Ontology of the African Philosophies Onyewuenyi (1996) begins his discussion of the dynamic character of the African concept

of being by specifying the following conceptualizations: force, inseparability of the concept of being from the concept of force, force as the nature of being, categories of force, inner realities, categories of visible things, and the dynamic notion of reality. From the ontological perspective, Gruber (1993) states that an ontology functions as a specification mechanism that begins with the idea of a conceptualization, which is,a body of formally represented knowledge based on a conceptualization of the objects, concepts, and other entities that are assumed to exist in some area of interest and the relationships that hold among them (Genesereth & Nilsson, 1987) . And further, that a conceptualization is an abstract, simplified view of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose. Thus, Onyewuenyis (1996) construction comes to life as an ontological structure when he argues that the essence or nature of anything is conceived by the African as force." He cautions that it is not even correct to say that 'being' in the African thought has the necessary element or quality of force. The emphasis is on the precision of {European] concept of being, which is not attainable if their notion of being is expressed as being is that which possesses force. Rather, the concept of force is inseparable from the definition of 'being.' So, it follows then that when Onyewuenyi (1996) states that there is no idea among Bantu of 'being' divorced from the idea of 'force,' such posture is not inconsistent with Grubers(1997) criteria set that asserts, when the knowledge of a domain is represented in a declarative formalism, the set of objects that can be represented is called the universe of discourse. Nor, with the system formulation that this set of objects, and the describable relationships among them, are reflected in the representational vocabulary with which a knowledge-based program represents knowledge. The universe of discourse as defined by Onyewuenyi (1996)as that which allows the specification of the concept of the inseparability of force and being, or as he put it, force is the nature of being, force is being; being is force. Nor should the caution that care must be taken here not to confuse this dynamic notion of reality with some kind of universal force animatine all existence. He, then moves from the particularized stylization of the Bantu to the generalized concept that the essence or nature of anything is conceived by the African as force. "Nor, does the proposition that for Africans there is a clear distinction and essential difference between different forces or inner realities of beings, just as there are differences between categories of material visible things. Harris(1997) refers to The American Heritage Dictionary, to elaborate further, that in South Carolina and Georgia low country, African Americans used the African term "det" meaning "heavy;" for example "det rain" as in "heavy" rain and &quo t det" shower or "heavy" shower. She adds that some listeners of these speech patterns concluded, however, that "det" was a mispronounced that. " Loan words from the Geechee (Gullah) assimilated after back vowels, as in "fa" (fall) and "saut" (salt). Lewis(2001) wrote regarding patterns in speech, that linguists identify several phonological and representative grammatical features which are indicative of Southern patois. Those that she listed include: 1) pronouncing I as the diphthong ai, as in time and like, 2) drawling vowels (common in the Lower South), and 3) pronouncing different vowels as though they were the same before consonants, so that get becomes git and ten is said as tin. Among the grammatical characteristics, she included: 1) use of y'all or you all, 2)

saying liked to to mean almost, as in I liked to have died, and 3) the a- prefix, as in a-walkin' and a-talkin, she referenced Montgomery (p.761- 762), with respect to these issues. The logic of these identifying characteristics is then the patterns of usage. Harris(1997) asserted that these patterns penetrated the speech of white American southerners. Which is a notion that Lewis concurs with, noting that southern speakers have tended to be conservative, retaining old words, pronunciation, and grammar prevalent in Britain in the 17th and 18th centuries. Additionally, such patterns have survived, it is believed, because of the strong oral traditions which resist change in the region. She concluded that the speech of many Southerners preserves idiosyncrasies which are older than Standard English , citing Montgomery(p. 762). The theory relative to the origin of the term, y'all, she supports is that its use reflects the Scots-Irish custom typical of Ulster, that of adding all to pronouns, which she found in McCrum et al , p.160). A completive explanation is the possibility is that y'all is a calque, a filling in of African structure with English material, she added, while also stating that the West African unu or una, brought to the American South by slaves and preserved in the Gullah language, is also a plural of you. Finally, she alludes to a study done in 1972,which asserts that the term possibly was learned by white children from slave mammies, for which she uses Mountain Range, (p. 142), as a reference. Regarding customs that dates back to the time of Middle English (1150-1500), Lewis(20010 cites the addition of the "a-" prefix and dropping the final "g" in words such as a-walkin' , from McCrum et al (p.160 and Montgomery, (p. 762). She makes the claim that examples of this grammatical feature are abundant in British poetry throughout the life of the English language, referring to "Cuckoo Song," which begins, "Sumer is icumen in. . . . ," citing Harmon, (p. 7) She saw the same pattern in the poetry of Robert Herrick (1591-1674), who wrote, "Come, my Corinna, come, lets go a-Maying," found in Herrick (p. 177- 178).Also, the work of Lord Byron (1788-1824), who was part Scottish, displayed this usage pattern, notably in "So We'll Go No More a- Roving," cited from Byron (p. 479). These linguistic forms were found in the speech traditions of Scotland, Ireland, and Old England. The notion of Harris(2001) that the ancestors of the current speakers of GullahGeechee in South Carolina and Georgia originated from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. Holloway(n.d) has shown that of the 106, 506 slaves that were imported to Charleston, S.C. ., there were 16.5 % from Senegambia, 5.3 % from Sierra Leone, 14.6 % from the Windward Coast, 12.3 % from the Gold Coast, 1.3 % from the Bight of Benin, 1.8 % from the Bight of Biafra, 32.1 % from Angola, 0.4 % from Madagascar, Mozambique, the category Other(Africa, Guinea, and Unknown contributed 15.7 %. Also, contrary to the prevalent notions, the Schomburg Center states that the Bambara, Mandingo, or Senegambians constituted about 24 percent of the approximately 388,000 Africans who landed in America, which was about almost 92,000. In fact, they also asserted that immigration to the Chesapeake region before 1700, there were more immigrants from Senegambia (almost 6,000) than from the Bight of Biafra about (5000), and that they totaled about 31,000 by the end of the migration, representing almost a third of all arrivals from Senegambia. Of the 92,000, they point out about 45,000 Senegambians were settled in the coastal Low Country of the Carolinas and Georgia, where they constituted 21 percent of African immigrants. Although they were also, prominent among African immigrants in the northern colonies, accounting for about 28 percent of

arrivals, or over 7,000 people, and the people from Senegambia were prominent everywhere in the united States, much more so than virtually anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere, although there were also considerable numbers of Senegambians in the French Caribbean islands and in French Guiana. Another point to consider, which is contrary to what has been asserted about the religions of West Africa, the Schomburg noted that Senegambia was strongly influenced by Islam, more so than any other region of origin, which means that many enslaved Africans in the United States had been exposed to Islam, more so proportionately than in the rest of the Americas. They stated, without reserve, that practitioners of the religion were clearly present in both the low country of Carolina and Georgia and in the Tidewater region of Virginia and Maryland. An additional odd entry was also found on the Schomburg website, adult Muslim males stand out prominently, while there are very few references to Muslim women. This reflects what is known about the slave trade originating in the interior of West Africa, which was composed almost entirely of males. They also indicate that the assumption that all Western African languages and religions were based on a version of Akan, i.e., the Gold Coast and the neighboring parts of the Windward Coast (Ivory Coast), may be in error. They stated that another 15 to 20 percent of Africans were originally from the Gold Coast and the neighboring parts of the Windward Coast (Ivory Coast), where Twi, was the common language, and most people were identified as Akan. People of the lineage also were concentrated in the Carolinas and Georgia, where they amounted to perhaps 18-20 percent of immigrants, or up 70,000 people. They were found in the Chesapeake, representing as many as 15-20,000 people, or 12-15 percent of total immigration there. They also were prominent in the northern colonies, especially New England, because the slave traders of Rhode Island concentrated their activities there, accounting for the enforced immigration of some 7,000 people, or 30 percent of the total arriving there. Regarding Gbe, the langauge of the Yoruba, Ewe/Fon/Allada/Mahi(the so-called Gbe languages), and Muslims, brought from the far interior of the Slave Coast or Bight of Benin, they were noticeably absent or of minor importance.

Ehret (2002) and Tempels (1945, 1959), used the analysis of language to reconstruct the original core beliefs of the followers of the five religious traditions of Africa: Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan, Koman and Sudanic, Niger-Congo and Khoisan. They found four linguistic phylums spoken in Africa: Afro-Asiatic, Nilo-Saharan, Niger-Congo and Khoi-San. A commonly agreed upon typological classification scheme can described as showing that a) of the five religious traditions of Africa, two (Koman and Khoisan) are nontheistic, b) one of the traditions (Afrasan) is henotheistic, meaning that people worship only one (clan) deity although they don't deny the existence of other deities belonging to other clans, c) two of the religious traditions (Sudanic and Niger-Congo) are monotheistic, and polytheism, which developed twice independently and in very different ways. Ehret (2002) asserts that traditional religion among Afro-Asiaticspeaking peoples was originally henotheistic in nature, and also states that in the founding Afro-Asiatic spiritual tradition, evil was seen as being caused by petty or demonic 'spirits' that dwelled among humans.

