Udita Das Miranda House University of Delhi Roll Number: 3113 3.4.

2012 The Modern imperial state imposed a thin administration: advanced capitalism invested little: and a civilizing mission ended up supporting conservative chiefs Based on your reading of Burbank and Cooper, discuss the imperial trajectories and repertoires of modern colonialism.

For over two millennia of human history, empire and their rivals have interacted to produce the varied political possibilities which provided the groundwork for people to pursue their ambitions and envision their societies. The seeds of the empire building were sowed by the ancient predecessor empires of Assyrians, Egyptians, Persians, Greeks which were expanded further by Rome and China preparing the stage for later social processes. Byzantine and Carolingian empires as well as their Asian counterparts of Ottomans and Mongols followed the classical models with required modifications. But the story of empire did not end there as in some distant future Sartre notices: Not so very long ago, the earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred million men and one thousand five hundred million natives as a handful of superpowers wielded their strength on this majority of native world population (Sartre, 1961). Thus the emergence of new concepts of imperialism and capitalism paved the way for a new dynamic of empire ethic in the 19th -20th centuries. Empires over the ages have shown distinct and diverse repertoires of rule depending on specific geographic and historical situations. Thus there is no universal formula for effective running of an empire but are driven by heterogeneous modules. Imperial strategies are thus flexible and innovative as opposed to continuity or change or contingency or determinism. The earlier multicultural empires were motivated by expansionist/militaristic policy towards an integrated economy of world-scale creating strong cultural institutions to accommodate and assimilate people allowing them to imagine their states and place in them. The early modern period ushered in a new age of maritime expansion sponsored by royal Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese empires to compete with their rival Ottomans and with a zeal to tap the important trade routes for acquiring resources and labour. Modern empires now took a turn in capturing lands creating large semiautonomous organizations of power dominated by an imperial culture upon an unequal hierarchy of heterogeneous population. The very fact that the early modern and modern empires undertook the conquests on the basis of a religious/racial discourse and failed to accommodate the varied population within their realm led to their decline. On a more Marxian basis, earlier colonialism was pre capitalist whereas modern colonialism was based on west European capitalism. Modern colonialism did more than just extracting tribute,

goods and wealth from countries but even restructured the colonies economies by which the latter provided the source for raw materials and labour as well as the potential market for the produced European goods. Thus there were global shifts in population and resources ultimately profiting the mother country: where materials and native labour would be transferred to metropolis or other locations and also associated transfer of colonisers for administration. Thus colonialism assisted the growth of European capitalism and industry. (Loomba, 1998) As imperial strategies are not uniform a set of modern characteristic modules for ruling are generalised by Burbank and Cooper. These are therein: Empires employed politics of difference recognizing the presence of multicultural subjects without incorporating them but rather segregating self and the other. Thus attempts to impose this colonizer-colonized binary resulted in metropole-colony distinction, restrictions in sexual relations and assimilation of the two cultures. The political imagination for the 19 th-20th century colonial campaigns was based on the principle of civilizing mission underlined by racial theories. Modern imperial states often inspired by earlier empires tried to impose homogenization or differentiation but clashes of interest or rebellion compelled them to place a thin administration in alliance with local leaders. This aspect draws us to another trait of modern empires where they created allies in the form of marginalised local indigenous leaders. At times they used transplanted loyal imperial agents brought from homeland or the very opposite tactic where transplanted slaves are used placed in high positions by their imperial masters. Inter empire interactions and rivalry provoked competition, imitation, innovation- both war and peace preventing the possibility of a unipolar power. Empires were variable political form where sovereignty was shared out, layered, and overlapping and sustained due to their flexible ruling modules. What we see in the 19th century is a vital transformation in the repertoires of rule of all the major empires. Thus this era of inter empire conflict led to sudden rush for new resources and colonial acquisitions. As French revolution and Enlightenment placed questions about the status of the colonized to these empires they took to modern way of acting as nation states. However this concept of nation state and empire was not in correspondence with each other. Though the superpowers set out to furnish their own homeland with glory and gold there appeared a rupture between their support of national self determination and refusal of the same to others. Also there were concerns regarding the unstable relationship between the nation, state and empire. There was not only a clash between the nationalists and the imperialists but the presence of uprooted slaves as in black slaves in Spanish Cuba and Puerto Rico, for example, posed a major problem for the nation state formation as the nationalists desired for a white, civilized, independent nation in Caribbean endangered by the presence of so many black slaves. The nationalists were thus anti-imperialist, anti-slavery and racist at the same time these slaves were exploited by both the pro-secession and pro-imperialist forces. While assessing the relationship of slavery to empire it is noticed that the empires were not only responsible for protecting slave insurrection and slave plantation but also made way for its abolition. The early British rule of slavery posed problems in the wake of anti-slavery campaigns of the liberals which drew on an inclusive conception of humanity. The break of the symbiotic relationship between the colony-metropole hampered the British economic prospects though Adam Smith proposed wage labour to be an effective alternative for the British capitalists. Ideologically, the European elites supported morally superior wage labour and the market and a more forward society set against a paternalistic protection of workers and old corrupted society of slave owners. The major change in the imperialist stratagem lay in adoption of a civilizing mission to transform the natives into rational, economic actors from savage sloths in 1833 with abolition of slavery.

