Table of Contents

The Fourth Amendment................................................................................................................................ 5 What is a Search? ...................................................................................................................................... 5 Katz v. United States ............................................................................................................................. 5 Smith v. Maryland ..................................................................................................................................... 5 What is a Search and what is a seizure? ................................................................................................... 6 Dog Sniffs .............................................................................................................................................. 6 Open Fields, Curtilages, & Beyond ........................................................................................................ 6 Again, what is a Search? ........................................................................................................................... 7 Kyllo v. United States ............................................................................................................................ 7 Bond v. United States* (pp. 136) .......................................................................................................... 8 What is a seizure? ..................................................................................................................................... 8 United States v. Karo............................................................................................................................. 8 Probable Cause ......................................................................................................................................... 8 Spinelli v. United States ........................................................................................................................ 8 Illinois v. Gates, pp. 150 ........................................................................................................................ 9 Arrest Warrants ........................................................................................................................................ 9 Payton v. New York, p. 171 ................................................................................................................... 9 Search Incident to Arrest (home, public place) ...................................................................................... 10 Chimel v. California ............................................................................................................................. 10 United States v. Robinson ................................................................................................................... 10 Search Incident to Arrest (auto) ............................................................................................................. 11 New York v. Belton .............................................................................................................................. 11 Arizona v. Gant .................................................................................................................................... 11 Search Incident to Arrest (auto, pretext) ................................................................................................ 12 Whren v. United States ....................................................................................................................... 12 Automobile Searches .............................................................................................................................. 12 Chambers v. Maroney ......................................................................................................................... 12 California v. Acevedo .......................................................................................................................... 13 Plain View................................................................................................................................................ 14

Arizona v. Hicks ................................................................................................................................... 14 Consent ................................................................................................................................................... 14 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte ................................................................................................................ 14 Illinois v. Rodriguez ............................................................................................................................. 15 Stop & Frisk ............................................................................................................................................. 16 Terry v. Ohio........................................................................................................................................ 16 Arrest vs. Stop (seizures vs. non-seizure encounters) ............................................................................ 16 Florida v. Royer* ................................................................................................................................. 16 Pennsylvania v. Mimms* .................................................................................................................... 16 United States v. Sharpe* ..................................................................................................................... 16 United States v. Mendenhall............................................................................................................... 16 United States v. Drayton ..................................................................................................................... 17 Florida v. Bostick* ............................................................................................................................... 18 Special Needs Searches........................................................................................................................... 18 South Dakota v. Opperman*............................................................................................................... 18 Camara v. Municipal Court* ............................................................................................................... 18 See v. City of Seattle* ......................................................................................................................... 18 New York v. Burger* ........................................................................................................................... 18 Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding* ................................................................................... 18 United States v. Ramsey* ................................................................................................................... 18 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte*...................................................................................................... 18 Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz....................................................................................... 18 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond ........................................................................................................... 18 Illinois v. Lidster*................................................................................................................................. 19 Brown v. Texas* .................................................................................................................................. 19 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association* ............................................................................. 19 National Treasury Employees Union. V. Von Raab* ........................................................................... 19 Vernonia School district 47J v. Acton*................................................................................................ 19 Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawwatormie County v. Earls* ..... 19 Chandler v. Miller* .............................................................................................................................. 19 Ferguson v. City of Charleston* .......................................................................................................... 19 Remedies for 4th Amendment Violations .................................................................................................... 19 2

The Exclusionary Rule ............................................................................................................................. 19 Wolf v. Colorado ................................................................................................................................. 19 Mapp v. Ohio....................................................................................................................................... 20 United States v. Calandra* p. 474 ....................................................................................................... 20 Standing .................................................................................................................................................. 20 Alderman v. United States* ................................................................................................................ 20 United States v. Payner* ..................................................................................................................... 20 Rakas v. Illinois .................................................................................................................................... 20 Simmons v. United States* ................................................................................................................. 21 Minnesota v. Olson* ........................................................................................................................... 21 Minnesota v. Carter ............................................................................................................................ 21 Rawlings v. Kentucky* ......................................................................................................................... 21 Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule ....................................................................................................... 22 Good Faith........................................................................................................................................... 22 Independent Source & Inevitable Discovery ...................................................................................... 23 [Attentuation or Dissipation of Taint Doctrine] .................................................................................. 24 Confessions ................................................................................................................................................. 25 Torture .................................................................................................................................................... 25 Hector (a slave) v. State ...................................................................................................................... 25 Brown v. Mississippi ............................................................................................................................ 25 The Due Process Approach ..................................................................................................................... 26 Spano v. New York .............................................................................................................................. 26 Ashcraft v. Tennessee* ....................................................................................................................... 26 Arizona v. Fulminante* ....................................................................................................................... 26 Miranda v. Arizona .................................................................................................................................. 26 Chavez v. Martinez .............................................................................................................................. 26 Schmerber v. California* ..................................................................................................................... 27 Murphy v. Waterfront Commission* .................................................................................................. 27 Counselman v. Hitchcock* .................................................................................................................. 27 Miranda v. Arizona .............................................................................................................................. 27 In re Gault* ......................................................................................................................................... 28 Illinois v. Perkins*................................................................................................................................ 28 3

Miranda Applied: Custody ...................................................................................................................... 28 Oregon v. Mathiason .......................................................................................................................... 28 Berkemer v. McCarty .......................................................................................................................... 29 Thompson v. Keohane* ...................................................................................................................... 29 Miranda Applied: Interrogation .............................................................................................................. 29 Rhode Island v. Innis ........................................................................................................................... 29 Pennsylvania v. Muniz* ....................................................................................................................... 30 Miranda Applied: Waiver and Invocation ............................................................................................... 30 North Carolina v. Butler ...................................................................................................................... 30 Colorado v. Spring* ............................................................................................................................. 30 Moran v. Burbine* .............................................................................................................................. 30 Miller v. Fenton* ................................................................................................................................. 30 Edwards v. Arizona .............................................................................................................................. 30 Michigan v. Mosley* ........................................................................................................................... 31 Oregon v. Bradshaw* .......................................................................................................................... 31 Davis v. United States* ....................................................................................................................... 31 Exceptions to Miranda ............................................................................................................................ 31 New Jersey v. Portash* ....................................................................................................................... 31 Michigan v. Tucker* ............................................................................................................................ 31 New York v. Quarles ............................................................................................................................ 31 Oregon v. Elstad .................................................................................................................................. 32 Miranda Revisited ................................................................................................................................... 33 Dickerson v. United States .................................................................................................................. 33 Missouri v. Seibert .............................................................................................................................. 33 6 Amendment Confessions ................................................................................................................... 33 Massiah v. United States ..................................................................................................................... 33 United States v. Henry* ...................................................................................................................... 34 Kuhlmann v. Wilson* .......................................................................................................................... 34 United States v. Johnson* ................................................................................................................... 34 Brewer v. Williams .............................................................................................................................. 34 Rothgery v. Gillespie County* ............................................................................................................. 34 Kansas v. Ventris ................................................................................................................................. 34 4
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New Jersey v. Portash* ....................................................................................................................... 35

The Fourth Amendment

What is a Search?
Katz v. United States Premise: Man involved in wagering scam at telephone booth, had his end of conversation recorded by FBI and used against him. Was this a search? Yes. *The conversation was seized.+The governments actions in electronically listening to and recording the petitioners words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. The fact that the electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can have no constitutional significance. Policy: The 4th Amendment protects people not places. *It wasnt the booth that was protected, per se+. What a person knowingly exposes to the public is not protected. Two Question test: (1)Does individuals conduct show an expectation of privacy? (2) Is society ready to recognize this as a reasonable expectation of privacy? Affect: Katz arguably expanded the scope of the protection offered by the 4th Amendment, it also says that a warrant could permit the government to intercept an electronic communication.

