Commonwealth Ministers Reference Book

The Challenge of International Terrorism and its implications for the Rule of Law and Human Rights

By Paul Wilkinson*

* Professor of International Relations and Chairman of the Advisory Board, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St Andrews

The Concept

International terrorism is one of the most intractable problems facing the Commonwealth and the entire international community. It is both foolish and irresponsible to try to ignore it or to pretend that it does not exist. Some try to argue that terrorism is a purely subjective experience and that there are no objective criteria which can be used by society as a whole to distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence. This view flies in the face of the fact that there is a word for terrorism in every major language in the world and that there are numerous UN resolutions and conventions and other international and national legal measures which deal with the problems of terrorism. Terrorism is clearly a different form of violence from, for example riots and street violence or conventional wars.

Although various specialists in the study of terrorism may wish to give greater emphasis to certain features of terrorism rather than others, there is a very wide measure of acceptance that terrorism can be differentiated from other forms of violence by the following characteristics:

s It is premeditated and designed to create a climate of extreme fear; s It is directed at a wider target than the immediate victims; s It inherently involves attacks on random or symbolic targets, including civilians; s It is considered by the society in which it occurs as 'extra-normal', that is in the literal sense that it violates the norms regulating disputes, protest and dissent; and s It is used primarily, though not exclusively, to influence the political behaviour of governments, communities or specific social groups.

It is important to bear in mind that this concept applies just as appropriately to the use of terror by state regimes and governments as it

does to its use by non-states. Indeed historically regimes have been far the most lethal and destructive perpetrators of terror violence because they have control of the major instruments of coercion and intimidation and some regimes have been responsible for the use of terror on a near genocidal scale. The concept of terrorism has also been useful to historians as well as social scientists because it is possible to project it back in time to analyse the violence used by regimes and groups in ancient and medieval history. We also know from a myriad of eye-witness accounts that major acts of terror are collective experiences, often shared by thousands of people who did not experience physical injury during an attack.

However, if we examine the typology of the kinds of state and non-state perpetrators of terrorism it is clear that one of the reasons why non-state terrorism is such a security threat today is because the Al Qaeda network of networks and its affiliated groups is explicitly committed to masskilling, no-warning attacks, and because its track record shows that it continues to kill and injure large numbers of innocent civilians. The September 1111-1, 2001 Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC resulted in almost 3,000 deaths, the greatest number of fatalities ever caused by a non-state terror group. The coordinated Al Qaeda attacks of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 should have been a warning of the sheer inhumanity of the terrorist group. Al Qaeda failed to express remorse for killing over 240 and injuring over 5,000, most of whom were citizens of Nairobi going peacefully about their business.

It is useful for Commonwealth ministers to be reminded of the August 1998 attacks. From the perspective of the government in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam the attacks came like bolts out of the blue. The lesson that should be drawn from this and from the history of Al Qaeda-linked

attacks and foiled attempts at attacks is that no country should regard itself as immune from attack. Nor should countries with large Muslim populations regard themselves as immune from attack. As is clear from the history of recent attacks in Iraq, Pakistan, Algeria, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries, Al Qaeda linked groups appear to have no compunction about slaughtering hundreds of their co-religionists in suicide bombings.

As far as the Commonwealth is concerned, seven of the Al Qaeda-linked attacks between 1988 and 2005 were carried out in Commonwealth countries or directed at Commonwealth targets. If we examine the chronology of foiled plots and failed attacks since 1993 we find that well over 10% involved Commonwealth countries or Commonwealth targets, and some of the conspiracies uncovered have been found to be extremely ambitious and potentially destructive. For example, in December 2001 the Singapore authorities arrested 21 members of an Al Qaeda-linked group, Jemaah Islamiya, who planned to attack the Australian and British High Commissions, water supplies, the metro, Changi airport, the Ministries of Defence and Education and a radar station as well as a shuttle bus containing US military personnel, US marine ships and an American school. In November 2002 in Kenya, a plot to shoot down an Israeli aircraft using surface-to-air missiles narrowly failed and in August 2003 in Singapore, it was discovered that Al Qaeda was plotting to hijack a plane and crash it into Changi airport. The Australian authorities have been investigating the possibility than an Al Qaeda-linked group was plotting to attack a nuclear facility.

I have emphasised the activities of the Al Qaeda network because it is by far the most dangerous of the currently active international terrorist organisations and it has shown that it has 'global reach'. It is estimated that it has a presence in at least 60 countries. However, it would be foolish

to overlook the fact that some Commonwealth countries (e.g. India and Sri Lanka) have to face the challenge of ethno-nationalist groups using terrorism on a major scale, and these terrorist campaigns are often extremely deadly, destructive and protracted. Al Qaeda is not the only terrorist challenge. Moreover, some of these ethno separatist groups (e.g. the Tamil Tigers) have established sophisticated international support networks even though their campaigns of violence are concentrated in specific countries or regions.

A table on the typology of terrorism, shown below, reveals the wide range of both state and non-state perpetrators of terror in the modern world.

