Hitlers Following

The Support, Acquiescence, and Denial of the German Public

Bryn Spielvogel

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Hitler captivated audiences. His extreme enthusiasm and oratory skills were vital in helping him capture the loyalty of the German people, and his rhetoric spoke to people of all classes and backgrounds. While many Germans were eager to join the National Socialist [Nazi] movement, others were not so keen on the party, and some were even suspicious of it. However, many of these people were soon influenced to support Hitler and his party, and it was not simply because of a few good speeches. Additionally, Hitlers ability to maintain loyalty from these followers, even as rumors of anti-Jewish atrocities became widespread, points to a German willingness to accept Nazi propaganda and ignore what was better not to know. While some argue that the totalitarian nature of Hitlers regime forced the German people into submission, it was not simply fear that led people to the Nazi Party. The German peoplewhether supporters of the regime or nottook the easy way out. Hitler established a loyal following of the German people through the Nazi party, personal relationships within communities, and reliable institutions and people, maintaining this loyalty by way of the German peoples willingness to buy into propaganda, seeing only the good and denying all the bad in the regime. It is important to remember that Nazi plans for the Jews were not kept secret. AntiSemitism was present in Nazi rhetoric from the beginning, and Hitler made no bones about his wish to rid German soil of Jews, and on at least two occasions made public his belief that annihilation was a perfectly acceptable, indeed desirable, solution, (Simpson 1991, 128). As anti-Semitism was inherent in Hitlers ideas, no one following his cause could claim ignorance of Hitlers view of the Jews. However, some disagreed with this part of Nazi rhetoric, and almost 4 per cent of Nazi party members expressed open disapproval of anti-Semitism (Abel 1938, 164). Of course, those who did not agree with this element of Nazi rhetoric had no trouble finding sufficient compensation in other features to induce them to join the movement, (Abel 1938,

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174). For example, one follower of the movement stated that it quickened my pulse to hear about the Fatherland, unity and the need for a supreme leader. I felt that I belonged to these people. Only their statements about the Jews I could not swallow. They gave me a headache even after I had joined the party, (Abel 1938, 164). The fact that non-anti-Semites existed within the Nazi party demonstrates that the party had much to offer everyoneit was not difficult to find something to like, and it was therefore very easy to become a member. Even those who expressed their dislike of anti-Semitic policy quieted their thoughts, expressing no concern to their fellow party members. Even as discriminatory policies and action were carried out, they failed to put up a fight against them. At a local level, it was personal relationships between friends and neighbors that brought average Germans into the Nazi party and under Hitlers leadership. When it came to party loyalty, some peopleespecially the younger generationswere automatically attracted to the excitement and fervor of the Nazi movement, while others were more hesitant, even suspicious. However, their opinions often shifted due to their exchanges, as is demonstrated by a Nazi party member. He described his change of opinion, stating, I became acquainted with a colleague of my own age He was a calm, quiet person whom I esteemed very highly. When I found that he was one of the local leaders of the National Socialist party, my opinion of it as a group of criminals changed completely, (Abel 1938, 116). Many others had similar experiences. A worker during the Third Reich described how he initially hated the Nazis, but was influenced to go to a party meeting because the speaker was a highly esteemed community leader, known for his justness, intellect, and lack of class prejudice (Abel 1938, 212). A push from trusted friends and neighbors brought many formally wary people to the Nazi party, and it was personal interactions that also brought farmers and other non-political people into the party. One field

