Matthew J.

Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966 There are innumerous factors that come into play during a campaign and election for a governor. This was also true in 1966 during the gubernatorial race in California between Ronald Reagan and Pat Brown. However, while there are innumerous factors involved in both the campaign and election of a public official, there are factors specific to each election. These factors are the ones that necessitate the very outcome of the election and why the person that won, won. Ronald Reagan won the 1966 gubernatorial race in California due to his opponents underestimating him, the Democratic party lacking cohesion, and his ability to become the perfect Ciceronian actor on the stage. First, we will look to the primary elections for both parties in the gubernatorial election as it will flesh out the Democratic partys lack of cohesion. Secondly, we will look at the Republican and Democratic strategies in campaigning for the general election. Thirdly, we will look at how Ciceros philosophical understanding of a person as an actor on a stage helps elucidate why Reagan won the election. Fourthly, we will pull together the different less important factors that went into the Republican victory in the general election. Finally, we will pull together all of these various elements and summarize why Reagan beat Brown in the general election. In the prelude to the primary elections for Californias gubernatorial race, both the Democratic party and Republican party were victims of political schism. Because both parties were plagued with division during a time where unity was of paramount importance, it appeared that whichever party united first would come out victorious in the general election. Totton J. Anderson, of the University of Southern California, and Eugene C. Lee, of the University of California, Berkley, analyzed the 1966 gubernatorial campaign and election and came to the following conclusion regarding both parties:

Matthew J. Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

Each party had the potential to win in California in 1966, that each faced internal factionalism composed of ideological differences and the clash of leadership ambitions and that "the victorious party in the 1966 struggle for power would be the first to have resolved these dilemmas successfully."1 For the Democrats, their disunity would prevail throughout the primary, which led to a litany of problems for the general election. We will investigate these issues before delving into those surrounding the Republicans. Seeking his third term in office, Democratic incumbent Governor Edmund G. Pat Brown was faced with fairly strong opposition within his own party vis--vis the Democratic gubernatorial primary itself. Brown won his first drive for governor in 1958 by more than a million votes over the Republican competitor William Knowland2. Following this, Brown defeated the Republicans again in 1962 when Richard Nixon made a dash for the governorship.3 However, two decisive victories appeared to create complacency in the Democratic party in California wherein they didnt need to strategize as much leading up to 1966. On June 8th, Brown only accumulated 140,1284 more votes than the combined votes of his opposition in the primary. For example, Mayor Samuel Yorty provided proof that there was statewide anti-Brown sentiment in that he personally polled only 374,174 less votes than Brown in the primary.5 Not only was the battle between Yorty and Brown too close for a then incumbent, it was also malicious. During his campaign for the gubernatorial primary, Mayor Yorty was constantly

Pg. 553, Anderson, Totton J., and Eugene C. Lee. "The 1966 Election in California." The Western Political Quarterly Part 2 20.2 (1967): 553. JSTOR. Web. 05 Apr. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/446081>. 2 "What the 1958 Elections Mean." TIME 10 Nov. 1958. TIME. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,938001,00.html>. 3 22, March. "Looking Back at the 1962 Gubernatorial Race : Debate: Edmund G. (Pat) Brown and ExPresident's Former Campaign Manager Discuss the Election at Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 22 Mar. 1992. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://articles.latimes.com/199203-22/local/me-7477_1_richard-nixon>. 4 The 1966 Election in California, 537 5 , 538

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

inferring that Brown was supported by Communists and lacked understanding of urban affair.6 On the counterattack, Brown said that Yorty was a right-wing fright peddler and implied that he had made a mess of city government.7 This should immediately raise a red flag in that an incumbent had intraparty challengers in the gubernatorial primary. That fact alone necessarily means that there was disunity within the Democratic party in California at the time. However, party disunity may not have been the only problem for Governor Brown. A collaborative study carried out by Stephen Ansolabehere and James M. Snyder, Jr. on the advantage of incumbents between 1942 and 2000 found that there was a slight demarcation between Browns first two elections and the race for governor in 1966: In the 1940s and 1950s, incumbency advantages are quite similar in all offices. The 1960s show significant differentiation across offices. In that decade U.S. House and Senate incumbents have relatively high incumbency advantages. Governors and lower state executives have lower incumbency advantages.8 By fitting in with the overall trend of lower incumbency advantages during that time period, Brown was stripped of one of the inherent benefits that would have aided him immensely. Now that we have looked to the problems facing Brown in his own partys primary, we must now analyze the Republican primary election as to note the dissimilarities. In 1965, the Republican political entity within California was as disjointed as the Democratic party due to both a sour presidential primary two years prior and the loss of the state in the general election to Lyndon Johnson.9 Coupled with an ideological split between the Goldwater Republicans and the Rockefeller Republicans, there was literally a geographic split: wealthy aristocratic types controlled the northern faction of Republicans in California while