Smith v. Maryland
Premise: A woman who was robbed starts getting threatening phone calls. Police install a pen register at phone companys offices to record numbers dialed at petitioners home. They then got warrant and seized phonebook at petitioners home based on info from pen register. Petitioner gets 6 years. Was this a search? No. The use of the pen register was not a search and did not, therefore, require a warrant. Why? Although the petitioners conduct may have been calculated to keep the contents of his conversation private, his conduct was not and could not have been calculated to preserve the privacy of the number he dialed. No legitimate expectation of privacy exists here. [2-Question Katz analysis used.] Policy: Analysis relied, in part, on the limited capabilities of the *pen register+ device.

What is a Search and what is a seizure?

Dog Sniffs United States v. Place Premise: Federal drug authorities subjected a passengers luggage to a sniff test Was this a search? No. Why? The method of investigation simply exposed respondents luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained K-9. [Think of the Katz test.] Illinois v. Caballes Premise: Dog used to sniff car trunk. Was this a search? No. Why? The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dogone that does not expose non-contraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public viewduring a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Policy: Any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed legitimate, and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interest. This is because the expectation that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities is not the same as an interest in privacy that society is prepared to reasonably consider. Short-hand rule: If non-criminal activity (even along with criminal activity) can be revealed, it might be a search. Open Fields, Curtilages, & Beyond Hester v. United States Rule: Entry of an open field does not implicate the 4th Amendment. The term effects is less inclusive than property and cannot be said to encompass open fields. Rule 2: An individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home. Oliver v. United States Open fields Doctrine: An open field may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage [of a home]. An open field need be neither open nor a field as the terms are used in common speech.

Payton v. New York Policy: Open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields. At common law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a mans home and the privacies of life. Rule 3: Only the curtilage, not the neighboring open fields, warrants the 4th Amendment protections that attach to the home. United States v. Dunn Four factors referenced when qualifying an area curtilage: (1) the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, (2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, (3) the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and (4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.

Again, what is a Search?

Kyllo v. United States Premise: Federal agents aimed a thermal-imaging device at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home. Was this a search? Yes. Why? Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, constitutes a search. Policy: While the technology used in the present case was relatively crude, the rule that must be adopted must take account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development. The 4th Amendments protection of the home has never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained. In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes. Rule: Technology used to search (thermal, scent, hearing) is allowed to be used without a warrant if it is commonly used among the public. So, as technology spreads, subjective expectations of privacy decline. Rule 2: Using technology is a search if the evidence couldnt otherwise been obtained without physically entering the home.

Bond v. United States* (pp. 136) Court decided that a search occurred when Border Patrol agents walked through a Greyhound bus stopped at a check point and routinely squeezed the soft luggage that passengers had placed in the overhead storage bins. A bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled, but he does not expect that the bag will be felt in an exploratory manner. This violated the 4th Amendment.

What is a seizure?
United States v. Karo Premise: A government informant was involved in transferring 10 cans to bad guy. Informant told DEA agents. With informants consent, agents substituted their own can containing an electronic tracking device (a beeper) for one of the cans in the shipment and then had all 10 cans painted to give them a uniform appearance. With regard to bad guy who received the shipment, was this a seizure? No. Why? A seizure of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individuals possessory interests in that property. Although the can may have contained an unknown and unwanted foreign object, it cannot be said that anyones possessory interest was interfered with in a meaningful way.

Probable Cause
Exists where the facts and circumstances within the officers knowledge and of which they have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that An offense has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested. Evidence subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched.

Lack of probable cause may be a defendants argument apart from lack of a warrant. Spinelli v. United States Premise: Spinelli was convicted for travelling to MO from IL with the intention of gambling. challenges that the search warrant lacked probable cause. The search warrant had four main points: (1) The FBI had tracked for five days, during four of which he traveled from Illinois to a certain apartment house in Missouri, and on one day he was further tracked to a specific apartment in the building; (2) Two phone numbers are associated with the specific apartment (3) The government officials stated that the numbers belonged to a person who was a known bookie; and (4) A reliable informant told the FBI that D was a bookie and used the two phone numbers associated with the apartment in Missouri. Was there probable cause for the warrant to search? No. An informants tip does not provide probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant if the tip does not state reasons why the informant is reliable & does not include specifics regarding the facts known by the informant.

Why? A warrant must state why the informant is reliable and include specifics in sufficient detail so that the magistrate may know he is relying on something more substantial than a casual rumor. Aguilar-Spinelli Two-part test: (1) is the information reliable? (Basis of knowledge) (2) is the informant reliable? (Veracity of affiant) Result: Conviction was overturned. Illinois v. Gates, pp. 150 Premise: Husband and wife were trafficking drugs from FL to IL. The police received an anonymous letter setting forth a modus operandi for the couple and giving dates for the next purchase. Police surveillance confirmed that s activities were as predicted in the letter. A car search following proper warrant revealed marijuana and other contraband. Evidence was suppressed below, but allowed by SC. Was there probable cause for the search warrant? Yes. Why? An anonymous letter alleging criminal activity with detailed modus operandi coupled with a policemans affidavits confirming activity conforming to aspects of the modus operandi is sufficient to constitute probable cause under the 4th Amendment. A totality of circumstances test should be used, rather than a rigid, excessively technical, two prong analysis. PC is a fluid concept, and not readily reduced to a rigid set of rules. Very strong evidence as to one prong can make up for the weakness on the other prong.

Arrest Warrants
Payton v. New York, p. 171 Premise: Police had enough evidence to establish PC that Payton had murdered a man. 6 officers entered s apartment, intending to arrest him. The police did not have a search warrant *for arrest+. The police broke down the door and found no one. They did find, in plain view, a shell casing. That casing was later admitted into evidence at the murder trial, following reference to a specific NY Code that said the evidence in plain view was properly seized. Should the police have had a search warrant for arrest? Yes. The 4th Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, prohibits police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspects home in order to make a routine felony arrest, thus making the NY statute that allows police officers to do so unconstitutional. Why? First, these were routine arrests with ample time to gain a warrant, so any exigent circumstances arguments are thrown out. The physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 4th Amendment is directed. There are no other exceptions that can be argued, as this was the petitioners own home, not a 3rd partys.

For 4th Amendment purposes, an arrest warrant founded on PC implicitly carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the suspect is within. Result: The judgment of the lower court was reversed.

