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Before 1947 tensions were mounting between Palestinians and the growing Jewish population. Conflicting ethnic and religious identities in the region both of which laid a strong nationalist claim to the same land. 1948, November the UN approved the partition of Palestine. Widespread violence erupted between local Arab resistance groups and Jewish groups, like Haganah. At the height of the fighting was the battle at Deir Yassin a massacre by Lehi and Irgun forces. Both Israeli and Palestinian officials exaggerated the details of this event, the latters plan backfired as instead of stirring resistance it caused thousands of Palestinians to flee. This period was so violent and disruptive that historians, such as Avi Shlaim, have called the time between November 1947 and the creation of Israel the first unofficial phase of the 1948 war. WAR OF INDEPENDENCE / THE CATASTROPHE of 1948 State of Israel declared May 14th, 1948 Immediately afterwards, forces from Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon attacked Israel. Zionists still maintain the overriding Jewish perspective at the time: that the Arab forces were united in their determination to destroy the newborn Jewish state and cast the Jews into the sea. However, although the military experts of the Arab League had worked out a unified plan for the invasion, King Abdullah who was given nominal command of all the forces wrecked the plan by making last-minute changes. King Abdullahs objective was not to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state but to make himself master of the Arab part of Palestine. Indeed, King Abdullah did attempt to engage in secret negotiations with Israel to facilitate this. All of the Arab states were moved by dynastic and/or national interests, hidden behind by the guise of securing Palestine for the Palestinians. The inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military plans was in no small measure responsible for the disaster that overwhelmed them. Israels leaders knew of these divisions and exploited them at the official outbreak of hostilities. It has always been assumed that the Arabs enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority a monolithic Arab adversary waging war on a tiny Israel, David vs. Goliath. However, the Israel Defence Force (IDF) significantly outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it by almost 2:1. The IDF initially had inferior military hardware at their disposal, however the first truce brought illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia which decisively tipped the scales in their favour. Revisionist historian Efraim Karsh, The final outcome of the war was not a miracle, but a reflection of the underlying Arab-Israeli military balance. Israel negotiated bilaterally with its neighbouring Arab states, beginning with Egypt, and concluded separate armistice agreements with each of them. The first Arab-Israeli war was officially over by July 20, 1949 when the last armistice agreement was signed between Israel and Syria. Israel expanded its territory from 55% allocated by the UN to 79% (most of the rest annexed by Jordan).
Israel expelled all the Arab forces from Palestine (exc. Arab Legion which maintained control of WB) Palestine was erased from the map. Palestinian historian Edward Said, Palestinians were left out in the cold. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR Israel was economically exhausted, but had superior organisation and morale, a tremendous sense of achievement and a confident outlook on the future. The victory showed the advantages of direct action over negotiation and diplomacy, and seemed the only direction that could possibly be taken from then on. However, peace was elusive in the region. Traditional Zionists: Martin Gilbert, this was due to Arab intransigence. Revisionist historians: post-war Israel was far more intransigent than the Arab states and bears a larger share of the responsibility for the political deadlock that followed the hostilities. Avi Shlaim: the real question facing Israel at that critical point in its history [after the first war], should not have been whether peace with its Arab neighbours was possible, but at what price. 750,000 Palestinian refugees had fled from, or been forced out of, Palestine, and were living in bleak refugee camps along the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and in various neighbouring states, such as Lebanon. 385 towns were taken over and large parts of 95 other towns of all buildings were taken by Israelis (over 200,000 homes and businesses) Palestinians were in a far worse position than they would have been had they accepted UN Res. 242. Skilled Palestinian workers went to the major Arab cities some gained citizenship (in Jordan), education and entry to the army/civil service (in Lebanon), while others had no rights at all (in Egypt). Most refugees went to UNRWA camps, which had little sanitation or medical facilities. Pan-Arab position: Israel alone had created refugee problem and must not be allowed to evade its responsibility to solve this problem Israeli position: Arabs created refugee problem because they started the war in the first place and Israel was not responsible in any way. Israel did not accept the UN resolutions which gave refugees the right of return and/or compensation. Palestinian views as to why no Palestinian state emerged: - the US supported Israel and prevented Palestine emerging - British hostility and duplicity destroyed Arab leadership, enabling Zionists to take over and expel Arabs Israeli views as to why no Palestinian state emerged: - Arab state did emerge as an expanded Jordan - No Palestinian state should exist west of the Jordanian River because Jordan is Palestine Various plans were proposed within Israel for a separate Palestinian government. BenGurion actively discouraged political planning of any kind and sought to solve most problems by military means, pressing Israels military advantage. Avi Shlaim: As a result, Israels Arabs felt increasingly marginalised and frustrated.
POLITICAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967 Refusal of Arabs to recognise Israel Refusal of Israelis to recognise Palestine No solution to the refugee problem (Israel refused to acknowledge the rights of Arabs) US support for Israel Israels extreme retaliatory strikes over small guerrilla raids Rise of Pan-Arab nationalism Great divide over Suez crisis SOCIAL ISSUES IN ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS IN 1967 No equal rights for Arabs in Israel limited living space (1ha per Israeli vs. 0.1ha per Arab), few education opportunities, stunted economy Tension between Zionists and Arabs siege mentality and fear of subversive fifth column No solution to the refugee problem
The PLO became an independent organisation, run by Palestinians, with the sole aim of destroying Israel in order to liberate Palestine. By the late 1960s the majority of those involved in the struggle had joined the PLO.