But this did not last long as difficulty in managing ex-slaves and their eventual usage of freedom called for a harsher racial ideology to be imposed as a method of exclusion of natives to economic rule. Deepening of racial discourse further transformed the colonial character of the state repudiating the impossibility of integrating slaves as subjects but as different from them. There is a marked absence of stable plan as strategies are moulded in lieu of the current situations and opportunities. The present situation involved increasing usage of contract labourers/indentured labourers based on geographical displacement from Asia to Africa and coercion to maintain discipline. The new way of ruling was racialized system of rule and labour discipline. As Robinson and Gallagher point out that the gap between the losses of American colonies and African conquests were filled by a drive towards building a strong navy by the British. This new period was marked by employment of power without formally conquering or annexing parts of the globe. The extension across space was not formally incorporating areas but threatening them with the colonisers superiority in terms of capital resources, military might, skills and mobility to exploit the weaker colonies vulnerability. Burbank and Cooper find this novel idea of imperialism as de jure recognition of another states sovereignty but de facto treatment of that state as only partially autonomous. The ruling elites of the colonies were bribed by European business classes and institutions to mould their governance to facilitate the influence of the colonisers. 19 th century saw a rapid rush towards colonial acquisitions of territories and resources among the industrializing powers which led to creeping colonization. The characteristics of these modern empires were explicitly exhibited by Great Britain and its relationships with the colonial territories. The first of the colonies where Britain displayed its strategies was China then ruled by the Manchu dynasty. Previously this Qing dynasty would control trade and commerce according to its own terms but 19th century changed the balance of power in favour of Europe as Europeans coerced the weaker Chinese state to serve her needs and followed an open door policy . Increasing demand for addictive items (opium, tea, coffee, sugar, tobacco) created a world consumer market between Great Britain and China interlinked by Calcutta, London, Canton, Hong Kong where bulk of capital was stored in banks and insurance companies. Chinese Qing dynastys attempt to impose a ban on opium trade for health reasons and more for its silver drain resulted in a failure as Britishers coerced China to open its ports on British terms. This entire rule saw placement of a supraficial administration which was furthered as foreigners exercised extraterritoriality application of their own laws in criminal cases in Chinese territory by mid 19th century. With declining power of the central administration the peripheral land areas controlled by local elites seized opportunities to expand their business with foreign support. Additional internal problems occurred with Christian missionaries who preached an opposing ideology to that of the dynasty. We see a collision of old versus new strategies which resulted in the victory of the latter which were mightier and needed the contacts of the localities in Chinese commercial networks for trading purposes. The situation reached its extremity as Boxer Rebellion broke out not only against the foreign power but also Chinese empire. As the Qing dynasty was unable to repress the revolt a coalition of foreign powers consisting British, French, German and Japanese took to containing the revolt. Burbank and Cooper also notes that Hong Kong did not follow the usual traits of modern colonialism with distinct resistance and collaboration, rather British inhabitants lived segregated lives and contingent accommodation was seen on the part of local elites in stark contrast to resistance as seen in other colonies like Asia and Africa. There were versions of enclave colonies and territorial colonization as Britain acquired Aden, Burma and other sultanates in 19th century. Britain showed diverse repertoires of rule for its different distant acquired territories. Australia was used by Britain as a disposal place for its convict population for keeping them away, punishing