Search Incident to Arrest (home, public place)

Chimel v. California Premise: A warrant for the arrest of the petitioner was made for the burglary of a coin shop. The officers identified themselves and were allowed entrance to the house by the petitioners wife where they waited for the accused man to come home. Upon arrival of the petitioner, the arresting officers showed the arrest warrant to the accused and asked permission to look around. The petitioner refused the request and the officers told the petitioner that a search could be conducted on the basis of lawful arrest and carried out the search. The officers searched the entire house including the attic, garage, and a small workshop, etc. and found various items which were admitted as evidence in court, over the defendants objection that they were admitted unconstitutionally. All lower courts affirmed the s guilty verdict. Is the search of an arrestees entire house incident to his arrest allowed without a warrant? No. Why? It is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. The Court felt that there was no comparable justification, for routinely searching rooms other than that in which an arrest occurs Such searches, in the absence of well recognized exceptions, may be made only under the authority of a search warrant. Rule: Basically, only a persons body and immediate area is justified by a warrantless search. Searching beyond those points must be accompanied by a search warrant. United States v. Robinson Premise: An officer spotted the respondent driving the car and officer had probable cause that respondent was driving the car after the revocation of his license. Officer stopped the respondent and lawfully arrested him. Officer patted down the person of the respondent and felt a cigarette packet and he further searched the packet and found heroin capsules. The Court of Appeals reversed the respondents conviction. Was the search incident to arrest constitutional? Yes. Why? First, its constitutional because of Chimel. Second, the justification or reason for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve evidence on his person for later use at trial. Third, a custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the 4thAmendment that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to arrest requires no additional justification. Based on 10

these reasons, the Court held that a search of the arrestee incident to a lawful arrest is not only a valid exception to the warrant rule but it is also reasonable under the 4thAmendment.

Search Incident to Arrest (auto)

New York v. Belton Premise: A car was stopped for speeding. The cop smelled weed, then saw a Supergold envelope in the car. All 4 men left the car and were placed under arrest. The cop opened the envelope and found weed. Miranda rights were given. Each guy was then searched, as well as the passenger area of the car. Beltons jacket was found on the back seat. A cop found cocaine in the pocket. The Appellate division of the New York Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the search and seizure. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was no longer any danger that the arrestee or his confederates no longer had access to the jacket, thereby invalidating the search. Is a car search incident to arrest upon a traffic stop constitutional? Yes. What is the scope of a car search incident to arrest? The passenger compartment and any containers within that compartment Rule: When a policeman has made a lawful, custodial arrest of the occupant of a car, he may, as contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that car and may also examine the contents of any containers found within the compartment. Why? The court states that the first principle of Fourth Amendment is that police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so. They also recognized that the exigencies of the situation make exemptions from the warrant requirements imperative. The court held in Chimel that a lawful arrest custodial arrest creates a situation, which justifies the contemporaneous search without a warrant of the person, arrested and the area immediately surrounding. So, if there is a proper arrest, any part of a vehicle that might be in the arrestees reach can be searched without a warrant or probable cause.

Arizona v. Gant Premise: Police were after a drug dealer, Gant. When Gant parked his car outside his home, police came and arrested him. They handcuffed Gant and locked him in the backseat of a squad car. After Gant was secured, two officers searched his car and found a gun and a bag of cocaine. Grant moved to suppress the evidence arguing that Belton did not authorize the search of his vehicle because he posed no threat to the officers after he was handcuffed. His motion was denied. Arizona Supreme Court found that the search was unreasonable. Are police allowed to search the car of a person theyve just arrested who has been handcuffed and placed in the back of a squad car? No.

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Why? ChimelI. If there is no possibility an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply. Rule: The Supreme Court held that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupants arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search.

Search Incident to Arrest (auto, pretext)

Whren v. United States Premise: Two black guys were pulled over for a minor traffic violation that two plainclothes police officers in an unmarked car had seen the guys commit. The cops spotted two large plastic bags full of drugs in the car. The s were convicted of drug possession. The s thought that the stop was a pretext motivated by racial stereotyping. They asked the court to apply the test of whether a reasonable officer would have stopped them for the minor traffic violation they were pulled over for. Is the temporary detention of a motorist who the police have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation inconsistent with the 4th Amendments prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable officer would have been motivated by a desire to enforce the traffic laws to stop the car? No. Why? The court ruled that it is impractical to apply the reasonable officer test in the current situation. The defendants violated a traffic rule and the officers had probable cause to believe that the violation took place and that is why they pulled the defendants over. The court further ruled that a balancing test need not to be applied here because that officers did not conduct the stop and the search "in an extraordinary manner, unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests..." Result: Conviction was affirmed.

Automobile Searches
Chambers v. Maroney Premise: Two men robbed some gas stations. There were lots of witnesses. The police stopped their car an hour later and arrested the robbers. Police searched the car, without warrant, at the police station later. Guns were found along with cards bearing the name of another service station attendant that was robbed two weeks before. After a warrant search of s home, police found ammunition similar to that found in one of the guns taken from the car. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, is a search made at another place without a warrant incident to that arrest? No.

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Why? There is no doubt that the police were justified in their arrest of the occupants of the car as they fit the description given by witnesses at the crime scene. They also were justified in an immediate search of the car pursuant to that arrest. The right to search and the validity of a seizure are not dependent on the right to arrest but are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the auto offend against the law. Under these circumstances, either the search must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search. However, there was probable cause for the search and seizure of the car that was independent of that required for the arrest. The car could have been searched on the spot, but it was not unreasonable to take the car to the station and search it there instead of searching it in the middle of a parking lot in the middle of the night. Once the car was in the station, there was little to choose from in terms of consequences between a warrantless search and the cars immobilization until a warrant was obtained. Result: The evidence was admissible. California v. Acevedo Premise: Drug agents had sting operation involving a package going through FedEx. The first guy that came to FedEx and picked up the box of marijuana was arrested after leaving his apartment. The police then saw Acevedo enter and leave the same apartment carrying a bag about the size of one of the packages of marijuana. put the package in the trunk of his car and drove away. The police stopped him. They opened both the trunk and the bag to find the weed there just as theyd suspected. D was convicted in California state court with possession of marijuana for sale and moved to suppress the marijuana found in the bag. His motion was denied, and he pleaded guilty but appealed the denial of the suppression motion. The California Court of Appeals ruled that the marijuana evidence should have been suppressed. The California Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. Did the police need to get a search warrant to search a container or package in a car when there is PC to support a search of the whole car? No. Why? Cars are movable instruments in which evidence can easily be spirited away where it will never be found again by law enforcement. In this case, the car would have been impounded anyway, and once the police had possession, they would have been allowed to search the whole car. Rule: There is one rule to govern all automobile searches. The police may search an automobile and the containers within it where they have PC to believe contraband or evidence is contained. Result: The marijuana is admissible.

