Otherwise than Being: Levinas compassion and Nagarjunas karuna Rashid Begg Stellenbosch University

Abstract: This paper compares Emmanuel Levinas concept of responsibility to the Madhyamikas account of compassion. Central to both philosophical ideas is the position of the Other. In the case of Levinas, the notion of responsibility and compassion becomes the duty of all individuals whereas in the case of the Madhyamikans, a heightened sense of responsibility toward the Other becomes the duty of the bodhisattva. With these two philosophical orientations we have two systems of thought, roads that lead if not to the same mountain, at least to peaks from which very similar views may be seen.

Key words: Levinas, Madhyamika, Boddhisattva, Suntyata and Nagarjuna.

Emmanuel Levinas and the founders of Madhyamika Buddhism are widely separated historically and culturally. Yet there are many similarities in Levinas concept of responsibility for the other and Madhyamikas accounts of the compassion of bodhisattvas. Central to both systems is the view that no self or ego is a separate, independent entity. The subject/object duality breaks down when the selfs sense of independence is overwhelmed in the wake of the Infinity of the other (Levinas) or through the force of co-dependent origination and sunyatas denial of inherent self-

existence (Madhyamika). The ethics that results focuses on the importance of fulfilling the needs of others and overcoming category-dependent thinking to recognize the interdependence of all beings. Although there are differences in both content and context, Levinas responsibility and Madhyamikas compassionate bodhisattvas share this denial of a fundamental separation between the subject as I and everything else. Ethical consequences arise from this belief.

Levinas sees responsibility as involuntary and passive. Whether or not we accept, acknowledge and understand this responsibility, Levinas says, each of us still bears this responsibility to the other. It is an absolute and unreserved responsibility that preempts any construction of justice and conscious intervention. It applies to all of us, unlike the Madhyamikan notion of some subset of humanity who have taken bodhisattva vows. Although reaching further, the universality of Levinas' approach may be less "practical." In interviews Levinas has acknowledged that he uses the word "ethics" differently from other philosophers, and this set of ethics is not always applicable to daily life (Bernasconi, 1988:581). This acknowledgement would seem to indicate his philosophy is more "descriptive" than "prescriptive." Furthermore, Levinas' responsibility is preconscious, possibly even unconscious. However, this has not prevented others from attempting to apply his concepts to politics, sociology, or a more "practical" ethics.

In comparing responsibility and bodhisattvic compassion, the initial stage will be to detail how Levinas deconstruction of subject/object duality lays the foundation for his views on responsibility. Then the Madhyamikan point of view is examined and shown to be

similarly rooted in the overcoming of subject/object duality on the road to living the compassionate ideal of the bodhisattvas. The similaritieswhich are extensiveof Levinas and Madhyamikas approaches will be reviewed, and the inevitable differences pointed out, differences that do not greatly detract from the general parallels drawn.

Emmanuel Levinas belief in our responsibility to the other can be traced to his rejection of an illusory subject/object duality. This rejection leads him to substitute a relationship that escapes the structures of subject-object, signifier-signified, saying-said correlation (Levinas, 2000:148). The illusion of an independent Self collapses when confronted by the Infinite. No theme, no present, has a capacity for the Infinite, he writes (Levinas, 2000:146). Under the weight of its confrontation with the Infinite, or the other, the Self or the same takes on the responsibility of fulfilling the needs of the other: The same in its bearing as same is more and more extended to the other, to the point of substitution as a hostage (Levinas, 2000:146). This responsibility is involuntary and passive: The condition of being hostage is not chosen; if there had been a choice, the subject would have kept his as-for-me, and the exits found in inner life. But this subjectivity, his very psyche, is for the other, his very bearing independence consists in supporting the other, expiating for him (Levinas, 2000:136). Responsibility is not a conscious decision: The inscription of the order in the for-the-other of obedience is an anarchic being affected, which slips into me like a thief through the outstretched nets of consciousness (Levinas, 2000:148). Because the distinction between subject and object is foregone, responsibility entails compassion: The difference in proximity between the one and the other, between me and a neighbor, turns into non-indifference, precisely into my responsibility. Non3

indifference, humanity, the-one-for-the-other is the very signifyingness of signification, the intelligibility of the intelligible, and thus reason. The nonindifference of responsibility to the point of substitution for the neighbor is the source of all compassion. (Levinas, 2000:66) Levinas distinguishes between this compassion and justice: Out of representation is produced the order of justice moderating or measuring the substitution of me for the other, and giving the self over to calculus (Levinas, 2000:158-159). And out of this compassion, this substitution, this responsibility for the other, comes release from the chains of the ego: Substitution frees the subject from ennui, that is, from the enchainment to itself, where the ego suffocates in itself due to the tautological way of identity, and ceaselessly seeks after the distraction of games and sleep in a movement that never wears out (Levinas, 2000:124).

