:r1unicipal ut

COURT OF APPEALS
FOR. TEE Un:TH CIRCUr':"'
PREFER::<EC Cm:.r.:Ui:7IC;:'-.TIONS f I1JC .. , No. 84-554:
a
n I

'-.E\ llant,
\['V
't/ S .. BEIEF OF TF-.E
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_ <0"'"...., ........ ...- ..-. <""l r"'f-.. ..... ...,..,.......".... ....... " .......... , '1'.....-.. ... .,. '!'" r"'<. '" .,..r ........ (T'!",;,":"< Ijl{"'lf,"':',,-," /"',\--::'
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15
2. r.;.U1"'.. lC:"Da.l co ratior:; arlc
16, a
I;
17
d
llees.
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19
JERC:lE S. FALX, JR.
D I

.... RD, R:CE, :'JEl'-lEP.C\7Sr(I , Crit';..:!\D1Y 1
[, FALK
A Professional Corporation
Center, 7th
San 941'1
ne: 415/434-1600
-1
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10
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TAELE OF
9
11
2
3 Table of Authori ties iii
4 T
ST OF
2
3
6
1. CABLE DOES NOT INFRINGE
S RIGHTS. 5
7
fl.. The Of A Cable
8
And The Rendering Of
Cab:e Services, Involve
No Ex raise Of First
Rigr1-:S. 7
E. Los Franchis:ng
From
Engag:ng
That Do
!'-2 S s:, on ..
I I .
19
16
Because Program
I / The
17
Test De:-i .. F:-c!7l
States v. O'Brien :3 '::'caDle. 20
18
B. The Interests
19
Served By Cable Franchising
Are I=portant And 22
1.
21
2. Community Access Service. 24
22
3. Leased Access. 25
23
4. Technological Sophistication. 26
5. Minimizing Of
Ri s Of Way And Related
B':..:rdens. 27
26
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22
Table of Contents
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

,\...-
12
:'::.\
C. Franchise Furthers
Interests. 23
D. Arguendo, That The
Franchislng Precess Incidentally

To ress Itself Via Cable,
That Restriction Is No Greater
Than Necessary To Further The
cified Interests.
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16
, 7
1 S
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22
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_____.14
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Acton CATV, Inc. v. City of Duarte,
No. CV-83-1018-RG (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 1984) 4
Affiliated Capital Co . v. City of Houston,
735 F.2d 1555 (5th Cir. 1984)
Allied Pictures Corp. v. Rhodes,
496 F. Supp. 408 (S.D. ohio 1980), af:'d,
679 :.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1982) 15
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) 17
Berkshire Cablevlsion of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke,
571 F. Supp. 976 (D.R.I. 1983), cketed,
No. 83-1800 (1st Cir.) 21, 25
Black Hills Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65
( 8 "'::--:. Ci r . 19 S 8 ) 10
3reard "I. Alexandria, U.S. 622 (1951) 27
i
-1 ""J'';;-V''H'C;'''-'; ,I Q;; r:".::::.
e.eb' e"lision Inc. v lR7 F?rl
.... -_ .. -.1.- l
Cir. 1967)
16
Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
17 .
582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972) 10
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, -- U.S. 5, 10, 17,
18
52 J.S.L.W. 4803 (June 18, 1984) 29
1:)
Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367 (1981) 17
Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto,
No. C 83-4231-SFL (N.D. CaL), (579 F. Supp.
21
1553 (N.D. Cal. 1984) 2
22
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers For Vincent, 19, 20, 21
--U.S.--, 52 U.S.L.W. 4595 play 15, 1984) 22, 3L 32
23
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
24
-- U.S. --I 52 4986 (June 29, 1984) 32
Community Communications, Co. v.
660 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981),
26
456 U.S. 1001 (1982)
-11:
City
--", ,-..\ nv
L ...... "'. ,'--" I
1 ' Cases
(cont.:..nued)
2
3
Conley E:ectronics C6rp. v. FCC, 394 F.2d 620
4 (10th Cir.), cert. den:'ed, 393 U.S. 858 (1968)
5
FCC "'I. tJational Citizens C::or."'.rn. For
436 U.S. 775 (1978)
6
v. United
7
Tel e-/l s ion, Inc., 3 92 U. S. 3 9 0 (:. 9 68 )
8
Falls Community TV Cable Co. v. FCC, 416
F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1969)
9
Heffron v. International Soc:'ety for Krishna
10
Inc. 452 U. S. 6';0 (2.981) I I
11
::o::'le Bex O::::":.:e, \l. F:C, 567 F.2d 9,
(D.C. Cir.), cert. de'.:'eci, U.S. 829 (1977)
12
CaDle I!1c. 'j. Per."yroya 1
13
IrlC. I 562 F . SLlpp. 5c;3 ("I.D. Ky. 1982)
A
,Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976)
i 5
Inc.
(D.C:. C':'r-. 1965)
16
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
17
Lamont v. General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965)
18
a
Los Union, Lccal 1021 v. Los Angeles
Iv
Board of Education, 71 Cal. 2d 551 (1969)
20
rletrorr.edia, Inc. v. City of Sa:;. Die;o,
453 U.S. 490 (1981)
21

t-;SC, 1:;.c. v. United States, .j..L_ U.S . 190 (:'9-i3)
22
-' 0. ..... ....... 'O"'eoa oIl __ __..J.. _
Products Co. v. City of
23
Indianapolis, 69';' F.2d 119, (7th Cir. 1982)
24
Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento,
No. C I V - 5 - 8 3 - ::. 03 4 -(.j L S (E. D. Cal . Aug. 3 J 19 84 )
25
26

Page
10
17
9
10
15
9, 21
4
27
10
27
17
31
27
25
4
2, 4
12
13
14
Total
( 9 -<:h
:;
I 4''''c:.
I V--.J
1 iI
Cases
........_
'I
,
q
(cont:inued)
2 q
I'
3 :1
'! "'I. 416 U"S. 396 (1974)
4
Red Lion Bro asting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)
5
Rowan v. U.S. Post Office
6
397 U.S. 728 (::.970)
7
State of New Attorney Investigators
Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Richards, 711 F.2d 8
8
(2d Cir. 1983)
9
Teleprompt:er Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 V.S. 394 (1974)
10
Titusville Cable inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d
1187 (3d Cir. 1968)
11
Telecable, :nc. v. 4:1 F.2d 639
Ci r. 1::;: 69 )
States Corp. I
U S h.:a
v ... ...,/ \ -' 1-..
I States 0' 3,!:":, .. 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
'" T +- ..
..Jnl ..... ec. Sta::es <? Inc. I
16
334 U.S. 131
17:1 U.S. Postal Service v. i1 of Greenbur
Civic As 453 U.S. 114 (1981)
18
v. Virginia Citizens
Council, U. S. 748 (:. 9 7 6 )
20 i Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.),
21
I cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975)
22
Warner Bros., Inc.
(D. Utah 1981)
v. Wilkinson, 533 F. Supp. 105
23
Young V. AmerIcan Mini Theatres, Inc.,
24
427 U.S. 50 (1976)
25
26
17
17
26
8
9, 12
10
10
9, 10, 17,
25
21
10. 12
13 I 14
17
8
15
10
-v
sand Sta-:utes
2
3iPb u... ", C '"'oO'
i: u. CCle 0
II
,I
4 Ii Cable Act 601 (..;,)
II
5;1 Cable Communica-:ion Policy Act of 1984,
'I! P b T 1\1 9P -"9 (C: Q" -c .... e r1
.j u. w ,0. 0, er.c;.
6 0"'" , , lOP' .. . "b t'
I 1..:., ana slgnea y ne
71
"
ii
'I
President 30, 1934)
8
6
3,
-n
jv
6, 13,
'1 C. Ferris, F. Flo:yd &: T .. Casey,