6 7

The 1966 Election in California, 538 , 538 8 Ansolabehere, Stephen, and James M. Snyder, Jr. "The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000." Election Law Journal (2002): 315-38. Print. 9 The 1966 Election in California, 538

Matthew J. Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

those espousing a new kind of conservatism headed up the southern division of California.10 Despite the atmosphere prior to the primary being fairly tense, state party chairman Gaylord Parkinsons eleventh commandment Thou shall not speak ill of any Republican seemed to lead the way for a united front for the Republican party (even during the primary).11 Even the appearance of a united front would allow for the forgotten familial ties between the conservative Republicans and the more moderate Republicans to show forth again. Despite the overall cohesion of the party by way of Parkinsons Law, there was still the manner of the primary itself that needs assessing. For the Republicans, there was one major issue of concern in the primary leading up to the gubernatorial general election: who could beat Brown? In terms of choices, they had two candidates to select from in their gubernatorial primary: an actor, Ronald Reagan and a former Mayor of San Francisco, George Christopher. Christopher had been an unsuccessful candidate for the U.S. Senate in 1958; lost his bid against the incumbent Lieutenant Governor in 1962; and had been the northern Californian campaign manager for Rockefeller in 1964.12 All in all, Christopher was precisely what one would categorize as a career politician. His strategy in the primary was two-pronged in that he attacked Governor Browns ineptness on the one hand and Reagans conservatism on the other.13 Contrastingly, the Republicans other option was Ronald Reagan, a movie actor who had supported Goldwater-Miller in 1964 and been president of the Screen Actors Guild.14 Compared to Christopher, Reagan was a political nobody who looked like someone who would be easily defeated. Shedding his association with any past involvement
10

De Groot, Gerard J. "'A Goddamned Electable Person': The 1966 California Gubernatorial Campaign of Ronald Reagan." History 82.267 (1997): 429-48. Print. 11 "California: Parkinson's Law." TIME 27 May 1966. TIME. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,835629-1,00.html>. 12 The 1966 Election in California, 539 13 , 539 14 , 539

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

in politics, Reagan ran a campaign centering on the virtue of his alleged inexperience in government service, by classing himself as a citizen politician.15 By distancing himself from the establishment, Reagan was able to create an enclave all his own and become something that neither Christopher nor Brown could claim of themselves: being a non-career politician. In fact, according to one poll, Reagan started out with a 17 percent lead over Christopher by September of 1965.16 The lead that favored the former movie star soon began to dwindle, though, as Reagans lead over Christopher dropped 11 points from September of 1965 to May of 1966 to only a 6 percent margin.17 Subsequent polls projected that former Mayor Christopher would beat Governor Brown by a larger margin than Reagan. Furthermore, the Republicans recognized that they would need a percentage of those party affiliation normally lies with the Democrats to vote for the Republican candidate. Unfortunately for Reagan, Christopher was also projected to attract 30 percent of the Democratic vote while Reagan was only projected to receive 23 percent.18 It would seem that the momentum in the Republican primary had switched in favor of former Mayor Christopher, but fate (or Browns camp or Reagans camp) had something else up its sleeve. Within two weeks of Reagan having dropped to a 6 percent margin with Christopher, Browns campaign team put out information regarding alleged altercations with government authorities some years earlier regarding his dairy business (one of the charges was a misdemeanor conviction) and stock market dealings: The Brown campaignreleased information about milk law violations by Christopher over 20 years earlier, when he was building his dairy business. Much was made of his recent successes on the stock market, even though his profits were entirely legal. The Christopher

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The 1966 Election in California, 539 , 539 17 , 539 18 , 539