In his analysis of the original Niger-Congo spiritual tradition, Ehret(2002) indicated that it centered around 'spirit' as manifested in various aspects of nature, deities and/or ancestors, in that, it recognized a series of levels of spirit. The levels included, a primary entity at the top, of little direct consequence in everyday religion, i.e., the First Cause or Creator...was a distant figure. Next, in line was a second kind of spirit, that dwelled within a particular territory and was believed able to influence events there..., followed by the Ancestors. The Wikipedia article that informs this commentary states, but the really crucial spirits for religious observance and ritual belonged to a third category. The oldest term for the god of creation " Nyambe " (cognate with the Akan word Nyame) is derived from a verbal root " -amb- " meaning to begin. Evil, Ehret(2002) asserted, originated with "witchcraft" executed upon targeted people by other individuals. Tempels and Ehret's are in agreement, the former, in his analysis asserting that the unifying ideological characteristic of the Bantu language subgroup of NigerCongo, is the concept of 'force', which is said to be identical to 'spirit,' 'being,' and/or 'existence', as composite elements of all human-perceived reality. One indigenous or intra-cultural analyst, when referring to the Akan version of the Niger-Congo religion with whom Ehret(2002) concurs is Wiredu (1998), who showed that the Niger-Congo religion is monotheistic, yet the former stated that both the ancestral spirits and the local spirits are part of the created world and do not have the status of gods.Karade(1994) and Doumbia and Doumbia(2004), in reference to the Sudanic Niger-Congo peoples, i.e. areas west of Cameroon and south of the Sahara, substantiate existence of the notion of 'force' or 'spirit' . Karade(1994) argues that in the Yoruba tradition of Nigeria, 'force' is called 'ashe'. He also asserted that the task of a Yoruba practitioner is to contemplate and/or ceremonially embody the various deities and/or ancestral energies, e. g., the deities represent energies, attitudes, or potential ways to approach life. In practice, the goal is to elevate awareness, and in or contemplating any of these states of mind such that one can transmute negative or wasteful aspects of their energy into conduct and mindsets that serve as wholesome, virtuous examples for oneself and the greater community. Doumbia and Doumbia (2004) agree that the same is true of the Mande tradition of Senegal and Mali, and many other regions of westernmost Africa., but the 'force' concept is represented by the term 'nyama'. Regarding divination, Doumbia and Doumbia(2004), asserts that it tends to play a major role in the process of transmuting negative or confused feelings/thoughts into more ordered and productive ones. They go on stating specifically, the process serves as a way to provide frames of reference, enabling those who are uncertain as to how to begin an undertaking and/or solve a problem can get their bearings and open a dialectic with their highest selves concerning their options on their paths. With respect to the Akan religion, which reflects the religious tradition of the Akan people of Ghana and Ivory Coast, the article asserts that they believe in a supreme god who takes on various names depending upon the region of worship. In Akan mythology there are claims that at one time the god interacted with man, but that after being continually struck by the pestle of an old woman pounding fufu, a traditional Ghanaian food, he moved far up into the sky. The God, in this tradition has no priests that serve him directly, and people believe that they may make direct contact with him. It, also has a belief in numerous spirits(abosom), who receive their power from the supreme god and

are most often connected to the world as it appears in its natural state, such as ocean and riverine spirits and various local deities. The priests that do exist serve individual spirits and act as mediators between the gods and mankind. As an everyday activity everyone participates in prayer, which includes the pouring of libations as an offering to both the ancestors who are buried in the land and to the spirits who are everywhere. The final religious tradition that has the proposition that many spirits exist in nature as a segment of its belief system is Odinani, which encompasses the traditional religious and spiritual concepts and practices of the Igbo, and its characterized as a panentheistic faith. Accordingly, in this religious belief system, there is one supreme God called Chukwu(Igbo: Great spirit) who was before all things and heads over smaller deities called Alusi. It is also characterized by the presence of different Alusi for different purposes, the most important of them is Ala the earth goddess. A traditional herbalist/priest among the Igbo is called Dibia.. The ubiquity of belief in the formulations above addresses the idea that it is possible that one world conceived of can exist in a universe of discourse among all possible worlds. When a single premise might seem absurd, its veracity obtains from its status as an African belief, which is to say that truth, in this case, obtains from the universal acceptance of the belief. Yet there appears to be a valid argument that applies when one distinguishes Black American philosophy from African philosophy but also one that distinguishes the particulars of one African ethnic group from another. This cannot be claimed to be a universal, in the sense that Ikuenobe(1997) argues the metaphilosophical debate over whether there exists an African philosophy and, if so, what its nature is, which has culminated in two camps, which I shall call the universalists and the particularists. The particularists, he states, are those which Wiredu characterizes as the anti-universalists or the nationalists and their universe of discourse is represented seen in the works of Ayoade, Gyekye, Sodipo, and Onwuanibe, among others Their argument is that different cultures have different ways of explaining reality; hence Africans must have a philosophy that is essentially different from other philosophies. He refers to the essential nature of 'African philosophy' , where Safro Kwame argues, that the metaphilosophical approach of the Western analytic tradition is not African, and as such, it is not and should not be a legitimate approach in African philosophy. Other who concurs have thus questioned the use of the [these characterizations] by African philosophers as African philosophy, and three of these have been criticized by the universalists as unphilosophical. The conceptualizations of universalists are represented by the works of Bodunrin, Wiredu, Appiah, and Hountondji, among others. Their argument is that the concept of 'philosophy', in terms of the methodology and subject matter of the discipline, should be the same in both the Western and African senses. And as such, the argument continues, that, compared to their paradigm[atic] view of the nature of philosophy -- that is, the contemporary analytic tradition of Western philosophy -- African philosophy does not have the requisite features of a tradition of writing and a rigorous and critical analytical approach to debates over universal conceptual and abstract issues that are engaged in by individuals. This paper is based on the premise that the subject matter and methodology can be found in the set of materials used by and alluded to as African philosophy.

Ikuenobe(1997) claims that there are both universalist and particularist elements in African philosophy. He also advances two propositions (Ikuenobe,1997) that aid in the effort to examine Onyewuenyis (1996) universe of discourse methodically: a) although there are culturally determined philosophical ways of constructing meaning, these ways are not incommensurable. As such, we can use the 'known' universal (?) philosophical concepts and methods of one 'culture' to analyze and make understandable the philosophical beliefs and worldviews of another culture that may 'appear' arcane -and this, in my view, is what many of the particularists have tried to do with African worldviews. This does not imply, as the universalists have claimed, that the beliefs and worldviews of one culture (Western) are comparatively superior to another philosophically, to the extent of denigrating one (African) as unphilosophical or denying its existence as a philosophical system." What has been asserted to this point in time resonates with the notion of Gruber(1997) that formally, an ontology is the statement of a logical theory, but it has been observed that the logic of the African can vary by cultural groupings and that some of the ontological notions as axioms dont quite resonate with those of the logic of the Western world. However this doesnt of necessity violate the precepts of ontology as specified by Gruber(1997), who would view the notion of the inseparability of being and force as ontogological commitments. Here the latter is defined as rules that guide the overt behavior, actions or a set of agents so that they can communicate about a domain of discourse without necessarily operating on a globally shared theory. So, when Onyewuenyis (1996 ) cites Tempels(1969) it is correct to assert that "when you say in terms of western philosophy, that beings are differentiated by their essences or nature; Africans say that forces differ in their essences or nature. There is the divine force, terrestrial or celestial forces, human forces, and vegetable and even mineral forces." That both assertions are essentially the same could also be correct, things and beings have essences, nature, or force(s). Onyewuenyis (1996) makes no assertion about the nature of nor the capabilities of God. But rather he expands the universe of discourse with the proposition that the concept of different categories of forces, and also, that these forces follow a hierarchical order such that God precedes the spirits; then come the founding fathers and the living-dead, according to the order of primogeniture; then the living according to their rank in terms of seniority. In an universalistic sense, with particularistic examples, Oduyoye (1997) argues that God is experienced as an all-pervading reality, as a a constant participant in the affairs of human beings, judging by the everyday language of West Africans of my experience. She cites the Muslim use of the term, insha Allah, which means by the will of Allah, " the Yoruba Christians, phrase " DV " i.e.," God willing ",and the Akan term " by the grace of God ," idioms, no doubt but as such commonly used terms to show ones point of view. Her point, as she states it, nothing and no situation is without God. The point being the ubiquity of this belief is her point reinforced, in the example drawn from her own cultural heritage, the Akan of Ghana - who use the phrase, Nsem nyina ne Onyame, or " all things/affairs pertain to God ".