State Terror International Terrorism 'New Terrorism'

Sub-State Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Traditional Terrorism

'Corrigible' Terrorism
By Political Motivation Ethno nationalist (e.g. ETA, Real IRA) Ideological terrorists (e.g. FARC, Shining Path)

'Incorrigible' Terrorism
Religio-Political (e.g. Al Qaeda, Hamas) Single Issue (e.g. Animal Rights Extremists)

State-sponsors (e.g. Iran, Syria)

Characteristics of the 'New Terrorism' (Archetype, Al Qaeda)

There are major features of the Al Qaeda network's 'global jihad' which differentiate it from more traditional terrorist campaigns:

s It has an extreme fundamentalist Islamist belief system;

s It aims to expel the US and other 'infidels' from the Middle East and from Muslim lands generally; s It wants to topple Muslim regimes/governments which it accuses of betraying the 'true Islam' and collaborating with US and its allies;

s Its ultimate aim is to establish a pan-Islamist Caliphate uniting all Muslims; s It has no compunction about killing thousands of civilians, including fellow Muslims, in terrorist attacks; s It has declared a holy war against the US and its allies and has set up a World Islamic Front for Jihad, declaring "it is the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens - civilian or military - and their allies everywhere"; s It believes that terror is the perfect weapon for fighting its holy war and taking it to the heart of the homelands of the US and its allies;
s It believes that they will ultimately win their 'jihad' because Allah is on their side; and

s It believes in recruiting 'martyrs' who are prepared to sacrifice their lives in suicide bombings which murder many innocent people.

Modus Operandi and Tactics

A key strategic aim and tactic of Al Qaeda's network is to cause maximum economic damage and disruption both to create a wider climate of fear and to weaken the economies of their 'enemy' states.

Typical methods are no-warning coordinated suicide attacks hitting several targets simultaneously. Its most commonly used weapon has been the large suicide vehicle bomb.

The Al Qaeda network has also shown a keen interest in obtaining CBRN weapons and its record shows it would have no compunction about using them to cause large numbers of civilian deaths. They believe their ends justify any means.

Structure and Leadership

Bin Laden and his deputy Zawahiri provide ideological and strategic leadership and direction, and they are assisted by a Shura and specialist committees dealing with such matters as 'military' planning, Islamist doctrine and indoctrination, the media etc. But in addition, they have a wide and complex network of cells and affiliated organisations (e.g. Jemaah Islamiya, GSPC) which they use as vehicles for waging terrorism around the world.

Area of Operations

Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network is more of a global movement than a traditional tight-knit terrorist organisation. From open sources we estimate that it has a presence in at least 60 countries, but this is probably a conservative figure. What is clear is that their network makes Al Qaeda the most widely dispersed transnational terrorist movement in the history of modern terrorism. (Inevitably this means that this network can only be effectively unravelled with maximum international intelligence, police and judicial cooperation).

Future Prospects of Al Qaeda Network

Over the past few years there have been numerous highly optimistic claims to the effect that Al Qaeda is no longer an effective force in international terrorism. It should be clear by now to all informed observers that these attempts to write off Al Qaeda were, to say the least, premature. Continuing massive suicide bombings by Al Qaeda in Iraq and a new wave of Al Qaedalinked suicide bombings in North Africa since January 2007, claimed by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, which has now renamed itself Al Qaeda in the Maghreb, indicates that the Al Qaeda network is still very much in business. In attacks in Algiers on 11th April, 2007, targeting the Prime Minister's headquarters and the Bab Ezzouar district on the Eastern outskirts

of the city it is believed that at least 30 people lost their lives and over 160 were injured.

These deadly attacks, especially in Iraq, where the terrorism has been on a huge scale, have caused great suffering and economic damage and disruption. However, they do not necessarily translate into success in achieving the terrorists' strategic aims. On the contrary, there is growing evidence that the indiscriminate mass slaughter of their co-religionists is leading to a backlash against Al Qaeda in both Shiite and Sunni communities.

Despite these blunders and setbacks, Al Qaeda continues to pose a real threat to peace and security in both the front-line states (Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) and in the homelands of the United States, Western Europe, as well as the global South.

The role of bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri, his deputy, is to provide ideological and propaganda leadership and overall strategic direction for their network, but most of the detailed operational planning and fundraising to support specific operations is done by regional and local cells and affiliated groups. This gives the network the great advantage of flexibility, but also carries the risk of tensions and 'schisms' developing between difference branches of the movement. Again, however, we must be careful to not assume that these tensions have been a fatal blow to Al Qaeda. It would also be prudent to avoid the assumption that the death or capture of bin Laden and his deputy would automatically lead to the end of Al Qaeda. The most likely scenario is that a new leadership would emerge and the network would continue its 'global jihad' using similar methods to those employed today.