them and creating a labour force. With the number of free settlers on the rise, a unified system of administration was imposed in 1850s. The ideological basis used by the British was that land occupied by nomads were for their legitimate rule with little regard for the natives such as Maoris abused by the state and settlers. This was accompanied by the formation of white, Protestant communities tracing their genealogies and forming a Greater Britain. There was no formal plan of running an unequal society as it existed except for some active resistance against crass materialism and capitalism. This new strategy employed here was in the form of a composite polity which was an amalgam of political units, each exercising sovereign functions but recognizing another level of sovereignty at the imperial level. Thus Britain imposed a Dominion on Australia which neither enjoyed autonomy nor complete subordination. Britishers on the whole used various repertoires of rule from granting economic incentives, coercion, controlling of ports or by imposing protectorates, dominions or colonies. Sovereignty in every case was not uniform rather composite, layered, overlapping. Britains free trade imperialism depended on changing modes of inter empire competition seeking alliance with old or new powers to intensify and extend colonial rule. One of the most classical cases of British imperialism was that of India. Initially India in the 18 th century saw paramountcy imposed by the East India Company as they established de-facto power in India in alliance with intermediaries accelerating the traditional Mughal dynastic decline somewhat similar to the Chinese empire. A cluster of princely states loyal to the British enabled smooth governance as direct rule was yet to be launched. We see hierarchical systems and layered sovereignty by which intermediaries used to collect revenue for the Company which became more entrenched with Permanent Settlement of 1793. Alongside Indians were also employed in lower posts where Company officials supervised their work. This use of intermediaries is similar to that of the Ottoman Empire and C.A Bayly sees this as a transformation from trading enclaves to territorial empire. Colonial power thus reinforced a thin administration of Residency system through alliance and surveillance over local intermediaries without industrializing or creating fully open markets in land. Similar to the Chinese case, profitable items of cotton, opium especially indigo and tea expanded the area for cultivating these though products like indigo was harmful for crop production and peasants rebellions against foreigners as well as oppressive local elites were successfully crushed. Concerning textiles, India became both the supplier of raw materials and market for the imported textiles destroying the indigenous industry. A feature of colonial rule that was to have far-reaching consequences for the post-colonial world was what Nicholas Dirks has described as a cultural project of control, one that objectified the colonized and reconstructed and transformed their cultural forms through the development of a colonial system of knowledge that outlived decolonization. It was an approach that reified social, cultural, and linguistic differences, causing the colonial state to be described as an ethnographic state. (Dirks 2001).1 Yet while imperial anthropologists such as Herbert Risley, census commissioner and later Home Secretary in British India in the 1900s, helped furnish a library of ethnicity, its shelves lined with tribal monographs (Young 1994: 233), what colonial regimes generally did was adapt and develop difference rather than create it where none previously existed. Anthropologists have been better at capturing this alteration than political historians or political scientists (Cohn 1996; Dirks 2001). Bernard Cohn notes that while Europeans of the seventeenth century lived in a world of signs and correspondences. . . Indians

1 Nicholas B. Dirks, Foreword to B.S. Cohn, Colonialism and its forms of knowledge: the British in India (Princeton, 1996), ix.

lived in a world of substances (1996: 18).His phrase captures a profound shift in how people first constituted and then transmitted, perceived, and interpreted authority and social relations. In the mentality of government, the malleability and pliability afforded by substance gave way to the unyielding notional rigour of scientific classification the intention being to set rigid boundaries so as to control variety and difference. As Cohn puts it, the command of language was paired with the language of command (1996: 16).2 While this did not erase the legacy of the precolonial, it certainly transformed it. That the impact of colonialism has been transformative rather than transitory is now widely accepted. Half a century or more after their independence, developing countries still live with colonialism (Sharkey 2003: 141; Dirks 2004: 1).

In this fashion, over the last two decades, knowledge has become a key issue in exchanges over the theory and practice of writing about European colonialism in Asia. Knowledge has come to preoccupy historians, anthropologists, geographers, area studies specialists, as well as scholars in postcolonial and gender studies as the production of knowledge is now understood as being fundamental to the power struggles, intellectual transformations and cultural realignments of modern colonialism. As recently as the late 1980s, many historians of European empires downplayed the role of imperial ambition and questioned the importance of ideology, seeing empires in Asia as the product of a series of local crises that ensnared European commercial interests, encouraging the militarisation of cross-cultural trade and growth of both formal and informal imperialism from the Persian Gulf to the China Sea. There is no doubt that Dirks and Cohns formulation owes a considerable debt to Edward Saids paradigmatic Orientalism (1978) in focusing attention more on imperial intent than colonial consequence. Said uses the concept of discourse to re-order the study of colonialism. It examines how the formal study of the Orient, along with key literary and cultural texts, consolidated certain ways of seeing and thinking which in turn contributed to the functioning of colonial power. Said argues that representations of the Orient in European literary texts, travelogues and other writings contributed to the creation of a dichotomy between Europe and its others, a dichotomy that was central to the creation of European culture as well as to the maintenance and extension of European hegemony over other lands. Saids project is to show how knowledge about non-Europeans was part of the process of maintaining power over them; thus the status of knowledge is demystified, and the lines between the ideological and the objective blurred. Saids discourse analysis, thus makes it possible to trace connections between the visible and the hidden, the dominant and the marginalised, ideas and institutions. It allows us to see how power works through language, literature, culture and the institutions which regulate our daily lives.