Cable (1983) 8, 23
22
M. Hamburg, All Abou 1.02,2.09 8

23
::drr'.ent I
24
7, 10, 11,
25
26
8
9
10
11
1 2
13
h .... ,
"'................ ' l( 1 A
"-' .{ "' ..... , , ...
15
16
17
18
19
20
47 C.F.R. 76.31 (1983) 3, 23
Gcv't Code 53056 3, 5
47 U.S.C. 2Jl-222 8
o r:-:':"es
5
22, 23
,
130 Congo Ree. HIC";'35 (daily ed. J.. ,
H.R. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) passim
24
Cable 7elevision Report and Order,
36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972)
Ot!:1er
2
3
4
5
16
17
8
19
20
21
22
23
24
26
6
"::, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976) 17, 24
9
.......
and I F.C.C.2d (1977) 23
10
11
!,....;," ___ ..
, .1.- I I. 'c '---'
25
.,,-
12
!\jL:.
17

South 30
& 14
7
8
11, 17
i5
31
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---
INTEREST OF NHCI CC'RIAE
2
The present case is one of at least three fi d by counseL
3 for Plaintiffs challenging the power of cities to franchise cab
1
4
television systems. One of those three cases is pending
5
inst ci in the Nor rn District of In that case,
6
amici (as defendants therein) filed a motion r sumrnary j udgment on
7
I
1
September
21, 1984, which is now duled to be he on
I ,
8
Noverrmer 30, 1984. The First issues in that case and tDlS
9 one a.:::-e close ly re 1a , if not identical.
10
The legal analysis of the First Amendment issues which
presented to the District Court in their case and which
present here, dif rs sorewhat f.:::-om the arguments that
presented by the parties in is case. In our view,
to franchise c Ie television systems without
':\r.ene.ment rights does not depend on es lishir:g ei
television is a "natural monopoly" or that, Ii
and television broadcasting, re 1S a severe
..... ;...,,,,,+
("\1"""'
on t::e number of cable systems can be
Vi::"
!':'.3 te i.
UTi "r'"\
:- While there is merit to such contentions, ",;e
think i
+-
'-
15 '" ... c:: '-"
20
21 ;, 1/ The secone. case is Pacific West Cable Co., No.
i'l CIV-S=83-1034-I-1LS (E.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1984), in w'h1-ch the District
22
Court has a motion for preliminary The
:11
23 I[ case is Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, No. C
183-4231-EFL (N.D. Cal.). In that case, brought against 2r,ic; ?e.l
II Alto, Menlo Park and Atherton, the District Court denied a t.u
2
4 dismiss the First Amendr.ent cIa (579 F. Supp. 1553 (N.D. Cal. '11
25 !1.11984)), but invited defendants to file the motion r SUf':'J':',arv
judgment which is .currently ndi
26 Ii //
1
I,
II
I
11
C1
12
14
of cities
1
,::;,
16
18
lir:Litation
19
to decide them. Rather, as s brief demonstrates, Plaintiff's
2 First Amendment claims fail for more fundamental reasons.
3 INTRODUCTION
4
P intiff has launched a broadside rst Amendment attack
5 on the practice expressly approved and authorized by the California
6 Legislature (Gov't Code 53066), the Federal Comraunications CorJnis
7 sion (FCC) (47 C.F.R. 76.31 (1983)) and, most recently, effectivel::,
8 mandated by Congress in the Cable Cormunication Policy Act of
9 Pub. L. No. 98-549 (S.B. 66, enacted October 11, 1984 and signed by
10 t
President October 30, 1984), of franchising one or more
1 1
television operators who will best serve the interests the
provid::':,g hi cable service. Plaintiff claims . a.
-,
\
nt guarantees it, and all others similarly
t_ absolute right to construct and operate net'.;orks
,
a.nte:1nae, poles, conCUl,-S, and other plant cn
rights of way in the South Central District of Los
to some undefined, but min 1, lice power
18,
,I
of tir:ce
It seeks, in ef ct, the inval aticn of a:'
,I
i
19 '
tate statutes and 102al ordinances, as well as compre
20 new federal statute, thit authorize the of cable
21 [lvisio:1 svstems.
il ....
11
22 : 1
Plaintiff s First Amendme:1t claim is at once
Ii
d
12
16
in
First
inclined,
subJect only
3';.(:
:1
23 II 1
ted. It is sweepi:1g in its condemnation of the franchise r;:';cc.t:'l
II
24 il! b\' whi ch cornrr,un i t ies acrosst country have tradit lly regul:lto
25[, cable
II
tele'lision. It is a limited cIa however, In the sense t:;
26
1,1
,I Plaintif":: has not attac d the details of Los Ange 5' particc.lilr
!I
I
-3
franchising process--a process in which it decl d to partici
21Ipate--but, rat r, has questioned the very institution of c Ie
311 :ranchising. Accordi
, we have no occasion to address, and this
4rcourt need not consider, the legali of each possible provislon of
51 a franchise agreement to which Plaintiff did not wish to be a party.'
I
BliThe question is simply whether cable franchising as an institution
7 II is constitutionally sound.
81 The courts that have aedressed similar First Amendment
i
i
9 II c 1a in recent year s have held that francr.ising of caD' e
'I
,I
. b 1 2/
10 is const-itutionally pe SSl -,-e.- State legislatures and the
11 1 rl
...... '.....4. Congress plain agree, ar.d no court has at:. r',';': se. The


12
District Cot:rt' s ruli this case
1 <::
, In acee \-; i t
ht 0 legislative and judic"al autnor:ty. It also
14 ,correct as a mat-tor of law. Nunicipal franchisi
>
15 CO:1struct and t-::::rate a c e s}'sterl ....
16 with--indeec:', afirmat Iv serves--the F.:rst fi.r.e;;drrer.t.
,
1 I
first instance, it does not infringe any of bona fide
18
communicative r:gnts. Section in:ra.
19
2/
F.2d 119,
,
, No. Cl;-83-1018-PG U1Cx) (C. D.
..
, f fact and
find otherwise, the infringement is content-neutra' and not
20
21
22
3 :2 ) ;
23
24
25
26
law) i see also COrilf:1Un':'t.y Cor:u.mr.ieations, Co. v. City of Boulder, 60C
F.2d':" ,---rJ/S-80 (lOth Cir. 198':"), ce!:'::. dism'd, 456 U.S. lnOl
(1982) (reversi grant of preliminary n unction to c le operator
challengi cable districting legislation); Pacific West Cab Co.
v. City of Sacramento, supra.
II
-4
5
10
15
20
25
substantially broader than necessary to protect those legitimate
2 governmental interests it serves, so that under established First
3 Amendment doctrine it passes constitutional muster. Section II,
4 infra.
i
il
6 !I
7 Ii I.
II
8' CAB:SE DOES NOT INFErJGE
I PL\n:TIFF' S Cml.t'1U:;ICATIVE RIGHTS.
9
The institut of cable television franchising is Vlr
11 tua 1 as old as the cable indu try itself. Presently, local
12 lj govern!:',ents in -five states have jurisdiction to franchise
""\
i'
13 :!
C,
:cable operations, and in the other f states, state COr:',,'T1SSlOns

