The Hebrew University: Rothberg International School Division of Graduate Studies Tutorial: The Strategic Relationship between the

US and Israel Year 2010-11 Dr. Eitan Barak

After Iraq: Israeli Involvement in the Bush Administrations Decision to Invade & the US-Israel Relationship Following Obamas Drawdown

Final Paper Kimberly Seifert Student ID: 777030826 December 21, 2011

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Introduction President George W. Bushs reasons for beginning the Iraq War are not entirely clear. To be sure, there rarely exists a single or streamlined explanation as to why any war is initiated. Indeed, the Presidents stated reason, to rid Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as part of the war on terror, quickly proved specious. As early as 2004, the Carnegie Endowment for Peace published an exhaustive report showing that Iraq had not possessed WMD capabilities for several years. The authors added that no evidence existed of cooperation between Saddam

Hussein and al-Qaida.1 Attempting to understand why Bush pursued the Iraq War requires not only an understanding of the relevant national security issues but also a comprehension of the functioning of the Bush administration. This essay attempts to provide such insight while also addressing the extent to which Israel was a catalyst in this equation. In light of the recent

drawdown in Iraq, the discussion ends with a brief review of the major differences between Bush and Obamas approaches to the Middle East, again with special attention to Israel.

I. National Strategic Interests One of the primary considerations underlying the Iraq War was undoubtedly an attempt to strengthen the US strategic national interest of American control over world oil supplies. In the re-building efforts following WWII, the United States set the foundation for controlling oil markets, focusing especially on the Middle East. First and foremost, American multinational firms quickly established themselves in the most oil-rich regions. The clearest indication of
1

Though reports critical of the Iraq War abound, this one represents probably the first comprehensive, thoroughly researched effort. Joseph Crincioni, Jessica Mathews, and George Perkovich (2004) WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace).

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American success in dominating world oil is that the commodity itself must be traded in US dollars. This allows the US to indirectly influence oil prices through currency manipulation as

well as guaranteeing strong demand for the dollar, so long as nations require oil. Such a strong position over the oil supply has both greatly boosted the US economy while rendering American capitalism to be very labor intensive.2 By the early 2000s, oil markets were tightening while American oil imports continued to rise. Somehow, the US had to avert a potential oil shock. At the same time, US direct control over Gulf producers was waning. First, the political and economic containment strategy the US had imposed on Iran and Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War was showing signs of significant weakness. Primarily, Iraq was selling oil concessions to major nations such as Russia, France and China. Additionally, much of Western Europe showed a preference for engaging with Iran rather than isolating it. Secondly, American hegemony in the Middle East is predicated upon the ability of the US to balance its considerable support for Israel with an equitable number of Arab alliances. To do so, the US is compelled to be an integral player in the Arab-Israeli peace process. The collapse of the peace process accompanied by Israeli settlement expansion and the second Intifada led Arab nations to become very skeptical regarding the United States commitment to Arab interests. Finally, the situation added considerable strain to relations

between the US and Saudia Arabia. Crown Prince Abdullah was growing visibly impatient with Bushs apparent refusal to revive the Arab-Israeli peace process, while American protective forces stationed there were wearing out their welcome. Furthermore, Saudia Arabias perceived

For an in-depth discussion of the various ways world oil production feeds the American economy, see Simon Bromley (1991) Oil and American Hegemony (Cambridge: Polity Press).

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decline in oil production undermined the countrys ability to play the effective swing role in securing oil and moderating oil prices at US behest.3 Conquering Iraq could potentially solve all three of these problems. The US would have privileged access to the second largest oil reserves in the world, thus establishing a new swing producer as well as allowing the US to stop, or significantly decrease, oil flows to global opponents such as Russia and China. Moreover, the US would forestall an oil shock without having to re-examine the seemingly futile Arab-Israeli peace process. A military campaign Nonetheless, this

would also reassert American military hegemony in the Middle East.

explanation for the Iraq War is insufficient for two primary reasons: (1) the threats Iraq presented to the US were neither imminent nor immune to less extreme alternatives; (2) war with Iraq carried too high a price tag to be waged simply on non-critical national strategic considerations.