This, according to Said, is crucial to European self-conception: if colonised people are irrational, Europeans are rational; if the former are barbaric, sensual, and lazy, Europe is civilisation itself, with its sexual appetites under control and its dominant ethic that of hard work; if the Orient is static, Europe can be seen as developing and marching ahead; the Orient has to be feminine so that Europe can be masculine. This dialectic between self and other, derived in part from Foucauldian deconstruction, has been hugely influential in subsequent studies of colonial discourses in other placessuch as colonial attitudes towards Africans, Native Americans, and other non-European peoples.

2 Cohn, Bernard, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge.The British in India,Ch.2 The Command of Language and the Language of Command, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1996, Pp. 16 57.

The British rule in India was justified by this orientalist discourse where the Britishers here also would consult and ally themselves with Brahmins to manipulate oriental patriarchy according to their own interests. Thus caste was a creation of this interaction between the whites and Brahmins as divide and rule strategy was legitimately imposed for easy rule by the British (Cohn B. S., 1987). Even Indian sepoys were employed to maintain law and order. However Liberals in British homeland provided for a more rigid ideology where difference was reconstructed for the benefit of the colonisers. Thus others were meant to follow terms set by the superior race. The entire concept of orientalist thought in this light is something artificial prepared by the British to slap an ideological justification to their oppressive regime. Thus increasingly Anglicization began with opening of schools and colleges with English as medium of instruction and also in maintaining distinct codes of behaviour by British officials and businessman. Thus a reputed club of colonial Bengal did not let Rajen Mookherjee enter due to his inappropriate dress code. This westernization was seen as good for economic development of subcontinent as some natives adopted it for job opportunities in administration or remained passive whereas some revolted. Raja Rammohan Roy was an ardent advocate of this westernization process as he thought retaining of Sanskrit and Arabic-Persian education would keep India in darkness as British learning and technology was progressive and blessing to the Indians whereas some like Bankim Chandra actively detested this process. Missionaries and utilitarians all worked together to civilize the natives portraying a progressive religious social order against superstitious rituals of sati which were to be altered by legislative means as propounded by William Bentinck. All these portrayed a picture of active British masculinity against feminine Indianness (Sinha, 1995). The outbreak of Sepoy Mutiny called for new British strategies as it exposed the vulnerability of local ties. Steps enforced were direct rule by the British state in 1858, higher ratio of British troops, technological and educational upliftment to ease economic tensions and relaxation of the rule in India. Manu Goswami argues how government actions of racial segregation in railway compartments or ICS exams, inadequate political representation, inequities of land revenue system allowed national consciousness to grow. This political critique joined hands with economics to show poor condition of India in world trade, growing famines, low GDP rates, home charges and drain of wealth were grievances slapped on the British. Sovereignty which till now was denied to the people was slowly tried to be won back by the nationalists. As we shift our focus to Africa we see a decline in commerce in slave declined in the 19 th century and trading activities slowly making its move towards consumer agricultural commodities controlled by the Africans. On the European front, Lenin saw imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism which was the situation at that time. With the profits running high due to increased production, huge finance capital which was produced was difficult to invest in increased production due to extreme low wage not letting people to consume the produced goods. Colonialism was thus an act to protect investment opportunities from local people and European competitors. The reasons for the conquest of Africa was the need for large, populated and untouched places by the 19 th century European powers of Britain, France, Germany, Belgium and Portugal who were all vying for monopoly over a small amount of available supranational resources. Africa by 19 th century consisted of multi-ethnic people enjoying trading relations with Europeans and others. The first attempt on the part of the Europeans to carry on free trade imperialism on the superficial level leaving the deeper aspects to the Africans faced its fair share of problems as internal African politics and European competition posed hindrance to the trading monopolies and smooth trading activities required to maintain social stability back in Europe. The penetration on the part of Europe was slowed by the technological gaps between the two places and economically difficulty arose with the confrontation of Africa and world economy. British EIC or Royal Niger Companies and