Matthew J. Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

surge was promptly halted.19 By placing Christopher in such a bad light, Reagan regained his 17-point lead mere days before the primary election; this would prove fatal blow for Christopher in the end. By the end of the primary, Reagan had proven himself as a contender (at least for the Republicans) by way of his defeating Christopher by 743,940, which correlated to his having a 63 percent victory.20 By claiming a large majority to his camp, Reagan had proven that he was relatable to both of the warring factions within the Californian Republican Party. By finishing stronger than an incumbent did in his own primary, the movie star turned politician was well on his way to becoming the new governor of California. Having analyzed the primary from both sides of the political coin, let us now assess the general election and campaign strategies of both camps. The general election gubernatorial campaigns of 1966 in California proved eventful and interesting to say the least. To flesh out the inner machinations of the general election, we will first analyze the strategy of the Republican party in the campaign for the general election. Following that, we will analyze the strategy of the Democratic party and why they failed to stop Governor Browns ousting. Reagans campaign for the Californian governorship in 1966 was made possible by the public relations firm Spencer-Roberts and Associates and their crafting of the once actor into a potential governor. One key thing to note here is that the word crafting is operating in the sense of repackaging what Reagan already was rather than creating something new: Spencer-Roberts steadfastly denied trying to change the Reagan image. Spencer declared that "that kingmaker stuff is a lot of bull. In politics you don't change a guy's image and get anywhere. If you try . . . and put words in his mouth, people see right through him. A guy has X number of qualities, and you emphasize some and not others, that's all.21
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A Goddamned Electable Person, 434 The 1966 Election in California, 539 21 , 542

Matthew J. Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

This is the heart and soul of candidate-centered politics wherein campaigns are based on the media and the skills of professional consultants. Money, strategy, and television advertising are key components of the modern campaign.22 The unified atmosphere of Californias Republican Party was made possible by the transcendent nature of the party itself. The voters in California werent going to be voting for the Republican Party or the Democratic Party; they were going to be voting for Brown or Reagan and the Republicans clamped down on this fact. Having fleshed out the last element coming out of the primaries, let us now turn to the analysis of the general election and why Ronald Reagan came out victorious in 1966. As noted previously, there was a general air of disunity about the Democratic gubernatorial primary race. The fractured nature of the Democrats, coming into the general election, didnt deviate much from the primary. Yorty, who had been brutal during the Democratic primary, refused to endorse Brown and his sentiments from the primary still hung in the air during the general election.23 However, this problem had been occurring since Browns stay in office began. For example, Governor Brown constantly fought with members of the state legislature, the Johnson Administration didnt care for him that much, he fought with the Speaker of the Assembly (a fellow Democrat), and was characterized as not politically adept at mobilizing his party's resources.24 Furthermore, the lack of a single P.R. firm for the Democrats played into feelings of disjointedness even more. The firm of Baus and Ross were used as an optional extra for the Democrats and the firm of Harry Lerner and associates was used sparingly for attack issues against Reagan.25

22

"Chapter 9: Political Parties, Candidates, and Campaigns: Contesting Elections." McGraw Hill Higher Education. The McGraw-Hill Companies. Web. 07 Apr. 2012. <http://www.mhhe.com/socscience/polisci/patterson/olc/stu/sum09.htm>. 23 The 1966 Election in California, 543 24 , 545 25 , 544

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

Beyond the issue of party disunity, Browns campaign poorly handled the issues that were part of his platform. The first problem was the fact that Brown attempted to play up what he had done in his previous two terms as Governor rather than what he could do for the citizens of California.26 His recitations of past acts falling upon deaf ears, Brown attempted to paint Reagan as an extremist who was in bed with the John Birch Society (an ultraconservative group grounded in anti-communistic feelings).27 Brown also tried to peg Reagan as a racist and a nonpolitician lacking all credibility.28 Overall, Browns campaign appeared to focus on defensive negativity by attempting to make Reagan the issue rather than the issues themselves. To Browns credit, he did receive a few endorsements that prove, at the least, noteworthy. For example, Life magazine, Harry S. Truman, and The New York Times all endorsed Browns campaign.29 The key thing to note about these endorsements is that they were all coming from sources external to the state. What Brown really needed, and never received, was influential endorsements of constituents or organizations run by constituents of California. If one takes into account that these lackluster endorsements are the only benefit listed within this analysis of 1966 gubernatorial race in California for Brown, one can easily come to the conclusion that his chances for beating Reagan were abysmal to say the least. At the other end of the spectrum, Ronald Reagan and the Republicans campaign for governor was anything but disjointed. In order to preserve the sense of unity that had been endowed by the eleventh commandment, the Reagan campaign decided early on to not bring in the figureheads of former Republican battles. For example, the Reagan campaign disallowed