It can be argued successfully that the artifacts of any culture include language about which Janz (n.d.) posed the rhetorical question: is reason culturally specific? How are reason and language related? To frame the diametric poles of the discursive exchange in academia, he first cites Winch and Horton(1964), to the effect that Winch (1964) advanced the position that reason is inextricably linked to language and culture, and therefore (following Wittgenstein) it is possible to consider separate systems to be rational yet incommensurable. While others, he states including Horton (1967), who argue that there is only one reality, and so there can be only one rationality as well. He then poses what appears to be a contradictory imperative, stating that societies that do not use the modern Western scientific method are closed societies because they cannot imagine alternatives to their views of the world, and also because there is no real distinction between words and reality, his earlier statement implied that there were, in fact, different culture and different languages. At any rate, Janz (n.d.) notes that words are not reality in the modern society, and Horton (1967) argues that this allows the words to take on explanatory rather than magical characteristics. Kwasi Wiredu and D. A. Masolo agree with Hortons (1967)commitment to the universality of reason, although both would argue that it is a mistake to compare Western science and traditional African thought. Janz (n.d.) continues, although words might not be reality, language itself has been a central concern in African philosophy. A proposition taken from the Western critique of African thought, which formed the basis of the critique, which is methodological in essence, follows: both the linguistic turn in twentieth-century analytic philosophy, and the focus on language in Continental philosophy, and has been an attempt to identify some unique feature of African life that is both truly African and truly philosophical. Ali(2001) cites the commentary of Schatzki (1992) regarding Heidegger, an empirical realist and his point of view, what something is 'in itself' is what it is independently of its actually being encountered by a Dasein. This he states Schatzki (1992) arguement was opposed to the perspective of Kant a transcendental realist, that what something is 'in itself' is what it is independently of any possible knowledge of it. The point Ali (2001) is making is that this implies that the Being of all beings, both human and non-human, is, in principle, publicly accessible to Dasein (human being), which assigns a critical significance when the 'other-minds' problem, that is, the problem of determining whether or not other beings are capable of consciousness (firstpersonhood, ontological subjectivity, private experience), is considered. As has already been mentioned, some attempts to locate African philosophy in artifacts of language become complicated. It is difficult to determine where Janz (n.d) stood regarding tales, proverbs, riddles, and so forth, as experiential demonstrations of answers to the problem, i.e., whether or not other beings are capable of consciousness, or ontological subjectivity. He only states that others look more deeply into language to find philosophical content, while citing Alexis Kagames analysis of Kinyarwanda, and Hallen and Sodipos work on Yoruba.

The Rationality Problem

Offia (2010) wrote defining the rationality problem, as the problem of how to determine the place and status of Africa and African knowledge in the great debate on the concept of reason, and also as the question of critically analyzing the conceptual issues, implied in the distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized, the logical and the pre-logical or mystical. This rationality debate or problem, can be understood as the theoretical and practical dimensions depicting the individuals role and impact in the shaping of ones identity and destiny, and control of history and other cultural values, according to Offia(2010).It encompasses issues like: a) the estimation of the basis and merits of cultural norms and the clarification of the supremacy of contending images of man. , b) delineation of the discourse as claims and counter-claims, justifications and alienations, passed between the two camps: western and non-western, and c) contribution to the discussion and definition of reason or what Hegel called the Reason. How then does one actually define rationality? There are those, according to Offia (2010) who argue that formal rational procedures, with the defining feature[s] of science, should be used, and also others who argue the diversity of human experience and systems of representation. While explicating the position of the African cultural relativists, Offia (2010) emphasized the following: a) such a position is predicated on their conception of culture as a peoples experience and ways of life, and b) it is believed that their attitudes towards life and issues of life would differ, and this according to them, cannot be overlooked in adjudging a peoples rationality. He reasons that a rational action or belief is one which is reasonable, that a rational action is one that has a reason and that taking rational action, is the power resident in human beings enabling them to make discrimination concerning reality which aids greatly any process [of] decision making and rational judgment. He adds that reasonable belief is consistent and rationality, in the form of reasoned based belief can determine actions taken. Beliefs, he states have their rationality determined externally and can be assessed based upon the available evidence. The fact that proponents of the Western view of philosophy feel that they have historically had a firm basis from which to launch criticism of African thought as process and also as a viable basis for a non-Western way of life means there are at a minimum problematics involved with the relative point of view. Regarding the consistency issue, Offia(2010) quotes Reddiford The way in which we come to hold our beliefs, in our attitudes to the evidence for example, and further to the procedures we adopt in maintaining or rejecting them. Thus to ascribe rationality is to comment on our success or failure in continuing to subject them to scrutiny in attempting to maintaining consistency particularly when we express our beliefs in action .

The second problematic is the moral problem, i.e., that of justifying as rational, an immoral belief which is expressed consistently in actions. He asked, does a mere consistency between a reason and an action make that action and belief rational or good? And, also, whether the problems associated with the definition of good would cause a rather quick abandonment of such definitions of rationality; they are rather sophistry than

normative. He also cited Lukes criteria for the rationality of a set of beliefs. a) such systems are logical, that is consistent and admit no contradiction, b) they are not wholly or partially false, c) not nonsensical, and d) not situationally specific or ad hoc.Among all the criteria listed above, the criterion of logicality stands out. For if a belief is illogical one can rightly infer that it is nonsensical, partially or wholly false, and inconsistent. He listed Levy Bruhl as one who judged African thought to be pre-logical thought-unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradictions, and Africans as inferior and savages to those who implicitly or explicitly intertextually entrenched criticism within the universal discourse of the French, British and German as enlightenment thinkers. Not comfortable with the assertion that thought differ not in degree but in quality from those with logical mind, Levy-Bruhl found contradictions in the Nuer assertions such as when [they] say twins are birds . His analysis proceeded in this fashion, the Nuer is involved in contradiction by saying that a twin is a twin (A is A) and at the same time that a twin is a bird (A is non- A). To show that more than one system of logic exists, Offia(2010) opposed the assertion that a sysllogism has to be composed of simple statements, whose truth or falsity could be readily assessed, by arguing that it is justifiable to assert that a syllogism could open with a metaphor

Ex: Nuer peoplethe saying twins are birds, means that birds unlike other creatures that crawl on the earth surface, are seen as divine creatures from above because they fly. Therefore twins according to them are likened as birds, special gifts from God, precious to man. According to Offia(2010), such saying, it would be observed are common among Africans.

Ex: the Igbos in Nigeria would say Uwaa bu popo, meaning that this life is Pawpaw, especially ripped pawpaw. This life likened to a ripped pawpaw that would break in to pieces when it falls.

This is a mere use of metaphor, which interestingly abounds in the Western literary expressions and thought system.

Ex: the expression, that man is a lion, is no violation of any rule of formal logic, but simply likens the man to a lion-strong, fearless and courageous. The Experience of God

Oduyoye (1997), in her discussion of the experience of God did address the issue by speaking to the concepts of experience, symbols and beliefs as she interpreted African religions and the languages spoken. She starts by arguing that the experience of God is portrayed in the language we use about God, i.e. especially the names by which God is known. Next, she notes that predecessors in AR research G. Parrinder, E. B. Idowu, and J. S. Mbiti, recorded several African names of God with copious annotations, And adds, what needs to be said is that these names are still current and that more names descriptive of people's experience of God are available in proverbs, songs, and prayers. She states that, according to Idowu, the names are not mere labels, but rather, "they are descriptive of character and depict people's experience of God."

Regarding symbols, Oduyoye (1997), asserted that when words fail, symbols take over, and offered examples to demonstrate the difficulty of translation and the inadequacy of words to express our experience of God. For the Akan of Ghana, there are Adinkra symbols, or the minuscule figures for gold weights and those on royal maces, include many that are theophorous. The star in Adinkra, is regarded as a symbol that says Like the star, I depend on God and not on myself. " In respect to belief, Oduyoye (1997), argued that God is experienced as the very foundation of existence, and offered Gye Nyame, as an example, where the Akan expression of the belief that without God nothing holds together, and is variously interpreted as except God or unless God. " God is experienced as the very foundation of existence. People believe that all the good and well-being they enjoy come from God, and that if one is not yet enjoying well-being it is because one's time has not yet come. " AR holds that the world and nature are good gifts that God entrusted to human beings-they provide nourishment for life, security and home for our bodies" (Lutheran World Federation [LWF] document on AR). The experience of God as beneficent is not only Muslim or Christian, but a living faith of Africans that has been reinforced by these "missionary" religions. The question Bolaji Idowu asked long ago becomes relevant at this point. In his words: Is there any reason why what has been thought and practiced in one place could not occur in another without any contact between the two places?