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Plain View
Arizona v. Hicks Premise: In the course of investigating a crime in s apartment, a cop noticed two sets of stereo equipment that looked displaced in the otherwise shabby apartment. After moving the stuff on top of the stereos, the officer recorded their serial numbers and found them to be property stolen in a recent armed robbery. Hicks was found and charged with various crimes. The prosecution argued that since there were exigent circumstances to search the defendants home, any evidence found in plain sight was seized legally. The defense contested the validity of the search, claiming that the search of the stereo equipment was unwarranted based on its appearance alone and violated the defendants Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant is found guilty of the initial charges, but all evidence relating to the robbery charges is ruled fruit of an unlawful search by the state trial court and the Arizona Court of Appeals. When the Arizona Supreme Court denied review, the United States Supreme Court accepted the States request for a hearing. Was there probable cause to search the stereo equipment based on its appearance alone? No. Why? The Supreme Court first ruled that the warrantless entry by the officers, under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, was valid. The court then ruled that the recording of the equipments serial numbers did not constitute a search or seizure (plain view). However, when the officer moved the turntable it was held to be a separate search, apart from the search for the defendant and his firearms. It was the courts ruling that the officer did not have probable cause, only reasonable suspicion to search the stereo equipment. The evidence seized after the discovery of the turntables was subsequently deemed inadmissible. Result: All evidence relating to the robbery charges is ruled fruit of an unlawful search and deemed inadmissible.

Consent
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte Premise: An officer on a routine patrol at 2:30 in the morning observed an automobile with a broken headlight. He stopped the car, and the driver was unable to produce a driver's license. There were five other passengers, and only one could produce a license. The officer asked that person (who said that the car was his brother's) if he could search the car. The person allowed him to search, and the officer found three stolen checks. Bustamonte (D) was convicted after these checks were admitted into evidence at his trial. The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. D sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court. He was denied, but the Court of Appeals set aside the district court's order. Schneckloth (P) appealed. Does voluntary consent depend on the suspect knowing he has a right to refuse to answer questions? No.

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Why? When the subject of a search is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied. The Due Process Clause does not require the state to prove that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse to answer questions. His state of mind and the police's failure to advise him of his rights are certainly factors, but are not in themselves determinative. There are two competing concerns when determining voluntary consent: the legitimate need for such searches, and the equally important requirement of assuring the absence of coercion. In order to satisfy both concerns, then, one must determine voluntariness as a question of fact from all the circumstances surrounding the case; all available facts. While the subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a! factor to be taken into account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics. There is no reason to believe that the response to the policeman's question was coerced, and there was no reason to reject the traditional test for determining the voluntariness of a person's response. Result: The conviction order is set aside. Illinois v. Rodriguez Premise: Rodriguez, the D and homeowner, moved to suppress drugs and paraphernalia seized at the time of his arrest, on the ground that the woman who gave the consent to enter had vacated the apartment several weeks earlier and, at that time, had no authority to consent to the officers' entry. Was the 4th Amendments reasonable search requirement satisfied when the police conducted a warrantless, search of home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another, and the person is later shown to not have the authority to grant such a search? Yes. The 4th Amendment is satisfied. Why? The 4th Amendment's reasonable search requirement is satisfied when police conduct a warrantless search of a person's home based upon the apparently authorized consent of another and the person is later shown to not have authority to grant such a search, SO LONG AS it is reasonable for the officers to believe that the person had authority to grant the search, based on the totality of the circumstances. Rule: A warrantless search of a home is valid if police at that moment reasonably believe that the consenting party has authority over the premises. Reasonableness Test: The determination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective

standard:

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Whether the facts available to the officer at the moment lead a man of reasonable caution to believe that the consenting party had authority over the premises. If not, then absent actual authority, the search is invalid. If so, the search is valid.

Stop & Frisk

Terry v. Ohio Premise: The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the Petitioner), was stopped and searched by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. Is a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest a reasonable search under the 4 th Amendment? Yes. The SC held that it is a reasonable search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that the officer reasonably believes could be armed. Why? A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed. Policy at work: The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officers suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of time to constitute an arrest without probable cause. Rule: An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and dangerous.

Arrest vs. Stop (seizures vs. non-seizure encounters)

Florida v. Royer* Pennsylvania v. Mimms* United States v. Sharpe* United States v. Mendenhall Premise: DEA agents observing Mendenhall at Detroit Airport believed she fit a drug courier profile. They approached her and identified themselves. Then they asked to see her ID and ticket. The names on the documents didnt match. The agents questioned her further and she appeared very nervous and had trouble speaking. They asked if she would accompany them to their office for further questions. She did. 16

Agents asked to search her and told her she could refuse, but she let them. This was done in a private room following another question as to her consent and by a female officer. As disrobed she removed drug packages from her underwear and handed them to the agent. The COA concluded that the s apparent consent to the search was in fact not voluntarily given and was in any event the product of earlier official conduct violating the 4th Amendment. Does a seizure occur when a reasonable person believes they are not free to leave? Yes. Did a seizure occur when agents approached as she was walking through the airport and requested her identification? No. Why? A person is seized only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained. The court concluded that a person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Examples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even where the person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. The agents initial approach and interaction with was not a seizure. Was s consent to accompany the agents voluntary? Yes. Why? This is determined by the totality of the circumstances. was simply asked to accompany agents, not told she had to go. There were no threats or a show of force. The initial questioning was brief and she was handed back all her documents immediately following it. Because the search of the s person was not preceded by an impermissible seizure of her person, it cannot be contended that her apparent consent to subsequent search was infected by an unlawful detention. The TC decision was based on that the D was 22 years old and had an 11th-grade education, and she was twice expressly told that she was free to decline to consent to the search. Result: Reversed and remanded: everything was above board. United States v. Drayton Premise: Drayton and Brown were on a bus when 3 officers boarded at a gas stop. Two officers went down the aisle asking people to identify their bags and one stayed at the bus entrance. When they reached s, they asked to check their bags and s said yes, then the officer asked to check their person, which both Ds said yes. Both s were found to be carrying cocaine. Must a police officer advise passengers of their right not to cooperate with questioning or requests for consent to search for the 4th Amendment to be satisfied? No. Why? First, the officers did not seize the s according to the Bostick rule. Second, the search was reasonable b/c the s consented to it and knew it was occurring. Third, the court rejects in specific 17

terms the suggestion that police officers MUST always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless search. Important Facts: Officer did not show a weapon or make any intimidating movements. He left the aisle free so that respondents could exit. He spoke to passengers one by one and in a polite, quiet voice. Florida v. Bostick* Rule: Regarding police encounters on buses, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.

Special Needs Searches

South Dakota v. Opperman* Camara v. Municipal Court* See v. City of Seattle* New York v. Burger* Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding* United States v. Ramsey* United States v. Martinez-Fuerte* Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz Premise: Police set up a sobriety check point. It lasted 75 minutes and 126 cars passed through at an average delay of 25 seconds. Two people were detained for field sobriety testing, one was arrested. Another guy, who drove through point without stopping, was arrested for drunkenness, as well. Do sobriety checkpoints violate the 4th Amendment? No. Why? A three-prong balancing test is used to determine the constitutionality of the checkpoint program. This test involves the balancing of, (1) the state's interest in preventing accidents caused by drunk drivers, (2) the effectiveness of sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and (3) the level of intrusion on an individual's privacy. In sum, the balance of the state's interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program. Rule: Sobriety checkpoints are constitutional. [Not seizures or illegal searches.] City of Indianapolis v. Edmond Premise: IN set up a series of checkpoints to intercept drugs. At each checkpoint location, the police stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, an officer approached the vehicle, advised the driver to produce a license and registration, and watched for signs of impairment and conducts an open-view

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examination of the vehicle. They could only do so with consent. A narcotics officer walked around the car with a dog. The whole stop was to be only two or three minutes. Two motorists sued. Is a drug checkpoint constitutional? No. Why? Police must have the usual requirement of individualized suspicion where *they+ seek to employ a checkpoint primarily for the ordinary enterprise of investigating crimes. Policy: We cannot sanction stops justified only by the generalized and ever-present possibility that interrogation and inspection may reveal that any given motorist has committed some crime.

