Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts Author(s): Patrick M.

Regan Reviewed work(s): Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 2 (Jun., 1996), pp. 336-359 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174356 . Accessed: 23/04/2012 07:32
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Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts

PATRICK M. REGAN
Universityof Canterbury

Since the end of the cold war,foreignpolicy makersappearto be devotingincreasingamountsof energy conflicts. They are doing so, moreover,with little guidancefrom the social science to containingintrastate conflicts since 1944 to assess interventions intrastate into This articleuses dataon all third-party community. historicalpatternsof intervention strategiesand theirrelativesuccess rates.Buildingon this, it uses a logit thatit is attempts.The results demonstrate analysis to develop prescriptiveoutlinesfor futureintervention of the characteristicsof the interventionstrategyratherthan the characteristics the conflict that largely determinethe success of the intervention.

INTRODUCTION Since the end of the cold war, many foreign policy decision makers are faced with decisions over whether, when, and how to intervene in intrastate conflicts (e.g., Gurr, 1994). Efforts to contain these new threats to stability are becoming increasingly salient at a time when we know little about the conditions under which successful intervention is most likely. This increased salience of intrastate conflict has spawned a plethora of studies on the causes of, consequences from, and strategies for managing intrastate conflict, and of prescriptive essays on how third parties might successfully intervene to bring an end to the hostilities (e.g., Licklider 1993; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Gurr and Harff 1994; Midlarsky 1992; Gottlieb 1993; Boutros-Ghali 1992; Damrosch 1993). Few studies, however, have systematically examined questions of whether to intervene and how best to carry out intervention in an effort to further foreign policy goals. Understanding the conditions under which interventions are likely to be successful might lessen the trauma of dealing with this new international environment. For example, between 1987 and 1992 there was a fourfold increase in the use of United Nations peacekeeping forces in intrastate conflicts around the globe. According to Gurr (1994, 350), there was a total of 70 ethnopolitical groups involved in serious conflict during 1993 and 1994. A look at some of the more glaring examples of third-party interventions, such as in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet republics, and Cambodia, gives a sense of both the magnitude of the intervention efforts and
AUTHOR'SNOTE:I wouldlike to thankHerbTillemaandDavidSingerfor theirvaluablecomments.
Vol. 40 No. 2, June 1996 336-359 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION, ? 1996 Sage Publications,Inc. 336

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the success thatthese forces have had. In spite of numerousattemptsby thirdparties to bring a halt to intrastate fighting, we know surprisinglylittle aboutthe conditions underwhich, and the types of interventions thatare most likely to be successful. This essay will addressthese questions in a mannerthat should (a) give a better of influenceattemptsand understanding the role andeffect of strategiesof internation (b) develop a blueprintfor policy makersgrapplingwith questionsof when, whether, and how to intervene successfully in civil conflicts. Procedurally,I will use data conflicts andany associatedthird-party interventions the in generatedfor all intrastate post-WWII period to develop a comprehensivepicture of the scope of intrastate conflict, the strategiesused by interveners,and the relative success of the latter in Afterdescribingthedata,I will articulate bringinganendto the hostilitiesin theformer. and test a theoretical model that should account for the conditions under which interventionwill be successful. third-party At the outset, a distinction about the theoreticalenquiry and research strategy should be made clear. Some scholarshave begun examiningthe natureof ethnically basedconflictto identifythe conditionsunderwhichthird-party interventions lead will of to the internationalization these conflicts; much of the focus is on interstateethnic conflict (Carment1993; Carmentand James 1995a, 1995b). The emphasis is on the of secession) andcharacteristics potential goals of the groupsin conflict (irredentism, interveners.However, a quite common form of third-partyinterventiondoes not the "internationalize" conflict but merely results in externalsupportfor some of the I internalcombatants. arguethatinternalconflicts, such as those in Mexico, Pakistan, and NorthernIreland,where for the most partintergroup conflict is confined within ethnicconflicts thattranscendstatebordersdifferfrom irredentist stateboundaries, e.g., those in Somalia and Ethiopia (Carmentand James 1995a). This difference, moreover, has policy implications that influence the decision-making process in potentialinterveningstates. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS of The most thoroughtreatment the dimensionsof intrastate conflict can be found in Gurr'svolume (1993; see also 1994) on the plight of minoritygroups aroundthe world. It identifies the issues over which the groups are fighting and trends in ethnopoliticalconflicts since the end of WorldWarII. Gurr(1994, 352) defines an ethnopoliticalconflict as one in which "oneor morecontenders... defines itself using communal criteria and makes claims on behalf of the group's collective interests againstthe state,or againstothercommunalactors."Using the label of ethnicconflict, Carment(1993) argues that these events generallyinvolve either irredentist,secessionist, or anticolonialmovements, though these goals can lead to inter- as well as intrastateconflict. Rupesinghe(1987), however, points out that giving all intrastate conflicts an ethnic label may be too simplistic and obscure as much as is clarifies. Small and Singer (1982) classify intrastateconflicts based on three criteria:(a) that of they takeplace withinthe internalboundaries a state,(b) thatone of the combatants be the government power,and(c) thatthe oppositionhas the abilityto offersustained in

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resistance.Small and Singerdenoteinternalconflicts thatdo not meet these criteriaas communalviolence and regionalinternalwars (p. 216). I define intrastate conflict as armed,sustainedcombatbetween groupswithin state boundariesin which thereare at least 200 fatalities.This thresholdis lower thanthat generallyused as partof the definitionof war (Small and Singer 1982), but it is high enough to exclude events such as coups, riots, and demonstrations.Two hundred fatalitiesconveys some sense thatthe level of conflict is intenseand thatthe potential for furtherescalationis reasonablyhigh. I adopta threefoldtypology of civil conflict betweenthe makeupof the groupsin conflict and the broad thatallows discrimination outlines of the causes of the strife. The typology used here breaksintrastateconflict into ethnically,religiously,and ideologically based groups,with the first two groups to or roughlycorresponding whatGurr(1993) refersto as ethnonationalists ethnoclass, and militant sects. Ethnically based conflicts involve groups that identify with a distinctethnicor cultural heritage; religiousconflictsinvolve groupsthatareorganized in defense of theirreligious beliefs. Ideological conflicts, on the otherhand, involve groups contesting the dominantpolitical or economic ideology, which can but need not incorporatean ethnic or religious dimension.Williams and Kofman (1989) use similarcriteriato identify communityconflict. This typology is not without its limitations,the most immediatebeing the excluof sivity of the groupings.AlthoughGurr(1993) andtheCorrelates WarProject(Singer are able to make the necessary distinctions between ethnic and religious 1996) thereis roomfor considerable identifications, overlapwithincontendinggroups.Gurr, for instance, categorizes groups based on primaryand secondary affiliations. The ideological distinctionis a much more clear-cutdistinctionto make. In spite of these limitations,the typology is a useful one, for, as Carmentand James (1995a, 1995b) demonstrate,the degree of similaritybetween the ethnic makeup of the groups in conflict and the ethnicdiversityof a potentialinterveningcountryplays a crucialrole are in determiningwhen interventions likely. it Furthermore, is assumedthat the decision to intervenein an intrastateconflict reflects concerns over who is fighting and why. As such, one critical aspect of the of decision calculus will involve the culturalor ethnic characteristics the disputants (Carmentand James 1995a, 1995b). The emphasishere is on determining,inter alia, for of affectthestrategy andlikelihoodof successful how thecharacteristics thedisputants In intervention. his analysisof communalmobilization,Gurr(1993) posits third-party and that intergroup grievancescan be tied to discriminations disadvantagesbetween identities.The specific character the conflictingparties,as well as theirdistinctcultural of these oppositiongroups,therefore,should influencethe interventionstrategyused to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Policy makers,for instance, would benefit from knowing that specific types of conflicts tend to be ratherimperviousto outside interventions,whereasothersrespondwell to certaintypes of interventions. conflicts also requiresome elaboraThe mechanismsfor interveningin intrastate tion. For example, the United Nations identifies three goals in terms of resolving and diplomacy,peacemaking, peacekeeping(Boutrosongoing conflicts:preventative

