The Chungig Legul Status

Distribution o Immiants: f
DOUGLASMASSEY S. KATHERINE BARTLEY
Princeton University

A Caution

This article presents arguments and data to show that the decennial
census and annual Current Population Surveys include immigrants falling into four broad legal status groups: naturalized citizens; legal immigrants; legal nonimmigrants; and undocumented mi rants. Since 1986, the relative rewards and penalties imposed on these our categories have shifted dramatically in response to U.S. policies, as have the relative number of foreigners in each group. In general, the relative share of foreigners in the most vulnerable status groups has increased, with the proportion of undocumented migrants and legal nonimmigrants rising and that of legal immigrants falling. Researchers usin census and CPS data need to be aware of the shifting distribution of oreigners by legal status over time and of the changing profile of opportunities experienced by each status group, and they need to exercise caution in their interpretation of trends with respect to immigrant assimilation and the effects of immigration on U.S. society.

Many investigators presently use the decennial U.S. Census and the Current Population Survey (CPS) to study the socioeconomic incorporation of immigrants into the United States. Researchers typically select persons of foreign birth, define them as immigrants, and compare their socioeconomic characteristics with those of persons born in the United States, who are labeled natives. They assume that immigrants defined in this fashion are permanently in the United States and are working to improve their social and economic positions under the protection of U.S. laws. In comparisons across time, they further assume this commonsense definition does not change much from year to year. Unfortunately, these assumptions are untenable. Both the census and CPS seek to include all people whose usual place of residence is the United States, making no distinctions with respect to likely permanence or legal status Uasso, 2004). As a result, the foreign-born population captured by the census and CPS includes four very different kinds of foreigners. As the relative number of people in each category shifts, and as the rewards and penalties attached to different statuses change, socioeconomic outcomes are
0 2005 by the Center for Migration Studies of New Ynrk. All rights reserved. 0 197-9183/05/3902.0150

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affected in ways that become confounded with processes of immigrant adaptation and incorporation. Whenever they use census or CPS data to draw conclusions about the assimilation of immigrants or their effects on society, therefore, researchers must exercise considerable caution.

WHO IS A N IMMIGRANT?
The first category of foreigner enumerated in the census and CPS includes naturalized U.S. citizens. These are people who were born outside the United States but were later admitted as legal resident aliens who subsequently applied and were admitted to American citizenship. In general, these immigrants have lived in the United States for at least five years (although there are exceptions to the five-year residence requirement), and they have the strongest claim to rights in U.S. society. In theory, they are entitled to the same privileges as native-born citizens. They have full political rights (except they cannot be U.S. President), the same access to U.S. social services as natives, and the ability to enter and leave the United States at will. Compared with other foreigners enumerated in the census and CPS, their opportunity structure is by far the most favorable. Next in terms of rights and opportunities are legal immigrants. These are foreigners who have been admitted for permanent legal residence in the United States. They share some, but not all, of the rights of U.S. citizens. They enjoy legal protection from discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity and have access to most U.S. jobs (though the federal government may prohibit them from public sector employment). However, while legal immigrants can freely enter and leave the country, they must return at least once every twelve months. They are not allowed to remain outside the Unitcd States indefinitely, and if they do they risk forfeiting their status as legal U.S. residents. Their political rights are also circumscribed, lacking the eligibility to vote in federal, state, and most local elections. Since 1996, their access to U.S. social services and benefits has been constrained as well, and after the passage of the USA Patriot Act in 2001 their access to due process was significantly curtailed. Whereas the former two categories embrace groups classically seen by most people as immigrants, the next category is different. Indeed, most members of the general public and probably many researchers are not aware that they are counted in the census and CPS. Legal nonimmigrants include all persons who are legally present in the United States but who do not have the right to remain permanently - that is, they have not been admitted as