Illinois v. Lidster* Brown v. Texas* Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association* National Treasury Employees Union. V. Von Raab* Vernonia School district 47J v. Acton* Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawwatormie County v. Earls* Chandler v. Miller* Ferguson v. City of Charleston*

Remedies for 4th Amendment Violations

The Exclusionary Rule
Wolf v. Colorado Premise: The petitioner was convicted of conspiring to commit abortions in a State court and appealed. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment constitutional right to be free from illegal searches and seizures had been violated and that any evidence obtained as a result of the illegal search and seizure should have been excluded from trial as a matter of due process. The conviction was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court, and certiorari was granted by the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court). Does a conviction by a State court for a State offense deny the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment, solely because evidence that was admitted at the trial was obtained under circumstances which would have rendered it inadmissible in a prosecution for violation of a federal law in a court of the United States because there deemed to be an infraction of the 4th Amendment? No. 19

Why? The 14th Amendment did not subject criminal justice in the States to specific limitations, unlike the requirements and restrictions placed by the BOR upon federal authorities. The states have their own alternatives to the exclusionary rule. Rule: The federal exclusionary rule does not apply to the States. Mapp v. Ohio Premise: Police officers sought a bombing suspect and evidence of the bombing at the petitioner, Miss Mapps (the petitioner) house. After failing to gain entry on an initial visit, the officers returned with what purported to be a search warrant, forcibly entered the residence, and conducted a search in which obscene materials were discovered. The petitioner was tried and convicted for these materials. Can evidence discovered during a search and seizure conducted in violation of the 4th Amendment be admissible in a State court (Ohio didnt have a Weeks-like exclusionary rule)? No. Rule: All evidence discovered in such a way shall be admissible in State court proceedings. Why? Since the Fourth Amendments right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same sanction of exclusion is also enforceable against them. Policy: The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter illegally obtaining evidence and to compel respect for the constitutional guarantee in the only effective manner. Otherwise, a State, by admitting illegally obtained evidence, disobeys the Constitution that it has sworn to uphold. A federal prosecutor may make no use of illegally obtained evidence, but a State prosecutor across the street may, although he supposedly is operating under the enforceable prohibitions of the same Amendment. Our government is the potent, omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law. Affect: Explicitly overrules Wolf v. Colorado. United States v. Calandra* p. 474

Standing
Alderman v. United States* United States v. Payner* Rakas v. Illinois Premise: A robbery was committed. The getaway car was pulled over and gun and other items were found under the front passenger seat. The s were just passengers and did not own the car. Prior to their conviction, they tried a 4th Amendment motion to suppress the evidence but were denied because the trial court found that the s had no standing over the car or the gun, which they did not own. 20

Did the s have standing over the property? No. Did the s have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the car? No. Why? The court ruled that unlike Jones, where the defendant had stayed overnight in the apartment of a friend, the defendants in the current case were just sitting in a car and they had no expectation of privacy under the passenger seat of the car, where the gun was found. The court further ruled that the 4th Amendment is designed only to protect personal rights and the defendants can claim no such rights because the car did not belong to them. The conviction was affirmed.

Simmons v. United States* Minnesota v. Olson* Minnesota v. Carter Premise: Carter and Johns; the defendants were bagging cocaine in the apartment of a person whom they did not know before and they were in the apartment purely for business purposes. An officer observed the defendants bagging cocaine through a gap in the closed blind. The defendants were later arrested. Upon appeal, the defendants argued that their arrest was the result of the original unlawful search (officer seeing through the gap) and it was the fruit of a 'poisonous tree'. The Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed the conviction and now the state appeals. Did the s have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment? No. Did the officers observation through the window constitute a search? Not decided. Why? The court ruled that unlike Jones v. United States, the defendants in the current case were in the apartment only for commercial purposes and they were there only for about 2 and a half hours. The court stated that the defendants had no prior relations with the owner of the apartment before the day of the arrest and their sole purpose for being in the apartment was to conduct business. So the court ruled that the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment. Result: The decision of the lower court was reversed. [bad guys back to jail] Rawlings v. Kentucky* Premise: In executing a valid search warrant a woman at a house where five people lived was told to empty her purse. When she did, Rawlings was told to take what was his from the pile. He claimed ownership of controlled substances. He later claimed a 4th Amendment violation had occurred. Was Rawlings legitimate expectation of privacy violated by the search of Coxs purse? No. Why? The test enunciated in Rakasw hether the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searchedis the exclusive test for determining whether a may successfully challenge a search. 21

Exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule

Good Faith United States v. Leon Premise: A search warrant was issued to search the Respondent, Leons (the respondent) residence wherein a large quantity of illegal drugs was found. The affidavit upon which the search warrant was issued was found to be insufficient on its face because it was based on a tip from a confidential informant of unproven reliability. The evidence was suppressed at trial. Should evidence obtained under a search warrant issued by a neutral and detached judge, but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause be excluded? No. Why? In the absence of an allegation that the magistrate abandoned his detached and neutral role, suppression is appropriate only if the officers were dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit or could not have harbored an objectively reasonable belief in the existence of PC. Policy: First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather to punish magistrates and judges for their errors. Second, there exists no evidence that judges and magistrates are inclined to ignore the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Constitution) and that their actions would require the ultimate sanction of exclusion. Third, there is no evidence that suppression of evidence obtained under a search warrant will have any deterrent effect upon judges and magistrates. Suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant should be ordered only on a case-bycase basis and only in those instances where exclusion would promote the purposes of the exclusionary rule. Herring v. United States Premise: Investigator Mark Anderson learned that Bennie Herring had driven to the Coffee Country Sheriffs Department to retrieve something from his impounded truck. Herring was no stranger to law enforcement and Anderson asked the warrant clerk Sandy Pope to check for any outstanding warrants for Herrings arrest. When she found none, he contacted Sharon Morgan, a warrant clerk on the neighboring country. She was able to come up with an active warrant for Herrings arrest for failure to appear for Felony charges. Anderson and a deputy followed Herring out of the impound lot, pulled him over and a search incident to arrest found drugs and a gun. Herring was arrested. However, there had been a mistake about the warrant. The Dale County sheriffs computer records are supposed to correspond to actual arrest warrants, which the office maintains. But when Morgan went to the files to retrieve the actual warrant to fax to Pope, Morgan was unable to find it. She called a court clerk and learned that the warrant had been recalled five months earlier. For whatever reason this information about the recall did not appear in the computer database. After Morgan contacted Pope who contacted Anderson over a secure radio, Herring had already been placed under arrest. District Court: Herring was indicted for illegally possessing the gun and drugs. He moved to suppress the evidence on the ground that his initial arrest had been illegal because the warrant had been rescinded. 22