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Ghali 1992). The first of these relies primarily on the acumen of the available diplomaticcorps;the othertwo initiativesgenerallyentail the use of militaryand/or and humanitarian economic supportto one or anotherof the combatants.Excluding the role of diplomacyrestrictsthe options availableto potentialinterveners the use to of military or economic supportor sanctions;' it is on these that I will focus.My decision to exclude the role of diplomacy as a strategyof conflict managementis predicatedon two factors:(a) thereis alreadya substantialbody of work describing and detailing the conditions associated with mediation and negotiation (e.g., Bercovitch and Rubin 1994; Touvaland Zartman1985) and (b) the use of diplomacy is generally not the type of interventiondecision that causes much anxiety among decision makers. Although not always the mechanism of first resort, diplomacy generallyincursthe least costs, is usuallynotpoliticallytroublesome,andis often used in conjunctionwith other forms of intervention.For analyticalpurposes, however, can isolatingthe moreintrusiveformsof intervention help to clarifysome of the policy issues thatdecision makersregularlyconfront. can intervention,furthermore, takeplace on behalf of the government Third-party or opposition forces. If the decision as to whetheror how to interveneis predicated of largelyon the character the partiesin conflict,thenthe decision of whomto support, or which of the antagoniststo constrain,becomes centralto the deliberativeprocess (Carment and James 1995a, 1995b). Following Small and Singer (1982, 219), I dichotomize this question, with interventionsconsideredto be carriedout either on behalf of the governmentor againstit.2 Possibly the most visible form of interventioninto civil conflicts is the use of militaryforce. Pearson(1974) outlinedinternalconditionsunderwhich externalmilitary interventionwas likely, whereas Cooper and Berdal (1993) gave prescriptive advice on when and where militaryinterventionshould be considered.Tanca(1993) identified 30 instances of armed interventionsinto internal conflicts since 1956. Tillema (1989) has undertaken probablythe most comprehensivestudy of foreign militaryinterventions,identifying591 overt militaryinterventionswithin 269 internationalconflicts between 1945 and 1985. His data,however,includeforeignmilitary as interventionsinto internation well as intranation disputes.Small and Singer (1982) identify 106 civil wars during the period from 1816 to 1979, with 55 military interventionson behalf of either the governmentor the oppositionforces. Although Tillema,and Small andSingerprovidea systematicprofileof who is fighting andwho is intervening,they do not addressissues pertainingto the relative success of intervention strategies,nor do they incorporate economic interventions. Military force, however, is not the only form of third-partyintervention into intrastateconflicts. Economics can be, and has been, a forceful tool with which to intervene in ongoing domestic disputes, both through positive inducements and punitive sanctions.The usefulness of economic sanctionsas a mechanismof interna1. Others broaden the scope of potential forms of interventionto include paramilitaryand covert strategies (see Schraeder1992), though this analyticaldistinction,I would argue, is unnecessaryfor the presentstudy. 2. Thereare a few cases in which the governmentis not involved in the conflict. In those instances,the intervention been coded as neutralwith respectto the government. has

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in attention the literature tion influencehas receivedconsiderable (e.g., Leyton-Brown and Martin1993; Carter1988;Renwick 1981; Hufbauer Schott 1983; Li 1993), 1987; thoughthereis much skepticismover the degree to which sanctionshelp achieve the desired outcome. Hufbauer and Schott (1983), for example, find that economic sanctionsare successful about50% of the time when the goal is the destabilizationof a government,and they are about40% successful when tryingto disruptthe military adventuresof targetstates. In many interventionattempts,moreover,we are likely to see a mix of strategies, used alongsidetheirmilitarycounterparts. or with economicinducements punishments Interventionsare also not constrainedto bilateralinitiatives,with organizationssuch Unionplayingincreasinglyimportant as the UnitedNations,NATO,andthe European the roles in the effortto containinternalconflicts.To summarize classificatoryscheme constructedto this point, we have three general types of intrastateconflict: being ethnic, religious, and ideological; three basic strategiesfor interveningin these conflicts, incorporating military,economic, and mixed strategies;and we have the target of the interventionidentifiedas eitherthe governmentor the opposition.This essenthe tially describesa 3 x 3 x 2 matrixincorporating type of conflict and the specific interventionstrategy.What is critical at this junctureis to outline the goals of the framework from which we can understand particular and intervener a theoretical any choice of strategy. DEFINING SUCCESS AND ARTICULATING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Leaving aside issues of the events that precipitateintrastateconflict,3I make the assumptionthat third parties intervenein intrastateconflicts to bring an end to the violence associatedwith the underlyingdispute.One way to view this is to consider tries sufficientlyto bolsterone side to compel the opposing side to thatthe intervener Continuedfightingis rarely,if ever,the goal of a contendinggroup.The quit fighting. revolve largely around ensuring political interests of the intervener,furthermore, in a specific region of the globe; one way to facilitatethis is to help contain stability a overtmilitaryviolence-be it by orchestrating cease-fireor facilitatingthe defeat of It the opposing group.4 is assumedthatthirdpartiesdo not interveneto exacerbateor prolong the fighting. This also consciously excludes the role of tryingto resolve the underlyingissues involved in the disputefromthe motivationsbehindthe decision to intervene.Solving the often deep-seatedissues associatedwith ethnic, religious, or ideological conflicts will requirea much more concertedeffortthanthe type of interventions addressedhere (see Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993; Carment1993), however,
3. Three good treatmentsof the demographicsand causes of ethnopoliticalconflicts can be found in Gurr(1993), Gurrand Harf (1994), and Horowitz(1985). 4. Endinghostilities can come in many forms,including,but not limitedto, a negotiatedor unilaterally declaredcease-fire, the acquiescenceof one side in the conflict, or the defeat of one side. Each in its own thougheach may or may not resolve way would have theeffect of stoppingthe fightingbetweenantagonists, any issues at stake.