British South African Companies were all incapable of administering and devolved much responsibility to their home governments. British tactically advanced by using Indian troops in African conquest and alliance with the local elites. There was also an intellectual transformation in Europe as earlier reluctance to involve in African matters was transformed as they started treating it as a place in dire need to be civilized or in other words and more appropriately to exercise benevolent despotism. Britain was most successful in the African conquest and international conferences were held to regulate these European competitors by international law unlike the barbaric Africans. However such regulations did not eliminate the existing race for power but rather all the major players administered in a similar fashion with minor modifications having placed a thin administration in alliance with conservative chiefs, mid level authorities, indigenous policemen and translators while knocking of the top layer of traditional society. British kept a watchful eye over the chiefs who were expected to collect taxes, organise labour for work, and maintain law and order everything as the Britishers would order. Colonial administration was little concerned about education excepting missionary activities posing to preach broader conception of humanity against the exploitative settlers. Colonial discourse saw empire as a male enterprise and missionaries behaved women in these third world countries were to be rescued by their white sisters. They even went to the extent of showing their masculinity in regulating selfrestraint and self-discipline and practising segregation. Natives were never incorporated in the European society as they were always treated as racially discriminated subjects. Colonizers now entered into the agriculture and commercial sectors seizing overseas trade and expanding production with the aid of the intermediaries who also consequently flourished and created enclaves of wage labour organizations without at all imposing a direct colonial rule. Another effective aspect was settler colonialism which was an useful strategy of the Europeans to employ, capture, export production and sizeable European community in strategic lands. However the settlers demanded European lifestyle and protection against the native resistance against their exploitation. Initially the Britishers gave the scope to the African peasants as active producers and semi autonomous rule under British overrule. With mines on the rise, urbanization, improved transportation led whites to work with hired labour for new grain farming on a capitalist basis. The African workers were now kept under stricter surveillance and segregation by the white officers. This extreme oppression of the British led to Boer war where again the Britishers changed their strategy applying a reconstruction policy to show how their modern administration is beneficial mutually for both British and Afrikaners and internationally helpful in South African progress towards a self- governing dominion. Condition of African people was extremely precarious as capitalist transformation went hand in hand with maximum extraction and oppression. These traditional European empires and their colonization was in stark contrast to the other kinds of colonialism that Japan and United States pursued. Coming to the situation in 19th century America, its motive was to build a continental empire or rather a world nation-state consisting of homogenous population incorporating some simultaneously excluding majority which clashed with the strategies of British Empire and also the social realities of ruling multi-ethnic people. The first and the foremost dilemma Faced by these new imperialists is whether to pursue along the footsteps of the European powers. Though some supported this at home, the other lot rejected the oppressive concept of imperialism. From the outset US carried a free trade imperialism but did not annex any state in the European fashion, rather carried their own model of indirect rule or neo-imperialism by placing a blanket of commonwealth(Puerto Rico), zone(Panama Canal region) , enclave colonies (Guam)or deferred independence(Philippines), behind the scenes rule (Cuba) in various places. Here they granted them sovereignty but regulated their administration according to their whims and crushed