II. Neoconservatives An understanding of the reasoning behind the invasion of Iraq can be achieved through an examination of the the neoconservative agenda. The neoconservative camp played a major role in the Bush administrations foreign policy and decision to invade Iraq. Indeed, the neocon plan to declare war on Iraq and replace Saddam Hussein was developed prior to the events of 9/11. In 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser4 authored and sent incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a bold policy paper entitled, A Clean Break: A New

Raymond Hinnebusch, The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications, Critique: Critical Middle East Studies, 16:3, 221.
4

Perle, Feith and Wurmser were primary authors of among a study group. Perle and Feith went on to serve President George W. Bush as Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, respectively. Wurmser became the lead Middle East advisor to Vice President Dick Cheney and special assistant to Ambassador John Bolton.

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Strategy for Securing the Realm.5 The authors were so confident enough of their proposal that they placed structural emphasis (i.e., to bold and off-set the text) on those of their recommendations that could be incorporated into a future speech. In an effort to distinguish soberly and clearly friend from foe the authors suggest, focusing attention on removing

Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right.6 Apparently Netanyahu chose not to pursue this course. Another now famous example is the 1998 open letter to President Clinton urging unilateral action against Iraq. The letter describes the threat posed by Saddam Hussein to be so grave that the US must not wait for coalition support, but rather should develop a unilateral plan for implementing a strategy for removing Saddam's regime from power.7 The letter was

signed by several of the foremost neocon leaders, such as Dick Cheney, Richard Perle, John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, Willism Kristol, and Francis Fukuyama. As many of these men went on to be top Bush advisors, it is little surprise that the possibility of a war with Iraq was discussed at the very first meeting of the National Security Council of the Bush administration.8 Yet the question remains, for what reasons did neocons want to invade Iraq? The answer is clear enough if one briefly considers the tenants that underlie the ideology of neoconservatism. Generally, neoconservatism can be described as a very deep-seated belief in the long-term benefits of American hegemony, for both the US itself and the rest of the world. Waxman writes,

A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Security the Realm, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (1996) <http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm>.
6 7

Ibid.

Open Letter to President William J. Clinton, Project for the New American Century (26 January 1998) <http:// www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>.
8

Hinnebusch, 220, footnote 41.

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It is concerned above all with the United States, its interests, values, power and global role. It is based upon a belief in American goodness and in Americas global mission (in a moralistic sense)...It elevates the spread of freedom and democracy abroad as a goal of US foreign policy and embraces the use of American military might to accomplish this goal.9

Neocons primary objective for the Iraq War was to forcibly democratize a problematic nation with the belief that democracy would then spread throughout the region. The spread of democracy would transform the Middle East into a more friendly environment for the United States and US interests. Given democracys innate superiority, those authoritarian countries that refused to adopt democracy would be greatly undermined. Paul Wolfowitz described the idea as a democratic domino effect.10 Waxman explains that [d]emocratization would in turn

ameliorate the [Middle Easts] political, economic, and social conditions that foster Islamist radicalism. The new, democratic Middle East that would eventually emerge would no longer be a source of threats to the United States, Israel, or the rest of the world.11

III. Israels War? According to the above analysis, it is certainly inaccurate to assert that the US launched the Iraq War solely to serve Israeli interests. True, Israel does have a history of tenuous relations with Iraq and potentially gleaned more benefit from the campaign that the United States can
9

Dov Waxman, From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq, International Studies Perspectives, 10 (2009) 6.
10 11

Bill Keller, The Sunshine Warrior, New York Times Magazine (22 September 2002). Waxman, 7.

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claim; however, that the US assumed the role of fighting Israels war by proxy is above all too simplistic. Not even neocons would go that far, in spite of the fact that Israel is near and dear to neocons hearts. To discern the level of Israeli involvement leading up to the invasion of Iraq, the appropriate question is: to what extent did Israel actively endorse the American decision to invade? In the absence of access to classified materials, this question can be approached through an examination of the sentiments expressed by the Israeli government and public leading up the the war. According to media statements by Israeli government officials, it is undeniable that at least a certain faction of the political elite supported overthrowing Saddam Hussein.12 A close reading of their statements shows that even these notably hawkish leaders harbored reservations as to how to bring this about. Current Defense Minister Ehud Barak presciently noted the

difficulties surrounding the morning after issue.13 What if rapid regime change brings chaos to the region? While serving as Foreign Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu simultaneously

supported American unilateral action while also noting logistical challenges,

Indeed, there are [legitimate questions about a potential operation against Iraq]. But the question of whether removing Saddam's regime is itself legitimate is not one of them. Equally immaterial is the argument that America cannot oust Saddam without prior approval of the international community.14

12

Such supportive sentiment was not uniform across Israeli leaders. Many within the political elite and security establishment were skeptical about the invasion. Waxman, 10.
13 14

Ehud Barak, Taking Apart Iraqs Nuclear Threat, New York Times (4 September 2002). Bejamin Netanyahu, The Case for Toppling Saddam, Wall Street Journal (20 September 2002).