Motion was denied since the judge believed that the officers acted in good-faith that the warrant was still outstanding. Eleventh Circuit Appeals: Affirmed but held that this error was negligent, but did not find it to be reckless or deliberate. Should the exclusionary rule be applied to evidence found as a result of an unlawful arrest, when in fact, the officers were acting out of good faith? No. Why? References Leon, where there the officers did nothing improper. Though here good faith was found because there was no gross negligence, recklessness or willful act, J. Roberts wrote: If the police have been shown to be reckless in maintaining a warrant system, or to have knowingly made false entries to lay the groundwork for future false arrests, exclusion would certainly be justified under our cases should such misconduct cause a Fourth Amendment violation. Result: Affirmed [police in the clear and evidence admissible] Independent Source & Inevitable Discovery Murray v. United States Premise: Two agents trailing the petitioner forced entry into a warehouse containing the petitioners vehicle. They discovered marijuana. Subsequently, they returned with a warrant. Should evidence obtained following an independently obtained search warrant be suppressed if it was observed in plain view at the time of a prior illegal entry? No. Why? The court applied the independent source rule formulated in Segura, permitting evidence found independently, despite an improper search. In the present case, knowledge that the marijuana was in the warehouse was assuredly acquired at the time of the unlawful entry. But it was also acquired at the time of entry pursuant to the warrant, and if the later acquisition was not the result of the earlier entry, there is no reason why the independent source doctrine should not apply. This was applied to the tangible evidence: the bales. However, the court was uncertain as to whether the search pursuant to the warrant was in fact a genuinely independent source of the information and tangible evidence at issue here. The agents did not reveal the original search to the magistrate issuing the warrant. Thus, they remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions that it remand to the District Court for determination whether the warrant-authorized search of the warehouse was an independent source of the challenged evidence in the sense *the court+ described. Policy: The independent source doctrine . . . rest*s+ upon the policy that, while the government should not profit from its illegal activity, neither should it be placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied. Nix v. Williams Premise: The defendant, Williams, was charged with the abduction and first-degree murder of a young girl in Des Moines, Iowa. The defendant surrendered himself to local police in Davenport, Iowa and was 23

arraigned on his charges and given counsel. Upon transport back to Des Moines, one of the officers notified the defendant that there was a possibility of snow that could jeopardize the recently begun search for the victims body. The defendant volunteered the location of the body and the search, which had neared the location of body, was cancelled. First trial: Were the officers comments to the in essence an unlawful interrogation in violation of his right to counsel? Yes. New trial was ordered with the evidence excluded. Why? Williams statements were ruled inadmissible as an interrogation in violation of his right to counsel. Second trial: Is there an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule? Yes. Why? The fact that the girls body would have been found in short order outweighs the s argument of an unlawful interrogation, a minor mistake, by the police. [Attentuation or Dissipation of Taint Doctrine] Wong Sun v. United States Premise: Federal narcs illegally broke into Toys business and handcuffed him. He then implicated Yee in the selling of narcotics. Yee was promptly arrested and implicated Toy and Wong Sun in the trafficking scheme. Can verbal evidence derived from an illegal search and seizure be used in the subsequent prosecution? Sometimes. Rule: Verbal evidence, like physical evidence, may not be used if it is the fruit derived immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest. However, if the connection between the evidence and the illegal government activity becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint of illegality, then it may be admitted as evidence. Result: Only the last bit of evidence was excluded. The confession stood, etc.

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Brown v. Illinois* United States v. Ceccolini*

Confessions
Torture
Hector (a slave) v. State Premise: Some white guys discovered a burglary and began whipping the nearest black man. They whipped him all night because he wouldnt admit to the crime. Then black guy got some other white guy to get him away from his tormenters on the promise that the black man would take him to the stolen money. Black guy led white guy to his masters house where no money was found. Black guy whipped again for wasting white guys time. The court excluded black guys testimony because of torture, but let the white guys testimony stand. Rule: Whether a confession is sufficiently free and voluntary to be competent testimony, is a matter of law to be decided by the court and not by the jury. Brown v. Mississippi Premise: Two individuals were convicted of murder, the only evidence of which was their own confessions that were procured after violent interrogation. The Petitioners were indicted on April 4, 1934, arraigned thereafter and then pleaded not guilty. The Petitioners were found guilty after a trial solely on the basis of their confessions. Are convictions, which rest solely upon confessions shown to have been extorted by officers of the state by brutality and violence, consistent with the due process of law required by the 14th Amendment? No. Why? The state is free to regulate the procedure of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. However, the freedom of the state in establishing its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the requirement of due process of law. It would be difficult to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of these petitioners, and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a clear denial of due process. Note: This case illustrates how federal constitutional rights also often times apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.

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The Due Process Approach

Spano v. New York Premise: Spano; the defendant was an Italian American. One night, while the defendant was at a bar, an ex-boxer took his money and when the defendant followed the ex-boxer, he was severely beaten by the boxer. Spano went to his house and got a gun and went to a candy store where the ex-boxer was and the defendant shot and killed the ex-boxer. The store employee saw this shooting. The defendant disappeared for one week and the grand jury charged the defendant for 1st degree murder. Then defendant called his friend, who was about to become a police officer, and the defendant told him that he is going to turn himself in. Defendant, with the help of an attorney, turned himself in and the attorney instructed the defendat not to say anything to the police officers. The officers interrogated the defendant for about 8-10 hours and they even used defendant's friend to get a conviction out of him. Finally the defendant gave in and confessed. The confession was used by trial court and defendant was sentenced to death. Was Spanos confession voluntary? No. Why? The court stated that the police had a witness to the crime and they had the defendant charged with 1st degree, so the only intent the officers had was to get a confession out of the defendant. The court further observed that the defendant was put through long hours of interrogation and his friend was used by the officers to get the confession out of him. So the court ruled that the defendant "was overborne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused" which makes his confession not voluntary. Result: The conviction was reversed. Ashcraft v. Tennessee* Arizona v. Fulminante*

Miranda v. Arizona
Chavez v. Martinez Premise: While riding his bicycle home from work, Martinez was stopped by police officers who were investigating narcotics violations. Whey they attempted to handcuff him, a struggle ensued, during which Martinez was shot. The wound to Martinez resulted in permanent paralysis and loss of vision. Later, he sued the officers, arguing the search and use of deadly force was unconstitutional. At trial of that matter, in their defense, the officers introduced evidence of a taped confession, obtained while Martinez was at the hospital, in which he admitted grabbing the gun of one of the officers. Martina claimed the tape could not be used because he had not been Mirandized and both the trial and appellate courts agreed. The officers appealed. Are the 5th and 14th amendment rights to be free from coercive questioning and self-incrimination violated when an individuals statements are used in a matter, other than a criminal case? No.

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Result: remanded Why? The Court determined that Martinezs 5th Amendment rights had not been violated; another panel reasoned, however, if he could show that his constitutional guarantee was placed at risk, he may show a violation of the right. All of the court agreed that whether Martinez may pursue a claim of liability for a due process violation should be addressed on remand. Discussion. At first glance, this case appears to be a true plurality, but the key to understanding it is finding the areas where the justices agree. All justices seem to feel that remand is appropriate, in light of the fact that it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove a violation of his rights. The justices go on to give the defendant ample proof that his rights have been violated, should he raise the issue of the hospital questioning.