14 ,: fran ise local SystS2S. Albert, The Federal and Local ReGulation
!I
of Cable Tele"ision, 48 U. Co2.o. L. Rev. 501, 509 n.36 (1977).
16 Sanctioned by FCC under t t Supreme Court has recently
17 described as a "progral7', of 'deliberate structured dualism'" 2-1:::-
18 suar.t to which "state and ca: authorities [havel responsibility
19
r granting franchises to c 2.e rators within their cOr:-L.-:':-1nities
(Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, -- U.S. --, 52 U.S.L.W. 4803,
21 4806 (June 18, 1984)), local franchising of cable television In
22: California is aut rized by comprehensive state 1 i5
Ii
"3 i!
c. !i lation. See Gov't Code 53066-53066.4.
i
!I
24 il
Moreover, the authori of state and local government to
'I franchise cable sion operators--and to exclude those not
I
26 i francl1is -was expressly confirmed by Co 5S when it adopted
-5
5
10
15
20
25
1 3
12 ';conce!"!1S a.:;.c. goals, '::--.e First AL,endr'tent value of
II assur [ir..g J tr.a t c . the ',lidest
ssible G
rs': of and services to the
Cable Act 601(4).
Plaintiffts constitutional theo
;
,

I
strucLure. It lr1 one st::coke
11 dere lat:e -::.he
18
cons--uction and cpe::cation 0= local cable television systems,
19 would recuire the Court to declare the Cali c::cnia legislacicn a:
t
Cable Act unconstitutional. 5e dramatic results are the
21
22
3/ A COF! 0"" tt-:e "Cable .'\ct" 1S provided in I'.dix A. ':.:;::
Court's CCf:'\/cr'lience I a of the F,eport of the HOLl e e
23
cn Ene;::,gy and COTI':':erce, to v;hich re"'erence is made nerectfter, icc
ct 0 provi ct, in Appendix B. Pertinent excerpts from the
24
sional Record are provided in C. Strictly speaking,
t10n 2 of the Cab'e Act arne s the Communications Act of 1934
addi:1g a r:ew Ti tle VI. The Section nUI:1bers ci ted rein are to '::'
COlTtITunications Act of 1934 as are d by Cable Act.
26
/f
r
-1)
16
1:
2
3
4
6
7
8
9
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 (hereafter "the Cable
3/
Act") Sect 621 (a) (1) 0: the Cable Act expressly aut rizes
a c1 to "award 1 or more franchises within its jurisdic
tion." Exerc i se of is authority is, as a ctical matter, manda
tory r municipalities desiring cable television service, r
Section 621 (b) (1) provides that" a cab le operator may not provide
cable service without a franchise." The Cable Act is the result
years of legislative study, deliberation and te (see H.R. Rep.
934, 98th . , 2d Sess. (1984) ndix B reto) i 130 Cc:-.g .
Rec. HI0435 (daily ed. Oct. I, 1984) p .. ppendix C)) ar.d is a
c rehensive ch seeks to accornrr,odate a list 0
1 !consequence of Plaintiff's erroneously that eve
of television enj s First Amendment protection so that
franchlslng of cab systems becomes, in its view, impermissible
4 II licensing of a protected activity. Plaintiff has pain with far
Ii
Stoo broad a brush. To a large extent, cable television ownership
6 and ration involve no communication protected by t First Amend
7 ment Section I(A), infra. l10reover, where such are
8 involved Los Angeles' franchise program does not material inhitit
9 them; to t contrary, by reason of the" ased access"
10 imposed by t franchise and required by Congress, Plaintiff wiil bE
11 free to exercise its First speech rights rdless 0:
hC'.!,
12 whether it owns and operates the cable system. Section I(B),
c>\"\,';.L.""> 1 3
ii'

15
16
17
18,
that,
,I
'1 ' _
19 :: l.tselr I involves no protected bv
I
I
Ii
20 build a system, the operator must secure the necessary easerents
21 Ii or rights of way, install signal ga ri and electronic
il
II
22 i, distr tion string or lay cable throughout the area 1 ar.. (
I
I
23 Ii connect it to each customer's hor.:e or business. These act ities
24 II themselves are no more protected 0y the First Ace nt than a::.:e
[I
25
11 construction of water, electrica2., or gas distribution sj/stems, cr
26
11 fOr that matter telegraph or telephone stems. Kreiss,
-/
The construction of a cable system is a
Deregulation of Cable Television and tte Problem of Access Under the
2 First Amend:nent, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1001, 1011-12 (1981) (hereafter
4
3
I
4
Likewise, many services provided by a cable system, once
5 it constructed, do not invo corr",unication or expression
6 protected by t First l\r.er,dment. To take an obvious example,
7 provision of interact services, such as fire and burglar
8 systems, hor.e banking, a interoffice data transmission involves nc
9 element of expression on the part of the cable system
" . --'
10 :O\.,;ner!or::erator. Yet these services are a potentially slgnl:
11
source of cab e See 1 C. Ferris, F. F
12 T. Cas e '/, Cab Ie Te I.;; ,: s i 0 r: La"v <IT 1 4 . 0 2 (1 98 3) .
13
Similarly, the original, and still
1.:1
cable channel s9ace is ret-an ssion 0:: prograr7L':1ing procluced
alteration. See M. Hamburg, All About Ie 1.',)2,
1 Ie Television Law, , SgS.03-.04; see also id.

scr ins FCC IS "r:\ust carry" n:::gula ons). For
18
,
cable operators use raster antennae to capture .LOCCl._
19
avai able stations ('.<lh ch FCC "must carry" rules reqt!i re
20
21
4/ Despite fe ral and state lation of the tele
phone lndustry (see 47 U.S.C. 201-222; Pub. Util. Code
22 :1 7901-7906), no telephor:e company or prospective provider of t 'E::
i phonE:: services has cha':lenged these regulat.ions cIa ng a First:
23 iiAJ:-;ce:::dr,'ept. right to own or operate a tele r:e systen. The
tl First Z\r.1encment interests rec ized in the telephone
24 ,Ibeen t se of
I tors
25:! r
114:2 3 .
26 :1//
I;
II
-8
I
II
I
il
II
II
Ii
15
rs
16
17 .. 7.06-.01
5
----
10
15
20
25
4
1 I carry), others that are more distant and hence unavailab
to
2 .,
most viewers, and distribute those signRls through the cab
I
31 distinction between retransmission of off-the-Rir broadcast
ming of others en the one hand and operator-originated programming
(" cablecas ting") on other is well recogniz See
6 j Corp. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 404, 409 (1974); Home Box Office,
7! Inc . FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 45 n.80 (D.C. Cir.), cert. den , 434 U.S.
8 829 (1977); id. at 61 (,deigel, J., The courts have
9 recognized that in signals--without
addition, or the exercise of editorial judgment--cable operators arE
11
doing no mere than passively conveying the of others to
12 viewers. United Artists Televis Inc., 392

U.S. 390, 399-401 (1968) (cable opeY"Rtors who retran ...
signals to enher.ce Vie'.lers' capaci . to rece such signels do not
perform the retransmitted rams of copyri
but
whereas broadcaster is an