26 27

The 1966 Election in California, 544 , 544. 28 , 544 29 , 544

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

Barry Goldwater and Richard Nixon from giving speeches on the behalf of campaign. 30 Furthermore, the Republican entity in California modified a statute, which required the election of a new state chairman between the primary and the general election (which could have led to disjointedness within the Republican ranks).31 To further unify the party, Reagan and the Republicans set out their party platform on the issues that would prove most salient during the campaign. On the issue of extremism (attached to the John Birch Society), the Reagan campaign decided that silence was the best strategy to start out with.32 The issue of racial discrimination, as it pertained to housing, was met with the stance of repealing or amending the Rumford Act, which had made it illegal to discriminate on such grounds.33 By collectively agreeing on the aforesaid issues, the Reagan campaign had begun to make manifest its already obvious benefit of having a united front. Segueing from an overarching theme of a united party, the most paramount element that factored into the overarching themes that won the election for Reagan was the P.R. firm running his campaign, Spencer-Roberts: Professional campaign management has become virtually a necessity in California gubernatorial elections and many observers believe that the skillful guidance of SpencerRoberts and Associates contributed greatly to Reagan's success. The firm participated in all aspects of the campaign with the exception of fund-raising and controlled the organization, schedule, itinerary, and the selection and timing of issues.34 Spencer-Roberts did not want to change Reagans image but, rather, wanted to accentuate what he had going for him: In politics you don't change a guy's image and get any- where. If you try . . . and put words in his mouth, people see right through him. A guy has X number of qualities,

30 31

The 1966 Election in California, 542 , 542 32 , 542 33 , 542 34 ,543

Matthew J. Bailey

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

and you emphasize some and not others, that's all."35 Out of a want to accentuate what their candidate had going for him, Spencer-Roberts turned the Brown campaigns negative framing of Reagan being a citizen with no political background into a positive. Spencer stated that, Citizenpolitician was our creed in recounting the clear demarcation between Browns being a part of the system and Reagan being an outsider. Another key factor to Reagans victory was Spencer-Roberts employing BASICO, the Behavioral Science Corporation, for the Republicans campaign. Headed up by Stanley Plog and Kenneth Holden, professors of psychology, BASICO felt that scientific voter profiling and sophisticated candidate coaching could better Reagans campaign.36 Subjecting Reagan to three days of intense cross-examination, Plog and Holden began to analyze how the non-politician analyzed information so that they could develop methods for bursts of quick information intake.37 By placing information on five by eight cards attached to black notebooks, Reagan was able to rapidly study and take in information so that he could work in an expeditious manner; this is also how Plog and Holden taught Reagan the art of the soundbite.38 This played directly into the lives of the constituents of California at the time in that they could easily digest what Reagan would say in speeches and the like (even if it came off as simplistic to political types). However, the notion of a soundbite played directly into Reagans strength as an actor in that he could convey a complex idea in a short (albeit polarized) one or two liner. These soundbites allowed Reagan and Spencer-Roberts to keep focus on their three main issues for the campaign: morality; taxes and spending; and eight years of incumbency.39 This simplistic phraseology also allowed Reagan to quickly parry attacks made by Brown. For
35 36

The 1966 Election in California, 543 A Goddamned Electable Person, 438 37 , 438 38 , 438 39 The 1966 Election in California, 543

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

example, Brown charged Reagan with bigotry when he signed a Caucasian only restrictive covenant in 1941.40 To counter this, Reagan said that he came from a small townand had never heard of such things.41 Reagan then said, I was the first member of my family to ever own propertyI never read the deed and would not have known how to interpret the legal terminology.42 In his parry to Browns attack, Reagans simplistic response carried with it the messages of appealing to Mr. and Mrs. Average, being a self-made man, and speaking of how people have a hard time understanding legal jargon and bureaucracy.43 Again, Browns team seemed to focus on Reagans prima facie appearance rather than what was being manifest through his simplistic phraseology. While Browns campaign was hell-bent on showing that Reagan was a non-politician moron, the framing of Reagan as a non-politician actually falls right in line with the Ciceronian notion of being a player on the stage (in this case a political one). In Ciceros On Obligation he succinctly points out his philosophy of not acting out of character: We should each of us stick closely to the characteristics peculiar to us as long as they are not flawed; this is how we can more easily maintain that element of the fitting which we are investigating. We must follow this course so as not to resist the general sway of nature, and so as to follow our natural bent in conforming with thisIf the concept of fitting means anything at all, it is surely nothing more than keeping our whole life and all of our activities on an even keel within it, and we cannot achieve this if we forsake our own nature by mimicking that of othersSo we should be aware of our own abilities, and show ourselves to be keen judges of our merits and failings. Otherwise actors on stage may

40 41

The 1966 Election in California, 546 A Goddamned Electable Person, 442 42 , 442 43 , 442