Schmerber v. California* Murphy v. Waterfront Commission* Counselman v. Hitchcock* Miranda v. Arizona Premise: Miranda (D) was arrested and taken to the police station where officers questioned him for two hours. D signed a confession. The confession stated that it was made voluntarily and that D had full knowledge of his legal rights. D's confession was used against him at trial and over D's objection. D was convicted of rape and kidnapping. The state supreme court affirmed the conviction. D appealed. Must law enforcement officials inform an accused of his constitutional rights? Yes. Are statements obtained from an individual subjected to custodial police interrogation admissible if he has not been notified of his privilege under the 5th Amendment not to be compelled to incriminate himself? No. Why? The 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination is jeopardized when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. Rules: 1. Incriminating statements made by an individual are only admissible if the following safeguards have been taken; and/or, when a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom, the following warnings must be given: he has the right to remain silent; that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law; that he has the right to have an attorney present; and if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him.

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2. Once these warnings have been given, a person may knowingly and intelligently waive his rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. 3. No evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against a person unless the prosecution has shown that the person had been informed of his rights. 4. If a person indicates a desire to remain silent or have an attorney present at any time during questioning, the interrogation must cease or cease until an attorney is present. 5. If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney, the state has a heavy burden to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege. 6. A valid waiver is not presumed simply from silence. Policy note: Warnings are a judicial prophylactic to protect the fundamental right against compelled self-incrimination because of the oppressive nature of station house questioning. This case does not hamper police officers in investigating crime because general on-the-scene questioning is not affected. In re Gault* Illinois v. Perkins*

Miranda Applied: Custody

Oregon v. Mathiason Premise: In investigating a burglary, The Respondent came to the police station and was told he was not under arrest. The officer told the Respondent that he thought he was involved in the burglary and lied to him that his fingerprints were found on the scene. The defendant then confessed to taking the property. After the confession, the officer read the Respondent his Miranda rights. Thereafter, he taped a confession. The Respondent was then again informed that he was not under arrest at the time and released to go home and to his job. During trial, the Respondent moved to suppress the confession because it was not preceded by Miranda warnings. The trial court refused to suppress the confession because it found the Respondent was not in custody. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the Respondents conviction, but the Supreme Court of Oregon reversed. If concluded although *the Respondent+ had not been arrested or otherwise formally detained, the interrogation took place in a `coercive environment of the sort to which Miranda was intended to apply. Were the respondents Miranda rights violated? No. Why? There is no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondents freedom to depart was restricted in any way. He came voluntarily to the police station, where he was immediately informed that he was not under arrest. At the close of a 1/2-hour interview respondent did in fact leave the police station without hindrance. It is clear from these facts that Mathiason was not in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause

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the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Rule: Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a persons freedom as to render him in custody. Berkemer v. McCarty Premise: An officer stopped respondent's vehicle and asked if respondent had been using intoxicants. Respondent replied yes. Respondent was arrested, asked again about the use of intoxicants, and again answered in the affirmative. Respondent was never advised of his constitutional rights. Must an officer who stops a motorist give Miranda warnings before questioning the motorist to confirm or dispel the officers suspicions? No. Why? The was not in custody until after the officer arrested him. Traffic stops are presumptively temporary and brief. Therefore, because the initial stop of respondent's car, by itself, did not render respondent in custody, respondent was not entitled to a recitation of constitutional rights. However, after respondent was arrested, any statements made were inadmissible against respondent without a reading of respondent's constitutional rights. Because it could not be determined which statements were relied upon in convicting respondent, vacation of respondent's conviction was affirmed. Rule: Miranda does apply even to misdemeanors, but only after a custodial interrogation. Thompson v. Keohane*

Miranda Applied: Interrogation

Rhode Island v. Innis Premise: Innis, the defendant was arrested for murder of a taxi driver and robbery of another taxi driver. At the time of the arrest the defendant was unarmed and the officers read the Miranda warnings to the defendant on two different occassions and the defendant asked for a lawyer. The officers did not find the weapon and the defendant was placed in a caged wagon to be transported to the police station. On their way to the police station, two of the transporting officers started a conversation. The conversation was about the little handicap children finding the defendant's gun and then shooting themselves. The defendant could not take it any longer and he intervened and told the officers to return to the arresting spot so he can show them where the weapon was. The weapon was used as evidence to convice the defendant. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reversed the conviction by ruling that the defendant was interrogated after he had invoked his Miranda right. Did the conversation between the two officers mount up to the level of custodial interrogation? No. 29

Why? The court first defined custodial interrogation. The court stated the interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." The court went a step further and ruled that custodial interrogation also includes "any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." The court ruled that in the current case, the officers never included the defendant in their conversation and their conversation was not of the nature which would have made an officer reasonably believe that it would likely elicit incriminating response from the defendant. Result: So the ruling of the lower court was reversed and the conviction stood. Pennsylvania v. Muniz*

Miranda Applied: Waiver and Invocation

North Carolina v. Butler Premise: Butler (defendant) was arrested and convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felonious assault. After his arrest, Butler was given his Miranda warnings. He was also given a form to read outlining his rights. When asked, Butler said that he understood his rights. He refused to sign the form indicating that he waived his rights, but agreed to talk to the agents and made self-incriminating statements. Butler never requested an attorney or tried to stop the agents questions. Butler sought to have his statements excluded from evidence, arguing that he had not waived his right to counsel at the time the statements were made. The trial court denied the motion, holding that Butler effectively waived his right when he agreed to answer the agents questions. The state supreme court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, holding that Butler never waived his rights because he never made an express statement that that was his intent. Must a court suppress a statement if the accused did not explicitly waive the right to an attorney? No. Why? The Court found that an express oral or written statement is strong proof of the waiver, but is not inevitably necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. Colorado v. Spring* Moran v. Burbine* Miller v. Fenton* Edwards v. Arizona Premise: Edwards; the petitioner was charged with robbery. A warrant was issued and Edwards was arrested. After Edwards was read his Miranda warnings, he immediately requested for a lawyer. The

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next morning, two detectives went to question Edwards without the presence of his attorney and they obtained a confession out of the petitioner. Can Edwards confession be admitted as evidence? No. Why? According to Miranda v. Arizona, all police interrogation should stop when a person requests for an attorney. If an officer starts a conversation with the defendant which according to a reasonable officer is likely to result in the defendant making incriminating statements, then that conversation will be considered police interrogation. Unless the defendant voluntarily intiates the conversation, all other questioning will be seized after a defendant asks for the assistance of a counsel. Key facts: The officer in the jail who brought Edwards to the detectives told the petitioner that he had to speak to the detectives. Edwards intially refused to speak to the detectives. Michigan v. Mosley* Oregon v. Bradshaw* Davis v. United States*

Exceptions to Miranda
New Jersey v. Portash* Michigan v. Tucker* New York v. Quarles Premise: A woman told officers that she was raped, that her assailant went into a supermarket, and that he had a gun. Officers apprehended Quarles (D) in the rear of the store. The first officer frisked D and found an empty shoulder holster. After handcuffing D, the officer asked where the gun was. D responded "the gun is over there; while he nodded to some empty cartons. The officer found the loaded revolver in one of the cartons. The officer read D his Miranda rights. D waived those rights, then stated that he owned the revolver and had purchased it in Miami. D was tried for criminal possession of a weapon. The New York courts suppressed the statement "the gun is over there; as well as the gun itself because they were obtained in violation of D's Miranda rights. The courts also excluded his statements about the ownership of the gun and the place of purchase as having been fatally tainted by the seizure of the gun and D's response about its location. The State (P) appealed. Can considerations of public safety justify the violation of a defendants Miranda rights? Yes. Why? Miranda does not require officers to refrain from asking questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety. In this case, the police had reason to believe that D had just removed the gun from his empty holster and discarded it in the supermarket. Miranda might deter suspects from answering questions if officers were required to read them prior to asking questions about the location of a weapon.

