic goals and resources. (Betts adds a fifth layer, actually, for ROE.) The military has responsibility for everything else under Huntington's model. If you look at the decision-making process in 2009 on the war in Afghanistan, things more or less proceeded according to the normal theory. The president commissioned a review of policy and strategic goals in the winter of 2009, which resulted in this white paper. Gen. McChrystal then thought about how to operationalize the president's policy and strategic goals and submitted his own assessment along with a request for more resources. That assessment, combined with a corrupt Afghan presidential election, caused the administration to re-think its assumptions and prompted another strategic review. This was, on balance, a good thing that made me feel good about the president. The president then reaffirmed his policy aims, articulated new strategic goals, and committed more resources to the war in Afghanistan. (I write more about this process here.) The good news in all of this is that whether or not you agree with the decisions made by the president and his team in 2009, the national security decision-making process more or less worked, and the civilians were in charge every step of the way. This is as both Sam Huntington and the U.S. Constitution intended.

Civil-Military Relations Disad---1NC

Reducing foreign military presence sparks massive backlash that undermines CMR Kohn 8 - Richard H. Kohn, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina, Winter 2008, Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations, World Affairs, online: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Winter/full-civil-military.html
Yet imagine the outcry any one of these proposals would provoke, and the resistance it would generate from the services, agencies, and congressional committees whose ox was being gored. The delegation or defense company about to lose a base or a weapons contract would certainly howl and mobilize. Organizational change in any bureaucracy provokes enormous and almost always successful resistance. In the Pentagon, the battles have been epic. The world has a say in all this, too. The next administration will take office nearly twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Yet the American military establishment is essentially the same one created in the 1940s and 1950s to deter the Soviet Union. The United States today boasts four independent armed services with the same weapons, upgraded and more capable to be sure, as those known to George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Chester Nimitz, and Curtis LeMay. Not only are the ships, planes, tanks, vehicles, and guns similar, but they are organized similarly, performing virtually the same roles and missions assigned them in the late 1940s. The United States after 1989 did not demobilize. It downsized. Successive administrations cut the budget by ten percent and the size of the force by about 25 percent, while the Pentagon substituted regional threats for the Soviet menace in its planning. Even in the midst of a Global War on Terrorism, neither the generals nor their bosses in the White House and Congress have been able to rethink the purpose, organization, command and control, or even operation of the armed forces. Two decades is a long time. The decades between 1895 and 1915, 1935 and 1955, and 1975 and 1995 all involved paradigm shifts in Americas role in the world and in its national security requirements. Todays security situation differs no less radically from the Cold War for which todays military establishment was devised. Are these the armed forces we really need? Bitter fights over strategy, budgets, weapons, and roles and missions dating back sixty-plus years suggest the question may not be answerable in any practical sense. To understand fully just how difficult it will be to raise fundamental concerns about defense policies, consider the recent confusion over what exactly the role and purpose of the National Guard and reserves ought to be. A week before 9/11, I participated in a roundtable discussion of the subject for the Reserve Forces Policy Board. There was general agreement that reserve forces should concentrate more on homeland defense and less on backstopping active duty forces on the battlefield. Yet the former head of the National Guard Bureau insisted, without evidence and in the face of great skepticism, that the Guard and reserves could do both. The past five years have proved him wrong; reserve forces are underequipped and stretched thinner than the active duty army and Marine Corps. Today, a congressionally chartered commission on the National Guard and reserves still struggles with how to shape and organize the reserves (particularly the National Guard, which reports to each state governor unless summoned for federal service). Admittedly, the National Guard and reserves possess unusual political power and since 1789 have been more resistant to rational military policy than any other part of the national security community. Robert McNamara, who transformed American defense more than any other Pentagon leader, failed utterly to budge the Guard and reserve. None of his successors possessed the nerve even to try. But the problem cannot be avoided. As the commission wrote in bureaucratic understatement, in March 2007, the current posture and utilization of the National Guard and Reserve as an operational reserve is not sustainable over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the reserve components ability to serve our nation will diminish. All the more so because Iraq and Afghanistan compose the first substantial, extended military conflicts the United States has fought with a volunteer force in more than a century. Todays typical combat tour of fifteen months is the longest since World War II. Expensive procurement programs are underway, but sooner or later they will be robbed to pay for other costs, such as war operations, the expansion of ground forces, or medical and veterans costs. Already, the Project on Defense Alternatives has proposed cutting two Air Force wings, two Navy wings, and two aircraft carriers for a total savings of more than

$60 billion over the next five years. Eventually, the bill comes due, either in blood, defeat, or political crisis. As the old Fram oil filter advertisement put it, Pay me now, or pay me later.