Belief In Reincarnation In The Framework Of Western Ontology Onyewuenyis (1996) goes further using the concepts of substance, and accidents to address the idea of belief in reincarnation in the framework of Western ontology. After asking the rhetorical questions how does Western metaphysics consider the entity man as a being? and what is the reality in man? He asserts here the notion of substance comes into play, defining it as the term used to signify that which is sought when philosophers investigate the primary being of things (ousia) or essential nature. And further that

conjoined with substance is the notion of accidents, which are predicable features of the essence or substance of a being, and also that accidents may change, disappear, while substance remains the same always. He interprets Western ontology to mean that man is made up of substance and accidents; the substance is the soul or spirit; the accident is the body or matter. Then, referring to Descartes, that man is a mind/body dualism. The body as an accident may change, rot, and cease at death, but the substance-soul, spirit, mind-the reality that is, (for man) subsists. Regarding the notion of life after death he states that according to Christianity, this soul goes to either heaven or hell, depending on how it conducted its operations during its earthly existence, while for believers in reincarnation, this soul informs another body for another span of life, even ad infinitum. But the implication that there is a finite amount of souls, spirits, or minds is difficult, since its no secret that the earths population has increased exponentially over time, he argues that because it is substance which is static, singular and unitary in nature, when once it informs a new body whether human, animal or tree, it ceases to exist in the spirit world. Does this mean that the spirit world has one less inhabitant, if a person leaves the physical world? or will spirit then enter an inanimate or animate life form? What makes such speculation justifiable is that it is the proposition that there is no further respect accorded it in the spirit world but acts of recognition and respect are accorded it in its new bodily abode. This he argues resonates with Frazers(1964) assertion about the religious life of primitive European peoples-"to the savage the world in general is animate and trees and plants are no exception to the rule. He thinks that they have souls like his own, and treats them accordingly.

RELIGION AND MYTH: PRIMITIVE MAN AND THE SUPERNATURAL

In 1883, Macdonald wrote what is regarded as a pioneering Victorian study of comparative African religious beliefs, which draws on ethnographies, folklore studies, historical and traveler's accounts, where he examined in detail taboos, magic, divination, prophecy, sacrifice, sorcery, sexual practices, and the status of women, which he compared to data from Celtic, Ancient Near East, Pacific and other cultures. The point is that he demonstrated that there are broad similarities between African belief systems and those of other pre-industrial peoples. Macdonald(1883) stated that in general religion could defined as man's attitude towards the unseen, and also the earliest forms of human thought furnish the clue from which must be traced the development of those great systems of religion that have at different periods been professed by the majority of men. For him religion included not only beliefs in unseen spiritual agencies, but numerous customs, superstitions, and myths which have usually been regarded, by both travelers and students, as worthless and degrading, till within a comparatively recent period. He reasoned that only by taking account of such, and comparing usages common among tribes far removed from the influence of civilization with survivals in other parts of the world, can we arrive at any definite knowledge regarding the world's earliest systems of thought. This differs from what Kant wrote some 90 years early attaching mortality, the necessity of the idea of God, morality, law and duty in his deontological notion of ethics. He wrote regarding the relationship of morality, man, reason, law and God that the former is based upon the

conception of man as a free agent who, just because he is free, binds himself through his reason to unconditioned laws That mortality stood in need neither of the idea of another Being over him, for him to apprehend his duty, nor of an incentive other than the law itself, for him to do his duty. Also that morality does not need religion at all (whether objectively, as regards willing, or subjectively, as regards ability [to act]); by virtue of pure practical reason it is self-sufficient.

Acts of Devotion-Myths Macdonald (1883, 180-181) wrote, to the savage who is constantly surrounded with spiritual beings, and whose life is dependent on securing their continued favor, no actions can be performed without a religious significance. Regarding the notion of causation, and the actions and events of daily life, he noted that to these agents he owes allegiance, because of the benefits he receives at their hands, and according to his conceptions of their wants and wishes, their tastes and fancies, will his life and actions be ordered. These necessary and sufficient attributes accorded at first sight, would appear to be left to, spiritual beings, yet one sees evidence in connection with every event which happens. This, however, doesnt warrant the attribution of the use of agents as such, as Macdonald(1883, p. 182) puts it, the magician's vocation, does not represent the domestic religious life of the people. As a rule, he points out that the magician's services are required only in connection with what is unusual in village life, as births, marriages, deaths, accidents, evil omens or any circumstance the meaning of which may be doubtful, while the religion of ordinary life, of eating and drinking, sleeping and walking, working and talking is conducted by each individual according to the approved method of the tribe. About how this plays in the rearing children and the conduct of the daily activities of life, Macdonald(1883) states regarding the details of this religion he has been instructed from childhood. His intellectual faculties lie dormant, but the ritual of life has been burned into his very soul and become part of his being. And, further that an African is no more likely to forget the minutest detail of private devotion than a European is to forget to undress when he retires to rest.

To further explicate the logic and/or the reasoning patterns found in pre-industrial Africa, where the prospective mates physically fight each other or where a female uses a weapon in a blood-letting procedure to choose between two prospective suitors, one must use the principles of the value of a display of vigor and virile power, and heroic endurance which are the cardinal virtues. Obedience as a trait of a prospective ruler, in the sense of duty, similar to the deontology of Kant, especially regarding the affairs of gods and men is also a virtue. The assumption unstated, is that man should live a virtuous life. Macdonald(1883, p. 182) concluded that many acts, which according to Western

ideas are far removed from the region of devotion and worship, are in reality parts of a life, where every act, word, and movement of which has a significance in a religious sense. He goes further to generalize, to the effect that these are all acts of devotion, and represent forms of worship common among a large proportion of primitive men. They are performed by each individual on his own account, apart from the more formal religious rites which are the proper functions of the magician. What was written above about the acts that compose the daily activity of the everyday person in pre-industrial Africa as they relate to what in Western philosophy is construed to be the classic problem of how propositional attitudes, i.e., beliefs and desires, impact daily actions. This conundrum is related to another classical problem, the mindbody problem, which concerns the explanation of the relationship that exists between minds, or mental processes, and bodily states or processes. There are two solutions to this problem recorded in the annals of Western philosophy, which was first formulated by Descartes in the 17th century. The first offers two schools of thought a) substance dualists, who argue that the mind is an independently existing substance, and b) the property dualists, who maintain that the mind is a group of independent properties that emerge from and cannot be reduced to the brain, but that it is not a distinct substance. (Philosophy of mind, n.d.) The second solution is monism or the position that mind and body are not ontologically distinct kinds of entities, first advanced by Parmenides in the 5th century BC and later advocated in the 17th century by Spinoza. There are three schools of thought, each advancing a different solutions: a) Physicalists, who argue that only the entities postulated by physical theory exist, and that the mind will eventually be explained in terms of these entities as physical theory continues to evolve., b} Idealists, who maintain that the mind is all that exists and that the external world is either mental itself, or an illusion created by the mind, and c) Neutral monists, who adhere to the position that there is some other, neutral substance, and that both matter and mind are properties of this unknown substance. According to Macdonald(1883, p. 185) there exists a class of myths which are common from the Ganges to the Atlantic, and that is the soul dwelling apart from the body. While similar to the position of the dualists, it is distinguished by the nature of devotion, and the caring for the soul's welfare by placing it in such safe keeping as to defy the enemies of mankind to obtain access to it. Yet while the existence of the soul is not disputed by either of these positions, it is somewhat more complicated by African philosophies and religions that accept the notion of the soul's absence during sleep or fainting. This separation of the soul from the body exposes it to the dangers of soul-snatching by ghosts, wizards, and evil spirits have also been noticed. Regarding this temporal sequence, Macdonald(1883, p.186) stated that the dangers of the soul during its temporary absence were considerable, while resident in a man's body it was comparatively safe; but even then there were dangers, and dangers of such nature as to be difficult to guard against. A further consideration is that, while a man remained in sound vigorous health his soul was safe, but should he be taken ill his soul was then in danger, for it could be reached and injured, perhaps stolen. To reinforce the notion that belief assumes the status truth and accordingly impact overt action, Macdonald(1883, p.187) wrote it would be of the utmost importance for a man to have a place of safe keeping where he could deposit his soul in time of danger, and if this place were very secure, it would be a manifest advantage to have his soul kept there

permanently. Having such a haven for ones soul would make a man independent of wizards on the one hand and of magicians on the other. This because the former could no longer hurt him; the latter he could dispense with when freed from the fear of witchcraft. With respect to agency and action, then such a man could boldly strike out a new course, and become a reformer by a defiance of the powers of evil, and a total neglect of the gods. The impact on social status is also noted by Macdonald(1883, p.187), because such men, in popular imagination, are regarded as giants, monsters of impiety, cruel and cunning, regardless of all interests except their own, and oppressing all who come into their power. To show the ubiquity of such a notion and its underlying logic, Macdonald(1883, p.187)wrote, this was a sober belief widely diffused throughout the world, and is a faithful reflection of the facts of life, in relation to the unseen, as these appeared to primitive man. Additionally, these tales would in the first instance be preserved and recited as a true statement of the facts, and, handed down through millenniums of years, told at one time to warn the impious, at another as nursery rhymes, or by the fitful light of a blazing log on a winter's night, to amuse the curious, they would preserve much of their original form, though places and circumstances would change. These incidents are relayed to demonstrate that while these are not the axioms that guide Western logic and reasoning, they did, at one time function as reasonable points from which to reason and, also could be advanced as true syllogism, as the last examples demonstrates.