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stoppingthe carnageassociatedwith these conflicts is quite often the necessaryfirst step before diplomaticinitiativescan begin. Others have articulateda broaderrange of motivations behind interventionsin intrastateconflicts. For example, territorial acquisition;regional stability;protection of the intervener'sdiplomatic, economic, or military interests; ideology; and the upholdingof humanrights have all been identifiedas goals of intervention(Pearson 1974; CooperandBerdal1993). Althoughthatlist of goals can be expandedsomewhat (Tanca1993), one can do so withoutmuchloss of coherence.One might arguefurther that the goal of interventionis to destabilize,not stabilize, the local environment.If that is a goal then (1) therecan only be a few such cases, and (2) the effect would be to bleed everybodyinvolved continually,even the interveningcountries.The goal in these types of instances, I posit, is to stop the fighting on terms favorable to the intervenerand, in doing so, to bringstabilityto the region. I do not deny thatthereare but multiple goals behindany intervention arguethatthe first step in achievingthese other goals is the cessation of hostilities. For example, the UN "peacemaking" interventionin Somaliawas designedinitiallyto stop the fightingbetweenrival clans so that humanitarian assistance could address the severe problems of starvation, whereasin El Salvador, U.S. militaryandeconomicinterventions weredirectedtoward domesticeconomic stabilitywhile assistingthe governmentforces in putting ensuring down the rebel insurgency. If the goals of the intervenerare somewhatstraightforward, logic behind the the choice of methodis much less so. Singer (1963) models the conditionsunderwhich certaintypes of influence strategieswould be most appropriate eitherreinforcing for or modifying the behaviorof the target.Accordingto Singer,the preferred choice of or strategy-whether to reward,punish,threaten, promise-should dependon current and expected behaviorof the target.Given this theoreticalorientation,he constructs an 8 x 8 matrix outlining the optimal strategyfor a given preferredoutcome. The strategyof choice should be a functionof both currentand desiredbehavior,as well as expectations about future behavior from the perspective of the influencer.For example, if country A were trying to reinforcethe currentbehavior of country B, economic rewardsmight be the strategyof choice. But if behaviormodification is desired,a more punitive approach may be necessary. The key to any interventionstrategy is to alter the calculations by which the antagonistsarrive at particularoutcomes. In other words, the goal of designing an interventionstrategyis to make it too costly for the combatantsto continuefighting. This can be achieved eitherby makingthe actualcosts of fightingprohibitivelyhigh or by makingthe benefitsof not fightingparticularly A attractive. successful intervention strategy, that then,will resultin a cost-benefitcalculationby the antagonists results in not fighting providingthe highest expected outcome. However,this calculationis obviously a strategicdecision thatis affectedby each of the antagonists'expectations aboutthe effect of the intervention the opposingside in the conflict. In otherwords, on A's decision aboutwhetherand how to intervenein a conflict between B and C will reflect, in part,A's expectedabilityto influencethe cost-benefitcalculationsof B and

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C regarding statusquo. ButB's calculationswill also in partreflectB 's expectations the aboutthe effect of interventionon C, and vice versa.5 The currentfocus, however, is on the strategiesof the intervenernot the targets. The objective is to develop a frameworkby which decision makers in potential interveningstates can arriveat an optimalstrategy.The choice of the decision maker in the interveningstate is to determinethis optimalstrategygiven the context of the conflict, the decision rules of the antagonists,andthe expectedprobabilityof any one strategysecuringthe cessation of hostilities. An inherentdifficulty in these types of analysesis thatthe decision to interveneimposes a selection bias, where stateschoose not to intervenewhen they do not expect to succeed.In otherwords,we may have data only on the determinantsof successful interventionin cases where the intervener expectedto succeed. In those instanceswhere this expectationwas low, states chose when andunderwhatconditionsthird not to intervene(see Fearon1994). Determining partieschoose to interveneis beyondthe scope of this analysis,but at minimum-and assuming a large selection bias-the results presentedbelow are suggestive of the whenthe intervening stateheld a reasonable characteristics successfulinterventions of expectationof success. DATA, SOURCES, AND PATTERNS The data generated for this analysis consist of all intrastateconflicts initiated or between 1944 and 1994, excluding any involving preindependence colonial disdefinitionoutlinedearliercasts a net somewhatmore inclusive putes. The operational than Small and Singer's (1982) operational definition,yet it is still sensitive enough to avoid smallerevents such as coups. Sources includedthe Correlatesof WarCivil of Wardatabase(Small and Singer 1982), the annualYearbook the StockholmInternationalPeace ResearchInstitute(SIPRI),KeesingsContemporary Archives,TheNew data York Gurr's(1993)Minoritiesat Riskproject,andthe MilitaryIntervention Times, Tillema (1991). The type of conflict was identifiedand classified based generatedby of on the orientation the primarygroupsinvolved in the fighting.The identificationof was determined throughthe use of the Minoritiesat Risk classificationscheme groups was and the Correlatesof Warculturaldataset.6Intervention coded as eithermilitary, was coded as the governor mixed, whereasthe targetof the intervention economic, ment or the opposition. Interventionswere broadly conceived and operationally of defined as convention-breaking grantsor withdrawals economic or militaryassisof influencingthe course of an ongoing civil conflict tance with the apparent purpose (Rosenau 1969). I conceive of militaryinterventionto include the supply or transfer of troops,hardware, intelligenceand logistical supportto the partiesin conflict, or, or
5. To some degree,this analyticframework similarto thatof Patchen's(1988, particularly is chaps.7-9), though he is concerned with when to use positive inducementsor negative sanctions within a dyadic relationship.I posit thatthese same questionsare centralto decisions on when andhow thirdpartiesshould intervenein intrastate conflicts. 6. The Correlates Warcultural of dataset recordsethnic,religious,andlinguisticgroupswithincountries, identifyingeach group'spopulationand theirpercentagemakeupof the total populationof the country.