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The Israeli Jewish public overwhelmingly supported a US-led initiative against Iraq. Survey data from February 2003 show that a whopping 77.5 percent of Israeli Jews favor a US military campaign in Iraq. 15 Given Saddam Husseins nearly unwavering status as an enemy of Israel, the country was almost sure to benefit from his removal. For

decades, Israel had lived in fear of a nuclear, chemical or biological attack stemming from Iraq; thus, destruction of any potential WMDs would also be a significant strategic improvement. Israelis did not tend to support the neocon idea of democratic dominoes. Not only were Israelis critical of the viability of democratization, but the spread of democracy throughout the Middle East was also not necessarily in Israels interest. 16 Furthermore,

many Israeli officials, security analysts, and regional experts tended to regard the American plan for regime change in Iraq as ill-conceived and dangerously naive.17 A

2002 story in the Washington Post described the pervasiveness of efforts by Israeli officials to persuade the Bush Administration to turn their sights to Iran. Then Defense Minister Binyamin Ben-Eliezer told reporters, Today everybody is busy with Iraq...Iraq is a problem...But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.18 Lawrence Wilkerson, the former chief of staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, later remarked, The Israelis were telling us Iraq is not the main enemy - Iran is the enemy.

15

Ephraim Yair and Tamar Hermann, The Peace Index, The Israel Democracy Institute, (February 2003) <http:// www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=82&monthname=February>.
16 17

Israelis were correct in this respect: in 2006, Hamas was democratically elected to rule the Gaza Strip. Waxman, 12. Sipress, Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat, Washington Post (7 February 2002).

18 Alan

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If you are going to destabilize the balance of power, do it against the main enemy.19 Thus, Israeli gains from the Iraq War were surely marginal in the mindset of President Bush and the neoconservative architects of the invasion.

IV. The Drawdown and President Obamas Middle East On December 18, 2011, President Barak Obama fulfilled his campaign promise of ending the Iraq War. Though the US Embassy in Baghdad will remain open, the last of the American troops has been pulled-out. To determine what this means for the future of USIsrael relations, it is helpful to review the central issues framing President Bushs Iraq invasion and discuss these within the framework of President Obamas Middle East doctrine. The departure of American troops from Iraq does not directly affect the US-Israel relationship; however, the drawdown is a useful metaphor for understanding Obamas new approach.

a. Oil As illustrated by the Iraq War, President Bush undeniably recognized American dependence on Middle East oil and chose to avoid potential oil shocks by forcefully reasserting American regional hegemony. President Obama has taken great measures to relive the US of its oil import dependency, largely through programs that will increase domestic production. In 2010, US oil production reached its highest level since 2003. The President insists that domestic production must continue to grow and that his

19

Gareth Porter, Israel Warned US Not to Invade Iraq after 9/11, Inter Press Service, (28 August 2007) <http:// ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39051>.

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administration is actively researching the potential reserves in Alaska and off the midAtlantic and South Atlantic coasts.20 The administration has also called for reduced oil

consumption through lifestyle adjustments and new technologies.21

b. Unilateral Engagement in Conventional Conflict President Obamas recent refusal to take the lead in the military offensive against Muammar Gaddafi of Libya is evidence of his disfavor for unilaterally initiating war. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates initially denied that there would be any deployment of US troops to Libya.22 He later modified this position, stating that NATO is prepared to support local organizations rather than [take] the initiative on its own.23 This disinclination for unilateral action is, however, limited to full-scale conflicts. On May 2, 2011, for example, the Obama administration orchestrated an covert operation to assassinate Osama bin Laden at his home in Pakistan. Additionally, while the President continues to strengthen rhetoric and increase containment policies against Iran,24 Obama has repeatedly reminded Iran that the military option remains on the table.

c. Democratization

20 21

Stephen Power, Obama Confronts Oil-Policy Critics, Wall Street Journal, (12 March 2011).