Macdonald(1883) also wrote that to gain any influence over savages one must first of all master their system of thought, and learn how to connect the most trivial acts with their philosophy, and such conceptions as they have of the supernatural. It is impossible to know what an act of devotion is till one has learned something of social usage and myth. Here, although he uses to the word savages to refer to the pre-industrial people he encountered in Africa, he does suggest a method that connects human action, philosophy, myth and society-at large, especially when he wrote that all these are in the savage mind associated with religion and the worship of the gods. What we have to this point is discourse that spans two hundred years about ethics, mortality, the nature of man, law, duty and the notion of God. Kigongo (n.d.) states that African ethics, places considerable value on conformity of the individual to the social group in order to preserve the unity of human relationship. With this fundamental unity between the different human beings in the community, i.e., a unity of human relationship, one find a fundament from which to reason. And so, in an epistemological sense, it could be said that in a way African thought is, indeed, more concerned with the relationship than with the different entities which constitute the relationship. While contemplating the relationship between technology, alienation and destiny Xuanmeng (n.d) understood Heidegger to be questioning even the essence of essence. His explanation of Heidegger proceeds from addressing the what of essence (Wesen), he states Heidegger to maintain that: " the noun is derived from the verb wesen and is the same as to last or endure (wahren)." Noting that with the prefix an, anwesen means to come to presence. " In an ontological sense, then for Heidegger essence means enduring or being present. But Xuanmeng (n.d) points out that even in ontology which has universal beings or categories as its objects one should raise first of all the question of the meaning of Being. This is the so-called "ontological priority of the question of Being," from Heideggers perspective, who sought to bring out the primordial meaning of Being,

i.e., to deal with beings on this ground is to uncover the various ways in which the beings reveal Being. In his famous book, Being and Time, Heidegger sees man as distinctive in that the human understands its own Being, which makes man a Dasein in which both man and the entities encountered in the world are revealed. Mans distinctive Being is called existence, mans essence,which " lies in his existence. "This Xuanmeng (n.d) states that this means man is essentially his own possibility or ability to exist. Without such ability, one would no longer be human. Xuanmeng (n.d) asserts that the loss of possibility in life is death, in that, "Death, as possibility, leaves Dasein nothing to be `actualized." This is death in an existential sense, akin to angst, a form of alienation, if the latter is construed to be the phenomenon or existential reality called facticity. This is said to be the realization of possibility in daily life as represented in the essence of man, the possibility is called authenticity. Yet, while it entails attainment of that aspect of existential reality called facticity, it is more, manifesting itself, as a result, in daily life, where one is judged as who he or she is, mainly by his position, achievement, etc. This Xuanmeng (n.d) says makes Heidegger see man as being for the most part in his inauthenticity, not only because he already is his facticity in the world, but also because for the most part he would choose his way "to be" not according to his own possibilities, but as merely following others. This gives the insight that as each one lives in the world together with the others, in choosing ones way one cannot but care about others or the mode of Being-with and the attendant mental state of man fearing being isolated. So, one chooses a way of existence like that of the others; the popular way of existence is a strong temptation in which each one would tranquilize himself. Accordingly, the human becomes "They", but in so acting loses his or her own possibility to be. Kigongo (n.d.) wrote that whereas the European renaissance signifies rebirth of knowledge so it would seem that the African a cultural renewal, should be seen as an element of the rebirth of knowledge, since, in the sense that the African perception of the intrinsic value of culture was an important epistemological aspect which the African renaissance wanted to restore, hence to this extent it was a rebirth of knowledge. He points out that when this cultural renewal is viewed in the specific ethical sense, we see the concern for renewal focused on the African sense of community, which is basic to the traditional ethics. His use of the term culture should be construed to mean the source which nourished all human activity in traditional society. Kigongo (n.d.) accents the concepts and values , which he asserts, are central to traditional thought as they underlie human culture and play a significant role in influencing change and thought in contemporary African society. Such that traditional identity, where Traditional, refers to longestablished elements that are indigenous, i.e., originate from within the culture, are integrated in the way of life of the people and are passed on to succeeding generations. Some of these elements persist and continue to change. He also is wont to point out that it is important to distinguish it from custom, especially given the tendency to view African ethics and African custom as synonymous. And also that, custom may be defined as the cultural norms of the society, while ethics is the human social relations to which the cultural norms make a contribution. It follows that all human behavior is expected to conform to this value to ensure social harmony, meaning that human relationship and social harmony are vital elements in the African sense of moral aesthetics. Mbiti reminiscent of but

antagonist to both Kant and Heidegger states, it is only in terms of other people that the individual himself is conscious of his own being, his own duties, his privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other people: I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am. Citing Chyme(1996), who argues that this is also a basis building block in the morality of `conduct, as opposed to the morality of `being, i.e., - of personal morality. As with most ethical principles, it guides how one relates to others in the sense that it is ones relationships and, therefore, conduct in the social sphere that dictates ones sense of morality. This is diametric opposition to a view of the world that emphasizes an individuals sense of self, autonomy or being, that is, of the self which does not place much value on the social relationships. In a universal sense, Kigongo (n.d.) generalizes this notion as representative of most sub-Saharan African cultures, i.e., an individuals sense of self, autonomy or being was a strong awareness of ones existence and relationship with others in the community, a strong sense of social self. Haynes(n.d) commented on the possibility of comprehending Heideggers notion of Dasein commenting that his concept is synonymous with the humans own way of Being; his/her little and individual spark of spirit; humans reconciliation between ones Self and ones being in the world which is similar but not the same as the Bantu concept of what remains after physical death. One needs to also understand what he meant by essential thinking, which is the only perspective that comprehends humans Being - for ever missed by calculative thinking. The idea of essential thinking, he claimed is holistic because it is able to be reflective of itself and of the Being by which it itself comes forth. Meaning, it is able to be both within itself as thinking and also outside itself - in a very important sense to be other than itself - in terms of assessing itself. In social relations, if one seeks to be like the others and follows the others, why is there a need for this mode of thought, would be the most obvious question, yet some are capable of this attaining this level of thought, according Heidegger. He goes further asserting that essential thinking helps as the simple inwardness of existence because essential thinking needs time to nurture its wisdom in order to get to a stage in ones life of simplicity. This suggests the attainment of wisdom is an individual characteristic of those capable of accessing this mode of thought, while African philosophy asserts that it is the community that acts as the repository of wisdom and it is accessed by any individual member of the community, as needed.

The advantage of thinking in this way is that it is a minimal but nevertheless effective form of thinking that also leads to an economy of, but nevertheless effective, action concerning ones existence. Or, as Xuanmeng (n.d) put it, this kind of thinking simplifies by wisdom the enormous puzzling complexity of existence. This becomes problematic in the sense that it seems that through reflection one can consider oneself as the other, is certainly one interpretation of what has been out put forward, yet Xuanmeng (n.d) states that the benefit obtains since the sense of otherness pervasive to essential thinking and its ramifications as a way of producing wisdom, is crucial to the preservation of others (other people) of like essential thinking capacities. Xuanmeng (n.d) wrote that in relation to calculative thinking, Heidegger citing Kaufmann (1975, pp 261-2): asserts

that all calculation makes the calculable come out in the sum so as to use the sum for the next count. Nothing counts for calculation save for what can be calculated. And also that, any particular thing is only what it adds up to, and any count ensures the further progress of counting. This process is continually using up numbers and is itself a continual self-consumption. The coming out of the calculation with the help of what-is counts as the explanation of the latters Being. Calculation uses every-thing that is as units of computation, in advance, and, in the computation, uses up its stock of units. This consumption of what-is reveals the consuming nature of calculation. Yet only because number[s] can be multiplied indefinitely ... is it possible for the consuming nature of calculation to hide behind its products and give calculative thought the appearance of productivity By its nature, calculative thought places itself under compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of its procedure.