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worker described the small gatherings held in peasant cottages. The intimate setting appealing to the attendees, who did not suspect they were attending a political meetingthis was particularly useful since farmers normally would not have joined the Nazis (Abel 1938, 83). While those instantly willing to flock to the Nazi cause played an important role in its success, it is those that were at first reluctant that are the most important. This is because their initial suspicion implies that they would be less willing to blindly follow Nazi doctrine, and they would therefore be the most likely to question the movement once initiated. However, countless interviews have showed that once someone attended a party meeting, they were virtually indoctrinated into the movement. As one man stated, even the sympathizers with the movement were ready to die for Hitlers ideas, (Abel 1938, 177). While the Nazi movement might have survived with only large scale meetings and speeches, local groups and personal interactions brought unlikely followers to the party, without which a takeover of German politics would have been improbable. Legitimacy was the next step in Hitlers establishment of a following, and he obtained this through the involvement of reliable institutions and people in his party and government. There were certainly Germans who doubted Hitlers reliability, and as many people look to the leaders of their communities to set an example, the participation of those leaders certainly affected their outlook. In order to involve community leaders, the Nazis created subordinate organizations, such as the Teachers League, the Physicians League, the Law Officers League, etc, in which people could find friends, connections, and those with similar interests (Simpson 1991, 43). While Germans were eager to confirm the Nazis trustworthiness through the example of their friends, neighbors, and leaders, as the regime gained power and started implementing policies another form of legitimacy was requiredlegal legitimacy. This legal issue required

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cooperation from specific professions, as members of all professionsteachers, journalists, doctorsserved the Nazi cause, but lawyers and judges played an especially important role in giving the regime and its measures a veneer of legitimacy that was important to international observers and at least some Germans, (Bergen 2009, 71). Both forms of legitimacy trustworthiness and legalitywere necessary to Hitlers new and continued support, especially since individuals are less likely to oppose injustice if it has been accepted by institutions, leaders, and neighbors (Barnett 1999, 41). Although Hitler had to appeal to community leaders, he also had to be careful not to isolate other classes, particularly the far upper and lower classes. Because of this, he established personal relationships with officers like Captains Mayr and Rhm who had strong contacts with the lower middle class and trades people, thus giving Hitler greater influence over the middle and working classes (Deutsch 1940, 16). In addition, he also made connections with old conservative elites that would help bring him to power (Bergen 2009, 76). Hitler covered all areas when it came to establishing a support base, ensuring he would be seen as a reliable leader who offered something to everyone. A veneer of legitimacy was important in helping him maintain a following throughout his reign, especially as his actions became less and less moral. Nevertheless, historical preconditions had much to do with public complicity during this period, especially the eagerness of many Germans to hand power back to leaders. Because the German nation had been going through difficult timeseconomically, structurally, and internationallyand because people were more than willing to blame the Weimer Republic, a return to the old ways seemed appealing. The German people were used to an autocratic government, and army service had inculcated in them a strong sense of discipline and willingness to submit to a leader. Hence the average German was not opposed to the return of a

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system involving submission and decisions made by trusted leaders, (Abel 1938, 150). For the German people, it seemed much easier to sit back and allow the Fhrer to make decisions on behalf of the country than to attempt a true democracy, and although Hitler feigned interest in a democratic approach, his taking of full power was met with little resistance for this reason. Most of Hitlers followers found it impossible to imagine that he might not act for the common good, or that the need of removing him might ever arise, (Abel 1938, 150). This again demonstrates how important a belief in his legitimacy waswithout it, Hitler could never have gained such loyalty from the public. As Hitlers dictatorship began and his anti-Semitic policies were turned into realities, with Jewish deportation rising and death camps working at full force, his following remained intact. People remained silent when it came to the Jews. That was the easiest thing to do. One of the most common defenses regarding German silence is the we didnt know argument. However, the fact of the matter is that gentile Germans did know what was happening to the Jews, at least to an extent, as the non-Jewish population did not have to view the proceedings to realize that the Jews were disappearing, (Hilberg 1992, 215). While the Germans possibly knew the Jews were being deported, they did not know for certain where they would end up, or what would be there fate. However, what can be established beyond question is that widespread rumors were in circulation about the fate of the Jews, and that the information contained in the rumors was often explicit enough to provide an unmistakable indication that Jews were being killed in great numbers in the east, (Kershaw 1988, 148). The reality is that had the Germans wanted to know what was happening to the Jews, it would not have been difficult for them to find out. Even if hard evidence was scarce, Hitlers rhetoric was fairly explicit in his writings and speeches. What must be understood is that on a day-to-day basis, the Nazi regime only needed