1977 Likud government: Begin initiates deliberate policy of creating settlements, citing religious rights. This is an acceleration of a process initiated by the Labour government a more extreme level which becomes a complicator for peace. Begin manipulates Camp David accords Israeli nationalism prevents actual progress over OT Conflicted response to OT: - Oriental Jews relied upon Palestinian under-class to elevate them from social and economic under-class - Sephardic Jews had less of an attachment to Palestinian underclass, although it does support the economy. They were generally more willing to trade land for peace 1978-1982 Israel continues policy of two-fold reprisals against PLO attacks from Lebanon. Sharons violent push into Beirut in 1982 causes public outcry internationally, and also within Israel Israel responds harshly to the intifada, using violence to break up riots (Iron Fist Policy), assassination of Abu Iyad, etc. The attempts to end intifada with violence attracted international and domestic condemnation, and inevitably failed. Shamir Plan created in response to the failure of aggressive policy, outlines negotiation with Arabs which fails 1993 Rabin signs Oslo Accords. However it was a peace enforced from on high and did not carry down to regular Israelis Rabins assassination shows a division of opinions over peace. Perez maintains commitment to Oslo, but responds harshly to attacks from Muslim extremists which provokes fear in Israeli population Netanyahu denies Palestinian state, and supports Occupied Territories this is a reverse of Rabins efforts Israels democratic system has caused inconsistencies in policy. Avi Shlaim: divisions lay not only between parties but within parties. Religious fanatics, e.g. Herut, Likud and Zionists are attached to OT as part of Eretz Israel. They are responsible for the continuation of the settler movement
ATTEMPTS AT PEACEMAKING
1978, September Camp David Accords Negotiations Egypt, Jordan, Israel, and Palestinian representatives to settle the question of WB and GS. Self-governing Arab authority would replace Israeli military forces in OT for 5 years. From the signing of the accords (September 78) until the signing of the peace treaty (March 79), both Sadat and Begin were under intense domestic political pressure not to make concessions. Disagreements broke out almost immediately among Carter, Begin and Sadat as to exactly what had been agreed The Camp David Accords contained provisions that have formed the basis of all subsequent peace negotiations. However, they simply ignored the issue of Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights. 1982, September The Reagan Plan & The Fez Plan As soon as the PLO left Beirut in 1982, US President Reagan proposed the Reagan plan and the Arab League put forward the Fez Plan. Palestinians rejected Reagan Plan: it did not support Palestinian state, rather a JordanianPalestinian state. Israelis rejected Fez Plan: it did not include Arab peace with Israel and demanded total Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories. 1987, December The Intifada A result of the gradual shift of resistance into the OT a new style of rebellion which seriously challenged the sustainability of occupation. Edward Said: The intifada combined the character of a civil rights movement with that of a national struggle for independence 1. Iron Fist Policy (Jan 88) Yitzhak Rabin: subject to harsh military and economic pressure, in the end, they will be broken 2. The Shamir Plan (May 89) diplomatic response based on principles of Camp David. The initial decentralised and varied methodology of the intifada confused Israelis and local initiatives showing potential for sustainability. The movement faded out due to ruthless Israeli repression and the PLOs attempts to centralise the movement (this decreased the level of popular participation and marginalised local leaders, allowing semi-militant groups, such as Hamas, to become the main players). 1988, December The Stockholm Declaration Arafat recognised Israel and condemned and rejected terrorism in all its forms. Shift in PLO policy gained international support, however Israel refused to accept PLO peace initiatives until the Palestine National Covenant and 1974 phases plan was amended. 1990, August Gulf War Arafats solidarity with Iraq badly damaged the PLOs reputation and resulted in political and economic setbacks as Arab states withdrew diplomatic and financial support. In the aftermath, when an Arab-Israeli peace process was placed high on international and regional agendas, the Palestinians were in a weakened position forced to make political concessions to keep the Palestinian issue at the forefront of discussions. 1991, October Madrid Peace Conference Participation in peace talks meant addressing the question of territorial compromise. Shamir was not willing to negotiate.
By mid-1992 it became clear that peace between Israel and Arabs and an interim settlement with the Palestinians was an impossible target. However, Madrid talks marked a historic turning point. Martin Gilbert: The belligerents had met around the same table, and were talking directly to each other for the first time since the first Arab-Israeli war, forty-three years earlier 1993, September 13 Oslo Accords; Declaration of Principles Mutual recognition, phased redeployment of Israeli troops and Palestinian interim government in WB and GS for 5 years while permanent peace treaty and final status of OT were worked out. Israel-PLO accord ratified by Knesset and Palestine National Council. Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe: Secrecy was the key to the success of the Oslo talks; negotiators were free from the external pressures and interference which had characterised the Madrid process 1995, September 24 - Oslo II Broadest and most concrete agreement concluded. Facilitated limited withdrawal from WB, implemented election of Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), and partitioned control of OT between Israeli military and PA. The agreement was never implemented in full. The Oslo experience makes clear that there will be no chance for a genuine settlement of the conflict unless the process is consistent with the Geneva Conventions, international law, and Palestinian rights. 1995, November 4 Yitzhak Rabin assassinated Rabin brought a credibility to the peace process that no other Israeli leader possessed. Major setback for peace process which stalled in his absence, while terrorist attacks intensified. 1996, May Netanyahu becomes prime minister Obstructionist to peace Netanyahu: terrorism was a weapon that could be successfully countered. He persisted in the controversial construction of Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. 4 September 1996, yielding to internal and external pressure, Netanyahu finally met Arafat at the Eretz checkpoint near Gaza. The two shook hands which was largely symbolic but there was no real progress in implementing the peace accords.