Carol D. Leonnig, Joe Stephens and Alice Crites, Obamas Focus on Visiting Clean-Tech Companies Raises Questions, Washington Post, (26 June 2011).
22 23

Paul Harris, Robert Gates: No US boots on the ground in Libya, The Guardian (31 March 2011).

Kevin Baron, No Desire to Lead Military Action in Libya, NATO Defense Chiefs Say, Stars and Stripes (10 March 2011).
24

Michael Makovsky and Blaise Misztal, Obamas Iran Policy Shifts to Containment, Washington Post (10 December 2011).

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Though President Obama offers all means of support to Americas democratic allies, he clearly does not pursue a policy of democratization. Indeed, he has decreased emphasis on differentiating foreign nations according to a democratic or non-democratic dichotomy. Where President Bush closed the doors on dialogue with several non-

democratic leaders, President Obama is open to the prospect of a diplomatic option almost universally. Due to a decreased willingness to utilize coercive force, Obama is unlikely to employ such phrases as Axis of Evil.25 As opposed to the ideologically driven Bush, the current President definitively takes more nuanced course, unique to every situation.26 Israel can no longer rely on its status as a democracy to guarantee its relationship with the US.

d. Israel The US-Israel relationship is also a point of great divergence between the current and former Presidents. While Bush was markedly soft on Israel, shying away from For

criticism for the country, Obama has presented a much stronger rhetorical front.

instance, the White House made little effort to hide its chagrin over the timing of events surrounding Vice President Joe Bidens visit in March of 2010.27 Similarly, Israel was

aghast at Obamas explicit call for an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal to be based on the 1967

25

In his 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush referred to Iran, Iraq and North Korea as Axis of Evil due to their suspected support of terrorism.
26

Jonathan Masters, Democracy Promotion and the Obama Doctrine: an Interview with Larry Diamond, Council on Foreign Relations (8 April 2011, online), <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/democracy-promotionobama-doctrine/p24621>.
27

As Biden Visits, Israel Unveils Plan for New Settlements, New York Times (9 March 2010).

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Green Line. 28 Most strikingly, the President has avoided personal visiting Israel, in spite of a highly publicized 2009 tour to the Middle East. Still, Obama has not abandoned Israel either. Following Israels controversial flotilla altercation, Obama refrained from More recently, the President has assured international

condemning Israeli actions. 29

audiences that the US will veto any attempt by the Palestinian Authority to achieve a United Nations sanction for Palestinian statehood.30 It is unclear whether or not Israel has figured out how to handle President Obama. It seems as though Israels leaders are stuck in the Bush paradigm, still grieving from their loss. In a meeting with the Minister of Strategic Affairs, Lt. General Moshe Yaalon,31 the Minister spent the bulk of his time bemoaning Americas current strategy for the Middle East. Yaalon stated that the US insists on achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement before addressing other issues, such as Iran and violent non-state organizations. Echoing a familiar cry, Yaalon emphasized that regional unrest stems from Iran. In his estimation, the US should proactively handle the Iranian situation. He suggests beginning with

political and economic isolation but quickly ramping-up to the military option: the United States should force Iran to choose between nuclear warheads or survival. They will

28

Mark Lander and Steven Lee Myers, Obama Sees 67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal, New York Times (19 May 2011).
29

Obama Withholds Condemnation of Gaza Flotilla Clashes, Calls for Clarification, Haaretz (31 May 2010, online, English) <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama-withholds-condemnation-of-gazaflotilla-clashes-calls-for-clarification-of-facts-1.293387>.
30

Obama to Abbas: US Will Veto Palestinian Statehood Bid, MSNBC (21 September 2011) <http:// www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44606988/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/obama-abbas-us-will-veto-palestinianstatehood-bid/#.TvCnBiOolLw>.
31

Moshe Yaalon, Private meeting, Offices of the Prime Minister, Jerusalem (15 September 2010).