Centuries before, the Mahayanist Buddhists developed their concept of the bodhisattva grounded in the Madhyamikan concept of sunyata, which has many definitions but implies the lack of an independent, separate reality inherent to any object: The unfolding of the Mahayana marked a decisive phase in the history of the Buddhist tradition. Against earlier forms of Buddhism the Mahayana represented a metaphysical shift from a radical pluralism to an absolutism anchored in the doctrine of sunyata; epistemologically, through Nagarjunas Madhyamika, the Mahayana moved from a psychologically-oriented empiricism to a mode of dialectical criticism; ethically the centre of gravity shifted from the arhat ideal of private salvation to that of the bodhisattva, one attuned to the universal deliverance of all beings down to the last blade of grass. (Oldmeadow, 1997:181) According to Oldmeadow, The bodhisattva is one who voluntarily renounces the right to enter nirvana, who, under certain inextinguishable vows, undergoes countless rebirths in the samsaric realm in order to devote his/her energies, in a spirit of boundless compassion, to the deliverance of all beings [...] (Oldmeadow, 1997:183). He adds, The 4

attainment of insight into sunyata makes possible the compassionate mission of the bodhisattva, unhindered by dualistic misconceptions (Oldmeadow, 1997:185). Oldmeadow further details the relationship of insight into sunyata and development along the path of the bodhisattva: In the Mahayanist perspective karuna (compassion) is inseparable from prajnainsight into sunyata which, for the moment, we can translate in conventional fashion as emptiness or voidness (Oldmeadow, 1997:186). However, to avoid the egoic attachment of the subject to this insight of prajna, Ultimately, karuna is identified not only with prajna but with sunyata itself. This is so because the duality of knower and known must be transcended (Oldmeadow, 1997:187).

Francis Brassard explores the notion of bodhicittathe bodhisattvas desire to serve othersas explained by Santideva, a Madhyamika philosopher. Brassard examines two traditional stages of bodhicitta: The first type is called bodhipranidhicitta and can be translated as the resolution to attain Bodhi [awakening] and the second, bodhiprasthanacitta, as progression toward the attainment of Bodhi (Brassard, 1996:51). Brassard rejects the view that an active will or desire is involved in the second stage, the progression. In his analysis of Santidevas work, he comes to the conclusion that the efforts given to help all sentient beings are not the product of a desire but rather the result of having reached a certain spiritual stage (Brassard, 1996:59). Referring to the many passages in Mahayana literature exploring self-sacrifice of the historical Buddha or of bodhisattvas, Brassard writes: What transpires from such passages is not the idea of strong will or intense motivation on the part of the Bodhisattva, but rather, an attitude or readiness. This readiness does not seem to be the result of an active effort of renunciation similar to that given by a smoker trying to stop smoking, but, on the contrary, 5

it appears to be a natural disposition of the mind. It is something that is or ought to be done quite effortlessly. (Brassard, 1996:60) Again relying on textual citations, Brassard writes, The idea of readiness is further emphasized by the fact that it is not the Bodhisattva who initiates the action of giving but rather those who are in need (Brassard, 1996:60). Brassard concludes: Given these examples, I am of the opinion that it would be wrong again to interpret the generous attitude of the Bodhisattva on account of his willpower or even his commitment to the final goal. Instead, his readiness to give up parts of his body for the sake of others could be explained by the fact that he or she has attained a state of mind characterized by the absence of a lack of motivation. (Brassard, 1996:61) Brassard states that feelings of joy and contentment are related to the self-sacrificing attitude of the Bodhisattva and not a product of strong will (Brassard, 1996:63). Once a particular spiritual level has been reached, an act of will or a commitment, as mentioned earlier, does not have any role to play; as a matter of fact, it might be counterproductive because it reinforces the distinction between subject and object (Brassard, 1996:64).