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most people to obey the law, try to stay out of trouble, and promote their own interests as best they could under the current circumstances, (Bergen 2009, 75). That is exactly what most Germans did, and as it turned out their indifference was as devastating as active hatred, (Barnett 1999, 118). German failure to oppose Hitlers plans for the Jews was no better than actively supporting them, and the silence of the nation gave Hitler the ability to implement all of his horrific plans. Hitlers domestic success gave the German public an excuse to admire and cherish him, making it much more difficult to admit any wrong in his policies. People were willing to brush off rumors of atrocities and give into propaganda because Hitler brought them jobs, a greatly improved economy, intense feelings of nationalism and pride, and hope for the future. In reflecting on the feelings of prosperity felt by many Germans, Philip Jenninger, Speaker of the West German Parliament, said in 1988, didnt Hitler just make reality what was just a promise under Wilhelm II, that is to bring wonderful times for the Germans? (Simpson 1991, 123). To most gentile Germans of the time, Hitler had given them the nation he promised, and it is admitted that he was the architect of Germanys economic miracle which had ended unemployment and brought prosperity, (Simpson 1991, 124). These comments, made long after the fall of the Third Reich, demonstrate the real success that many Germans felt at that time. If such sentiments are expressed today, the feelings of joy and gratitude towards Hitler during the period were undoubtedly at an extreme, and it is clear why most people would hesitate in criticizing the regime. No one wants to question someone that is bringing them prosperityit is always much simpler and safer to stay quiet and content, as the German population did. The public was also quick to give into Nazi propaganda and ideology, ensuring that the people would follow Hitler unquestioningly and at the very least submit to Nazi ideals and

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expectations. Those that were willing to follow Hitler and the Nazis felt that they could not be untrue to the movement without being untrue to Germany. Even those that might not have been avid fans of the Nazis could not have escaped guilt for disobeying the movement, as personal interests were far inferior to the good of Germany according to party rhetoric. As one party member exclaimed, we acted as if under compulsion. Even had we wished to, we could not have been untrue to the movement without having our hearts torn out of our breasts, (Abel 1938, 145). While this extreme stance was certainly not shared by every German during the Third Reich, most people were at least influenced by some Nazi notions. A middle-class youth, speaking of the ideas present in the National Socialist oath, wrote in his autobiography, these ideas were for me the fulfillment of an inner longing for clarity, and I realized for the first time how easy it was to act according to National Socialist ideas, (Abel 1938, 269). Much of Nazi propaganda and ideology focused on the tendency to stress action, rather than theory, (Bartov 1992, 107). This conceptaction before thoughtwas appealing to the masses, especially since it left consideration and reflection to the leaders, once again letting the public off easy. In addition to this idea, one of the most significant results of the propaganda effort was that the distortion of perceived reality consequently led to a distortion of objective reality: one saw what one expected to see, (Bartov 1992, 127). What makes this idea so important is that as people began to filter what they expected and wanted to see, they also began the process of defensive denial. Rather than acknowledging the wrongdoings of the regime, the German people ignored what they did not want to believe, refusing to think about the fate of the Jews in accordance to Nazi propaganda efforts. The German population had access to information, at the very least rumors, regarding the fate of the Jews, yet they denied what was inconvenient for them to believe. While what

