VITUG FACTS:Romarico Vitug and Nenita Alonte were co-administrators of Dolores Vitugs (deceased) estate.

Rowena Corona was theexecutrix. Romarico, the deceaseds husband, filed a motion withthe probate court asking for authority to sell certain shares of stockand real properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedadvances to the estate, which he claimed as personal funds. Theadvances were used to pay estate taxes.Corona opposed the motion on ground that the advancescame from a savings account which formed part of the conjugalpartnership properties and is part of the estate. Thus, there was noground for reimbursement. Romarico claims that the funds are hisexclusive property, having been acquired through a survivorshipagreement executed with his late wife and the bank. The agreement stated that after the death of either one of the spouses, the savings account shall belong to and be the soleproperty of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible orwithdrawable by such survivor. The lower court upheld the validity of the agreement andgranted the motion to sell. CA reversed stating that thesurvivorship agreement constitutes a conveyance mortis causawhich did not comply with the formalities of a valid will. Assumingthat it was a donation inter vivos, it is a prohibited donation(donation between spouses). ISSUE:W/N the survivorship agreement was valid. HELD: YES. The conveyance is not mortis causa, which should beembodied in a will. A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and freeact by which a capacitated person disposes of his property andrights and declares or complies with duties to take effect after hisdeath. The bequest or devise must pertain to the testator.In this case, the savings account involved was in the natureof conjugal funds. Since it was not shown that the funds belongedexclusively to one party, it is presumed to be conjugal.It is also not a donation inter vivos because it was to takeeffect after the death of one party. It is also not a donation betweenspouses because it involved no conveyance of a spouses ownproperties to the other.It was an error to include the savings account in theinventory of the deceaseds assets because it is the separateproperty of Romarico. Thus, Romarico had the right to claim reimbursement.A will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by whicha capacitated person disposes of his property and rights anddeclares or complies with duties to take effect after his death.Survivorship agreements are permitted by the NCC.However, its operation or effect must not be violative of the law(i.e. used as a cloak to hide an inofficious donation or to transferproperty in fraud of creditors or to defeat the legitime of a forcedheir. Sia v. CA Facts : The plaintiff rented on March 22, 1985 the Safety Deposit Box No. 54 of thedefendant bank at its Binondo Branch located at the Fookien Times Building, SolerSt., Binondo, Manila wherein he placed his collection of stamps. The said safetydeposit box leased by the plaintiff was at the bottom or at the lowest level of thesafety deposit boxes of the defendant bank at its aforesaid Binondo Branch

During the floods that took place in 1985 and 1986, floodwater entered into thedefendant bank's premises, seeped into the safety deposit box leased by the plaintiff and caused, according to the plaintiff, damage to his stamps collection. Thedefendant bank rejected the plaintiff's claim for compensation for his damagedstamps collection, so, the plaintiff instituted an action for damages against thedefendant bank. The defendant bank denied liability for the damaged stamps collection of the plaintiff on the basis of the "Rules and Regulations Governing the Lease of Safe DepositBoxes [The liability of the Bank by reason of the lease, is limited to the exercise of the diligence to prevent the opening of the safe by any person other than the Renter,his authorized agent or legal representative] [The Bank is not a depository of thecontents of the safe and it has neither the possession nor the control of the same. The Bank has no interest whatsoever in said contents, except as herein provided,and it assumes absolutely no liability in connection therewith] The defendant bank also contended that its contract with the plaintiff over safetydeposit box No. 54 was one of lease and not of deposit and, therefore, governed bythe lease agreement which should be the applicable law; that the destruction of theplaintiff's stamps collection was due to a calamity beyond obligation on its part tonotify the plaintiff about the floodwaters that inundated its premises at Binondobranch which allegedly seeped into the safety deposit box leased to the plaintiff.The trial court then directed that an ocular inspection on the contents of the safetydeposit box be conducted. That the Safety Box Deposit No. 54 was opened by bothplaintiff Luzan Sia and the Acting Branch Manager Jimmy B. Ynion in the presence of the undersigned, plaintiff's and defendant's counsel. Said Safety Box when openedcontains two albums of different sizes and thickness, length and width and a tin boxwith printed word 'Tai Ping Shiang Roast Pork in pieces with Chinese designs andcharacter. Both albums are wet, moldy and badly damaged. RTC ruled in favor of Sia,CA reversed. Issue : Whether or not the bank is liable for damages. Held : In the recent case CA Agro-Industrial Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court explicitly rejected the contention that a contract for the use of a safety deposit box is a contract of lease governed by Title VII, Book IV of the CivilCode. Nor did We fully subscribe to the view that it is a contract of deposit to be strictly governed by the Civil Code provision on deposit;it is, as We declared, especial kind of deposit Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of fraud, negligence, ordelay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable fordamages, thus comes to the succor of the petitioner. The destruction or loss of thestamp collection which was, in the language of the trial court, the "product of 27years of patience and diligence" caused the petitioner pecuniary loss; hence, hemust be compensated therefor. We cannot, however, place Our imprimatur on thetrial court's award of moral damages. Since the relationship between the petitionerand SBTC is based on a contract, either of them may be held liable for moraldamages for breach thereof only if said party had acted fraudulently or in badfaith. There is here no proof of fraud or bad faith on the part of SBTC. Petition granted.

ACLARING LUCMANvs.ALIMATAR MALAWI et al.

FACTS After the failure of elections, respondents remained in office in a holdover capacity pursuant tothe provisions of sec. 1 of R.A. No. 6676 and COMELEC resolution no. 2888. Respondents attempted toopen their respective barangay's IRA's bank account, eventually, they allowed to open but not allowedto withdraw owing to the absence of the requisite Accountant's advise. They filed a special civil actionfor mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction to compel petitioner to allow themto open and maintain deposit accounts and to withdraw. Respondents Pangcoga, Sarip, Cadar,Macarambon and Usman testified during the trial that they were duly elected chairpersons and testifiedfurther the refusal of the petitioner to allow the withdrawal despite of documents presented. RTCrendered a decision commanding petitioner to pay respondents except Alimatar Malawi who failed totestify, the IRA's of their respective barangays even without accountant's advice. CA affirmed thedecisions.: ISSUES Whether or not respondents have the causes of actions against the petitioner.:Whether or not respondents have the legal personality to institute the petition for mandamus. HELD The relationship being contractual in nature, mandamus is therefore not an available remedysince mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. Furtheremore,respondents have no legal personality to institute petition since the funds for which the bank accountswere created belong to the barangay headed by respondents. The case at bar was not initiated by thebarangays themselves. Neither did the barangay chairmen file the suit in representation of theirrespective barangays. Only the barangays are the only lawful recipients of these funds