INTERVENTION 343 Regan/SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY

as may be thecase, the cutoffof anysuchaidcurrently place.Economicintervention, in economic aid or trade,and economic sanctionsor embargoes. likewise, encompasses Sourcesfor dataon interventions includethosepreviouslymentionedbutalso included case historieswhen necessary.7 country-specific Operationalizingsuccess is a particularlythorny topic. First, what is meant by success is crucialto evaluatingthe alternative strategiesavailableto decision makers. of a preferred futurebehavioris useful,as is Licklider's(1993) Singer's(1963) concept definitionof the end of civil wars.He considersa civil warto end when eithermultiple for sovereignty ends or the violence is terminated 5 years. This definition,however, is overly restrictive,given the political expediencies associated with interveningin ongoing civil strifes. Political leaders generally cannot make policies regarding interventionswith a 5-year time horizon.Politicalforces dictateotherwise.When we interventions into militarycontests, success must be conceived talk aboutthird-party of in terms of either stopping the fighting or resolving the underlyingdispute. The latter would make the barriersto success impossibly high relative to the tools horiemployed, whereaspolitical imperativesdictatethatpolicies have a short-term zon. Success in this analysis will be operationalizedas the cessation of military hostilitiesfor a periodlastingat least 6 months.Althoughstoppingthe fightingfor this a relativelyshorttime would rarelyeven approach resolutionof the underlyingissues at stake, 6 months withoutconflict can (a) give policy makerscause to claim success with theirpolicy and (b) give a sufficientbreakin the fighting to initiatemeaningful dialogue in an effort to resolve the underlyingcauses of the conflict. This narrow definition also makes for a particularlystringent test of the factors that predict successful interventions. has and Determiningwhen an intervention been attempted whetherit was successful can present difficult coding problems;two particular difficulties stand out. The is when a particular intervention is first, andgenerallythe most tractable, determining determination; directlylinked to the conflict at hand. Often, this is a straightforward at times, it imposes quitedifficultdecisions. Forexample,armstransfers(to eitherthe governmentor opposition)in the midst of armedconflict poses few difficulties. U.S. aid to UNITAis a case in point. However,economic aid to a governmentfighting a war guerrilla presentsa moredifficultcodingproblem.El Salvadoris a useful example. Wouldthe UnitedStateshave given economicaid in the absenceof a seriouschallenge to the government?Maybe, but possibly in differentamountsor combinations.My coding procedurelooked for (1) any explicit linkages between aid decisions and the fluctuationsin supportthatcoincided progressionof the conflict and (2) any dramatic with the initiationof or changes in the conflict. The secondcodingproblemis less tractable thanthefirstandstemsfromaninherent in linking any particular intervention the outcomeof the fighting. Someto difficulty times, again, this is relatively easy. In cases of military interventions,it was often and possible to make the necessaryconnectionbetweenthe intervention the outcome. The DominicanRevolt standsout. Otherforms of intervention otherpoints in time at
7. See appendixfor a list of cases andinterventions. Additionalinformation coding rules is available on from the author.

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TABLE1

Numberof ConflictInitiationsper Year(since 1944)

1940s 1944 1946 1947 1948 1949 N 1 2 2 5 1 1950s 1950 1953 1954 1956 1958 1959 N 2 1 2 2 2 2 1960s 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 N 4 1 3 5 1 4 2 3 2 1 26 1970s 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1977 1978 1979 N 4 4 5 1 2 6 2 6 3 1980s 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 N 4 2 4 4 3 3 3 2 3 3 31 1990s 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 N 4 7 10 2 3

Totals

11

11

33

26

NOTE:Missing years are withoutconflict initiations.

tend to have a more obscure relationshipbetween cause and effect. In the coding difficult to achieve process, I triedto erron the side of caution,makingit particularly a successful intervention.The U.S. supportfor the NicaraguanContrasserves as a useful example. Although large amounts of military and economic support were pouredinto the Contraeffort,it was difficultdirectlyto link this supportto the end of hostilities. The fighting eventually did end but only after a Sandinistadefeat at the ballot box. U.S. aid may have contributedto that electoral defeat, but it takes a from the dataat hand. considerableleap to make thatdetermination Based on the above criteriaand sources, 138 intrastate conflicts were identified,of which 85 hadat least one third-party intervention. Withinthese 85 conflicts, therewere a total of 196 individual interventions-with each interventionin a conflict coded itself. The individualcoding of each separatelyon each dimensionof the intervention interventionallows for the examinationof the effect of multipleinterventionsinto the same conflict, including those conflicts with interventionssupporting competing groups in contention. These data differ significantly from those data generatedby eitherTillema (1991) or Pearsonand Baumann(1993) in two generalways: (1) they broadenthe scope to include economic as well as militaryinterventions,and (2) they conflicts and any associate outside interventions.For focus exclusively on intrastate example, Pearson and Baumanncode only the direct use of military force (troops, more subtleforms of interventions shelling, etc.), whereasthese new dataincorporate such as the transferof equipment,technology, or intelligence, as well as economic interventionssuch as the use of sanctions. Of the 138 intrastate conflicts identifiedin the postwarperiod, 34 of them are still ongoing as of 1994, 10 of which had only begun as of 1992. When the conflicts are brokendown into the year that they started,we see that the 1960s usheredin an era more prone to the initiationof intrastatestrife (see Table 1); this is consistent with Gurr'sfindings (1994). Furthermore, apparent the conflict in the upsurgein intrastate 1990s does not yet constitutea clear change in the trend-at least as determinedby

INTERVENTION 345 Regan /SUCCESSFULTHIRD-PARTY TABLE2

Most FrequentInterveningStates,by Numberof Interventions

State United States U.S.S.R./Russia United Nations France Britain China Cuba Numberof Interventions 35 16 10 10 9 6 5

comparingthe differencein means between the 1980s and 1990s.8However, events in the earlypartof the 1990s suggests thatthe cold warmay have actedas a constraint on ethnopoliticalstrife,thoughit remainsto be seen whetherthis trendwill continue. AfricaandAsia areclearlythe most conflictprone,accountingfor approximately 34% and25% of the conflicts, respectively;Europeaccountedfor only 9% of the conflicts, whereasfiguresfor the MiddleEastandthe Americas,respectively,are 18%and 14%. In termsof interveners, were carriedout nearly40% (76 cases) of all interventions were underUN auspices,andthe by majorpowers, 5% (10 cases) of the interventions were attributed minorpowers.The United States accountsfor by far the to remainder most instances of interventions,with 35, whereas the Soviet Union intervened 16 times. Franceand Britainwere involved in 10 and 9 interventions,respectively (see Table2). Of the 196 cases of intervention, only about30%were consideredsuccessful. When breakingdown the success or failureof differentinterventionstrategiesby the type of conflict and the targetof the interventionattempt,these data suggest that interventionsareaboutequallyas likely to be on behalfof the governmentas they are on the side of oppositionforces (95 supporting opposition;96 supporting government; that 5 neutral).The data also demonstrate a purelyeconomic interventionstrategyis rarely undertakenand that a strictly military strategyis the most common form of intervention(military,70%; economic, 7%; mixed, 23%). The success rates of each regardlessof the target,areas follows: a mixed strategyhas been type of intervention, the most successful (35% of the time); strictly military interventionhas succeeded has about30%of the time;andeconomic intervention succeeded23%of the time. The most successful interventionstrategieshave been to either supportthe government through military interventions(a success rate of just under 50%) or to intervene economicallyon behalf of the opposition,thoughonly when the partiesto the conflict are organized the alongethniclines (43%successful).Interventions supporting governthe mentweretwice as likely to succeedas thosesupporting opposition(41%vs. 19%). are to Althoughit has been assumedthatinterventions undertaken bring an end to themselvesprolongthe conflict. hostilities,it is entirelypossible thatthe interventions seems to confirm this interpretation. example, the For The evidence, furthermore, mean durationof all ongoing conflicts is just over 16 years, regardlessof whetheror
8. The differencein means between the 1980s and 1990s is 2.1 ? 2.2 at a 95% confidence interval.