17
"active tor is merel
18
sis d)); 7eleoromoter Corp. :. CES, , 415 C.S. a:-"

19
408-11 (cable operator's distant broadoast sigra..l.s
from one reg n to does not constitute of the
21
retransmi t ted programs; If [e] ven exe ro ising its limited freec:'ofC1. tc
22 choose among various broadcast stations, a CATV operator Slmp
23 oar.r,ot v ie'.,"ed as' seleotir,g " 'procuring,' or I prcpagat ing'
24
broadoast signals"); United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406
649, 680 (1972) (Cm:glas, J., jo d by Stewart, Powell and
26 Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) ("Cri':'V is simply a carrier having no
-9
14
16
more control over the content than does a tel hone com
pany"} i accord, Kreiss, 54 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 1024-26. Thus
-----
,
it is not surprising that the FCC's ex nsive regulations governing
cable retransmission activities have uniformly en urhe1d against
First 11l:'.endment challenge. See Great Falls Cornmun
v. FCC, 416 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1969) (reaffirming Total Telecable,
Inc. v. FCC, 411 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1969}) i Titusville Cab
i:
8,:: Inc. v. United States, 404 F.2d 1187 (3d Cir. 1968); Black lIs
9
10
11
12
'\\,i\ ['\

13
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

(1968) ;
38/
196"7); Icar-:o
, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968);

, 394 F.2d 620 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 858
F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir.
Inc. 'J. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
A plurali of t CO'Jrt the B'ack Hills Video caSE
in States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. at 659 n.li.
S reme Court has upheld these regulations as
consistent with ral Corrnur.icatior.s Act. CaDi tal Ci ties
.
short I to the exte!'. t Seck to
retransmit over its own cable the same signa s distributed by other:
(including Los les' franchisee in the South Central District),
its preclL:.sion lr::rlnges no First lti'11endment right. C.:.
.i'ur.ericar1 , 427 U.S. 50, 78 & n.2 (19/6) (Pm':ell,
J., concurr g); United State v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., U.S
131, 166-6; (1948) i __ ________________ ______________ 333
F. Supp. 582, 584 (O.O.C. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (19;2).
Since t O\mership and ration of cable
-10
---
5/
,
1 : systems frequently entail no exercise of the sort of corununicative
2 rights that the First A.J:1e nt protects, it is necessary to us
3 carefully on those of a cable television rator that do
4 e:1joy First Amendment protection in order to examine whether the
5 ss restrains the exercise of se rights. As
6
franchisi:1g
explained in the next section, that is not the case here.
7
8
9
B. Los Anaeles' FranchisinG Proaram
if .-I
Does Prevent Plaintiff From
10
In Activlties
That Do Constitute t
11
me:1
Al h ;r,05 t cab services are not protected by

,--,"'.>,A.:"'Y 13 first .i'>.r.enc2ent, sOr'.e surelj' are. For ex le, to the extent that i
14
operators originate their O\vn prograrruning, they are
5/
15
ln an t First protects.
16
17
Ie operators also select prograrnl'"r1ing pro d by ot::--,0'':'-::'
HEO, Show-tir::e, le ";e.;'s :::etwork) and ide it to theil:
18
often for an rge. h this Court
not reach the issue here, it is highly doubtful t such se
19
(wit editing or alteration) of an entire package of movies
other features, or corrmerclal decision to offer articular
20
premium netwo such as HEO, is kind of edltorial or
21
protection.
I
22 i
I
i 1025-26.
23 I
I Even if the selection and retransmissio:1 of the progr.::::,:
24 i mi:1g of others did consti tute an exercise of
II First Ame:1dment r iahts in t abstract, ial
25 i. dees not restrict the exercise of those rights
26
(continued)
-11
s
0
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

'.r\ ::iZ,,'\ :;"
13
14
"ccrr.ercial
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
the distinction between activities in which a cable operator
proposes to engage that are not protected by the First Arnendment a
those few that are is crucial to the proper analysis of this case;
as to those in the latter category, the short and di sit ans;ver
to Plaintiff's First i'.l':1endnent claim is that Los Angeles' ::ranchis
ing program simply does not preclude Plaintiff engaging in the
5e lection, creation and / or di s tribut ion of prograrcning by f:',eans of
c Ie television. To the contrary, Los Angeles is endeavori to
facilitate and expand such expressive activi not only by 01 In-
tiff but by any 0 rs who nay wish to engage in it.
Both the federal Cable Act the Los Angeles
resuire that channels for al use or access--typ
"leas access" chanr.els or, in the language of the l..ct I
access" chan!"',els- reser?ed r "cof:'tfllec::-cial
liers with program ser?ices which compete with existing cabl
offerings, or which are othe se not offered by the cable opera
"
H.R. Rep. No. 934, at 30 The SO'J t 1:
5/ (footnote continued)
rator intends to offer onlv those program packages alre
offered by the rival operator to whofll the franchise is awarded.
p.lO, supra; United States v. Paramount Pictures, suora, 334 C.S. at
1 6 6 - 6 7 i c f . 11 k( fa c t t hat cab "