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41 7

permanent resident aliens. As long as someone usually lives in the United States (and the concept of usual residence is by no means clearly defined or well understood even by census enumerators), they are supposed to be included in the CPS and census. Legal nonimmigrants are a diverse collection of people that includes employees of foreign corporations, members of diplomatic missions, international students, temporary workers, persons admitted in a temporarily protected status (such as asylum seekers), traders and investors, as well as the spouses and dependents of people in these categories. The census and CPS typically do not include tourists, who are granted permission to stay for only a few months and are thus not likely to be mistaken for permanent residents (people who deliberately overstay tourist visas are discussed below). Although legally present, nonimmigrants have very limited rights within the United States. They are restricted in their ability to exit and enter the country and under some circumstances may forfeit permission to live and work in the United States simply by leaving. Many are not allowed to work, and those who are granted this privilege are typically not free to change jobs at will. They have few, if any, political rights and lack strong claims for due process. They have no right of access to U.S. social services, although they are entitled to emergency medical care and public education in areas where they live. The last category of foreigner included in the census and CPS consists of illegal immigrants - people who originally entered the country without inspection (by clandestine border crossing) or arrived using nonimmigrant visas and then violated the terms by working or staying too long. Although people in illegal status may be reluctant to identify themselves and be counted in the census or CPS, it is well documented that a large number are routinely captured in both data sets (Bean et al., 1998). The issue is one of relative underenumeration, not complete omission. Obviously, the rights and privileges of illegal immigrants are the most severely constrained of all groups. They have no political rights, few legal rights, and little in the way of access to U.S. social services (again, the exceptions are public schooling and emergency health care). Most importantly, they do not have the right to reside in the United States, nor do they have a right to hold U.S. jobs. Should federal authorities detect their presence, they face immediate incarceration or deportation or both. As a result, they are generally fearful and seek to remain in the shadows of society, thus severely limiting their geographic, social, and economic mobility (Chavez, 1998).

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Rather than being a homogenous, undifferentiated mass, therefore, . immigrants enumerated in the census and CPS fall into four distinct classes that occupy different locations on a continuum of rights and privileges and, hence, potential assimilability within the United States. At one extreme are naturalized citizens, followed closely by legal immigrants, and somewhat farther down by legal nonimmigrants. At the very end of the continuum are illegal immigrants, who have the most tenuous toehold in U.S. society.

CHANGING RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

Given the different opportunity sets faced by foreigners in different categories, the lack of legal status indicators constitutes a serious problem for social scientists seeking to measure trends in immigrant assimilation. Any shift in the distribution of foreigners by legal status will alter the likely distribution of socioeconomic outcomes. A large-scale amnesty extended to undocumented migrants, a wave of naturalizations, or a legalization program for migrant farm workers each can be expected to shift large numbers of people quickly toward categories that carry more rights and privileges and thus offer more opportunities for socioeconomic progress - irrespective of immigrants other characteristics and apart from general economic conditions. It would be bad enough if the problem was simply compositional limited to changes in the distribution of immigrants by legal status - but the situation is worse because the opportunity sets accruing to different status groups have themselves shifted dramatically over the past several decades. Alrhough the rank ordering of groups with respect to privileges and rewards has remained the same, their absolute position on a continuum of social and economic rights has shifted greatly. In general, the distribution of opportunities has moved from one that was relatively compressed, with mild distinctions on the basis of legal status, to one that is quite variable and considerably more punitive towards noncitizens of all sorts - legal, illegal, and temporary. The key date is 1986, when the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) passed congress and was signed into law by President Reagan. This legislation inaugurated a period of growing immigrant repression - both a t the border and internally. In terms of assimilation, the most important thing that IRCA did was criminalize the hiring of undocumented migrants. Before 1986, people working in the United States without authorization were at risk of arrest and prosecution, but their employers were not (Teitelbaum, 1986).