And of essential thinking, Heidegger says (Kaufmann 1975, pp 263-4):

The thought of Being seeks no hold in what-is. Essential thinking looks for the slow signs of the incalculable and sees in this the unforeseeable coming of the ineluctable. Such thinking is mindful of the truth of Being and thus helps the Being of truth to make a place for itself in mans history. This help effects no results because it has no need of effect. Essential thinking helps as the simple inwardness of existence, insofar as this inwardness, although unable to exercise such thinking or only having theoretical knowledge of it, kindles its own kind.

In relation to calculative thinking, Heidegger, according to Xuanmeng (n.d) citing Kaufmann (1975, p 262) that this kind of thinking cannot comprehend itself. The focus here is the notion of calculative thoughts compulsion to master everything in the logical terms of its procedure, as shown in the following passage (Kaufmann 1975, p 262) makes it abundantly clear:

It [calculative thinking] has no notion that in calculation everything calculable is already a whole before it starts working out its sums and products, a whole whose unity naturally belongs to the incalculable which, with its mystery, ever eludes the clutches of calculation. That which, however, is always and everywhere closed at the outset to the demands of calculation and, despite that, is always closer to man in its enigmatic unknowableness than anything that is, than anything he may arrange and plan, this can sometimes put the essential man in touch with a thinking whose truth no logic can grasp.

Although both epistemological systems account for the social nature of man, it is the African use of others for orientation and as depositories of wisdom it seems that interaction and discourse are a premium form this perspective, while it is the ability to regard ones self as an other that aids in the development f wisdom at the individual level, and provides the basis for exchange and interaction with others. Kigongo (n.d.) argues further that it is the support of others, that was more important than ones capacities to achieve ones existential ends that reflected the value of corporate existence. He wrote further that corporate existence signified a responsibility of many for one, since the others had to look after the well-being of the individual, i.e., the responsibility of many for one, and also the individual had to look after the well-being of others. This he determines to be a collaborative relationship, where the latter was motivated by the former, which existed between the individual and society that helped to build and sustain a moral character in a person and moral order (social harmony) in the society. The importance of meta-positioning is that these two elements helped build a strong sense of belonging and identity in the society.

Reincarnation Impossible In The Framework Of African Ontology Onyewuenyis (1996) ontological conceptualizations: force, inseparability of the concept of being from the concept of force, force as the nature of being, categories of force, inner realities, categories of visible things, and the dynamic notion of reality, where it is said to be populated by goes further using the concepts of substance, and accidents. The latter implies some notion of action. But the mere contemplation of action advances the discussion to another Western philosophical category, epistemology. One difficulty in the methodical application of the Western version of ontology as delineated by Gruber(1997) occurs when one considers the agents actions as ontological commitment because actions are observable, i.e., the fundament of the empirical school of analysis, which means that knowledge construction, in the Western view precedes or succeeds action, planned or unplanned. This is consistent with Grubers (1997) view of ontological commitments based on the Knowledge-Level perspective. (Newell, 1982) Is the spirit, soul or mind of man then construed to an agent, who actions bestow life to the bearer? But at thus juncture the discussion of African philosophy transitions from ontology to epistemology, since Cline(1998) informs us that epistemology is the investigation into the grounds and nature of knowledge itself, with a defined focus on our means for acquiring knowledge and how we can differentiate between truth and falsehood. Here, the vocabulary of Gullah derives primarily from English, but it also uses words of African origin. The use of verbs demonstrate a basic tense and aspect system composed of the following patterns of usage: a) present/past tense, b) past tense, c) future tense, d) perfect tense, e)present progressive, and past progressive, which aids in the construction of meaning in a temporal sense to conversation, story telling, and writing. Some, like Brouwer(1995 )have argued that there is a discrepancy in the labeling of the dimensions of time between the Westerns philosophical past, present and future and the Africans past, present, and the unborn, where the later appears to connote an inability to predict or control, yet an abiding trust awaiting whatever develops. There is also a certain reverence of the past, as in the sense of according an element of the sacred to ancestors, symbols, traditions and such, which are, if not epistemological, in nature, then certainly axiological.

Ali(2001) argued that from earliest times until Plato, the word techn was linked with the term episteme, while the last implies names for knowing in the broadest sense, i.e., to be entirely at home in something, to understand and be expert in it. The latter incorporates a connotation useful to the current analytical point of view, which is to say, as a noun it refers to the body of ideas that determine the knowledge that is intellectually certain at any particular time.Although, such is a rare usage, it applies, in the sense of cognition and noesis, where the latter should be construed to mean the psychological result of perception and learning and reasoning, which should occur over the duration of a discursive exchange. This resonates with the argument of Appiah,(1992), who reasoned that African philosophy can only be seen as growing out of a history of systematic reflection on widespread, prereflective beliefs about the nature of humankind and its purposes; and about our knowledge of and our place in the cosmos The search for analytical attributes, accords with what Wiredu (1989) describes as the habit of exactness and rigor in thinking, (the pursuit of systematic coherence) and experimental approach. And, further, his argument contains the claim that notwithstanding this metaphilosophical issue of the existence and nature of African philosophy. He listed a set of concepts such as that are the kind of issues that are amendable to discovery using techniques like discourse analysis, beauty, being, causation, evil, God, good, illusion, justice, knowledge, life, meaning, mind, person, reality, truth, right, understanding, and wrong, These are concepts addressed during everyday conversations and in many written texts, and are used by Africans to express their views and convictions, and as Wiredu (1989) states, these concepts need to be analyzed and examined.

What is Epistemology?

Janz (n.d.) wrote Africa since the Enlightenment had been regarded as a place incapable of philosophy. He also refers to the work of Hegel, in the Philosophy of History, who was just one of many from the Critical school of Philosophy that alleged that there was no philosophy, as they knew it that emanates from Africa, which may be just a problem of being victims of the perspectives or dominant paradigms of their times and the framing of their discourse. At any rate they used Africa as the foil against which all reason could be contrasted. He cites Hegel further, to the effect that it was not the Akan or the Kikuyu in particular that were regarded as incapable of reason, but all (sub-Saharan) Africans. This is one of the points about which people with some part African genetic coding mean to retort and, since in the words of Janz(n.d.), to be unified in rejection in this manner meant that it made sense to see a common resistance to this theorized and pervasive racism. The problem is that Africa continues to be seen as a unified and coherent category by the rest of the world, if only in rejection, it continues to make sense to resist the reductionist move which would locate philosophy primarily in ethnic groupings. Janz(n.d.) cites Mudimbe (1988),who articulated this by arguing that Africa has been a construction of Europe, in the sense that Europe needed its other on which to project its fears and aspirations. He also states that Kwame Anthony Appiah has also taken up the question of the meaning of Africa, specifically in terms of race (Appiah 1992). Is Africa a state of mind, an object in the mind of man or merely a geophysical location? Rhetorically, stated Where is Africa?

According to Janz(n.d.) Hegel called North Africa European Africa, and for some today, northern Africa has more in common culturally and intellectually with the Mid-East than with the rest of Africa. Such machination led Janz(n.d) to formulate the following question set Where, intellectually, does Africa end and the rest of the world start? What is the intellectual relationship between Africa and its various diasporas? Is there such a thing as a pure culture in Africa, which allows us to identify truly African concepts or cultural artifacts and can possibly ground and guarantee a truly African philosophy? Where is Africa? requires us to also ask What is Africa?

Cline(1998) wrote that modern epistemology generally involves a debate between rationalism and empiricism, or the question of whether knowledge can be acquired a priori or a posterior, where empiricism is defined as knowledge is obtained through experience, while rationalism is defined as knowledge can be acquired through the use of reason. Its importance obtains from the belief that it is fundamental to how we think, according to Cline(1998), without some means of understanding how we acquire knowledge, how we rely upon our senses, and how we develop concepts in our minds, we have no coherent path for our thinking. This might explain the tendency to categorize African schools of thought as irrational, since he completes his syllogism with the conclusion, a sound epistemology is necessary for the existence of sound thinking and reasoning. Gruber (1997) stated that ontologies are often equated with taxonomic hierarchies of classes, but class definitions, and the subsumed relation, but ontologies need not be limited to these forms. This is shown in the African use of the spiritual hierarchy to define God, the relationship of energy and force, deathlessness as the absorption of force from those in the physical world, i.e. ancestors, the dual use of the law of the excluded middle, etc. He also stated that ontologies are also not limited to conservative definitions, that is, definitions in the traditional logic sense that only introduce terminology and do not add any knowledge about the world, citing Enderton, (1972), because the African conception cannot be proved to false with the logical tools of analysis traditionally used by Western philosophy. To specify a conceptualization one needs to state axioms that do constrain the possible interpretations for the defined terms. (Gruber, 1997) Tishammer demonstrates the use of Modal and Symbolic logic as tools to ascertain truth, validity and soundness of African argumentation. Janz(n.d) then states, to ask where Africa is, is also to ask where it is in the development of disciplinary knowledge. With the attendant notion of if the nature of knowledge is the point of the quest at this point, what then are beliefs in relation to knowledge, basic axioms, alternative sets of propositions from which to reason, or just assumptions?