viewers broadcast signals that ha:e
alre y been to the public does not change nature c
the cablecaster's role from viewer to performer).
6/ There are certain "grandfather" provisions in
Act, but to the extent the Act is relevant here, will not __
to t franchisee for the South Central District because it is
(continued)
-12
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1 1
, ; ''"j ". ::.,r;:-.......
" n\.. y,
::'J,,
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1 ....
I I
18
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21
22
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24
26
Central District franchise requires t t at least two such channels
..., (
be reserved (see Appendix D hereto 4.6(b) (5) (d)--"); and the
Cable Act formula see note 6, as applied to 52 channel
system to be constructed in the South Central District (see Appen
dix D 4.6(b) (3)) will ire that, in fact, f channels be
reserved. As a result, Plaintiff will be free to use the leas
access channels for any progranming or other expression of ideas in
which it desires to enga , even though it has not sought and will
not receive a franchise to construct and rate a cab television
system of its own.
In short, Los Angeles' franchise program Sl ly does not
preclude Plaintiff from engaging in cablecasting activities, such as
original pro ng, that are protected by the First
wi_l be free to do so via leased access to the cable
less of who constructs and operates it.
In this respect this case is similar to U.S. Postal
tnote continued)
in operat According the provis s relating to I
"::"eased channels" app fully to all systerr.s not rat cn
July 1,1984. See 612(b)(l)(E). Li1<e'.-1ise, the irer:1ent t DC
cable system may operated without a franchise applies to all
systems not lawfully operating on that teo See 621(b).
The precise number of "cor:unercial channels" iree L:nGel
the Cable 2\ct depencis on the total nurrber of channels In the sys1:e;.1.
For those over 36 but not more than 54 channels, 10% must be
reserved for cOI:lrnercial use by others. 612 (b) (1) (A). For those
vlith 55 or more, the percentage rises to 15%. 612 (b) (1) (B) (C). I
7/ Judicial notice of this public record is requested.
/;'
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23 i
24
26
Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114
(1981), in which t plaintiffs raised a First Anencment challenge
to a Postal Service r lation prohibiting deposit of unstamped
mailable matter in letterboxes. The Court upheld the re lation
the grounds that the letterboxes did not constitute a pub:ic forum
and that the regulation did not restrict the plaintiffs' speech.
to the latter, Court observed:
"We are. . not confronted with a regulation ,-lhich
in way restricts t appel s' right to use e
mails. The appel s may mail their c ic notices
in ordinary fashion, and the Service will
treat such notices identically with all other mail
It! i thou t rega r d to cont e r; t s . " ( I d. at 12 7 )
No"ti'1g that would be required to pay if t
chose to mail their notices, the Court rejec"'" tr:e
"assertion because it may be somewhat more efficient [.:=or t
appellees] to place their messages in le"tterboxes there is a
Id. at 129.
Like the regulation upheld in cable
s not prevent Plaintiff from usina cable to deliver ::..tS
sagE. Plaintiff may lease channel space Ii anyone else, ':
will be permitted to do so without ard to the nature or content
of its progr Although Plaintiff may prefer, for reasons 0
profitability or otherwise, to construct its own cab
than payin,g a reasonable rental fee to trans;:"it its message via a
cable o\vned ancther, the opin makes clear that it
/ /
/ /
, .1
-.4'1
does not have a First Amendment right to do The franchise
2 process may deny to some the opportuni to construct, operate, and
3 profit from a system of antennae, wires and electronics; but it doe
4 not restrain the opportuni ty to cOIfu'7lunica te by Hay of cable te
5 vision.
6 Since governmental conduct that does not impair
7 tion does not raise First Amendr,ent concerns, no further showing on
8 behalf of Los Angeles should be necessary to affirm the result
9 beloH. Never less, the wrongheadedness of Pl tiff's cla is
10
underscored by recognizing t, under the aegis of the First
11
ment, Plaintiff seeks to invali te a franchise process t t if'. act
12 enhances the rtun i ties for cOf.';!11unica tion ty cab Ie te levis ion.
13
Cable fran:::::hising ?rODotes First Amendment values and
F,L
14
interests in two fundamental respects:
15
First, the franchise model increases the opportunities f8r
16
exercise of First rights. r or not cable television
17
is a "natural monopoly," no or:e seriously disputes that the n or
18
f cab e sys ter:-.s t can co-exist in the saGe service area
19
20
81 See also v. International Society for
ConscIOusness , 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (upholding staL.e
21
ru r sa s, exhibits, and distribution of literature to be
carried out only at assigned locations, noting that rule did not
22, 0 nization right to conduct its activities at soee poinL.
II within the forum at issue); Warner Bros., Inc. v. Wilkinson, 533
23 'I' F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Utah 1981) i Artists Pictures Cor? v.
I Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 433 (S.D. Ohio 1980), arf'd, 679 F. 2d 65q
:: II (6 th Ci r. l 9 8 2) .
I II
!
26 / I
-15
,
..... '\
" "" '-.l-_
,., r,
''\...\..., =


3
4 COI1'm/Ent L. J. 1, 10 (1981)
4
(he::::-eafte::::- "r.1eyerson") i see Affiliated Capital Corp. v. Cit?
+
of
5 Houston, 735 F.2d 1555, 1563 (5th eiL 1984). kewise, no one
ser ious ly di s es t t an un::::-egulated cable operato::::- will generally
7
6
be unwilling to lease channels on its cable system to others on a
8 whol non-disc::::-ininato basis s nee to do so would unde::::-nine the
9 operato::::-'s cont::::-ol of the system and allow programming in
10
Thus, in
11 absence of f::::-anchising, v:hether a co:cr.'lUni ty tad only one cable
12 systen or two or even three, editorial control ove::::-
tit ',vi th the
infinite and, In fact, is at best. t<1eye::::-son, The Fi::::-st Amend
2 ment and the Cable Television Ope::::-ato::::-: An Unp::::-otective Shield
.
13
: cab:e p:rograr:;r.i::g mo::::-e than a handful cf cable
14
.ose lacking the e':::c c wherewithall 0::::- practical
to a c S'\ls:'en vlould deniGd the very
16
communicative opportunl that Plaintiff incor::::-ect alleges Los
7
Angeles r:ged: access to the c Ie 'I iewer s 3es
18
cab2.e
19
Dv the f::::-anchise now roved Cc:-;c :;:).:::. ,
20
and employed by Los Angeles, by inc ing a i::::-ement fo::::-
21
channels among other modes of access, denies those
22
to own a cable monopo v power ove::::- access to such cable
23
See H.R. Rep. 934, , at 30-46. In doing se,
-""""'-
24
enables other potential creato::::-s and disseminators of tc
25 have access to the franchisee's leased and thus to the
26 cable vier,tiers in Los Angeles' Service Area. In short, the
-16
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8
9
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25
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12
1 c::
, ...;
91
StateBd.
425 U.S.
09 (1974);
(1969);
r:1S
-=--"'-',:-:-'
franchise process seeks to expand, not inhibit, opportunity
free expression by cable television. See id.; Report and Order, 59
F.C.C.2d 294, 299 (1976) (access rules "have as their foundation an
increased opportuni ty for communications and a furtherance of First
Arnendrr,ent objectives").
Second, the reciprocal First Amendment interest is that of
91
t he Vlewer.- Cable franchising furthers that vital interest in
two ir:1portant ways. In the first place, it is unlikely that a
viewer's home will be connected to more than one cab1e--even i Gore
than one cable system exists in a given service area. By
See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U. S. 367, 396 (1982.);
()f?harDacy v. vi rgi:1ia Cit iz ens Consu!",er Councl I, Inc.,
748, 756 (1976); Pr:ocunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, F;2
Red Lion Broadcastina Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
Lamont v. Postmaster Ge;eral, 381 u.s. 301 (1965) i see a1
a es v. , L.S. at rT'tl'
va c serv ce by "meeting public denand :or t.o_c
vision ser:vice in ar:eas too small in population to support lcca'
stations or too rer:1ote. . to rece regular or good
reception" (quoting Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C. 2d 725, 78
(1966)) .
Ensuring access to diverse sources or
of the pr:ir:\ary obJectives of the First Ar:1e:1dDent. See FCC v.
Citizens COTI'.T:".. For: Broadcastina, 436 U.S.
(1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCe, supra, 395 U.S. at 390;
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Cr:isp, supra, 52 U.S.L.W. a
United States v. Midwest Video, # , U.S. at 667-68, 673 &
n.27. Indeed, it has been force argued that prcvision for
leased access is mandated by the First Amendment. , Kreiss,
54 S. Cal. v. 1001 (1981); Nade note 5, 11 1
am Urb. L.J. at 220 & n.221. That issue ne nct be
here, of course, as Los Angeles (and Congress) have already pro\" c
for leased access channels. The point is that, whether Los s
and Congress are honoring a First Amendment command or merely ser'-'
ing First ArrIendment va' ues, the franchise model they have se1ecb",c!
serves the very interests that t First Arnendcent protects.
II
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potential number of cablecasters who will compete for the
viewing audience, the f iselleased channel model ensures that
the.c le operator will not be able to restrict the cable
subscr rs' selection of cablecast programs and that the
subscribers will have t opportunity to select competing
:1g of::ered others on the channels. In this