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

appear to be more farsighted than we are. They do not opt for the best plays, but for those most suited to their talents.44 By using Ciceros motif of the player on a stage, we can see that Reagan didnt need to become a politician in order to beat Brown in the general election. In fact, by catering to what he was good at (being genuine, speaking in a down to earth fashion, etc.), Reagan was able to connect to the constituency in a manner that Brown could not hope to do as a part of the well-oiled and heavily financed machine.45 Now that the main factors in both campaigns have fleshed been fleshed out, we can analyze the factors that played into the election itself and why Reagan was victorious in the end. One of the key factors in Browns loss to Reagan in the election was that of his misreading a demographic shift in California: Northern Californias influence was diminished as white, Midwestern and Southern immigrants coming to Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange County were attracted to Reagans message.46 This correlates to a California Poll that showed that Governor Brown had suffered substantial losses in support among white working people, especially union members, and among lower income and educational groups which had been his chief source of strength in 1958 andin 1962.47 This also accounts for the necessary swing of Democratic voters voting Republican for the Republicans to beat Brown (as union members were historically associated with the

44

Stephens, William O. "On Obligations (Book 1, 105-118)." The Person: Readings in Human Nature. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006. 18-19. Print. 45 A Goddamned Electable Person, 435 46 "Unforgettable Change: 1960s: The New Right Elects Ronald Reagan Governor." Unforgettable Change: 1960s: The New Right Elects Ronald Reagan Governor. Oakland Museum of California. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. <http://museumca.org/picturethis/timeline/unforgettable-change-1960s/new-right-electsronald-reagan-governor/info>. 47 The 1966 Election in California, 550

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Matthew J. Bailey Democratic party):

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

We lost votes with the conservative Democrats. Id say the backbone of the party, the blue-collar majority worker. Thats who we lost. As a matter of fact, we did better in the suburbs that wed done. Reagan did not appeal to a lot of the suburbanites. We upped our percentages in the suburbs and lost it in the traditional Democratic areas.48 Furthermore, the Republicans handled the issues associated with these groups as evidenced by 55 percent of the California Poll crediting Reagan as the candidate likely to do a better job of handling the issues which were important to them.49 Browns loss in the election can also be attributed to financial problems in that one of the major sources of campaign funds was cut by a tax amendment: In the middle of March 1966 a mortal blow was struck at one of the prime sources of party funds by an amendment to the federal tax bill, which bans deductions by corporations for advertisements in political publications. With their 136- page "Tribute to Governor Edmund G. Brown" souvenir program dispensed at Los Angeles Sports Arena on March 2, the Democrats raised approximately $300,000. Advertising in gold ink was sold at $5,000 a page, while the silver pages brought $2,500 each. Under the new legislation, none of this advertising will be tax deductible.50 As Browns camp was still not unified, any severing of revenue for the campaign would prove a critical blow. One thing to keep in mind, in having just noted a piece of fiscal evidence, is that money was not the key factor in Browns losing to Reagan. While important in all campaigns and elections, the outcome of this particular election was not necessitated by campaign expenditures. However, as it is a part of all campaigns and elections, we will quickly summarize
48 49

A Goddamned Electable person, 447 The 1966 Election in California, 547-550 50 , 552

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Matthew J. Bailey the amounts spent by both candidates.

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

In the primaries, Brown was reported to have spent $561,876 while Reagan was reported as having only spent $544,199.51 Contrastingly, the Reagan campaign spent over $2.6 million in the general election and Browns campaign spent $2.0 million. If one were to analyze this is a very simple fashion, they might come to the conclusion that Reagan won the election just based on the numbers (had they not known that Reagan won the governorship). However, it is stressed again that this paper is arguing on Reagans opposition underestimating him, the lack of cohesion in the Democratic party, and the packaging of Reagan as himself. With that in mind, let us highlight a few examples of Brown underestimating Reagan as a competitor. At every opportunity presented, Governor Brown underestimated Reagan. From the outset, Brown didnt believe that such an avowedly right-wing candidate as Reagan could possibly attract a sufficiently wide constituency to win the election.52 Brown was wrong. However, Brown wasnt the only one to underestimate Reagan and paint him as only being an actor. On the night of the election, Newsweek columnist Emmet John Hughes was shocked at Californias rallying around Reagan: Perhaps only the capricious California electorate could stage such a political jestA veteran of service in B movies and TV commercials, the victorious Reagan attests a special freedom from discrimination in Republican politics: No man should be barred from such a rich prize of power merely on the grounds of his desperate poverty of thought. Ruddy of cheek and white of tooth and blue of eye, he projects a Technicolor study in patriotic imageryThe event simply dramatizes the virtual bankruptcy, politically and intellectually, of a national partyOn the West Coast, the vacuum is filled by the windy
51 52