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After 1986, IRCA required employers to inspect documents that confirmed a workers identity and right to work in the United States or face sanctions. As a result of the risk of sanctions, the hiring process was restructured in sectors of the economy where immigrants worked. Employers shifted to a pattern of indirect hiring, using labor subcontractors rather than directly contracting the workers themselves. Under a subcontracting arrangement, the employer signs a contract with a U.S. citizen or resident alien who agrees to provide a specific number of workers for a certain period of time to undertake a defined task at a fixed rate of pay per worker. As the workers are not employees of the firm but of the subcontractor, the employer need not comply with IRCAs paperwork requirements and escapes liability under the law. After 1986, labor subcontracting arrangements became common in industries characterized by high turnover and substantial foreign employment (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). As indirect hiring became established, moreover, it was imposed on all workers regardless of legal status. If legal resident aliens, and even citizens, wished to get jobs in agriculture or construction, they had to work through a subcontractor and forfeit a portion of their wages in return for the opportunity to work. IRCA thus served to undermine the wages and working conditions not only of undocumented migrants, who had always been hindered, but of legal immigrants as well. Although wages decreased for both status groups, the decline was steepest for those with legal authorization to work in the United States (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). Despite expectations that IRCA would somehow slow illegal migration, by 1990 it was clear that the legislation was not working. Congress therefore returned to the drawing board and in 1990 passed another revision of U.S. immigration law. The 1990 Immigration Act focused strongly on border control, authorizing new funds to hire more Border Patrol agents. It also tightened employer sanctions, streamlined criminal and deportation procedures, and increased penalties for numerous immigration violations. In 1993-94, the INS inaugurated a new border enforcement strategy known as prevention through deterrence. The idea was to prevent Mexicans from crossing the border illegally in order to avoid having to arrest them later (Andreas, 2000). The buildup of enforcement resources was further accelerated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which authorized funds for the construction of additional fencing along the border and enacted tougher penalties for smugglers, undocumented migrants, and visa overstayers. It also included funds for the purchase of new military technology and for hiring 1,000 Border Patrol

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agents per year through 200 1 (Andreas, 2000; Nevins, 2002). By 2000, the total INS budget was eight times its 1986 level and that for the Border Patrol Budget alone was six times its former level (Nevins, 2002). The acts provisions were not confined to the border, however, for it also declared undocumented migrants to be ineligible to receive social security benefits and limited their eligibility for educational benefits, even if they had paid the requisite taxes. It also gave authority to states to limit public assistance to aliens (both legal and illegal), and it increased the income threshold required for a legal resident alien to sponsor the immigration of a family member. In the same year, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act barred illegal migrants from receiving most federal, state, and local public benefits and required the INS to veritj. the immigration status of foreigners before they could receive any federal benefit. It also placed new restrictions on the access of legal immigrants to public services, barring them from receiving food stamps, Supplemental Security Income, and most means-tested programs for five years after their admission. As might be imagined, the foregoing changes in U.S. immigration and border policies had far-reaching effects on the fortunes of immigrants in different legal status groups. Least affected were naturalized U.S. citizens. To the extent that they worked in sectors that shifted from direct hiring to labor subcontracting (such as agriculture), they were subject to downward pressure on wages and working conditions; but in general their access to opportunities in U.S. society changed little. More affected by the changes were legal immigrants, whose wages and working conditions declined significantly in the wake of IRCA. As their economic status was undercut, moreover, their access to the social safety net was curtailed. The effect of post-IRCA policies on legal nonimmigrants is less clear. While temporary agricultural workers no doubt suffered the same downward pressure as illegal migrants, other nonresidents - students, skilled temporary workers, business migrants, and diplomats - are unlikely to have experienced much of an effect. In contrast, the direction of the effect of the new regime on undocumented immigrants is clear and unambiguous: their bargaining position in the political economy deteriorated markedly. Their wages were lowered, they were forced increasingly into informal employment arrangements, they were explicitly barred from U.S. social services, and along the border they were systematically repressed by a massive militarization.