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TABLE3

Number of Interveners and Number of Casualties

Numberof Casualties Interveners 1 2 3 4 5 6 < 4,000 12 10 3 12 5 6 4,000 through27,000 8 4 15 12 5 0 > 27,000 6 12 18 8 20 6

At not therehave been outside interventions. the same time, the mean durationof all is of previouslyresolvedconflictswith outsideinterventions 7 years.Thirty-nine these conflicts, however, lasted less than one year,possibly skewing the averageduration. Excludingthose conflicts of both shortdurationandwith outsideinterventions brings the mean durationup to 9 years.In conflicts in which therewere no interventions, the mean durationwas only 1.5 years, with the longest conflict lasting only a decade. These data do suggest that interventionsare associatedwith longer runningconflicts, though two points need to be raised: (1) do multiple interventions make and resolutionmore intractable, (2) do thirdpartiesgenerallyintervenein conflicts of to long durationratherthancontributing the length of the conflict? An answerto the first question is fairly straightforward, and, although somewhat tempered by the response to the second question,it also helps to answerit. For all resolved conflicts that had outside interventions,if there were multiple interveners,the mean duration was just under 9 years. For those conflicts with only one intervention,the mean durationwas just over 3 years. Not only are interventionsassociated with longer running conflicts, but it seems that the more interveners,the more likely that the conflict will drag on. In fact, 92% of conflicts with only two interventionswere less thanthe 9-year mean duration,and 83%of those with threeinterventionsranfor less than 9 years. However, when there are four interveners,62% of the conflicts are of 50%areof greater whereaswithfive or six interveners, greaterthanthe meanduration, than averageduration. The question of whetherstates tend to intervenein conflicts of long durationor whether the interventionsthemselves prolong the hostilities cannot be answered definitively with the data at hand.However, of the 39 conflicts lasting less than one Viewed in conjunctionwith the above year,62%had at least one outsideintervention. data on single and multiple interventions,this suggests that the interventionsthemthereappearsto be selves may contributeto the durationof the conflict. Furthermore, no systematic relationshipbetween the number of intervenersand the number of to casualties (Table3), contributing the inferencethat, in general,interventionstake conflicts, and they can have the effect of place across of broadspectrumof intrastate prolongingthe hostilities.

INTERVENTION 347 Regan/SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY

TOWARD A MODEL OF SUCCESSFUL INTERVENTION The decision to intervenein an ongoing civil conflict involves a complex decision process, with decision makersweighing numerousoptions and varying contexts in which the conflict unfolds.If the decisionto interveneis predicated tryingto affect on the cost of continuedfighting, or the benefits from a cessation in the hostilities, then one must examinethose factorsthatcontribute decision makers'perceptionsof the to strategywill alterthe contestants'calculations. probabilitythateach particular For example,in a conflict with relativelylow casualties,the incremental costs from continuedfighting might be considerablyhigherthan in a high-casualtyconflict. In an extremely bloody conflict, it is less likely that a third party would be able successfully to intervenewithoutthe commitmentof a massive amountof resources. The costs alreadyincurredby each of the combatantswould generallymakepositive inducements-such as economic aid-an insufficient strategy to change the costin benefit calculationsof the antagonists.Furthermore, a high-casualtyconflict, the role of affective motivationswill take on a highersalience to the combatants, making outside participantseither largely irrelevantor a targetand a cause to continue the struggle.We would expect, therefore,thatthe greaterthe level of casualties,the lower intervention would be successful. the probabilitythatthird-party In a similarvein, as a conflict takes on a more ideological character, issues at the and stake will become more entrenched the opposingsides less likely to retreatin the face of outside pressure.When a conflict is over grievancesrelatedto the desires for ethnic or religious autonomy-or discriminationsbased on ethnicity or religious orientation-then temporarysolutions to the conflict are more readily evident, and outsideintervention to may contribute the resolutionprocess.This notionis supported by evidence suggesting thatthe more tangiblethe issues, the less difficult are efforts to resolve a dispute diplomatically(Bercovitch 1989; Vasquez 1995). The Miskitos Indiansin Nicaragua,for example,could be grantedlimitedautonomywithin a given geographicalregion while still falling under the umbrellaof the Nicaraguanstate. However,when the issues at stakerevolve aroundchangingthe operativeideology of the rulingcoalition,the most salientoutcomesrequireone side to relinquishclaims to sovereignty. These intangible issues prove to be particularlyresistant to efforts at intervention less likely to succeed. The natureof the resolution,makinga third-party conflict, therefore, should contributeto the success of interventionattempts, with thaneitherreligious or ethnic varieties. ideological conflicts being more intractable The strategyfor interveningwill also affect the likely success of any intervention attempt.This involves both the type and the targetof the intervention.In an effort to alter the calculationsof the antagonists,militaryinterventionwill affect the cost of continuedfighting, whereaseconomic interventionswill generallyalterthe expected benefits from not fighting. When the decision to interveneis predicatedon trying to affect this cost-benefitratio, a mixed strategyshouldresultin the greatest"swing"in the expected utility of the combatants.From the perspectiveof the combatants,the ability to sustain a united front against an opponentwill involve both the degree of supportwithin the constituentbase and the relativealignmentof militaryforces; this

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OF RESOLUTION JOURNAL CONFLICT