any elite intransigence or revolution by military intervention or temporary occupation as seen in Haiti, Panama, Dominican republic, and central Asian American republics. Benevolent intervention in Cuba was different from the European powers as their policy was preceded by a notion that combinations of Spanish and African ex-slaves were incapable of administration. thus supporting the revolution against them by the Cuban rebels, America manipulated the liberation movement in favour an alternative social order dominated by rich Cuban property owners who preferred a diminished sovereignty where a large part of politics especially making treaties, loaning lands etc. were given to US. They moulded the situation in their favour portraying as if they support anti-imperialism and want to provide good government. American intervention in Philippines was also based on a drive towards seeking trade links with China. Their initial attempt of anti-imperialist policy towards defeating the Spanish forces saw them making new indigenous enemies. Their perception radically altered as they now viewed Filipinos as untrustworthy and unfit to rule themselves- a view shared even by elite Filipinos. Dreams of benevolent imperialism, private investment or congregessional funding of administration was fulfilled only in alliance with these local elites postponing Filipino self rule. Americas hypocrisy lay in their duality of engaging in rigorous imperialism building on the concept of white-Christian nation and ruler of colonies whereas opposing corrupted racist antiimperialism at the same time. Japan announced its arrival in the imperialist game in the 1870s, setting in motion a dynamic only paralleled by the likes of Germany and Italy in contemporary terms that seventy years later spawned havoc consequences in the world stage. As Basil Davidson points out, reinforced by its relative isolation, nineteenth-century Japan was a nation-state in beingMeiji political nationalism [creating] the modern Japanese nation on the basis of aristocratic (samurai) culture and its ethnic state (Smith 1991: 105). Indeed, two decades after Commodore Perry used the threat of force to reduce Japan to semi-colonial status, Japan did the same to Korea. The Kuroda expedition of 1876 was not Japan's first foray into imperialism, but it was one its boldest - a decisive step in the acquisition of an empire which would, at its peak, cover much of southeast Asia. The reasons for Japan's expansionism are various. Greed, fear, racism - all contributed to a sense of manifest destiny. But a simple listing of these various elements tends to gloss over the fact that there are still deep disagreements among historians over which of these reasons was predominant. A closer look at this debate reveals the minute intricacies of the Japanese variant of imperialism. There seems little doubt that Perry's arrival shook the Japanese psyche. Suddenly, Japan realized that the world was not a safe place. Western powers were advancing eastward, carving up China and southeast Asia. A line of defense had to be drawn - but where? As an island nation, Japan has natural borders, but some argued that Korea's independence was also vital to Japan's security. Therefore, Korea had to be modernized - even against its will, if necessary. This view was espoused by Fukuzawa Yukichi, the renowned essayist who, in 1881, compared Korea to a wooden house.3 Other historians claim that greed was a greater factor than fear. Certainly, the interests of Japan's military were compatible with the interests of the powerful merchant families that dominated Japanese politics during this period. Just as in Europe it was customary for the firstborn son to

3 Fukuzawa, Yukichi. "On Shedding Asia", Jiji Shimpoo, 1885. Quoted in Oka Yoshitake, "National Independence and the
Reason for the State's Existence" in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970.

inherit property while the second-born joined the Church, in Japan it was not unusual for one son to go into business while another joined the army. Thus, a military strategist who argues for a vigorous "defense" of the motherland may really be thinking about his family's fortune. The economic argument owes much to the Marxist-Leninist theory that imperialism is the final stage of capitalism. According to this theory, capitalist industrial societies are compelled to find new markets, sources of raw materials, areas of investment, and outlets for surplus population. Russian historians like O. Tanin and E. Yohan have applied this theory to the case of Japan, arguing that Japan's rapid industrialization led inevitably to its overseas expansion. This theory has been accepted, with some refinements, by Japanese historians such as Inoue Kiyoshi. The greatest problem with this theory seems to be one of timing. Prior to Japan's annexation of Korea, there was relatively little trade between the two countries. Historian Hilary Conroy therefore dismisses the idea that a trade rivalry with China had anything to do with Japan's initial expansion into Korea. In The Japanese Seizure of Korea he writes: "[E]conomic factors were negligible, insufficient, unimportant ... This conclusion is suggested by the fact that during this period [before 1900] the economic stakes in Korea were small, involved only a few Japanese, and the Japanese government accepted ups and downs in regard to them with equanimity." Some historians emphasize the role of Japanese culture, in particular the exaltation of military virtues. This approach was especially common among Western scholars who grew up during World War II. One such scholar is John Maki, who writes: "[Japan's] wars were not wars of defense, although they were treated as such in Japanese propaganda. They were wars of aggression, each of which added something to the wealth of Japan, temporarily at least. They were the logical expression in foreign affairs of the ideas of the authoritarian state. They were the extension beyond Japan's borders of the militarism that had so long been characteristic of Japan." Maki admits that proving this thesis is difficult, but intuitively it has some validity. Anyone who has studied bushido traditions can attest to a deeply ingrained "warrior spirit" among the Samurai class. According to Maki's theory, the Meiji restoration - as sweeping as it was - did not remove this class from power, and therefore it is not surprising that these people led Japan into a series of foreign wars. 4 The idea that there is something especially malignant about Japanese imperialism has persisted to this day. It has, however, been ameliorated by another generation of historians who grew up after 1945. These revisionist scholars have pointed out that Japan's expansionism can just as easily be attributed to Japan's imitation of the West. If Japan committed the crime of plundering its neighbours, it was only because it was following the example of the West. The Japanese, too, succumbed to the facile logic of social Darwinism. Another more nuanced view is that societies become more liberal as they modernize - and thus it is somewhat unfair to compare Japan to the western powers against which it was then competing. A more apt comparison, perhaps, is between Japan's Meiji era expansion and other, more virulent forms of imperialism, such as Britain's colonization of Ireland. Scholars that accept this theory see Japan's modernization as a perversion of the normal process. Forced by outside threats to
4 Maki, John M. "From Japanese Militarism, Its Cause and Cure" in The Emergence fo Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington, Heath, 1970.