Modal Logic of African Philosophies Precepts - some basic concepts of modal logic
1) a division of logic - modal logic

2) there are many other ways reality could have been like, i.e. many other possible

worlds.
3) mainly deals with necessary (signified by a square, like this one:

possible (signified by a diamond, like this one: example:

) and ) modal operators. For

4) p - means that p is possibly true, or the concept of force is inseparable from the definition of 'being.'

Contingent statement - According to p, there exists at least one possible world where p is true. An example of a possible (but not necessary) statement would be that It is not the "soul" or "part of man" that has gone to the world of the spirits but the whole man though not in a visible but invisible state There exists a world in African philosophy (even if it is not our own) where death is viewed as " the man still exists as this person in a spiritual invisible form. His bodily energy goes but his vital force persists and waxes stronger and stronger ontologically, because such a world is possible where energy and force are two different things. However, there also exists at least one possible world where the dichotomy of soul and body is not applicable such that at death, the soul separates and inhabits another body. Therefore, the statement is possible even if it is not true in every possible world. A statement thats true in some possible worlds but also false in some other possible worlds is called a contingent statement (because it can be either true or false). ( Tishammer, n.d.)[contingent is the term that ought to be used to sum the arguments about Arica rather than irrational]

Another example:
5)

p - This means that p is necessarily true. That is, it is true in all possible worlds, that as Africans say that forces differ in their essences or nature. There is the divine force, terrestrial or celestial forces, human forces, and vegetable and even mineral forces." Onyewuenyis (1996) discourse expansion includes the proposition of the concept of different categories of forces, that these forces follow a hierarchical order such that God precedes the spirits; then come the founding fathers and the living-dead, according to the order of primogeniture; then the living according to their rank in terms of seniority.

It follows then that statement p would be true in as a lifeworld, where defined by Habermas as the sphere of everyday communicative interactions, defining interaction to involve

communication between subjects in the pursuit of common understanding. Here the law of non-contradiction (this law states that for any specified proposition p, it is impossible for both p and not p to be true; is a source of cross cultural tension since it is possible for me to exist and to not exist at the same time), where death is viewed as " the man still exists as this person in a spiritual invisible form. His bodily energy goes but his vital force persists and waxes stronger and stronger ontologically, because such a world is possible where energy and force are two different things. Additionally energy is one many types of force and the law of excluded middle, as such are all things could be true in all possible worlds. Note that a possible statement (one thats true in at least one possible world) can also be necessary (true in all possible worlds), and all necessary statements are possible. However, a contingent statement (one thats true in some possible worlds, and false in some others) cannot be a necessary statement, and no necessary statements are contingent.(Tishammer, n.d.) Following Tishammer(n.d.), all three of those terms belong to the category of modal status, because they describe statements as being necessarily true/false, possibly true/false, or contingently true/false. ).( Tishammer, n.d.)

A Symbolic Logic Approach to African Philosophies Deathlessness and immortality( the logic of this argument is drawn from the work of Tishammer) If God exists, He exists necessarily. (And this statement holds true in all possible worlds.) Evidential justification: God is defined as the highest spiritual being in a spiritual hierachy) (which is necessary existence). It is possible for God to exist. Evidential justification: Again, God is defined as the highest being in spiritual hierarchy of spiritual beings. If a being is possible, and if a hierarchy of beings is possible, it cannot be impossible. Were it the case that the being was not the highest in the hierarchy to an

extent that is not possible, it would not be the greatest possible being. Given its coherent meaning then, it would be irrational to claim that the greatest possible being cannot possibly exist. If God necessarily exists (i.e. if God exists in all possible worlds), then he exists. Proof: Suppose God exists in all possible worlds. Reality is itself a possible world. Therefore, if God exists in all possible worlds then he exists in reality. ).( Tishammer, n.d.) Regarding the Law of excluded middle right, Tishammer(n.d.) stated this logical precept states that for any proposition p, either p is true or not p is true. There is no middle ground. For example, either African philosophy exists or African philosophy does not exist. ). ( Tishammer, n.d.) The skeletal form of the syllogisms is shown below:

If dichotomy of soul and body is not applicable such that at death, the soul separates and inhabits another body then Rather "the man" still exists as this person in a spiritual invisible form. (necessarily true) Translation to spiritual form If Spiritual form, then His bodily energy goes but his vital force persists and waxes stronger and stronger ontologically. (necessarily true) If the hierarchy of "forces," then the dead ancestors assume an enhanced vital superiority of intelligence and will over the living; " (necessarily true) Also the departed must therefore have gained in deeper knowledge of the forces and nature" (5) and it follows that because of the ontological relationship existing among members of the clan, they interact with the living. If translation to the spiritual form mean return to the form of force, then what interacts with the living is the man himself who is now essentially force." If interaction with the living mean vital force grows and/or weakens through the interaction of forces. A person is "really dead" when his vital force is totally diminished. Due to their preoccupation with immortality and deathlessness, the ancestors are concerned with the increase of their and their descendants' vital force for the well-being and continuity of the clan.

One of the ways of increasing the ancestor's vital force is by sacrifices and prayers from the living descendants. Hence the wish of Africans to have many children who will offer sacrifices to them after death. By an inverse movement the "force" of the ancestor flows into the sacrifices and into the community which he embodies and the living receive the "strengthening influence" of the ancestor. "The whole weight of an extinct race lies on the dead... for they have for the whole time of their infinite deathlessness, missed the goal of their existence, that is, to perpetuate themselves through reproduction in the living person. (6) This "perpetuation of themselves through reproduction" is what has been mistakenly called reincarnation. ).( Tishammer, n.d.)

Why Does Epistemology Matter to Atheism? The only way to assess the syllogism and therefore, the reasoning of African philosophy since it can be shown to exhibit logical truth and validity, is to assess the soundness of the argument is premise by premise, i.e., to find , at least one premise that when evaluated in isolation can be shown to be false. Cline (n.d.) has argued that Many debates between atheist and theists revolve around fundamental issues which people don't recognize or never get around to discussing, and also that many of these are epistemological in nature and as such they rely on basic epistemological principles. Whether or not God is necessary in the African view can be posed as a legitimate question, if when one transitions to a non-living form, i.e., being in the realm of spirit, since all there is as a priori axioms is substance, about which Cline(n.d.) states without understanding this and understanding the various epistemological positions, people will just end up talking past each other. Epistemology, Truth, and Why We Believe What We Believe: Cline argues that theists believe in some god, atheists do not. Although their reasons for believing or not believing vary, and also that they differ in what they consider to be appropriate criteria for truth and, therefore, the proper criteria for a reasonable belief. Remember that it was advanced that African philosophy is theistic and Cline(n.d.) stated that theists commonly rely upon criteria like tradition, custom, revelation, faith, and intuition, which appears to be the based from which the argument proceeds. He also wrote that atheists common reject these criteria in favor of correspondence, coherence, and consistency. The notion of Harris(2001) that the ancestors of the current speakers of Gullah-Geechee in South Carolina and Georgia originated from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. Holloway(n.d) has shown that of the 106, 506 slaves that were imported to Charleston, S.C. ., there 16.5 % from Senegambia, 5.3 % from Sierra Leone, 14.6 % from the Windward Coast, 12.3 % from the Gold Coast, 1.3 % from the Bight of Benin, 1.8 % from the Bight of Biafra, 32.1 % from Angola, 0.4 % from Madagascar, Mozambique, the