would be most easily facilitated by bringing a combination of both military and economic forces to bear. From a political vantagepoint, economic constraintsor inducementscan partially contribute to the allegiances of the constituents behind either of the centers of sovereignty.Using sanctionsor rewardsto move this centerof supporttowarda more to compromisingapproach the conflict should be effective in alteringthe calculus of the opposing leaderships.But economic intervention probablyis not sufficient,under normalcircumstances,to bringan end to the fighting. The balanceof militaryforces will also contributeto the expected outcome of the combatants.Equally matched forces, for example, may feel reasonablyconfidentthat victory is aroundthe corner, of whereasa preponderance militarycapabilitiesmay give reasonto push for further However, neitherwould militaryforce by itself be sufficient, in the norm, to gains. move the partiesfar enough towarda compromisethat a cease-fire would be a likely outcome. As we saw recently in Somalia, a vastly superiormilitary force simply became a targetfor the antagonistspreviously pitted against each other.This need dramaticallyto sway the cost-benefit calculationsof the antagonistswould suggest that a mixed strategy would be more likely to succeed than either a military or economic interventionalone. Furthermore, given the logic of how the intervention to purports influencedecision making,thereis little reasonto expect, interalia, thata military or economic interventionindependentlywill be more successful than the other.The context under which a nonmixed strategywill give the upper hand to a thoughthose specific conditions militaryor economicinitiativeis criticallyimportant, are beyond the scope of this analysis. For reasons associatedwith the disparityin resourcesbetween the centralgovernment and the oppositionforces, we would, in general,expect the balanceof power to side with the ruling coalition. At the same time, the efficiency of any third-party interventionshould be increasedwhen the interventionattemptsupportsthe sitting intergovernment.But simply because the governmentis the conduitfor third-party ventions does not imply that governmentsare usually the recipients of third-party support.For instance, supportfor one side in the conflict can result from positive inducementsto the supportedside or negative sanctionsto the opposing side. If we think about Singer's (1963) model, threateningor punishing the opposition can be as interpreted interveningon behalf of the government,as can be rewardsor promises made directlyto the government.However,for reasonsof efficiency, legitimacy,and shouldleadto moresuccessfuloutcomes.I would stability,supportfor the government with a mix of economic andmilitaryelements therefore,thatintervening hypothesize, would increasethe probabilityof success over eitherapproach individually,as would interveningon behalf of the government. shouldbe criticalto the likely outcome Finally,therole of the statusof the intervener of any interventionattempt.Largercountrieshave a greaterdegree of latitudewhen it comes to organizingan intervention strategy.Majorpowers not only have largerand moreprojectable militaryforces but also a widerrangeof economicresourcesthatcan be broughtto bear in a foreign policy role. Regardlessof the side on which a major power intervenes,the effectiveness of thatinterventionshouldbe greaterthanthatof a nonmajorpower.The ability to affect the cost-benefitcalculationsof combatantsin

INTERVENTION 349 Regan/SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY

conflict must be a function,interalia, of the resourcesthat any potential an intrastate intervenercan bring to bear. We should expect major power involvement in the interventionattemptto increasethe probabilityof successful intervention. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION The hypothesizedrelationshipsoutlinedabove were tested using a logit model. A logit analysis is much like a regression model except that the outcome variable is dichotomousandthe coefficientsassociatedwiththe logit requirefurther manipulation Table4 displaysthe resultsof that analysis.The before they arereadilyinterpretable. outcome variable in the model is the success or failure of a specific intervention attempt. It can be seen that all the variables associated with the interventionare statisticallysignificantat or above conventionallevels of confidence, whereasthose of the associated with characteristics the dispute are not very robust. Furthermore, it appears model correctlypredicts71% of the outcomes of the interventions, though to overpredictthe actualrate of success. The signs of the coefficients associatedwith the variablesin the model allow us to evaluate the hypotheses outlinedearlier.In general,as the interventionmoves from either a purely militaryor economic strategyto a mixed strategy,the probabilityof outlinedearlier.9 success increases,in line with the argument Furthermore, supporting the governmentover the opposition increases the chances of success. Interventions in ethnic or religious conflicts have a higherprobabilityof success thaninterventions in ideological conflicts; likewise, the higher the level of casualties, the lower the probabilityof successful intervention.In each case, however, the level of statistical confidence is ratherlow. When isolatingthe effect of majorpowers on the success of interventions,there appearsto be a differencein the probabilityof success, at least when judged relativeto a minorpower adoptinga similarinterventionstrategy.10 the To interpret logit results in termsuseful for policy makersstrugglingwith the issues of the day,we needto calculate probability a successfuloutcomeassociated the of with each explanatoryvariable.Tables5 through7 try to move us in that direction. They will show that the interventionstrategyis the critical element in successfully one. bringinga civil conflictto a halt-even if it is a temporary Althoughthe orientation of the conflict-whether ethnic, religious, or ideological-has implications for the likely success of an intervention,policy makers should best focus on how they interveneratherthanwhere they do so.
9. The economic andmilitaryinterventions were collapsedintoone categoryfor thispartof the analysis; this was done for two reasons: (1) there was no logical reason to argue that either one alone would of and significantlyaffect the probability success of an intervention, (2) the descriptionof the datasuggests that there are very few purely economic interventionsduringthe period under scrutiny.However, when controllingfor the independenteffect of majorpower interventions,the three categories of interventions were maintained,allowing me to tease out additionalinformation aboutthe effect of differentstrategiesof A interventions. similarcollapsingwas done on the "typeof conflict"variable,where ethnic and religious conflicts were combinedinto one andcontrasted with ideologicalconflicts. The reasonsaresimilarto those involving economic and militaryinterventions. 10. This is capturedby creatinga variablethat is zero when minor powers interveneand reflects the value of the type or targetvariablewhen the intervener a majorpower. is

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RESOLUTION JOURNAL CONFLICT OF

TABLE4

Results of Logit Regression on the Success or Failure of Intervention

Variable EstimatedCoefficient -.40 -.70 x 10-6 1.26 -.12 -.07 .12 .89 SE .34 .13 x 10-5 .59 .03 .02 .03 .54 T-Ratio -1.17 -.54 2.13 -3.36 -2.91 3.25 1.63

Conflicttype Casualties Type of intervention Targetof intervention MajorPower x Type MajorPower x Target Constant Log likelihood (0) = -117.71 Log likelihoodfunction= -107.95 Likelihoodratiotest = 19.50 with 6 df

PredictedOutcomes Actual Outcomes Success Failure Success 11 48 Failure 7 124

NOTE:Numberof correctpredictions= 135; percentageof correctpredictions= 71%. TABLE5

Effects of Individual Variables on Probability of Successful Intervention, Holding All Other Variables Constant
Variable Probabilityof Success % Change in Probability

Type of conflict .17 Ethnic/religious .12 Ideological Numberof casualties .15 200 .11 500,000 .09 900,000 Type of intervention .11 Military/economic Mixed .31 Targetof intervention .23 Government .08 Opposition by Type of intervention majorpower,relativeto minorpowers .23 Military .07 Economic .02 Mixed by Targetof intervention majorpower,relativeto minorpowers .26 Government .55 Opposition

-5

-4 -2

+20

-15

-16 -5

+29

INTERVENTION 351 Regan/SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY TABLE6

Effect of Varying Both Type of Conflict and Type of Intervention on the Probability of Success, Holding Other Variables Constant
Probabilityof Success % Change in Probabilityof Success

Typeof Conflict Ethnic/religious Type of intervention Military/economic Mixed Ideological Type of intervention Military/economic Mixed

.10 .49

+39

.07 .39

+32

TABLE7

Effect of Varying Both Type and Target of Intervention on the Probability of Success, Holding Other Variables Constant
Typeof Intervention Military/economic Targetof intervention Government Opposition Mixed Targetof intervention Government Opposition Probabilityof Success % Change in Probabilityof Success