- House COrlI:littee vlhich developed the Cable A.ct stated:
"A requireme:ct that cha:cnels be set asi for
third-par corr,ercial access se tes editorial
cont.rol over a liri nur-ber of le c :1nels from
tr!e c\;:cership 0'" the cable system itself. Such a
is fundamental to the goal of providing
rs with the di7ersity of informatio:1
scurces i:1tended the First A.r;,endr:-,ent." (H. R.
Rep. r:c. 934, , at 31)
In acc::tion, t =}:"anchise 1 avoids the problem 0::
16
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
26
r1ar::/ c i tize::.s ir. a ccrr.rnu:1i "C.;/ 0 the opportunity to become cable
subscribers at all a:1C thus denies them access to the range of
that the cable systen See p.22-24, infra.
These points are, of course, frosting on the
EVen if Los Angeles Viere not fosteri:1g First Amend::le:-l
values, it is undeniable t t it is not inhibiting Plaintiff fror
engaging in any activities tected the First Amendment.
ml.., -""
...L 1.( ct '
being so, First lmendment clain must be rejected.
II
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I !
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II.
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF COULD SHOW THAT ITS
ABILITY TO CmL."lUNICATE IS HIPAIRED BY
THE LOS ANGELES FRANCHISE PROG&\N, THE
FIRST vJOC'LD NOT BE VIOLATED.
Even assuming Plaintiff could demonstrate that it intends
and is prepared to engage in protect expression via cable and thai
Los Angeles' franchise program somehow prevents it frem doing
so--sonething we be lieve the ious discussion shews is plainly
not the case--Plaintiff's First Anendment claim would
fail. Po.s the Supreme Court recently observed,
,., [T]o say the ordinance presents a First Amendment
issue is not necessarily to say that it constitutes
a rst ALendr.-,ent violation. ' It has been
clear since this Court's ectr'iest decisions concern
ing the free of speech the state may scse
t s curtail speech necessary tc advance a
signi:icar.t interest."
The two "tracks" 0'" First ADendr.-.ent analysis that
Suprene Court has loped are now universally reccgnized. As
Professcr mribe describes them,
"The Suprene Cour'" has e\-olved t"vo nct
approaches to the resolution of first amendment
clains1 the two correspond to the two ways in which
government may 'abridge' speech. I'" a government
regulation is aimed at the communicative impact of
an act, ana sis should proceed along what we will
call t one. On that track, a regulation is
un cons onal unless governnent shows that the
message being suppressed poses a 'clear und present
danger,' constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or
otherwise falls on side of one of
the I s the has drawn to distinguish those
expressive acts privileged by t first amendment
from those n to government regulation with on'
minimal due process scrutiny. If a governnent
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regulation is aimed at the noncornInunica tive impact
of an act, its analysis proc s on what we will
call track two. On that track, a regu tion is con
stitutional, even as applied to express e conduct,
so long as it does not undVly constrict the flow of
and i as. On track two, the 'balance'
between the values of freedom of expression and the
government's regulatory interests is struck on a
case-by-case basis, guided by whatever uni ing
principles four.d in past decisions .. II
(L. Tr , FJ'"":lerican Constitutional Law 12-2, at
p.S82 (l978) (herearter ilL. Tribe"})
Accord, City Council Los Anaeles v. Taxpayers Fer Vincent,
52 U.S.L.W. at 4598-99. Although for the reasons discussed in
-'= '
Sectior. I, , we believe that Angeles' program

impairs no First Amendment ri ts and, accordingly, that no weighing
of interests is necessary in this case, even if the Court were to
conclude othen:ise Los sses constitutional
Eluste!'.
Plaintiff does not contend that in evaluating
franchisees, Los les considered the content 0= the applicants'
proposed programming. To the contrary, as shown below, its goals-
such as assuri cable service to all resi ts who desire it,
provision for puclic access, leased channels, a "state-of-the-art"
system, and avoiding unnecessary disruption of rights of wav and
related burdens (see pp.22-27, infra)--have nothing whatever to do
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with the content of a franctisee's cODIDunications. See Hor.:e Box
Office, Inc. v. FCC, supra, 567 F.2d at 48 (purpose of protecting
viewing rights of those 00t served by cable or too poor to pay for
it is neutral); Berkshire Cablevision of Island, Inc. v.
Burke, 571 F. Supp. 976, 98'7 (D.R.I. 1983), docketed,
No. 83-1800 (1st Cir.) (r:1andato provisions for
access to cable are content-neutral).
In this res ct s case is like Taxpavers For Vincent,
supra, which upheld an ordinance banning the posting of slgns on
public property_ Like t ordinance, the Clties' cable franchi
process does net "regulat[e speech in ways some view
points or ideas the r.se of others." I d., 5 2 U. S L at

-' In the case, Court :ound
"not e'len a hint 0:: bias or censorship ln Ci 's
There
is no claim that the ordinance was designed to
suppress certain ideas that the City finds distast
ful or at it has been applied to appe:lees cause
of views t they express. The text of t
ordinance is neutral--indeed it is
silent--concerning any speaker's int of view and
e Court's findings indicat that it has
been applied to appe:lees and 0 r 1n an
evenhar.ded mar.nar." (:d. )
Becal.:se frar.cr.ise precess is neutral,
'" J./
two" test, derived from United States v. O'Br n, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) lies.
"
52 U.S.L.I!.
4599. As r.oted, test requires a balancing of the interests
promoted and the al cCIT'xmnicative interests c:
Plaintiff. r it, an otherwise p r rnDent regulation lS
sufficiently justi:ied if it "furthers an tant or substantia:
-21
fo::: the National Scier:ce Foundation)
i
1 ,government interest" and "if t incidental restriction on al d
2,IFirst Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
3 !\herance of that interest." , 52
391 U.S.
4I,u.S.L.W. at 4599 (quoting United States v. O'Br
5ilat 377). As set rth below, both of these conditions are plainly
6 II t
lime re.
7 ,I
II
8;
:1
II
9!
Ii
B. The Interests
!I
Served By Cable Franchising
10
,I
I
Are Important And Substantial.
!
11
Franchising serves a of vital interests of

.. \- 1..
RJCE 12 potential c lecasters, and governnent:
'"'t,\
13

14
1.
15
C Ie systems are capital intens , and the cab itse
16 accounts for the bulk of the required capital investment. W. Baer,
17
46, 52 (1973) (R3.nd
18
(hereafter "Cable ':::'2: ,:>
19 vision :.iandbook"). Thus, cost of a cab system increases in
20 direct proportion to nurrtber of oi s of cable laid. The greater
21 the density of households in a g n area, the more households a
22
single mile of cable can serve. Cab ision Handbook at
23
'
H
ence, allot r factors being equal, cable system is
24
en ced by construction in densely populated areas and dirinished
25 by
ding service to sparsely populated ones. See id. at
26 I / /
-22
Similarly, because demand r le se:cvices will highe:c in areas
2 popula by families with a middle- or high-income level than it
3 : will :c low-income areas (see id. at 42), operators prefer
4 II to lay c in areas that a:ce populated by midd class o:c wealthy
511 families.
See 1 Cab_l_e__T__e_____s__i_o_n__L_a __ w, supra, (dJ i
6iland r, 66 F.C.C.2d 380, 388-89, 392-93 (1977); Cable Television
7ilRepo:ct a:-ld Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 208 (1972).
<I 8 For these reasons, absent a franchise irement that
9ise e be p:covided to all households, an 0 rator is likely to
;1
10 ,I begir. constnlction ir. :1se2.y-populated, le-class or higher
11 :1 incof:1.e areas and ei r lay extel1sion of services to less desir