U.S. CMRs modeled globally---key to democratic consolidation Perry 96 William Perry, Former Secretary of Defense, 1996, Foreign Affairs
Many nations around the world have come to agree that democracy is the best system of government. But important steps must be taken before worldwide consensus can become a worldwide reality. Most of the new democracies are fragile. Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a free society; democracy is learned behavior. Democratic values must be embedded in the key institutions of these nations if they are to flourish as democracies. The Defense Department has a pivotal role to play in that effort. In virtually every new democracy -- in the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, and in Asia -- the military is a major force. In many cases it is the most cohesive institution in the country, containing a large percentage of the educated elite and controlling important resources. In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it. Societies undergoing the transformation from totalitarianism to democracy may well be tested at some point by a crisis, whether economic, a reversal on human rights and freedoms, or a border or an ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. If such a crisis occurs, the United States wants that nation's military to come down on the side of democracy and economic reform and play a positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role in fanning the flames or using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup. This administration has sought to exert a positive influence on these important institutions through regular, working contacts with U.S. military and civilian defense personnel -- a task made easier by the fact that every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as the model to be emulated.

Democratic consolidation prevents extinction Diamond 95 (Larry, Senior Fellow Hoover Institution, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s, December, http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)
OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built. CASE:

US military presence on Okinawa is crucial to sustain the Japanese economy Michael, 2/06

(R.D., Captain in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and writer for the Expeditionary Warfare School Contemporary Issue Paper, Okinawa: The Economic Repercussions for Closing the U.S. Bases, EWS, pg-1 //ag)

The United States military bases are the third single largest contributor to Okinawa's economy. The United States military bases contribute this money to the Okinawan economy through base revenue (revenues generated through military- related transactions). Base revenues consist of salaries and wages paid to Japanese base employees, rental fees paid to Japanese landowners for land used by military facilities and money spent by status of forces agreement (SOFA) personnel on the local economy.1 The Japanese government should resist any suggestion of closing the United States military base on Okinawa. The closing of the United States military bases on Okinawa will cause an economic burden for the citizens of the prefecture because of the loss of income for Japanese base employees, land rent, and money spent by SOFA personnel on the local economy.

Japanese economy is key to the global economy and to check back Chinese nuclear conflict The Guardian, 2/11/02 (Defenseless Japan Awaits Typhoon, pg online @ lexis //ag)

Even so, the west cannot afford to be complacent about what is happening in Japan, unless it intends to use the country as a test case to explore whether a full-scale depression is less painful now than it was 70 years ago. Action is needed, and quickly because this is an economy that could soak up some of the world's excess capacity if functioning properly. A strong Japan is not only essential for the long-term health of the global economy, it is also needed as a counter-weight to the growing power of China. A collapse in the Japanese economy, which looks ever more likely, would have profound ramifications; some experts believe it could even unleash a wave of extreme nationalism that would push the country into conflict with its bigger (and nuclear) neighbour.

Economy Turn 2NC

US presence on Okinawa not only is a huge source of income for Japan but it increases overall Southeast Asian economic confidence Michael, 2/06 (R.D., Captain in the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and writer for the Expeditionary Warfare School Contemporary Issue Paper, Okinawa: The Economic Repercussions for Closing the U.S. Bases, EWS, pg-1 //ag)

"The American military presence [in Okinawa] is a confidence-building measure, and if that presence were withdrawn, the countries in [Southeast Asia] would feel less confident that no threat to their [economic] security would appear".5 Although this is a regional consideration the withdrawal of the United States military should be a concern for the Japanese government. According to Okinawa's 1999 data , the United States military bases on Okinawa contribute 1.831 billion yen or 5 percent of the Okinawan gross prefecture expenditure.6 "The value of base revenues has approximately doubled from 78 billion yen at the time of reversion to 183.1 billion yen in 1999. Thus, base revenues still remain a large source of income for Okinawa's economy as one of the essential element in the prefecture's economic activities."7 The largest contribution of the United States military base is rental fees paid to the Japanese landowners for the land that the military uses.