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Rule: there is a public safety exception to the rule requiring Miranda rights that can justify their absence. Critical thinking: This is a strange case to try and invoke a public safety exclusion to Miranda. The police could have simply read D the rights and then asked the questions. They had the crime scene under their control. This violation of D's rights is over just a matter of at most one minute of time. The conduct on the part of these police can only be excused if there is a present danger to the public; like a bomb that is about to go off, etc. The exclusion for public safety is proper but how long does it take to read the rights and how many situations would taking the time to read the rights result in danger to the public? This case is more of a showing that the courts are not happy with Miranda but don't have the necessary votes to overturn it. Oregon v. Elstad Premise: A house was burglarized. A witness contacted the sheriff's office, implicating Elstad (D). Officers Burke and McAllister went to D's house with a warrant for his arrest. Burke sat down with D in the living room, and without telling him that he had a warrant for his arrest, stated that he "felt that D was involved in the burglary. D replied, "Yes, I was there; D was transported to headquarters. An hour later, McAllister, in the presence of Burke, advised D of his Miranda rights for the first time. D agreed to talk and signed a statement. The trial judge excluded the remark D made in his living room, but admitted the statement made at the sheriff's office. D was convicted. The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed, stating that there wasn't a sufficient break in the stream of events between the inadmissible statement in the living room and the written confession in the sheriff's office. The State (P) appealed. Does an initial failure to inform a suspect of his rights bar admission of subsequent statements by the suspect after he has been fully advised of his rights? No. Rule: A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after given the proper Miranda warnings. Why? The failure to give Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion. However, this presumption, though irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief, does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted. It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine D's ability to exercise free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a defendant has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. The relevant inquiry was whether or not the second statement was voluntarily made. Critical thoughts: this is another big hole in Miranda. Justice Brennan points out in his dissent that there is now the incentive to interrogate first, then give the Miranda rights and get a second statement.

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Miranda Revisited
Dickerson v. United States Premise: The petitioner made a statement at the FBI field office concerning a bank robbery wherein he was a suspect. The government agents did not notify the petitioner of his rights outlined in Miranda. The state relied on a federal law, 18 U.S.C. Section: 3501, that allowed the admission of statements as long as the suspect was making them voluntarily. The District Court suppressed the statement, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (the Fourth Circuit) allowed the statements into evidence. Can Congress overrule the 4th and 14th Amendment constitutional protections outlined in Miranda? No. Why? Miranda was a decision based on the Constitution, rather than simply court-made law. The SC is not willing to overrule Miranda, and therefore the statements should be suppressed. Missouri v. Seibert Premise: Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder, after a fire was set to her mobile home, killing another individual who lived there. Several days after the fire, she was interrogated by a police officer, who initially withheld her Miranda warnings, hoping to get her to first confess. Once Seibert confessed, the officer took a break, read her the Miranda rights and resumed questioning after she made a waiver. He prompted her to restate the confession she made earlier, and she was convicted based on that second question. Seibert appealed based on the fact that the use of an un-Mirandized confession to get a later confession made that later confession inadmissible. The Supreme Court of Missouri agreed and overturned the conviction, and the State brought appeal to the United States Supreme Court. When an officer intentionally decides to withhold Miranda warnings to elicit a confession, is a laterMirandized confession admissible? No. Why? The second Post-Miranda confession is not admissible when a prior confession has been given unless the Miranda warning and accompanying break are sufficient to give the defendant the reasonable belief that she can decide not to speak with police.

6th Amendment Confessions

Massiah v. United States Premise: Petitioner Massiah, a merchant seaman, along with a conspirator Colson, were indicted for narcotics offenses. Both pled not guilty and were released on bail. Colson, without petitioners knowledge, decided to cooperate with the government. He permitted agents to place a radio transmitter under the seat of his car, by which agents could hear conversations in the car. Colson and the petitioner met in the car, and were overheard by an agent. The petitioner made several incrimination statements during the conversation.

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Were Massiahs 6th Amendment rights violated by the use in evidence against him of incriminating statements which government agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his retained counsel? Yes. Why? The Supreme Court used the previous Spano rule. The Court did not question that in this case . . . it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the petitioner. It simply held that the defendants own incriminating statements, obtained by federal agents under *these+ circumstances . . ., could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial. Policy: If such a rule is to have any efficacy it must apply to indirect and surreptitious interrogations as well as those conducted in the jailhouse. United States v. Henry* Kuhlmann v. Wilson* United States v. Johnson* Brewer v. Williams Premise: Police were investigating petitioner for abducting a little girl. A warrant for his arrest was issued, and his attorney in Des Moines advised the defendant to turn himself in to the nearby Davenport authorities. The defendant had counsel in Davenport as well. Both attorneys advised the defendant not to speak to the officers without their presence, and he indicated on several occasions to officers that he wished to talk only with the assistance of counsel. During the ride back to Des Moines, with only an officer and the defendant in the car, the officer decided to leverage his knowledge of the defendants religious nature by mentioning that he hoped they found the body before snowfall so they could give her a decent Christian burial. The defendant then gave the officer the location of the body. Does the officers conversation with the constitute an interrogation that violates the s right to counsel, and therefore require the suppression of the evidence? Yes. Why? The evidence should be suppressed because the defendant was denied counsel during an interrogation environment. Once judicial proceedings begin, such as the arraignment, assistance of counsel is required. In this case, the defendant not only did not waive his right to counsel, he affirmatively maintained it through several exchanges between the officers. Policy: The definition of interrogation here is very broad compared to a case decided a few years later, Rhode Island v. Innis. The important factors in this case were the timing of the interrogation (after a judicial proceeding), the definition of interrogation, and whether the right to counsel was knowingly and voluntarily waived. Rothgery v. Gillespie County* Kansas v. Ventris Premise: Placed informant in Ventris holding cell; admitted to murder, told agent to keep ear open.

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Can a defendants incriminating statement to a jailhouse informant, concededly elicited in violation of 6th amendment strictures, be admissible at trial to impeach defendants conflicting statement? Yes. Why? Massiah right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation. That, we think, is when the Assistance of Counsel is denied. New Jersey v. Portash*

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