12
RJL:

C.-\"'-.!'\L""'r' 13
S"--

14
15
16
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Ie areas until all of more profitab ones have been wi , or
fail to wire such areas altogethe:c--a phenomenon as "cream
sk
ng. " In 1974, widespread practice and undesirabili o
"creaD skiJ::L.'C,irlg" was recognized by the FCC, \vhich adopted a c
se standard iring that full notice and public hearing
adoption of "a franchise ccnta ( i a policy of cor.
rec;:uiri ss than camp te ring of the franchise
47 C.F.R. 76.31 As the FCC later no
"[o]ur intention in adopt is. . p:covision
was to nt 'crear..-sk.
17
18 structior
'--the practice of
wir only the more profi le portions of
franchlse area while leaving unserved the poorer or
less pulated areas." ,s ,66

F.C.C.2d at 391)
The FCC conc 1 that ensuring "p:covision of the best and mas:::
extensi"lIe cab cove:cage to subscribe:cs" in this re
that could best be accomplished through local franchis
-23
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j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
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j
j
j
j
j
j
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than federal lation. See see also inet on
Cable Communications, Report to the President 81-82 (1974) ("To mee::
this difficulty [i.e., that of cream-skimraing], franchisi author
ities should require extens of service to all portions of t
franchise areas.
II
)lG/
In short, the free market model ses a substantial and
recognized risk that "less desirable" nei rhoods will not
access to cable television services at all.
2
Public, and governmental access :rea:ter
"corr.r:mni access") re er.able
to serve local needs and interests an to foster a sense self
14
sUDra, 36
59 ?C.C.2d 294, 296 (1976). Specif
16
governments and to convey ical1
2
' I t
allQ'.y al
1 7 inf 0 rr;ta t -for Ie, city meetings, local news, ar.d
18
scheol or ccllege sports events--te the local wnlC..
19
ticular interest in it. See Cable Tel
_____r_, 36 F.C.C.2d at 191. 8i1.',i lar ly, e ational access
21
22
10 The interests to be advanced avoidance 0_
, "cream-skir:L"'ing" are net only those of local 90vernment, but are
23
also (and primari ,) those of cable importar.ce
First Amendment c racter of c Ie viewers' interests in this
24 ct were by the Tenth Circuit 1.n Ii
660 F. 2d 1370, 1 & n.
I 10 0 1 (1 9 8 2), as we 11 a s by CO:1g res s .
II 8 e e , , e s p e cia1 at p p . 3 1 - 3 6 .
26 II ----"
I
-24
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10
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I
1
I
. channels allow local schools colleges to offer their services td
2 a broader sector of the cOITu'Uc.nity t t supports them. Id. Local
3 is, of 90urse, a function r which cable is uniquely
4 suited. Report of the Sloan COITmission On Cable s On
the Cable The of Abundance, 97-100, 117-18, 123-26
6
(1971) (hereafter "Sloan Comnission Report"). In sum,
7 access channels benefit local citizens and by providing them
8 a means of expressing ir ideas to local viewers. They also
9 benefi t vie'tlers bo by increasing ir know dge about and ster
i
their participation in local governmental COT:'"-:,,uni
11
ities and by increasing diversity of voices and ideas t may
12 hear on the cable.
--..\. "\ . .:... r-1\
,----, ,,"" \L , 13
Suprer.e Court has recognized the rtance of the
\:,,,

14 interests ur.cer ing Los Ar.geles' cOf,u-runi access requirenents both
in the context broadcasting (NBC, Inc. v. United States, 319
16
i
190, 203 (1943) )
and .. the context 0 cable. United S tes v
17
t;ldv;est Video Co . , 406 U.S. at 66 -69. S lar l.:i' , the
18
Fec.:eral District Court for District of e lsI recogr.i eel
19 t
importance of t se gove-nmental interests in upholding Rhode
Island's nandatory cable access r irenents. See Berkshire Cablc
vision v. Burke, , 571 F. Supp. at 987-88. Congress nas
--"-
22 recentl'! s to same effect. H.R. Rep. [;0. 934,
23
at 30.
24
3 . Lea Access.
26
As noted earlier, one of the most important potential
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3
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7
8
features of a c Ie system is the availability of "leas access
channels," since s requirements ensure that at least sane of
those without the resources to construct a cable
will have access to cable television viewers. See pp.15-17,
Although potential!y revenue-producing, leased access
channels proscribe the rator's own use of a port of the
channel ace on a cable system and thereby operator's
control over system as a whole. Specifically, they require the
9 . operator to allow others to corI:1.unicate over the cable and preve,+::
it from controlling the content of t progranml I which
11
COr:lpetc 'tli tr:.
,
l ts O',,'I1
.
For 5e reaso::-'.s, c Ie ra
tors arc not i;:cllned to nondiscrininatory access
rec:t: i re!:',e:l. t th2t r sc)n , , at 10.

4.
16
transit in the cable I7'.eciu;'.1
a ene-way distribution techno log:' to a interactive Ded
, c:
-'-
18 in the early stages, and the revenue structure _or the industry :2
19 still based on one-way services. becau
perceived risk that the data rarket will not devel
21 an ocerator is not likely to provide state-of-the-art features such
22 as computer-to-conputer data transnission unless required to as a
23 cendi tion 0 f operating a sys ter:1.
24 / I
/ /
26 II
-26
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1 1
HC\

12
\..E,\
C:\"",,\["r 13
1\,.
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'8
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5. Disruption Of
Rights Of Way And Related
Burdens.
Installation maintenance of above and below ground
c Ie wires requires a level of act ity that obv usly
has the potential to be disruptive and burdensome in a variety of
res cts. The quantity and burden of these disruptive activities
are, of course, increased never more than one cable system is
constructed within the same service area, as well as by any
refurbishing of a that has become technologically inadequate.
"There is," of course, "a 1 t as to how many times a munlci litv
will war.t its streets torn up." Meyerson, at 27. I
--'--
requiring advance disclosure of pertinent data and employing ot
"screening" devices, t franchising process serves to
spec or such disruptions, at least as they might resu:t from
underilnancing, incompetent management or poor planning.
Minimizing disruption and sion of c Ie installa
t n and maintenance bv avo ing needless duplication of the cable
plant and by assuring at outset a technically sound and
logically current cable system is precisely the of gC21 on
which the Supreme Court has repeatedly relied in uphol police
power regulations against First Amendment challenge.
U.S. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736-38 (1970) (frotection
of individual prlvacy in home); Bard v. Alexandria, 341 C.S. E2:,
644-45 (1951) (same); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949)
(same; traffic safety); see rOIT'.edia Inc.
453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (plurality) (traffic safety); H\'I'.es ','.
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Hayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 618-19 (l976); see also
2
Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d at 1379
3 (city's districting sc for cable might justifiable as "neans
4 to avoid cking into an outmoded or less than state-of-the-art
Ie communications systen").
6
In each of the foregoing respects, the interests underly-:
7 ing cable are, as a matter of law, important, substan
8
tial and to a large extent already recognized.
9
11
c. The Franchise Mode
rnr.en ta
12
13
Los Angeles, the United States Congress, and r,ost ci ::ies
14
which have considered the problem, have conclu that the alterna
tlve to franchising--the unregulated 1 tr:at Pl tiff urge::;--is
1;:;
v inc able of achieving the foregoing ooli objectives. As noted,
17 the interests of a cable rator make it ghly
18
that, absent the compUlsion of a franchise, it would provide
19
t:o all parts of service area, and a state-of-t -art
public access channels, or leased access channels. That: be so, a
21 city would be unable to induce other operators to install a rival
22 system with those sired features for several reasons: First, it:
23
lS rare econoDical feasible for more than one system to serve a,
24 given service area. Meyerson, I at 10; see Affiliated Ca ita"