CHANGING LEGAL STATUS DISTRIBUTIONS

At the same time that penalties and rewards accruing to different legal status

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groups shifted, the relative number of people in the various categories also changed, greatly complicating the interpretation of studies based on census and CPS data. In addition to criminalizing undocumented hiring, IRCA also shifted millions of former undocumented migrants into legal status within the space of a few years, thus improving their access to the U.S. political economy. Between 1986 and 1990, more than 3 million undocumented migrants applied for legalization, and between 1988 and 1992, over 95 percent were granted permanent residence status (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). As a result, IRCAs sudden massive legalization had the effect of reducing the resident illegal population by around 40 percent in just four years (Woodrow-Lafield, 1998). The continued arrival of new undocumented migrants, however, brought about a recovery of growth in the illegal population by the early 1990s, and according to indirect demographic estimates the undocumented population once again surpassed its 1986 peak by 1992. Although there is little evidence to suggest that the repressive border policies instituted in 1993 lowered the inflow of undocumented migrants, they did have a very pronounced effect on the outflow, for the perverse effect of militarizing the border was not to decrease the odds of coming to the United States, but to lower the likelihood of going home (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). Having paid the higher costs of border crossing, illegal immigrants worked longer to amortize their investment. At the same time, migrants grew more reluctant to face the harrowing gauntlet at the border again. After 1993, undocumented migrants increasingly remained in the United States and arranged for the entry of family members, causing an unprecedented increase in the size of the undocumented population, especially among Mexicans. Although legal immigrants were not directly affected by the massive increase in border enforcement during the 1990s, they were affected indirectly. According to data analyzed by Massey, Durand and Malone (2002), 46 percent of settled Mexican households with legal immigrants also contain someone without documents. The presence of an undocumented migrant within a household means that family members cannot circulate together freely. As a result, the rate of return migration for legal immigrants, which was already much lower than that of undocumented migrants, fell even further after 1990. Congress introduced a further complication into this complex brew of changes when it stripped legal immigrants of their rights to public benefits in 1996. This action dramatically increased the incentives for citizenship, resulting in a massive stampede toward naturalization, even among groups

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that historically had exhibited very low rates of citizenship, such as Mexicans. Whereas 1.47 million immigrants applied for citizenship in the four years from 1992 to 1995, during the four-year period from 1996 to 1999 the number doubled to 2.95 million, a surge unprecedented in U.S. history (Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). Finally, the 1990s brought the longest sustained economic boom in U.S. history, and by the latter half of the decade labor markets grew extremely tight and unemployment rates fell to historically low levels. In response, Congress authorized successive increases in temporary work visas. At the same time, the booming economy and the expansion of international trade brought in growing numbers of foreign executives, investors, and business migrants, while the prominence of American higher education brought about a surge in international students. The end result was a rapid increase in the number of nonimmigrant residents of the United States. In short, during the late 1980s and 1990s the distribution of foreigners across the four legal status categories underwent important and often abrupt shifts. Figure I, for example, uses data from successive Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to plot changes in the number of legal immigrants, legal nonimmigrants, and illegal immigrants entering the United States from 1980 through 1999. Using a formula developed by Massey and Singer (1995), annual INS apprehensions were converted into an estimated number of illegal entries (see Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). Each series refers to the gross inflow of foreigners and does not account for return migration. Nonetheless, it indicates roughly the extent to which different categories of immigration were growing at different points in time. Because each series is on a different scale, each was divided by its 1980 value to show trends according to a common metric. In 1980,430,639 legal immigrants entered the United States, along with 1,921,398 legal nonimmigrants (excluding tourists and aliens in transit) and an estimated 1,403,931 illegal immigrants. Beginning in 1982, there was a surge in illegal immigrants, which peaked at 2.5 times the 1980 value in 1986, then declined through 1988, before rising to a new peak of 3.1 times the 1980 value in 1993. The series then declines through 1996 and rises to a local maximum three times the 1980 value by 1999. In general, the trend in undocumented migration is upward. Starting in 1982 there was also a surge in the entry of legal nonimmigrants. Unlike the case of illegal migration, the number of nonimmigrants entering the United States steadily and monotonically rose after 1984, with

LEGAL STATUS DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS

Figure I.

477

Inflow of Foreigners to the United States 1980-1999 (1980 = 1.0)