Characteristics of Traditional Terrorist Groups

In contrast to the Al Qaeda network, traditional terrorist groups direct their attacks mainly against their traditional single enemy in a specific country or region. In some cases the leaders of ethno-separatist groups are sufficiently pragmatic to consider declaring a ceasefire and using a political pathway to obtain their goals. It would be misleading to suggest that it is an easy matter to initiate an effective peace process. The Northern Ireland peace process has made remarkable progress since the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, but it has take a very long time to come near to fruition and even now hostility could prevent or derail the final push to establish power-sharing institutions. Sadly, at the time of writing (April 2007) the major efforts to push forward the Sri Lankan peace process with the Tamil Tigers appear to be in meltdown.

The sad reality is that the overwhelming majority of 'traditional' terrorist groups do not willingly abandon the terrorist weapon. They see it as a relatively low-risk, low-cost, potentially high yield way of struggling for their goals. They may be well aware that terrorism will not be a magic bullet for winning their long-term strategic objectives, but they do know that they can use it to win what for them are extremely attractive tactical gains, such as; global publicity for their cause, forcing the authorities to release the imprisoned members of their group and the obtaining of large ransoms.

The Problems of Responding to Terrorism in Ways Compatible with Preservation of Basic Human Rights and the Rule of Law

The problem of preventing and combating terrorism is made all the more complicated in many Commonwealth countries because they face both the threat from the Al Qaeda network and from a range of other terrorist groups. Such countries cannot afford to abandon their vigilance and counter-measures for dealing with traditional terrorist threats while at the same time enhancing their legislation and security measures to deal with the threat from the 'New Terrorism' of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Of course every member of the

Commonwealth has its own unique combination of threats to deal with and will need to deploy their anti-terrorism resources and expertise in proportion to the range and nature of the threats faced.

A basic principle of response to terrorism for countries committed to upholding the rule of law and human rights must be to ensure these values and the institutional safeguards that ensure their continued observance are not sacrificed on the grounds of 'protecting national security'. We see a tragic example of a government adopting terror tactics to suppress opposition on bogus grounds of 'national security' in the regime of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe. It is to be hoped that neighbouring states and the African Union as a whole will bring real pressure to bear to relieve this situation, which is causing so much suffering and economic damage to the people of Zimbabwe.

If states sacrifice respect for human rights and the integrity of the rule of law with its underlying principles of independence of the judiciary, the assumption that the accused are innocent until proved guilty, the guarantee of no imprisonment without trial and the absolute requirement that no suspect will be convicted unless the prosecution can produce evidence that proves guilt'beyond reasonable doubt'.

Terrorism involves serious crimes under both national criminal codes and international law. The logical way of dealing with terrorist crime in a rule of law society is clearly to use the criminal justice system. This is not by any means an easy option. In many cases it will prove impossible to identify the perpetrators, or even when identified, to capture them and bring them to justice. Moreover, even when terrorist suspects are brought before the courts it is often difficult to secure convictions because the terrorist groups are constantly learning how to hide their traces and intelligence services are often reluctant to come forward to testify in courts for fear of compromising counter-terrorist operations. There may also be severe problems for the

courts hearing terrorist cases. Juries may be threatened and intimidated, terrorists may decide to refuse to cooperate with the courts by refusing to answer questions, disrupting proceedings with political speeches etc. Yet despite these inherent difficulties there have been highly successful trials of terrorists convicted on the basis of overwhelming evidence.

What of the military or 'war model' of response to terrorism? The military clearly have special advantages of weaponry, training and technical knowledge, e.g. for dealing with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which make them an invaluable component of the state response to terrorism. However, there are severe dangers to an all-out militarisation of response. The military are trained to use maximum force, not to carry out the role of the civilian police. If they use their huge air power to bomb alleged terrorist targets or if they use the firepower of their tanks and artillery to pursue alleged terrorists into areas of civilian housing where they so often seek to hide, hundreds may be killed in so-called 'collateral damage'. Worse still, the deployment of military forces into a foreign country on the grounds that it is needed to prevent terrorism or to avenge attacks runs a real risk that this will provide a military response from the state attacked, thus escalating into a major interstate war which ends up killing thousands more innocent civilians than were ever endangered by the terrorist events which triggered the war.

Limitations of the War Model of Countering International Terrorism

Military forces are inherently handicapped in their efforts to suppress terrorism. Sophisticated modern terrorists of the Al Qaeda network and its affiliates know how to hide and operate covertly in cities around the world, how to melt into their surroundings and to keep communications secret.

To win the struggle -v- Al Qaeda you need to win the intelligence war and use law enforcement agencies world-wide as well as cooperation in the

finance sector in the civil aviation industry, in the private sector and between the private and public sectors. The military can be of enormous value when they have specially trained units, equipped and configured for the purposes of counter terrorism for specific operations e.g. the toppling of the Taliban regime, which had given safe haven to Al Qaeda. But over dependence on military operations and heavy - handed use of firepower in civilian areas which is likely to cause heavy casualties among innocent civilians is a huge strategic blunder, fuelling support and recruitment to terrorist and other extremist groups (e.g. the invasion and occupation of Iraq).