modernize rapidly, Japan skipped the "liberal stage", and thus, in the 1850s, it was still "a halfprimitive, half-sophisticated society". This may account for the horrific nature of Japan's wartime atrocities. It is equally plausible that modern societies are not necessarily any less ruthless, but simply more aware of public opinion, and therefore more calculating in their acquisition of new territories. This view is held by Robert Pollard, who dismisses the notion that Japan was imitating the West. Japan was already, according to Pollard, quite as expansionist as any western nation: what it learnt from the West was only the art of justifying foreign conquests with lofty-sounding excuses - in other words, western hypocrisy. Pollard is equally dismissive of other theories of Japanese imperialism, saying that Japan's habit of territorial acquisition seems "to bear little relationship to population pressure, the need of markets and raw materials, political necessities, or strategic needs". Instead, he argues, Japan's expansion was simply an expression of national pride.5 Other historians also stress the influence of nationalism. They point to the many patriotic societies that sprang up during the Meiji era, partly as a reaction to the perceived threat from the West. According to historian E. Herbert Norman, these societies were not a "lunatic fringe" of Japanese political life, but rather a driving force behind Japanese imperialism. He claims that the Genyosha (Dark Ocean Society) and the Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) were particularly powerful. After examining the origins of these societies and the history of their various machinations, he concludes: "These societies thus are the cement which holds together the whole edifice of Japanese aggression - the army, big business and the key sections of the bureaucracy".6 Since many of Japan's patriotic societies were more or less secret, it is easy to ascribe to them grandiose plans of conquest. Some historians take these allegations seriously. George Kerr, for example, is one historian who, in 1945, gave credence to the charge that Japan's expansion was the result of careful planning by power-hungry individuals. In particular, he cites a document called the Kodama report, a secret "blueprint for conquest" purported to have been written by General Kodama and presented to the Tokyo cabinet in 1902. 7The authenticity of this document is in dispute, but Kerr has no difficulty believing that it is proof that Japan had a sinister plan to conquer much of Asia. After citing ex post facto evidence that the document is genuine, he concludes: "The specific lesson to be learned needs little discussion: Japanese policy since 1868 has shown a singular consistency and uniformity, and undeviating purposefulness that has been objective, cold, and calculating to a degree inconceivable in American thinking. No true democracy could project such grandiose schemes for aggression; no democratic government could so commit future generations to conquest and inevitable conflict with other peoples ..." Historian Marius Jansen has shown that many Japanese nationalists sincerely wanted to help Asia. These people believed it was their duty to help Asia resist Western imperialism. They saw themselves as pan-Asian leaders, obliged, by their superior position, to extend a helping hand to those less fortunate. In the past, Japan had been a grateful recipient of Chinese culture - now Japan could repay the debt by "holding the West at bay". Furthermore, these people had a deep reverence

5 Pollard, Robert. "Dynamics of Japanese Imperialism" in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970. 6 Herbert, Norman E. "The Genyosha: A Study in the Origins of Japanese Imperialism" in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970. 7 Kerr, George. "Kodama Report: Plan for Conquest" in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970.