-Legsl
Immigrants

-Legal Nan-immlorants

---

ll!+gal Imm@ranls

05

0 1980

1982

1984

1986

I988

1990

1992

19%

I998

1998

2000

Yea#

Figure 1 . 1

Composition of Inflow of Foreigners 1980-1999

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a notable increase after the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 (see Massey, Durand and Malone, 2002). In contrast, legal immigration remained fairly flat until 1988, when the number of people admitted to permanent residence suddenly surged as a result of the adjustment of people legalized under IRCA. This surge in legal immigration peaked at 3.5 times its 1980 level in 1991, but the flow never fell back to the status quo ante. From 1992 to 1997, legal immigration ran at around 1.5 times the 1986 level, falling to a figure of 1.25 during 1998 and 1999. In Figure 11, we show the effect of these fluctuations on the composition of annual cohorts of foreigners entering the United States. Legal immigrants comprise about 15 percent of all entrants from 1980 to 1982, then drop to around 10 percent through 1988 before peaking at 20 percent in 1991 and then trending slowly downward from 10 percent after 1992. The share of legal nonimmigrants and illegal immigrants generally trade places and fluctuate back and forth between 40 percent and 50 percent through 1993. Thereafter, however, there is a sharp increase in the relative number of nonimmigrants relative to other categories. Based on these data, we conclude that since 1990 the relative share of legal nonimmigrants has grown among foreigners enumerated in the census and CPS, while the share of legal immigrants, after a surge in the early part of the decade, has fallen. T o understand the likely trend in the proportion of illegal migrants, however, one must take into account trends in the probability of return migration as well as changes in the number of entrants, for as we have already noted, the rate of emigration among illegal migrants plummeted over the course of the decade. Although we cannot measure the net in-migration of illegal immigrants, we can observe their effect on the foreign-born population of the United States using census and CPS data, which have been shown to enumerate undocumented migrants. These data also allow us to consider the foreign-born population with respect to citizenship. Figure I11 draws upon census and CPS data to plot changes in the number of citizen and noncitizen foreigners residing in the United States from 1980 through 1999. As can be seen, the foreign-born population was roughly balanced between citizens and noncitizens in 1980 at around 7 million each. Thereafter, however, the rate of growth among noncitizens consistently exceeded that of citizens, and the two curves increasingly depart. By 1999, the number of noncitizens was approaching 18 million, compared with around 12 million citizens. In other words, the percentage of foreign residents with full rights in the U.S. political economy steadily dropped from around 50 percent in 1980

LEGAL STATUS DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS

Figure 1 1 1.

479

Trend in Size of Naturalized and Non-CitizensAmong the

Foreign Born 1980-1999
1-Non-Citizen

---

Naturalized Cilizen

2M)oo 18000
16000 -. 14000 -

12000-

;10000b
8000 -

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

I990

I992

1994

1996

lS98

2000

Year

to around 40 percent by the end of the 1990s. Put another way, the share of foreigners experiencing greater vulnerability in the labor market steadily rose at a time when the degree of that vulnerability was growing. However, the legal composition of noncitizen immigrants was also likely to be changing given trends described earlier. Although the census and CPS do not ask foreign residents about their legal status beyond the question of citizenship, demographers have developed reliable indirect methods of estimating the number of undocumented migrants captured by these data sources. According to Woodrow-Lafield's (1998) detailed review, the best estimate of the stock of illegal immigrants counted in the census and CPS was 2.057 million in 1980, 2.093 million in 1983, 3.158 million in 1986, 1.906 million in 1988, 2.050 million in 1989, and 2.274 million in 1990. Official estimates by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2002) put the number at 5 million in 1996, and recent estimates by the U.S. Bureau of the Census put it at 7 million in the year 2000 (Cohn, 2001). We took these figures and extrapolated linearly between years to derive a time series for illegal immigrants included in the census. Figure IV shows the resulting trend in the composition of the foreignborn population from 1980 through 1999, dividing it into three status categories: citizen, illegal, and legal (the latter includes both immigrants and

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nonimmigrants). As can be seen, the proportion of illegal immigrants increased from around 15 percent in 1980 to around 19 percent in 1986. Over the same period, the share of U.S. citizens went from 50 percent to around 45 percent, and the share of documented migrants evinced no particular trend. With the advent of IRCAs legalization programs, the share of illegal residents dropped to around 10 percent in 1988 as the proportion of legal immigrants rose to around 48 percent, leaving citizens at around 42 percent.
Figure IV. Composition of Foreign Born Population with Respect to Legal
Status 1980-1999