The 1966 Election in California, 553 A Goddamned Electable Person, 435

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Matthew J. Bailey rhetoric of Ronald Reagan53

Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

Hughes comment carries with it an abstract elitism that misses the point of the election: Reagan is what the people wanted. While one could assume that a comment made after Reagan had already been elected was as bad as it could get, they would be dead wrong. During the campaign, as desperation set in, Browns people came out with a TV ad that reminded school children that Ronald Reagan had been an actor.54 Brown then went on to remind the school children that it had been an actor who had shot President Lincoln.55 When a candidate attempts to put his opponent in the same camp as a Confederate sympathizer who murdered the President in cold blood, they can almost entirely be written off. In an ironic turn of events, however, the writing off that Brown attempted to do to Reagan was no happening to him. As one can ascertain through the language and assertions made earlier in this paper, Ronald Reagan won the election in a sweeping landslide. Reagan won with 58 percent and by claiming 55 of Californias 58 counties.56 In doing so, the conservative Republican proved that he had not been a simple-minded actor; he had become a political force to be reckoned with. The people just arent going to turn this great state of ours over to that actor.57 Governor Browns fixation on Reagans inability to convince him of his competency as a political force would ultimately prove to be the linchpin allowing for his defeat. Stemming out of this underestimation was the fact that the Democrats in California were extremely disjointed, which led to a plethora of problems. In contrast, we saw that the Republican party was unified by the eleventh commandment which, in turn, led to Reagans development by Spencer-Roberts into
53 54

A Goddamned Electable Person, 448 Hayward, Steven. "The Claremont Institute - Exclusive Excerpt: 'Here We Are On The Late Show Again'" The Claremont Institute. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. <http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1019/article_detail.asp>. 55 56 The 1966 Election in California, 546 57 A Goddamned Electable Person, 434

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

his Ciceronian role on stage: that of himself. By capitalizing on what came naturally to him, Ronald Reagan didnt win over California by being more right than Brown or by having a better political philosophy. No, at the end of the day it came down to Reagans genuine good-hearted nature and his ability to be a Jacksonian everyman rather than an elitist.

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Californian Gubernatorial Election of 1966

Works Cited Anderson, Totton J., and Eugene C. Lee. "The 1966 Election in California." The Western Political Quarterly Part 2 20.2 (1967): 553. JSTOR. Web. 05 Apr. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/446081>. Ansolabehere, Stephen, and James M. Snyder, Jr. "The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000." Election Law Journal (2002): 315-38. Print. De Groot, Gerard J. "'A Goddamned Electable Person': The 1966 California Gubernatorial Campaign of Ronald Reagan." History 82.267 (1997): 429-48. Print. Hayward, Steven. "The Claremont Institute - Exclusive Excerpt: 'Here We Are On The Late Show Again'" The Claremont Institute. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. <http://www.claremont.org/publications/crb/id.1019/article_detail.asp>. Stephens, William O. "On Obligations (Book 1, 105-118)." The Person: Readings in Human Nature. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2006. 18-19. Print. "California: Parkinson's Law." TIME 27 May 1966. TIME. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,835629-1,00.html>. "Chapter 9: Political Parties, Candidates, and Campaigns: Contesting Elections." McGraw Hill Higher Education. The McGraw-Hill Companies. Web. 07 Apr. 2012. <http://www.mhhe.com/socscience/polisci/patterson/olc/stu/sum09.htm>. "Unforgettable Change: 1960s: The New Right Elects Ronald Reagan Governor." Unforgettable Change: 1960s: The New Right Elects Ronald Reagan Governor. Oakland Museum of California. Web. 12 Apr. 2012. <http://museumca.org/picturethis/timeline/unforgettablechange-1960s/new-right-elects-ronald-reagan-governor/info>. "What the 1958 Elections Mean." TIME 10 Nov. 1958. TIME. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,938001,00.html>. 22, March. "Looking Back at the 1962 Gubernatorial Race : Debate: Edmund G. (Pat) Brown and Ex-President's Former Campaign Manager Discuss the Election at Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 22 Mar. 1992. Web. 06 Apr. 2012. <http://articles.latimes.com/1992-03-22/local/me-7477_1_richard-nixon>.

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