.17 .05

-12

.64 .41

-23

Table5 displays the effect of each variableon the probabilitythat an intervention will be successful,when holdingall othervariablesat theirmeanvalues. Forexample, holding all else constant,the probabilityof successfully interveninginto an ethnic or of religiousconflictis 17%,butthatprobability success dropsto 12%when ideological issues predominate.The greatestchange in the probabilityof success is associated with changes in the method of intervening.An individual military or economic interventionhas a quite low chance of success (11%),thoughthat probability jumps to nearly31% when a mixed strategyis employed.In general,supporting governthe ment over the oppositionin the conflict increasesthe probabilityof success from 8% to 23%. Surprisingly, changein the likelihood of success is not greatas we move the froma conflictwithrelativelyfew casualties(200) to a quitebloody conflict(900,000). When majorpowers intervenein intrastate conflicts, the effect on the probability of success can be quite significant, at least when comparedto the effectiveness of

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OF JOURNAL CONFLICT RESOLUTION

interventionsby nonmajorpowers. The role of majorpowers, however,is somewhat divergentfrom the generaltrend.For example, a mixed strategyby a majorpower is only marginallymore likely to be successful than a similar interventionby a minor power (2%), suggesting that a mixed strategyhas a similar effect on the outcome However,a purelymilitaryintervention regardlessof the resourcesof the intervener. a majorpoweris 23%morelikely to succeedthana militaryintervention a minor by by power. Likewise, the effect of a major power intervening on behalf of either the governmentor the opposition shows a considerableincrease in the probabilityof success over minor-power interventions (29%).One inferenceis that,underalmostall for intervening,majorpowers areconsiderablymore likely to succeed than strategies minorpowers. When isolating the effect of differentmethods of interveningwithin the various types of conflicts, two factorsemerge (Table6). First, we can see quite clearly that a mixed strategy of interventionremains the most likely to achieve a cessation in hostilities, with a change in the probabilityof a successful outcome jumping up to nearly40% (32% and 39%,respectively).For example, a mixed interventioninto an ethnic or religious conflict has a 49% probabilityof success, whereas a militaryor economic initiativealone has only a 10%probabilityof success. This patternis consistentwhen isolatingideologicalconflicts fromtheirethnicor religious counterparts. Second, the analysis suggests thatthe type of conflict matterslittle in the likelihood of successful interventions. Regardlessof who is fighting,the greaterthe sole reliance on eithermilitaryor economic interventionsalone, the lower the chances for success of those policies. The strategyfor intervening,however, is more complex than simple calculations about who is fighting and the type of influence a thirdparty brings to bear on the can conflict. As outlinedearlier,the intervener generallyweigh in on behalf of either the governmentor the opposition, and presumablythe choice of the target for the interventionhas some impact on the likelihood of success. Table 7 confirms the importanceof both the type of interventionused and the targetof that intervention attempt.Once again,the dataarefairly conclusive.To increasethe probabilitythatan interventionwill succeed in bringinga halt to the fighting,potentialintervenersmust move away from a sole relianceon eithermilitaryor economic initiatives.Regardless an of the targetof the intervention, individualstrategyis at best about60% less likely At to succeed thana mixed intervention. the extreme,a singly focused intervention on has of behalfof theopposition onlya 5%probability success,allelse beingequal,whereas a mixed strategyon behalf of the governmenthas a 64%probabilityof success. CONCLUSIONS Based on a multivariatelogit model, a numberof findings give ample reason to to make cogent policy prescriptions those foreignpolicy makerscontemplating future interventions.The clearestresultof this analysisis thatthe strategyfor interveningis in of paramount importance termsof the likely success of achievingthe desiredgoals.

Regan /SUCCESSFUL

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

353

of Althoughcharacteristics the conflict-such as its type orthe numberof casualtiesaffect the probabilityof success, policy makersseeking to maximize this probability thanwhenor where,even though would do betterto focus on how they intervenerather dictatethe centralityof those latterquestions. political imperativesmight When focusing on the strategyfor intervening,the findingsareequally clearthata sole emphasison eithera militaryor economic initiativeis going to be less effective than a mixed strategy. In trying to influence the cost-benefit calculations of the shouldemploy as manypressurepoints as possible. antagonists,potentialinterveners do However,the prescriptions not end there.In designing a strategyto intervenein a civil conflict, policy makers would be well advised to weigh in on behalf of the government rather than the opposition. Even a singly focused strategy of either is militaryor economic intervention threetimes morelikely to succeedif the intervention is on behalf of the government.Holding all else constant,the differencebetween the worststrategy(type andtargetof intervention) the best is nearlya 60%change and in the probabilityof success. The strength these findingsis quiteremarkable, of dataused given thatthe historical in this analysis span 50 years and 85 civil conflicts involving a total of 196 separate interventions.The definitions of success and failure, furthermore,were designed specificallyto framethe outcomein termsfamiliarto, andconsistentwith,the concerns and issues commonly addressedby foreignpolicy decision makers.In this light, the importto those strugglingto marshal prescriptiveinferencesshould be of particular arena. the tools of state in the international

APPENDIX Intrastate Conflicts with Third-Party Interventions

Conflict GreekCivil War Type Dates Typeof Targetof Casualties Interventions Intervention Intervention Success 200,000 U.S. U.K. Albania Bulgaria Yugoslavia U.S. U.K. Australia New Zealand China Nicaragua China U.S. U.S. U.S.S.R. U.S. U.S. U.K. Syria Syria Mixed Mixed Military Military Military Mixed Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Government Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Government Opposition Government Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Opposition Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No

Ideological 1944-1949

Chinese Civil War MalayanInsurgency

Ideological 1946-1950 Ideological 1948-1962

300,000 14,000

Costa RicanCivil War Burma The Philippines Guatemala BudapestUprising Indonesia Lebanon

Ideological Ethnic Ideological Ideological Ideological Ideological Religious

1948 1,000 1948 - Present 130,000 1950-1952 3,000 1954 2,000 1956 3,500 1956-1960 50,000 1958 30,000

Iraq

Ideological 1958

5,000

(continued)

354

RESOLUTION OF JOURNAL CONFLICT

APPENDIX continued
Conflict
Republic of Vietnam Zairian Civil War

Type
Ideological Ethnic

Dates
1960-1965 1960-1965

Typeof Targetof Casualties Interventions Intervention Intervention Success

300,000 300,000 U.S. DRV Vietnam Belgium United Nations Algeria Egypt Belgium Somalia U.S. U.S.S.R. RVN Vietnam Syria Cuba U.S.S.R. U.S. Cuba U.S.S.R. Sudan Egypt Saudi Arabia Jordan U.S. DRV Vietnam France Belgium U.K. Greece Turkey United Nations France Libya U.S. Honduras U.S. China Malaysia U.S. Mixed Military Military Mixed Military Military Mixed Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Mixed Military Military Mixed Mixed Mixed Economic Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Mixed Government Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Government Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Neutral Government Opposition Neutral Government Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Government Government No No No Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No