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1Qg8

2000

Year

The year 1988 represents a high-water mark, offering the most favorable distribution of immigrants by legal status over the period considered, at least vis-A-vis economic assimilation: 90 percent were legal, and almost half of these people were citizens. Moreover, given that the increase in the entry of nonimmigrants had only recently begun (see Figure I), most noncitizens were legal resident aliens rather than foreigners with temporary visas. After 1988, the legal status distribution began to shift toward greater marginalization relative to U.S. society. The percentage of illegal immigrants among resident foreigners more than doubled from 10 percent to around 22 percent in 1999. At the same time, the percentage of those with documents (temporary and permanent) fell from 48 percent to 38 percent, and over most of the period the share of citizens also falls, reaching 38 percent in

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1994. With the surge in naturalizations beginning in 1995 the relative number of citizens begins to increase for the first time since 1980; but given the very rapid growth in the number of resident foreigners, the proportional increase is quite modest, reaching just a little over 40 percent in 1999.

CA UTIONARY IMPLICATIONS
Given the very different prospects for social, economic, and political incorporation experienced by naturalized citizens, legal resident aliens, legal nonimmigrants, and undocumented migrants, in combination with marked shifts in the distribution of immigrants among these categories, to be truly valid studies of immigrant adaption and incorporation must control directly for legal status. Unfortunately, this is impossible with census and CPS data. The only indicator of legal status available from these sources is whether or not a foreigner is a U.S. citizen, and studies suggests that this indicator is problematic because of a tendency to over-report naturalization (WoodrowLafield, 1998). More importantly, among noncitizens there is no way for the census or CPS to distinguish between legal immigrants, legal nonimmigrants, and illegal immigrants (Jasso, 2004). In trying to interpret census-based estimates of the economic effects of immigrants and the prospects for assimilation, therefore, investigators must take into account a complex set of factors that are all changing simultaneously. In 1980, we observe conditions that are generally favorable for immigrant assimilation. In terms of structural labor market conditions, the hiring of undocumented migrants had not yet been criminalized, and there was no detectable discrimination on the basis of legal status (Phillips and Massey, 1999). Hiring was accomplished mainly through direct recruitment, and legal immigrants achieved strong returns to experience and skills and had relatively free access to supportive social services. In terms of relative numbers, half of all foreigners were naturalized citizens, 35 percent were in the country legally, and most documented migrants held permanent resident visas rather than temporary permits for work or residence. Not surprisingly, estimates based on 1980 census data generally yield a relatively positive picture about the prospects for assimilation and the effects of immigrants on native workers. By 1990, the situation had changed markediy. In structural terms, undocumented hiring had been criminalized, and, as a consequence, employers were discriminating on the basis of legal status and many shifted to labor subcontracting rather than direct hiring. As a result, the wages and

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working conditions of undocumented migrants deteriorated. Of greater importance, however, is what happened to legal immigrants, many of whom were forced into subcontracting in order to continue working, thus lowering their returns to human capital and sharply reducing their wages. These negative structural changes were partly offset by a drop in the share of illegal migrants and a corresponding increase in the relative number of documented migrants, most of whom became permanent resident aliens; but the number of citizens dropped to around 40 percent in the early 1990s. O n balance, the decline in the number of citizens, when combined with a deterioration in the labor market position of legal and illegal immigrants, adds up to a more unfavorable economic climate for immigrants. A a result, s studies conducted on 1990 census data yield a more pessimistic assessment compared with a decade earlier. Over the ensuing decade, overall conditions with respect to economic assimilation have continued to deteriorate. Structurally, legal immigrants lost access to social supports in 1996, and near the border they were increasingly subject to police harassment. In terms of composition, the relative number of vulnerable workers among immigrants grew as the share of illegal immigrants rose, the proportion of citizens remained at historically low levels, the share of those present legally declined, and the balance among the latter increasingly tilted toward temporary rather than permanent visas. By the year 2000, approximately a quarter of all foreign residents of the United States were in illegal status, an unprecedented share. Borjas (1995a, b, 1999) has observed changes in socioeconomic outcomes across the 1970, 1980, and 1990 censuses and concluded that the apparent reversal in immigrant fortunes reflects a decline in immigrant quality and the emergence of the U.S. welfare magnet attracting unproductive foreigners. Our analysis suggests that more caution is warranted before drawing such extreme and divisive conclusions. Observable shifis in the distribution of immigrants by legal status and changes in the penalties and rewards accruing to different status groups means that econometric studies done in 1970, 1980, and 1990 (and 2000, for that matter) can be expected to yield sharp differences even if there was no shift in the underlying quality of immigrants. Unless one is able to control directly for legal status in econometric models, it is impossible to know whether observed shifts in the socioeconomic performance of immigrants reflects changing personal characteristics, changing legal status distributions, or changing economic opportunities experienced by different status groups. Changes in the apparent assimilability