Rounding out our examination of the ethics of the bodhisattva is Peter Harveys account. He connects the Buddhist principle of co-dependent arising, which states that all phenomena are related, to the Madhyamikan concept of sunyata: Nothing exists absolutely, with an absolute nature; things only arise in a mutually conditioning network of processes. A key feature of each process, and the network as a whole, is its emptiness (sunyata): its lack of inherent, substantial existence. This is also expressed by saying that all the dharmas [which Harvey earlier defined as changing mental and physical processes] lack any nature of their own except this shared quality of emptiness: the sameness of all dharmas. (Harvey, 2000:124)

From this postulated interdependence, Santideva persuasively draws on such ideas to argue that indifference to the suffering of others is as absurd as indifference to ones own suffering (Harvey, 2000:125).

Hence it can be seen in both Levinas responsibility and the Madhyamikans compassion of the bodhisattvas that a deconstruction of subject/object duality leads to a rather similar responsibility or compassion for the other. The breaking down of this duality is not a conceptual affair but rather is preconscious or intuitivealthough in the case of the bodhisattvas there are vows, obviously conscious, that are taken first. Nonetheless, true progress on the bodhisatvic path is not rooted in conscious acts of willnor is conscious will a central feature of Levinas responsibility. As we have seen, Levinas vividly sketches a picture of the Self held hostage by the other in light of the incomprehensibility of the other or the Infinite. The Self as seen by Levinas expresses itself most fully in meeting the needs of the other, just as the bodhisattva expresses compassion through a non-volitional self-sacrifice. In neither case is this expression of compassion dependent on justice or other conscious frameworks. Instead, intuitively grasping the illusory nature of the subject/object dualism leads to recognizing the needs of the other as the responsibility of the Self.

Of course there are differences in these approaches. As with Buddhism in general, Madhyamika sees in sunyata the end to all dualism. Levinas is more ambiguous. Peter C. Blum says Levinas rejects Kantian dualism in which the intelligibility of the world [is placed] entirely within the confines of subjectivity (Blum, 2000: 95) but Levinas retains

some elements of Cartesian dualism in his indebtedness to the idea of God (or, as he refers to it, the idea of infinity) in Ren Descartess Meditationsan idea from which he draws primary inspiration for his account of the Other (Blum, 2000: 99). Although Levinas rejects the Cartesian notion of a self-reliant subject, there remain traces of a Western dualism in his thought.

Levinas presents his analysis of the human condition as a universalhe makes no exceptions. The path of the bodhisattva, and the notion of the bodhisattvas compassion, is a notion limited to those who have taken the vows of the bodhisattva. These spiritual adepts demonstrate their compassion in daily life. Levinas approach to responsibility is that our responsibility endures even if it is not displayed. In Blums words: Further, my responsibility is not eliminated even if I eliminate the Other physically. The face commands me not to murder; that I am capable of breaking this command does not silence it. That there is an Other means that I am perhaps not the center of the universe after all and that I am not the only one who might possess all that I possess. To go on as if I were the center, as if I were the only possessor, would be to position myself over against the Other in a way that would necessarily impact the Other. I did not know I was so rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything for myself. Metaphysical desire is as much a compassion and a generosity as an appetite. (Blum, 2000: 111) So in Levinas there is a universal, but often hidden, responsibility. In comparison, the compassion of the bodhisattvas may be hoped for as an ideal for all humanity, but by definition the compassion of the bodhisattvas is seen only in that limited group of people who choose the bodhisattvic path.

Tracing these philosophical systems separated in time and space, one is left with the unity of belief in the illusion of subject/object duality and the road to responsibility or 8

compassion that this leads to. Levinas explicitly incorporate the idea of compassion in his notion of responsibility, and in turn the bodhisattvic compassion entails a responsibility for the other with self-sacrificing dedication. Although Levinas and the Madhyamika school of Buddhism differ in the details, the tight connection between the dismissal of this duality and compassion for the other remains. It is perhaps yet another indication of an enduring ethical and spiritual meaning that underlies all systems of thought: transcend the ego, a selfless compassion results. Here we have two systems of thought, roads that lead if not to the same mountain, at least to peaks from which very similar views may be seen.

Bibliography:

Bernasconi, R. & Wood, D. 1988. The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other. London: Routledge. Blum, P.C. 2000. Overcoming Relativism? Levinass Return to Platonism. The Journal of Religious Ethics, 28(1): 91-117. Brassard, F. 1996. The concept of bodhicitta in Sntideva's Bodhicaryvatra. Doctoral dissertation. Montreal: McGill University. Harvey, P. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Levinas, E. 2000. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press. Oldmeadow, H. 1997. Delivering the last blade of grass: Aspects of the Bodhisattva ideal in the Mahayana. Asian Philosophy, 7(3), 181194.

10