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choose to survive! If Israeli leaders are hoping that Obama will wage this war any time soon, they are likely mistaken. Given Obamas indisputable efforts to decrease American dependence on Middle Eastern oil supply and willingness to build relationships with both democratic and nondemocratic nations, Israel can expect less US intervention for as long as Obama remains the President. Obama does not provide Israel the same privileged status the country While the President certainly will not disregard its

enjoyed during the Bush years.

relationship with Israel in exchange for favor among Arab nations, he is committed to reestablishing a more balanced role for the US in the Middle East. President Obama will not remain Israels ally at the expense of the rest of the region. Additionally, the President is less likely than Bush to support as Israeli national security strategy that leads with hard power. As Israel struggles to keep the IDF from dominating the strategic planning

process32, the political elite will need to ensure restrain when address strategic threats. Due to cogent ideological differences between current Israeli and American political leaders, Israel may consider cultivating an alliance with another potential patron state. This is not to imply that Israel should turn to Russia or China; rather, the nation should prove its value to a significant American ally so as to reinforce Israels relationship with the US. Most importantly, Israel must try to persuade the US to apply pressure toward a creating a favorable post-Arab Spring environment in the Middle East. In any case, America under Obama is distinctly less aggressive than it has been in the recent past. Israel should realize

32

See Kobi Michael, Who Really Dictates What an Existential Threat Is? The Israeli Experience, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 32:5 (October 2009).

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that fact and capitalize on using the US as Israels great ambassador not just her body guard.

REFERENCES A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Security the Realm, Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies (1996) <http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm>. As Biden Visits, Israel Unveils Plan for New Settlements, New York Times (9 March 2010). Barak, Ehud, Taking Apart Iraqs Nuclear Threat, New York Times (4 September 2002). Baron, Kevin, No Desire to Lead Military Action in Libya, NATO Defense Chiefs Say, Stars and Stripes (10 March 2011). Bromley, Simon (1991) Oil and American Hegemony (Cambridge: Polity Press). Crincioni, Joseph, Jessica Mathews, and George Perkovich (2004) WMD in Iraq: Evidence and Implications (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace). Gareth Porter, Israel Warned US Not to Invade Iraq after 9/11, Inter Press Service, (28 August 2007) <http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=39051>. Harris, Paul, Robert Gates: No US boots on the ground in Libya, The Guardian (31 March 2011). Hinnebusch, Raymond, The US Invasion of Iraq: Explanations and Implications, Critique: Critical Middle East Studies, 16:3, 221. Keller, Bill, The Sunshine Warrior, New York Times Magazine (22 September 2002). Lander, Mark and Steven Lee Myers, Obama Sees 67 Borders as Starting Point for Peace Deal, New York Times (19 May 2011). Leonnig, Carol D., Joe Stephens and Alice Crites, Obamas Focus on Visiting Clean-Tech Companies Raises Questions, Washington Post, (26 June 2011).

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Makovsky, Michael and Blaise Misztal, Obamas Iran Policy Shifts to Containment, Washington Post (10 December 2011). Masters, Jonathan, Democracy Promotion and the Obama Doctrine: an Interview with Larry Diamond, Council on Foreign Relations (8 April 2011, online), <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategyand-politics/democracy-promotion-obama-doctrine/p24621>. Netanyahu, Bejamin, The Case for Toppling Saddam, Wall Street Journal (20 September 2002). Obama to Abbas: US Will Veto Palestinian Statehood Bid, MSNBC (21 September 2011) <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/44606988/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/obama-abbas-uswill-veto-palestinian-statehood-bid/#.TvCnBiOolLw>. Obama Withholds Condemnation of Gaza Flotilla Clashes, Calls for Clarification, Haaretz (31 May 2010, online, English) <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obamawithholds-condemnation-of-gaza-flotilla-clashes-calls-for-clarification-of-facts-1.293387>. Open Letter to President William J. Clinton, Project for the New American Century (26 January 1998) <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>. Power, Stephen, Obama Confronts Oil-Policy Critics, Wall Street Journal, (12 March 2011). Sipress, Alan, Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat, Washington Post (7 February 2002). Waxman, Dov, From Jerusalem to Baghdad? Israel and the War in Iraq, International Studies Perspectives, 10 (2009) 6. Yaalon, Moshe, Private meeting, Offices of the Prime Minister, Jerusalem (15 September 2010). Yair, Ephraim and Tamar Hermann, The Peace Index, The Israel Democracy Institute, (February 2003) <http://www.peaceindex.org/indexMonthEng.aspx?num=82&monthname=February>.