category Other(Africa, Guiena, and Unknown contributed 15.7 %. Also, contrary to the prevalent notions, the Schomburg Center states that the Bambara, Mandingo, or Senegambians constituted about 24 percent of the approximately 388,000 Africans who landed in America, which was about almost 92,000. In fact, they also asserted that immigration to the Chesapeake region before 1700, there were more immigrants from Senegambia (almost 6,000) than from the Bight of Biafra about(5000), and that they totaled about 31,000 by the end of the migration, representing almost a third of all arrivals from Senegambia. Of the 92,000, they point out about 45,000 Senegambians were settled in the coastal Low Country of the Carolinas and Georgia, where they constituted 21 percent of African immigrants. Although they were also, prominent among African immigrants in the northern colonies, accounting for about 28 percent of arrivals, or over 7,000 people, and the people from Senegambia were prominent everywhere in the united States, much more so than virtually anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere, although there were also considerable numbers of Senegambians in the French Caribbean islands and in French Guiana. Another point to consider, which is contrary to what has been asserted about the relgions of West Africa, the Schomburg noted that Senegambia was strongly influenced by Islam, more so than any other region of origin, which means that many enslaved Africans in the United States had been exposed to Islam, more so proportionately than in the rest of the Americas. They stated, without reserve, that practitioners of the religion were clearly present in both the low country of Carolina and Georgia and in the Tidewater region of Virginia nad Maryland. An additional odd entry was also found on the Schomburg website, adult Muslim males stand out prominently, while there are very few references to Muslim women. This reflects what is known about the slave trade originating in the interior of West Africa, which was composed almost entirely of males. They also indicate that the assumption that all Western African languages and religions were based on a version of Akan, i.e., the Gold Coast and the neighboring parts of the Windward Coast(Ivory Coast), may be in error. They stated that another 15 to 20 percent of Africans were originally from the Gold Coast and the neighboring parts of the Windward Coast(Ivory Coast), where Twi, was the common language, and most people were identified as Akan. People of the lineage also were concentrated in the Carolinas and Georgia, where they amounted to perhaps 18-20 percent of immigrants, or up 70,000 people. Although, they were found in the Chesapeake, representing as many as 1520,000 people, or 12-15 percent of total immigration there. They were also prominent in the northern colonies, especially New England, because the slave traders of Rhode Island concentrated their activities there, accounting for the enforced immigration of some 7,000 people, or 30 percent of the total arriving there. Regarding Gbe, the langauge of the Yoruba, Ewe/Fon/Allada/Mahi(theso-called Gbe languages), and Muslims, brought from the far interior of the Slave Coast or Bight of Benin, they were noticeably absent or of minor importance.

Gullah-Geechee - a People, a Langauge, a Culture

Lorenzo Turner (1969) investigated the Gullah dialect in the South Carolina coastal communities of Waccamaw, James, Johns Wasmalaw, Edisto, St. Helena, and Hilton Head. Those in Georgia were Darien, Harris Neck, Sapeloe Island, St. Simon Island, and St. Marys. There were at least three informants; two were over sixty and one was between forty and sixty, in the seven communities where he studied the dialect. Both sexes were represented. Informants were interviewed and taped. Autobiographical sketches, narratives of religious practices, folk tales, proverbs, superstitions, and recollections of slavery were among the information obtained (Turner, 1969). The work of Turner(1949, 1969, 2002) have shown that the Gullah have maintained a language that was identical to the one they left behind consisting of a unique lexicon, syntax, and intonation which could be described as an African Krio ". He also shows that it was a confluence of languages spoken along the West African coast stretching from Senegal, Sierra Leone, to Cameroon. Records of slave traders have helped to establish that many of the Gullah people came from a country of Africa, currently know as Sierra Leone." Lewis(2001) when describing Gullah pointed out two identifying features a) the omission of certain verbs, like is and are, and the dropping of past tense inflections. She also cites the replacement of the omitted is and are with the word be, to signifies a stable condition. The example she relates is, to say, he working, would mean that he is busy right now, whereas he be working, would mean he has a steady job, " citing McCrum et al, (p. 197, 199). She cites Turner(1949) who, asserted that more than six thousand Africanisms survive in Gullah. She provides, as an example, the phrase is sweet talk meaning to flatter ; as in often African American men sweet talk their women to seduce them. Swit mot was the original African Krio term, citing both Bryson (p. 86; Facts on File 44, 651) and McCrum et al, p. 208- 209). A creole language, or simply a creole, is a stable language that has originated from a pidgin language that has been nativized (that is, acquired by children), The article, Creole langauge asserts, whereas a vocabulary of a creole language, is composed of cognates from the parent languages, though there are often clear phonetic and semantic shifts. The grammar of a creole, often has original features but may differ substantially from those of the parent languages, while the vocabulary comes from the dominant group and the grammar from the subordinate group, where such stratification exists. In addition to what has been definitively stated the Geltzer(2001) also posits that Gullah dialect evolved when the English language mingled with a number of West African tribal tongues, resulting in a patois that was incorporated into the mythology and personality of the South by writers such as Joel Chandler Harris. He continues explaining the difference between Geechee and Gullah, citing Haffner "The words are like a synonym to us. We in Africa prefer to say Gullah, because we have the Gola tribe in Eastern Sierra Leone.

Lewis(2001) provide a avid description of plantation creole, providing context with two enjoiners, a) As slaves who were brought to America were progressively sold farther and farther inland, with them spread their native tongues, including their rhythms and inflections and what English pidgin they learned on the ships, and b) Slave advertisements from the 18th century - indicate that Wolof, a West African language, was widely spoken on the plantations of America's South. She wrote about creole as a pidgin, citing McCrum et al , (p. 209-211) that children of first generation slaves would have heard the native language, but because of pressure to become "civilized" and speak English, they did not learn Wolof themselves. But rather, as second generation laborers spoke what has become known as Plantation Creole, a kind of English mixed with many African elements developed. Regarding the psychological proximity of the people who populated that plantation, she states that it was spoken in white nurseries as early as the middle 18th century, as African American women slaves served as mammies to the children and also that slave children and white children - often grew up side by side. This aspect of the social relations was reflected in the speech of white womenfolk, because they were affected most noticeably by the mingling with slaves. This because the norm was, while boys were often sent up North or to the cities to go to school, girls stayed home and interacted with it the slaves daily, she asserts citing McCrum (p. 216). Regarding what she euphemized as Nigger English, portraying the prevailing attitude about linguistic communication in the 19th century, with the normative assertion that both whites and blacks in general recognized the existence of what was called nigger English." Using the example of slave advertisements , which indicate this recognition in descriptions of the merchandise: " speaks English though some what Negroish, " and " speaks rather more proper than Negroes in general ," again referring to the work of McCrum et al, (p. 210-212). This she notes as, "nigger English," and equates it with the langauge of the geopolity, where this sort of communicative pattern was part and parcel of the everyday activity sequences, she referred to as Plantation Creole She states despite its humble origins, yielded some noteworthy poetry and provide the following examples: a) George Moses Horton, born around 1797, was called "the Coloured Bard of North Carolina," and b) Daniel Webster Davis (1862-1913) wrote a lovely song entitled " 'Wey Down Souf," which exhibits a fascinating blend of Middle English, South Midland, and Gullah, thus demonstrating that a true blending had taken place by his time. Mr. Davis' poem reads, in part: 0 de birds ar' sweetly singin' 'Wey down Souf, An' de banjer is a-ringin' 'Wey down Souf, An' my heart it is a-sighin' Whil' de moments am a-flyin' Fur my hom' I am a-cryin'

'Wey down Souf. (McCrum 212) Parenthetically she adds, included with the poem in its published version was a glossary of terms two pages long, which defined such words as fhar (far), huccum (how come), and shorz (sure as), all of which are heard in our time, and also included was the item Ho'oped as the past tense of help is a term widely used by white South Midlanders, citing McCnum et al(p. 212) and Mountain Range (p. ix,&66).

The Gullah people and their language, Altman(1997) remarked are also called Geechee, which some scholars speculate to be related to the Ogeechee River near Savannah, Georgia. In contrast, Harris(1997) counter-argued that the presence of the Guichee or Gu1lah communities provides the clearest case study of the persistence of multiple African languages within the twentieth century African American community. She notes that there is an ongoing debate the origin of the term Gullah. She cites, Vass who has suggested that it came from "ngola," a royal title which the Portuguese mispronounced and applied to the area now called Angola., while the other suggestions are that the term Gullah comes from the Gola people who came from Liberia, while the term Geechee originated from the Kisi (Kissi) also from Liberia. Alternatively, Altman(1997) asserts that Geechee is an emic term used by speakers, which can have a derogatory connotation depending on usage, while "Gullah" is a term that was generally used by outsiders but that has become a way for speakers to formally identify themselves and their language.The Geechee are known for preserving more of their African linguistic and cultural heritage than any other African-American community in the United States. As a langauge, then Gullah , according to Altman(1997), an English-based creole language containing many African loanwords and significant influences from African languages in grammar and sentence structure. It is normally noted for its use in Gullah storytelling, cuisine, music, folk beliefs, crafts, farming and fishing traditions, all of which exhibit strong influences from West and Central African cultures.

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