Statutory interpretation is the process of interpreting and applying legislation.

Some amount of interpretation is always necessary when case involves a statute. The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation unambiguously and specifically addresses all matters. Legislation shares the general problem of certainty, which is inherent in any mode of verbal communication. Therefore legislation may contain uncertainties for a variety of reasons: Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in meaning over time. Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make application of existing laws difficult. Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for compromise or catering to special interest groups. To find the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation to legislation enacted by the legislature or to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations. In an attempt to deciding upon the precise meaning of any statute, judges use well established rules of interpretation, of which there are three primary ones, together with a variety of secondary aids to construction. The literal rule: according to this rule, the words in a statute must be given their plain, ordinary and literal meaning even if the outcome of the law is unjust and undesirable. However, the literal rule sometimes causes absurdities; such as in Whiteley v. Chappell (1868), where a defendant was found not guilty of impersonating any person entitled to vote because they had impersonated a dead person. As a result of these problems, the courts developed the

golden rule; which was first expressed in the case of Grey v. Pearson (1857). The golden rule states that the grammatical and ordinary sense of words may be modified so as to avoid [an] absurdity or inconsistency, but no farther. The golden rule has two forms: wide and narrow. The wide rule, as demonstrated by the decision in Re Sigsworth [1935] that a son who murdered his mother could not inherit her estate, allows an obnoxious result to be avoided even where the wording of a statute has only one true meaning. The narrow rule is much more restrictive and is only used where there is ambiguity or absurdity in the law itself. For example, in R v. Allen (1872) the Act outlawing bigamy gave rise to impossibility. The court therefore interpreted the bigamy legislation so as to imply commission if a person underwent the marriage ceremony while already married, rather than having to be married twice at the same time; an impossibility due to the wording of the marriage law. The oldest rule of statutory interpretation is the mischief rule, also known as the rule in Heydon's Case (1584). According to this rule, the court examines what the state of the law was before the legislation was passed, in order to determine what problem, or mischief, it was supposed to prevent. It does this by asking four questions: Was the law before the statute was enacted? What was the mischief or defect not remedied by existing law? What remedy did Parliament propose? What is the true reason for the remedy? As the rule interprets statutes addressing defects in the common law, the mischief rule is now of limited use. In its place is the purposive approach; adopted from European Court of Justice via the European Communities Act. Here, the courts try to determine the purpose behind a statute, then interpret the wording in light of this. It is, essentially, the mischief rule for modern legislation.

In addition to the four main rules of statutory interpretation, the courts will also look at the intrinsic and extrinsic aids available to them. Extrinsic aids are documents outside of the statute itself, including other statutes and explanatory documents, such as:

The Human Rights Act 1998, section 3 of which requires statutes to be interpreted in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights, so far as is possible;

The Interpretation Act 1978, which gives guidance on what many terms mean; and Hansard, the record of discussions in the House of Commons, following the ruling in Pepper v. Hart [1993]

Intrinsic aids include any portion of the statute that defines terms or relates to any special meaning being given to everyday words. In addition, there are three latin phrases that give guidance on how lists of words should be interpreted:

Eiusdem Generis (sometimes spelled ejusdem generis) is the same kind or nature rule. A general word following two or more specifics will refer only to the same type of things as the specifics.

Noscitur A Sociis is the recognition by associated words rule. The meaning of a specific word is determined by the nature of the surrounding words.

Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius (expressing one thing excludes others). Mention of one or more specifics without an accompanying general word implies that the specifics are the limit of the statute's coverage.

The interpretation of statutes is a complex area of English law and also an essential one. Without these rules, it would soon become impossible to not only understand the law but even just to apply it, as new situations are always coming to light which Parliament and the courts could not have foreseen when the law was developed.

However, it is a fact to the legal fraternity that the primary role of judges is to apply the existing law into the case he is deciding. So, judges need to find any pre-existing law that they wish to apply and by virtue of that act, judges are law finders instead of lawmakers. They have to find the law and not to enact the law. This is due to the fact that by the doctrine of separation of powers, judiciary shall not interfere with the role of the legislature. As such, judges shall not interfere with the Parliament, which is the lawmaker of the country. Nonetheless, it is also a fact that as the legal system develops, so does the role of judges. Instead of sticking to their job as law finders and the feeder of justice, they now leave their legal imprint on the legal system. What is meant by legal imprint is that they leave a legacy, which is a new principle of law, developed by them when they decide upon a case. As a common law country, this legacy will then be applied by many others through the doctrine of judicial precedent and indirectly, to some extent, judges do make law.