Ogaden Conflict I Laos I

Ethnic Ideological

1960-1964 1960-1962

300 30,000

Iraq (Kurdish Rebellion) Eritrean War

Ethnic Ethnic

1961-1966 1962-1991

5,000 45,000

Arab Republic of Yemen Laos I

Ideological

1962-1964

100,000

Ideological

1963-1973

18,000

Sudanese Civil War Cyprus

Religious Ethnic

1963-1972 1963-1964

200,000 3,000

Chad Civil War I Dominican Revolt Thai Communist Insurgency Guatemalan Communist Insurgency I Congo, Kisanguni Mutiny Burmese Communist Insurgency I Oman, Dhofar Rebellion

Ethnic Ideological Ideological

1965-1972 1965 1965-1985

1,500 1,000 10,000

Ideological

1966-1972

45,500

Ideological Ideological Ethnic

1967 1968-1980 1970-1975

20,000 1,500 2,000

U.S. Belgium China U.K. Iran Jordan YPR Yemen RVN Vietnam U.S. DRV Vietnam Libya

Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military

Government Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Opposition

Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No

Cambodia

Ideological

1970-1975

150,000

Northern Ireland

Religious

1968-1994

3,000

(cointinued)

Regan/SUCCESSFUL

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION

355

APPENDIX continued
Conflict War PLO-Jordan South Africa, AfricanNationalist Struggle Pakistan Uganda,Obotes Overthrow LebaneseCivil WarI Type Ethnic Ethnic Dates 1970 1970-1994 Typeof Targetof Casualties Interventions Intervention Intervention Success 1,500 14,500 Syria UnitedNations
U.S.

Ethnic Ethnic Religious

1971 1971-1972 1975-1988

9,000 2,000 125,000

U.K. U.S.S.R. India Tanzania Israel

U.S.

Military Economic Economic Economic Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Military Mixed

Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Government Government Government Government Government Government Government Government

No No Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No

Sri Lanka,JVP InsurgencyI

Ideological 1971

1,000

Burundi Philippines Communist Insurgency Rhodesia

Ethnic 1972 Ideological 1972-Present

10,000 10,000

Syria France U.S. U.K. Pakistan India U.S.S.R. Zaire U.S.

Ethnic

1972-1979

15,000

Pakistan Cyprus

Ethnic Ethnic

1973-1977 1974 1975-Present

9,000 3,000 1,000

Ethnic Mauritania, WesternSahara Independence Movement Ethnic Morocco, WesternSahara Independence Movement Indonesia,East Timor Ethnic Angolan Civil WarI

Cuba SouthAfrica United Nations Afghanistan Turkey Greece France Morocco Algeria Mauritania Algeria Libya U.S. Canada Cuba SouthAfrica
U.S.

Military Military Economic Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Economic Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Mixed

Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Government Government

Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes No

1975-Present

15,000

1975-Present 200,000 102,000

Ideological 1975-1991

Ethiopia,Ogaden Conflict II Zaire,ShabaCrisis I Guatemala, Communist InsurgencyII Zaire,ShabaCrisis I

Ethnic

1977-1985

30,000

Ethnic 1977 Ideological 1978-1984

500 21,000

Zaire U.S.S.R. Somalia Cuba U.S.S.R. Morocco U.S.

Ethnic

1978-1979

1,000

Morocco Belgium France

Military Military Military

Government Government Government

Yes Yes Yes

(continued)

356

RESOLUTION JOURNAL CONFLICT OF

APPENDIX continued
Conflict AfghanistanI Type Dates Typeof Targetof Casualties Interventions Intervention Intervention Success 200,000 U.S.S.R.
U.S.

Ideological 1978-1992

ChadCivil WarII

Ethnic

1978-1982

1,000

Ethnic 1978-1979 Iran,Kurdish Rebellion Civil War Ideological 1978-1979 Nicaraguan Cambodia Ideological 1979-1991

10,000 30,000 25,300

Iran Pakistan Lybia France Congo Zaire Nigeria Senegal Iraq U.S. DRV Vietnam U..S.S.R. China Thailand Laos U.S. Honduras Zimbabwe Tanzania SouthAfrica Malawi U.S.S.R. U.S. ROK Korea SouthAfrica Senegal U.S. U.S. Honduras U.S.S.R. Ethiopia U.S. U.S. India Norway U.K. France Libya Zaire France Libya Iran U.S. Iran U.S. United Nations

Mixed Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Mixed Military Military Military Mixed Mixed Military Economic Military Mixed Mixed Military Economic Economic Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Mixed

Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Government Neutral Neutral Neutral Neutral Government Government Government Government Opposition Opposition Government Government Government Government Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Opposition Government Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Opposition Opposition

No No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes No No No No Yes Yes

El Salvador Mozambique

Ideological 1979-1992 Ideological 1979-1993

60,000 122,000

UgandaI Zimbabwe Gambia,Sanyang

Coup

Ethnic

1980-1986

250,000 1,500 800 27,000 10,000

Ideological 1980-1988 Ideological 1981 Ideological 1982-Present Ideological 1982-1990

Peru Nicaragua

Somalia

Ethnic

1982-1991

20,000

Sri Lanka, TamilInsurgency ChadCivil WarIII

Ethnic

1982-Present

24,000

Ethnic

1983-1986

1,500

SudaneseCivil War Colombia Iraq,Kurdish Rebellion

Religious

1983-Present 990,000

Ideological 1984-Present 11,000 1985-Present 180,000 Ethnic

(continued)

INTERVENTION 357 Regan/SUCCESSFUL THIRD-PARTY

APPENDIX continued
Conflict
India Ethiopian Civil War Lebanon II Liberia I Chad Civil War IV Rwanda Niger Mali Georgia Azerbijan Somalia Iraq, Shiites Suppression Bosnia, Serbian Rebellion Moldova Tajikistan Liberia Yemen Civil War Israel-Palestinian Conflict

Type
Religious Ideological Religious Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Religious

Dates
1985-Present 1987-1991 1988-1990 1989-1990 1989-Present 1990-1994 1990-Present 1990-Present 1991-1993 1991-Present 1991-Present 1991-Present

Typeof Targetof Casualties Interventions Intervention Intervention Success

30,000 45,000 1,500 20,000 1,000 250,000 1,000 1,000 10,000 7,000 300,000 500,000 Afghanistan Pakistan U.S.S.R. Israel Syria Nigeria Ghana France France Liberia Liberia U.S.S.R. Armenia Turkey U.S. United Nations U.S. U.K. United Nations Yugoslavia United Nations U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. Afghanistan Nigeria Ghana Saudi Arabia Libya Saudi Arabia Kuwait Bahrain Syria Lebanon Iraq Egypt Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Military Mixed Military Mixed Mixed Mixed Military Military Military Mixed Military Military Military Military Military Economic Economic Economic Military Military Mixed Military Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Government Government Government Opposition Opposition Government Opposition Government Neutral Neutral Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Neutral Opposition Government Opposition Government Government Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition Opposition No

No
No No Yes Yes Yes No No No

No
Yes

No No No Yes Yes
Yes

Ethnic Ethnic Ideological Ethnic Ideological Ideological

1992-Present 1992-Present 1991-1994 1992-1993 1994 1964-1994

200,000 1,000 40,000 15,000 2,000 10,000

Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No

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