Corp. v. City of Houston, supra, 735 F.2d at 1563.
Second I eVE n ,T
26 the economics might permit parallel stems, once the most
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9

iE,CZ,L!\'
C/\><>\=:'\
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13
portion of the service area had been "cream skil':'Jrled" by an unreg
ulated system, such potential cOffipetitors would deterred and,
even if t were not case, the of a cable system in
the most profitable sections OF the service area would render any
r al system rator S3 able willing to sustain t
added cost of the desired system features. pp.22-23,
Third, by allowing construct of the first unregulated cable
system, a city forfeits the leverage necessary to ojtain such cen
cesslons from a later prospective c Ie operator.
operator will have no reason to agree to serve all of the
service area and to provide public access, leased c 15 f ana
like if the municipali cannot exact those concessions as the
of
14
16
17
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21
22
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24
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---"-
franchising is an ef ct ve mechanism r a'Cta:.r.l
se kinds of objectives lS by its
ma]ori of localities have regulated their construction and of era
tion of cao_e systems throll a franchising process. See p.:-,
supra. The FCC has endorsed svstem 5 i:::g b\' 10ea 1
governr.'Gn t s . See pp.3-S, sucra. ties Cable
, suora, S2 V.S.L.W at 48C6, the reme Court reaffirmed the
. 1 '
FCC's statutory authori to create lS dual f ra.l- oc:tl. regt.:
latory sc , thus indicating its recognit of t11e 1 tt?
governmental interests franchising serves. And, most recently,
ss has sweepingly endorsed the Franchise model as the essen
tial means of achiev these rtant object s.
The new Cable Act expressly addresses the licic;s tha'"
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7!lnated

I l:<.. ep.
1
i'
il franchising serves. p.mong ot r ngs, the Cable Act provides:
2:
I
(1) The franchis au rity must assure that
<I
1
3 d :,1 " ,.."
oes not occur that low-ir:.come neighbo
II
1
4 !Iare not denied cable service. 62l (a) (3) i see H.R. Rep. No. 934
,i , at 5 9 ) ..1.1
i'---
9
11
1 ...,
, I
18
19
21
22
23
24
26
!I
"
( 2 ) Cities i.re that channel capacity be desig
for public, educational or government use. 6l1i see H.E.
934 , at 3'0,41;-47. 11/
;0., -'
(3 ) As alre no cable operators with 36 or mer
(4 ) The authority may impose
13 carcis for a:-:d ui.pmer.. t" (5624 (b) (2) (A)),
channels must reserve cor."rnercial access ("leased access") channels.
See p.13, supra.
a 1 SC) rec!,..l re
624 (b) (2) (E)
.. ') /

In sc:::t, ess
and many ether cities
11/ Sectien 4 of the Soc:th Central franchise requires
that service extended to all parts of the D_strict within three '
(3) years, subJect to
12/ Section 4.6
requires a nimum
menc access channels,
stan
inclu n
abili
br-cad catecori.es of progr
See H.R. Rep. No. 934,
_
, at
.."'"-
has reccgnized--as Los
- -that on 2.::- by
reasor.able exte!1sions the city.
of the Soc:th Central District
two Dublic access channe s, two local
and educational access channels.
13/ Sou Central District franchise contains extensive
r facilities and equipment, as well as ffilnlffium ser speci
'\lices. ndix D.
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ro, -,
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this kind in a fra ise can achievement of the important
public object S disc1;s above be assured.
D.
The final of the O'Brien test is that tne
lnCl nta: ef ct franc:-:is g S 0:1 S ech, if a:-IY, not be "sub
stantially bro2der t nece a-y to protect the City's inter
estls}." , 52 U.S.L.W. at 4600; see

As Cu ifor a Court has noted,
test. cuses
pt:. 21 -.=2,
avail ility of alternativEs
fer the gevern2ent but also on t gree of lmpalrment of First
rs Union Lecal 1021 v. Los
Anaeles Beard of Education, 71 Ca 2d 551, 556 (':;'969); acccrc, L.
su;::::ra, 12-20 at pp.683-87 & :1.10 and cases cited t::erei::.
previeus section 0_ t s br show :hat
is necessary to ebtain a cable systen t t me ts Les les'
tant public policy objectives; wi t franc s se ecti'1es
in all 2..ikelihsoc \/C'..lld not be Moreover, any intrusicr
Plaintiff's First Amendment r hts that mi a se result ::r::m.
franchising is at least minimiz , i:E not e1 , by
vision of leased access. See Section I(B), s Los les
thus ensured that the franchising process "curtail no more
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than is necessary to accomplish its purpose:s]."
Vincent, , 52 U.S.L.W. at 4600. This is more than sufficient
--""-
to meet the O'Brien standard. See id.; Clark v. for
Creative Non-Violence, -- U.S. 52 U. S. L. W. 4986, 4989 (June 29,
1984).
cm:CLUSION
Plaintiff's novel legal tory would invalidate the instl
tution of franchising, the state laws that regulate it, and an
new and comprehensive federal statute--the Cable
Act--which careful balances competing interests in order to
proDote the veyy First AP.end::r,ent values Plaintiff ''''ofes es
to protect. But cab television franchising is,
It furthers important interests without
the right of anyone to cornr:1Unicate by c lecastir.gi indeed, it
11'
First interests by e ClY'.; t.
rtuni ty of non-cable system owners to cor:u':1unicate over cJ.cle
opportunity 0 viewers to rece programming from dlverse
II
II
/I
II
II
I
'
I
I
II
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1 II source s.
211
The judgment should be affirmed.
Ii
,I
31
II
Kovember 9, 1984.
4 II DATED:
'I
:1
JEROME B. FALK, JR.
DIRK M. SCHENKKAN
61
THERESE M. STEWART
H0\;ARD, RICE, NEHEROVSKI, CAt;J:..DY,
1
7
ROBER':'SON & FALK
A Professional Corporation
8
9
11
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
17
18
19
21
22
23
24
26 ' 110984/6- 3 5 0 4 0 OC f
-33
PROOF OF SERVICE
2
3
I, SPIEGL, declare as follows:
4
1. I am a resident of the Ci and County of San Francisco,
5
i
over the age of eighteen ars and not a party to the within action.
,I
6My busniess address is Three Center, Suite 700, San
7 Francisco, 94111.
8
2 On November 13, 1984, I served the following document:
9 BRIEF AY.ICI Cl'RIAE OF THE CITIES OF PALO ALTO AND HENLO P.2,RK A:':O
1C THE OF ATHERTON by Federal Express addressed as fo ows:
Steven K. Rubin, Esq.
Deputy City Attorney
12
City of Los eles
.,", '
-,,', " ,--,"'-....,
P.O. Box III
13
III N. Hope Street
Los les, CA 900S1
15
and by First Cldss United States Mail with postage fully prepaid
16
addressed as follows:
1 ..,
, i
Haro Farrow, Esq,
FARRm..;:, & HAINS
401 Grand Avenue, Second Floor
Oakland, CA 94621
20
I declare under penalty of rjury that the foregoing
21 is true and correct.
22 Executed this 13th day of November at San Francisco,
23 CaliOl"nia,
24
/
"
25
26