for traditional values and they wanted to help Asians "wipe out the shame of Western domination ..."8 However Jansen concludes, "The road to hell is paved with good intentions". At first, a backward civilization may be grateful for the guidance of a paternalistic power. Indeed, some Chinese nationalists were receptive to the initial overtures of Japanese nationalists. But "liberation" soon turned to "occupation", and the occupied grew weary and resentful. Insurgencies were brutally suppressed, leading to a cycle of oppression, violence, and retribution. Since the days of ancient Rome, this cycle has repeated itself more times than can be counted, and Japan simply fell into this same, age-old trap. In the words of John W Dowyer, a leading historian of twentieth century Japan: "Despite the deepening quagmire of occupation and empire, Japanese leaders and followers alike soldiered on - driven by patriotic ardour and a pitiful fatalism. It was only afterwards, in the wake of defeat, that pundits and politicians and ordinary people stepped back to ask: How could we have been so deceived?"9 Historians usually hedge their conclusions, and therefore most would readily concede that Japan's expansion had many different causes. Scholars and academicians alike have projected "a yardstick for measuring the guilt of Japan, for ascertaining whether her actions in Korea could be classified as those of a 'good' government pursuing legitimate security interests or those of a 'bad' government bent on aggression". Needless to say, different historians provide different yardsticks. And thus this issue remains politicized, as evidenced by the contentious debate in recent years over the contents of Japanese history textbooks, and Korea's insistence that Japan has not yet sufficiently apologized for the various atrocities it committed during its 45-year occupation of that country. Other Asian nations are similarly resentful. And of course this is but a small part of a wider debate. There are many countries, including the US, that judge their own actions with different yardsticks than those they use to judge the actions of others. As noted by Mayo, there is a vague boundary "between benevolent and correct expansionism on one side and irrational imperialism on the other". There is little doubt that Japan crossed that line, though when and where remain an issue of great debate. Defining this line should be a top priority for humankind, in order to better prevent wars of aggression in the future.10 Thus to surmise, it can rightly be said that that modern colonialism was somehow different from older imperial models. Burbank and Cooper argue that rather than a new type of imperialism, by looking at the period of the 19th century through the lens of repertoires of power, similar patterns of imperialism are easily discernible. Although they acknowledge that the growth in wealth and technology gave European powers an advantage, they point out that these same empires still had to respond to the demands of governance and administration themes that were altered by the rise of the language of human and citizenship rights, but which continued to fall into a category of responsive rule. Modern colonialism was swift and dynamic coagulating into an organized surveillance and punishment device in some places while remaining thin, superficial and sporadically brutal in the other. As Cohn says, modern colonialism has been transformative rather than transitory accompanied by a harsh white black racial dichotomy which not only replaced the earlier less categorical, more relational forms of hierarchical order but also emerged as the single
8 Jansen, Marius. "The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen" in The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970. 9 Dower, John W. "Lessons From History: Imperial Japan and Imperial America". Reckonings (August 07 2003). http://www.reckonings.net/other_japanese_occupation.htm 10 Mayo, Marlene J. The Emergence of Imperial Japan, edited by Marlene J Mayo. Lexington: Heath, 1970.

most critical factor in ironing out inter - colonial and intra colonial differences backed by a vehement European legitimacy. Modern colonialism relied on local collaborators functioning as intermediaries to maintain its authority. While the regimes did not have uniform policies for recruiting intermediaries, they had to work with and reshape the structures of an authority they found. The way in which patterns of colonial rule varied had important repercussions for post-colonial development. While there was not much of a prelude to decolonization in Africa, in India the introduction of representative institutions and Indianization of the civil service went much further. However, the biggest hurdle the colonial regimes had to encounter in putting a racial order to practice came from the colonized themselves as constant rebellions and internecine warfare in areas beyond colonial control proved to be a major setback which eventually eroded the regimes social base. As the civilizing mission of the colonial governments led to the creation of a multitude of African and Asian intermediaries to serve them in junior positions, it gradually blurred the lines of colonial difference which the regimes so staunchly wanted to protect. Educated indigenous elites, being conscious of the exclusions they faced started providing critiques of colonial rule through their oral and written interventions, in colonizers own terms as well as through the languages and networks of their own communities. Caught between a desire to rule and exploit Africans and Asians and the need to work through intermediaries, the regimes failed to represent a large political body. Thus, the inherent weakness of the modern colonial apparatus lay in their inability to devote the financial means, the manpower, or the will to logically undertake either brutal exploitation or organised social engineering. In the wake of the ideals of popular sovereignty flowing through the European countries, colonial regimes across the globe became an object of incessant attack as it served as a reference point for educated Asians and Africans something they felt they were completely deprived of. As Burbank and Cooper points out, the modern imperial powers failed in the long - cherished dream to achieve contingent accommodation in the colonies where in they paraded that their ginormous advances would result in achieving whatever they willed to their subjects, exploiting them without restriction or remaking them in a European image, but they failed miserably in doing so. Thus in conclusion, colonial rule did not and could not live up to a totalizing vision of Europeans reconstructing the World in their image or for their selfish brutish use. As Burbank and Cooper conclude, The compromises required by Empire were stronger than the fantasies of modernizing European colonialism.

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