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happened to the Jews was unbelievable, the rhetoric and the policies that the Nazis spread and implemented hinted towards a terrible fate: Only those anxious to shut their ears to the rumors in circulation could have been utterly ignorant. And only the willfully ignorant could have imagined a drastically different fate for the Jews than was actually in store for them, even if the exact character and scale of the Final Solution was scarcely conceivable. (Kershaw 1988, 150) While some people might have had the capacity to believe the rumors, many were internally contradicted by the fact that the regime had brought them so much success. The German people undoubtedly realized, consciously or subconsciously, that not only would questioning the regime likely bring them personal misfortune, but it could potentially cause harm to come to the Fatherland, and for many Germans, that was the ultimate failure. For the internally conflicted, the simple solution was to give into Nazi ideologyletting contemplation remain with the leaders, and permitting social passivity and silence marked by a deliberate turn away from personal concern, and a willingness to accept uncritically the states right to take radical action against its enemies, (Kershaw 1988, 154). In an extreme case of denial, a Nazi enthusiast, Frau Gussi Hohlbaum, in discussing the Holocaust, stated that to this day Im absolutely sure the Fhrer himself never wanted these things and probably didnt know about themAnd yet he really did accomplish the impossible! Millions of people found new happiness, (Bartov 1992, 119). This fanatical statement demonstrates full heartedly the willingness of some to deny what they do not want to believe, no matter how strong the evidence, focusing only on the good as an overriding factor. Of course, most Germans were not this radical, but the presence of defensive denial throughout the Third Reich was undeniable. Almost everyone in Germany knew the Jews were being deported, yet very little of the population, and even less of the party, lifted a finger to fight thiseven those members that initially expressed their disapproval of anti-Semitic rhetoric.

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While some Germans must have been at least internally opposed to Nazi treatment of the Jews, their silence demonstrates that even they supported Hitlers ideals, ignoring the sinister and going about their daily business without question. The final question, the one of great importance, is whether or not the German public willingly and deliberately gave into Nazi propaganda. Did the people deny rumored atrocities to make their own lives easier, or were they so influenced by Nazi ideas that they were blinded from any wrongdoings of the regime? While some would argue that the Germans were forced into submission by a repressive government, the fact that protest could and did take place in a range of issues, even including, as in the euthanasia action, a directly humanitarian issue, itself indicates the hollowness of the apologetics that the terroristic repression of a totalitarian system was sufficient in itself to deter any dissent, (Kershaw 1988, 146). While I do not deny that fear did play a role in lack of protest against the regime, the success of the protest against euthanasia shows that not only was it possible to force policy changes in the regime, but it was also possible for people not to ignore and deny the evils of the party. In other words, it was possible for people to avoid giving into Nazi propaganda and ideology. Some fanatics, led by blind faith, certainly did not believe that the Nazis could commit such atrocities. However, this does not imply that everyone living under Hitlers rule was influenced by the party to that extreme. Those who were extreme fans of the party would likely have listened to rumors, dismissing them, like a German mother did, as stupid, malicious gossip, while Germans of lesser affiliation with the party were eager to avoid hearing any rumors at all (Waite 1987, 119). Within the German population, many doubtless became skilled at knowing how not to know, concluding that many people made the decision to turn a blind eye from any rumors (Kershaw 1988, 148). For those who chose not to know, buying into propaganda and denying the inconvenient was the easiest way to

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pretend that Hitler and his regime remained ideal, and so much of the German population consciously gave into Nazi rhetoric. In retrospect, the German people were as much responsible for the establishment of the Third Reich as Hitler himself. Without continued support, or at least acquiescence, from the German population, the Nazi Party never would have risen to power. Hitlers desire for public approval meant that the general population had a large influence over the Fhrer, and the passivity that society practiced gave him full power to initiate his will, no matter how drastic and immoral. While Hitlers support base encompassed a wide range of people, even those Germans who had never been a formal part of the Nazi party bought into many of the Nazi ideals, following the regime and standing behind it throughout its duration. Maintaining this support was made easy by the German publics willingness to hand back full power to a trusted leader, and this eagerness to remain outside of the political realm meant that even as rumors of Nazi atrocities began to circulate throughout the nation, the people continued to focus on their daily lives rather than involve themselves in trouble. Germanys prosperity helped the Nazis retain an aura of reliability, and those that bought into Hitlers vision began only to see and hear what they expected and wanted, while others resorted to passivity and denial, also giving into Nazi propaganda that largely discouraged thought. The conclusion that much of the German population chose to give into propaganda and consciously attempted to avoid rumors of wrongdoing is important not because it allows us to lay responsibility on the German people, but rather because it demonstrates that despite extreme pressures, people have the power to determine what they want to believe.

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