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of immigrants and their effects on U.S. society are as likely to be artifacts of unmeasured heterogeneity stemming from legal status as to reflect any shift in the intrinsic nature of immigrants or the character of immigration. The potential for artifacts is especially large for Mexicans, as they are by far the biggest immigrant group and the most influenced by undocumented migration. According to the 2000 census, there are roughly 8 million U.S. residents of Mexican birth, around half of whom are likely to be in illegal status and only 20 percent of whom are U.S. citizens (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001). Thus, 80 percent of Mexican immigrants do not have full rights in the U.S. labor market, half have no rights at all, and of the remaining 30 percent a large share are likely to be working in sectors hard-hit by the shift to labor subcontracting (agriculture, construction, janitorial services, gardening). We are thus skeptical of arguments and results suggesting that recent immigrant cohorts are of lower quality than are earlier arrivals and more injurious to native workers. We argue that such strong conclusions require controlling for the legal status of immigrants in the relevant analytic models. Most studies to date have been based on census or CPS data, and both sources include immigrants falling into four broad legal status groups whose access to U.S. social and economic resources has fluctuated dramatically over the past two decades. With the exception of naturalized citizens, we have no way of knowing which immigrant is in which legal category - legal resident alien, legal nonimmigrant, or undocumented migrant - calling into question strong interpretations of past analyses of immigrants and their effects.

REFERENCES
Andreas, P. 2000 Border Games: Policing the US.-Mexico Divid. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Bean, F. D., R. Corona, R. Tuirin and K. A. Woodrow-Lafield 1998 The Quantification of Migration between Mexico and the United States. In Migration between Mexico and the United States, Binantional Study, Volume I : Thematic Chapters. Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Pp. 1090. Borjas, G. J. 1999 Heaven i Door: Immigration PoLioliLy and the American Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1996 The Earnings of Mexican Immigrants in the United States, Journal of Development Economics, 5 1 (1):69-98. 1995a Immigrants and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to Immigrant Earnings in the 198Os?, Journal of Labor Economics, 201-245.

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1995b Immigration and Welfare: 1970-1990, Research in Labor Economics, 14:253-282. Chavez, L. 1998 Shadowed Lives: Undocumented Immigrants in American Sociey. New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich College Publishers. Cohn, D. 2001 Illegal Immigrant Total is Raised by Census Bureau, Washington Post, October 25. P. A24. Jasso, G. 2004 Policies and Immigrant Skills: Evidence from the U.S. Immigrant Cohorts of 1977, 1982, and 1994. International Migration: Prospects and Policies. Ed. J. E. Taylor and D. S. Massey. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Massey, D. S., J. Durand and N. Malone 2002 Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Immigration Policy and Global Economic Integration. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Massey, D. S. and A. Singer 1995 New Estimates of Undocumented Mexican Migration and the Probability of Apprehension, Demography, 32:203-213. Nevins, J. 2002 Operation Gatekeqer: The Rise of the I1legalAlienand Making of the US.- Mexico the Bozmdzy. New York: Routledge. Phillips, J. A. and D. S. Massey 1999 The New Labor Market: Immigrants and Wages After IRCA, Demography, 36:233246. Teitelbaum, M. S. 1986 Intersections: Immigration and Demographic Change and Their Impact on the United States. In World Population and US. Policy: The Choices Ahead. Ed. J. A. Menken. New York: W. W. Norton. U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001 Profile of the Foreign Born in the United States: 2000. Washington, DC: U S . Government Printing Ofice. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service 2002 1999 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Woodrow-Lafield, K. 1998 Estimating Authorized Immigration. In Migration between Mexico and the United States, Binational Study, Volume 2: Research Reports and Background Materialr. Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform. Pp. 619482.